thornton, ocasio - 2008 - institutional logics

Institutional Logics

Patricia H. Thornton and William Ocasio

INTRODUCTION

The phrase, ‘institutional logic’ has becomesomewhat of a buzz-word. Buzz words areover used; as a result their meanings often getdistorted and overextended and they burn-outof existence. Mizruchi and Fein (1999)showed in the institutional theory literaturehow meanings get distorted and then takenfor granted. To avoid misunderstandings ofthe institutional logic concept and to build onresearch in this genre, now is the time toreflect on definitions and the theoretical andmethodological contributions this perspec-tive brings to the analysis of institutions.

We begin by defining the concept of aninstitutional logic and how it emerged as partof the development of institutional theorysince the 1970s. Second, we illustrate theinstitutional logics approach as both a meta-theory and a method of analysis. Third, wepresent a select review of the literatureemphasizing how the institutional logicsapproach makes headway in addressing sev-eral limitations and tensions identified byscholars of institutional analysis. In thisreview we focus on an analysis of theimplicit and explicit social mechanismsemployed in these studies, not on thedescription or strength of their empirical

findings. Last, we critique the literature oninstitutional logics and suggest how theapproach can be used to further advance thestudy of organizations and institutions.

The research on institutional logics repre-sents an impressive variety of empirical con-texts, from thrifts (Haveman and Rao, 1997),higher education publishing (Thornton andOcasio, 1999), health care organizations(Scott et al., 2000), colleges and universities(Gumport, 2000), consumer research(Moorman, 2002), mutual funds (Lounsbury,2002), French cuisine (Rao, Monin, andDurand, 2003), equity markets (Zajac andWestphal, 2004), accounting firms (Thornton,Jones, and Kury, 2005), occupational prestigerankings (Zhou, 2005), and architects (Jonesand Livne-Tarandach (Forthcoming), amongothers. Given the incredible diversity ofresearch topics, what are institutional logics?

DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONALTHEORY

To understand the concept of institutionallogics we must first place it within the con-text of institutional theory and institutionalanalysis. The study of institutions has a long

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history in organizational analysis, beginningwith Selznick’s (1948, 1949, 1957) empiricalanalyses of organizations and the institu-tional environment, and Parson’s (1956) theorizing, which emphasized how institu-tions function to integrate organizations withother organizations in society through uni-versalistic rules, contracts, and authority.

In the 1970s a new approach to institu-tional analysis emerged with Meyer andRowan (1977) and Zucker (1977), who high-lighted the role of culture and cognition ininstitutional analysis. From a macro perspec-tive, Meyer and Rowan (1977) emphasizedthe role of modernization in rationalizingtaken-for-granted rules, leading to isomor-phism in the formal structures of organiza-tions. Organizations had to conform to therequirements of external environments forlegitimacy, meaning that parts of organiza-tions had to be loosely coupled from theirtechnical core. Meyer and his colleagueswere concerned with the importance ofrationality in the account of western culture,and viewed the development of formal orga-nizational structures as part of world societyand its cultural system (Meyer, Boli, andThomas, 1987; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, andRamirez, 1997). From a micro perspective,Zucker (1977) also emphasized the taken-for-granted nature of institutions, and the roleof cultural persistence as a measure of insti-tutionalization.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) extendedMeyer and Rowan’s (1977) focus on isomor-phism from the societal level to the level oforganizational fields. With their emphasis oncoercive, normative, and mimetic sources ofisomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell’sapproach led to an explosion of empiricalanalysis. In DiMaggio and Powell (1983),the effects of cognition are mainly viewedthrough mimetic isomorphism – focusing onmindless behavior in response to culturalrationalization. Subsequently, what theytermed ‘the new institutionalism’ alsobecame largely identified with a rejection of rationality as an explanation for organiza-tional structure, and an emphasis on

legitimacy rather than efficiency as an explanation for the success and survival oforganizations (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).

Friedland and Alford’s (1991) seminalessay, together with empirical work byHaveman and Rao (1997), Thornton andOcasio (1999), and Scott et al. (2000), created a new approach to institutional analy-sis which posited institutional logics asdefining the content and meaning of institu-tions. While the institutional logics approachshares with Meyer and Rowan (1977),Zucker (1977), and DiMaggio and Powell(1983, 1991) a concern with how culturalrules and cognitive structures shape organizational structures, it differs from themin significant ways. The focus is no longer onisomorphism, whether in the world system,society, or organizational fields, but on theeffects of differentiated institutional logicson individuals and organizations in a largervariety of contexts, including markets, indus-tries, and populations of organizationalforms. Institutional logics shape rational,mindful behavior, and individual and organi-zational actors have some hand in shapingand changing institutional logics (Thornton,2004). By providing a link between institutions and action, the institutionallogics approach provides a bridge betweenthe macro, structural perspectives of Meyerand Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell(1983) and Zucker’s more micro, processapproaches. Situated forms of organizing arelinked with beliefs and practices in widerinstitutional environments in ways thataddress the critique of isomorphism and diffusion studies (Hasselbladh andKallinikos, 2000).

DEFINITIONS OF INSTITUTIONALLOGICS

We present definitions of the institutionallogics approach and then return to how it dif-fers from the new institutionalism. The terminstitutional logics was introduced by Alford

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and Friedland (1985) to describe the contra-dictory practices and beliefs inherent in theinstitutions of modern western societies.They describe capitalism, state bureaucracy,and political democracy as three contendinginstitutional orders which have differentpractices and beliefs that shape how individ-uals engage political struggles.

Friedland and Alford (1991) further devel-oped the concept in the context of exploringthe interrelationships between individuals,organizations, and society. They view institutions as supraorganizational patterns ofactivity rooted in material practices and symbolic systems by which individuals andorganizations produce and reproduce theirmaterial lives and render their experiencesmeaningful. Rejecting both individualistic,rational choice theories and macro structuralperspectives, they posited that each of theinstitutional orders has a central logic thatguides its organizing principles and providessocial actors with vocabularies of motive anda sense of self (i.e., identity). These practicesand symbols are available to individuals,groups, and organizations to further elabo-rate, manipulate, and use to their own advan-tage (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 232, 248,251–252).

For Friedland and Alford (1991) the coreinstitutions of society – the capitalist market,the bureaucratic state, families, democracy,and religion – each has a central logic thatconstrain both the means and ends of individ-ual behavior and are constitutive of individu-als, organizations, and society. However,while institutions constrain action they alsoprovide sources of agency and change. Thecontradictions inherent in the differentiatedset of institutional logics provide individuals,groups, and organizations with culturalresources for transforming individual identi-ties, organizations, and society.

A separate, albeit related, conception ofinstitutional logics was developed by Jackall(1988). In his ethnographic analysis of ethi-cal conflicts in corporations, Jackall (1988:112) defines institutional logic as ‘the complicated, experientially constructed, and

thereby contingent set of rules, premiumsand sanctions that men and women in partic-ular contexts create and recreate in such away that their behavior and accompanyingperspective are to some extent regularizedand predictable. Put succinctly, an institu-tional logic is the way a particular socialworld works.’ Jackall, like Friedland andAlford, views institutional logics as embod-ied in practices, sustained and reproduced bycultural assumptions and political struggles.But the emphasis for Jackall is on the norma-tive dimensions of institutions and the intra-institutional contradictions of contem-porary forms of organization; in contrast thefocus for Friedland and Alford is on symbolic resources and the inter-institutionalcontradictions of the inter-institutionalsystem, for example between the market andthe family and the professions and the corporation.

Building on the developments of the concept by both Jackall (1988) and Friedlandand Alford (1991), Thornton and Ocasio(1999: 804) defined institutional logics as‘the socially constructed, historical patternsof material practices, assumptions, values,beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsis-tence, organize time and space, and providemeaning to their social reality.’ According tothis definition institutional logics provide alink between individual agency and cognition and socially constructed institu-tional practices and rule structures. WhileFriedland and Alford’s approach is bothstructural and symbolic, and Jackall’s is bothstructural and normative, Thornton andOcasio’s (1999) approach to institutionallogics integrates the structural, normative,and symbolic as three necessary and comple-mentary dimensions of institutions, ratherthan separable structural (coercive), norma-tive, and symbolic (cognitive) carriers, assuggested by alternative approaches (e.g., Scott, [1995] 2001).

While varying in their emphasis, the vari-ous definitions of institutional logics all presuppose a core meta-theory: to understand

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individual and organizational behavior, itmust be located in a social and institutionalcontext, and this institutional context bothregularizes behavior and provides opportu-nity for agency and change. The variousdimensions of the meta-theory are furtherelaborated in Section IV.

Precursors

Research sometimes referred to as logics ofaction provides precursors to the institutionallogics approach – similarly being based onan interdependent set of logics that providesome context for social influence on actors’actions in a domain. We highlight the exam-ples that illustrate different logics of actionoperating either within or between institu-tional orders – Fligstein’s (1987, 1990) threeconceptions of control within corporate gov-ernance, DiMaggio’s (1991) two conflictingmodels to organize the field of art museums,and Boltanski and Thevenot’s ([1986] 1991)multiple modes of justification to evaluateagreements situated between six differentworlds. In reviewing these examples note therelatively early and similar dates of publica-tion and that all the examples involve ananalysis of conflicting logics without focus-ing on isomorphism.

Fligstein (1990) identified three competingconceptions of control that guide the gover-nance of large industrial firms: the manufac-turing, marketing, and finance conceptions.For Fligstein, both intra-organizational powerstruggles (Fligstein, 1987) and field-levelstruggles to control market competition andcontest state legislation shaped the formationof these competing conceptions, or logics ofaction. Executives’ views on how to best runthe corporation were selectively influencedby their experience in the corporation.Employees’ ability to fight it out among eachother in the rise to the top of the corporationoccurs in a Chandlerian (Chandler, 1962)world of significant economic and industrialchange, organizational and professional inno-vation, coupled with a powerful State.

