the us and the muslim brotherhood: losers in the defamation game?

Issue 1575 • September 2012 Established in London 1980

The Forgotten KurdsThe matter of Syria's Kurds and how they

might fi t in to the future of the country

Libya’s Cursed WealthWhat strategies could Libya implement in

order to turn its resources into a blessing?

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The Majalla Issue 1575

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9 771319 087129

Defamation GameDefamationThe

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Credits

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There have been astonishing accusations flying around Egypt and the United States since the first tremors of the Egyptian revolution. In Cairo It has become practi-cally de rigueur to issue claim after counter-claim that the

most unlikely bedfellows are conspiring to gain mutual advantage, but the theory that the Muslim Brotherhood have a clandestine re-lationship with the CIA remains a popular favorite. Meanwhile in Washington, insinuations of Muslim Brotherhood infiltration into the State Department are considered plausible in some circles.

Undisguised name-calling and cheap tricks to try and discredit an opponent are the stock-in-trade of politicians around the world, but occasionally a theory surfaces that is never satisfactorily put to rest. Accordingly, in this month’s main feature, The Majalla examines the alleged links between US agencies and the Muslim brotherhood.

Since the Syrian crisis continues to devastate communities across the country, thought must be given to how these communities might fit in to a future state—if one emerges from the destruction of civil war. Tanya Goudsouzian considers the fate of the Kurds in Syria and the possibility of their future self-determination.

Recently emerged from violent struggle, caused in part by ex-treme economic grievances, Libya is now coming to terms with what the future holds. Paula Mejia tackles the conundrum of the so-called resource curse, and wonders what Libya can do to make the most of its abundant natural gifts.

These articles, as well as all the pieces in this month’s The Majalla, can be found at www.majalla.com/eng. We invite you to visit us online and follow us on Facebook and Twitter for regular updates.

Editorial

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Contributors

Bryan GibsonBryan R. Gibson is a PhD candidate in International History at the LSE and specializes in US-Iraqi relations during the Cold War. His PhD thesis is on the US policy toward Iraq and the Kurdish Revolt, 1958-75. He received his Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees in history and a Bachelor of Social Sciences in criminology from the University of Ottawa, Canada. He is the author of, Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, based on his MA thesis.

Alex Edwards Alex Edwards holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and the Middle East from Durham University in the UK, in addition to a Bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from the same institution. He is currently a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics, where his research focuses on American foreign policy and Persian Gulf security issues. He is a former Deputy Editor of the Millennium international relations journal. He is based in London, where he is also studying Arabic.

Tanya Goudsouzian Tanya Goudsouzian is a Doha-based media professional with extensive experience in post-conflict countries. She has covered the greater Middle East region for over a decade. From 2006-2010, she was founding editor of a bimonthly English-language news digest in Suleymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Tanya has also travelled Central Asia and has interviewed many of the leading figures of Afghanistan’s political world.

Juliet Highet Juliet Highet is a writer, photographer, editor and curator, Juliet Highet specializes in Middle Eastern heritage and contemporary culture. Ms. Highet is currently working on her second book, Design Oman, having published her first book, Frankincense: Oman’s Gift to the World, in 2006.

Paula Mejia Paula Mejia is a contributing writer for The Majalla. As a freelance journalist and former consultant for the African Development Bank, her work has focused on the economic and social challenges in Africa, with a special focus on Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. She is a graduate of the London School of Economics, L’Institut D’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Science Po) and the University of Chicago.

Nicholas Birch Nicholas Birch is a freelance reporter who has worked in Turkey and the surrounding region for 10 years. Nicholas lived in Istanbul, Turkey, from 2002 to 2009, working as a freelancer. His work ‒ mainly from Turkey and Iraq ‒ appeared in a range of publications, including the Washington Post, Time Magazine, the Guardian and the Times Literary Supplement. Birch was a stringer for the Wall Street Journal and The London Times until the end of 2009. He now lives in London.

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12 Politics Boomtown Suleymaniyah:

Iraqi Kurdistan's second city has seen enormous development in the past decade –––––––––––––––––––––––––– ––––––––– US Missile Umbrella: A new report suggests that the US and its allies are ramping up their missile defenses in the Gulf

34 Human Condition Between a Rock and a Hard Place:

The dilemma facing Syria’s refugees

38 Candid Conversations A Man on a Mission: Othman Bin Sassi,

Secretary General of the Libyan National Transitional Council

40 Profile Prime Minister of Egypt,

Dr. Hisham Qandil

44 Wealth of Nations Libya’s Cursed Wealth:

The mismanagement of Libya’s oil and resources

46 Editor’s Choice Al-Assad Exposed

–––––––––––––––––––––––––– ––––––––– Putin and Russia’s Real Interests in Syria

50 The Arts A Victorian in Arabia: Jordan marks 200

years since Western discovery of Petra –––––––––––––––––––––––––– ––––––––– Dear Mr. President: From the Egyptian Youth to the President

60 The Critics A Life Cut Short: House of Stone

–––––––––––––––––––––––––– ––––––––– Solutions for Sudan: The Soufan Group attempts to propose sustainable solutions to the crises of North and South Sudan

62 The Final Word Arab Leaders: False modesty

and the trappings of power

Cover Story The Defamation Game24

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Contents

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The Forgotten KurdsCarving out a future for Syria’s Kurds?

Tanya Goudsouzian and Lara Fatah discuss the potential consequences for Syria’s Kurdish community of the continuing civil war

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As the conflict in Syria intensi-fies, so does the speculation over the state of the country in the event of Bashar Al-Assad’s

ouster. Will this multi-ethnic and diverse sectarian state, which has been held to-gether by an autocratic regime, ease into democracy? Or will it descend into full-fledged civil strife and a proxy war be-tween regional powers that risks spilling over into neighboring countries?

Short of permanent conflict, one of the scenarios contemplated by regional and international strategists is a partition of Syria into autonomous or semi-autono-mous regions. Syria was itself carved out of the Ottoman Empire less than a cen-tury ago by the Sykes-Picot agreement.

Syria's religious and ethnic diversity raises many questions about the potential aftermath of the country's continuing civil war. Not least is the matter of Syria's Kurds and how they might fit in to a future Syria.

Tanya Goudsouzian and Lara Fatah

The Forgotten Kurds Carving out a future for Syria’s Kurds?

Simply put, if the Alawites take the north, the Sunnis establish an independent country in the center, and the Druze create a fiefdom in the south, then the Kurds (who make up roughly 10 percent of the Syrian population) would want to claim the coun-try’s northeast, abutting regions of Turkey and Iraq where their fellow Kurds also re-side in significant numbers.

The mere thought of a division arouses fiery emotions across the greater Middle East. Will the Kurds succeed in achieving now, amidst the rubble of the so-called Arab Spring, what they failed to achieve nearly a century ago? In fact, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres foresaw an independent Kurdish state as Syria and Iraq gained self-determination, though the accord was never implemented.

The semi-autonomous ‘Kurdistan Re-gion’ in northern Iraq is still regarded with suspicion—even contention—by some of its neighbors. Turkey notably continues to reject the term ‘Kurdistan’, despite its extensive commercial relations with the region. A second autonomous ‘Kurdistan Region’, this time in Syria, would be even harder for Ankara to swallow.

The forgotten KurdsThe Kurds of Syria, who number more than two million, have often been called the ‘forgotten Kurds.’ Over the years, many families were forced to leave Kurd-ish areas in search of employment, which was scarce in northeastern Syria. Settled around Damascus in slums and isolated

Syrian Kurds hold their rifles, as they flash the sign for victory, in the Kurdish town of Jinderes, near the northern Syrian city of Aleppo, on July 22, 2012

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state with apprehension because of the inor-dinate influence wielded by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) among Syrian Kurds.

“The PYD is essentially a PKK-affiliated formation and it seems they are very strong in northeast Syria,” he insists. “Although they have reached a kind of truce with the Kurdish National Council of Syria, which gathered 10 political parties under the aus-pices of Massoud Barzani [President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region] in June to work to-gether against the Ba’ath regime in Damas-cus, they are still the strongest party in the Syrian Kurdish region.”

While the PKK operate in the Qandil mountains along the Iraqi-Turkish bor-der—which is under the jurisdiction of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—Aktar asserts it is an altogether different matter if a PKK-affiliated party were in power in an autonomous Kurd-ish region in Syria. According to him, this has become “the main concern, the chief headache for Turkey now.”

“According to unofficial sources, in the course of the past 30 years some 5,000 Syrian Kurdish fighters/guerrillas have died fighting for the PKK. This is a huge figure,” he emphasizes.

Kani Xulam, director of the Washington, D.C.-based American Kurdish Information Network, confirms this assertion: “For close to 20 years, Syrian Kurds played a major role in the ranks of the PKK and managed to shake Turkey to its foundations. Ankara knows this and is anxious not to allow the PKK sympa-thizers a say in the emerging government. But it may be a little bit too late. PYD, the party with close links with the PKK, remains the most organized party in Syrian Kurdistan.”

But Omar Sheikhmous disputes the claim that the Syrian-Kurdish region is a PKK hotbed in its entirety. He believes Turkey’s fears are “exaggerated and propped up by extreme nationalist Kurds.”

“The PYD are strong in Afrin and to a lesser degree in Kobani, but not in Aljazeera (Qamishli, Hassakeh, etc,),” he avows. “There, the Kurdish National Council of Syria (KNCS) is stronger.”

from the rest of the world, they received far less media attention than their breth-ren in Iraq, Turkey, or Iran. Still, most suf-fered just as much over the decades at the hands of the Syrian regime.

The Kurdish population in Syria began to swell beginning in the 1920s. As the Ottoman Empire fell apart, many Kurds fled to Syria from Turkey to escape op-pression. They settled mainly in northern Syria, where nomadic Kurds had already arrived decades earlier.

When the Ba’ath party came to power in 1963, Kurds endured the consequences of the nationalist agenda, which included a full-fledged Arabization policy that ignored local ethnic norms. This included depor-tation, Arab settlements in Kurdish areas, prohibition of the Kurdish language, and the denial of Syrian citizenship, among other measures. Many Kurds were refused access to healthcare or education; others were denied work opportunities or forbid-den from owning property. They could also not register births, marriages and deaths.

Astonishingly, what the Kurds are ask-ing for in 2012 is no different from what they’ve demanded since 1963: basic hu-man and economic rights.

Omar Sheikhmous, a veteran Kurdish pol-itician from Syria, says: “In all their meetings with the Syrian Opposition, the Kurds have asked to be recognized as the second ethnic group in Syria. They have asked for political decentralization in the Kurdish regions of Aljazeera, Kobani and Afrin, within Syrian unity. They have also asked for the abolition of all discriminatory policies like Arabization and the Arab Belt plan…”

Turkey’s chief headacheFor Turkey, a key power player in the re-gion, the prospect of a ‘Syrian Kurdis-tan’ along its border presents the threat of a second front in their ongoing battle against ‘terror’.

Autonomous Kurdish zones in neigh-boring Syria and Iraq, where the Kurd-istan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters have found refuge, would likely embolden Tur-key’s own 10–15 million-strong Kurdish population to ramp up the campaign for various socio-political demands.

Cengiz Aktar, a Professor at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul, maintains that Tur-key views an autonomous Syrian-Kurdish

Sheikhmous maintains that the PYD is close to the Syrian regime as well as Iran, and as such, those Kurdish towns that are now under PYD control were handed over to the PYD by the Syrian army “to create problems.”

“The Syrian regime withdrew from some of these Kurdish towns and left their control to PYD deliberately to create prob-lems between the Kurds and the Syrian Free Army,” he says. “But after pressures from the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, they have agreed to control these places together with the KNCS.”

According to Sheikhmous, a few small towns with populations of about 10,000 have come under Kurdish control, and only a few others that have populations over 50,000—such as Amouda, Qamishli, Deerik, Ain Alarab, and Afrin—are still un-der some form of Syrian management. In any event, not all border towns have strate-gic value, which is why access and control remain volatile and contested at this stage.

Moustafa Mohamed, a Syrian Kurd who served as member of the People’s Council (Syria’s parliament) between 1990 and 1994, concurs. He stresses that Kurdish aspirations and objectives are contained within Syria.

“Syrian Kurds don’t want indepen-dence. We all agree on one Syria, with a multi-party system. We are all against any attempt to divide Syria. Syrian Kurds will coordinate with the other Arab factions of the opposition in order to get rid of the Assad regime,” he says.

“There will be no hardship and dif-ficulties between the Kurdish people in Syria and those Kurds in other countries in the region. And there ought not to be any concerns over security for the Turkish government and the Iraqi government.”

Mohamed is now a member of the Syrian National Council, which is headed by Abdul Bassit Seyda—who is also a Syrian Kurd.

Kurdish unityDisunity has almost always plagued Kurds, and regional and international ac-tors repeatedly exploited these differences to quash Kurdish aspirations.

The PYD is seen as the PKK’s politi-cal wing in Syria, which riles Turkey, and which was the principle reason why it was initially reluctant to join with other Kurd-ish parties in the fight against Assad.

“The PYD is essentially a PKK-

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New configurationsIn the mayhem experienced by the entire Middle East region following the upris-ings, there is a perception that these are critical times and that fresh opportunities may yet emerge for minority populations who have long been denied freedom and independence. The upheavals have raised existential questions for many of the coun-tries whose borders were drafted by wily British and French politicians, and those borders may be ready for reconfiguration.

With respect to Syria, it is fair to in-quire whether the fall of the Assad re-gime may present Kurds with the open-ing to dream of, or perhaps even pen, a new Sèvres Treaty—one that would actu-ally be implemented.

Cengiz Aktar believes that “we are in fact living in a post-Sykes-Picot era, as well as a post-neocolonial era.”

