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Sociological Institutionalism andWorld Society

Evan Schofer, Ann Hironaka, David John Frankand Wesley Longhofer

Sociological institutionalism, as applied to international issues and global social change,

has generated a growing literature on ‘world society’. Scholars working in this tradition

have sought to understand how international institutions, world culture, global profes-

sionals and transnational associations – facets of an increasingly structuredworld society

– shape the identities, structure and behaviour of states, organizations and individuals

across the globe. In contrast to theories that focus on interested actors and their resources

andmilitary capabilities, the world society perspective sees social action as deriving from

culture, knowledge and authority rooted in global institutions and structures. Among

other things, the perspective predicts surprising levels of global conformity and distinc-

tive patterns of disorganization or ‘loose coupling’ in the structure and behaviour of

social actors. We discuss key theoretical issues and the empirical literature that has

followed, address commonmisconceptions and chart somepromising future directions of

the world society perspective.

Introduction

Sociological institutionalism (or ‘neo-institutionalism’) has had influence across

sociology and beyond, but particularly on studies of the transnational sphere andglobal social change (for general reviews, see Jepperson 2002; Meyer 2010; Meyer

et al. 1997; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006). Variously labelled world polity theory,

world society theory and simply institutional theory, scholars have drawn on socio-logical institutionalism to generate an expansive theoretical and empirical agenda

The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, First Edition. Edited by Edwin Amenta,Kate Nash, and Alan Scott.� 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

stressing the importance of global institutions and culture in shaping the structure and

behaviour of nation-states, organizations and individuals worldwide.

The world society perspective is historically linked to John W. Meyer and colla-borators, working at Stanford University in the 1970s and 1980s. Reacting on one

hand to the enduring influence of functionalism in American sociology (e.g., mod-

ernization theory) and perspectives stressing economic and military power on theother (e.g., world-system theory, neo-realism), the world society tradition has sought

to explain global change – most notably the diffusion ofWestern-style state policies –

as the consequence of emerging global institutions, international organizations and anincreasingly common world culture in the period following World War II.

Institutionalisms

Institutional perspectives, generally, shift attention away from individual social actors

and toward the social context or environment in which actors are embedded (seeAmenta 2005). Institutionalisms vary substantially, however, both in the conceptu-

alization of institutional environments and in the extent to which actor interests and

identities are seen as existing a priori versus being fundamentally shaped or evenconstituted by the external environment. We may think of a continuumwith interest-

seeking rational actors on one end and ‘stage actors’ on the other (Meyer 2009).World

society theory is on the latter end of the spectrum, characterizing actors as creatures oftheir context – as enactors of social or cultural rules and scripts provided by theirwider

environment.

Economic institutionalism (e.g., North 1990) and much work in political science(e.g., Keohane and Nye 1977) begins with the assumption of strong interested actors,

and seeks to understand when and why those actors choose to enter into institutional

arrangements that may ultimately constrain their behaviour to some degree. Histor-ical institutionalisms focus on the ways that historically emergent features of the

institutional environment channel subsequent behaviour (and even interests) in

contingent, path-dependent ways (Skocpol 1979). Actors may struggle to pursuetheir interests, but within a range of possibilities shaped by the past.

Sociological neo-institutionalism goes further in asserting the influence of social

context, which shapes or even ‘constitutes’ social actors – defining their identities andgoals (DiMaggio and Powell 1983;Meyer andRowan 1977). To varying degrees, neo-

institutional scholars draw inspiration from the cultural and phenomenological

traditions of Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Goffman (1974), which stress thesocially constructed nature of reality, and the extent towhich social behaviour reflects

the enactment of socially appropriate frames in a given context (in contrast to, say,

images of rational calculation). The strong emphasis on macro-social dynamicsultimately represents a stark alternative to the methodological individualism that

pervades much contemporary (especially American) sociological research (Jepperson

and Meyer 2011).