The eventual result was that first manufactur-ing, then marketing succumb in power andcontrol to those in finance. Updating his dataon corporate control, Fligstein (2001) devel-oped a shareholder value conception of control as distinct from the earlier financeconception – shifting influences away fromthe corporate venue to that of the market.

For Fligstein (1985, 1987, 1990), individ-ual executives are the primary carriers of thecontending conceptions of control. However,these conceptions may not be explicitly institutionalized. For example, Ocasio andKim (1999) suggest that the alternative conceptions of control were never institu-tionalized in the organizational field, as noneof them became dominant. While Fligstein’swork is similar to the institutional logicsapproach because of its implicit interplay ofinstitutional sectors – the professions, thecorporation, and the State, the emphasis onthe utilitarian individual and the power-oriented organization motivated subsequentwork leading to the institutional logicsapproach that more systematically integratedconflict and cultural perspectives.

In another example of logics of action,DiMaggio (1991) develops ideal types oforganizing the organizational field of artmuseums, the Gilman and the Data models,to understand how competing culturalmodels formed the basis of a power struggleto redefine the field; a struggle between theelite upper classes and their social circle ofcollectors and curators and the new class ofmuseum professionals fueled by the expan-sion of higher education in the fine arts. Thecase reveals the structuration of organiza-tional fields is a contested process betweenthese two cultural models. However, there isan evolutionary ordering with the creation ofa standardized body of knowledge, theorganization of professional associations,and the collective definition of a field, beinghistorically prior to the diffusion of the DataModel.

Boltanski and Thevenot (1991) apply a taxonomy of cultural repertoires that presentdifferent justifications of worth to understand


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how people disagree, compromise, and conclude more or less lasting agreements.Identified with the tool kit school, they viewculture as a social resource that individuals usestrategically, culture is more than motivatingaction – it also justifies it. Boltanski andThevenot illustrate in a variety of scenarios ofinteractions that what is legitimate changesdepending on the context in which it is negoti-ated and evaluated, the ideal types being sixdifferent worlds – the inspired, domestic, fame,civic, market, and industrial. Compromises areless fragile when there is groundwork toembed them in the specific arrangements ofthese worlds assuming that the embedding iscongruent with the worlds. Transposing or putting together elements extracted from thedescriptions of the various worlds of worth cancause actors to be placed in incongruent orcompromising situations, depending on theparticular scenario. An intuitively awkwardexample illustrates their point. ‘At home, to gethis children’s attention, a father presents aglowing picture of his ability to direct a projectat work …. The first combines elements bor-rowed from the domestic world (a father andhis children), from the world of fame (attractattention, present a glowing picture), and fromthe industrial world (ability to direct a project)(Boltanski and Thevenot, 1991: 227). This is anincongruous transfer of worth from differentworlds since fathers do not receive attentionbased on industrial worth through the eyes oftheir children.

Fligstein’s (1985, 1987, 1990),DiMaggio’s (1991) and Boltanksi andThevenot’s ([1986] 1991) approaches allposit the existence of conceptions, models, orlogics at a supraorganizational level, andeither implicitly or explicitly emphasize therole of culture in shaping and interpretingindividual and organizational activities.These examples also illustrate the interrela-tionship between individuals, organizations,and the environment and how logics interpenetrate multiple levels of analysisfrom the social psychological to the levels ofthe organizational field and societal sector.These approaches are less focused, however,

on the role of institutions and institutional-ization in shaping logics than the approachesof Friedland and Alford (1991) or Jackall(1988). While sharing with the institutionallogics perspective a focus on culture as asource of agency (Swidler, 1986; DiMaggio,1997), these precursors differ from an institu-tional logics approach by deemphasizing thestructural and normative constraints imposedby institutional logics.

META-THEORY OF INSTITUTIONALLOGICS

The institutional logics approach incorpo-rates a broad meta-theory on how institu-tions, through their underlying logics ofaction, shape heterogeneity, stability andchange in individuals and organizations. Notall aspects of the meta-theory have beenincorporated into every application of theinstitutional logics perspective, due to differ-ences among authors in emphasis, and par-tially to the limitations of the journalpublication process. Here we propose fiveprinciples that in our judgment underlie themeta-theory and provide opportunities fortheoretical development and refinement.

Embedded agency

Perhaps the core assumption of the institu-tional logics approach is that the interests,identities, values, and assumptions of indi-viduals and organizations are embeddedwithin prevailing institutional logics.Decisions and outcomes are a result of theinterplay between individual agency andinstitutional structure (Jackall, 1988;Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton andOcasio, 1999). While individual and organi-zational actors may seek power, status, andeconomic advantage, the means and ends oftheir interests and agency are both enabledand constrained by prevailing institutionallogics (Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992).


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This assumption, which over time hasbecome known as embedded agency (Seoand Creed, 2002; Battilana, 2006;Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), distin-guishes an institutional logics approach fromrational choice perspectives on institutions(North, 1990; Ingram and Klay, 2000) whichpresume individualistic interests. Thisassumption also distinguishes an institutionallogics approach from macro structural perspectives which emphasize the primacy ofstructure over action (DiMaggio and Powell,1983; Meyer et al., 1987; Meyer et al., 1997;Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006) andParsonian (Parsons 1956) perspectives oninstitutions, which posit a separation of insti-tutional from economic or technical sectors(e.g., Meyer and Scott, 1983).

The embeddedness of agency presupposesthe partial autonomy of individuals, organi-zations, and the institutions in society in anyexplanation of social structure or action(Friedland and Alford, 1991). Society consists of three levels – individuals compet-ing and negotiating, organizations in conflictand coordination, and institutions in contra-diction and interdependency. All three levelsare necessary to adequately understand soci-ety; the three levels are nested (embedded)when organizations and institutions specifyprogressively higher levels of constraint andopportunity for individual action.

Rather than privileging one level overanother, this perspective suggests that whileindividual and organizational action isembedded within institutions, institutions aresocially constructed and therefore consti-tuted by the actions of individuals and organ-izations (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Thissuggests that cross-level effects are critical.One limitation, however, is that mostresearch, whether theoretical or empirical,tends to emphasize one level over another.Friedland and Alford (1991), despite theirdirect call for multiple levels, emphasized therole of the societal level. Recent work oninstitutional entrepreneurship (Battilana,2006; Greenwood and Hinnings, 2006) has incorporated the relationship between

levels as an important mechanism for organi-zational and institutional change.

Society as an inter-institutionalsystem

The main innovation of Friedland and Alford(1991) is to conceptualize society as an inter-institutional system. To locate behavior in acontext requires theorizing an inter-institu-tional system of societal sectors in whicheach sector represents a different set ofexpectations for social relations and humanand organizational behavior. In Friedlandand Alford’s words, the capitalist market,bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclearfamily, and Christian religion are key institu-tional sectors, each with its own distinct logic.Thornton (2004: 44–45) elaborated thistypology in a review of a series of empiricalstudies to include six sectors – markets, corporations, professions, states, families,and religions.

Viewing society as an inter-institutionalsystem allows sources of heterogeneity andagency to be theorized and to be observedfrom the contradictions between the logics ofdifferent institutional orders. There is not justone source of rationality, as in world systemsapproaches (Meyer et al., 1997), but multiplesources. Rather than positing homogeneityand isomorphism in organizational fields, theinstitutional logics approach views any con-text as potentially influenced by contendinglogics of different societal sectors. For exam-ple, the health care field is shaped by theinstitutional logics of the market, the logic ofthe democratic state, and the professionallogic of medical care (Scott et al., 2000).

The inter-institutional system enables twoadvances in institutional analysis. First, it isnon-deterministic, that is no institutionalorder with its accompanying principles oforganization and logics of action is accordedcausal primacy a priori. Second, the inter-institutional system provides researcherswith an understanding of the institutionalfoundations of categories of knowledge.


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Key constructs in the analysis of organiza-tion, such as efficiency, rationality, participa-tion, and values are not neutral, but arethemselves shaped by the logics of inter-institutional system. As posited byFriedland and Alford (1991: 260) ‘Categoriesof knowledge contribute to and yet dependupon the power of institutions which makethem possible. Without understanding thehistorical and institutional specificity of theprimary categories of analysis, social scien-tists run the risk of elaborating the rationalityof institutions they study, and as a resultbecome actors in their reproduction.’

The material and culturalfoundations of institutions

A key assumption of an institutional logicsperspective is that each of the institutionalorders in society has both material and cul-tural characteristics (Friedland and Alford,1991). For example, both the family and reli-gion, while typically not considered part ofthe economic sphere, are directly involved inthe production, distribution, and consump-tion of goods and services (Becker, 1976).Similarly, markets, while often not consid-ered part of the cultural sphere, are directlyshaped by culture and social structure,including networks of social relationships aswell as structures of power, status, and dom-ination (Granovetter, 1985). Rather thanprivileging material or cultural explanationsof institutions, an institutional logics per-spective recognizes that institutions developand change as a result of the interplaybetween both of these forces.

In explaining human behavior and organi-zational structure, Friedland and Alford(1991) argued that theories which ‘retreatfrom society,’ – emphasizing market mecha-nisms to aggregate individual utilities andpreferences, organizational competition,technology, and resource dependence – beginto fail. Instead, institutional sectors, forexample families, professions, states, andreligions locate the origins of values and

utilities – and these values and utilities cannotbe traded off as simple economic alternatives.Thus, an important underlying assumption isnot whether motivation and action are rationalor irrational; instead the argument is how thecomparative conflict and conformity of insti-tutional logics (which are both material andcultural) influence human and organizationalbehavior (Thornton, 2002).