All these nice designs for the Middle East invented in the British Foreign Of-fice are going down the drain,” he said. “But for the peoples of the region that are confessional driven, autonomy based on homogeneous territories is bad news . . . Frankly, the Kurds have learned poli-tics [since the days of the Sèvres Treaty]. I don’t think at the end of the day they will go for a state. They know it is much

For its part, the KRG in Iraq pushed the rival Kurdish factions in Syria to sign a co-operation treaty. The initial treaty signed in Erbil between the KNCS and the PYD on 11 June was followed by a second accord on 12 July, this time incorporating all Kurdish parties in Syria to form transitional governing bodies in Kurdish-controlled parts of Syria.

Despite these agreements, however, the unity is fragile at best.

“There are many problems, but every-body is putting a lot of effort that the agree-ment should be respected and implement-ed. But with PKK, there are never any guarantees because they are both pragmat-ic and unpredictable,” says Sheikhmous.

Consequently, to say that there is some resentment among Syrian Kurds over the perceived lack of support from the KRG would indeed be an understatement. Re-markably, Massoud Barzani, the President of Iraqi Kurdistan, recently revealed that they have started training Syrian Kurds, though it was unclear to what end.

“The level of aid from Iraqi Kurds has been very limited and not satisfactory. Only now, some efforts are being made to collect funds and aid. Some soldiers who deserted [the Syrian army] have also re-ceived training,” says Sheikhmous.

Plausibility of Syrian Kurdish autonomyInternal divisions over long-term agendas may have been set aside for now in the interest of presenting a unified front to various Arab opposition factions, but it is fair to examine the plausibility of Syria’s Kurds achieving their age-old aspirations.

The various Kurdish parties in Syria are doing their best to avoid “fratricidal fighting” and avoid clashing with the Syr-ian opposition. As Sheikhmous says, “The PYD and PKK have their own agendas.”

According to Cengiz Aktar, there are enough challenges externally to dampen any hyperbolic dreams of full-fledged independence.

“It will be very difficult to have their own region. It depends on the evolution of the civil war in Syria,” says Aktar. “The oth-er players in the region, such as Ankara, Baghdad and even Erbil, are not happy with the idea of a partitioned Syria. If their will prevails, it will be very difficult for Syr-ian Kurds to have a state in the north…. A Kurdish state in the region is not viable.”

too adventurous and unviable. And I think they will exert pressure to all involved par-ties to have maximum autonomy.

Xulam seems to agree: “The minorities in Syria who constitute close to 40 percent of the population need to come together to guarantee their rights. The United Na-tions, the European Union and the U.S. hopefully will play a positive role in the formation of the new power blocks in Da-mascus. In other words, even if ‘Syrian Kurdistan’ doesn’t take the path of Iraqi Kurdistan, it will have greater liberties than what the previous government of-fered to the Kurds.”

Whether the idea is premature or an impossible dream is debatable, of course, although epochal developments carry sur-prises few can foresee.

Tanya Goudsouzian is a Doha-based media professional with extensive experience in post-conflict countries. She has covered the greater Middle East region for over a decade. From 2006-2010, she was founding editor of a bimonthly English-language news digest in Suleymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Tanya has also travelled Central Asia and has interviewed many of the leading figures of Afghanistan’s political world.

Distribution of the Kurds in Syria

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Time here has speeded up: days have become hours, weeks have become days, months have become weeks, and if you

have money…”Makwan Jelil gestures at his business-

man friend, sitting behind the wheel of a $60,000 Toyota Jeep so new that he hasn’t yet got around to removing the manufac-turer’s protective plastic from the seats. He hasn’t removed the import papers that al-most entirely block the view from the rear windows, either. They read “2012” in big letters: newness here is the ultimate source of prestige.

But I have seen enough already to know what Makwan means. It has been five years since I last visited Suleymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan’s second city, and the place has changed almost beyond recognition.

The bazaar is still there, with its tiny shops like the polyps of a coral reef, try-ing to entrap passing money. So are the headquarters of the Kurdish parties, in faded Saddam-era buildings, armed guards outside.

But they are dwarfed now by new devel-opment. The city has expanded about two miles north along the divided highway that splits the city in two.

In four-storey malls, supermarkets sell Turkish produce; there are amusement arcades and children’s play areas, restau-rants where you can buy steak au poivre for $20 and listen to Swedish businessmen discussing the terms of multi-million dol-lar contracts.

In the airport, Bangladeshi and Tamil and Chinese workers wearing brown, Guantanamo-style jumpsuits work 24 hours a day to keep the marble floors free of dust blown in from the south, “Arab dust,” people like to say.

The extraordinary growth in the city of Suleymaniyah, as well has the suspicious death of the mayor, have raised eyebrows in Iraq.

Nicholas Birch

Boomtown SuleymaniyahIraqi Kurdistan's second city has seen enormous

development in the past decade

The new over- and under-passes are packed with cars, SUVs, Jeeps, Corvettes, and the occasional Range Rover, most of them less than three years old.

At a car dealer on the outskirts, near the grand new Palace of Justice and Pak City, the cheapest car – a KIA – is going for $16,000. Buyers can put down a part pay-ment, but interest rates on monthly pay-ments are very high: 10% for a year, rising to 40 percent for a three-year payback.

“Sales have slowed a little with the Syr-ian crisis,” says the dealer, “But we’re do-ing all right.”

Where is the money coming from? A teacher’s starting salary is 600,000 dinars, less than $500. The dealer doesn’t know. He’s an Arab from Baghdad, attracted like so many others by Iraqi Kurdistan’s extraordinary growth.

The simplest answer is oil. Under Iraq’s new constitution, Kurdish federal authori-ties receive 17 percent of Iraq’s budget, rapidly growing as petrol production re-covers from more than a decade of sanc-tions. In the absence of an Iraqi hydro-carbons law, they have also been opening up their own previously-untouched petrol and gas fields to prospectors, much to Baghdad’s displeasure.

In October last year, the Kurdistan Regional Government gave Exxon, the American giant, the green light to pros-pect in six petrol and gas fields.

On 17 May this year, senior Kurdish of-ficials were in Turkey to sign an agreement to build a pipe line linking new Kurdish fields to an existing pipeline connecting the Iraqi city of Kirkuk with Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. It is due to open in August 2013, the first outlet for oil fields that the Kurdish authorities claim hold 45 billion barrels.

Not everybody is happy about the new, conspicuous opulence. “The corruption is appalling,” says one former senior official who asked not to be named. “Kurdistan is divided now into three: the senior mem-bers of the [Kurdish] parties, the hangers-on – the ‘plate lickers’, as we call them in Kurdish – and the rest. You can’t do any-thing without connections.”

Late in April, the mayor of Suleimani-yah committed suicide (some say he was murdered) after being taken into custody on suspicion of falsifying urban develop-ment plans in order to sell worthless land at high prices.

Local newspapers estimate the may-or’s takings had been upwards of $200 million. “He was small fry,” says Asso Herdi, editor of Awena, one of only a handful of papers unattached to any political party.

Among ordinary Kurds, particularly the younger generation, anger at the po-litical parties is widespread. Last spring, crowds occupied Suleymaniyah’s old-est square for two months after Kurdish militiamen shot and killed a student. A dozen people died in subsequent violence across the Kurdish region.

“I am graduating in a month and I’m sure I won’t get a job,” says Dler Ahmad, one of the leaders of a student group ac-tive in the protests. “And there are thou-sands like me.”

He is elegantly dressed, with a neat goatee, polished Oxford-style shoes and neatly pressed dark blue shirt. I point to his shoes and he laughs. “I look like one of the big guys, right,” he says. “I’m not. People don’t care about food on the table. They’ll buy that car. They’ll do anything. If you are from a good family, you can’t go around behaving like a tramp.”

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“That’s the biggest problem here, you know,” says his friend Aziz Hawrami. “Bling is the thing, man: you gotta have gold, you got to have leather. Everybody is trying to copy the newest style, ’cos if they don’t they think they won’t get anywhere. And it’s ruining them.”

He speaks fluent English, marked by eight years spent working as an inter-preter for the US army. He refers to men and women as ‘males’ and ‘females’, and intersperses his conversation with military jargon.

“I got my Green Card and came back here to get married, but it costs money, man. You gotta buy gold for your wife, you

Has he found a wife yet? “Yep, and when it’s all settled and done, I’m gonna get the hell outta here. America. Nothing’s gonna change here.”

Nicholas Birch is a freelance reporter who has worked in Turkey and the surrounding region for 10 years. Nicholas lived in Istanbul, Turkey, from 2002 to 2009, working as a freelancer. His work – mainly from Turkey and Iraq – appeared in a range of publications, including the Washington Post, Time Magazine, the Guardian and the Times Literary Supplement. Birch was a stringer for the Wall Street Journal and The London Times until the end of 2009. He now lives in London.

“Everybody is trying to copy the newest style, ’cos if they don’t they think they won’t get anywhere.”

Thousands of Iraqi Kurdish anti-government protesters chant slogans in central Suleymaniyah last Spring

gotta buy the lounge suite, you gotta buy the bedroom suite: $10,000 at least.”

Like a lot of young Kurds, Aziz thinks the government should use its oil wealth to help subsidise young couples, building houses for them.


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With the installation of new launchers and radars, a detailed picture is emerging of an American defense ‘umbrella’ opening in response to fears of Iranian power.

Alex Edwards

US Missile Umbrella A new report suggests that the US and its allies are

ramping up their missile defenses in the Gulf

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A file photo of the Pentagon’s THAAD anti-missile defense rocket

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Ever since the use of Scud mis-siles in the war between Iran and Iraq, the specter of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear or

chemical warheads, or even just conven-tional explosives, has haunted the states of the Gulf.

The US has a long-standing commit-ment to the Gulf States—and consid-ering the recent tensions with Iran, the Obama administration probably believes that now is the time to both reassure its allies and send a message to Tehran that Washington is determined to contain its regional (and possibly nuclear) am-bitions. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton originally stated in a conference in Thailand back in 2009 that the US would extend a “defense umbrella” to regional allies in order to deter Iran, and some recent developments appear to be the latest step in that process.

Based on these latest developments, an overall picture is emerging of the evolu-tion of a regional, American-led mis-sile defense system, one that aims to tie the individual systems operated by each Gulf state together into a single, larger, unifi ed system. The Obama administra-tion proposed the creation of a regular ‘US-GCC Strategic Cooperation Fo-rum’ last year partly to help smooth the process. The fi rst meeting was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in March 2012, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with leaders from the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain. At the meeting, Secretary Clinton said that the US believed that “we can do even more to defend the Gulf through cooperation on ballistic missile defenses.”

At present, the UAE and Saudi Arabia operate the latest version of Patriot air-defense missiles, while Kuwait signed an agreement to purchase them from the US in July. The newest, most advanced sys-tems in the region will be located in the UAE, which purchased the latest system to come off the assembly line in the US, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)—a combination of intercep-tor missiles and guidance radars—late last year. In total, The New York Times re-ports that the UAE has purchased $12bn of missile defense systems in the last four years, which presumably will make it the lynchpin of any regional system.

The physical infrastructure of regional missile defense is complex. Rather than being geared towards large, nuclear-armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) such as those in the arsenals of the US and Russia, the new system is de-signed to intercept smaller, short-range weapons like the Scud or the Shahab fi elded by Iran. To detect the launch of hostile missiles, the US has announced it will install a specialized, long-range, high-resolution X-Band radar system in Qatar to complement one already based in Israel. A similar radar forms part of the THAAD purchased by the UAE. Once a hostile missile launch is

“The New York Times reports

that the UAE has purchased $12bn of missile defense systems in the last

four years.”


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detected, its progress will be tracked and missiles launched to intercept it while it is falling to its target (known as the ter-minal phase). Both the latest version of the Patriot missile (the PAC-3) and the newer, longer-ranged THAAD are ‘ki-netic kill’ weapons, without large war-heads, designed to destroy their targets by colliding with them at high speed. A system with the same mission is operat-ed by the US Navy, known as Aegis, and is deployed aboard some of its warships stationed in the Gulf. It incorporates a combination of advanced missiles and radars, upgraded versions of a system originally designed to defend American aircraft carriers from Soviet attack.

Simply acquiring the hardware may not be enough to guarantee success. To be effective, the patchwork of individual missile batteries and radars supplied over the years by the US to the GCC states will have to be networked together into a single, integrated, comprehensive system. As The New York Times notes, this will present both a technical and a political challenge. To date, the GCC member states have a poor record of genuine co-operation in military affairs, with several states reluctant to dilute or surrender control of their own military assets by incorporating them into a larger struc-ture. For example, the Peninsula Shield Force, a joint military unit, was set up in 1984 with contingents from each mem-ber state but proved to be ineffective in the confrontation with Iraq in 1990-91, and has been hampered by co-ordination problems according to some observers. It remains to be seen if prodding from the US (which Secretary Clinton and her more junior colleagues have doubtless

been doing behind the scenes) and fear of Iranian progress in nuclear and missile development will change this.

To be a credible deterrent, the system will have to be proven to work consis-tently in order to establish confidence both in those it is designed to deter and those it defends. To reach this goal, a number of technical challenges have to be met. Coordination, as noted, is the obvious one, but not just between the states that host the system. The US it-self may encounter problems integrat-ing ground-based systems based in the territory of its allies with those of its warships. Though many of the systems have been designed with this in mind,

such a complex process may throw up unforeseen technical problems.

Aside from this, perhaps the biggest obstacle is the simple fact that the task of missile defense systems of this kind is extraordinarily difficult given the phys-ics involved. A missile’s flight is divided into three stages: boost phase, the mid-course phase, and the terminal phase, and each poses problems to attempts to shoot it down.