World society and world culture

The initial impulse for theworld society tradition cameout of comparative research on

education and governance in the 1970s. Education systems in sub-Saharan Africa, for

58 EVAN SCHOFER, ANN HIRONAKA, DAVID JOHN FRANK ET AL.

instance, seemed surprisingly like those of Western societies despite stark differences

in the labour markets they served. Schools and curricula looked like resource-poor

imitations of those in the West, rather than functional systems adapted to theeducational needs of agricultural economies. It appeared that governments and

educators were more attuned to global models of schooling than local needs and

realities ‘on the ground’.This similarity across societies, or isomorphism, was explained as conformity to

dominant, legitimated, or ‘taken-for-granted’ views. Conventional ideas about gov-

ernance and education could be seen as cultural models – that is, blueprints or recipesthat define what a ‘normal’ or appropriate nation-state looks like (Meyer et al. 1997).Cultural models are sometimes referred to as myths, emphasizing that they reflect

societal ideologies or fads, and are not necessarily functionally optimal. Nevertheless,these cultural models suffuse the international sphere, becoming a key component of

the institutional environment surrounding and constituting nation-states. One pri-

mary consequence is the global diffusion of ideas and policy models (see Strang andMeyer 1993). The world society tradition thus stresses the historical build-up of

international organizations and structures – such as the United Nations and inter-

national associations – that serve to institutionalize cultural models, effectivelyembodying and sustaining a global culture.

Whereas much work in political sociology stresses both heterogeneity and con-

testation, theworld society tradition focuses on strong commonalities in internationaldiscourses on awide range of topics, from human rights to environmentalism. Aswith

clothing fashions, variability may coexist with clear patterns and trends, such as

common assumptions, rules and fads. Ideas and discourses regarding educationalpolicy institutionalized in the international sphere, for example, may vary on specifics

yet embody broadly common assumptions that pervade a given historical period –

providing common blueprints that generate conformity among countries.A great deal of empirical research has studied the top-down process through which

global models and discourses diffuse to nation-states – particularly those with strong

organizational links to the international sphere. As constructed entities of a highlyrationalized world society, seemingly disparate nation-states exhibit a great deal of

structural similarity in their constitutions (Boli 1987), ministerial structures (Kim,

Jang andHwang 2002), and policies, including those on national security (Jepperson,Wendt and Katzenstein 1996) and women’s suffrage (Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan

1997). Common goals of the modern nation-state are furthermore reflected in such

areas as expanded educational systems (Baker and LeTendre 2005; Meyer, Ramirezand Soysal 1992; Schofer and Meyer 2005), environmental protection (Frank,

Hironaka and Schofer 2000; Frank, Longhofer and Schofer 2007; Hironaka2000), and the promotion of science (Drori et al. 2003; Schofer 2003).

The content of world culture

World society theory is a theory ofmodernity. Scholars in this tradition have sought to

unpack the institutionalized culture of modern society, and to characterize social

actors as products of that culture. Drawing on Weber and other accounts ofmodernity, world society scholars emphasize rationalization, universalism, belief

in progress, and individualism as foundational cultural assumptions that undergird

SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND WORLD SOCIETY 59

global discourse and organization (Boli and Thomas 1999). This culture supports a

verywide array ofmovements, initiatives and innovations but proscribesmany others.

It is unthinkable for the United Nations, for instance, to argue for the return oftraditional feudal arrangements, which violate cultural norms regarding individual

freedom and progress.

World society scholars view global culture as a product of history, not someinevitable or teleological evolution of values. Historically, Christendom and major

cultural movements, such as the Enlightenment, formed the basis for an emergent

European culture (Meyer 1989). Subsequent European dominance and colonialexpansion propagated Western ideas on a global scale. The Allied victory in World

War II and the emergence of the United States (rather than Germany) as a dominant

power shifted global culture in amore liberal, individualistic and arguably ‘American’direction. Yet, world society scholars have resisted the idea that global culture is

simply hegemonic ideology, carried by force of arms. Rather, the cultural system

evolves substantially autonomously. For instance, the liberal ‘American’ ideals ex-pressed in the UN Declaration of Human Rights have formed the basis for a much

larger international human rights movement than the US state envisioned or (pre-

sumably) desired.More recently, scholars have begun to dig more deeply into the origins and content

of world society. Lechner and Boli (2005) suggest that world culture, though riddled

with tensions and contradictions, saturates social life through law, organizations,religion, national identity, and even anti-globalization movements. Frank and Gabler

(2006), meanwhile, examine world culture as reflected in university curricula world-

wide, highlighting striking similarities in substantive emphases in seemingly nationalinstitutions. We discuss directions for future research below.

