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Durkheim and DurkheimianPolitical Sociology

Kenneth Thompson

The main concepts of Durkheim’s sociology are discussed in terms of their relevance for

political sociology. Early accounts of his work focused on the somewhat evolutionist

description of the changing forms of the division of labour as societies moved from

traditional tomodern. Subsequently, attention began to be paid to those of hisworks that

dealt more directly with political institutions, including the state. His conceptualization

of politics seems particularly relevant to the ongoing discussions of civil society. More

recently his work has also proved a rich source of analytic ideas for cultural sociologists

inspiredbyDurkheim’s discussions of the symbolic sphere of socio-cultural life,whohave

used them to explore political processes. Notable examples of this application include

Jeffrey Alexander’s work on theWatergate crisis and the Obama presidential campaign.

Before discussing some of the more important of Durkheim’s contributions to the

development of political sociology, it is important to be clear about the relevant andfundamental conceptual building blocks of his sociology. They are as follows: individ-

ualism(moral individualismdistinguished fromegoistic individualism), social solidarity,

regulation (social and moral), intermediate associations (such as professional associa-tions, civil society), the state, collective effervescence (as experienced in social move-

ments and gatherings, and collective ritual performances), and symbolic representations

of the socially sacred (society itself in an idealized form). Early accounts of Durkheim’ssociologyweremainly focused onhis contrast between the formof the division of labour

in traditional society and that in modern society, equating his view with that of others

who adopted an evolutionary view of the increasing specialization of the division oflabour. It was only later that attention began to be given to his explicit discussions of the

The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, First Edition. Edited by Edwin Amenta,Kate Nash, and Alan Scott.� 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

institutions of politics and the state, and thenmuch later to the political relevance of his

ideas about the sphere of culture and the symbolic.

To summarize his view of the main problems facing the modern society of his ownday:Durkheimbelieved that individual libertywas a central value, but it needed tobe a

moral individualism that respected the needs of society as a whole. Contemporary

capitalism tended to encourage individual competitive striving without sufficientregulation and in a system that exacerbated inequalities. The state needed to level the

playing field, if necessary by restricting inheritance of wealth and unfair employment

contracts, butmainly by encouraging intermediate institutions to practice an ethicallybasedregulationwithintheirownsectors.Hispersonalpoliticalpositionapproximated

that of the ethical socialists or guild socialismofR.H.Tawney inBritain – although the

implicationsofhis theoreticalpositionhavebeenjudgedbysomelatercommentators toplace him potentially much more to the radical left of the political spectrum (Pearce

1989;cf.Laborde2000foradiscussionofFrenchandContinentalpluralismrelevant to

Durkheim’s position). Apart from the state-initiated reforms concerning wealth andcontracts, mentioned above, his view of the state rested on a ‘communicative theory of

politics’whichviewed the state as an institutionwhose taskwas to elevate anddistil the

representations and opinions coming from below, so acting as a synthesizing intelli-gence on behalf of the whole. Its sphere of operations corresponds more to what

Habermas and others have termed the ‘public sphere of civil society’ than it does to the

organized state of much state-centred sociology (Emirbayer 1996: 114).In terms of social philosophy,Durkheim stressed the centrality of the concept of the

individual person inmodern thought. However, he showed how this could take either

negative (socially pathological) or positive (balanced and progressive) forms. Thenegative formwas that of egoistic and anomic individualism,whichwas characteristic

of much of modern economic thought and activity. The positive form was that which

fostered social solidarity (Joas 2009: 2–3). A balanced individualism also required anadequate sense of social needs, not least in the economic sphere (Durkheim, 2009

[1917]: 3–6). To put this in disciplinary terms: Durkheim opposed the dominance of

economic thinking and sought to stress the need for a sociological perspective thatemphasized the priority of the social dimension and its moral basis. Even apparently

economic phenomena, such as the market and contracts, could not operate or be

understood without regard for their social and cultural dimensions.It will be argued that the most important methodological and analytical contribu-

tions of recent Durkheimian sociology to the study of political processes can be

situated within the ‘cultural turn’ that has occurred in the social sciences andhumanities. Sociologists have returned toDurkheim’smagnumopus,TheElementaryForms of the Religious Life (1995 [1915]), inspired by his discussion of the binarystructures of culture, especially the sacred–profane dichotomy. It was this that

influenced the subsequent development of structuralism (e.g., the work of Claude

Levi-Strauss (1963)), and has recently been drawn on by sociologists attempting todevelop a symbolic approach to politics.