In many ways, a missile is most vul-nerable when it is in its boost phase: when it has just been launched and is pushing itself upwards against the force of gravity. In this period, it has not reached its maximum speed and is easy to track, because it presents the biggest target profile to radars and emits rocket exhaust fumes that also show up on in-fra-red sensors. THAAD is designed to knock out missiles at the very end of the midcourse phase, when they are about the re-enter the atmosphere, or, like the Patriot, in the terminal phase. The

terminal phase, after the warhead has separated from its missile and is falling through the atmosphere at maximum speed, is the time that presents the big-gest challenge. Essentially, THAAD and Patriot must hit a small, incoming target which may be moving at thousands of kilometers per hour at only a few min-utes notice. As the website of the US Missile Defense Agency admits, “Inter-cepting a warhead during this phase is difficult and the least desirable of the phases because there is little margin for error and the intercept will occur close to the intended target.”

The development of American bal-listic missile defenses has consequently been dogged by failures, technical hur-dles and ballooning budgets ever since Ronald Reagan’s ambitious ‘Strategic Defense Initiative’ of the 1980s. The poor performance of older versions of the Patriot missile against Iraqi Scuds in the 1991 Gulf War proved to be a costly embarrassment for the US armed forc-es, though the latest version managed to intercept two Iraqi Scuds in 2003. As for the THAAD, most of its early tests in the 1990s were failures, but the weapon was redesigned in 2005 and most of its tests since then have been declared suc-cessful. It has yet to be tested in combat.

Overall, it remains to be seen if the US and its allies will be able to over-come the serious technical and political challenges inherent in the task they have set themselves, despite the enormous investments both the US and the GCC have already made in equipment. This is to say nothing of whether or not the threat from Iran truly justifies it, given the possibility of massive American re-taliation to any nuclear, biological or chemical attack.

Alex Edwards holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and the Middle East from Durham University in the UK, in addition to a Bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from the same institution. He is currently a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics, where his research focuses on American foreign policy and Persian Gulf security issues. He is a former Deputy Editor of the Millennium international relations journal. He is based in London, where he is also studying Arabic.

“The physical infrastructure of regional missile defense is complex. Rather than

being geared towards large, nuclear-armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)

such as those in the arsenals of the US and Russia, the new system is designed to

intercept smaller, short-range weapons like the Scud or the Shahab fielded by Iran.”


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The US and the Muslim Brotherhood

Losers in the Defamation Game? Forces are conspiring on both sides of the Atlantic that seek to conjure up a covert relationship between

the US government and the Muslim Brotherhood—but does this relationship actually exist?

Alex Edwards and Bryan R. Gibson

Since the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, America’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood has been driven by American interests in

Egypt. Only during a brief period at the start of the Cold War and following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 did Washington actually seek to engage the Brotherhood directly, and only then as a tool in the fight against Moscow.

Nonetheless, while the Arab Spring has created momentous, historic changes in the Middle East, some features of politics in the Arab world remain unchanged. One of these is the obsession with the operation of sinister forces behind the scenes, most no-tably the machinations of the US govern-ment and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Accusing one’s political opponents of being CIA puppets has proven to be a popular tactic in the past and now, with the rise of Mohammed Morsi to the presiden-cy of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has become a target of rumors accusing them of being agents of American power.

An examination of the initial US re-sponse to the Arab Spring shows that it was actually caught completely off guard by the tumultuous events in Tunisia and Egypt. Contrary to claims that it was working be-hind the scenes to bring about Mubarak’s downfall, the US was slow to respond to crises which unfolded very quickly.

Since coming to office in July, Morsi has been subject to attacks from his oppo-nents—many of whom conveniently ignore their own background in the Egyptian mili-

tary and Mubarak-era political elite, which historically maintained strong ties to the US—that imply that he is an agent of the US government. These attacks are simply part of the power struggle in Egypt. In par-allel, there have been outbursts of paranoia within the US about Brotherhood ‘infiltra-tion’ of the US government (and society) that eerily mirror the rumors in Egypt, and are reminiscent of Senator Joseph McCar-thy’s notorious witch-hunts of the 1950s.

A Brief History of the US and the Muslim BrotherhoodThere is considerable evidence to show that since the early 1950s, the US has pe-riodically maintained contacts with the

Brotherhood, depending on its percep-tions of the political outlook of Cairo and the state of its relations with Nasser and subsequent Egyptian rulers.

When the Free Officers’ Movement over-threw the dissolute King Farouk in 1952, the Brotherhood initially aligned itself with the new regime, which had promised to cater to its desires for a more equitable sys-tem of governance that also incorporated Islamist views. At the time, the Eisenhower administration—eager to establish good re-lations with Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous nation and site of the strategi-cally vital Suez Canal—sought to win over all major sources of power inside Egypt, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

US Ambassador to Egypt, Anne Peterson, meets with leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Badia

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hood—to see if they could be useful US allies in the Cold War. Indeed, as Talcott Seelye, a US diplomat who has been sta-tioned throughout the Middle East, told Dreyfuss, “We thought of [political] Islam as a counterweight to communism…. We saw it as a moderate force, and a positive one.” Given this, it was not surprising that following the conference, a professor from Princeton and a senior official at the Li-brary of Congress arranged for the fifteen delegates, including Ramadan, to visit the White House on 23 September, where

“On the surface, the conference looks

like an exercise in pure learning.

This in effect is the impression desired.”

they met with President Eisenhower and posed for a photograph in the Oval Of-fice. Unfortunately, beyond this brief visit, there is no other information available that documents what else occurred during Ramadan’s stay.

The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser, on the other hand, quickly soured after some initial co-operation. As Dreyfuss points out, “The Brotherhood saw Nasser as a hateful secu-larist who had abandoned Islam and who was too willing to cooperate with com-

In 1953, a delegation of Islamist schol-ars, including Said Ramadan, the son-in-law to the Brotherhood’s founder, Hassan Al-Banna, traveled to the US under the pretext of attending a “Colloquium on Islamic Culture” at Princeton University. Robert Dreyfuss, an investigative jour-nalist and author of Devil’s Game: How the US Unleashed Fundamentalist Islam, quotes a declassified US document that explained the purpose of the conference: “On the surface, the conference looks like an exercise in pure learning. This in effect is the impression desired.” However, the document maintains that the objective was to “bring together persons exerting great influence in formulating Muslim opinion in fields such as education, sci-ence, law and philosophy and inevitably, therefore, on politics....”

Viewed through today’s lens, bringing together a colloquium of Islamist scholars in the US might appear odd. But in 1953 the fundamental driving force of US poli-cy was anti-communism, a position shared by the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, as Ian Johnson, a Pulitzer prize-winning journalist and author of A Mosque in Munich, which examined the early links between US intelligence and the Mus-lim Brotherhood, points out, “Ramadan, like others in the Muslim Brotherhood, strongly opposed communism for reject-ing religion” and this, in turn, “made him a natural ally of the US.” It seems that another purpose of the conference was to sound out Islamists—like the Brother-



Nasser. But whatever support Sadat had gained through his overtures to the Broth-erhood was wiped out when he signed the Camp David peace accords with Israel.

Not only did the Egypt-Israel peace agreement shatter Sadat’s relationship with the Brotherhood, it also entrenched a growing view inside the US govern-ment that the Brotherhood was not only an obstacle to peace but also a danger to American interests. This appeared to be confirmed in September 1981, when sec-tarian clashes erupted in Cairo that led Sadat to order a crackdown. On 6 Oc-tober—only a month later—a radical Is-lamist terrorist group not connected with the Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, assassinated Sadat at a military parade.

Sadat’s toleration of the Brotherhood continued under his successor Hosni Mubarak, at least at first. Like Sadat, Mubarak did not have a power base, and he needed the Brotherhood in order to work toward national reconciliation. This was evident in Mubarak’s release of many of the political prisoners detained after the September 1981 riots. While Mubarak was always careful not to get too close to the Brotherhood, he did allow them to partici-pate in parliamentary elections as indepen-dents. But when the Brotherhood fared par-ticularly well in the 1987 election, winning 36 seats, Mubarak had the courts declare the results null and void and blocked them from participating in the political process. In response, the Brotherhood simply turned its attention to trade syndicates, where it found considerable support. This, in turn, led to another crackdown in the mid-1990s, when the Egyptian government introduced new measures to dilute the power of of-ficials affiliated with the Brotherhood in some syndicates, and simply took over oth-ers by installing government ‘guardians.’

munism—beliefs that endeared them to both London and Washington.” This di-vergence of views meant that before long Nasser and the Brotherhood would have a falling out, especially since Nasser refused to cater to its wishes. The tension between the two came to a head on 26 October 1954, when a member of the Brotherhood tried unsuccessfully to assassinate Nasser. In the aftermath, the regime declared the Brotherhood illegal and arrested many of its leaders. He would later order that the organization’s chief ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, be hanged in 1966 after a show tri-al, despite having offered him a ministerial post after the 1952 revolution.

Ramadan fled to Switzerland following Egypt’s crackdown on the Brotherhood in 1954. He set up the Islamic Centre of Geneva that would serve as a hub for the Brotherhood’s international activities, and then went on to West Germany. His activi-ties were largely unknown until July 2005, when Johnson wrote an article in the Wall Street Journal that was based on archi-val research that suggests that Ramadan worked with the CIA. In the article, John-son reveals that “the Muslim Brotherhood formed a working arrangement with US intelligence organizations” but before long the “US lost its hold on the movement.” Nevertheless, German documents show that the US persuaded Jordan to issue Ra-madan a diplomatic passport and that “his expenditures are financed by the Ameri-can side.” Swiss archives also confirm that Ramadan worked for the US: “Said Ra-madan is … an information agent of the British and Americans.” Nevertheless, fol-lowing West Germany’s refusal in Decem-ber 1963 to allow Ramadan to participate in a CIA propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union, evidence of the CIA’s involvement with Ramadan dries up.

When Nasser died in September 1970, his successor, Anwar Sadat, took a very different approach to ruling Egypt’s frag-mented society, which had been devastated both militarily and economically through war with Israel. On top of this, Sadat found himself opposed by both Nasserist and communist factions that disapproved of his policies. This meant that Sadat’s most logical ally in the country was the Brother-hood. As a result, he gradually began to re-lease members that had been jailed under

Throughout the 1980s, Islamists, like those in the Muslim Brotherhood, took on new relevance for the Reagan admin-istration’s cold warriors following the So-viet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Throughout this period, the CIA and Pakistani intelligence worked closely with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Pakistani branch, Jamaat-e-Islam, to keep the Red Army tied down inside Afghanistan. In spite of criticism that the US operation helped unleash the forces of radical Is-lam that led to the creation of Al-Qaeda, influential US policymakers still view the operation as a major success. Years later, a journalist from Nouvel Observateur asked Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Advisor, if he regretted the Afghanistan operation. He answered, “Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea.... What is more impor-tant in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agi-tated Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?”

But regardless of its ties to Islamic mili-tants in Afghanistan, the US remained cautious with respect to Egypt, lest it up-set the delicate balance of forces that kept Egypt’s peace agreement with Israel intact. In the end, America’s fear of upsetting the Egypt-Israel peace would be the driving force of US policy toward Egypt until the waning days of the Mubarak regime. Dip-lomatic cables from the 1980s and 1990s, made available through WikiLeaks, tell us that the US Embassy in Cairo sought to maintain limited contacts with the Broth-erhood, while in turn the Brotherhood, fearful of bad publicity and a government backlash, asked American diplomats to obtain official permission for future meet-ings. Later, it became US policy to restrict diplomatic contacts to Brotherhood mem-bers who were sitting members of parlia-ment or officials of professional syndicates in order to comply with the letter of the law, if not its spirit. As one cable from 1999 explains, “We call on them in their capaci-ties as syndicate leaders, not as members of a banned group.” The cables also dis-play a considerable degree of skepticism regarding the Brotherhood’s intentions and motives, hinting in many instances that American diplomats suspected that the organization’s public commitment to

“The Egyptian government is

a crucial ally to Washington, but the population is

very suspicious of American motives.”

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non-violence, democracy, and equality for Egypt’s Copts was only a façade.

This would not change much under President George W. Bush. After 9/11, the Bush administration adopted an ambitious agenda of democracy promotion through-out the Middle East. However, the Broth-erhood’s great electoral success in Egypt’s 2005 elections—where they won approxi-mately 20 percent of seats, up from 3 per-cent in the 2000 elections—and Hamas’s victory in the Palestinian territories a few months later, proved quite embarrassing to the US and slowed its push for democracy in the region. Like previous administra-tions, when faced with a choice between national interests in maintaining the sta-

tus quo and the promotion of democracy, the former has always been paramount. It would take the events of 2011 to turn de-cades of American policy on its head.

An “Orderly Transition”American pressure to oust Mubarak and advocacy for democratic change in the midst of the Arab Spring has stoked suspi-cions in some quarters. Nonetheless, despite recent accusations that the US has been se-cretly supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, that key US officials are “sympathetic” to the Brotherhood’s aspirations or have links to Islamic organizations, and that the Obama administration secretly financed Morsi’s presidential campaign, we should

take claims of this nature with a grain of salt. It is worth recalling the ponderous US response to the outbreaks of the uprisings against Tunisia’s Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak.

The US was caught completely off guard by the Tunisian and Egyptian up-risings, though there were certainly indi-cators that unrest could occur in Tunisia, thanks to the corruption of Ben Ali’s fam-ily and senior officials. There was no way anyone could have known that the tragic death of a young Tunisian man, Moham-med Bouazizi, who set himself on fire on 17 December 2010 in protest at the con-fiscation of his fruit cart by municipal of-ficials, would be the spark that set off a chain of events that shook the world. By the time Bouazizi died of his wounds in early January 2011, few in Washington truly understood the implications of what was taking place in Tunisia. As word of Bouazizi’s self-immolation spread, anti-government riots broke out across Tuni-sia. It was not until 7 January that the US acknowledged the unrest, calling in the Tunisian ambassador to criticize his gov-ernment’s handling of the riots and urge restraint. Despite the timing, it was likely pure coincidence that US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, traveled to Qatar amid the unrest, and gave a speech that pressed Arab leaders to “further open their political systems,” since it had be-come clear that progress toward reform had “stagnated.”