Disorganization and loose coupling

Cultural/phenomenological institutionalisms, in rejecting actor-centrism and func-

tionalism, characterize social life and social actors themselves as rather disorganizedand messy. Whereas neo-realist perspectives in political science, for instance, assume

that states are coherent and unitary actors, world society theory sees states, organiza-

tions and even individuals as loose structures with internal inconsistencies andinstabilities over time. Lacking coherent interests or identities, states (and their

subunits) drawhaphazardly upon culturalmodels from the institutional environment,

moving in multiple (and sometimes inconsistent) directions at the same time. Fur-thermore, ritualized enactment of global models may be only loosely related to policy

implementation – especially in impoverished countries. Disjunctures are the norm.

This may seem unsatisfying to those who want a simple answer as to whether worldculture ‘really matters’. Yet, one of the strengths of the perspective is that it recognizes

and helps make sense of the complex forms of loose coupling observed in modern

organizations (Orton and Weick 1990).Both case study and quantitative research support notions of loose coupling as

described by world society theory. For example, Boyle (2002) finds that anti-female

genital cutting reforms – derived from global principles of human rights and over-riding many notions of national sovereignty – did not necessarily diminish the

practice, even when individual attitudes aligned with global norms (see also Boyle,


McMorris andGomez 2002). Similarly, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) show that

signing human rights accords did not actually improve human rights records in the

most abusive countries. Decoupling appears to be especially pervasive in developingcountries, where, for example, the pressures of economic globalization produce a

variety of science policies in the nameof development but rarely aboost in the scientific

labour force (Drori et al. 2003). Yet, loose coupling does not simplymean the ‘absenceof real change’. Schofer and Hironaka (2005) seek to identify the conditions under

which change is likely to occur ‘on the ground’. They argue that institutional forces

may push consistently across levels of an organization, generating systematic changeeven if the organization lacks tight internal coupling.

Related traditions

Complementary perspectives include constructivism in political science, as well as

sociological work on transnational civil society and social movements. Constructiv-ism in International Relations is a close cognate of the world society tradition (see

Finnemore 1996). Constructivism fundamentally accepts the idea that culturematters

– most often conceptualized as ‘norms’. State behaviour is, in part, influenced bynorms, which are propagated by non-state actors (‘norm entrepreneurs’) (Sikkink

1998). Within sociology, recent work on transnational social movements also bears

much in common with the world society tradition – including an emphasis oninternational association, and (to varying degrees) an appreciation for ‘cultural

frames’ as a source of mobilization (e.g., Smith 2002). Yet, (despite exceptions) these

traditions have retained more of the actor-centrism and emphasis on power thatcultural/phenomenological institutionalists seek to reject. Actors are still frequently

characterized as prime movers, even if their behaviour is sometimes constrained by

‘norms’. Non-state actors or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ are, themselves, cast as strategicactors rather than agents of a broader culture. And, imageries of interests and

incentives, rather than culture, are often more central to arguments. Nonetheless,

the broader image – of a thick international environment consisting of non-state actors(organizations) andnorms (culture) that influence states –bearsmuch in commonwith

world society theory.

Recent work in science studies on performativity is in many ways a cognate of theworld society tradition (e.g., MacKenzie 2010). World society scholarship has

attended to the role of authoritative knowledge, epistemic communities and policy

professionals as the source of global cultural myths and models, which ultimatelybecome recipes or blueprints that diffuse around the globe – transforming how states

behave (Drori et al. 2003). Theworld society tradition also shares a surprising amount

of common ground with Foucaultian-inspired studies of the state, global institutionsand ‘governmentality’ (e.g., Ferguson 1990; Scott 1998; Goldman 2005). Although

the world society research generally de-emphasizes the concept of power (instead

stressing ‘taken-for-grantedness’ and authority), it nevertheless describes a dominantculture of ‘high modernity’ and driving trends toward rationalization that are

reshaping the globe. The authoritative, rationalized models and myths of world

culture (embedded in international institutions and regimes) bear similarity to thedisciplinary regimes and systems of governmentality described in the Foucaultian

tradition.


Myths and Misperceptions

Over time, several interrelated criticisms of world society theory have arisen – and inpart grown themselvesmyth-like and institutionalized.We address themhere in hopes

of advancing discussion. At the same time, we consider some misperceptions in the

literature – to some extent shared by practitioners – that may limit the perspective’scontributions to the wider field.

