14

Interest Groups and Pluralism

David Knoke and Xi Zhu

Interest groups in pluralist democracies aggregate and represent their members’ political

preferences. First, we define an interest group as a collective political actor seeking

to influence governmental policy decisions. Next, we review recent research on US

and European interest groups, highlighting their contexts and structures, strategies and

actions, and influence onpublic policy outcomes. Thenwe assess policy network research

as a distinct subfield that applies social network analytic methods to reveal how interest-

group coalitions form and how their influence-activities affect policy decisions. Finally,

we offer three suggestions for future directions in research on interest groups.

In pluralist democracies, organized interest groups aggregate and represent thepolitical preferences of their constituencies. Their actions influence policy decisions

that may benefit the public good or serve only narrow concerns. We concentrate on

recent US and European interest-group research that extends understanding ofthese dynamics.

Interest Groups Defined

An interest group is a collective political actor that attempts to influence governmental

policy decisions. Interest groups are typically formal organizations with a name and

membership requirement.However, some groups lack boundedmemberships, such as‘astro-turf’ organizations fronting for wealthy individuals (in contrast to ‘grassroots’

groups with a broad membership). For example, during the 2010 elections, the

conservative Tea Party movement was strongly supported by the advocacy wing ofthe Americans for Prosperity Foundation, an organization started by David Koch to

The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, First Edition. Edited by Edwin Amenta,Kate Nash, and Alan Scott.� 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

further the environmental deregulatory interests ofKoch Industries, an oil refinery and

pipeline conglomerate owned by Koch and his brother Charles (Mayer 2010). We

restrict our attention to voluntary associations whose members pool financial andother resources to engage in conventional political actions intended to influence policy

decisions (Knoke 2001: 324). Excluded are voluntary associations without policy

interests, such as fraternal, philanthropic or recreational goals. The primary vehiclesfor aggregating large corporate and small business interests are peak business

associations and industry trade associations. For example, a month before the

2010 congressional elections, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. gave $1 million to theUS Chamber of Commerce, which advertised against Democratic candidates (Ruten-

berg 2010). Trade unions behave as interest groups when they lobby for favourable

labour policies (Bradley et al. 2003).Government agencies, legislative and regulatory bodies are usually conceptualized

as targets of interest-group influence. However, governmental entities act as interest

organizations by participating in coalitions or directly pressuring other governmentalunits. The National Association ofMayors lobbies on federal policies affecting cities,

from transportation to police assistance and green energy. Similar associations

promote the common interests of state legislatures, governors and local conservationdistricts. Social movement organizations (SMOs) are sometimes disregarded by

interest-group analysts. An SMO is a formal group of activists trying to advance the

interests of excluded or relatively powerless persons, such as ethnic and sexualminorities, animal rights, and migrant workers. Although SMOs frequently stage

rallies and street protests, occasionally erupting into violent confrontations with

authorities, many routinely engage in conventional tactics, such as petitions, mediapromotion, and litigation. Burstein (1998) made a compelling case that SMOs differ

little from other types of interest organizations. Grossmann (2006) found few

differences in political mobilization and representation between 92 environmentalorganizations and 1,600 other types of constituency interest organizations. Broad

similarities occurred among 141 US advocacy organizations representing 19 ethnic

group categories (Grossmann 2009). We concur that SMOs and interest groups areequivalent political actors.

Recent Research

The past two decades witnessed a surge of empirical research on interest groups in

Europe and the United States, stimulated in part by integration of the European

Union (EU) and rich data released under the US Lobbying Disclosure Act. Wehighlight three research areas: contexts and structures, strategies and actions, and

influence on policy outcomes.

Contexts and structures

Recent work on the contexts and structures of interest-group pluralism includes thesize of interest-group systems, institutional contexts of group formation, biases in

interest representation, and group coalitions. Since the 1960s, the number of interest

groups has grown substantially in both the United States and the EU (Walker 1991;

INTEREST GROUPS AND PLURALISM 159

Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Greenwood 2003;