Meanwhile, the situation inside Tu-nisia was deteriorating rapidly, with the New York Times reporting on 11 January that as many as fourteen people had been killed. This prompted the State Depart-ment to reiterate to the Tunisian govern-ment the Obama administration’s “con-cerns not only about the ongoing violence, the importance of respecting freedom of expression, but also the importance of the availability of information.” But the violence continued and by 13 January an additional sixteen people had been killed, prompting Ben Ali to indicate that he would step down at the end of his term. This was not enough. That day, the Tu-nisian military made it clear that it would not put down the uprising by force. Aban-doned by the military, Ben Ali fled into exile with his family.

The CIA

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Muslim Brotherhood Branches in the Middle EastThe Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan Al-Muslimun) was founded by the Islamic scholar Hassan Al-Banna in the late 1920s as a movement aimed at spreading morals, preaching Islam, and teaching the illiterate. It soon became involved in politics, and its members now form the largest political opposition organisation in many Arab states. Although they profess to support democratic principles, the Brotherhood espouses a desire to create a state based on Shari’a law.

Beyond Egypt, where the organization was founded, members of the rotherhood have created political parties in various Arab countries including Syria, Tunisia, and Palestine.

EgyptIn 1928, Banna created the Muslim Brotherhood and soon began to establish branches throughout Egypt. Each branch ran a mosque, school, and a sporting club. The group expanded rapidly throughout the 1930s and was said to have had two million followers in Egypt by the end of the 1940s. Banna then proceeded to create a paramilitary wing of the organisation called the Special Apparatus (Al-Nizam Al-Khas), whose activists joined the struggle against British rule and participated in a campaign of assassinations and bombings.

The group was banned in 1948 by the Egyptian government for attacking British and Jewish interests, and was also accused of assassinating Prime Minister Mahmoud Al-Nuqrashi. Although Banna denounced the killing, he was shot dead on 12 February 1949 by an unknown gunman, who many believed was a member of the Egyptian security forces.

The Egyptian Revolution in 1952 brought to power a group of military officers known as the Free Officers. The Brotherhood played a supporting role in the coup, but before long a schism occurred between the military and the Brotherhood over the secularist constitution the Free Officers implemented. Tensions between the two escalated further after the Brotherhood made an unsuccessful attempt on Gamal Abdel Nasser’s life in 1954. In response, Nasser ordered a ruthless crackdown on the group, leading to the arrest and imprisonment of hundreds of members.

Until Nasser’s death in September 1970, the Egyptian Brotherhood operated in the shadows, underground. But following his death, the Brotherhood renounced violence with a view to participate in mainstream politics under the more moderate leadership of Anwar Sadat. This moderation of the Brotherhood’s position continued to be evident during the Mubarak era. It was still periodically subject to additional crackdowns, such as after the 2005 parliamentary elections when ostensibly independent Brotherhood candidates won 88 seats.

Since Mubarak was toppled in January 2011, the Brotherhood has formed the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and won nearly 50 percent of the seats of the People’s Assembly in the first parliamentary elections since the revolution. Although they previously promised not to put forward a candidate for the presidential elections, the Brotherhood did field Khayrat El-Shater, who was later disqualified. The current President of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, was elected as a candidate of the Freedom and Justice Party, but resigned from the Brotherhood to show his independence and willingness to serve the Egyptian people as a whole.

TunisiaIn Tunisia, the Ennahda Party (The Renaissance Party) was influenced by the Brotherhood and is the country’s main Islamist political grouping. It was founded in 1981 by Rashid Ghannouchi after he returned from studying in Damascus and Paris.

Although the group was banned under Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime, following his overthrow in January 2011 the Ennahda Party won 41 percent of the vote in the first free and fair elections held in Tunisia. The party claims to model itself on Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), and Ghannouchi has pledged that the rights of all Tunisians would be upheld and protected when he was elected in November 2011: “We will continue this revolution to realise its aims of a Tunisia that is free, independent, developing and prosperous, in which the rights of God, the Prophet, women, men, the religious and the non-religious are assured because Tunisia is for everyone.”

The US government was shocked, and before long President Obama criticized the CIA for failing to predict the uprising in Tunisia and Ben Ali’s abrupt departure. According to American journalist Mark Mazzetti, US officials “focused their criti-cism on intelligence assessments last month [January 2011] that concluded, despite demonstrations in Tunisia, that the secu-rity forces of President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali would defend his government,” but this clearly did not happen. Indeed, as one US official observed, “Everyone rec-ognized the demonstrations in Tunisia as serious ... What wasn’t clear even to Presi-dent Ben Ali was that his security forces would quickly choose not to support him.” Indeed, US officials were open about how surprised they were by Ben Ali’s departure, with Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitting on The Daily Show on 3 February that Ben Ali’s overthrow had “taken not just us, but many people, by surprise.” Going further, Mullen said, “To a great degree I think the timing of it certainly caught us [by sur-prise]—as [unrest] moved from Tunisia … to the really difficult challenge that is there right now in Egypt.”

The contortions of the US government during the uprising against Mubarak were even more convoluted, with positions shifting rapidly as events unfolded, forc-ing the US to try to catch-up with them once again. Spurred on by the success of the protesters in Tunisia, demonstrations against Hosni Mubarak and his govern-ment gathered momentum throughout late January, prompting the US to call for calm while urging the Egyptian govern-ment to respect the rights of its citizens. As Mark Lander observed in the New York Times on 25 January, before the pro-tests in Egypt had begun, “An uprising in Tunisia, a peripheral player in the region, is not the same as one in Egypt, a linchpin. The Egyptian government is a crucial ally to Washington, but the population is very suspicious of American motives, and the potential for Islamic extremism lurks.”

After a period of uncertainty in which the White House (along with everyone else) was a spectator to the events in Egypt, Obama eventually concluded that Mubarak was doomed. During this time, the administration shifted its position from

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warning the regime against the use of vio-lence to calling for an “orderly transition” without calling for Mubarak’s resignation outright, then changing again to hinting that he should quit.

At the end of January 2011—after the Egyptian president stated he would re-main in offi ce until September—Obama dispatched Frank Wisner, a former am-bassador to Egypt, to Cairo to convey the administration’s view that Mubarak had to begin an “orderly transition.” But, as Josh Rogan pointed out in Foreign Policy, while in Cairo Wisner did not quite de-liver the message the Obama adminis-tration had hoped he would convey. On 5 February, Wisner told a security con-ference in Munich (at which Secretary Clinton was in attendance), “We need to get a national consensus around the pre-conditions for the next step forward. The president [Mubarak] must stay in offi ce to steer those changes.” The US began to distance itself from his comments almost immediately, especially since Obama had declared in a speech on the Egyptian crisis on 1 February that an “orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now.”

Obama’s call for Mubarak to step down was followed by a major escalation of the situation in Egypt as pro-government thugs, riding horses and camels, attacked Tahrir Square with clubs, machetes, and swords, lead-ing to a pitched battle in the street. According to the New York Times, as many as 600 people were injured and three killed during the fi ghting. Faced with this unexpected display of vio-lence, which was broadcast throughout the world, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs clarifi ed how the adminis-tration felt about the situation: “I want to be clear ... ‘now’ started yesterday.” But the administration’s call for an “orderly transition” went unheeded.

By 3 February, the Obama administra-tion was convinced that Mubarak was fi n-ished and pressed him to hand over power to the newly-appointed vice president and former intelligence chief, the late Major General Omar Suleiman, who had the

Although the Ennahda Party is Islamist and infl uenced by the Brotherhood, it does not seek to establish an Islamic state in Tunisia. Instead, it aims to offer “hope and prosperity” to Tunisians, concentrating more on pressing issues such as unemployment—one of the main motives behind the revolution.

Palestinian TerritoriesHamas is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was founded in 1987 with the primary objectives of liberating Palestine from Israeli occupation and establishing an Islamic state in its place. Over time, Hamas has moderated its political objectives—especially to win over more secular-minded Palestinian voters—since it has become more involved in the political process.

One key concession relates to the question of recognising Israel. In 2009, Hamas’ Damascus-based political bureau chief, Khaled Meshal, stated that the organisation was willing to accept “a resolution to the Arab-Israeli confl ict which included a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders,” though on the condition that Palestinian refugees would have the right to return to Israel and that East Jerusalem be the new nation’s capital. This falls much shorter than the traditional “death to Israel” slogans of the late-1980s.

Hamas’ popularity among Palestinians originates from the fact that it provides many social services to Palestinians in the service-deprived occupied territories. These services include running relief programs, funding mosques, orphanages, healthcare clinics, schools and soup kitchens. The aforementioned services provided by Hamas are supplemented by the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA).

LibyaThe Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1949, but was banned following Muammar Qadhafi ’s seizure of power in 1968. This pushed the Brotherhood underground, where, like in Egypt, it operated in the shadows until the Arab Spring freed Libya from Qadhafi ’s tyranny in 2011. Since then, the Libyan

Muslim Brotherhood’s leader, Suleiman Abdelkader, along with Tunisia’s Rashid Ghannouchi, announced the formation of the

Justice and Development Party in November 2011.Despite the fact that the Brotherhood was expected to do well in the fi rst democratic elections, they did not do nearly as well as their counterparts in Egypt or Tunisia, with Libyan voters preferring secularist parties like the National Forces Alliance, which won 39 out of 80 seats reserved for political parties.

SyriaThe Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was

founded in 1935 and has played a major role in the mainly Sunni-based resistance movement that opposed

the pan-Arabist, secularist Ba’ath Party who formed a government after the 1963 coup. The Brotherhood was

soon banned and, following Syria’s intervention in the Lebanese Civil War in 1976, the movement agitated ever more strongly against

Hafez Al-Assad’s Ba’athist regime. During the Brotherhood-led Hama uprising of 1982, an estimated 20,000 people were killed as a result of a ferocious government crackdown. Afterward, the group was forced underground until the 2011 uprising allowed it to reorganise itself. It has recently announced plans to create an Islamic party that would participate in potential future elections.

The Brotherhood plays a key role in the Syrian National Council (SNC), the coalition opposing Assad. It has claimed that the SNC is largely infl uenced by its Brotherhood members, some of whom sit on the Executive Board and therefore wield great authority. According to a member of the Movement of Justice and Development Party (MJD), Malik Al-Abdeh, “Ninety percent of the decisions rest with the Executive Board, which is headed by Burhan Ghalioun, and he is backed by the [Muslim Brotherhood]”. Ghalioun has since resigned in protest against the Brotherhood’s growing infl uence in the SNC.

declared in a speech on the Egyptian crisis on 1 February that an “orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful,

Obama’s call for Mubarak to step down was followed by a major escalation of the situation in Egypt as pro-government thugs, riding horses and camels, attacked Tahrir Square with clubs, machetes, and swords, lead-ing to a pitched battle in the street. According to the New York Times, as many as 600 people were injured and three killed during the fi ghting. Faced with this unexpected display of vio-lence, which was broadcast throughout

Brotherhood underground, where, like in Egypt, it operated in the shadows until the Arab Spring freed Libya from Qadhafi ’s tyranny in 2011. Since then, the Libyan

Muslim Brotherhood’s leader, Suleiman Abdelkader, along with Tunisia’s Rashid Ghannouchi, announced the formation of the

Justice and Development Party in November 2011.Despite the fact that the Brotherhood was expected to do well in the fi rst democratic elections, they did not do nearly as well as their counterparts in Egypt or Tunisia, with Libyan voters preferring secularist parties like the National Forces Alliance, which won 39 out of 80 seats reserved for political parties.

SyriaThe Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was

founded in 1935 and has played a major role in the mainly Sunni-based resistance movement that opposed

the pan-Arabist, secularist Ba’ath Party who formed a government after the 1963 coup. The Brotherhood was

soon banned and, following Syria’s intervention in the Lebanese Civil War in 1976, the movement agitated ever more strongly against

Hafez Al-Assad’s Ba’athist regime. During the Brotherhood-led Hama uprising of



support of the military. The plan was for Suleiman to take over as president, set up a transitional government, and move for-ward with reforms that would eventually lead to the creation of a representative democracy. But as history shows, things never go according to plan. Mubarak still refused to relinquish power and seemed determined to remain as president un-til September, when elections were pro-posed. This plan, especially in light of the excessive violence used in Tahrir Square, underscored just how out of step the US was with the protesters, who were at this point even more vehement in their calls for an entirely new system.

At the same time, the US realized that a democratic Egypt would almost certainly include dealings with the Muslim Broth-erhood, which was the country’s largest and most organized opposition group. As the New York Times pointed out on 4 February, “If Egyptians are allowed free and fair elections, a goal of the Obama administration … they will have to deal with the real possibility that an Egyptian government might include members of the Muslim Brotherhood.” This realiza-tion deepened an existing problem for the US: the conflict between the longstanding American ideals of democracy and free-dom and the national interest of ensuring stability in Egypt, a key part of US Middle East strategy. At the same time, the US was under immense pressure from key regional allies in the Middle East to “go slow” on Egypt. This was largely because they feared that if elections were held the Muslim Brotherhood would seize control of the country, upend Egypt’s thirty five-year-old peace agreement with Israel, and further destabilize the region.

On the morning of 10 February, the Egyptian government announced that Mubarak was going to deliver a public statement that evening, prompting wide-spread speculation that he was going to step down. But when millions of view-ers around the world tuned in to hear his speech, they were disappointed to find a belligerent Mubarak who promised to “delegate authority” to Suleiman but would not resign. The protesters in Tah-rir Square were outraged, with many pre-dicting that extreme violence could occur the next day. George Ishak, an Egyptian

opposition leader, commented that night, “Can this man be serious or did he lose his mind? People will not go home and to-morrow will be a horrible day.”

