the wicked problem of somali piracy david west & garry hindle deputy director for operational...

The Wicked Problem of Somali Piracy

David West & Garry Hindle

Deputy Director for Operational Analysis, Combined Maritime Forces / Lead Operational Analyst, UK Maritime Component Command - Bahrain

July 2010 – February 2011 & February 2011 – August 2011

Defence Science & Technology Laboratory

UK Ministry of Defence

Briefing to Cornwallis XVII, 2nd April 2012

UNCLASSIFIEDDstl is part of the Ministry of Defence© Dstl 2012

Contents

1.Historical Context

2.Modern Day Piracy

3.Wicked Problems

4.Counter Piracy

5.Conclusions


UNCLOS Definition of Piracy

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of

depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directedi. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or

against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; ii. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place

outside the jurisdiction of any State; b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of

an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).


1. History of Piracy

• Brief look at some examples of how piracy has differed over the ages– State sponsored and private initiatives

• Range of methods used to tackle problem – Military, political, social

UNCLASSIFIED© Dstl 2012

Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence

Sea Peoples

• First recorded pirates in history– Devastated the eastern

Mediterranean during the late 2nd Millennium BC

– Fought extensive campaigns on both land and sea

– Finally defeated by the Egyptians in naval battle off Xois, Egypt in 1178 BC

• Military solution



Rome and the Cilician Pirates• Based in what is now SE Turkey

– Menaced the eastern Mediterranean during 2nd and 1st centuries BC

– Pirate raids strangled Roman commerce• Julius Caesar (75 BC)

– Captured by a Cilician pirate group and ransomed

– Returned and crucified his captors• Pompey (67 BC)

– Deployed 500 ships, 120,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry to defeat the pirates

– Sea and land campaign lasted only 3 months

– Defeated Cilicians treated generously


Piracy in Europe

• Lack of centralised power after fall of Rome allowed piracy to flourish through Dark Ages and Medieval Period– Vikings best known example– Other prominent groups were Irish,

Friesian, Slavic, Arab• No clear solution – many pirates

eventually settled down (e.g. Vikings → Normans)

• Barbary pirates– Operated out of North Africa between 16th-

19th Centuries, taking over 1 million Europeans as slaves

– Defeated by US and Royal Navies in Barbary Wars of the early 19th Century


Pirates of the Caribbean

• Golden age from 1560 to 1720• Preyed on lucrative trade from

New World colonies• Some given legal status by rival

states (Privateers)• Finally eliminated by expanded

European Navies after Thirty Years War– Royal Navy formed the

main counter-piracy force– Rigorous ROE - captured

pirates were usually summarily hanged


2. Modern Day Piracy

Follows two primary types:• Robbery of crew and/or stealing of

cargo– Current hotspots include Gulf of

Guinea and Bangladesh– Major problem in Strait of

Malacca in early 2000s• Seizure of vessels for ransom

– Requires safe anchorages where vessels and crews can be held

– Typical of current day Somalia-based piracy



History of Malacca Strait Piracy

• 500 miles long, narrowest point 1.7 miles

• 90,000 vessels per year, 40% of world trade

• Long history of piracy – often associated with local politics– Increased with arrival of

European colonisers– Largely eradicated by British

/ Dutch Navies during 1870s



Re-emergence of Straits Piracy

• Continuous activity at a low level, but seeing a rapid increase in late 1990s– Several high profile attacks

occurred, these may have:• Increased awareness of piracy

in population• Increased tendency of ship

owners to report attacks/attempts

– Lack of co-operation between local navies (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia) – sovereignty an important issue


Counter Piracy in the Straits

• Attacks peaked in 2004 at 38, to 12 in 2005 and 2 each year 2008-2010 – now virtually eliminated

• Increased military co-operation a major factor– 2005: Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia joint air

surveillance– 2006: Regional Cooperation Agreement on

Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) established

• Greater economic and political stability– Peace deal with rebels in Aceh, Sumatra,

following 2004 tsunami• Solution a mix of military and political/economic

factors



Somali Piracy – Context

• Non-existent to limited central government.

• No central bank or banking system.• Limited regional governments.

• Extensive & comprehensive legal system.

• Functioning monetary system - notes & hawalla.

• Access to foreign investment – Diaspora.

• Functioning entrepreneurial economy.• Devolved informal “political” institutions.