This assumption reflects a cultural turn inthe study of conflict and agency. This cultural turn is motivated by the thorny ques-tion of how individual agents know they haveeconomic or political struggles on theirhands and what is an appropriate way torespond to them. For example, Thornton andOcasio (1999) and Thornton (2004) showedthat resource competition was actuallygreater in higher education publishing in theera of the editorial logic – but this competi-tion was interpreted differently andresponded to in a non-conflictual manner.With the rise of a market logic, resourcecompetition, although less significant, hadgreater effects on organizational actions anddecisions. Stinchcombe (2002: 429) hascommented around this issue – needing culture to define the meaning of power andcompetition – viewing it as a causal sequenc-ing problem. His argument is that if power istheorized as a first-order construct inexplaining change, independently of culture,two problems need to be addressed. First,power is created in the course of action: itdoes not occur prior to the action that itexplains. Second, the decision to use poweris an intentional, strategic choice; however, itis not always possible for actors to know thecultural framing or menus of availableoptions in advance of any action. Thus,instrumental political theories of action maybe incomplete explanations because the necessary sequence of events is unlikely to occur. Consequently, cultural explana-tions are necessary adjuncts to structural explanations.

In making way for the role of culture in shaping action, institutional logics incorporate both the symbolic and the


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normative components of culture. FollowingGeertz (1973) and Douglas (1986),DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Friedlandand Alford (1991) highlighted the symbolicand cognitive dimensions of institutions andinstitutional logics. But symbolic and cogni-tive explanations of institutions and institu-tional logics are incomplete without alsoincorporating the normative dimensions(Hirsch, 1997; Mizruchi and Fein, 1999).Sociologists, rejecting the strong view ofinternalization of universalistic values andcultural norms proposed by Parsons (1951)and early Merton (1957), have been reluctantto rely on social norms as an explanation forbehavior. Even DiMaggio and Powell (1983),in discussing the normative forces drivingisomorphism, emphasized the role of formaleducation, legitimating authorities, and professional networks, with an unclear rolefor social norms, per se. An institutionallogics approach, in contrast, emphasizes howinstitutions provide social actors with ahighly contingent set of social norms(Jackall, 1988), where behavior is driven not by a logic of consequences but by a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1989).

The requirement of norms as a criticaldimension of institutions and their underly-ing logics does not imply universalism,moral behavior by individuals, nor deeplyinternalized values, all part of Parson’s(1951) conceptions of norms. An institu-tional logics approach shares withGranovetter (1985) and others the over-socialized critique of Parsons, while at thesame time suggesting that ignoring normsimplies an under-socialized view of individ-ual and organizational behavior. A focus onidentification (see below) as the mechanismby which cultural norms exert their effectsover individuals and organizations (Kelman, 1956, 2006; O’Reilly andChatman, 1996) distinguishes an institutionallogics approach from an over-socialized conception of institutions that focuses oninternalization and value commitments andan under-socialized conception that focuses

on resource dependencies and political interests.

An institutional logics approach viewsnorms as drawn from experience and exem-plars of the institution (Jackall, 1988; Ocasio,1999). Norms imply ambivalence about uni-versalistic principles, with both dominant andsubsidiary norms co-existing. This suggests aprobabilistic, rather than a deterministic viewof adherence to dominant norms of behavior,and the identification of specific contingen-cies where subsidiary norms prevail.

Institutions at multiple levels

The institutional logics approach as meta-theory provides tremendous capacity todevelop theory and research across multiplelevels of analysis. For Friedland and Alford(1991) the focus was on societal-level logicsand their effects on individuals and organiza-tions. But the meta-theory that has emergedis broader, and institutional logics maydevelop at a variety of different levels, forexample organizations, markets, industries,inter-organizational networks, geographiccommunities, and organizational fields. Thisflexibility allows for a wide variety of mech-anisms to be emphasized in research and theoretical development and may be onereason the term institutional logics hascaught on among scholars (Kuhn, 1962).

Theoretical mechanisms are elements oftheory that operate at a different level ofanalysis (e.g., individuals or organizationalfields), than the main phenomenon being the-orized about (e.g., organizations or groups).To identify the effects of mechanisms acrosslevels of analysis makes the theory more pre-cise as well as more general (Stinchcombe,1991). Therefore, to apply the institutionallogics meta-theory it is critical that the levelof analysis at which institutionalizationoccurs be clearly specified, whether at a societal level (Friedland and Alford, 1991),or at other levels.

For example, Haveman and Rao (1997), intheir study of the coevolution of institutions


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and organizations in the California thriftindustry, studied how with the rise ofProgressivism, changes in institutional logicsat the societal level affected the formation ofdistinct organizational forms at the industrylevel. In particular, their analysis shows howplans that embodied bureaucratic logics andrational decision making were more likely tothrive than those that embodied a communitylogic and mutual cooperation among actors.The emphasis here is on institutional logicsat the societal level affecting the selection ofalternative forms at the organizational level.A secondary, and less developed, aspect ofthe coevolutionary process in the paper sug-gests that as organizational forms thatembody a particular institutional logic evolveand become institutionalized at the industrylevel, the corresponding societal-level insti-tutional logics further evolves and becomesfurther institutionalized.

The emphasis on societal-level institutionsis illustrated by the work of Bhappu (2000),which draws on anthropological analysis ofthe ancient Japanese family system to arguehow the institutional order of the family isthe origin of the institutional logic ofJapanese corporate networks. Scott et al.(2000) examine how societal-level profes-sional, government, and managerial-marketlogics shape the transformation of the healthcare organizational field, from one domi-nated by professional logics to one where the three logics co-exist and no single onedominates.

In Jackall’s (1988) ethnographic analysis,the emphasis is on institutionalization at theorganizational level. Here the focus in on thestructures of managerial careers and howthey shape the formation of a managerialethos that shapes decision making and actionin organizations. The formal structures of theorganizations combine with institutionalizedpractices of fealty and patronage to create aninstitutional logic termed patrimonialbureaucracy. While clearly focusing on orga-nizational-level institutionalized practices,Jackall’s analysis suggests how these practices also reflect cultural forces at the

societal level. Jackall argues that the formalbureaucratic logic, as characterized by Weber([1922] 1978), had little affinity withAmerican individualistic affinities and cultural values, with the hybrid logic of patrimonial bureaucracy thereby emerging.

Thornton and Ocasio (1999) focus on theformation of industry-level institutionallogics in higher education publishing. Theypropose that industries are a relevant bound-ary for establishing institutional logicsbecause producers in an industry establish acommon identity through social compar-isons, status competition, and structurallyequivalent network positions (White, 1992).Their analysis and the subsequent researchby Thornton (2001, 2002) focus on theeffects of shifts, at the industry level, from aneditorial logic to a market logic. While focus-ing on industry-level logics that both emergefrom and sustain market competition, theselogics do not emerge in the industry de novo,but are shaped by higher-order societal professional and market logics. The linkbetween industry-level logics and the logicsof the inter-institutional system is furtherdeveloped by Thornton (2004).

Research on institutional logics adopting afield-level perspective has emphasized theexistence of competing logics within thefield. For example, in a qualitative analysisof U.S. academic health centers, Kitchener(2002) explores the effects of competingmanagerial and professional logics on theresponses to merger initiatives. Reay andHinings (2005) adopt a similar approach intheir analysis of structural change inCanadian health care organizations.Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) focusinstead on contradictions between institu-tional logics in organizational fields and suggest that boundary bridging organiza-tions are sources of change in institutionallogics (see below). Lounsbury (2007) examines competing trustee and professionallogics in the mutual fund industry. In hisanalysis geographic communities are also asource of institutionalization of logic, asBoston and New York are centers of the


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trustee and professional logics respectively,leading to different patterns of organizationalchange in the two areas.

The variety of levels of analysis studiedsuggests the fecundity of the institutionallogics perspective. The breadth of the meta-theory may have encouraged imprecision inresearch, and it could be inferred that anylogic or interpretive scheme, at any level ofanalysis, may be characterized as an institu-tional logic. We suggest otherwise.Institutional logics are more than strategiesor logics of action as they are sources oflegitimacy and provide a sense of order andontological security (Giddens, 1984: Seo andCreed, 2002). Research on competing institutional logics, as some of the work onorganizational fields described above, often isnot precise on the level of which logicsbecome institutionalized, or whether theyshould be considered institutional logics at all.

Historical contingency

Historical contingency is a key meta-theoret-ical assumption of the institutional logicsapproach. In general this assumption is con-sistent with institutional theory, which focusesattention on how larger environments affectindividual and organizational behavior. Whilethe six institutional orders of the inter-institu-tional system in western societies previouslyidentified have remained influential, empiri-cal observation also informs us that they differed in development and importance overtime. For example, modern societies havegreater emphasis on corporate and state influ-ences and earlier societies in general empha-sized family and religion to a larger extent. Inparticular, during the last 30 years the promi-nence of market logics has been found inmultiple studies in various contexts, includingThornton and Ocasio (1999) in higher educa-tion publishing, Scott et al. (2000) in healthcare, Lounsbury (2002) in financial interme-diation, Zajac and Westphal (2004) in equitymarkets, and Meyer and Hammerschmidt(2004) in public management.