Jordan andMaloney 2007). Parallel to this trendwere declining sizes of other political

organizations, such as political parties (Scarrow 2000). Knoke (1986) highlightedsome historical events triggering the growth of US interest groups, including con-

gressional reorganization, post-Watergate election reforms, waves of regulatory and

deregulatory policies, an unravelling two-party system and ideological polarization.Mahoney and Baumgartner (2008) observed agreement among interest-group re-

searchers that the development of interest-group systems was strongly influenced by

the expanding size and breadth of government policy activities. Over time, compar-isons of the United States and the EU consistently found that the number of interest

groups and their scope of activities increased whenever the size of the government

expanded. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) traced the development of US governmentactivities and interest-group formation after the Second World War. They demon-

strated that both expanded simultaneously, growing most quickly during the 1960s

and 1970s, and slowing down after the late 1970s. Fligstein and Sweet (2002) andWessels (2004) found a similar European pattern. Further, US federal policy activities

both directly and indirectly affected interest-group mobilization at the state level

(Baumgartner, Gray and Lowery 2009). Interest groups responded directly to federalpolicy by becoming more active in those issue-areas. The indirect effect was triggered

by subsequent state legislative activities following the national-level policies.

Beyond general trends in system growth, researchers examined group formation byapplying population ecology theory (Gray and Lowery 1996; Halpin and Jordan

2009). Population ecology departs from traditional treatments of interest-group

formation, which emphasize incentive structures or political opportunities, by focus-ingon the institutional contexts. The rate atwhich anew typeof interest group forms is

affected by the density of this type within the entire interest-group population.

Ecology theory predicts that the formation rate will be low when a new type ofinterest group is scarce, because the new type must justify its activities and gain

legitimacy. The formation rate accelerates as legitimacy increases, but eventually the

new type stops growing because competition resulting from a denser populationconstrains available resources. Several studies confirmed the predicted group forma-

tion pattern (Nownes 2004;Nownes andLipinski 2005).Although current evidence is

limited to interest groups working in specific issue-areas (e.g., gay rights), ecologytheory remains a promising explanation for interest-group population growth.

One enduring effort is evaluating biases in interest representation. The bias

question has important normative implications for pluralist theories because manyscholars equate interest-group composition to political fairness. Berry (1994) iden-

tified two representation biases evident in the United States and EU. First, individual-level bias is the tendency for people with higher socio-economic status to participate

more than lower-status people in interest-group activities. Second, organizational-

level bias occurs when most groups are organized around business and professionalinterests instead of citizen interests (a.k.a. public interest groups, or ‘PIGs’). Scholars

have observed persistent organizational biases in both the United States and the EU

(Baumgartner and Leech 1998). More than 70 percent of EU groups are business orprofessional organizations, while PIGs account for only 20 percent (Greenwood

2003). Business groups are not only larger, but have resource and expertise advan-

tages, enabling them to exercise greater policy influence. Yackee and Yackee (2006),

160 DAVID KNOKE AND XI ZHU

examining business interest advocacy on government regulations, found bias towards

business interests in bureaucratic notice and comment rule making. Government

agencies more often adjusted final rules to suit business interests, but not otherexpressed preferences. They concluded that these procedures did not succeed in

‘democratizing’ regulatory policy making. Persistently biased interest representation

led pluralist scholars to abandon any presumption that proliferating interest groupsequate to fair and representative politics (McFarland 2007).

Some researchers examined interest-group coalitions using social network analysis.

Grossmann and Dominguez (2009) analysed US interest-group networks based oninvolvement in three types of political activities: endorsing the same candidates in

primary elections, donating to the same candidates in general elections, and support-

ing the same legislative proposals. Interest groups were split into two coalitionspolarized along party lines in primary and general elections, but not in legislative

debates. In legislative debates, the structure of the interest-group network was

organized by a core bipartisan coalition and a peripheral group of ‘tag-alongs’.Winner-take-all elections force interest groups to make partisan choices, while law

making is more multidimensional and encourages bipartisan cooperation.

Strategies and actions

The strategies that lobbyists employ to influence policy outcomes are a focus of muchinterest-group research. Whether examining external factors influencing interest-

group strategies or internal group dynamics, recent research extends understanding

of interest-group pluralism. Scholars challenged the conventional distinction betweeninsider strategies (i.e., directly influencing decision making through contacts with the

government) and outsider strategies (i.e., indirect influence through media or group-

member mobilization). US and European researchers demonstrated that most interestgroups deploy a wide range of lobbying tactics, including both direct and indirect

activities (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Binderkrantz 2005). In pluralist theories,

most groups can gain some access to policy-makers. Yet, as political contexts aroundsome issues grow more complex, ‘insider’ groups actively implement outsider strat-

egies in their advocacy (Grant 2001). Binderkrantz (2005) used survey data on all

Danish national interest groups to demonstrate that they use both direct and indirectstrategies. Strategic choice depends on both political contexts and interest-group

characteristics. Groups with privileged access to policy-makers pursue more activities

targeting those officials, but absence of privileged access does not induce indirectstrategies. Groups in competitive situations more actively pursue indirect strategies

when facing challenges of attracting members.