Recognizing this, that evening the Su-preme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) released a statement entitled “Communique No. 1.” that said: “In af-firmation and support for the legitimate demands of the people,” the SCAF con-vened “to consider developments to date … and decided to remain in continuous session to consider what procedures and measures that may be taken to protect the nation, and the achievements and aspira-tions of the great people of Egypt.” At the time, observers believed that this statement suggested that a military coup was about to take place. While there is uncertainty as to what actually happened behind the scenes on the night of 10-11 February, the next day Suleiman held a press conference in which he announced that Mubarak had stepped down and had transferred his ex-ecutive powers to the SCAF, led by Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi. The SCAF also released a statement stating that it would lift the emergency law as soon as stability returned, was committed to “un-dertaking the legitimate demands of the people,” and would not “prosecute hon-orable people who refused corruption and demanded for reform.”

When word of Mubarak’s downfall reached Washington, Obama gave a tele-vised address in which he said, “Egyptians have made it clear that nothing less than

genuine democracy will carry the day… It was the moral force of nonviolence—not terrorism and mindless killing—that bent the arc of history toward justice once more.” Obama then called on the military to lift the emergency law, revise the consti-tution, and lay out a path to free and fair elections. It was clear that SCAF had taken the initiative and the US was responding to its actions, not the other way around.

President Obama and the rest of the US government were caught off guard by the downfall of Mubarak, who had ruled for almost thirty years and looked set to continue despite the problems Egypt faced. As the uprisings against Mubarak gathered pace, the administration raced to keep up with events on the ground, and at several junctures found itself blindsided by developments. While the US retains some leverage over Egypt and the Egyp-tian military—thanks to its enormous aid program—it proved itself to be far from an all-powerful puppet master, pulling the strings behind the scenes.

The Defamation GameThe omnipresent reach of the CIA and its ability to manipulate events in the Middle East from its secluded headquarters in Langley, Virginia, is a staple of conspiracy theories across the Arab World and Iran, revealing a deep anxiety about the role of unaccountable, foreign forces in the lives of its residents. But how much power do the CIA and the US government actually wield? The answer is not a comforting

President Eisenhower meets with Islamic scholars, including Said Ramadan, 23 September 1953

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Cover Story


one for those who either blame the US for many of the ills that plague the Middle East or who hope the US can use its infl u-ence to solve them.

Although the US intelligence budget is huge, reaching almost $80 billion in 2011, the CIA and the other American intelli-gence agencies and organizations are not omnipotent, and are by no means all-seeing and all-knowing. At the same time that the uprisings against Mubarak, Ben Ali, and other leaders were shaking the Arab World, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (the Pentagon’s own intelligence organi-zation) and other intelligence organs had their hands full with the withdrawal from Iraq and the ongoing war in Afghanistan, both of which exposed serious weaknesses in the American system of intelligence-gathering and analysis. America’s spies were also preoccupied with foiling Al-Qae-da plots, tracking down and killing Osama Bin Laden, monitoring drone wars in Af-ghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, and with keeping tabs on Iran’s efforts to acquire and develop its nuclear technology. This is to say nothing of the reorientation, or ‘pivot,’ of American strategy towards East Asia in recognition of the rising power of China. Indeed, because North Africa had been relatively stable in the decade preceding the Arab Spring, it is under-standable that Washington would not have allocated a signifi cant amount of resources when other regions were perceived to pose greater challenges to American interests.

Due to the fear of unaccountable Amer-ican power behind the scenes and its deep unpopularity throughout the Middle East, the accusation of being ‘in America’s pocket’ has become a popular means of attacking one’s opponents. Egypt has been a prominent example. That Mubarak had sold Egypt out to America was a com-mon theme of much of the discourse of his opponents. Mubarak, in turn, used the same line when he needed to deploy a good smear. For instance, WikiLeaks cables released in November 2010 contain a series of dispatches from 2005 in which US diplomats stationed at the US embassy in Cairo report on their investigations into rumors that the Muslim Brotherhood was receiving American funds. The cables also deal with media reports that the Broth-erhood was mulling establishing a direct

dialogue with Washington at the urging of the Department of State. They concluded that the rumors and leaks were attempts to undermine the Brotherhood as part of a wider “showdown” between the move-ment and Mubarak’s government.

During the Cold War, the CIA had hoped to use the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists against communists throughout the Middle East. This connec-tion would obviously not have survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, even if it had endured that long. As Wayne White, a former intelligence analyst at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and now a scholar at Washing-ton, D.C.’s Middle East Institute (an inde-pendent think tank), puts it: “Any effort to guide or direct the Muslim Brotherhood would be an exercise in self-delusion ... The Muslim Brotherhood doubtless has had, at least for the past three or four de-cades or so, a healthy suspicion of Wash-ington.” Other observers of the Muslim Brotherhood agree. For instance, Ian Johnson told The Majalla that accusations of links with the CIA have “been a stock way to defame the Muslim Brotherhood over the decades. Starting with Nasser it's been a popular way to attack it—say it's in cahoots with the American (and by exten-sion Zionist) global conspiracy.”

Former offi cials in the US government deny that the US ever sought to infl u-ence the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, the former Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, Richard Murphy, said

that he could not recall any offi cial con-nections between the CIA and the Broth-erhood during his time at the State De-partment. Similarly, Tom Twetten, who was the chief of the CIA’s Egypt/Libya branch during the mid-1970s and later rose to be Director of Operations in the 1990s, also denied that the White House had ever authorized any effort to infl uence the Brotherhood. Twetten explained: “If policy makers … want the CIA involved in [an] infl uence [operation], it requires a written document called a ‘fi nding’ which sets out the goals, limitations, and ratio-nale for CIA attempted action ... I can assure you with some authority that there was no ‘fi nding’ or discussion of infl uence on or with the Muslim Brotherhood from 1974 to my retirement in 1995. Nor do I recall any mention of such a program be-fore 1974.” However, a distinction needs to be made between attempting to infl u-ence an organization and spying on them, which is the CIA’s job. Indeed, as another intelligence analyst concedes, “The CIA had sources within some Islamist organi-zations because it generated a respectable amount of clandestine reporting about them that refl ected ‘insider’ information.”

Within Egypt, criticism of links between the Brotherhood and the US continues to-day. Now that the group, in the guise of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), is in con-trol of some of the levers of power in Egypt, its opponents have an added incentive to try to cut it down to size and undermine its rep-utation. During Secretary Clinton’s visit to Cairo in July, newspaper columnist Ahmed Moussa criticized President Morsi and the FJP for not being critical enough of what he sees as US interference in Egypt’s inter-nal affairs, arguing that the US has changed from the “Great Satan” to an “ally” in the eyes of the FJP/Brotherhood. Signifi cantly, he claims that the alleged collusion between the two is a “conspiracy” aimed at under-mining the Egyptian military’s authority. His concerns were echoed by protesters who turned out to pelt Clinton’s car with shoes and tomatoes as she left the US con-sulate in Alexandria. Many of them bran-dished placards accusing the US of funding the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the US, an oddly parallel process is underway, with some public fi gures using accusations of collusion with the Muslim

“It was the moral force of nonviolence

that bent the arc of history toward

justice once more.”

Sayyid Qutb behind bars in

an Egyptian prison



Brotherhood to attack the character and loyalty of their opponents. On 13 June, five members of Congress, including Michele Bachmann, wrote to the State Depart-ment’s Office of the Inspector General to question why Hillary Clinton’s long-time aide, Huma Abedine, had been given a se-curity clearance, given that her parents and brother had alleged links to individuals and groups associated with the Brotherhood. The allegations were met with a furious response from other lawmakers, including Senator John McCain, who took the floor of the Senate to denounce the letter, say-ing, these “sinister accusations … have no logic, no basis and no merit.” McCain de-scribed Abedine as “a friend” and implied that these claims closely mirrored those of Senator Joseph McCarthy during the “Red Scare” of the 1950s, when US officials—particularly from the State Department—were dragged before Congress to defend themselves against accusations of collusion with the Soviet Union.

But the Muslim Brotherhood and State Department are not the only ones be-ing accused of nefarious dealings. In July, Al-Dostour, an Egyptian tabloid owned by a Christian businessman and a strong supporter of the military, dedicated half its front page to a story headlined ‘After-shocks of the Group’s [Muslim Brother-hood] scandal with the Americans’, which claimed that Congressman Frank Wolf of

Virginia had provided the US Congress with a legal document proving the Obama administration had bankrolled the Muslim Brotherhood to the tune of US$50 mil-lion during the second round of Egypt’s presidential elections. When The Majalla contacted Congressman Wolf ’s office in Washington, his spokesman denied any knowledge of this. Wolf has travelled to Egypt twice, most recently in June 2011,

and he had met with Mubarak and senior Egyptian officials where he raised his con-cerns for the rights of religious and ethnic minorities in the Middle East. Indeed, Wolf ’s public support for Coptic Christians is likely to have raised his profile inside Egypt, making him an easier target for this kind of accusation. As for the claim itself, it seems to be another example of a cam-

paign that is attempting to smear Morsi by suggesting that he is an agent of the US government. Taken together, it appears that both Congressman Wolf—and the US more generally—were drawn into an escalating propaganda campaign aimed at undermining Morsi’s credibility among the Egyptian people. (It is important to note that in mid-August 2012 the Egyptian gov-ernment charged Al-Dostour with insulting Morsi and inciting sectarian discord.)

Given the struggle over power that lurks in Egypt’s future, nothing in the way of political chicanery can be ruled out at this stage. Together with the fervor with which some elements of the Egyptian media trumpet rumors and conspiracy theories, this means that accusations of collusion with the US will likely recur as soon as it becomes useful to make them. But the body of evidence presented here suggests that barring a brief flirtation with the Brotherhood during the early stages of the Cold War, the US has never held in-fluence over the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, since the Egypt-Israel peace agree-ment of 1979, the only influence the US has ever had in Egypt lies with those who have been most at odds with the Brother-hood: the Egyptian military. In any event, American influence behind the scenes, wielded by the president, the CIA, the State Department, or any other agency, cannot possibly live up to the hype.

Alex Edwards holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and the Middle East from Durham University in the UK, in addition to a Bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from the same institution. He is currently a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics, where his research focuses on American foreign policy and Persian Gulf security issues. He is a former Deputy Editor of the Millennium international relations journal. He is based in London, where he is also studying Arabic. Bryan R. Gibson is a PhD candidate in International History at the LSE and specializes in US-Iraqi relations during the Cold War. His PhD thesis is on the US policy toward Iraq and the Kurdish Revolt,1958-75. He received his Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees in history and a Bachelor of Social Sciences in criminology from the University of Ottawa, Canada.

“We need to get a national consensus

around the pre-conditions for the next step forward.

The president [Mubarak] must

stay in office to steer those changes.”

Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood

Phot

o ©

Get

ty Im

ages

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TM1575_33_Ad.indd 33 30/08/2012 11:11

Photo © Getty Images

Amidst the hand-wringing from diplomats and world leaders over what to do about Syria's civil war, a developing refugee crisis goes largely ignored.

Simona Sikimic

Between a Rock and a Hard PlaceThe dilemma facing Syria’s refugees

The global response to the Syr-ian conflict has been domi-nated by fraught discussions about intervention, sanctions,

and arming opposition fighters, all under the umbrella of providing humanitarian assistance. As the scores of Syrian refu-gees fleeing the conflict are discovering, the prioritization of those who are the most vulnerable has once again been treated as an unpleasant afterthought.

With the nearly 17-month uprising descending upon Syria’s two main cit-ies, Damascus and Aleppo, which had

both been spared the worst of the fight-ing until recently, refugees have begun to stream into neighboring Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.

According to the United Nations Refu-gee Agency (UNHCR), refugee numbers have tripled in the last three months, and nearly 150,000 Syrians are now registered with the agency in bordering countries, al-though the actual numbers are thought to be much higher—and rising quickly.

In spite of the protracted nature of the conflict and the widespread media atten-tion surrounding it, many refugees have

been greeted by scarce resources, with most camps operating on limited budgets and seemingly incapable of handling the rapidly increasing number of civilians fleeing the fighting.

Another problem is that of border clo-sures. Overwhelmed by the influx and scared that the fighting might spill across borders, Syria’s neighbors have, to vary-ing degrees, blocked the movement of ei-ther goods or people. Only Lebanon has so far resisted calls for a clampdown.

Apart from Turkey and Israel, Syria’s neighbors are not party to the 1951 UN

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Human Condition

TM1575_34-36_Human Condition.indd 34 30/08/2012 11:52

As Iraqi authorities noted, its own trou-bles mean that Jordan and Turkey will have to shoulder an even greater share of the refugee burden. It is unclear how ca-pable both states are of doing this.

Jordan also closed its borders on 23 July, with Information Minister Samih Maaytah announcing that Jordan would “take all necessary measures to protect the northern region as well as national security from any kind of infiltration.”

He pledged to “continue providing aid to our Syrian brothers who have sought refuge in the kingdom,” but remained vague about what this meant for new ar-rivals, stressing that Jordan was “closely monitoring developments and working on controlling the influx of refugees.”

Regardless of the uncertainty, refugees have continued to flood in, but not all are being admitted. Even prior to Maaytah’s announcement, widespread reports had emerged that Syrians, and particularly men, were being denied entry.

The 6-million strong kingdom has been vocal about its concerns that the 150,000 Syrians who have fled to Jordan since the start of the uprising could overwhelm the country’s water reserves and internal di-visions, and exacerbate economic prob-lems, all of which have already been af-fected by the existence of large Iraqi and Palestinian refugee populations.

Jordan has long resisted establishing permanent camps. The first UNHCR-designated facility, for now capable of housing 5,000, only opened at the end of July.

It has enough land to house 113,000, but money has been in short supply, leav-ing the remaining 36,000 registered refu-gees—not to mention the other 50,000 estimated to be in need of assistance—without adequate resources.