Country 2000 2009

Somalia 1.4 8.1

Eritrea 0.8* 3.7

Ethiopia 0.4 6.0

Nigeria 0.5 49.1

*mainline phone data only

Source: UN data (via BBC)

Phone subscribers (per 100 inhabitants)



Somali Piracy - Origins

• Origins in the collapse of the central Somali state in the early 1990s

• Strong local belief that piracy emerged as a local reaction to exploitation by foreigners– Illegal fishing in Somali waters– Widespread dumping of toxic waste

• Armed local fishermen began extorting ‘taxes’ from foreign vessels

• Realisation that the vessels and their crews were valuable – taxes became ransoms

• Now a highly organised criminal activity– Incredibly lucrative in an area with little other employment

prospects


Somalia Piracy - Environment

• Longest continuous coastline in the world

• Somalia is made of several distinct areas and more tribal areas

• Safe anchorages where pirates can be based and retreat to with their prizes


Somali Piracy – Area of Operation

• 20% of world’s oil goes through Strait of Hormuz

• 23,000 ships pass through Gulf of Aden each year– Diverting around Africa adds

~2 weeks to journey time to Europe / North America

• Monsoons twice a year limit boat operations in seas off eastern Somali coast



Piracy Success Rates - Somali Basin (Jan 2008 - April 2011)

25%25%25%

35%

18%16%16%16%16%

10%

17%15%

24%24%24%27%27%28%

24%

40%40%37%36%35%

31%

14%14%13%11%

9%

17%19%

25%23%24%

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep Oct

Nov

Dec Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep Oct

Nov

Dec Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep Oct

Nov

Dec Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

2008 2009 2010 2011

Month

Nu

mb

er o

f In

cid

ents

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

% S

ucc

ess

Rat

e (e

xcl D

ho

ws)

DisruptionsAttack / Attempt - Vessel for RansomPirating / Maritime Crime - Vessel for RansomPirating / Maritime Crime - Dhow% Success (6 month moving average)



Piracy Success Rates - GOA (Jan 2008 - April 2011)

40%

28%29%

35%33%

37%35%34%

27%23%22%

16%14%

16%13%

12%

7%6%

11%8%

13%

19%21%

25%23%

29%28%29%

31%31%27%

19%16%

8%4%

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep Oct

Nov

Dec Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep Oct

Nov

Dec Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep Oct

Nov

Dec Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

2008 2009 2010 2011

Month

Nu

mb

er o

f In

cid

ents

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

% S

ucc

ess

Rat

e (e

xcl D

ho

ws)

Military DisruptionsAttack / Attempt - Vessel for RansomPirating / Maritime Crime - DhowPirating / Maritime Crime - Vessel for Ransom% Success (6 month moving average)


Piracy Incidents: Period 2009

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED


3. Wicked Problems

• Wickedness reflects the resistance of a problem to resolution, not its moral character

• Problems that cannot be treated with traditional, linear, analytic approaches

• Characteristics:– often multi-causal– unstable– have complex interdependencies– may lack a single specific authority responsible for their

resolution– attempts to resolve them may lead to unforeseen

consequences


Countering Somali Piracy

1. Application of military force– Offensive, protective and reactive

2. Self protection measures (Best Management Practice)– Industry looking after itself

3. Political / Economic resolution– Address causes of the symptom of piracy within Somalia

• The unique complexity of Somali Piracy makes understanding and predicting the effect of counter piracy activity problematic


Regional Naval Operations

• Three co-ordinated Task Forces

1. Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) Counter Piracy Task Force

2. NATO: Operation Ocean Shield

3. EU: Operation Atalanta• Wider group of ‘Independent Deployers’

– India, Russia, China and others – meet with coalitions and industry at 2-monthly ‘Shared Awareness and De-confliction’ (SHADE) meetings

• Other regional Navies: Oman, South Africa, Kenya• Conducting law enforcement operations


Regional Naval Operations

• Area Patrol– Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in GOA

– Wider Somali Basin (most of Western Indian Ocean)• Escorts & Convoys

• Independent Deployers in Gulf of Aden• EUNAVFOR escorts World Food Programme ships

• Surveillance• Land-based Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Ship-based helicopters


Somali Piracy - Organisation

• Complex organisational hierarchy– Operations:

• Former fishermen (navigation)• Ex-militia (vessel assault / protection at shore)• Technical experts (GPS and Comms)

– Logistics supply– Negotiators– Financial backers

• Local and international • No known significant, direct links with terrorism



Somali Piracy - Tactics

• Attacks launched from small number of skiffs – each with ~ 5-10 pirates

• Use ladders with hooks to board target vessels – usually underway

• Typically armed with AK-47s, RPGs also common

• Once boarded pirates head to the bridge and round up the crew



Somali Piracy – Range of Operations

• Traditionally Pirate Action Groups were 2-3 skiffs, plus a larger whaler for supplies, launched from the shore– Relatively short range /

duration– Somali Basin activity limited to

within ~200 miles of Somali coast

– High seas during Monsoon seasons prevent pirates accessing in Somali Basin

But now..