Changing Views of Durkheimian Sociology

There is an interesting question that needs to be answered aboutwhy it took so long forDurkheim’s sociology to gain recognition as an important resource for political

28 KENNETH THOMPSON

sociology. After all, it took very little time for sociologists to appreciate the contri-

bution his works made to the study of subjects such as changes in the forms of the

division of labour, suicide, crime, education and religion. But formany years therewaslittle consideration of the relevance of his sociology for the study of political processes

and issues.

Onereasonmaybe thatDurkheimavoideddirect involvement inpolitics, apart fromthe Dreyfus Affair (1898), and concentrated on developing sociology as a respectable

academic discipline.However, another reason for the slow recognitionmay have been

the delay in publishing and translating his most overtly political book, which did notappearuntil33yearsafterhisdeath,andeventhenitwasonlyasaresultoftheeffortsofa

Turkishdisciple tohave itpublishedbytheUniversityof Istanbul.BasedonDurkheim’s

lecturenotes,Leconsdesociologie:physiquedesmeursetdudroit (1950), thebookwastranslated into English as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (1957). It is not

surprising that some of themost influential early commentators on his sociology failed

to refer to this work (Alpert 1961 [1939]; Parsons 1937) and consequently minimizedthepolitical relevance ofhis thought.The earlyAmerican commentators, inparticular,

were inclined to assimilate Durkheim’s thought into a contemporary ‘functionalist’ or

‘voluntarist’ approach. Teachers of sociology slipped all too easily into misleadingdichotomies, in which Durkheim was identified with a conservative approach preoc-

cupied with ‘order’ and ‘stability’, in contrast to Marx and Weber, who could be

portrayed as concerned with ‘conflict’ and ‘change’ (e.g., Nisbet 1965).A better acquaintance with his writings on politics in Professional Ethics and Civic

Morals and lesser works such as Socialism (1958 [1928]) and various articles and

reviews has led to a greater appreciation of his concern about the need for socialchange if the ideals of the FrenchRevolution – liberty, equality and fraternity –were to

be fulfilled. Unlike Marx, he did not believe that political revolution based on class

conflict was the answer. Experience suggested that political revolutions tended to leadto bureaucratic domination: ‘It is among the most revolutionary peoples that bu-

reaucratic routine is often most powerful’ (Durkheim 1961 [1925]: 137). In

Durkheim’s view, the problem in France was that the underlying social changes, ofwhich the Revolution of 1789 and the revolutionary movements of 1848 and

1870–1871 were only a symptom, had not yet been accommodated within the

structure of modern France. The task of sociology was to analyze the long-termevolutionary character of the changes that had brought about industrialization (the

division of labour) and to diagnose the causes of the strains that were present in

actually existing society. This was the analytical task taken up in The Division ofLabor in Society (1984 [1893]) and Professional Ethics and Civic Morals.

According to Durkheim’s analysis, the differentiation of institutions and functionsentailed in the division of labour produced a situation marked by greatly increased

individualism. This could be a positive development or it could have pathological

results, depending on the type of individualism that prevailed. In fact, as it haddeveloped in France and other capitalist societies, it had taken on pathological

characteristics, because egoism rather thanmoral individualism predominated. Com-

petition and conflict to satisfy individual, unrestrained appetites reigned in placeof cooperation to promote the common good. Freedom of contract in the context of

inequality simply meant that the strong exploited the weak. The situation could

only be changed if the state took a more positive role in securing the conditions underwhich individuals could develop their potentialities, involving greater equality of

DURKHEIM AND DURKHEIMIAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 29

opportunity and a drastic reduction in the inequalities perpetuated by the inheritance

of wealth. A necessary reform would be the development of intermediate institutions

between the individual and the state, so as to cohere the opinions of individuals andcommunicate them to the state, and to channel the state’s leadership down to the

grassroots; such institutions would also act as a buffer between the individual and the

state, and balance the power of the state. In some respects, Durkheimwas anticipatingthe calls for the strengthening of civil society that have now become topical. However,

because he appreciated the importance of the economic sphere in industrial societies,

he recognized that the key intermediate institution would need to be one thatcombined economic and moral functions – something along the lines of occupational

associations, analogous to the ancient guilds or corporations. He stressed, however,

that the guilds could only perform their function if they modernized and took on ademocratic structure.