“According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), refugee numbers have

tripled in the last three months, and nearly 150,000 Syrians are now registered with

the agency in bordering countries.”

Refugee Convention, the main human rights instrument dictating the treat-ment of refugees, but this only limits their responsibilities.

As UN members, all are signatories to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and are obligated to secure the “right to seek and to enjoy in other coun-tries asylum from persecution.”

Unfortunately, not even this most basic of rights has been fully observed.

A day after his meeting with US Sec-retary of State Hillary Clinton on 16 July, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak made Israel’s position clear: “If we have to stop waves of refugees, we will stop them.”

Things will have to get almost unimag-inably worse for Syrians to seek shelter in Israel. But if they do—and Israel re-sponds as it did during the 2011 Nakba Day memorial protests, when it opened fire on demonstrators trying to enter—the country faces the prospect of either gunning down civilians itself or watching as pro-Assad forces do it for them.

While such a tough response was to be expected, the actions of fellow Arab or Muslim states have been more surprising.

On 20 July, Iraq took the provocative move of deploying troops and closing its borders, even to refugees. This stood in stark contrast to Syria’s acceptance of 1.2 million Iraqi refugees during the Iraq War.

Although Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki reversed this stance on 23 July, Iraq’s ability to look after refugees re-mains dubious, especially since it can hardly cope with its own internal prob-lems. Indeed, Iraq has had great diffi-culty repatriating its own citizens fleeing Syria, including some 10,000 that left in the week following 16 July.

Syrian refugee statisticsTurkey• More than 50,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey to date. This number continues to increase.• Fleeing Syrians are mainly housed in camps near the border, while additional accommodation is kept ready in Sanliurfa province, located about halfway along the 560 miles (910 Km) Turkish-Syrian border.• Kilis is one of seven camps dotted along Turkey’s 511-mile (822 Km) border with Syria, which together hold more than 27,000 people.• Other camps include Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, and Hatay.

Jordan • More than 40,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan to date.They are made up of 15,121 households.• An additional 4,036 persons (1,165 cases) are awaiting registration and approximately 50,000 people have been identified by local organisations as being in need of assistance.• Zaatari was the first refugee camp and the Jordanian authorities have approved a UN plan to build two hundred camps along the border.

Lebanon• 36,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon to date.They are made up of 8,231 households.• There are an additional 1,000 Syrian refugees in Tripoli and 700 in Bekaa are being assisted pending registration.• Lebanon has no refugee camps. Instead, Syrians are housed in evacuated schools, shops, and temporary tents.

Iraq• Around 14,000 Syrian refugees in Iraq to date.They are made up of 7,690 households• Domiz refugee camp was officially opened in April near the city of Dahuk in the northern Iraqi region of Kurdistan. Refugees who do not live here have found shelter in local mosques in the governorates of Sulaymaniyah and Irbil or with friends and family.



Turkey—once an eager supporter of refugees and opposition fi ghters alike—has also followed in Jordan’s footsteps, shutting all remaining border crossings on 25 July. Within hours, UNHCR issued reassurances this would not affect refu-gees, but the news may be of little com-fort to the 50,000 UNHCR-registered Syrians already inside Turkey, and those still trying to get in.

In recent weeks, Turkey’s camps have been rocked by shortages of food, water, and medical provisions. Skirmishes have erupted during food distribution times, leading to injuries, and prompting police to fi re tear gas at crowds.

That the refugee issue is only now be-ing addressed is indicative of how tense a situation this is. As early as April, at least 70 countries gathered for an Ankara-based Friends of Syria conference and were pledging a monthly multimillion-dollar sum to equip activists and provide communications equipment. By June, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were stepping up this support to include arms ship-ments. Meanwhile, the US has begun to provide the FSA with technical and in-telligence assistance in their fi ght against the Assad regime.

Yet on the day of the Damascus assassi-nations, the UN was launching an emer-gency appeal to plug an 80 percent defi -cit in its $189 million budget earmarked for civilians inside Syria and $193 million for refugees.

The EU has since pledged €20 million ($24 million), and the Arab League $100 million, but with funding notoriously slow at converting to on-the-ground action, this seems like an all-too-familiar case of put-ting the cart before the Middle East donkey.

The problem is not so much whether or not international support for the op-position was legitimate or necessary. It may have been both. Proponents of early support may well be proven right, but if they were their unwillingness to prioritize the humanitarian aspects of the confl ict will be even harder to explain.

Simona Sikimic is a British journalist and a graduate of the Columbia Journalism School in New York. She specializes in developmental and human rights issues.

“In spite of the protracted nature of the confl ict and the widespread media

attention surrounding it, many refugees have been greeted by scarce resources, with most camps operating on limited

budgets and seemingly incapable of handling the rapidly increasing number of

civilians fl eeing the fi ghting.”

36

Human Condition


TM1575_37_Ad.indd 37 30/08/2012 11:52

Only a few days after it was formed on 27 February 2011 in Beng-hazi, the National Transitional Council (NTC) declared itself to

be the sole political body representing Libya and the Libyan people. Less than a month lat-er, the NTC took its seat at the United Nations.

As a de facto parliament formed by opposition forces advancing an armed revolution against Libya’s long-time ruler, Muammar Al-Qadhafi, the NTC never enjoyed the legitimacy of an elected body and was often criticized for being non-transparent and ineffective.

In August 2011—the month that Tripoli fell to the opposition—the NTC issued a Constitutional Declaration that set the terms for a transitional process that would eventu-ally lead to an elected parliament and govern-ment. The key step in that process was the establishment of an independent electoral body that would supervise a free and fair elec-tion for a General National Congress.

A Man on a Mission Othman Bin Sassi, Secretary General of the

Libyan National Transitional Council

Secretary General of the NTC, Othman Bin Sassi, outlines his current role in managing the transition from the NTC to the National Congress and touches upon some of the critical issues that Libya faces today.

Jacqueline Shoen

On 7 July 2012, the NTC fulfilled that mandate as 1.6 million Libyans cast their ballots in the first democratic election in the country for more than 40 years.

With the 200-member Libyan congress now elected, all that remains for the NTC is to organize the handover of power from the NTC to the Congress and to lay foundations for the adequate functioning of the congress.

In this interview with The Majalla, Sec-retary General of the NTC, Othman Bin Sassi, outlines his current role in managing the transition from the NTC to the Nation-al Congress and touches upon some of the critical issues that Libya faces today.

A Berber from Ein Zwara, Bin Sassi was politically active at a young age in an effort to assert his ethnic Berber identity, which had for decades been marginalized and oppressed by the Qadhafi regime. In the 1970s, he sought political asylum in France after having had escaped from prison for organizing cul-tural activities prohibited by the government.

Thirty-two years later, Bin Sassi returned to Libya with the NTC, with whom he worked as a member of the political committee, fol-lowed by his current post as secretary general.

Libyans are now entering a new stage in their revolution. What are the primary challenges for your country as it moves forward?The immediate challenge is to choose a good government. This is very urgent, because the population cannot wait any longer. We have a big problem with the [transitional] government. They had a 68 billion dollar budget, but did nothing. People are still going outside of Libya for medical care. There is no security. The entire economy is on standby. Foreign companies have left the country, so their employees are living without a salary.

The people that made this revolution did it because they had nothing left to hope for. If you don’t give them something to hold on to, especially now that the elections have passed, they might have another revolution.

Security, or lack thereof, has been a common theme in international media and humanitarian reports on Libya, which highlight, among other things, heavily armed mili-tias often operating above the law. What should be done?No one has a monopoly on power here, so who can maintain security in the country? If you take their arms, it would be dangerous for the larger population. They should keep their arms until we are ready to govern responsibly, until the state is capable of providing real se-curity. Only then will these fighters feel com-fortable enough to relinquish their weapons.

Now that we have a legitimate govern-ment, I think things will start to change.

Secretary General of the NTC, Othman Bin Sassi, stands in what will be the new and temporary location of

Libya’s General National CongressPhot

o ©

Jac

queli

ne S

hoen

38

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TM1575_38-39_Candid Conversations.indd 38 30/08/2012 11:51

After having been driven from their homes by rebel forces as punish-ment for fi ghting on the side of Qa-dhafi , some 40,000 Twerghans are now living in temporary housing throughout Libya. Is anything being done to facilitate their return?This is a disaster. It’s a big problem, espe-cially for the families, for the children. They are Libyans as we all are. We need a minister to focus specifi cally on the issue of Libyan refugees and internally displaced persons. Many Libyans remain outside of Libya too, without any help. It is very urgent that the next government do something about this.

We are not a poor country. We can build a new city for them. It’s not necessary for them to go back to Twergha. If the new place is bet-ter than Twergha, perhaps they will accept it.

I have experience from the confl ict be-tween the Zwara and Jumeil [tribes]. If we continue like this any longer, the confl ict will entrench itself. If we do something now, it can be resolved in a few months. But to change things, you need power; you need money; you need to help people. Because if you give people work, services, a home somewhere, then they will forget about each other and start to move on.

You are managing the transition of power from the NTC to an elected parliament. What will this entail?The NTC will be replaced by the newly-elected Congress. We have been working for the last few weeks to prepare for this transition, and my experience with the NTC has guided me in this process.

We are now building a temporary parlia-ment on the second fl oor of the Tripoli In-ternational Convention Center. With the as-sistance of international consultants, we are designing administration facilities like you would see anywhere in Europe, including a library for documentation and research. In-ternational experts with experience in build-ing a government system from the bottom up are here advising us as we develop prac-tices and procedures specifi c to Libya.

For example, with the support of the UN, we just fi nished writing three . . . let’s say instruction booklets . . . for our MPs outlining their role in parliament, how to work inside parliament, how to organize the parliament, and even how to vote for a president or prime minister.

You mentioned earlier that your experience with the NTC has been valuable as you prepare to hand over power to a new authority. Can you elaborate on this?The NTC was meant to be a legislative body, but it didn’t have the expertise to fulfi l that role. We had only one or two people with a background in law. So, anytime we wanted to draft a new law, it would take much longer than it should have.

Now, of course, we are doing something different. We invited about 70 Libyan jurists to participate in a course to learn about parliamentary legislation. From them we will select a panel of 15 to work directly with the new parliament.

Why did the NTC pass a law two days before Election Day stipulating that the 60-member constituent assembly was to be directly elected by the peo-ple instead of being appointed by the elected members of the new parlia-ment as had been originally panned? Was it related to the demand from federalists in the east for more rep-resentation in parliament?Our intention was to reach out to these people. We were concerned that they would create problems on Election Day, so the NTC decided to make a compromise. I’m not sure that this made any difference

though, because this group is very small and they are not the kind of people to ac-cept such a gesture by the NTC.

In any case, the law that was passed was not legal. Ultimately, the way in which the constituent assembly is formed will be up to the elected parliament, which could de-cide to revoke it and appoint the constitu-ent assembly themselves.

Many in the international media continue to emphasize Libya’s trib-al structures as an impediment to progress. Do you agree?I really don’t think that tribes are as im-portant as they are made out to be.

They comprise a small percentage of our population. We are no more tribal than Tunisia or Egypt. In Tripoli, for example, there are hardly any tribal structures at all. In Benghazi, it’s the same thing. Those who live outside the main cities mostly identify with their families and not their tribe.And what about the militias? I under-stand that they were organized along tribal lines.Some of the militias are organized along tribal lines, but defi nitely not all of them. Some of them are mixed and most are or-ganized based on their geographical origins.

What advice can you offer people wishing to make a change in their own country?The most important lesson is that it is bet-ter if they don’t use arms, even if it takes more time—because once civilians arm themselves and start killing each other, it takes much longer for the country to heal, for people to move on.

Many of the problems we face today are a direct result of our decision to take up arms. Women and children have watched other Libyans die. Many of the men who fought are suffering from psychological ill-nesses. To do something now in Libya, we need the help of those people. So it’s a big problem for the population and for the fu-ture of the country.I fi rmly believe that it’s better to change things through diplomacy.

Jacqueline Shoen is a London-based American writer and media professional specializing in geopolitics and US policy in the Middle East.


TM1575_38-39_Candid Conversations.indd 39 30/08/2012 11:51

A Humble Prime MinisterPrime Minister of Egypt, Dr. Hisham Qandil

The choice of Qandil for Prime Minister surprised many in Egypt, and there are plenty of people willing to suggest that he is not a man able to give this esteemed position the weight it deserves during

Egypt's transition to democracy.

40

Profile

TM1575_40-41_Profile.indd 40 30/08/2012 11:50

Not much is known about the current Prime Minister of Egypt, Dr. Hisham Qandil, except for general details

about his education and career as a wa-ter and irrigation engineer. He is said to be married with five daughters and—in a conspicuous sign of humility—he refuses to ride in the luxury car that is put at his disposal as head of the cabinet. Qandil’s appointment by the first democratically-elected president of Egypt, on 24 July 2012, was quite a surprise, considering his low public profile.

Born in 1962, Qandil is the youngest prime minister since Gamal Abdul Nass-er. He graduated from the University of Cairo in 1984 with a bachelor’s degree in engineering, and like many of his con-temporaries headed to the US, where he obtained a master’s degree in irrigation and drainage from Utah State University. He later obtained a doctorate from North Carolina State University in 1993, in the same discipline.

After he returned to Egypt, Qandil worked at the Ministry of Water Re-sources and the National Water Research Center (NWRC). He later worked as the office director for the minister of water re-sources until 2005.

Qandil then moved to Tunisia to work for the African Development Bank (AfDB), and was promoted to chief wa-ter resources engineer. During the time that he was employed at the bank, Qa-ndil worked on the Nile Basin Initiative, which aimed to attain sustainable devel-opment through the fair allocation of water resources.

He was appointed minister of water resources in the government of Essam Sharaf in July 2011—appropriate given his great expertise in the field. Despite the fact that Sharaf was forced to resign five months later, Qandil continued as minister in the cabinet of his successor, Kamal Ganzouri.

