theorizing cultural identities: historical institutionalism as a challenge to the culturalists

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Theorizing Cultural Identities: Historical Institutionalism as a Challenge to the CulturalistsAuthor(s): André LecoursSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 33,No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 499-522Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3232580 .

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Theorizing Cultural Identities: Historical Institutionalism as a Challenge to the Culturalists

ANDRI LECOURS Carleton University

The interest of philosophers in the politics of cultural identity was one of the most interesting developments in this field in the 1990s.1 Their involvement in an area dominated by historians, sociologists, political scientists and anthropologists2 has been particularly evident in Canada

1 Cultural identity politics has been studied primarily within the field of nationalism and ethnicity. Scholars of nationalism have focused on groups whose members share cultural markers and a historical territorial basis while specialists of ethnicity have also examined cultural diversity resulting from immigration. The work of philosophers on cultural identities has dealt with these two related subject matters. See, for example, Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. A Lib- eral Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). This article addresses primarily the case of historical cultural groups. On the recent interest of philosophers in the politics of cultural identity, see Will Kymlicka's introduction to The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1-3. See also Allen Buchanan, "What's So Special About Nations?" in Joce- lyne Couture, Kai Nelson and Michael Seymour, eds., Rethinking Nationalism (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1998), 28.

2 The first academic studies of nationalism are usually traced to the two "founding fathers" of the field, historians Carleton B. Hayes and Hans Kohn. See Carleton B. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: Russell, 1931) and Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. A Study in its Origin and Back- ground (New York: Macmillan, 1944). The use of the term "ethnicity" becomes popular only in the 1970s, as African-Americans challenge the social and political order in the United States. The work of Nathan Glazer and Patrick Moynihan opened the way for the study of related phenomena with their Ethnicity. Theory and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). Historians who have made significant contributions to the field of nationalism and ethnicity include Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism. Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and John Breuilly, Nationalism

Andre Lecours, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario KiS 5B6; [email protected]

Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique XXXIII:3 (September/Septembre 2000) 499-522

@ 2000 Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Soci~t6 qu~b~coise de science politique



500 ANDRIA LECOURS

where scholars such as Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor have shaped the way many academics understand cultural identity politics.3 These theorists have favoured a cultural approach to the phenomenon. They have established frameworks for understanding and managing multi- ethnic states that stress the inherent strength and meaning of culture. Their goal is to interpret the meaning of cultural identities and to suggest strategies to deal with their claims rather than to explain how they are created and made politically relevant. As such, these theorists leave the last two questions unanswered. In fact, their approach is unable to tackle these issues as a consequence of two assumptions. The first is that identities flow naturally and spontaneously from cultural markers. This assumption is accompanied by the idea that cultural identities are more fundamental than others and mutually exclusive. The second is that cultural identities are inherently political. These arguments are similar to those in an older literature from the 1960s and 1970s known as "primordialism" whose contributors debated

and the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982). Prominent sociologists include Anthony D. Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) and Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism, The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). Politi- cal scientists such as Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism. The Quest for Under- standing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) and Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison (London: Sage, 1991) have made their mark on the field. Anthropologists have also produced seminal works. See Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution. Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics," in Old Societies and New States. The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) and Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Differences (Lon- don: Allen & Unwin, 1969). Political philosophers have been remarkably absent from this field. One exception is Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber ofHumanity. Chapters in the History ofldeas (London: Murray, 1990).

3 Not all philosophers who have taken interest in cultural identity politics have adopted similar approaches. There is, however, a discernable school of thought, embodied by the work of scholars such as Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, Yael Tamir, Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, which is the focus of the first part of this article. Allen Buchanan refers to this school when he states that "a growing number of political philosophers are endorsing self-determination." See "What's So Special About Nations?" 283. See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship; Charles Taylor, Rapprocher les solitudes. Ecrits sur le ftddralisme et le nationalisme au Canada (Ste-Foy: Les Presses de l'Universit6 Laval, 1992); Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, "National Self-Determination," in Kymlicka, ed., The Rights of Minority Cultures, 79-92. For a different perspective, see Janet Ajzen- stat, "Decline of Procedural Liberalism: The Slippery Slope to Secession," in Joseph H. Carens, ed., Is Quebec Nationalism Just? Perspective from Anglophone Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995) and Harry Brig- house, "Against Nationalism," in Couture et al., eds., Rethinking Nationalism, 365-405.



Abstract. The recent interest in cultural identities by a group of theorists that includes, most notably, Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor revives an old debate on the nature and political consequences of these identities. These theorists, called culturalists in this article, have adopted a cultural approach to identity politics which tends to assume that cultural markers translate naturally and spontaneously into identities that are inherently political. This article argues that cultural identities and their political manifestations are not "givens," and that theorizing cultural identity politics should begin with questions on the processes of identity formation, transformation and politicization. It suggests turning to institutions to answer these questions, and finds in the historical institutionalist literature insight for theories of cultural identity politics. Historical institutionalism has been used primarily in the field of public policy, and its potential remains largely unexploited. It stresses the role of political institutions in shaping social and political outcomes, and holds that these outcomes are contextual and "path dependent," as they are shaped by varying institutional factors. This theoretical position makes historical institutionalism a particularly promising approach to explain the contingencies, fluctuations and irregularities of cultural identities and their political manifestations.

Resume. L'int~rft accord6 aux identit~s culturelles par plusieurs thdoriciens, dont Will Kymlicka et Charles Taylor, r~actualise le d~bat sur la nature et les consequences politiques de ces identit~s. Ces th6oriciens, d~sign~s sous le vocable <culturalistes>> dans cet article, ont adopt6 une approche culturelle des identit~s politiques qui postule que les traits culturels se transforment naturellement et spontan~ment en identit~s ayant une essence politique. Cet article soutient que la nature politique des identit~s culturelles et de leurs manifestations n'est pas ?donne>> et que la thdorisation de la dimension politique des identit~s culturelles devrait 8tre fond~e sur un questionnement des processus de formation, de transformation et de politisation des identit~s. Il suggbre de se tourner vers les institutions pour rdpondre i ces questions et montre que la litt~rature institutionnaliste historique est une source d'inspiration pour les theories sur les caract~ristiques politiques des identit~s culturelles. Le potentiel de l'institutionnalisme historique, utilis6 i l'origine dans le domaine des politiques publiques, demeure largement inexploit6. Cette approche insiste sur le r61e des institutions en tant que determinants des ph~nomines sociaux et politiques. En raison de cette position thdorique, l'institutionnalisme historique est une approche particulibrement pertinente pour l'explication du caractbre contingent, fluctuant et irr~gulier des identit~s culturelles et de leurs manifestations politiques.