Zajac and Westphal’s analysis of historicalcontingency in financial markets (2004) isnotable in viewing markets themselves asshaped by institutional forces. The paperfinds that the emergence of an agency perspective in the 1980s led to historicalshifts in stock market response to stockrepurchases, from an unfavorable reaction,consistent with a professional logic, to afavorable one, consistent with an agencylogic. The paper suggests that the market’sreaction to particular corporate practices arenot, as financial economists contend, simplya function of the inherent efficiency of suchpractices, but are influenced by the prevail-ing institutional logic.

However, note with the current rise of reli-gion in world discourse that institutionallogics, both in their elaboration and relativepattern of dominance between institutionalorders, are not simply an evolutionary orlinear model of development driven by scien-tific progress or market rationalization. Herethe institutional logics approach departs dis-tinctly from Meyer and his colleagues’ worknoted earlier on modern rationalization. Forexample, Thornton, Jones, and Kury (2005)illustrate other models of the historical contingency of institutional logics that showcyclical or punctuated equilibrium functionalforms in their comparison of the cases ofaccounting and architecture.

Many studies reveal findings that are validin one historical time period but not in others.Thornton (2004: 127) presents a meta-analy-sis partitioning the findings on the highereducation publishing studies by universaland particular effects. Founder and owner-ship effects were found to be universal acrosstime, whereas relational and structural effectswere particular to a historical period in whichan institutional logic prevailed. Many find-ings typically predicted by resource depend-ence and economic theories are found to behistorically contingent. Note that the modelsin this meta-analysis controlled for differ-ences in organization age, size, and resourcecompetition and other macro economic variables. Note also that the meta-analysis


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design controls for differences in industry,product market, data set, population andsampling methods, and statistical modelingprocedures. The universal founder effect suggests the persistence of individual entre-preneurs or leaders to hang tough on a logicof action, regardless of contradictory logicsprevailing in their surrounding environment.

The objective of recognizing historicalcontingency as a meta-theoretical assump-tion is to explore if the effects of economic,political, structural, and normative forcesaffecting individuals and organizations areindeed historically contingent. Moreover, thegoal is not to develop universal theories oforganizational behavior and structure but toexamine whether such theories, oftenassumed to be universal through time andspace, are instead particular to historical timeand cultural environments (Thornton, 2004:130–133).

INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AS METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Theory and methods go hand-in-hand and themeta-theoretical principles reviewed in thepreceding section have been examinedthrough the creative development of meth-ods. While many social science researchershave been skeptical of cultural effects(DiMaggio, 1994), in our view researchersare rising to the challenges of measuring theeffects of content, meaning, and change ininstitutions using the institutional logics perspective. In this endeavor, we commenton the use of event history analysis, interpre-tive methods, triangulation, and ideal types.

Foundational studies have combined eventhistory (Tuma and Hannan, 1984) and inter-pretive methods, for example from archivalrecords (Haveman and Rao, 1997), personalinterviews (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999), andcontent analysis of professional journals(Scott et al., 2000). Event history models typ-ically use historical time (not organizationage) as the clock, particularly when historical

contingency is a focus of the analysis(Thornton, 2004: 126–127). They also canaccommodate data at multiple levels ofanalysis, for example at the individual, orga-nizational, and environmental – making itpossible to partition material from culturaleffects (DiMaggio, 1994). The challenge ofmeasuring cultural effects is oftenapproached by examining how one or moreof the institutional orders of the inter-institu-tional system are changing in its strength ofinfluence on individual and organizationalbehavior. These types of studies require identifying a scientific boundary to draw apopulation or sample for hypothesis testing –such as an industry, market, or profession.Note that the organizational field concept isproblematic in this sense, unless it can bedefined, for example as a geographic community, positional community, i.e. CEOsof Fortune 500, or inter-organizational network.

The development of interpretive methodsenriches the possibilities of the types of dataand data gathering methods available forresearchers to examine the content andmeaning of institutions. Scott et al. (2000),for example. used content analysis of publi-cations to identify the key terms important tothe actors of the professions and corporateinstitutional orders of the health care systemand then measured the frequency of vocabu-laries associated with the institutional orders,signaling the emergence and decline of thesealternative institutional logics.

Phillips and Hardy (2002: 55) definemethods from discourse theory and describehow they have been borrowed to furtherdevelop institutional theory and methods.Data sources include, for example, inter-views, focus groups, archival documents andrecords, naturally occurring conversations,political speeches, newspaper articles,novels, stories, cartoons, and photographs.Methods of analysis include, for example,genealogy, ethnography, conversation analy-sis, content analysis, narrative analysis, critical discourse analysis, and rhetoricalanalysis that make use of a variety of ‘texts,’


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including spoken words, pictures, symbols,and cultural artifacts among others. Suddabyand Greenwood (2005), for example, usedrhetorical analysis of vocabularies (words) toexpose contradictory institutional logicsembedded in historically different understandings of professionalism to explainthe multidisciplinary partnership as a neworganizational form.

While this vibrant resurrection and devel-opment of qualitative methods strengthensthe capacity to interpret meanings, we caution that the strength of the foundationalstudies of the institutional logics perspectivehas been on triangulation of types of data andmethods of analysis – being reliant on bothqualitative and quantitative methods. Onemethod that integrates interpretive andhypothesis testing approaches is the use ofideal types.

Ideal types are a method of interpretiveanalysis for understanding the meaning thatactors invest their actions with. They werefirst developed by the classic theorists as atheoretical tool to facilitate intelligible comparisons (Weber, 1922). Researchershave further developed this method of analy-sis to suggest testable hypotheses (Thorntonand Ocasio, 1999).

In theory building, ideal types require thedevelopment of formal typologies composedof two parts: (a) the description of ideal typesand (b) the set of assertions that relate theideal types to the dependent variable (Dottyand Glick, 1994). While often derived fromempirical observation, ideal types are not fordescribing an organizational field, butinstead are theoretical models for comparingthe effects of various meanings in a locationwith a definable boundary. They do not precisely conform to reality because of deliberate simplification to afford compara-tive analysis and multidimensional classifi-cation of phenomena not restricted by theevents of the selected cases. Ideal typesassign a hypothetical meaning that can beused as a yardstick to compare and contrasthypothesized and actual meaning and behavior.

Swedberg (2005: 3), in drawing fromWeber, gives an example. ‘When the wood-cutter brings down his axe on the wood, itcan be a case of wage labor, provision forone’s household, or form of recreation – andwhich one it is depends on the meaning withwhich the action is invested.’ In the Appendixwe include examples of ideal types devel-oped from the analysis of the effects of insti-tutional logics in three industries, highereducation publishing, accounting, and architecture.

DiMaggio’s (1991: 271) analysis of thetwo models of organizing art museums is aprecursor to bringing back the use of idealtypes in institutional analysis. His categorieson the Y axis focused on the mission, defini-tion of art, legitimate perception, education,major publics, control, strategy, building, andliving artists – showing how the X axis spec-ifies the Gilman and Data models varied onthese universal dimensions. Rao et al. (2003)also used ideal types in their characterizationof classical and nouvelle French cuisine tounderstand how new logics displaced old andushered in new role identities. Their categories on the Y axis examine the dimen-sions of culinary rhetoric, rules of cooking,archetypal ingredients, role of the chef, andorganization of the menu – showing how theX axis defined the two characteristics of classical and nouvelle cuisines. However,what is the causal connection betweenDiMaggio’s and Rao et al.’s ideal types andthe inter-institutional system? Should we, forexample, intuit that the Gilman Model wasinfluenced by the institutional logics of thefamily and the Data Model by the logics ofthe professions and the state?

Thornton and Ocasio (1999: 808–809) andThornton (2004) explicitly anchor the highereducation publishing ideal types in thedomains (orders) of the inter-institutionalsystem – revealing their origins. Their categories on the Y axis examined form ofcapitalism, organizational identity, legiti-macy, authority structures, mission, focus ofattention, strategy, logics of investment, andrules of succession – showing how the X axis


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specifying the editorial and market logicvaried on these general elements. Once derived from interview and archivaldata they pushed the standards further by externally validating the ideal types with publishers’ experiences and their usein the Stanford University PublishersCollege.1

HOW LOGICS SHAPE INDIVIDUALAND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION

Collective identities and identificationA mechanism by which institutional logicsexert their effects on individuals and organi-zations is when they identify with the collec-tive identities of an institutionalized group,organization, profession, industry or popula-tion (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; March andOlsen, 1989). A collective identity is the cognitive, normative, and emotional connec-tion experienced by members of a socialgroup because of their perceived commonstatus with other members of the social group(Polleta and Jasper, 2001). Collective identities emerge out of social interactionsand communications between members ofthe social group (White, 1992). As individu-als identify with the collective iden-tity of the social groups they belong to they are likely to cooperate with the social group (Tyler, 1999; Brickson, 2000),abide by its norms and prescriptions (March and Olsen, 1989; Kelman, 2006), and seek to protect the interests of the collec-tive and its members against contendingidentities (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; White, 1992).

Individuals are members of multiple socialgroups with a collective identity, includingprofessions and occupations (Abbott, 1988;Fine, 1996; Glynn, 2000), gender, racial andethnic groups (Cerulo, 1997; Lamont andMolnar, 2002), social movements (Benfordand Snow, 2000; Rao et al., 2003), and indi-vidual organizations (Selznick, 1957; Albertand Whetten, 1985; Dutton and Dukerich,

1991). Collective identities also emergeamong populations of organizational forms (Haveman and Rao, 1997; Carroll and Hannan, 2000), market competitors(Porac et al., 1989; White, 1992; Peteraf and Shanley, 1997; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999), and industry associations(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; King and Lenox,2000).