What was unexpected, however, was the fact that he was asked to form a new gov-ernment by President Morsi. According to Morsi, Qandil was the perfect choice for the post because of his patriotism, independence from party affiliation, and competence. Many Egyptians, however, believe that neither his background nor

his political moves indicate any of the above. To the “man in the street,” Qandil is an unknown quantity, appointed by an unproven president.

Although Qandil is not a member of the Brotherhood and is politically inde-pendent, his ideology is believed to be similar to that of Morsi’s. The fact that he sports a beard has been viewed by some commentators as an indication of his identification with the Islamist cur-rent in Egyptian politics. Qandil, on the other hand, once said that he had grown his beard as an act of religious devotion “in line with the Sunnah”—the Prophet Muhammad’s words and actions. In this sense, if Morsi’s choice of such an ob-scure figure was an attempt to pre-empt speculation about his cabinet’s religious orientation, it has been a failure.

In terms of his political moves so far, Qandil’s choice of cabinet has been the subject of criticism. The distinct lack of female and Coptic Christian min-isters is worrying—there are only two female minsters, Nagwa Khalil and Na-dia Zachary. Zachary is the only Coptic Christian in the cabinet of a country where Copts are estimated to make up ten per cent of the general population. This does not bode well for a coun-try that toppled a dictator in order to achieve liberty and equality for all sec-tions of society.

The fact that Field Marshal Tantawi remains defense minister in the new gov-ernment indicates an on-going struggle behind the scenes over Egypt’s future. As a prime minister appointed by a president who needs to establish himself as a source of authority independent of the mili-tary, it remains to be seen if Qandil will have any say in what happens in Egypt, and what his role will be in the struggle. “This is a very weak president and very weak prime minister; it’s very hard to see Egypt stabilizing under these two men,” one Cairo-based European diplomat told Al-Ahram newspaper.

Egypt currently faces many political and economic crises, such as the struggle to restore domestic security after the events in Sinai and a need to ease congestion in greater Cairo that causes losses of $2.5 billion every year. In that setting, it is dif-ficult to see if Qandil’s career as a water engineer—or indeed those of his cabinet’s as technocrats—will help achieve Morsi’s ‘100 day plan’ that aims to end traffic con-gestion, improve public sanitation, and end shortages of staple foods like bread. Morsi appears to have gambled his reputation, and that of the Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, on prov-ing that they are a ‘normal’ political party capable of solving Egypt’s everyday prob-lems. It is a very tall order, and it remains to be seen if Qandil can help Morsi meet it.

Qandil’s choice of cabinet has been the subject of criticism

Displays of HumilityIn the current post-Arab Spring political climate, several politicians are indulging in conspicuous displays of humility, perhaps in a bid to win the respect and admiration of their people and display a common touch. Whether these attempts are enough to convince their respective peoples—who have been subjected to years of corrupt authoritarianism—is another matter.

The President of Tunisia, Moncef Marzouki has said that he does not own a car and that his home is an old house. According to him, his presidential duties are much more important than material displays of wealth.

Hisham Qandil, the Prime Minister of Egypt, does own a car—a modest Kia model— and uses this quotidian run-around instead of the government car at his disposal.

Although the President of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi does use the motorcade at his disposal, he refuses to block traffic.

Perhaps the most ascetic display of all is the recent example of the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Rafik Abdul Salam. He saw fit to take a short nap on the floor of the conference hall at the last Ennahda party conference.


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According to traditional economic theory, countries endowed with natural resources are more likely to exhibit inequality, low levels of growth, and a propensity for conflict. Libya is case in point, but what

strategies could Libya implement in order to turn its resources into a blessing?

Paula Mejia

Libya’s Cursed WealthThe mismanagement of Libya’s oil and resources

At the heart of the socio-economic grievances that led to Libya’s rev-olution was the rentier economy of the Qadhafi regime. Though

oil resources had permitted Libya to accu-mulate wealth, the country suffered from a number of macroeconomic concerns. By 1973, Libya had a dualistic undiversified economy dominated by the state, afflicted by pervasive rent seeking and regulatory de-ficiencies. The effects of the rentier charac-teristics of Libya’s economy permeated both the economic and political structures of the country. Excessive oil resources had allowed the political elite to hollow out governmental institutions—allowing those in power to op-erate without oversight.

Although the system remained in place for over 40 years, as the revolution dem-onstrated, Libya’s social contract was untenable: the unequal distribution of wealth, the country’s poor track record on transparency, governance, and corrup-tion, as well as diminishing opportunities

for the development of human capital created grievances against the former re-gime which could not be acquiesced in the usual manner. No longer able to buy the support of its citizens, the former govern-ment was confronted with a revolution.

Unfortunately, Libya’s story is not unique. Traditional economic theory would suggest that the macroeconomic imbalances of the Libyan economy and the social unrest that ensued were unsur-prising. Rather, Libya’s political economy followed the usual trajectory of resource abundant economies. According to the theory of the resource curse, resource abundant economies tend to grow less rapidly and are more prone to conflict than resource-scarce economies.

Libya, like other resource-rich countries in the MENA region, experienced particu-larly low and non-inclusive growth as well as high levels of macroeconomic volatility. Moreover, the Libyan economy was virtu-ally undiversified and entirely dominated

by the hydrocarbon sector, which generat-ed close to 70 percent of GDP, more than 90 percent of government revenues and 95 percent of export earnings. The very limited backwards and forwards integra-tion of the industry confined the wealth generated from oil riches to export and fis-cal revenues, while it generated less than 5 percent of employment in Libya.

Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the resource curse in Libya, however, was the impact that oil had on state insti-tutions. Libya’s clientalist state structure, which centralized economic power in the hands of the state, created an environ-ment in which individual interests both outweighed—and were in conflict with—the interests of the common good. As a result, government accountability suffered and the social contract depended on the state’s ability to provide rents to its people in exchange for their acquiescence.

To illustrate the impact of the rentier mentality on Libya’s governance record, in 2009, Libya ranked in the 5th and 12th percentile for voice and accountability and government effectiveness, respectively, ac-cording to the Kauffman index (World Bank, 2009). It was in this context of poor representation and unequal distribution of wealth that the revolution took place, further aligning Libya with yet another common manifestation of the resource curse: propensity for violent conflict.

In addition to poor citizen representa-tion, the lack of transparency in govern-ment and the tendency for rent-seeking by the state also seriously affected the devel-opment of the private sector and conse-quently hindered the diversification of the economy. Although the previous govern-ment attempted to reform the economy, vested interests by the political elite result-ed in the inconsistent implementation of

An armed National Transitional Council (NTC) fighter provides security inside the Zawiya Oil Refinery, some 40 km west of Tripoli, on October 27, 2011

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into the previous habit of rent-seeking. The recent elections that took place in Libya are an important step in establishing an ac-countable and representative government that will take into account the interest of its citizens while establishing fi scal policies.

Libya stands at a development crossroads in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. The interim government can take the opportu-nity for reform created by the revolution to apply the important lessons drawn from Bo-tswana’s resource wealth management. In doing so, Libya’s new leaders will be able to overcome the legacy of wealth mismanage-ment established by the former government. If distributed evenly, Libya’s oil wealth could improve the standard of living of all Liby-ans, and furthermore act as an important source of investment industries and devel-opment initiatives. Rather than allowing its vast oil wealth to become a liability, Libya can use its resources to ensure the respon-sible management of its revenues and apply these funds to promote inclusive growth.

Paula Mejia is a freelance journalist based in Tunisia and consultant for the African Development Bank. Her work has focused on the economic and social challenges in Africa, with a special focus on Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. She is a graduate of the London School of Economics, L'Institut D'Etudes Politiques de Paris and the University of Chicago.

promote investment, including lower and uniform taxes as well as the protection of property rights.

In addition to economic diversifi cation, it is important that Libya introduce explicit fi scal rules for the treatment of natural resource revenues. According to the IMF, any windfall gains should be deposited in a special account and used for designated economic and social development. The country could also adopt a non-oil defi cit target to promote economic diversifi cation. By offi cially de-linking expenditure from natural resource revenues, the government would be making a public commitment to responsibly manage the nation’s wealth.

Implicit in the two policy recommen-dations listed above, Libya’s success will depend on the government’s ability to implement a culture of good governance. Fiscal policy rules, investment guidelines and promises to diversify the economy are insuffi cient to guarantee that the govern-ment will always apply a responsible strat-egy for resource wealth management. In order to ensure these policies help Libya to promote the effi cient management of its oil wealth, it will have to promote good governance in the country.

Good governance should include the es-tablishment of voice and accountability in the country. For Libya this will imply the in-stitution of checks and balances in the gov-ernment that will prevent the it from falling

“The revolution in Libya has created an opportunity for the country to reverse its

previous mismanagement of the oil wealth.”

policies and reversal of reforms. As a re-sult, Libya’s private sector has been histor-ically stifl ed by a number of issues, includ-ing limited sources of fi nancing to small and medium enterprises, the inconsistent application of property rights, and the fo-cus of most of the economy’s resources on the oil sector. Development of the non-oil sectors, including services, requires broad participation through domestic or foreign private sector investment. Poor economic governance has consistently discouraged investment in the non-oil sector.

However, the revolution in Libya has created an opportunity for the country to reverse its previous mismanagement of the oil wealth and the culture of poor gov-ernance that dominated both the private and public sector. There are thus a num-ber of policies the country could imple-ment in order to turn its resource into a blessing rather than a curse.

The fi rst step Libya must take is to pro-mote economic diversifi cation. As Libya’s experience demonstrated during the 2011 revolution, relying excessively on one re-source for its revenue renders an economy extremely vulnerable to shocks in that sector. Because 70 percent of the country’s GDP depends on oil revenues, the fact that the country was forced to stop exporting oil for 6 months that year resulted in a 42 percent drop in the country’s GDP growth. Though economic diversifi cation is certainly a long-term objective, Libya stands to gain greatly by pursuing this avenue for sustainable growth. According to a study conducted by Monitor Group, the country has great po-tential to grow in the tourism, construction, and services sectors, among others.

However, it is important to take into ac-count that economic diversifi cation is an end, and a number of reforms must be successfully implemented if Libya is to promote the development of other sectors of the economy. Because natural resource development must by necessity involve a long-term relationship with private par-ties, market-unfriendly policies like those in place in Libya under the previous gov-ernment not only discouraged investment in the oil sector, they also discouraged investments in alternative industries, ulti-mately hindering much-needed economic diversifi cation. Libya should institute fa-vorable and predictable regulations that


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Al-Assad Exposed

Syria continues to witness an esca-lation in the quality and quantity of defections from the al-Assad regime. Whilst the defection of

Manaf Tlass served as an indication of the internal fragmentation of the Bashar al-Assad regime, the recent defection of newly appointed Syrian Prime Minister Riad Hijab, along with some of his minis-ters and officers, serves as another indica-tion, namely that the majority of the Syr-ians who are serving al-Assad are doing so under threat of his forces, and some – if not many – are looking for a way to escape his grasp. These Syrians are looking for a way to free themselves of al-Assad and the brutal manner in which he has cho-sen to confront the enmity of his people, namely with murder and destruction, sec-tarianism and the creation of a civil war, and reviving the dream of establishing an Alawite state in the region close to the An-Nusayriyah Mountain range [west-ern Syria]. As for his final refuge, this will not be Moscow or Tehran, or even a fate written by the angry and enraged Syrian people when they announce their victory!

We have seen the complete fragmenta-tion of the inner circle surrounding al-Assad, not to mention the government that he appointed and the generals that he allowed to reach high positions, as well as officers and soldiers in his army. This is something that is taking place in coordination with the Free Syrian Army [FSA], which is fighting against al-Assad on the ground and which carries with it the hopes and desires of the Syrian peo-ple. As for Iran, it is desperately trying to defend al-Assad regionally, whilst Russia and China are defending the broken and collapsing Damascus regime in the inter-national sphere. The FSA is providing ways for defectors to leave the country, as well as protecting their families, carrying out these operations in an impressive and professional manner.

In addition to what these defections rep-resent regarding the fragmentation of the rigid al-Assad regime, this also represents

another important indication, namely that the regime’s numerous security appa-ratus – and there are perhaps a dozen of these – are also fragmented and divided. This is because all these security appa-ratus rely on the prestige of the state, as well as intimidation and fear, rather than utilizing professional and modern means of operations. These security apparatus lack the required experience and exper-tise, although Iran has sought to train the al-Assad regime forces in suppressing the population, as Iran’s own security forces did during the Green Revolution there.

Following this enormous public pres-sure on Syria, Iran was forced to an-nounce that it would not allow the Da-mascus regime’s back to the broken, ending its “resistance” axis, which in reality is nothing more than a sectarian lie. The Bashar al-Assad regime is there-fore being provided relief by members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp [IRGC], who are aerially bombarding Aleppo, as al-Assad cannot allow Syrian forces to carry out such operations in fear that they may turn against him and tar-get his presidential palaces! The FSA was able to capture 40 Iranians in the heart of Damascus, right under al-Assad’s nose, and now we see Iran floundering between attacking some regional coun-tries and calling for intervention to save these captured Iranian, considering them to be religious pilgrims. The FSA lately revealed that some of these Iranians – according to their own documentation – are members of the IRGC, which has been acknowledged by Iran. However the larger question remains, namely: is it logical for Iran to send religious pilgrims to Damascus at a time when the al-Assad regime is falling apart, which is some-thing that Tehran – as al-Assad’s prin-

Abdullah Al-Otaibi

cipal ally – knows better than anyone? Couldn’t they have sent these pilgrims to equally sacred holy sites within Iran itself or neighboring Iraq?