1. World society theory ignores actors, interests and power

It is true that work from the world society perspective – and sociological neo-

institutionalism generally – de-emphasizes actors and interests relative to the socio-

logical mainstream. It is indeed a core contention of the perspective that ‘actors’ and‘interests’ are best, or at least usefully, conceived as derivative features of the wider

institutional environment, and that one gains fundamental insight into their nature

and quality by examining the models or blueprints from which they derive.Related to this, world society theory de-emphasizes the role of coercive power in

creating and maintaining institutions, contra the standard American view of a socialworld comprised of primordial actors – in this casemarked not only by interests but by

disparities in power. Such views dominate political sociology. The problem they face is

that considerable social change occurs without clear assertions of power – that is,coercion by means of violence. Rather, authority – that is, persuasion by status or

expertise – is pervasive in social life.

By de-emphasizing actors, interests and power, world society scholars are able topose questions about phenomena that are unobserved or unremarked upon by more

conventional actor-centric and power-based theories. For instance, theorists of actor-

centric and power-based theories might note the role of anti-colonial movements insubsequent decolonizations of the 1950s and 1960s. What is striking from a world

society perspective is the opposite side of the coin. In the majority of colonies, anti-

colonial movements were ostentatiously weak and disorganized – with little controlover means of coercion. Nevertheless, decolonizations occurred, even in those

colonies that did not mobilize anti-colonial movements. World society scholars have

argued that in many cases, the authority and legitimacy conferred by a wider globalinstitutional environment was more effective in generating political independence

than armed coercion (Strang1990).This bynomeans implies aworldwithout conflict,

but even conflict itself is structured by the global ‘rules’ of the game (Hironaka 2005).

2. World society theory cannot explain the origins of culturalforms or cultural change

This criticism also typically, though not always, arises from conventional actors/

interests assumptions. Here, one concedes the importance of cultural ‘blueprints’ butthen askswhere they come fromor how they change – often assuming that ‘real’ actors

with ‘real’ interests stand behind the curtain. It is true that much empirical work from

the world society perspective focuses on the global diffusion of existing models, andthe sheer abundance of this work – and the attention it merits – perhaps tempts the

conclusion thatworld society theorists ignore the origins question. But that conclusion


is more caricature than accurate representation. In fact, a growing number of studies

attenddirectly to the origins of cultural forms– articulating theways inwhich evolving

and intensifying global institutions give rise (and fall) to various blueprints andmodels. Accounts stress that contemporary world society is replete with individual

actorhood and also professionalized expertise, aimed at developing general models of

legitimate goals and putative ‘best practices’. Models with stronger theories ofcollective good, with better articulations of the taken-for-granted elements of devel-

oping world culture, and with more elaborate international organizational carriers,

are more likely to become institutionalized. The origins question in many of theseaccounts never reverts to actors and interests, as some might hope, but remains in the

realm of enactors and culture.

In this vein, for example, one might query the origins of environmental protection.The powerful and interested actors in the story – especially nation-states and corpora-

tions – may oppose most forms of protection, insofar as they compromise goals of

development and profit. Nevertheless, experts and professionals, authorized bymembership in the scientific community, pose models of the human–nature relation-

ship that assert the primacy of collective goods. The victory of the ecosystems model,

wherein humans are elaborately and causally connected to wider nature, represents atleast as much the triumph of a scientific model, advocated by formally disinterested

others, as it does the imposition of a model by interested actors (Frank 1997).

3. World society theory is equivalent to the INGO effect

International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are a key conduit of worldsociety models and discourses. World society resembles a transnational version of a

decentralized Tocquevillian associational landscape, abundant with INGOs in fields

ranging from development to human rights to technical standardization (Boli andThomas 1999; Drori, Meyer and Hwang 2006). INGOs represent the organizational

dimension of world society, conveying global models to domestic receptor sites

charged with ‘unscrambling global signals for local constituencies’ (Frank, Hardingeand Wosick-Correa 2009: 277; Frank and McEneaney 1999). Thus, many empirical

studies find an important ‘INGO effect’, or a positive relationship between INGO

memberships and policy diffusion. However, the persistent INGO effect is oftenmisinterpreted.