Differing US and EU institutional contexts fostered diverging research on interest-group strategies and actions. Emerging multi-level EU governance structures and the

Europeanization of interest groups inspired scholars to study cross-level ‘venue-

shopping’ as an interest-group strategy. As EU institutions proliferate policy venues,what determines domestic interest-group decisions about where to attempt influence?

Researchers offered somewhat contradictory perspectives on policy influence efforts

at the supranational EU level. Eising (2004) found that groups unable to influencedomestic policies often choose to mobilize at the EU level. In contrast, Grossman

(2004) argued against overestimating interest-group ability to mobilize at the highest

INTEREST GROUPS AND PLURALISM 161

level due to EU-level barriers. Beyers and Kerremans (2007) suggested that choosing

an advocacy level is shaped both by EU governance structural opportunities and by

group embeddedness in immediate contexts, especially dependence on critical re-sources such asmembership.Mahoney and Baumgartner (2008) proposed that future

venue-shopping strategy research consider the political opportunity structures within

which interest groups operate, such as number and openness of access points, politicalinstitutions and political climate.

In a long traditionof observing advocacy-relatedphenomena,US scholars sought to

explain complex interactions among contexts, issues and interest-group actions.Several recent studies made important breakthroughs. Mahoney (2008) compared

the advocacy strategies of US and European interest-group communities. She dem-

onstrated that American and European advocates deploy similar tactics in argumen-tation, inside lobbying, and networking. They differ on lobbying approaches, target-

ing strategies, outside lobbying, and coalition building. Mahoney found US lobbyists

more inclined to block policy proposals, target numerous policy-makers, bring issuesto the public and construct coalitions. American groups are likely either to achieve all

their goals or nothing, while Europeans tend to achieve partial goals. Mahoney’s

research highlighted the important effects of institutional characteristics and issuecontexts on group advocacy behaviour.

In a relatively underexplored area, Beyers, Eising and Maloney (2008) called for

more systematic research on intra-group dynamics and their relations to externalactivities. Strolovitch’s (2007)work on intersectionality and interest representation of

marginalized groups was an important advance. Strolovitch examined how advocacy

groups represent interests and differentially benefit their constituencies. She foundthat advocacy organizations devote great efforts to issues affecting the majority of

their members. But, much more energy is expended on issues affecting advantaged

subgroups than those affecting disadvantaged, marginalized subgroups. Interestgroups engage in different activities across various issues. For example, groups tend

to engage in costly actions, such as litigation and coalitions, to fight for issues

benefiting advantaged subgroups but not for issues addressingmarginalized subgroupinterests. Group leaders generally believe that benefits will trickle down to the

disadvantaged if their efforts on behalf of majority or advantaged subgroups succeed.

Influence

In pluralist theories, interest groups play a critical role in democracies because theypurportedly represent popular interests and serve as intermediates between citizens

and policy-makers. Consequently, the legitimacy of pluralism depends on how much

influence interest groups wield and how power is distributed among them (Baum-gartner and Leech 1998; D€ur and De Bi�evre 2007a). Classic pluralists proposed an

equilibrium model of political forces to explain interest-group emergence in demo-

cratic polities. People formgroups andmobilize politicallywhenever their interests arethreatened. In the absence of barriers to mobilization, opposing interests tend to

counterbalance and constrain one another’s influence. This dynamic leads to solutions

that optimize the needs and desires of the citizenry (Truman 1951). Such benign viewswere challenged on their assumption that all affected interests would be naturally

mobilized and fairly represented (Schattschneider 1960).

162 DAVID KNOKE AND XI ZHU

Moving beyond normative questions, recent research concentrated on identifying

the conditions shaping group capacity to exercise influence. D€ur and De Bi�evre

(2007a) classified explanatory factors as institutions, group characteristics andissue-specific factors. First, government institutions affect relationships between

interest groups and decision-makers, which in turn affects group potential influence.