"modernists" on the essence of these identities.4 Indeed, the cultural approach articulated more recently revives an old debate concerning the nature of cultural identities and their political consequences.

On the one hand, this cultural approach furthers the understanding of cultural identity politics by alerting theorists to its subjective and emotional dimensions. On the other, its core assumptions limit its ability to provide insight into the construction, transformation, politicization and mobilization of these identities. This article suggests that the shortcomings of the cultural approach point to a new perspective

4 Early primordialists include J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (Lon- don: Cambridge University Press, 1949); M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley: University of California, 1965); Geertz, "The Inte- grative Revolution," and Pierre van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (New York: Elsevier, 1979).



502 ANDRI LECOURS

and new research opportunities. It argues that research and theorizing on cultural identities should begin with questions concerning their creation, transformation, politicization and mobilization. It suggests that gaining insight into these processes requires adopting a political approach, and, more specifically, focusing on political institutions.5 It points to the new institutionalist literature, particularly historical institutionalism, as a source of inspiration for theorizing cultural identities. Historical institutionalism has produced many stimulating studies in political science, especially in public policy,6 but its potential to illuminate cultural identities and their political manifestations remains largely unexploited. Its central argument, that political institutions shape social and political outcomes, suggests that institutions affect as well as reflect identities. This view challenges the dominant perspective on the relationship between political institutions and cultural identities, since institutions tend to be understood strictly as instruments to manage identities and claims that are considered "givens." Further- more, historical institutionalism's historical perspective, its concept of "path dependency" and its conceptualization of structure-agency relationships represent theoretical, conceptual and methodological tools that enable theorists to make sense of the contingencies, irregularities and spatial-temporal variations associated with cultural identities and their political consequences.

Cultural Identity Politics: The Cultural Approach

The current interest of political philosophers in the politics of cultural identity is not surprising considering that at least two recent developments featuring cultural diversity have raised questions of morality and justice.7 The first is the increased volume of international population movements resulting from immigration, refugees and the creation

5 The marginalization of "the weight of government, and the moulding effects of institutions on political behaviour" in Canadian and comparative studies has been noticed and found problematic by several observers, perhaps most notably Alan Cairns. See Douglas E. Williams, ed., Constitution, Government, and Soci- ety in Canada. Selected Essays by Alan C. Cairns (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 169.

6 Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Ellen M. Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1992); Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State. Rea- gan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1994); and Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

7 See, again, Will Kymlicka's introduction in The Rights of Minority Cultures, 1-3.



Historical Institutionalism as a Challenge to the Culturalists 503

of movement-free zones such as the European Union. These population movements, triggered in part by the increasingly porous borders of states and the many regional conflicts that have followed the end of the Cold War, have significantly altered the cultural and sociological profile of many societies. These transformations have raised issues concerning the political and legal framework necessary to accommo- date the new reality. The second is the surge of claims for autonomy or independence on the basis of cultural distinctiveness. The emergence, or resurgence, of nationalist movements since the 1970s is significant, for it discredited the "diffusionist" model which equated nationalism with political integration.8 A group of theorists, let us call them culturalists, has sought to interpret the meaning of these movements by focusing on their cultural dimension.

The specific aim of culturalists in tackling issues of identity is twofold. First, they seek to find responses to groups whose claims for autonomy and recognition rest on culture. This exercise includes laying the theoretical basis for constitutional and institutional reform. This problem-solving focus explains why many such theorists are Canadian. The work of Charles Taylor is permeated by the dilemmas posed to Canadian political actors by the rise of Qu6b6cois nationalism.9 Will Kymlicka has also drawn on the Canadian situation for his research, paying particular attention to Canada's Aboriginal communities.10 These theorists have also engaged in collective enterprises aimed at finding solutions to the current constitutional impasse." Second, they have been engaged in an intellectual project that seeks to make room for culture in social and political theory. Their target is the traditional liberal doctrine which conceptualizes the autonomous individual independent from its cultural environment. For scholars such as Will Kymlicka or Yael Tamir, the challenge is to reconcile liberalism with collective rights or, more specifically, with nationalism.12 For Charles Taylor, it is to articulate a social and political theory that would be more sensitive to cultural identity than liberalism.13

8 This model is best embodied by the work of Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. An Inquiry into the Formation of Nationality (Cam- bridge: MIT Press, 1966).

9 Taylor, Rapprocher les solitudes. See particularly the introduction by Guy Laforest. 10 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1989), 173-76. 11 See Will Kymlicka and Guy Laforest's contributions to Guy Laforest and Roger

Gibbins, eds., Sortir de I' impasse, les voies de la rdconciliation (Montreal: IRPP, 1998).

12 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship; and Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. See also Carens, ed., Is Quebec Nationalism Just?

13 This theory is known as "communitarianism." See Charles Taylor, "Atomism," in Philosophical Papers 2, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cam-



504 ANDR1 LECOURS

The nature of these theorists' project leads them to focus their research on the political manifestations of cultural identity, and on strategies of accommodation. Consequently, there are important issues they do not investigate, such as how identities are formed, transformed, politicized and mobilized. In fact, their approach to identity politics seems to rest on assumptions about the relationship between cultural markers, identities and political claims that hinder investigation into these issues. Their emphasis on the strength of the bond between individuals and their culture suggests that cultural markers translate necessarily and naturally into identities. This assumption tends to entail that cultural identities are more primordial and more important than other identities, as well as mutually exclusive. The stress placed by culturalists on the power of culture and the importance of cultural identity for fulfilment also suggests that these identities necessarily lead to political claims. In other words, self-determination, in the form of autonomy or independence, would be the natural and almost inevitable consequence of the identity that comes with cultural distinctiveness. These assumptions are problematic, for they preclude investigating the mechanisms of identity formation, transformation, politicization and mobilization that are central to the politics of cultural identity. Moreover, considering cultural identities as politically generated and transformed rather than as "givens" of social existence which are inherently political is not only theoretically more promising, but empirically more accurate.

The idea that cultural identities are "givens" of social life origi- nates in the belief that cultural markers are the natural, and most fundamental, constitutive elements of individual and collective personali- ties. This argument holds that these identities are the natural and inevitable consequence of the mystical and spiritual bond between human beings and their culture, particularly language. The relationship between language and the human condition is at the centre of Taylor's philosophy and his approach to the politics of cultural identity. Taylor has been heavily influenced by the philosophy of Johann Gottfried Herder.14 For Herder and Taylor, language has a natural subjective meaning. It is more than a simple instrument for communication and represents the essence of the human subject. Taylor argues that man is above all a "language animal" and insists on the mysterious and enigmatic character of this relationship.1" Furthermore, for

bridge University Press, 1985), 187-210. Guy Laforest is close to Taylor's position, see his "Herder, Kedourie et les errements de l'antinationalisme" and "Lib6ralisme et nationalisme au Canada," in De la prudence. Textes politiques (Montr6al: Bor6al, 1993), 59-84 and 85-118.