The analysis developed in Professional Ethics and Civic Morals is a direct con-

tinuation of that begun in The Division of Labor in Society. There could be no goingback to the mechanical solidarity of simpler societies, in which the individual was

subordinated to the collective conscience, based on uniformity. There was still a

‘sacred’ quality in society, and it attached to social ideals; in the modern era they wereideals concerning the dignity and worth of the individual. However, the organic

solidarity that should characterize modern society would only be realized when

society was organized in such a way as to enable the individual to govern his/herself and where moral regulation led to voluntary restraint of the appetites for the

benefit of all. For this to occur, solidary groups and group ethics were required.While

some critics dismissed this as a conservative hankering for a return to the past or anauthoritarian urge to subjugate the individual to society, it eventually became clear

thatDurkheimwas attempting to overcome the dichotomy that opposes individualism

to communitarianism (Cladis 1992). His sociological perspective was meant to be acorrective to an overemphasis either on the economy or on the state, focusing instead

on the social facts that make up the totality of the social phenomenon, which included

a variety of structured layers: morphology (substratum), institutions (normativesphere), collective representations (symbolic sphere) (cf. Thompson 2002: 59–60).

According to his definition, the characteristics of social facts were: externality,

constraint and generality. A social fact had an existence external to any individualor themind of any individual. It exercised a constraint over the individual in a number

ofways, depending on its position in the continuumof social phenomena ranging from

morphological facts that determined the availability of facilities, to the constrainingforce of norms backed by sanctions, to the constraints imposed by language, the force

of myths and symbols, and the pressures of public opinion.During the period from the 1960s throughmuch of the 1980s the political sociology

of leading practitioners of historical-comparative sociology in the English-speaking

world paid little attention to Durkheim’s general sociology, drawing more on Marxand Weber in focusing attention on the rise and development of capitalism and the

formation of national states (see Emirbayer 1996, for a critique of BarringtonMoore,

Charles Tilly and Theda Skocpol, in this respect). The title of Charles Tilly’sessay ‘Useless Durkheim’ (1981) illustrates this tendency (a rare exception was

Robert Bellah 1959). Partly this was due to the tendency to equate Durkheim with

the structural-functionalism and social evolutionism of Talcott Parsons, who had

30 KENNETH THOMPSON

selectively appropriated some of Durkheim’s ideas. It was only when sociologists

began to give more attention to the theoretical juncture in between the modern state

and capitalism that they discerned a new relevance for Durkheimian concern with thestructures and processes of civil society. It is the intermediate domains of social life –

the domestic, associational and public institutions of society – that Durkheim

analyzed; not only the domain of political society (or the ‘public sphere’), but also‘the intimate sphere’ (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially

voluntary associations), social movements and forms of public communication

(Cohen and Arato 1992: ix; quoted in Emirbayer 1996: 113).An example of Durkheim’s historical analyses of institutions that play a key role in

social and political regulation was his posthumously published L’Evolution pedago-gique en France (1938; translated into English as The Evolution of EducationalThought, 1977). One of the criticisms of Durkheim’s sociology before the English

translation of that workwas that he did not see that ideology, as represented bymoral

and education doctrines and practices, could be biased and systematically work infavour of the interests of some classes against those of others. Added to this was the

charge that he was blind to education’s role in restricting the life chances of some

classes (cf. Lukes 1975: 133). However, these criticisms are refuted by his analysis ofthe relations between social classes and educational ideas and practices, as set out in

The Evolution of Educational Thought. In the example of the educational changes

brought about by theRenaissance, he argued that a growth inwealth and consumptionled to an increased emulation of aristocratic lifestyles by the aspiringmiddle class – the

educational ideas of humanism, such as those of Erasmus, were aimed at refinement of

cultural tastes to fit the ‘leisured class’ for polite society. Durkheimadded that thiswasat the expense of the educational needs of the masses (Durkheim 1977 [1938]:

205–206). Drawing on Durkheim’s ideas, Jeffrey Alexander has pointed out that

modern education plays a crucial mediating role connecting ‘two kinds of moralities,the affective morality of family life and the more rigorous, impersonal faith that

controls civic society’ and the state (Alexander 1982: 279–280). It is above all in his

later religious sociology, notably The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, thatDurkheim links the normative regulation of institutions and the symbolical cultural

logics that constrain action in all the institutional sectors of society, including that of

modern civil society.He suggests that religious beliefs and, by extension, other culturalformations are organized according to a binary logic, most famously in the contrast

between the sacred and the profane, but also in further subdivisions such as the pure

and the impure, thedivineand thediabolical, and the forcesoforderand thoseof chaos.It is through the analysis of these binary codes that cultural sociologists have sought to

apply Durkheim’s ideas to political processes. In doing so they insist on grantingmoreautonomy to cultural factors in their analyses than did those sociologists of the 1980s

whohadpointed to the overlapbetweenAlthusserianMarxist theories of ideology and

Durkheim’s ideas on religion (Strawbridge 1982; Thompson 1986; Pearce 1989).

Cultural Sociology and Politics

As disaffectionwith the structural-functionalism epitomized in Talcott Parsons’ work

increased during the 1970s, three of his former students and co-workers began to push

DURKHEIM AND DURKHEIMIAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 31

his framework towards a distinctively Durkheimian emphasis on symbolism, sacred-

ness and ritual, which paved the way for the cultural turn in political sociology.

Edward Shils argued that secular, differentiated societies have symbolic ‘centres’which inspire awe and mystery and that it is proximity to these sources of sacredness

that allocates such ‘structural’ qualities as social status (Shils 1975). Clifford Geertz

argued that whether cultural systems are ‘religious’ has nothing to do with anyreference to the supernatural, but rather concerns the degree to which they are

sacralized, inspire ritual devotion and mobilize group solidarity (Geertz 1973,

chapters 4 and 8). He went on to analyze American political campaigns in similarsymbolic and culturalist terms (Geertz 1983). The thirdmember of this group, Robert

Bellah, was most explicit in drawing on Durkheim, arguing that secular nations have

‘civil religions’ – symbolic systems that relate national political structures and eventsto a transcendent, supra-political framework that defines some ultimate social

meaning (Bellah 1970, 1980). Like Durkheim, Bellah calls this framework ‘religious’

only in order to emphasize the sacredness of its symbols and the ritual power itcommands. This cultural turn in political sociology has been described and developed

in the work of Alexander, a student of Parsons and Bellah. He traced out the

theoretical continuities and innovations in his Introduction to the edited volumeDurkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies (Alexander 1988), which also contained his

own first attempt to apply this framework to a political process, that of theWatergate

crisis that began in 1972. Where Alexander moved beyond his predecessors was indeconstructing the binary sets of good and evil characteristics of the narratives and

discourses enshrined in the civil religion that bestowed a sacred character on society.

He examines the Watergate crisis and its unfolding as a public drama of ritualcleansing, tracing the transition from one set of binary symbolic classifications to

another in the course of the purging process. Subsequently, he and his collaborators

have gone beyond the case of American civil religion and drawn up binary codes thatthey take to be characteristic of all liberal-democratic societies. As Alexander states:

Democratic discourse, then, posits the following qualities as axiomatic: activism, auton-

omy, rationality, reasonableness, calm, control, realism and sanity. The nature of the

counter-code, the discourse that justifies the restriction of civil society, is already clearly

implied. If actors are passive and dependent, irrational and hysterical, excitable, passion-

ate, unrealistic or mad, they cannot be allowed the freedom that democracy allows.

(Alexander 2000: 299)

Alexander’s colleague, Philip Smith, also describes the code of liberal democracy interms of the binary opposites of the sacred and profane. The sacred is said to be

characterized by an emphasis on: order, the individual, reason, activism, law, equality,

inclusiveness and autonomy; whereas the profane involves: disorder, group emotion,passivity, power, hierarchy, exclusiveness and dependence (Smith 1998: 120). These

two sets of binary opposites are particularly prominent where one group is claiming to

represent the values of the idealized society and to convince the public that itsopponent represents the opposite, negative characteristics. Because of the Western

world’s shared historical heritage, dating back to Ancient Israel and Classical Greece,

Western societies tend to share many of the same forms of discourse and symbols intheir idealized civil society. However, as each society also has somewhat different

32 KENNETH THOMPSON

historical components, there are also differences in the forms taken by the binary

oppositions and in the way these are summoned up and articulated in public

controversies. It is here, in the deconstruction of cultural codes operating throughthe particularities of discursive narratives, that the neo-Durkheimian approach has

most to offer to political sociology.