The US electoral system amplifies politicians’ dependence on interest-group resourcesto finance campaigns, thus enhancing group influence over electoral politics. In

contrast, coalition governments, often found in European parliaments, may reduce

political parties’ reliance on interest-group resources and thus weaken group clout(Mahoney 2008). Second, such interest-group characteristics as resourcefulness,

strategies and political positions (relative to other groups and government agencies)

affect group influence. Influence may also depend on whether a group representsdiffused or concentrated interests because diffused interests are more difficult to

mobilize (D€ur and De Bi�evre 2007b). Third, scholars argued that interest-group

influence varies significantly across issue-areas. Depending on an issue’s place on thepolitical agenda and how much controversy it ignites, an issue may provoke weak or

strong counter-mobilization, which in turn affects how much influence a particular

group achieves (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Analysing a random sample of 137issues inUS interest-groupactivity reports filed in 1996 under theLobbyingDisclosure

Act, Baumgartner and Leech (2001) documented a highly skewed distribution of

group involvement across issue-areas. The top 5 percent of issues attracted more than45 percent of lobbying activity, whereas the bottom 50 percent attracted less than

3 percent of lobbying. This distribution implies that issue context affects how groups

allocate attention and influence resources. D€ur and De Bi�evre (2007a) suggested thatpublic attention also amplifies the difficulties that specific groups encounter when

trying to exert pressure.

Although researchers have long attempted to assess interest-group influence onspecific policy decisions, little evidence has accumulated (Baumgartner and

Leech 1998; D€ur 2008a). D€ur (2008a) noticed that researchers often reported

contradictory findings from different settings while addressing the same researchquestions. For example, researchers found that concentrated interests considerably

influenced some EU policy areas, but had limited influence in other areas (Bandelow,

Schumann andWidmaier 2000;Michalowitz 2007). D€ur (2008a) discussed obstaclesthat possibly hinder research consensus, including disagreements in defining influence,

the complexity of influence pathways and difficulties in measuring interest-group

influence.He suggested overcoming themeasurement problemby combiningmultiplemethods and collecting larger-scale data sets (D€ur 2008b).

Policy Networks

Policy network analysts apply social network methods to identify important actors

participating in policymaking institutions, to describe structural relations in policy

fights and to explain policy outcomes. Achieving these objectives requires under-standing the formation and transformation of policy networks, showing howpolitical

communication shapes policy proposals, and revealing how interest-group coalitions

and influence processes lead to specific policy decisions. Over the past four decades,

INTEREST GROUPS AND PLURALISM 163

policy network research has generated new concepts andprinciples for studying policy

events and demonstrating their usefulness (Knoke 2011).

Lobbying coalitions

A policy network is a bounded set of actors connected by one or more relations. Kenisand Schneider (1991: 26) defined it as ‘a relatively stable set of mainly public and

private corporate actors’whose linkages ‘serve as channels for communication and for

the exchange of information, expertise, trust and other policy resources’. Actors aretypically organizations, such as interest groups, legislative institutions, executive

agencies and regulatory bodies. Laumann and Knoke (1987) argued that substantive

issues define the boundary of a policy network, which they termed a policy domain, apolicy system whose participants are interconnected by political relations. Policy

actors socially construct a domain’s boundary by ‘mutual recognition that their

preferences and actions on policy events must be taken into account by the otherdomain participants’. Examples of policy domains include education, agriculture,

welfare, defence (Laumann andKnoke 1987), health, energy, transportation (Burstein

1991: 328), labour (Knoke et al. 1996), telecommunications and homeland security(Knoke 2004).

Policy network analysis treats a relation (a specific type of tie, such as information

exchange) between a pair of interest organizations as the basic unit of analysis. Theoverall pattern of present and absent ties among all participants comprises policy

network’s social structure. ‘The perceptions, attitudes, and actions of organizational

actors are shaped by the larger structural networks within which they are embedded,and in turn their behaviors can change these network structures’ (Knoke 2001:

63–64). The probability of persuading legislatures or agencies to make policy

decisions favourable to group interests increases when organizations pool theirpolitical and material resources. Hence, the primary political subgroup within a

policy network is the lobbying coalition. Coalition partners all prefer the same event

outcome, such as a proposed legislative bill, are connected by communication ties andcoordinate their lobbying and other influence activities, such as media outreach and

membership mobilization (Knoke et al. 1996: 22). By combining finances, expertise

and political experience, coalitions can construct an efficient division of labour. Someinterest groups mobilize their members to phone and e-mail legislators, other orga-

nizations use knowledgeable research staff to produce credible data, yet others raise

campaign contributions.Although lobbying activity should not be viewed as blatant vote-purchasing