The problem lies in equating the signature INGO effect to the world society effect.

The role of INGOs in diffusion is undoubtedly central, and clearly it has beencelebrated in the literature. The mistake is to stop there, to collapse the cultural

dimensions of world society theory into its organizational dimensions or reify INGOs

as causal agents (‘norm entrepreneurs’). There is no question that INGOs serve asimportant organizational expressions of global institutions. But a cultural aspect

accompanies the organizational aspect – spurring not only diffusion but diffusion

along particular lines, in particular directions.Thus, for example, world society theory predicts not only the reforms of sex laws –

enabled by INGO ties – but also reforms that are consistent with the ascending status

of the individual in world models of society. The substantive dimensions of change –the cultural anddirectional dimensions – toooften fade fromdiscussion. Sex-law–and

many other – reforms track substantive transformations in world society.


4. World society theory is equivalent to ceremony without substance

As articulated above, conventional sociological accounts privilege actors and interests

over enactors and institutions, and thus they prioritize substance over ceremony. This

is part and parcel of traditional American sociology. World society accounts, bycontrast, stress the extent to which social life bears a ceremonial or ‘ritualized’

character. Therein, one finds formal adherence to institutionalized blueprints, often

only loosely coupledwith implementation on the ground (i.e., enactors and scripts). Itis mistaken, however, to deduce from the differing emphases that world society

theorists envision an enduring state of hypocrisy, with no change at the level of

practice. On the contrary, the perspective suggests (a) that the oft-noticed phenom-enon of ceremony without substance is accompanied by the less-noticed phenomenon

of substance without ceremony, and (b) that a host of processes promote the

convergence of the two over time.It is easiest for world society scholars to counter competing explanations – to show

that ‘culture matters’ – when one observes patterns of global conformity that are (a)obviously dysfunctional, such as copyingpolicies that are ill-suited for local conditions;

and (b) do not support, or appear to contradict, the interests of powerful domestic

actors. As a result, world society scholars have sometimes presented the ‘diffusion ofthe trivial’. This was, perhaps, a reasonable strategy when world society theory was in

its infancy, given the priority of explanations involving power and interests. But it is

important to note that even core ‘functional’ aspects of the modern state – such aseconomic or military policy – may be analyzed as products of a global cultural system.

Indeed, substance (or, outcomes) without ceremony (adoption) is common in the

global system. For example, Frank, Hardinge andWosick-Correa (2009) find that theglobal diffusion of rape-law reforms is associatedwith increased police reporting even

in countries without any rape-law reforms. Similarly, human rights practices improve

even in countries that fail to ratify human rights accords, given the ascendantlegitimacy of the global human-rights movement (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui

2005). Formal commitments render countries as even more vulnerable than others

to pressures for everyday compliance. Global institutionalization involves substancewithout ceremony – that is, changes in practice without changes in formal commit-

ment – and also vice versa. The two sides of decoupling go together.

5. World society theory predicts that everything will diffuse

The heavy emphasis on diffusion studies in the empirical literature can lead to the

misconception that world society theory predicts that everything will diffuse, and

some critics take evidence of non-diffusion or resistance (e.g., Vietnam) as disprovingthe theory. On the contrary, world society is as much a theory of non-diffusion as

diffusion (see Strang and Meyer 1993). In particular, it predicts that (a) models that

fail to assert collective goods over private interests, (b) models that fail to articulatewith prevailing global institutions, and (c) models that lack international organiza-

tional carriers will be unlikely to diffuse, regardless of support from powerful andinterested actors.

Thus, for example, neoliberal economic policies did not diffuse globally until they

were cast as general models promising general benefits, until they embraced the


individuated human actorhood that is central to contemporary global institutions

(democracy,mass education, etc.), and until they received the authoritative backing of

professional economists and intergovernmental organizations (Simmons,Dobbin andGarrett 2006).

The emphasis on global or worldwide effects by nomeans excludes effects at lower

levels of analysis. To find, for example, women’s suffrage rights around the world(Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997) is not the same as finding that such rights are

respected to the same extent, in the same way, with the same implications in every

country, village and household globally. Of course there are differences and varia-tions, and of course they are important, just as are the global effects to which world

society theory calls attention.