Somali Piracy – Use of Motherships

• In recent years pirates have developed the use of motherships

– may be a captured dhow or a pirated merchant vessel

• Allows pirates to operate over a thousand miles from Somalia, for long periods

• Allows operating throughout Monsoon period

– Motherships can be used to transport skiffs to calmer waters

• Presence of crews as hostages reduces military options

• Hostages valuable as crew and commodities for ransom



Somali Piracy - Hostages

• Hostages valuable as crew and commodities for ransom

• Little evidence of increased violence towards hostages

• Held in poor conditions generally and threatened but actual levels of violence reflect their status as a commodity

• Threatened as a means of control and as part of the negotiation process

• Some violence by inexperienced, frustrated pirate groups


Counter Piracy - Disruption

• Disruption of motherships constrained by hostages– Limited to monitoring pirates and

warning other nearby vessels• Disruption of skiffs depends on the

presence of legally defined ‘tripwires’– e.g. hooked ladders, multiple motors,

fuel drums, weaponry– Naval forces may seize vessels /

paraphernalia• Arrest if caught in the act

– Reluctance to prosecute and imprison pirates - ‘Legal Finish’ remains a significant problem


Best Management Practice (BMP)

• Industry needs to take responsibility for its own security– Pirate operating area too large for

Navies to effectively control– Pirate attacks often too quick for

Naval response• BMP Recommends:

– Use of IRTC, higher speed, manoeuvring, look-outs, informing UKMTO / MSC-HOA organisations

– Defensive measures including barbed wire, fire hoses, deck lighting and citadels


BMP: Citadels• Designated area built into the ship where crew can seek protection • To increase the time between boarding and taking of hostages• Naval forces will only consider boarding to release crew in a Citadel if:

– 100% of the crew are secured in the Citadel– The crew of the ship have self contained, independent, reliable 2-

way external communications – The pirates are denied access to ship propulsion

• The use of a Citadel will not guarantee a Naval response, but increase the window of possible intervention

• Pirates know they only have a limited time to access Citadel before Naval forces arrive– Complexity: Pirates develop better TTPs to break into Citadels,

Industry develops better Citadels…


Armed Security Teams

• No vessel with an embarked, armed security team (EST) has been pirated

• BMP / Naval Forces neutral on ESTs– Increased risk of violent escalation and

harm to all involved– Legality of arming vessels varies with

jurisdiction– Quality / proficiency of ESTs variable– Risk of mistaken attacks on fishing

vessels• BMP4 recommends Military Vessel

Protection Detachments rather than Private Maritime Security Contactors if armed security is required


Attacking Pirate Land Bases

• New ROEs for EUNAVFOR– Will permit attacks on boats, fuel

dumps, land vehicles, bases• Short-term tactical gains, but significant

strategic risk– Pirates may respond by moving

inland, merging with civilian areas – Likelihood of violent escalation –

pirates will fire on naval vessels– Risk of retaliation to hostages– Risk of collateral damage to

innocent Somalis and property– Undermines Counter Piracy

influence operations


Decline of Somali Piracy?

• Since early 2011 Somali piracy has declined– Q1 2012: 36 attacks, 7 hijackings – Q1 2011: 97 attacks, 18 hijackings

• 13 ships currently held, with 197 hostages (26 Mar 2012),

• Down from 30+ ships with 700+ hostages in early 2011

• Most probable causes:– Use of effective BMP, particularly

Citadels & increased disruption– Embarked Security Teams


5. Conclusions

1. Historical and recent examples indicate solutions to piracy require: – The ruthless application of deleterious and deterrent lethal force, or – The combination of military, political and economic levers

2. The financial rewards for Somalis are unparalleled and the impact on global trade negligible – the primary cost is human

3. Piracy is not the most significant factor driving efforts to effect political change in Somalia

– Piracy is a symptom of the current Somali political situation which lacks the potential for medium term resolution

4. Containment is the objective at sea for Navies and Industry– Somali Piracy lacks a Naval ‘fix’– Pirates have shown themselves to be able to adapt their Tactics, Training

and Procedures (TTPS) rapidly and in unexpected ways


5. Conclusions

5. Somalia Piracy presents a Wicked Problem born of a complex, lawless state, inherent pirate operational and tactical advantage, and constraints on international action


Questions?

the wicked problem of somali piracy david west & garry hindle deputy director for operational...

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