14 Laforest, "Herder, Kedourie et les errements de l'antinationalisme," 77-78. 15 Charles Taylor, "Language and Human Nature," in Philosophical Papers 1.

Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 216.




him, language allows individuals to ask and answer questions relevant to their existence, thus enabling them to build their own conception of a good life. The crucial role played by language in the constitution of the self translates into a need to belong to a cultural community,16 as membership in such a community is essential to the fulfilment of its potential. For Taylor, these communities are the condition of selfhood. Kymlicka argues that the bond between individuals and their own culture can be attributed in part to culture providing meaningful options to individuals. He also states that the profound sources of this bond "lie deep in the human condition, tied up with the way humans as cultural creatures need to make sense of their world" and that "a full explanation would involve aspects of psychology, sociology, linguis- tics, the philosophy of mind, and even neurology."'17 For him, the strength of the attachment of individuals to their culture is the underlying force behind national identities. This bond is "a fact" and national identities are "givens."18

The arguments presented by Taylor and Kymlicka on the relationship between human nature, culture and identities are shared by others. Yael Tamir, for example, holds that "membership in a national culture is part of the essence of being human" and that one could not be "totally dissociated from any cultural national reference and remain human."•9 This connection between cultural identities and the human condition suggests that these identities are more important and more fundamental than others related to gender, socio-economic status or age. Avishai Mar- galit and Joseph Raz argue that "people's sense of their own identity is bound up with their sense of belonging to encompassing groups," and that membership in these groups provide individuals with "an anchor for their self-identification and the safety of effortless secure belonging."20 They also argue that the bond between individuals and culture is so fundamental that individual dignity and self-respect are directly connected to group status.21 Taylor shares this primordial view of cultural identity.

16 Charles Taylor, "Pourquoi les nations doivent-elles se transformer en Etats?" in Rapprocher les solitudes, 52-53.

17 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 90. 18 Ibid., 90, 184. Kymlicka states that "to some extent national identities must be

taken as givens." His overall approach suggests, however, that he considers them largely givens (my emphasis in the second italics).

19 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 36. 20 Margalit and Raz, "National Self-Determination," 86-87. This article was first pub-

lished in Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990), 439-61. The authors call "encompassing groups" groups that have six features: (1) their members share a common culture, (2) they are marked by this culture, (3) they find in it the key to their self-identification, (4) membership is a matter of mutual recognition (5) and of belonging, not achievement. Finally, (6) the groups are not face-to-face small groups. Ibid., 82-85.

21 Ibid., 87.



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Indeed, he makes it very clear which type of identity is the most important, and deserves to be recognized and protected.22 The argument for the primacy of cultural identity is also apparent in Kymlicka's distinction between national and civic identity (or patriotism), 23 where the former has a cultural basis while the latter does not. Indeed, Kymlicka's sugges- tion that individuals can adhere to a civic identity only through their national identity negates the possibility that non-cultural identities could be as strong (or stronger) than cultural ones.24 The ontological consequence of this emphasis on culture as the central force of the human condition is the conceptualization of cultural communities as a fundamental socio-political reality. The position that the world is naturally divided and organized into "pervasive cultures"25 leads to them being chosen as primary units of analysis for socio-political behaviour. The idea that culture is the primary reference for self-identification also suggests that cultural identities are mutually exclusive: Kymlicka's insis- tence that individuals need to have access to their own culture excludes the possibility that they may have more than one culture.26 It assumes a rigid dichotomy between one's own culture (never cultures) and others.

A second assumption that pervades culturalists' work is that identities are inherently political. This argument has been developed most explicitly in discussions on self-determination. Tamir makes a case for a distinction between self-rule and self-determination, where the former involves civil rights and political participation while the latter refers to the natural desire of individuals to project their cultural identity into the public sphere. Tamir's argument for a cultural interpretation of self-determination is based on the idea that individuals naturally "wish to be ruled by institutions informed by a culture they find understandable and meaningful."27 In other words, cultural identities have natural political consequences. Margalit and Raz share similar assumptions on the relationship between cultural identities and politics; they argue that the well-being of individuals is connected to their ability to express publicly their cultural identity, and that this public expression of membership in an "encompassing group" finds in the political sphere an attractive arena for its manifestation.28 For Charles

22 See Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" (Prince- ton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

23 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 13, 187. 24 Ibid., 190. 25 Margalit and Raz, "National Self-Determination," 86. Will Kymlicka uses "societal

cultures." See Multicultural Citizenship, 75. 26 See Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative," in

Kymlicka, ed., The Rights of Minority Cultures, 93-119, first published in Univer- sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25 (1992), 751-93.

27 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 72. 28 Margalit and Raz, "National Self-Determination," 89.




Taylor, claims for autonomy follow naturally the emergence of cultural identities.29 These claims are the consequence of a process of self-identification whose origins may be found in the mystical bond between individuals and their culture.

The arguments presented above are similar to those of the classic primordialist position.30 Jack Eller and Reed Coughlan define this position in terms of three core ideas: apriority, affectivity and ineffability.31 Apriority refers to the idea that cultural identities pre-exist social action and politics; affectivity alludes to the spiritual and inescapable bond associated with these identities; ineffability expresses their inherent strength. This primordialist position was introduced in the 1960s and 1970s by scholars reflecting on the challenges of the newly independent states in Asia and Africa, and on the emergence, or resurgence, of nationalist movements in the West. These scholars situated the forces shaping ethnic politics around "primordial ties" or "primordial attachments." The classic primordialist statement is found in the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz who viewed the future of newly independent states as being inextricably linked to the tension between, on the one hand, an integrative revolution that seeks to create a new form of community based on citizenship, and, on the other, "primordial attachments."32 Geertz holds that primordial attachments result from the "givens" of social existence (assumed blood ties, race, language, region, religion and custom) which "have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves."33 He views these attachments as natural and universal, and argues that "for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural-some would say spiritual-affinity than from social interaction."34 Harold Isaacs has emphasized the fundamental character of these primordial attachments, which he calls "basic group identity." This identity, "which consists of the ready-made set of endowments and identification that every individual shares with others from the moment of the birth,"35 must not be mistaken with the less important "secondary group identities" such as class. For Isaacs, "it is in the inwardness of group iden-

29 Taylor, "Pourquoi les nations doivent-elles se transformer en Etats?" 54. 30 Sasja Tempelman calls Taylor's position on cultural identity politics "primordialist

multiculturalism." See "Constructions of Cultural Identity: Multiculturalism and Exclusion," Political Studies 47 (1999), 17-31.