As collective identities become institution-alized, they develop their own distinct insti-tutional logic, and these logics prevail withinthe social group (Jackall, 1998). Theseeffects of institutional logics are emphasized,among others, in the work of Haveman andRao (1997), on the theory of moral senti-ments embodied in the collective identities oforganizational forms; in Thornton andOcasio (1999)’s shift from an editorial logicto a market logic in the collective identity ofcompetitors in the higher education publishing market; in Jones and LivneTarandach’s (Forthcoming) rhetorical strategies of architects based in the institu-tional logics of business, profession, andstate that focus attention on distinct competencies – servicing clients, buildinggreat architecture, or managing facilities, andin Lounsbury’s (2002) analysis of collectiveidentities embodied in professional associations in the field of finance. In all of these cases, albeit at different levels of analysis, identification with therespective institutional logics occurs directly, as the identification with the collective is equivalent to the identifi-cation with the institutional logic prevailingin the collective, whether they are organiza-tional forms, market competitors, or profes-sional associations, or any other socialgrouping.

Contests for status and powerThe contests for status and power are rela-tively universal mechanisms for individualand organizational actions. However, aninstitutional logics perspective suggests thatthese mechanisms are conditioned by pre-vailing institutions (Fligstein, 1996;


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Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Lounsbury andVentresca, 2003). While power and statusdifferences are present in all organizations,researchers can identify the sources of powerand status, their meaning and consequencesby understanding how these power and statusdifferences are associated with the prevailinginstitutional logic. Institutional logics shapeand create the rules of the game, the means-ends relationships by which power and statusare gained, maintained, and lost in organiza-tions (Jackall, 1988; Ocasio, 1999;Lounsbury and Ventresca, 2003). Socialactors rely on their understandings of institu-tional logics in the competition for powerand status and in doing so generate the conditions for the reproduction of prevailinglogics.

For Jackall (1988), competition for power,status, and position in organizations shapesthe creation and reproduction of a patrimo-nial bureaucratic logic in U.S. corporations.Managers, driven by career concerns, estab-lish and maintain a system of patronage andfealty, where strong social ties to those inposition of authority determine power andprivilege in organizations. Achieving careersuccess requires social actors to play by therules, with language use and symbolic management serving to reproduce the formalstructure, while promotion patterns parallelthe patrimonial structure, serving to reproduce the informal status hierarchies andpower structures.

Thornton and Ocasio (1999) focus on thelink between institutional logics and powerstructures. They find that under an editoriallogic, publishers’ means and ends are shapedby author-editor relationships, and powerstructures are determined by organizationsize and structure. Under a market logic,publishers’ means - end relationships areshaped by resource competition and acquisi-tions, and power structures are determined bycompetition in the product market and themarket for corporate control.

Lounsbury (2002) focuses on status competition and status mobility in the fieldof finance. A shift from a regulatory logic to

a market logic created a shift from statusdriven by reputation within business practiceto reputation driven by normative conformityto increasingly mathematical economics.Professional finance associations led thetransformation to a market logic in this field.New professions such as money managementand securities analysis helped diffuse new financial theories such as portfolio andrisk management, and status within the field became increasingly determined byfamiliarity and expertise with new financialtheories. As social actors gained status andposition by their reliance on financial theo-ries, the market logic gained prominence inthe field.

Zhou (2005) relies on an institutional logicperspective to explain occupational prestigeranking. Building on Weber’s argument thatsocial statuses or social honors are related,but distinct from one’s economic resourcesor structural positions, Zhou is searching foran explanation of how a hierarchical orderingof occupations must be recognized through ameaning system shared by members of thesame community. He proposes an institu-tional logic of social recognition to explicatethe causal mechanisms. What is appropriateand legitimate must be seen as transcend-ing self-interests and group boundaries, andbe accepted by a large audience. Overall, occupation prestige should vary system-atically with the basis for making legitimateclaims and with group membership as a function of their inclusion into the realm of a shared institutional logic (Zhou,2005: 98).

Classification and categorizationA key mechanism by which institutionallogics shapes individual cognition is throughsocial classification and categorization(DiMaggio, 1997). Cognitive psychologistsemphasize the importance of categories inshaping individual cognition (e.g., Rosch,1975; Medin, 1989). While psychologistswho study categories typically emphasize thestudy of categories of objects occurring innature, the classification and categorization


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of social and organizational categories isdetermined by social institutions (Douglas,1986; Searle, 1995). Given the institutional-ization of categories, individuals take forgranted that the categories of organizingactivity such as CEO, return on assets,human resources, corporate governance,multidivisional structures, patents, restaurants, to name but a few common sub-jects of study, are not categories that exist innature but socially constructed, institutionalcategories (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).

Institutional logics provide agents withinorganizations with socially constructed systems of classifications that constitute categories of social actors (Mohr andDuquenne, 1997), organizational forms(Haveman and Rao, 1997), products(Lounsbury and Rao, 2004), and organiza-tional agendas (Ocasio and Joseph, 2005).Changes in institutional logics lead to thecreation of new categories (Rao et al., 2003)and to changes in meaning of existing cate-gories (Ruef, 1999; Ocasio and Joseph,2005). Categories, as a basic unit of cogni-tion, do not imply mindless cognition, as doschemas and scripts, but are a necessarycomponent of all mindful, agentive behavior.

Mohr and his collaborators have emphasized the link between systems of categories and institutional logics. Mohr andDuquenne (1997) analyze the changing insti-tutional logics in poverty relief by examininghow they provide a different system of classification of the poor (distressed, desti-tute, fallen, deserving, homeless, indigent,misfortunate, needy, poor, stranger, andworthy) and the categorization of organiza-tional practices (giving advice, giving food,giving money, paying a person to chop wood, placing a relief applicant in an asylum, and so on). Mohr and Guerra-Pearson(Forthcoming) studied how categories ofactors, organizational forms, and organizingactivities varied by competing institutionallogics. Breiger and Mohr (2004) develop network methodologies among systems ofcategories to empirically measure institu-tional logics.

Categorization processes have been partic-ularly central to work on institutional logicsthat focuses on logics residing in competingorganizational forms (Haveman and Rao,1997; Rao et al., 2003). Distinct categories offorms are shaped by changes in societal levelinstitutional logics (Haveman and Rao,1997). At the organizational field level, Rao et al. (2003) explore how changes in the categories of French cuisine led to self-categorization by industry entrepreneursand triggered institutional transformation.Rao et al. (2005) explored how organiza-tional change occurs through bricolageamong categories of organizational productsassociated with alternative institutionallogics.

Research has also explored how changinglogics lead to changes in the meaning ofexisting categories. Ruef (1999) explores theshift to a market logic in the heath care fieldby examining the changing systems of categories that underlie discourse amongtechnical, managerial, and policy-orientedhealth care professionals. Ruef’s analysisfocuses on the relationships among linguisticcategories and finds that a historical shift in logics results in changes in the meaning of underlying categories of organ-izational forms. With the rise of a marketlogic there is increased integration of issues of financing and risk bearing acrossthe various forms in the organizational field,and less focus across the spectrum on issues of access. With the rise of a marketlogic the meaning of a hospital or a health maintenance organization shifts, as doother organizational forms, with less differ-entiation among forms in their focus onfinancing.

AttentionContemporary perspectives on organiza-tional attention emphasize how organiza-tional responses to economic and socialfactors are mediated by the attention of organizational decision makers (Ocasio,1995, 1997). Theoretical and empiricalresearch provides key mechanisms to explain


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how institutions moderate organizationalattention.

In a theoretical analysis of how organiza-tions respond to economic adversity, Ocasio(1995) proposed that institutional logicsaffect the allocation of attention to alternativeschemas for perceiving, interpreting, evaluat-ing, and responding to environmental situations. According to theory of allocationof attention, institutional logics provide indi-viduals and organizations with a set of rulesand conventions – for deciding which prob-lems get attended to, which solutions getconsidered, and which solutions get linked towhich situtations (March and Olsen, 1976).Ocasio (1997) suggests two mechanisms bywhich institutions structure attention: (1) bygenerating a set of values that order the legit-imacy, importance, and relevance of issuesand solutions; and (2) by providing decisionmakers with an understanding of their interests and identities. These interests andidentities generate in turn a set of decisionpremises and motivation for action.

Thornton and Ocasio (1999) developed therole of industry-level institutional logics instructuring attention in organizational decisions on executive succession. Thetheory was further developed in applicationto decisions on acquisitions (Thornton,2001), and the rise of multidivisional structures (Thornton, 2002) in the highereducation publishing industry. The core ofthe argument in these empirical studies isthat institutional logics focus the attention ofdecision makers on issues and solutions thatare consistent with prevailing logics.Institutional logics focus attention on issuesand solutions through a variety of mecha-nisms, including determining their appropri-ateness and legitimacy, rewarding certainforms of political behavior in organizations,shaping the availability of alternatives, andselectively focusing attention on environ-mental and organizational determinants ofchange. A key finding of these empiricalanalyses is that the effects of resource competition and resource dependencies arenot universal effects, but are contingent on

organizational attention to market forces thatare salient under a market logic, but notunder an editorial logic. Thornton (2004:44–45) further developed the role of institu-tional logics in structuring attention by linking these organization and industry levelanalyses to societal-level institutional logics.Relying on content analysis, Glynn andLounsbury (2005) examine the shifts in focusof attention by newspaper critics of theAtlantic Symphony Orchestra from an aesthetic logic prior to a strike at the orches-tra to a market logic post-strike. Consistentwith the effects of institutional logics onattention, they find that pre-strike newspapercritics, in their reviews, focus attention on thevirtuosity and musical interpretation (associ-ated with an aesthetic logic) and post-strikecritics increased their attention to ticketsales, production of recordings, and audiencereactions (consistent with a market logic).The ascendancy of the market logic did notimply, however, a rejection of aesthetic con-cerns, but the blending of the two logics.