On the whole, Alexander and his colleagues have tended to stress the similarities inthe binary codes operating in liberal-democratic societies or even in an emerging

global civil sphere. However, it has been argued that, bearing in mind Weber’s

distinction between the nation and the state – the nation is a cultural phenomenon,whereas the state is an organized structure (Weber 1978: 922) – it is increasingly the

case that in multicultural societies the national element is not always firmly anchored

in or supportive of the culture of civil society that is congruent with the liberal-democratic state. This becomes obvious in the light of the different images summoned

up by appeals to the spirit of ethnic nationalism or other nationalisms not coterminous

with the state (Thompson 2004: 20). The highly charged binary symbolic structuresthat construct nationalisms are also highly particularistic and often opposed to the

more universalistic symbols and values that are typical of civil society in liberal

democracies. Of course, ethnic or nationalist groups often seek to broaden politicalsupport for their cause by appealing towider values of civil society. But this is only part

of the story. The approach that focuses on liberal-democratic discourses tends to

equate civil societywith ‘normal’ political processes and appeals to a consensual set ofvalues. But ethnic nationalisms are culturally significant and of sociological interest

precisely because of their totalizing, expressive, emotional, particularisms, rather than

because they are similar to all other liberal-democratic processes.Durkheim was conscious of the power of appeals to nationalism and addressed his

wartime pamphlets to countering German nationalist ideology, such as that emanat-

ing from Weber’s teacher Heinrich von Treitschke, which claimed that state sover-eignty is absolute, above morality, and that the state is the realm of unity above and

opposed to civil society (the realm of plurality and difference). By contrast, Durkheim

maintained that the idealized society underpinning themodern democratic state, suchas France, was based upon the moral code whose collective representations derived

from values and principles enshrined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the

Citizen. His vision was of a pluralistic state in which intermediate groups andassociations, with their particularistic cultures and interests, would mediate between

the state and the individual, while the state would encourage the development of a

constitutional patriotism that could supply the organic solidarity compatible with theconscience collective of the French nation. Thus, while he recognized the elements of

‘mechanical solidarity’ in collective nationalistic rituals thatwould persist, he believedthat patriotism would find its ultimate legitimation in the universal rights celebrating

the cult of the individual as embedded in the nation and its constitution.

Using Durkheim’s own prescriptions, it can be argued that France has found itdifficult to develop and accommodate intermediate associations that provide the link

between state and individual. The political sociologist, Mabel Berezin (2009), has

argued that France is a ‘hegemonic’ nation-state that combines parliamentary de-mocracywith a strong sense of political community that subsumes ethnic and regional

cultures. In this institutional context, citizens rely on the nation to provide them with

both cultural identity and social security. When citizens are encouraged by some

DURKHEIM AND DURKHEIMIAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 33

politicians and themedia coverage of socio-economic problems to perceive the nation

as endangered by globalization (or Europeanization) and immigration, they react

emotionally to both cultural and material threats. These are experienced as threats topersonal identity and security and, when politically mobilized, give rise to collective

emotions that inspire right-wing populist voting in favour of the National Front.

According toDurkheim’s political sociology, this should be regarded as an ‘abnormal’and ‘pathological’ condition for a modern society and should prove to be temporary.

However, it is a cogent criticism of Durkheim that his ideal type (ormodel) of modern

society was destined never to correspond very closely to actually existing conditions.Nevertheless, it can be argued that itmight help to provide a benchmark againstwhich

actual political tendencies can be judged in terms of their likely temporary or more

permanent character. Jeffrey Alexander pinpoints the gap between Durkheim’sappreciation of the importance of moral regulation for the coherence of modern

society and his rather empirically vague discussions of how modern morality is

connected to institutions, social groups and movements in our complex, fragmentedand stratified societies:

This Durkheim hardly begins to explain. How can moral regulation be squared with the

rot and murderousness that have marked so much of modern life? Durkheim died in

1917, in themiddle of the first great military conflagration of the twentieth century. Two

decades later, as the modern world prepared for a second horrendous war, his closest

collaborator remarked that the Durkheimians had never imagined totems as swastikas.