31 Jack Eller and Reed Coughlan, "The Poverty of Primordialism: the Demystification of Ethnic Attachments," Ethnic and Racial Studies 16 (1993), 183-202.

32 Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," 105-75. 33 Ibid., 109. 34 Ibid., 110. 35 Harold R. Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe. Group Identity and Political Change (Cam-

bridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 38.



508 ANDRI LECOURS

tity [that] we can learn more than we know now about the interaction of the individual, his group, and the larger politics of his time and place and more, therefore, about the nature of our common contemporary experience."36 Sociobiologists such as Pierre van den Berghe have argued that basic group identity has a biological as well as a socio- cultural basis and that it can "be understood as an extended and attenu- ated form of kin selection."'37

The assumptions of cultural approaches on the nature and consequences of cultural identities are problematic empirically and theoretically. The empirical problem is twofold. First, there is evidence to suggest that the strength of the bond between individuals and their language is variable and situational. Paul Brass's research into one of the world's most linguistically diverse societies, India, has revealed patterns of language change that suggest that "many people, if not most people, never think about their language at all and never attach any emotional signifi- cance to it."38 The phenomenon of dual political identities also raises doubts on the mystical and spiritual character of the relationship between humans and culture. The fact that most Catalans, Galicians and many Basques feel at least as Spanish as they do Catalan, Galician and Basque undermines the idea that culture is necessarily the primary and most powerful determinant of identity.39 Switzerland weakens this argument even more. Indeed, the Swiss case is troublesome for culturalists. Kymlicka argues that describing Swiss identity as a national identity is "misleading" since the different language groups are "national groups." Consequently, Swiss identity has meaning only through membership in the groups.40 These propositions are dubious. The sense of Swiss identity is very strong and there is nothing to indicate that it is dependent on membership in language groups. In fact, Wolf Linder argues that "thanks to its political institutions, Switzerland became a nation and has found its own identity as a modern society."41 In sum, cultural diversity in Switzerland should not be equated with feelings of self-identification.42

36 Ibid., 45. 37 Pierre van den Berghe, "Race and Ethnicity: a Sociobiological Perspective," Eth-

nic and Racial Studies 4 (1978), 403. See also, The Ethnic Phenomenon. 38 Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison, 70. See also Lan-

guage, Religion and Politics in India (London: Cambridge University Press), 1974. 39 See the data and analysis presented by Luis Moreno, La federalizacidn de Espaia.

Poder politico y territorio (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno de Espafia Editores, 1997), 123-40.

40 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 13. 41 Wolf Linder, Swiss Democracy. Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural

Societies (London: Macmillan, 1998), 36. 42 See Jiirg Steiner and Jeffrey Obler's distinction between cultural diversity and

subcultural segmentation, "Does the Consociational Theory Really Hold for Switzerland?" in Milton Esman, ed., Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 332-33.




Second, cultural identities that do not put forward any claims for autonomy (or do so very weakly) defy the assumption that these types of identities have natural political consequences. The strong Basque nationalist movement in Spain and the absence of such a movement in the French Basque Country suggests that Basque identity may have very different consequences depending on its institutional context. The sharp contrast between the strong political claims of two of the three Spanish "historical nationalities," Catalonia and the Basque Country, and the weak claims of the third, Galicia, also suggests that cultural identities are not inherently political.

The cultural approach also has serious theoretical shortcomings. Its central flaw lies in its conceptualization of cultural/ethnic groups as natural, coherent, permanent and inherently subjective entities. This problem has been noticed by Chandran Kukathas who, in his defence of traditional individualist liberal theory against culturalist discourse, argues that "groups are not fixed and unchanging entities in the moral and political universe. Groups are constantly forming and dissolving in response to political and institutional circumstances."43 He goes on to explain that the Malays in Malaysia, the Ibo in Nigeria and the Moro in the Philippines emerged as distinct groups only after colonial powers altered the political-territorial structuring of their "possessions."'44 As a result of their conceptualization of groups and identities, culturalists are unable to explain how cultural identities are formed and transformed. Consequently, they cannot explain why cultural markers acquire a subjective meaning only in some cases, nor can they account for the timing of the emergence of identities. Their approach is also unable to explain why and how cultural identities become politically relevant and it does not explain why only some cultural identities are politicized and why most of them are politicized at certain times only. These criticisms of culturalists are, to some degree, unfair. Indeed, their goal is to prescribe rather than explain, and their normative methods are not designed to uncover the underlying forces of social and political processes. Nevertheless, par- ticipants in multidisciplinary debates, such as the one on cultural identity politics, may be expected to justify and defend not only the finer nuances of their analysis, but also the more general assumptions underlying their approach. Therefore, the question of the appropriate- ness of a cultural approach to identity politics is perfectly legitimate. In fact, it is crucial. The limited capacity of the cultural approach to illuminate the processes of identity formation, transformation, politi-

43 Chandran Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" Political Theory 20 (1992), 110.

44 Ibid., 111.



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cization and mobilization suggests exploring new avenues. One such avenue is to view identities as a political phenomenon, and to focus on political institutions to provide insight into their development and claims. Most approaches to identity politics that stress the overpowering strength of cultural markers include institutions in their framework only as instruments to manage identities and to respond to claims that are considered "givens." They do not conceptualize political institutions as an independent or a crucial intervening variable. The historical institutionalist literature and its focus on the role of political institutions in shaping social and political outcomes represents a promising source of theoretical insight for specialists of cultural identity politics.

Historical Institutionalism: Theoretical Insight into the Politics of Cultural Identity

The 1990s saw political science develop a renewed interest in institutions as reflected in the growing importance of the new institutionalist literature.45 Of course, the focus of political scientists on institutions is not a new phenomenon. The field of comparative politics was dedi- cated, until the mid-1950s, to the study of formal-legal structures. This "old" institutionalism was accused of being descriptive, a-theoretical, parochial and non-comparative.46 These criticisms triggered a major change in the discipline as society-centred approaches, whether they spoke of groups, classes or simply civil society,47 became favoured over institution-centred ones. While institutions never completely dis- appeared from the agenda, few theorists seriously considered their role in shaping political outcomes.48 Indeed, most studies that dealt with

45 R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1993); James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Free Press, 1989); Peter Hall, Governing the Economy; Ellen M. Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe; Paul Pierson, Dis- mantling the Welfare State; Sven Steinmo et al., eds., Structuring Politics; and Paul Pierson and Miriam Smith, "Bourgeois Revolutions? The Policy Consequences of Resurgent Conservatism," Comparative Political Studies 25 (1993), 487-520.