(Browne 1998), a winning coalition often makes a more persuasive case for its

preferred policy outcome than does its opponents on substantive, technical-scientific,economic, social and, most importantly, political criteria. Illustrating these dynamics,

on the eve of a crucialHouse ofRepresentatives floor vote on regulatory reforms of the

finance industry, Rep. John Boehner, the Republican minority leader, huddled withmore than a hundred industry lobbyists and conservative political activists in aCapitol

Hill strategymeeting. ‘We need you to get out there and speak up against this’, he said,

according to three witnesses (Lipton 2010). Although theHouse Democraticmajoritycarried that particular decision, Boehner’s close-knit alliance of lobbyists and former

aides representing large corporations, nicknamed ‘Boehner Land’, helped accelerate

164 DAVID KNOKE AND XI ZHU

campaign fundraising for a Republican takeover in the 2010 House elections. With

Boehner as the new House Speaker, his inner circle of lobbyists and former aides

would wield great influence during legislative efforts to roll back the ObamaAdministration’s policies.

Policy network research

Network studies of pluralist policymaking by sociologists and political scientists

emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in the United States, Germany and the UnitedKingdom (B€orzel 1998; Knoke 1998). The initial project, a community power

structure study of a small German city, revealed how multiplex ties (communication,

resource exchanges, influence reputations) among its elites shaped collective actionson community policies (Laumann and Pappi 1976). This approach was subsequently

replicated in two small Illinois cities (Laumann, Galaskiewicz and Marsden 1978;

Galaskiewicz 1979). Next, an ‘organizational statemodel’ of national policy domainsexamined networks in the US national energy and health policy domains (Laumann

and Knoke 1987). Replications included a comparative investigation of labour policy

domains in the United States, Germany and Japan (Knoke et al. 1996), and interest-group representatives in the US energy, health, agriculture and labour policy domains

(Heinz et al. 1993). Key actors are labour unions, business associations, corporations,PIGs, state and local government associations, executive agencies and legislativecommittees. Because organizational interests diverge, no core groups can control or

dominate policymaking. Instead, short-term opposing coalitions form to take col-

lective actions in attempts to influence outcomes of specific policy events. After apolicy decision occurs, coalitions disperse and new policy events attract other

combinations of interest organizations. Despite such unstable microstructures, du-

rable cleavages may emerge and persist, such as business-versus-union conflicts inlabour policy and pharmaceuticals-versus-consumers in health-care policy domains.

German conceptualizations of policy networks originated with Laumann and

Pappi (1976) and Lehmbruch’s (1989) depiction of the West German federal systemas generalized exchanges among interest organizations, resulting in interlocking

autonomous policy networks. German scholars tended to view networks as a distinct

governance form, an alternative to strongly centralized hierarchies and deregulatedmarkets for settling policy disputes between the state and civil society (B€orzel 1998).

Absent a central authority capable of imposing national policy solutions, cooperative

policy coalitions provided informally institutionalized structures for the complexnegotiations required to reach acceptable policy decisions (Kenis and Schneider 1991;

Marin and Mayntz 1991). The EU increasingly proliferated new policy domains and

dispersed resources among public and private interest organizations. Overloadednational governmentswere compelled to cooperate with interest organizations during

policy formulation and implementation. Volker Schneider’s comparative studies of

German and EU telecommunications and dangerous-chemicals policy domains ex-emplified the Germanic approach to policy networks as a distinctive governance form

(Schneider 1986, 1992; Schneider, Dang-Nguyen and Werle 1994). He uncovered

diverse governance mechanisms – from formally institutionalized advisory bodies, toworking committees, to informal and secretive groups – that co-opted interest groups

in policymaking.

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UK political scientists tended towards more theoretical and narrative accounts of

policy networks rather than formal social network analyses of inter-organizational

relations (Rhodes 1990; Thatcher 1998). They conceptualized the ‘policy commu-nity’, a self-organizing network encompassing agents of government bureaucracies

and pressure organizations. Networks grew increasingly prevalent in the British

human services sector as governmentalministries, interest organizations and informalactors collaborated to manage a ‘hollowed out state’ (Marsh and Rhodes 1992).

Marsh and Smith (2000) proposed a dialectical change model positing interactions

among a policy network and its actors, its social contexts and its policy outcomes.They applied the dialectical model to explain transformative changes in UK agricul-

tural policymaking since the 1930s, and UK policy on genetically modified crops and

food (Toke andMarsh 2003). Kisby (2007) advocated adding ‘programmatic beliefs’as antecedent ideational contexts in the dialectical change model.