Theyhadbelieved that socialmoralitywouldbe transcendent, universal and abstract, and

that social obligations would reinforce sacred good, not sacred evil.

(Alexander 2006: 18–19)

The strategy developed by Alexander and other neo-Durkheimians in seeking to

bridge the analytical gap left by Durkheim’s political sociology is to use Durkheim’s

method of analyzing symbolic binary codes and apply it to the symbols and narrativesin the wider civil sphere, which contribute to the construction, destruction and

reconstruction of the elements of moral community and social solidarity that con-

stitute civil society. This approach follows Durkheim in giving priority to the moralbindings that run across institutions, groups and social movements, leading to either

social solidarity or fragmentation, depending on their degree of convergence, coher-

ence and strength. It stresses the notion of moral community as the basis of society, inthe same way that Durkheim emphasized the essential moral force of society as

exemplified by the ‘non-contractual’ elements of contract – contracts require a prior,

moral framework. In this sense, Durkheimian political sociology stands for a rejectionof the new utilitarian theories, including the resurgent rational choice theories and

‘realistic’ approaches to social and political life (Alexander 2006: 54, 568).If the fullest statement of the theoretical basis of the neo-Durkheimian political

sociology is to be found inAlexander’smassiveworkTheCivil Sphere (2006), itsmost

compelling empirical exemplification is to be found in the more recent analysis of theObama presidential campaign (Alexander 2010).WhereasHabermas and others have

conceptualized conflict in the public sphere as about truth claims and rational

justification, Alexander argues that while truth, honesty and fairness do matter, itis less amatter of being these qualities than of seeming to be them, of embodying truth,

34 KENNETH THOMPSON

narrating honesty and projecting fairness, and of doing it in a persuasive way. Being

truthful, honest and fair are discursive claims, and whether these claims take root and

hold is held to be a matter of performative success. Alexander shows that throughoutthe 2008 presidential campaign, operatives and journalists alike spoke of ‘painting’

the other side.The campaigners for each candidate sought toproject apicture/image of

their man as the living embodiment of the ‘discourse of liberty’, while painting theopposing candidate as embodying the dark and brooding qualities that mark the

‘discourse of repression’. Campaigning is then described as an aesthetic activity, not a

cognitive or moral one, and it depends on stagecraft rather than ethical worthiness orempirical accuracy. Political struggle achieves clarity and persuasive power by

defining the difference between one’s own and the other’s side, connecting ‘us’ to

the sacred civil qualities that sustain liberty, linking ‘them’ to the anti-civil qualitiesthat profane political life, undermine liberty and open the door to corruption.

Alexander demonstrates, through specific examples from the campaign, how each

of the candidates sought to paint the opponent in negative terms and to cast doubt onthe authenticity of the other’s performance, as in the McCain effort to create a

narrative that defined Obama as an arrogant celebrity (Alexander 2010).

While it would be foolish to neglect the contributions of other theoretical schools,especially those concerned with inequalities of power or the institutional mechanisms

of politics, it is clear that the approach of Durkheimian cultural sociology could make

a significant contribution to political sociology in our media-saturated age. It focusesattention on the ways in which social-political ‘facts’ are culturally constructed and

given meaning through their symbolical representations and the codes that enable us

to interpret the narratives or discourses in which they are presented. The particularcontribution of Durkheimian cultural sociology has been to analyze the binary nature

of those cultural codes, building on the kinds of fundamental dichotomies that

Durkheim illustrated with his contrast between the sacred versus profane. Whetherthe ‘facts’ at issue are about social inequalities of resources and power in relation to

class, gender and race, or about the qualities of politicians themselves, theirmeaning is

constructed (and can be analyzed) in terms of their cultural coding.

Further Reading

Cladis, M. 1992: A Communitarian Defense of Liberalism: Emile Durkheim and Contempo-

rary Social Theory. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Gane, M. (ed.) 1992: The Radical Sociology of Durkheim and Mauss. London: Routledge.

Cotterell, R. (ed.) 2010: Emile Durkheim: Justice, Morality and Politics. Aldershot: Ashgate.

DURKHEIM AND DURKHEIMIAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 35