46 Roy Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government (New York: Random, 1955).

47 The Neo-Marxist focus on class, the pluralist and neo-pluralist use of groups and the emphasis of the political economy literature on civil society are all examples of society-centred approaches to politics. See Edward P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Gollancz, 1963); Robert Dahl, Who Gov- erns? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets. The World's Political Eco- nomic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977); and John Keane, ed., Civil Soci- ety and the State. New European Perspectives (London: Verso, 1988).

48 Steinmo and Thelen mention Samuel Huntington and Reinhart Bendix as excep-




institutions conceptualized them as being ultimately dependent upon societal factors.49 The early new institutionalist work was a reaction to this societal bias of comparative politics as it sought, not only to make more room for institutions in the study of politics, but also, and more importantly, to give them theoretical importance.5? These studies defined the general objective of the movement: to conceptualize institutions as a variable affecting political outcomes.

The idea that political institutions shape social and political outcomes is highly significant for the study of cultural identity politics. It challenges the assumption that institutions simply reflect identities and articulate their natural claims. Instead, it suggests that they also affect the very existence of identities and condition their political consequences. This position allows the analyst to understand why cultural cleavages are sometimes more important socially and politically than other cleavages, and to gain insight into how identities emerge, change, become politically relevant and are mobilized. Indeed, the new institutionalist proposition that political institutions be considered independent variables holds great promise for the study of cultural identities and presents theorists with new research opportunities.

The first dilemma confronting theorists wishing to use a new institutionalist approach to cultural identity politics is to determine which branch is the most appropriate. New institutionalism has a defi- nite "theoretical core" embodied in the idea that institutions play a crucial and autonomous role in shaping political behaviour, but it is not a unified school of thought.51 In fact, three streams of new institutionalism have developed in relative isolation from one another: rational choice, sociological and historical.52

tions. See Sven Steinmo and Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in Structuring Politics, 4.

49 Structural-functionalism produced these types of studies. See Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little Brown, 1966).

50 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1981).

51 Ellen M. Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," Politics and Society 26 (1998), 5-34.

52 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44 (1996), 936-57. Ellen Immergut calls the sociological branch "organization theory"("The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," 14). Steinmo and Thelen distinguish only two approaches, rational choice and historical institutionalism. See "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 7. Some authors identify a fourth branch, the new institutionalism in economics which is akin to rational choice but "puts more stress on property rights, rents, and competitive selection mechanisms" (Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," 936, note 1).



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Rational choice institutionalism developed when scholars turned to the rules of the United States Congress to explain the voting behaviour of legislators.53 It builds on a set of assumptions on the nature of political actors and institutions. It views actors as self-interested maximizers who engage in highly sophisticated strategic calculus, and institutions as the product of this rational thinking. Rational choice institutionalists consider that institutions affect political outcomes primarily in a strategic context.54 They argue that institutions shape strategies, choices and political behaviour because the expectations that rational actors have regard- ing the behaviour of other actors are conditioned by the institutional environment. In short, institutions impose constraints on political actors or offer them opportunities for action. This rational institutionalist perspective suggests that identity politics is the result of the strategic action of political actors. While this statement may be partially true, it is incomplete; cultural identity politics may not be reduced to, or understood simply in terms of, logical sequences and rational calculations. It is rather the realm of contingencies and unintended consequences. Fur- thermore, the rational choice institutionalist bias towards dealing with the preferences of actors at the level of assumptions55 limits the ability of the approach to explain fully the impact of institutions on goals, interests, and also on identities.

Sociological institutionalism does not take identities and preference as "givens" but views them as the product of "the institutional forms, images and signs provided by social life."56 It holds that institutions embody the cultural practices and symbolic content of a particular context and produce symbolic codes, cognitive scripts, models and cate- gories that have a great influence on political behaviour. For theorists of cultural identity wishing to explain the processes of identity formation and politicization, this branch of new institutionalism has the advantage of not considering anything as given, but the disadvantage of taking the

53 Ibid., 943-44. Rational choice institutionalism has spawned contributions such as Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress: Structure and Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); John Ferejohn, "Law, Legislation and Positive Political Theory," in Jeffrey Banks and Eric Hanushek, eds., Modern Political Economy. Old Topics, New Directions (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1995), 191-215; and Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, "Posi- tive Theories of Congressional Institutions," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19 (1994), 149-79.

54 Steinmo and Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective," 7. 55 Ibid., 8. 56 Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," 948. Soci-

ological institutionalist studies include, Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Con- trol (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).




focus away from political institutions. Indeed, sociological institutionalists extend the definition of institutions beyond formal-legal structures to include cultural and symbolic systems. Consequently, it is not the most useful perspective for those attempting to adopt a political rather than a purely cultural approach to identity politics.

Historical institutionalism presents four advantages over its cousins as a political approach to cultural identity politics. First is the question of definition. Historical institutionalism is the branch of new institutionalism that developed most specifically as a reaction to the debates in political science between pluralists, neo-Marxists and structural-functional- ists. Historical institutionalists opposed the conceptualization of the state as a neutral arena where groups struggled, an instrument in the hands of a dominant class or the natural product of social needs. They argued that the state was a set of potentially autonomous institutions that could affect the structure and outcome of competition between groups.57 This focus on the state explains why historical institutionalism is mostly interested in political institutions. Indeed, contrary to sociological institutionalism, it defines institutions primarily as formal organizations, rules and procedures. There is a general agreement among historical institutionalists that institutions are structures such as "the rules of electoral competition, the structure of party systems, the relations among various branches of government, and the structure and organization of economic actors like trade-unions."58" This definition is particularly appropriate for an approach that seeks to highlight the theoretical importance of political institutions.

Second is the historical institutionalist view of interests and preferences which differs substantially from that of rational choice institutionalism. While historical institutionalists readily accept the idea that institutions shape actors' strategies, they insist that preferences and goals are also affected by institutional frameworks. For historical institutionalists, preferences, goals, interests and even identities are politically constructed. They are not "givens" but represent something to be explained.59 Therefore, institutions not only play a crucial role in the organization and mobilization of interests and identities, they are also prominent in their definition. Historical institutionalism does not suggest that institutions consistently operate a radical re-socialization of citizens, but simply holds that they "act as filters that selectively favor particular interpretations either of the goals toward which political actors strive or of the best means to achieve these ends."60 This

57 Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

58 Steinmo and Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 2. 59 Theda Skocpol, "Why I am an Historical Institutionalist," Polity 28 (1995), 105. 60 Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," 20.