In his study of competing logics in themutual funds industry, Lounsbury (2007)relies on attention as a mechanism to showhow non-growth funds and Boston-basedfunds focus attention on the issue of productcosts, while growth funds and New York-based funds focus attention on the issue offund performance. The empirical results sup-port this argument, demonstrating how theeffects of market forces are contingent onprevailing organizational logics, as mediatedthrough processes of attention.

CHANGE IN INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS

‘How can actors change institutions if theiractions, intentions, and rationality are allconditioned by the very institution they wishto change’ (Holm, 1995: 398). The institu-tional logics approach sheds light on thisproblem of embedded agency by conceptual-izing society as an inter-institutional system


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in which logics are characterized by culturaldifferentiation, fragmentation, and contradic-tion (DiMaggio, 1997). This differentiation,fragmentation, and contradiction is evident both within and between institu-tional orders (Friedland and Alford, 1991).We focus on three mechanisms of change:institutional entrepreneurs, structural overlap, event sequencing, and a fourth topic, often an antedecent or conse-quence of change – competing institutionallogics.

Institutional entrepreneursInstitutional entrepreneurs are the agents thatcreate new and modify old institutionsbecause they have access to resources thatsupport their self-interests (DiMaggio,1988). By definition, institutional entrepre-neurs can play a critical role in perceivinginstitutional differentiation, fragmentation,and contradiction by virtue of the differentsocial locations they may occupy in the inter-institutional system and in taking advantageof the opportunities it presents for institu-tional change (Thornton, 2004). Fligstein(1997), for example, describes how entrepre-neurs perceive and exploit contradictions ininstitutional logics to further their self-interest. DiMaggio (1988: 14–15) argues thatthe creation of institutions requires an institutionalization project in which theclaims of institutional entrepreneurs are sup-ported by existing or newly mobilized actorswho stand to gain from the success of theinstitutionalization project (DiMaggio,1991). The challenge for the institutionalentrepreneur is to create an environ-ment to successfully enact the claims of anew public theory. Sometimes this involvesinstitutional entrepreneurs organizing fromthe center of an established environment(Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) and atother times it may stem from the periphery of emerging fields (Maguire, Hardy, andLawrence, 2004).

However, the environments that institu-tional entrepreneurs enact to garner controlof resources are not just material, they are

also symbolic. To use an analogy to thebricoler (Levi-Strauss, 1966), institutionalentrepreneurs creatively manipulate socialrelationships by importing and exporting cultural symbols and practices from oneinstitutional order to another. In theory, thedifferent social locations of the institutionalorders bring to light different cultural toolsfor institutional entrepreneurs (Thornton,2004). Note the focus on cultural resourcesas distinct from material resources; culturebeing something people strategically use,deploy, and mobilize. This focus is consistentwith the meta-theory of the institutionallogics approach which views culture as botha motivation as well as a justification ofaction.

There are several mechanisms that institu-tional entrepreneurs use to manipulate cul-tural symbols and practices, for examplestory telling (Zilber, 2006), rhetorical strategies (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005;Jones and Livne-Tarandach, forthcoming),and tool kit approaches (Swidler 1986;Boltanski and Thevenot 1991).

Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) showed,for example, in their study of organizationalforms in the accounting industry, how institu-tional entrepreneurs used ‘rhetorical strate-gies’ to reinterpret and manipulate prevailingsymbols and practices. Rhetorical strategiesor ‘institutional vocabularies’ were used byentrepreneurs to affirm or discredit the dom-inant institutional logic which defined thelegitimacy of organizational forms. To discredit an institutional logic and bringabout institutional change, entrepreneursexposed the contradictions or ameliorated thecontradictions by associating them withbroader cultural analogies (Douglas, 1986;Strang and Meyer, 1994).

In returning to Holm’s (1995) concernwith embedded agency, Leca and Naccache(2006) argue from a critical realist perspective that the concept of institutionalentrepreneur does not completely address the paradox of embedded agency because theconcept by definition does not take into account the interrelated sequencing of


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structures and actions and the causal emer-gent properties of both structures andactions. They argue for a critical realistapproach in which actors use the causalpowers of pre-existing structures to create new institutions or challenge exist-ing ones. We highlight their important insight as it motivates our subsequent discus-sion of structural overlap and event sequencing.

Structural overlapStructural overlap occurs when individualroles and organizational structures and func-tions that were previously distinct are forcedinto association (Thornton, 2004). Mergersand acquisitions are an example of structuraloverlap when organizational actors fromdivergent cultures are forced into associat-ion, triggering a change in institutional logics guiding the firm. Structural over-lap across systems with differentiated logics creates contradiction in organiza-tions and organizational fields, creating entrepreneurial opportunities for institutionalchange.

For example, Stovel and Savage (2005)showed how a merger wave exposed compet-ing institutional logics and triggered the elab-oration of the modern, mobile, bureaucraticcareer in the financial sector. Thornton,Jones, and Kury (2005) illustrated how thestructural overlap when accounting firmsincorporated management consultants intotheir organizations brought professional andmarket logics head to head and conflicted thefocus of attention of accountants from over-seeing the accuracy of client’s books to usingexposure to accounting ledgers to identifyconsulting clients. Greenwood and Suddaby(2006), in their analysis of a pioneering neworganizational form, the multidisciplinarypractice (MDP) within the field of businessservices, theorize a case of structural overlapin which elite organizations are more likelyto come into contact with competing andcontradictory logics because they bridge different organizational fields. They point out that this case of institutional change is

interesting because it is inconsistent withextant theory which would predict change from the periphery, not the center of the field. They argue that contact with institutional logics in multiple and different organizational fields increases the awareness of and experiences with contradictions in logics, which lowers con-straints and embeddedness of actors andenables central actors to become institutionalentrepreneurs.

Event sequencingEvent sequencing is defined as the temporaland sequential unfolding of unique eventsthat dislocate, rearticulate, and transform theinterpretation and meaning of cultural sym-bols and social and economic structures(Sewell, 1996: 844). For example, this can bechanges in cultural schemas, shifts ofresources, and the emergence of new sourcesof power. As noted above, because structuresare often overlapping, any rupture has thepotential of cascading into multiple changes,particularly when the events are character-ized by heightened emotion, collective creativity, and ritual. The accumulation of events can result in a path-dependentprocess in which shifts in the symbolic inter-pretation of events are locked in place bysimultaneous shifts in resources. Suchsequencing produces more events thatreinforce or erode the dominance of theincumbent logic.

Event sequencing has been used as an ana-lytical method to address the problem ofembedded agency or what Barley and Tolbert(1997) term conflation and the problem ofreducing structure to action or action tostructure. (How such event sequences inter-sect to reveal causation has been extensivelyexamined in the literature on historical com-parative methods of analysis (Abbott, 1990;Griffin, 1992; Sewell, 1992, 1996)). Thereare several ways to assess the impact of eventsequencing on institutional change – for example, nominal and ordinal compar-isons and narrative analysis (Mahoney, 1999). These are different strategies of


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macro-causal analysis – ways thatresearchers iterate between theory and his-tory in identifying the causes of an outcome.The narrative analysis method is used tounderstand the ordering of circumstantialdetail in searching for analogies that are thefoundation for new and convincing accounts.In the institutional logics literature, it is theinstitutional orders of the inter-institutionalsystem that provide the meta-theory whichpoints to these analogies and that prevent theanalysis from getting bogged down in theminutia of historical details.

For example, the case of the change ininstitutional logics in higher education publishing from 1958 to 1990, from an editorial (based in the logics of the familyand the professions) to a market logic,reveals the causally linked events that inter-acted to produce a shift in the prevail-ing institutional logic (Thornton, 2004).Event sequencing is also shown to play a role in institutional change in the account-ing profession (Thornton, Jones, and Kury, 2005). Hoffman and Ocasio (2001)theorize what determines public attent-ion to events that trigger institutional change.

So what are the implications of individualsand organizations in a sea of cultural fragmen-tation and contradiction? It means that tostudy cultural institutions researchers need atheoretical framework that can accommodatehow individuals’ norms may deviate fromnorms at higher levels of analysis, for exampleat the level of individuals as distinct from cor-porate management or professional associa-tions (DiMaggio, 1997: 265). This multi-leveland multi-contextual requirement calls for atheory that conceptualizes how to partition‘units of cultural analysis’ and the relationsamong them (Holm, 1995). We argue that theinter-institutional system is well suited to thistask because each institutional order has dis-tinct organizing principles, cultural symbols,and logics of action that clarify how to defineunits of cultural analysis. Culture is not justamorphously out there in ‘thin air’ as per thecritique of culture as a world system, nor is

culture a monolithic and coherent influence onactors that results from socialization (Parsons,1951). Instead, conceptualizing society as aninter-institutional system implies that the insti-tutional orders have modularity and decom-posable elements. The decomposable natureof institutional logics allows for theorizing thefragmented and contradicted nature of culturalinfluences, revealing this not only at differentlevels of analysis, for example individuals andorganizations, but also in specific contexts inwhich individuals actively import and exportelements of institutional logics across institu-tional orders (Thornton, 2004). Thus, thedecomposability of the elements of the inter-institutional system makes it possible toobserve the influence of cultural institutionsfrom the standpoint of the vertical coherenceand fragmentation of different levels of analysis, not only bottom up or top down(Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006), but alsofrom the horizontal blending and segregatingof the elements of different orders of the inter-institutional system. This, for example,enables theorizing institutional changeprocesses such as bricolage, which is the creation of new practices and institutions from different elements of existing institutions(Levi-Strauss, 1966). Thus, in returning to thequestion of embedded agency, the institutionalentrepreneur does not disembed from thesocial world to create change – structures andactions are separable (Leca and Naccache,2006), allowing institutional entrepreneurs tohop and bridge from one social world toanother. Our review leads us to be encouragedthat literatures on organizations and cultureare converging, creating these fresh views onthe topic of agency.