6. World society theory is a normative and/or teleologicalperspective similar to modernization theory

World society scholars study ‘modernity’ not as an ideal or inevitable trajectory, but as

a set of cultural views or ideologies that have become institutionalized components ofglobal culture at a particular point in history. Contemporary world culture can be

characterized as ‘modernist’ in character, involving ideologies of national progress/

development, the expansion of education, science/rationality and so on.World societyscholars seek to understand the consequences of this culture. This is different than

normatively endorsing this set of cultural views or treating the emergence of these

ideas as inevitable.

7. World society theory fails to attend to mechanisms

This criticism has, in part, been addressed in recent empirical work (e.g., Schofer and

Hironaka 2005). Scholars have documented a variety of ‘carriers’ of institutionalized

cultural models, including international associations, scientists and professionals,media and telecommunication, modern school systems that convey standardized

curricula, and even the legacy of colonial ties. That said, Schofer and Hironaka

(2005) point out the limits of searching for concrete mechanisms to explain complexcultural processes. Can one easily enumerate the specific mechanisms through which

cultural capital is transferred from parents to children? Countries embedded in global

culture are influenced via multiple, often very diffuse, mechanisms operating simul-taneously. The more deeply institutionalized a cultural form, the more it becomes

‘built in’ to many mechanisms, such as law, custom, school curricula and so on. And,

dramatic change is often observed even when some specific mechanisms (e.g., a givenlaw or treaty) appear to be ineffective. Those in search of any single ‘smoking gun’

wholly responsible for diffusion or change are likely to be disappointed.

New Directions in World Society Theory

Research continues apace within the world society paradigm, much of it extending

the lines of research outlined above. But distinct new lines of research have also

emerged within the past decade. While partaking of the original spirit, these


new directions develop theoretical arguments to explain the role of actors in the

world polity, theories of institutional change, and theory about the outcomes

of world polity processes.

Role of individual actors

As discussed above, one common gloss on world society theory is that it ignores the

role of individuals in developing institutions. Recently, however, some scholars have

argued that the creation of meaning and interpretation by individuals is an essentialaspect of diffusion, particularly in a global context that champions individual human

rights and actorhood (Frank and Meyer 2002; Su�arez 2008). Such arguments

recognize that global institutions continue to influence the perceptions and actionsof individuals. Concurrently, however, individuals act as agents, or at times resisters,

of global institutions. Such individual actions enable the implementation of the often

nebulous influences of global institutions (cf. the old institutionalism represented byStinchcombe 1997).

Along these lines, Hallett and Ventresca (2006) develop the concepts of an

‘inhabited institution’. Instead of conceptualizing bureaucratization as expandingautomatically, Hallett and Ventresca find its contours depend upon the particular

personalities of the managers, the contingent interpretations of the workers, and the

formulation of specific policies. Similarly, Dobbin (2009) argues that the developmentof equal opportunity practices in the US workplace was not the result of automatons

mindlessly carrying out the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Instead, the practice of equal

opportunity depended upon the personnel staff that developed policies and standardsto construct a definition for equal opportunity.

Thus, a growing line of research links insights from world polity theory to the

growing field on transnational movements (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith andJohnston 2002). World polity researchers have expanded on these arguments, finding

that global processes also influence the mobilization of social movements. Global

political opportunity structures, such as the creation of international organizations,complement and may even supersede the effects of national political opportunity

structures (Barrett and Kurzman 2004; Tsutsui 2006; Cole 2006; Longhofer and

Schofer 2010). Global cultural frames provide broader legitimacy and meaning tolocal struggles (Tsutsui 2004; Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch 2003; Ghaziani and

Ventresca 2005). And global resources may be available from international organiza-

tions or interested players for domestic social movements (Tsutsui and Shin 2008;Berkovitch and Gordon 2008).

Theories of change

One distinctive new line of work explains institutional change as a ‘learning’ process,

in which organizations or states copy newly successful actors. However, ‘learning’ isin quotes as it does not necessarily connote improvement – but rather the adoption of

socially constructed ‘lessons’ copied from other actors and translated via profes-

sionals, experts and other authoritative interpreters. Scholars have studied the rise ofbusiness fads such as ‘quality circles’ (originally a Japanese innovation) in the United

States or more enduring shifts in political and military policy (Strang and Macy


2001; Dobbin 1993; Hironaka 2010). These changes occur with the rise of a

successful new star, such as the economic success of Japan in the 1980s. Alternately,

change may occur during a crisis, when perceived failure creates an opening forpolicy shifts.