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position on the constructed nature of interests, goals and identities is instrumental to a political approach to cultural identity politics.

Third is the emphasis of historical institutionalism on power.61 This approach stresses the idea that power is at the centre of politics, and that power relationships are a key engine of social and political outcomes. This angle is essential to locating the origins of identity creation, transformation, politicization and mobilization. Historical institutionalism holds, however, that these power relationships are struc- tured by institutions, and that, therefore, struggles for power follow different patterns and produce different outcomes partly as a result of institutional factors. Indeed, a central preoccupation of historical institutionalists has been to show how institutional designs favour some groups at the expense of others while paying particular attention to cross-national and historical variations.62 This preoccupation with the institutional patterns of power distribution and structure has translated into a focus on the policy process. Scholars wishing to highlight the biases inherent in political institutions have mainly conducted historical comparisons of social, economic and fiscal policies.63 They have virtually ignored cultural identity politics.

Fourth is the historical institutionalist emphasis on the contingencies and irregularities of history.64 This approach opposes the idea of an inherent logic to history. It does not view history as a coherent sequence of events resulting from the behaviour of rational self-interested maximizers but rather as the contingent product of the interactions of a diversity of actors and institutions. The process of institutional development is integrated into this vision of history, as historical institutionalism situates the emergence of institutions in a complex world marked by patterns of relationships between a multitude of actors and already existing institutions. Historical institutionalism emphasizes unexpected developments and incongruities as opposed to continuity and regularities, and is therefore philosophically able to deal with change. This conception of history has prompted one observer to argue that historical institutionalism turns to history as a philosophy or theory.65 It also uses history as a method. Historical institutionalism

61 Ibid., 16. 62 Bo Rothstein, "Labor-Market Institutions and Working-Class Strength," in

Steinmo et al., eds., Structuring Politics, 33-53; and Victoria C. Hattam, Labour Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

63 Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe; Hall, Governing the Economy; and Sven Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

64 Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," 19. 65 Ibid.




advocates the use of a comparative-historical method to explain the causes for cross-national differences and similarities of particular phenomena.66 This method consists of analyzing "slices of history" from different social systems and focusing on the effect of political institutions. It does not preclude attempts at generalizations. Historical institutionalism is a theoretical enterprise; it does not, however, consider possible or desirable the grand-theorizing associated with the behaviourial revolution but seeks to establish historically grounded generalizations leading to middle-range theorizing. The philosophical and methodological use that historical institutionalism makes of history puts it in a favourable position to deal with the contingencies of cultural identity, and to explain the spatial-temporal variations of its manifestations.

Most scholars working with an historical institutionalist approach have been particularly active in the field of public policy where they have sought to explain the features of state policies in areas such as health, welfare and industrial development.67 A few others have extended it to other areas of study; in fact, the pioneer historical institutionalist study tackled the issue of revolution.68 More recently, historical institutionalism has been brought into the debate over the nature of the European Union where it has suggested different interpretations of the integration and governance processes.69 The potential of this approach remains largely unexploited. An historical institutionalist approach to the politics of cultural identity is an intriguing possibility exactly because theorists have tended to ignore, marginalize or, at best, treat only sporadically the impact of institutions on cultural identities and their political claims.

Historical institutionalism also brings to the field theoretical, conceptual and methodological tools which are notably absent from cultural approaches but are crucial in illuminating the processes of identity formation, transformation, politicization and mobilization. These tools include an historical and diversified framework, the concept of "path dependency," and a dynamic perspective on the relationship between structure and agency.

Historical institutionalism brings to the study of cultural identity a distinctively historical perspective and a framework that incorporates

66 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 33-40. 67 See, especially, the contributions in Steinmo et al., eds., Structuring Politics. 68 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. 69 See Paul Pierson, "The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist

Analysis," Comparative Political Studies 29 (1996), 123-63; and Mark A. Pol- lack, "The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis," Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 9 (1996), 429-58.



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a diversity of causal factors. The inability of the culturalists to explain how identities are formed, transformed, politicized and mobilized stems from their tendency to conceptualize cultural identities as a-historical objective realities.70 This conceptualization inevitably leads to a form of circular reasoning, as the forces behind cultural identities and their political manifestations are the cultural identities themselves.71 The historical institutionalist "philosophy of history" represents an attractive response to the a-historical tendencies of cultural approaches. Historical institutionalism's openness toward different causal factors is also an interesting feature. Historical institutionalists do not claim that institutions are the sole determinant of political outcomes. Despite its emphasis on political institutions as key determinants of political outcomes, the historical institutionalist framework includes much more than institutions. Two aspects of this framework are especially important. First, it makes room for agency: historical institutionalism stresses the interactions between actors and institutions, focusing not only on the many ways in which institutions shape the behaviour of political actors, but also on how institutions are shaped and re-shaped by these actors. Historical institutionalism "allows us to examine the relationship between political actors as objects and as agents of history."72 Second, historical institutionalism does not ignore macro-level structures. It acknowledges, for example, that the socio-economic structures of a capitalist economy represent environmental conditions that affect social and political action. It argues, however, that institutions provide a crucial and non-neutral linkage between circumstances and agency. This insight is especially important since the many attempts to explain the political manifestations of cultural identity using macro-level structures such as uneven development have produced highly abstract theories with poor explanatory power.73

The emphasis of historical institutionalists on the contingencies of history and complex patterns of causality lead them to argue that political outcomes are "path dependent." They argue that these out-

70 Marco Martiniello, L'Ethniciti dans les science sociales contemporaines, Collec- tion Que sais-je? (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995), 36.

71 Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism. Territorial Politics and the European State (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), 115-16.

72 Steinmo and Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 10. 73 Hechter, Internal Colonialism; and Milica Zarkovic Bookman, The Political

Economy of Discontinuous Development. Regional Disparities and Inter-regional Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1991). For critiques, see Walker Connor, "The Seductive Lure of Economic Explanations," in Ethnonationalism. The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 144-64; and Joseph R. Rudolph Jr. and Robert J. Thompson, "The Ebb and Flow of Ethnoter- ritorial Politics in the Western World," in Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy and the Western World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989).




comes are shaped by contextual factors, many of which are institutional.74 Path dependency is the idea that institutions, once created, take "a life of their own" and may generate processes not intended, nor foreseen, by their creators. It stresses the weight of institutions on social and political life, a phenomenon that has been under- appreciated by theorists of cultural identity.75 Culturalists are the main culprits since they rarely give institutions theoretical importance but generally view them as the reflection of natural cleavages or as instruments to manage given identities and claims. The concept of path dependency is particularly useful in understanding the role of institutions in the formation, transformation and politicization of identities, for it highlights the discrete yet long-lasting and critical importance of institutional factors in producing social and political change. Path dependency draws the attention of theorists of cultural identity to schemes of territorial distributions of power (federalism, status of autonomy and so on), party systems and structures, electoral rules and procedures, constitutional provisions, and political practices as independent or critical intervening variables.