Competing logicsA focus on competition between alternativeinstitutional logics has guided research oninstitutional change. This diverse literatureencompasses a wide variety of mechanismsto explain the effects of competing logics onchange, including environmental selectionpressures, political contestation, and socialmovements. We emphasize that competing


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logics are not, by themselves, an explanationfor change in institutional logics but anantecedent or a consequence. Moreover,competing logics can facilitate resistance toinstitutional change as in the case of the con-test between the institutional logics of global corporate and local professional banking(Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007). The causalmechanisms for institutional change residenot in competition per se, but on a combina-tion of the effects of market selection pres-sures, power of institutional actors, and changes in the relative prevalence ofsocietal-level institutional logics, whichunfortunately in many studies is typicallyunspecified.

Much work has utilized both case andquantitative studies of competing logics inprofessional and occupational domains, forexample finance, health care, accounting,and culinary. Comparing and contrastingstudies across professional and occupationalcontexts reveals the vibrant ecology of competing institutional logics of the inter-institutional system.

Early research by Haveman and Rao(1997) on mutual funds, described above,adopted a selection meta-theory, positinghow environmental selection pressuresfavored organizational forms more congruentwith their institutional environments.Similarly, the Scott et al. (2000) historicalaccount of the Bay Area health care system isexemplary in describing institutional changefrom a setting once dominated by the institu-tional logics of the medical professions toone greatly influenced by the logics of thestate, the corporation, and the market. Theirstudy shows how the logics of the state interms of new regulatory systems disempow-ered those of the professions, in particularthe more powerful and higher priced MDs,creating an avenue for managers of corporatelogics in the form of managed care and neworganizational forms such as HealthMaintenance Organizations (HMOs), Pointof Provider Organizations (PPOs), and surgi-centers to become commonplace in thehealth care system.

Other studies on competing institutionallogics highlight power struggles among pro-ponents of alternative logics. Reay andHinings’ (2005: 375) description of theAlberta Canada case of health care servicesbears similarities. Their lens focuses on arecomposition of an organizational field inwhich competing institutional logics of med-ical professionalism versus business-likehealth care is driving a radical changeprocess. They conceptualize the organiza-tional field as a battlefield where powerstruggles motivated by competing institu-tional logics get played out. The structure ofthe field and the dominant institutional logicchanged, but the previously dominant logicof medical professionalism was only sub-dued rather than eliminated. The powerended up being distributed between the twopowerful actors – the physicians and the gov-ernment – creating a countervailing or stabi-lizing tension.

Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006: 1012)analyze to what extent an old administrativeorientation is being replaced with a newmanagerial logic in the Austrian publicsector. They trace institutional change byobserving how state bureaucrats make use ofsocial identities that are derived from com-peting institutional logics. They have foundevidence of the formation of a new manage-rial identity created by individuals whomixed a new orientation with more orthodoxbeliefs on public administration.

Research on competing logics has alsoincorporated a social movement perspective.For example, Rao, Monin, and Durand(2003) show how social identity movementsunderpin reinstitutionalization in the culinaryprofessions by contrasting the institutionallogics of the classic and nouvelle cuisinemovements. Change in logics and change inthe adherence to a logic take place throughfour mechanisms, the sociopolitical legiti-macy of food critics as activists, the theoriza-tion of new roles, prior defections by peersand gains to peers, and gains to defectors asidentity-discrepant cues. In essence, institu-tional logics and professions undergo change


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when activists gain control of professionalsocieties, critique the traditional logic, andproffer a solution hinging on a new institu-tional logic. Note, the theory doesn’t fore-shadow why critic activists chose to engagein an institutional deconstruction project.One can surmise the influence of other socialmovements that are supported by otherdomains in the professions and even otherinstitutional orders, for example the moregeneric health movement.

Overall, the studies of competing institu-tional logics focus either on strategies ofaction at a lower level of analysis, for exam-ple an organizational field, for example Reayand Hinings (2005), or on how a higher-level institutional logic at the societal-sectorlevel transforms strategies of action in alower-level domain, for example Havemanand Rao (1997) and Meyer andHammerschmid (2006). This difference maybe partly reflected in the research design, forexample the qualitative study of a case versusthe quantitative analysis of a specific instan-tiation of an institutional order. These differ-ences may also be reflected in how thecamera lens is focused. That is, if you getclose to the action as qualitative researchersare able to do, one is more likely to interpretthe action as a power struggle when indeed itmay also reflect the operation of higher-levelinstitutional forces.

MISCONCEPTIONS REGARDINGINSTITUTIONAL LOGICS

With respect to the institutional logicsapproach there are several misconceptions inour view that we feel compelled to commenton. One is a continued juxtaposition betweeninstitutional and market structures (e.g.,Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). While mar-kets are economic structures – they are alsoinstitutions. They function because of a set offormal laws and normative expectationsabout them and these normative expectationshave changed through time and space.

A market in one historical and cultural con-text is not the same as a market in another(Fligstein, 1996). Similarly non-market institutions, such as professions, the family,and religion are also economic structures andare not independent from market forces of demand and supply (Friedland and Alford,1991).

Second, institutional logics do not emergefrom organizational fields – they are locallyinstantiated and enacted in organizationalfields as in other places such as markets,industries, and organizations. Institutionallogics stem from the institutional orders ofthe inter-institutional system (Friedland andAlford, 1991), not as commonly miscon-strued from an organizational field (Scott,2001: 139). Institutional logics through various mechanisms may get reshaped andcustomized in an organizational field.However, an organizational field is a level ofanalysis; it is a place where institutionallogics get played out, but not by itself a theoretical mechanism. Friedland and Alford(1991: 244) have commented around thisissue:

defining the boundaries of an organizational field,within which there are strong pressures for conformity, is difficult and potentially tautological.The approach seems to assume that formal attributes of organizational fields can be specifiedindependently of the institutional arena in whichthey are located. But, we would argue, it is thecontent of an institutional order that shapes themechanisms by which organizations are able toconform or deviate from established patterns.These institutional orders, and the specific relationsbetween them, delimit types of organizationalfields.

Third, ideal types are not a description ofwhat happens in an organizational field. Idealtypes are formal analytical models by whichto compare empirical observations acrossinstitutions. Therefore, ideal types are bestdeveloped at least in pairs, if not multiplecharacterizations. Instead, often what areoften mischaracterized as ideal types are adescription of a particular case study ratherthan a set of findings that can be refuted orgeneralized and aggregated.


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Fourth, most studies of institutional logicsdo not in some way tie their analyses back tothe institutional orders of the inter-institutional system. This is partly due topage limitation requirements of the journalsand a focus on other alternative units ofanalysis. In other cases it appears due to theauthors who do not focus on causal relation-ships both up and down stream. To simplyand briefly recognize these multi-level relationships is important to further thedevelopment of the institutional logicsapproach as it systematically advances andforeshadows questions for future study. Forexample, why do culinary critics, the lynchpin of the four mechanisms that begin theshift in chef identities, decide to favor nouvelle over classic cuisine? Are these critics, for example, increasingly undermarket pressures or have professional pres-sures changed in some way?

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURERESEARCH

The main intellectual hurdle in institutionalanalysis is in many respects the same as it isfor sociological theory more generally. Weneed to better understand how macro-levelstates at one point in time influence individ-uals’ orientations to their actions, prefer-ences, beliefs; how these orientations toaction influence how individuals act; andhow the actions of individuals constitute themacro-level outcomes that we seek toexplain. Moreover, how does the stability ofinstitutional logics change systematically bylevel of analysis – is it more stable or change-able at the top or bottom, macro- or micro-level of analysis? This is a big theoreticalquestion.

We need more work on the microfounda-tions of institutional logics. Work on institu-tional logics is inherently cross-level,highlighting the interplay between individu-als, organizations, and institutions. While theembedded agency of actors is a key meta-theoretical assumption, as discussed above, afully developed perspective on institutional

theory requires increased attention to itsmicrofoundations. DiMaggio’s (1997) paperon culture and cognition is a start, providinga link between the microfoundations of cognitive processes and the cultural structures inherent in institutional logics. Butcognitive theory is only part of the story. TheCarnegie School is another source and therecent call for a neo-Carnegie perspectivemay also yield answers (Gavetti, Levinthal,and Ocasio, 2007). Given the rejection ofrational choice theory, how embedded inter-ests, identity and commitments play a role isan important topic for further theoreticaldevelopment and empirical research.

New methodologies that make use of web-based experiments show promise inresearch linking levels of analysis and also inpartitioning causes and effects by level ofanalysis, helping to specify the underlyingtheoretical mechanisms (Thornton, 2004).For example, Salganik, Dodds, and Watts(2006) show the micro-macro linkages inhow people select songs. This partitioningalso should address the meta-theoreticalassumption of incorporating both the material and cultural. However, incorporatingboth is not enough – what is needed is theoryand methods to partition these effects – that isto understand the autonomy of culture fromeconomy (DiMaggio, 1994).