Research onpolicy networks continued apace in advancednations; for example, US

water policy (Scholz and Wang 2006), Canadian biotechnology policy (Montpetit2005), British hospital construction (Greenaway, Salter and Hart 2007), Greek rural

development (Papadopoulos and Liarikos 2007) and Czech social welfare (Anderson

2003). The EU became fertile ground for policy network studies, with research onhigher education (Lavdas, Papadakis and Gidarakou 2006), genetically modified

foods (Skogstad 2003), industrial regulation (Coen and Thatcher 2008), European

integration, agriculture and immigration (Kriesi, Adam and Jochum 2006). Mostencouragingly, policy networks of non-Western nations slowly emerged: Chilean free

trade negotiations (Bull 2008); Egyptian and Ethiopian water policies (Luzi et al.2008); and Mexican forestry policy (Paredes 2008). Finally, some projects investi-gated global or transnational policy networks (Witte, Reinicke and Benner 2000) and

international policy networks (Kohlmorgen, Hein and Bartsch 2007).

Future Directions

Our suggestions for future directions: First, study how changing institutional condi-

tions affect interest-group actions. Second, compare interest groups and policy net-works cross-nationally. Third, improve interest-group theories.

On 21 January 2010, the US Supreme Court transformed how interest groups

participate inAmerican elections. Its 5–4 ruling onCitizens United v. Federal ElectionCommission struck down McCain–Feingold Act prohibitions on organizations

spending money on candidates for office. The policy change appeared slight: ‘The

day before the Citizens United decision, corporations had the constitutional right tospend unlimited funds telling voters that “Candidate Smith hates puppies.” CitizensUnited added only protection for these corporations to convey an incremental “Vote

Smith out” exhortation’ (Levitt 2010).However, the ruling immediately impacted the2010 national elections through unrestricted and undisclosed spending by corpora-

tions, unions and other groups. Interest-group spending on advertisements quintupled

to $80million compared to the 2006midterms, withRepublicans raking in 87 percentof funds (Farnam and Eggen 2010). Interest groups structured as non-profits were

not required to disclose their donors in filings. President Obama complained of

foreign sources illegally channelling money through the US Chamber of Commerce,

166 DAVID KNOKE AND XI ZHU

allegations it denied (Shear 2010). The Citizens United ruling offers a unique natural

experiment for investigating how altering institutional rules affects interest-group

actions and outcomes, both electorally and legislatively. Ironically, donor secrecyrenders data accuracy more problematic!

The ‘comparativist turn’ in EU interest-group researchwas clearly the past decade’s

major development (Beyers et al. 2008: 1293), but sovereign nation-states remaincrucial loci for interest representation. Researchers must conduct more cross-national

investigations of interest-group systems – particularly contrasting non-pluralist and

non-Western polities – to improve understanding of howpluralist and elite-dominatedinstitutions differ in policymaking processes and outcomes. Multidisciplinary teams

of country specialists, possessing skills in survey research and policy network data

collection, are indispensable for such projects. Unfortunately, too many studiescontinue to examine only single cases, with little effort devoted to integrating

empirical findings or building a shared research agenda. Baumgartner and Leech’s

(1998) observation, that interest-group research tends to produce toomany investiga-tions answering overly narrow questions, leading to findings ‘elegantly irrelevant’ to

one another, still aptly characterizes the field. Another assessment concluded, ‘much

we study, little we know’ (Beyers et al. 2008). Making dramatic progress requiresbetter interest-group theories to guide the selection of cases, measures and proposi-

tions. A unified grand-theory of everything is implausible, but middle-range interest-

group theories might be feasible if analysts would collaborate in developing rigorousconcepts, principles and frameworks with hypotheses amenable to empirical testing.

Without theory-driven research, the accumulationof knowledge about interest groups

will remain agonizingly slow.

Further Reading

Baumgartner, F.R. and Leech, B.L. 1998:Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics

and in Political Science, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Beyers, J., Eising, R. andMaloney, W. 2008: Researching interest group politics in Europe and

elsewhere: much we study, little we know? West European Politics 31: 1103–1128.

Grossmann, M. and Dominguez, C.B.K. 2009: Party coalitions and interest group networks.

American Politics Research 37: 767–800.

Mahoney, C. and Baumgartner, F.R. 2008. Converging perspectives on interest group research

in Europe and America. West European Politics 31: 1253–1273.

INTEREST GROUPS AND PLURALISM 167