Finally, historical institutionalism provides a framework for the role of institutions in structuring relations of co-operation and conflict between actors. At its centre is the idea that agents, particularly political elites, do not operate in a vacuum but within an institutional setting that might impose constraints or offer opportunities for action. Histori- cal institutionalism considers the impact of institutions on elite behaviour in two different ways. First, it holds that institutions structure political situations, as they produce contextual conditions, some fluid and others rigid, that dictate different patterns of co-operation or conflict. The institutional impact on the definition of preferences, goals, interests and identities is a key feature of this structural force. Second, historical institutionalism accepts the idea of its rational choice cousin that institutions affect the strategic calculations of actors, shape the agenda and render some alternatives more attractive than others. It also agrees that political actors use institutions for strategic purposes. These patterns of interaction between actors and institutions described by the historical institutionalist approach contain valuable insight for theories of cultural identity. They suggest that political institutions, such as party systems and the territorial distribution of power, create conditions that may favour the construction and politicization of cul-

74 Hall and Taylor, "Politica! Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," 941. 75 Notable exceptions include Joane Nagel, "The Political Construction of Ethnic-

ity," in Susan Olzak and Joane Nagel, eds., Competitive Ethnic Relations (Orlando: Academic Press, 1986); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism.



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tural identities. They also suggest that cultural identities are activated and stimulated when it makes political sense. In short, the historical institutionalist perspective on the relationship between actors and institutions holds that the development and politicization of cultural identities are the result of conflicts produced by specific institutional contexts.

A research programme inspired by the historical institutionalist perspective provides specialists of cultural identity politics with origi- nal and stimulating questions and working hypotheses on the relationship between political institutions and cultural identities. What is the impact of federal and autonomous structures in multi-ethnic states? To what extent do they create cultural communities, shape their boundaries, and generate political competition between centres of power that favour the politicization and mobilization of cultural identities? How do specific electoral rules and party system configurations shape politics in these states? To what extent does the creation of culture-based parties generate patterns of elite competition that favour outbidding, polarization and mobilization? How does the definition of the rules of political participation affect the mobilization process? To what extent does the constitutional "recognition" of cultural identities stimulate the creation of these identities and encourage the organization of politics around cultural lines? Gaining a clear understanding of the formation, transformation, politicization and mobilization of cultural identities necessitates answering these questions. It involves re-thinking the relationship between institutions and identities to give the former theoretical importance.

Two cases illustrate both the limitations of the cultural approach and the potential explanatory power of historical institutionalism. The first is the Basque Country. The strength of separatism among the Basques of Spain and the virtual absence of any such movement in the Pays Basque frangais defy the framework of the culturalists. There are no significant differences between the historical cultural/ethnic pro- files of Basques in Spain and France. The Basque culture on both sides of the border has been associated most importantly with a specific language (and specific surnames), strong religious (Catholic) faith, and a belief in common ancestry spurred recently by the discovery of a peculiar haematological trait.76 The cultural approach cannot explain

76 Physical anthropologists "found that the Basques showed no similarities in culture, language, or blood typologies to any other known population." With respect to blood type, "studies have confirmed that that the 'pure' Basque blood type... included a nearly 60 percent incidence of type "O" blood (compared to 40 percent in the general population), almost total nonexistence of "A" and "B" types, and an incidence of the Rh-negative factor ranging between 27 percent and 35 percent, which is the highest in the world" (James E. Jacob, Hills of Conflict. Basque Nationalism in France [Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1994], xiv).




the different political consequences of Basque culture. Historical institutionalism proves much more enlightening, for the contrast between the Spanish and French Basque Countries is the product of different institutional developments. Three aspects of Spain's institutional history explain Basque separatism there. The first involves attempts at state centralization and national integration in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which largely proved a failure. Although the system of Basque autonomy known as fueros was abolished in 1876, subsequent attempts by the Spanish state to establish control over the area never fully succeeded. Moreover, the abolition of the fueros was particularly conducive to the development of separatism since it occurred during a civil war between Liberal-Centralists and Traditionalists (known as Carlists) that took the form of a struggle between Spain and the Basque Country as the latter was the Carlist stronghold.77 In France, a similar system of autonomy (the fors) was abolished a century earlier during a revolution that produced highly centralized state structures which became synonymous with republicanism and engineered a dynamic and efficient integration process. The distinction between weak and strong states, dear to historical institutionalists, is therefore central in explaining the different political-territorial claims in the two Basque Countries. So is the idea of unintended consequences which accompa- nies the second aspect of Spanish institutional development that favoured Basque separatism: the weight of the authoritarian state under Franco. Franco's repression of cultural particularisms, especially brutal in the Basque Country, and their equation with treacher- ous behaviour, led Basque resistance leaders to conflate the ideas of nationalism, liberty and freedom. Consequently, the Franco dictatorship unintentionally legitimized regionalism and separatism.78 The third aspect features contemporary territorial division of power and exem- plifies the concept of path dependency. The system of autonomy established in the context of the democratic transition has taken a life of its own: the creation of Autonomous Communities generated patterns of nationalist/regionalist outbidding that favoured nationalist parties, such as the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, enabling these parties to acquire sufficient strength and legitimacy to bargain their support for the national government in exchange for increased autonomy.79 France's unitary state allowed no such pattern of territorial relation-

77 Daniele Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans and Spain. Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation (London: Hearst & Company, 1997), 46-48.

78 Luis Moreno, "Federalization and Ethnoterritorial Concurrence in Spain," Pub- lius 27 (1997), 67.

79 Josep M. Colomer, "The Spanish 'State of Autonomies': Non-Institutional Fed- eralism," in Paul Heywood, ed., Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain (Lon- don: Frank Cass, 1999), 44-48.



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ship. James E. Jacob argues that "the real differences in the nature of Basque politics in Spain and France have been strongly influenced by the different socio-political and historical conditions each movement had to face."'8 This is most certainly true, although most of the political/historical factors were institutional in nature.