In contrast to realist approaches, world polity theorists maintain scepticism that

these processes lead to effective change. Since indicators of success are constructed, the‘successes’ that are copiedmay bemisleading. Stories are created to explain the success

of particular firms or countries, yet these accounts are often fictive ormythical (Strang

and Soule 1998; Strang and Macy 2001). In a sense, states throw out a grab-bag ofpolicies and then ordain those that are followed by economic growth as effective,

despite the likelihood of spurious causality (Dobbin 1993). The complexity of

economic and military phenomena belies the accuracy of simple cause-and-effectstories (Hironaka 2010). Yet, such stories abound and form the basis for subsequent

isomorphic change.

Explaining consequences and outcomes

Scholars in the world polity tradition have increasingly sought to theorize thesubstantive outcomes that result from global institutional processes – rather than

focus solely on formal policies or laws. Early lines of research on loose coupling

questioned the link between institutional processes and substantive specified out-comes (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Cole 2005). Yet world polity research has subse-

quently uncovered a broad set of phenomena in which world polity pressures have led

to tidal waves of change ‘on the ground’ over time. The massive expansion ofeducation, the bureaucratization and rationalization of society, and the broad

empowerment of individuals represent fundamental changes to society in the past

century (Ramirez and Wotipka 2001; Drori et al. 2006; Dobbin 2009; Frank andMeyer 2002).

In other arenas, most notably in respect for human rights, world polity pressures

have failed to produce comprehensive changes (Bradley 2000; Hafner-Burton andTsutsui 2005; Cole 2005). Such research has shown that discourse alone is insufficient

to lead to substantive improvements in outcomes. Yet it is possible that improvements

in human rights may have also been confounded by the global legitimacy of author-itarian regimes during the Cold War. With the delegitimation of the authoritarian

state and the outbreak of democracy worldwide, human rights abuses may decline as

predicted by the rhetoric in future decades.In other fields, world polity processes have been shown to be consequential for

outcomes on the ground. Improvements in outcomes occur as the net result of broad

institutional shifts in which no one particular policy or action is essential (Schoferand Hironaka 2005). International treaties and discourses have indirect effects, such

as ‘naming and shaming’, rather than more direct sanctions and enforcement (Drori

et al. 2006). National policies that are criticized as ineffective may still result inimproved outcomes within a decade or two (Liu and Boyle 2001). Over time, world

polity pressures lead to the development of a ‘virtuous regime’ in which the

goodness of a particular outcome becomes taken for granted. Once virtue has beendeclared, actors may find it increasingly difficult to justify departure (Schofer and

Hironaka 2005).


Concluding Thoughts

Withmaturity, theworld society literature is shifting focus – fromoriginal battleswithfunctionalismandMarxism (which nevertheless continue to cropupunder new labels)

– to amore nuanced set of debates in aworldwhere ‘institutionalisms’ of various sorts

are increasingly common. A key fault line for future theory and research will likelybe between more cultural/phenomenological institutionalisms and those that take a

more purely actor-centric stance, such as the institutional traditions in International

Relations. The world society tradition has generated novel predictions, in largepart, by countering the endemic actor-centrism in much contemporary (especially

American) social science. The continuing vibrancy of the world society tradition will

likely hinge on continuing efforts in this vein, which differentiate the tradition fromconventional institutional analysis.

Acknowledgement

We thank Colin Beck, Elizabeth Boyle and members of the Irvine ComparativeSociology Workshop for their insightful comments. We regret that we could not, in

this brief review, do more than scratch the surface in terms of providing references to

the outstanding theoretical and empirical work on this topic.

Further Reading

Drori, G.S. 2007: Institutionalism and globalization studies. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, R.

Suddaby et al. (eds) Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism. London: Sage.

Frank, D.J., Hardinge, T. and Wosick-Correa, K. 2009: The global dimensions of rape-law

reform: a cross-national study of policy outcomes. American Sociological Review 74:

272–290.

Jepperson, R.L. 2002: The development and application of sociological neoinstitutionalism. In

J. Berger & M. Zelditch, Jr (eds) New Directions in Contemporary Sociological Theory.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

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