Future research needs to move beyondimplicit assumptions and to engage explicitdiscussion of the underlying theoreticalmechanisms, that is the clear identification ofthe ‘gears and ball bearings behind the statis-tical models’ (Davis and Marquis, 2005).Without formalization of the theory andmethods, studies of institutions cannot buildupon or invalidate one another and the socialscience of institutions cannot grow systemat-ically (Pfeffer, 1993). Instead, it will be forgotten as it was in the past (Hughes, 1939;Selznick, 1949, 1957).

Most research on institutional analysis hasrevealed the effects of market rationalizationor state regulation; the latter is more aboutresource dependence than institutional analy-sis. In theory, other underlying patterns ofinstitutional change should exist. Given the


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interpenetration of institutions across levelsthis raises the question of what implicationsthis has for the rise of market logics in soci-etal sectors where you would not expect tosee markets operating, such as in the case offamilies and the rising salience of religions ina world system.

Institutional change occurring in theglobal multi-national context provides fertileground for new research. Contrary toFriedland and Alford's (1991) formulation,the institutional logics perspective and inparticular the inter-institutional system is ananalytical tool not limited to expectations ofWestern culture. It is also useful in analysesof international contexts as evidenced byrecent applications examining the influenceof cross-national institutional logics onemployee training (Luo, 2007) and businessgroup restructuring in emerging economies(Chung and Luo, forthcoming).

We think there is a healthy growth ofmeasurement strategies of institutional logicson the horizon. Most quantitative research oninstitutional logics has relied on indirectmeasures of institutional logics, attemptingto bolster this approach by combiningresearch methodologies and triangulatinghistorical and interview methodologies withquantitative methodologies. Content analyticmethodologies by Scott et al. have beenattempted, albeit these have not been incorporated directly into the literature.Research on vocabularies and cultural structures provide opportunities in this areaand the use of techniques employed in mar-keting such as focus groups and the field test-ing of ideal types. More cross-over researchis needed between network and institutionalscholars as network methodologies offer awell-established set of methods that can beused for direct measurement of the meaningof cultural categories (Breiger and Mohr, 2004).

How institutional logics become institu-tionalized and deinstitutionalized continuesto be a vibrant vein of work. Synthesis of thestate of what we know in this realm isneeded. While work on institutional changehas focused on the role of competing logics

in institutional change, we need work oninstitutional logics, at various levels, organi-zations, industries, fields, societies, andworld systems can themselves be institution-alized and deinstitutionalized. In examiningthis issue it is important to distinguishbetween changes in logics and changes inpractices. What constitutes an institutionremains an unresolved conceptual issue for the field. How and why actors manipulateand switch institutional logics and in particular cases in which manipulations andswitches are not supported by cultural analogy are important empirical papers toanticipate.

CONCLUSION

With the exception of DiMaggio andPowell’s (1983) theory of isomorphism,institutional theory has lacked coherence.Subsequently, two papers have affected theabandonment of isomorphism theory and thecognitive meta-theory espoused byDiMaggio and Powell (1991), namely that ofKraatz and Zajac (1996) and Hirsch’s (1997)(in our judgment inaccurate) critique ofScott’s ([1995] 2001) emphasis on the cogni-tive perspective. The impact of these papersleft institutional theory adrift with Scott’s‘carriers’ perspective. As a result, much ofwhat is called institutional theory these daysis not very institutional at all. Instead it isabout resource dependencies, political strug-gles, social movements, and other mecha-nisms which, while important, are reallyabout non-institutional forces driving institu-tional change. Within this political sociolog-ical vein, culture is relegated to the narrowertopic of how groups and social movementsmake use of rhetoric and framing to be persuasive (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).The institutional logics approach provides animportant remedy to this theoretical driftaway from institutional effects, by highlight-ing how the cultural dimensions of institu-tions both enable and constrain social action.

We review how the institutional logicsapproach is a systematic way to theorize and


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measure the influence of institutions on indi-vidual and organizational behavior. Withoutpositing isomorphism or organizational sta-bility, the institutional logics approach offersprecision in understanding how individualand organizational behavior is located in asocial context and the social mechanisms thatinfluence that behavior. By categorizing soci-etal influences as an inter-institutionalsystem, previously tractable issues such asembedded agency and institutional changecan be better addressed. Through the use ofincreasingly sophisticated methods of inter-pretive analysis, most notably the use of idealtypes and discourse analysis coupled withquantitative modeling techniques, the institu-tional logics approach is well positioned tocontinue to address the questions of the cog-nitive meaning of culture and institutions.

An important advantage of the institu-tional logics approach as meta-theory is itssystematic means to associate various theo-ries (explanations) of organization and actionin which institutions and their effects andhow actors constitute institutions can beunderstood and measured objectively – theycan be heard, recorded, classified, and asso-ciated with a set of actors and strategicactions.

In this review we focused on an analysis ofthe implicit and explicit social mechanismsin a variety of studies, not on the descriptionor strength of their empirical findings. Ourapproach was guided by believing that theadvancement of institutional analysis in thesocial sciences requires an analytic, not adescriptive approach, that ‘explains’observed associations between individuals,organizations, and societies.

NOTES

1 Publishers included among others, LenLouchow, former CEO of Jossey-Bass, and JohnDavis, former head of the Prentice-Hall CollegeDivision. Louchow used the ideal types in teachingthe leadership course for the Stanford UniversityPublishers College.

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APPENDIX


Table 3.1 Ideal types of institutional logics in public accountingCharacteristic Fiduciary logic Corporate logicEconomic system Personal capitalism Managerial capitalism

Sources of identity Accounting as a profession Accounting as an industry

Sources of legitimacy Reputation of CPAs Scale and scope of firmStandardization & conservatism

Sources of authority Professional association Management committeeGovernment regulation Managing partners

Government regulation

Basis of mission Build legitimacy of public corporation Build seasonal stability of firmBuild prestige of partnership Build status position of firm through growth

Basis of attention Selling legitimacy Selling servicesGenerating profits

Basis of strategy Standardize and authenticate Growth through mergers and acquisitionsclient financial statements Differentiate on client service

Logic of investment Build legitimacy of profession Build wealth & career of partners

Governance mechanism CPA partnership Private corporationCPA ownership Majority CPA ownership

Institutional entrepreneurs British: Waterhouse, Big 8 accounting firmsYoung, Niven American: Haskels, Sells, Andersen

Event sequencing 1896–1921 State CPA World War IIlegislation 1965–1975 Consolidation to Big 8

1933, 1934 Securities Acts Corporate merger wave1938 SEC Accounting Series 1970s–1980s FTC ruling on open competitionRelease no. 4 1980s–1990s Consolidation to Big 5

2001 Enron collapse2001 Andersen bankruptcy

Structural overlap Intentional reduction of overlap CPA – ConsultingCPA – Lawyers in tax practice CPA – Lawyers in tax practice

Table 3.2 Ideal types of institutional logics in architectureCharacteristic Aesthetic logic Efficiency logicEconomic system Personal capitalism Managerial capitalism

Sources of identity Architect as artist–entrepreneur Architect as engineer–manager

Sources of legitimacy Reputation of architect Scale and scope of firmAesthetics of design Efficiency and economics of design

Sources of authority Design prowess Managing partner or supervisor

Basis of mission Build personal reputation Build multidisciplinary firmBuild prestige of firm Build market position of firm

Basis of attention Resolve design problems and Resolve technological and organizational entrepreneurial challenges challenges

Basis of strategy Increase prestige of patron or Increase number of corporate clientsgovernment sponsor Build recurring clientele

Win design competitions Increase markets for services

Logic of investment Build wealth and prestige of Build wealth of partnersentrepreneurs

Continued

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Table 3.2 Ideal types of institutional logics in architecture—cont’dCharacteristic Aesthetic logic Efficiency logicGovernance mechanism Entrepreneurial firm (atelier) Partnership ownership

Profession Private global multidisciplinary corporation

Institutional entrepreneurs H. H. Richardson, R. M. Hunt, Louis Sullivan, Wm Le Baron Jenney,R. R. Ware, Robert Venturi Walter Gropius, Mies Van der Rohe

Event sequencing 1857 Founding of Increased immigration and industrializationArchitecture profession 1871 Chicago Fire provides commercial

1893 Chicago Fair reinforces building opportunitiesaesthetic of Beaux Art tradition World War I provides building

1967 Postmodernism treatise rejects opportunities and implementation of aesthetic of minimalism new aesthetic which rejects history

World War II immigration of modernist architects to U.S.

Structural overlap Professions – architects, Professions – architects, engineers, and engineers, and contractors contractors

Clients – government and Clients – real estate speculators and wealthy individuals as patrons corporations

Table 3.3 Ideal types of institutional logics in higher-education publishingCharacteristic Editorial logic Market logicEconomic system Personal capitalism Market capitalism

Sources of identity Publishing as a profession Publishing as a business

Sources of legitimacy Personal reputation Market position of firmEducation value Share value

Sources of authority Founder–editor CEOPersonal networks Corporate hierarchyPrivate ownership Public ownership

Basis of mission Build prestige of house Build competitive position of Increase sales corporation

Increase profits

Basis of attention Author–editor networks Resource competition

Basis of strategy Organic growth Acquisition growthBuild personal imprints Build market channels

Logic of investment Capital committed to firm Capital committed to market return

Governance mechanism Family ownership Market for corporate controlTrade association

Institutional entrepreneurs Prentice Hall ThomsonRichard Prentice Ettinger Michael Brown

Event sequencing Increased public funding to education Founding of boutique investment Increased college enrollments bankersWall St. announces good investment Founding of publishing finance

newsletters

Structural overlap 1950–1960s Prentice Hall internal 1980s acquisitions wavecorporate ventures and spin-offs

1960s acquisitions wave

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thornton, ocasio - 2008 - institutional logics

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