The second case that highlights the usefulness of historical institutionalism in theorizing cultural identity and the weakness of cultural explanations is Brussels. The issue in this case is the relationship between culture and identity and, more specifically, accounting for the development of an identity without a strong cultural basis. Results from surveys conducted between 1975 and 1992 that asked Belgians to which community they felt they belonged to first and foremost reveal that 15 per cent of French-speakers living in Brussels answered the Brussels Region."8' This figure, while far from overwhelming, is not insignificant. It corroborates suggestions that the adoption of sym- bols such as a flag and a celebration day demonstrates that a Brussels identity has been developing over the last few decades.82 The city of Brussels and its surrounding areas are populated predominantly with French-speakers but located in historical Netherlandic territories. As such, the Brussels Region does not have distinctive cultural features nor has it ever formed a coherent cultural community. From a culturalist perspective, the Brussels identity makes little sense; from an historical institutionalist one, it can be explained. The basis for the emergence of a Brussels identity is the linguistic structure of the early Belgian state. The Belgium of 1830 was a francophone state. The attempt by an emerging Flemish Movement to render it bilingual met with resistance from French-speaking elites, some of whom decided to adopt a safer territorial anchoring for their politics and created the Walloon Movement. The activism of the Walloon Movement led to the construction of a Walloon identity that had language at its centre but also triggered mechanisms of exclusion which isolated Brussels because of its linguistic heterogeneity.83 The successful drive of both movements for

80 Jacob, Hills of Conflict, xiv. 81 See Lieven de Winter, Andr6-Paul Frognier and Jaak Billiet, "Y a-t-il encore des

Belges? Vingt ans d'enquates sur les identit6s politiques territoriales," in Marco Martiniello and Marc Swyngedouw, eds., Oi va la Belgique? Les soubresauts d'une petite ddmocratie europdenne (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998), 123-25. To that same question, 61 per cent of French-speaking Brusselers answered Belgium while 17 per cent said the French Community. The city and the commune were other possible answers. These figures are average results from several surveys.

82 See Serge Govaert, "A Brussels Identity? A Speculative Interpretation," in Kaz Deprez and Louis Vos, eds., Nationalism in Belgium. Shifting Identities, 1780-1995 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 229-39.

83 For an analysis of the Walloon Movement's position and impact on Brussels, see Vincent Vagman, Le mouvement wallon et la question bruxelloise (Bruxelles: Courrier hebdomadaire du Crisp, no.1434-1435, 1994).




territorial unilingualism, culminating in the linguistic legislation of the 1930s and 1960s, gave Brussels the ambiguous status of a "mixed" area,84 thus reinforcing its distinctiveness. However, the engine behind Brussels identity was the federalization of the state launched in 1970. The erection of formal Communities (Flemish, French and German- speaking) and Regions (Flanders and Wallonia) with the 1970 and 1980 constitutional revisions to answer the claims of Flemish and Walloon leaders left Brussels in a sort of institutional vacuum. This led Belgian elites to provide the capital, almost by default, with its own regional institutions in 1988-1989. This regional government has since become the main proponent of a Brussels identity."85 This identity did not emerge spontaneously from distinct cultural markers since they did not exist. Rather, it was built through institutional subtraction.86

The strength of historical institutionalism as an approach to politics lies in its ability to explain variations and irregularities in political outcomes. This makes it a particularly promising approach to cultural identity politics, for one of the noticeable features of cultural identities is their contingency. They appear only within some groups whose members share cultural markers. Their intensity varies. They lead to political claims only in some occasions. The nature and intensity of these claims fluctuate, and vary from group to group. The contextual character of cultural identities and their political consequences suggests that theorizing these phenomena requires an approach that stresses the weight of institutions on social and political life. Indeed, institutions are a sensible point of departure to illuminate the processes of identity creation, transformation, politicization and mobilization that lie at the heart of cultural identity politics.

Conclusion

The recent interest of political philosophers in the politics of cultural identity revives an old debate on how to approach this phenomenon, particularly as it relates to groups with a historical territorial basis. At the centre of this debate are fundamental questions concerning the nature of cultural identities and their political consequences. Cultural- ists such as Kymlicka, Taylor and Tamir, view these identities as mystical, almost a-historical and eternal, realities. They posit the existence of two different causal relationships: between the existence of a group sharing cultural markers and the emergence of a cultural identity, and

84 Kenneth D. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies, Vol. 2: Belgium (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), 151.

85 Govaert, "A Brussels Identity? A Speculative Interpretation," 229. 86 Ibid., 231-34. Govaert simply speaks of "subtraction" although the centrality of

institutional change is inherent to his analysis.



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between this identity and political claims. They consider these relationships necessary, natural and universal. This position, which is akin to the one defended by early primordialists, is problematic in two respects. First, it does not correspond to the contingent, contextual, situational and irregular manifestations of cultural identity. Second, and probably most importantly, it does not explain the processes around cultural identity but prefers to revert to the mysterious depths of human nature. This strategy renders cultural identities unintelligible for the social sciences.87 In fact, it constitutes a challenge for political and other social scientists to uncover the processes behind cultural identity politics.88

This article has suggested turning to institutions to illuminate these processes. The role played by political institutions in shaping cultural identity politics has been marginalized, for while institutions have been featured in some studies, they are not given any theoretical importance.89 They are simply viewed as faithful reflections of cultural cleavages or as instruments to manage situations that are considered "givens." The historical institutionalist literature, with its focus on political institutions as forces shaping social and political outcomes, contains valuable insight for theories of cultural identity. The idea that political institutions structure individual behaviour and produce long- term unintended consequences on social and political life has been used to shed light on different subject matters, most notably in the field of public policy. The methodological position that institutions should be taken as an independent or crucial intervening variable has allowed scholars to think about state policies, revolutions, continental integration and other phenomena in a different way. Historical institutionalism constitutes a particularly promising approach for theorists of cultural identity because it provides them with the theoretical, conceptual and methodological tools to delve into the processes of identity creation, transformation, politicization and mobilization. It brings an historical approach and a perspective on structure-agency relationships that can deal with the contingencies, fluctuations and irregularities of these identities and their political consequences. Indeed, historical institutionalism is well equipped to address the issues left unexamined and unsolved by cultural approaches.

87 Martiniello, L'ethnicitr dans les sciences sociales contemporaines, 37-38. 88 Jack Eller and Reed Couglan argue that social science is in the process of

bankrupting the concept of primordialism. See "The Poverty of Primordialism: the Demystification of Ethnic Attachments," 199-200.

89 See, for example, the different institutional proposals based on the idea of part- nership in Laforest and Gibbins, eds., Sortir de l'impasse.



theorizing cultural identities: historical institutionalism as a challenge to the culturalists

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