thecostsofbureaucracyandcorruptionat customs...
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The Costs of Bureaucracy and Corruption atCustoms: Evidence from the Computerization of
Imports in Colombia
Rachid Laajaj 1 , Marcela Eslava 1 & Tidiane Kinda 2
1 Universidad de Los Andes2 International Monetary Fund
June 25, 2018
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
The Paper in a Nutshell
Between 2000 and 2005, Colombia computerized theimport process at different dates for different customsWe match customs level data and panel census data onmanufacturing firmsTriple difference using timing of computerization andexposure of firms > stimulated growthDouble difference to study the channels: value ofimportations, custom clearance time...Facilitated importations (faster, more and more value, fromfarther away)Tax collection at customs increasedData on judiciary cases from the National GeneralSuperintendency > corruption significantly reduced by thereform
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Motivation and Related Literature
Effects of trade liberalization on firms productivity andgrowth (Eslava et al. 2010, Pierce and Schott 2012, Amiti andKonings 2007)Customs are prone to bureuacracy and corruption (Dollarset al. 2003; Clark et al. 2004; Yang 2006; Volpe Martincus etal. 2015; De Wulf and Sokol 2004; Engman 2005).Costs of Bureaucracy and corruption (Reinikka andSvensson, 2004; Ferraz et al., 2012; Ebeke et al., 2015...)In Uganda, bribes have three times the negative impact ofequivalent (Fisman and Svensson 2007)The use of IT can reduce bureaucracy and corruption(Muralidharan et al. 2014, Banerjee et al. 2016...)
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Context: Governance and Customs in Colombia
World Government Indicators of Colombia increased from34th to 41st percentile between 2000 and 2006, then up to45th percentile in 2015Greatest improvements in the Rule of Law and Control ofCorruption indexesModernization of customs is one of the areas thatunderwent improvementsCustom clearance time for importation went down fromabout 17 days in 1995 to about 9 days in 2014
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Custom Clearance Time of Importations to Colombia overTime
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
The Customs Reform in Practice
We asked DIAN management what reforms were mostinfluential : implementation of “Siglo XXI”All the processes can be done through the Internet, unlessselected for physical inspectionInstantaneous comparison of declarations made by exporter,transporter, importer, storage, and bankPhysical inspections went down from more than 50% to 9%,based on risk profile and inconsistenciesReduces discretionary power of customs agents and directinteractions with importersInternal doc claims reduced clearance time, increased taxcollection & reduced corruption (less complaints)
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
The Databases
EAM, about 3,500 manufacturing firms, variables includeSales, Value Added, Inputs, Labor, Capital,Productivity...DIAN importation data is a census of about 1,000,000importation transactions from 26 customs. Includes firmand custom identifiers, time, taxes, etc.Data from the General Prosecutor. We isolate judiciarycases involving DIAN at municipality levelUNCOMTRADE data to check effect on trade declared byexportersFrom DIAN data, we constructed a dummy for eachtransaction = 1 if digital
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Computerization of Importations in Colombia Between 2000and 2005
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Computerization of Importations in Bogota
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Computerization of Importations in Medellin
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Computerization of Importations in Cartagena
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Computerization of Importations in Different Customs
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
The Assignment of Customs to Firms
We:1 match firms to their corresponding customs2 assigned Customs is the most likely custom for the firm3 calculated, for each firm the share of the value of its imports
that came from each customs in 1999.4 calculated for each municipality, the share of imports from
each customs (averaged accros its firms)5 associated each firm to the customs from which its
municipality had the greatest share of imports in 1999
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Main Identification Strategy: Triple Difference
Computerization occurred in different customs at differentperiodsLikely that being close to customs with early computerizationis related to firm size, productivity, etc.Triple difference with year and firm fixed effects, and wherefirms’ degree of exposure to the reform depends onwhether they were importers in 1999The identifying assumption of triple diff.: the timing of thecomputerization of customs is not correlated with thedifference in the change in the outcomes of interest betweenimporting firms and non-importing firms
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Triple Difference Regression
Yfct = α +β Tct ∗ If +δTct +Xctγ +λf +θt + εfct (1)
Yfct is the outcome of firm f in customs c at year tTct is a dummy = 1 if in custom c , + than 80% of importationswere digital at year t.If is a dummy =1 if firm f imported a positive quantity in year 1999or before.λf are firm FE and θt are year FE.Xct are Ln of Value Added, and Ln of Customs value of importsboth interacted with year dummiesStandard Errors clustered at customs level (and do Wild Bootstrap)
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Effect of Customs Reform on Firm’s Growth
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Effect of Customs Reform on Exportation and Productivity
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Parrallel Trend and Dynamic Effects: Inputs
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Parrallel Trend and Dynamic Effects: Sales
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Parrallel Trend and Dynamic Effects: Value Added
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Parrallel Trend and Dynamic Effects: Nb of Workers
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Parrallel Trend and Dynamic Effects: TFP
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Effect of Custom Reform on Firm’s Growth by Quartile
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Summary of Results on Firms’ Economic Activity
Value Added of exposed firms increased by about 6.5%Also increased inputs, exports, workers and TFPConcentrated on medium size firms, not large onesResults robust to:
- Excluding Customs 1 by 1- Continuous treatment, depending on share ofassociated customs treated
- Continuous treatment, based on which customsinputs are likely to come from
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Double Difference Effects of Changes at Customs (FirmLevel)
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Effect of Custom Reform on Imports Outcomes by Quartile
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Double Difference Effects of Changes at Customs (Customsyear)
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Parrallel Trend and Dynamic Effects:Total Value of Imports
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Parrallel Trend and Dynamic Effects: Total Value of Taxes
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Double Difference Effects of Changes in (32) DIANCorruption Cases
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Parrallel Trend and Dynamic Effects: Factor of Corruptioncases
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Effects of Computerization on Predictability of Time toClear Customs and Tax Rate
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Effects of Computerization on Imports to Colombia declaredby Exporters in Other Countries
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Main Results on the Channells
Large Increase in number of transactions and value ofImports driven by:
- Reduction of smuggling and under-declarations(1/2)
- Facilitation and revealed preference (1/2)
More likely to pay what is due (for large firms)Decrease in Custom Clearance time & Importers are willingto travel from further away.Tax collection increased: important result for revenuemobilization.Reduction in corruption cases of the DIANIncreased predictability of time > reduction indiscretionary power
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs
Conclusions and Further Research
Provides new evidence that computerization at customsstimulated importing firms’ growthThe computerization had an estimated total cost of 6 to 9million dollars, which is dwarfed by the benefitsIn line with literature that found: 1) trade barriers harmfirms 2) “corruption tax” can have effects that are manytimes larger than an equivalent formal taxCorruption harms middle sized plants in favor of large ones:implications for dynamics and political economyImportant lessons for low income countries who have notimplemented it, and even for Colombia, which badly needsimprovementsSpecific feature of this intervention was to use IT to limitconnections prone to corruption (not always +transparcenty at all levels is better)
Laajaj, Eslava, Kinda Corruption & Computerization of Customs