It is clear, from all the above, that the infection of turmoil and confusion has begun to spread from the al-Assad regime to the Iranian regime, which is suffering domestically and looking for any external distraction to draw the attention of the Iranian public. The Iranian people are in a state of extreme anger as a result of de-cades of oppression and dictatorship in the name of God and sect, against the general public and the Green Revolution in particular, especially as the regime is still recovering from the wounds this “revolution” dealt it. This public anger is only growing stronger with the rising effects of the severe economic sanctions on Iran; this represents a slow death for the country for the sake of unjustifiable dreams of nuclear arms and imposing Iranian hegemony on the region. Iran is in a state of confusion and does not know whether it should recognize the new reality that is imposing itself on the ground or choose the victory of empty-handed return or cling to the dreams of old which have led to nothing but three decades of collapse and delusion. Iran could also choose the Samson Option that would kill everybody!

The advice put forward by the mul-lah’s regime in Tehran towards al-Assad was extremely bad, and this focused on the sectarian dimensions of the political game. They are experienced in playing the sectarian card in the region over the past decades; they succeeded in devouring the state of Iraq via their followers and utilizing the force of terrorism. They did the same in Lebanon, where they estab-lished and armed sectarian parties, and they were even able to hijack the country for a period of time, during which time it experienced all the destruction anyone can image. They sought to create a can-cer in many Arab states, including in Bah-rain via the “saboteurs”, in Yemen via the

“Syrians are looking for a way to free

themselves.”

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Huthi rebels, as well as by planting terror-ist and espionage cells in Kuwait, Yemen, and a number of other Arab states. This is the heart of Iran’s antiquated style.

When I previously wrote about al-Assad’s delusions regarding the establishment of an Alawite state in the An-Nusayriyah Mountain range, this was based on history, logic and reading and analyzing the reality of the situation. Whilst just days ago, King Abdullah II of Jordan, spoke about the same idea, warning against the establish-ment of a “Shiite crescent”, which is some-thing that we have seen ourselves recently. This is a statement from a political leader who possesses a great deal of information and knowledge on this issue, and we must therefore pay attention to this.

We have seen the beginning of a no-ticeable shift in the general US and west-ern position in dealing with the situation in Syria outside of the framework of the UN Security Council, particularly after the departure of Annan and his initia-tive and the change in the balance of power on the ground. This became clear after the collapse of the al-Assad began to be viewed as inevitable. Therefore we have seen numerous statements that have hinted that the West is in the pro-cess of adopting new policies towards Syria and the unbearable situation that is raging in the country, particularly in terms of the war crimes and sectarian massacres. This comes amidst escalating criticism of the Obama administration from some former senior government officials. These former officials have criticized the Obama administration for compromising Washington’s interna-tional position by allowing Russia and China to return to the international scene in such a strong manner, which is detrimental to America’s regional and global strategic interests.

Finally, the al-Assad regime’s domestic veil has been cast off with the defection of the prime minister, however the foreign protective screen – represented by Iran regionally and Russia and China interna-tionally – remains firmly in place. This is a protective screen that is weakening, and the current circumstances will not allow it to remain in place for long!

This article was printed in Asharq Alawsat Bashar Al-Assad



Putin and Russia’s Real Interests in Syria

Amir Taheri

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Vladimir Putin

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ever, the army is composed of Syrians and is unlikely to continue the massacre, even if it wanted to, in the teeth of rejection by the nation. What worked for Putin in Chech-nya, at least temporarily, may not necessar-ily work for Assad in Syria.

Putin’s second assumption is that by saving Assad he could cast Russia as the protector of other despotic regimes, from that of the mullahs in Tehran to the Kim clan in North Korea and passing by Rob-ert Mugabe’s set-up in Zimbabwe.

But what good would that do to Russia? Even supposing Putin succeeds in keep-

ing that gallery of rogues open for a bit longer, the fact remains that Russia, the imperfections of its fragile democracy notwithstanding, is not in the same league as those suffering nations.

Putin’s third assumption is equally problematic. He claims that by protecting Assad he would be able to maintain Rus-sia’s naval base in Tartus.

However, a base that backs into a trou-bled hinterland is of little military value. In any case, if Russia is not in a state of war its navy would continue to enjoy the right of innocent passage and mooring throughout the Mediterranean. But if there is a state of war, Turkey, as a mem-ber of NATO, would have the right to shut the Dardanelles to the Russian fleet before it reaches Tartus.

Putin’s final assumption is that, by pro-tecting Assad, Russia would prevent the coming to power of an “ideological en-emy” in the shape of an Islamist regime led by the Muslim Brotherhood. Yevgeni Primakov has echoed that sentiment by claiming that an Islamist regime in Da-mascus could amplify secessionist trends among Russia’s Muslim republics.

It is true that some crackpots in the so-called Caliphate movement dream of “taking back” chunks of Russian terri-

In politics, what is not necessary is im-prudent. This is the lesson that Rus-sian President Vladimir Putin would do well to ponder when he reviews

his handling of the Syrian crisis.Rightly or wrongly, there is interna-

tional consensus that Russia has played a negative role. Last week, two-thirds of the United Nations’ members implicitly held Russia responsible for blockage in the Security Council and thus continued bloodshed in Syria. Former UN Secre-tary-General Kofi Annan went further by blaming Putin personally for the failure of his “peace plan.”

Before the end of Ramadan a confer-ence of Islamic nations is expected to echo that sentiment.So far, Putin’s pro-Assad stance has also earned Russia opprobrium from a majority of the non-aligned move-ment, not to mention a majority of Arab and Islamic nations. It has also cast a chill on Russia’s relations with the European Union and the United States.

Putin’s policy has antagonised Russia’s principal trading partners in Europe, the Middle East, the Far East and the Ameri-cas. Regardless of how the crisis ends, the policy has injected a dose of bitterness into Russo-Syrian relations for years to come.

It has done harm in other ways as well. It has paralysed the Security Council, set-ting a precedent that could be used by oth-er veto-holding powers. Effacing the post-Cold War diplomatic gains, Putin’s policy has returned the international system to the bad old days of the 1950s and 1960s.

Russians would do well to wonder what benefits they might have drawn from un-critical support for Assad.

As a professional intelligence man, Pu-tin must know how to read the tea-leaves in distant lands. He knows that a majority of Syrians, including many of those who supported the regime for various reasons, are now fed up with Assad.

Putin’s Syrian policy has been shaped by several questionable assumptions.

The first of these is that the strategy of rule by massacre, tested by Putin himself in Chechnya could also work in Syria.

However, in Chechnya the Russian army was fighting in a territory with a non-Rus-sian population. Chechnya was a classical foreign war fought within the Russian fed-eration’s legal boundaries. In Syria, how-

“Putin’s policy has returned the

international system to the bad old

days of the 1950s and 1960s.”

tory. But they also want the whole of the Iberian Peninsula, Italy up to Rome and a good portion of France. However, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has never evoked irredentist claims against Russia. (Paradoxically, it has against Turkey!)

Putin may not know it but the Constitu-tion of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath (Renais-sance) Party, Assad’s political instrument, includes territorial claims that would im-ply the dismantling of the Russian Federa-tion. Claiming “Arab unity” as its goal, the Ba’ath Constitution speaks of a “single and indivisible Arab nation” within its “historic boundaries” stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.

That vast area consists of lands that were once raided and/or ruled by Arabs as part of various Islamic empires, includ-ing most of Ethiopia, the Sahara, much of the Mediterranean, south-western Iran, south-eastern Turkey and chunks of what is now Pakistan. The Ba’ath also regards as Arab a big arc of territory from the Ak-Tash (White Crown) mountains in Central Asia to the Caucasus, taking in virtually the whole of the Caspian Basin.

More interestingly from Putin’s point of view, the Ba’ath claims several autono-mous republics of Russia as part of the historic “Arab homeland”. These include Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Charkess-Qa-racahi, Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Udmurtia and Ossetia among others.

Putin would do well to ponder a simple question: how could a leader who treats his own people as enemy be a true friend to a foreign power?

Putin must not confuse diplomatic strat-egy with intelligence campaigns. In the latter all manner of skulduggery may be in order only if because things happen in the shadows. In diplomacy, however, espe-cially in this age of increasing transparen-cy, no one, not even Putin, could for ever hide the true nature of Assad’s brutal re-gime. And when Assad falls, as he is likely to do, Putin would be left as a self-deluded accomplice rather than a visionary leader projecting machismo.

Even in the most cynical version of Re-alpolitik backing Assad is bad for Syria, bad for Russia and bad for international peace and stability.

This article was printed in Asharq Alawsat



This year Jordan celebrates the 200th anniversary of the West-ern ‘discovery’ of the fabulous Nabatean city of Petra, as well

as the 170th anniversary of the artist Da-vid Roberts’ depictions of Petra and other Arabian historical treasures.

The Victorians were fascinated by scenes of far-off lands, in particular by what was perceived as ‘exotic Arabia,’ a fascination paralleled by the present-day interest of the people of that region for images of their homeland, and in the perpetuation of their heritage. Fuelled by oil wealth, the extensive buying during the past three de-cades or so by private collectors, museums and corporate organisations of the Middle East has radically affected international art market prices, stimulating a consequent and well-deserved interest in Victorian or 19th century art in its homeland—work that had become deeply unfashionable.

During the late 18th and early 19th cen-turies, following Napoleon’s conquest of Europe and the opening of overland trade routes to India for foreigners (then coun-tries hardly visited by Westerners), artists and archaeologists from Britain and France in particular were drawn to the region. Fol-lowing the example of so many British art-ists before him, David Roberts (1796–1864) regularly travelled in Europe in search of new subjects. But unlike most of his con-temporaries, he travelled extensively in the Middle East and North Africa, under con-ditions that at the time were often arduous, dangerous, and potentially injurious to the health of a northern European.

In 1838 David Roberts, who hailed from Scotland, arrived in Egypt, and by 1839 had reached Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon. The publication of Rob-

This year Jordan celebrates the 200th anniversary of the Western ‘discovery’ of the fabulous Nabatean city of Petra, as well as the 170th anniversary of the artist David Roberts’ depictions of Petra

and other Arabian historical treasures.

Juliet Highet

A Victorian in ArabiaJordan marks 200 years since Western discovery of Petra

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erts’ six volumes of lithographs, including Syria, Idumea, and Arabia between 1842 and 1849, met with huge success and criti-cal acclaim. One may very well ask how and why a Scotsman came to be travelling round the Orient, sketch pad in hand.

Born in Stockbridge in 1796, Roberts emerged from humble circumstances: his father a shoe-maker, but interestingly, his mother was an admirer of the Cathedral and monastic remains of her native St An-drew’s, an enthusiasm she communicated to her son. He had shown an early apti-

years stimulated Roberts’ incipient passion for architecture, plunging deeper than the sur-face decoration with which he was involved as a house-painter and interior decorator.

By 1818, Roberts had become an assistant scene painter in a minor Edinburgh theatre, and graduated fairly rapidly to being prin-cipal painter in leading Scots theatres. The dizzy heights of Drury Lane and Covent Garden in London beckoned, and as chief theatrical painter, he adapted to southern trends. Later, his experience with handling architectural subjects on a vast scale for stage scenery was to prove invaluable. He comments in his Journal that the task of communicating the grandeur and scale of some of the monuments he was recording was “impossible.” He writes of the “stupen-dous” rocks at Petra, and of conveying the dimensions of the huge columns at Karnak in Egypt. Again in his Journal, he wrote, “You must be under them [the columns] and look up and walk ’round them” to gain a true impression of their grandeur.

During this period of his life as a scen-ery painter, Roberts had begun to take up painting seriously, exhibiting and re-ceiving increasingly fulsome accolades. He was elected as Associate of the Royal Academy in 1838, becoming a full mem-ber in 1841. After travelling to France, Spain, and other European centres of an-tique architectural splendor—and paint-ing them to considerable acclaim—he began preparing for the most important event of his life: the journey to the Orient.

As his contemporary biographer, Bal-lantine, recognised, this was “the great central episode of his artistic life,” the fulfillment of “the dream of his life from boyhood,” . . . “the brightest of his antici-pations as an artist.” Supplied with a letter of introduction from the Foreign Office to Colonel Campbell, Consul-General for Egypt, Roberts left England in 1838, ar-riving at Alexandria a month later. He was given a guard to ward off “interruption or insult whilst sketching,” as his Journal puts it, and even obtained permission to paint inside mosques, provided that his brushes were not made of hog’s bristles.

After drawing almost every edifice from Nubia to the Mediterranean, he prepared to cross the desert by the route of the ancient flight of the Israelites from Egypt to Mount Sinai, via southern Jordan, touching Aqaba

tude for drawing, and there was scarcely an old castle or ruined chapel in his area that Roberts did not sketch as a boy. Some of these talented drawings were shown to the master of the Trustees Academy in Edinburgh, who advised “that as the par-ents of the boy were poor, he had best be apprenticed to a house-painter, where he might still practice drawing, and learn an art by which he could make his living.”

And so Roberts served a long, harsh ap-prenticeship with an overbearing master, Gavin Beugo. Yet those challenging seven


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and Petra, and then continue on to Palestine. Roberts and his party dressed themselves as Arabs and left Cairo “well-armed with 21 camels, and nearly as many Bedouin Arabs.” Roberts wrote in his Journal, “I am so com-pletely transmogrified in appearance that my dear old mother would never know me. Before I could get admission to the mosques, I had to transfer my whiskers to my upper lip, and don the full Arab costume... I have a tent (a very gay one, I assure you), skins for carrying water, pewter dishes, provisions of all sorts, not forgetting a brace of Turkish pistols, and a warm covering for the night. Imagine me mounted on my camel, and you will have an idea of what an Eastern mon-arch I am.” We also begin to have an idea of how novel, exotic, and potent the Oriental experience was for Victorians.

It was one of Roberts’ achievements to familiarize a new and appreciative au-dience with the look and feel of foreign places, a window that the Romantic poets like Byron and Scott had opened. Indeed, those poetry books often contained land-scape illustrations and were so successful that publishers sent artists abroad in in-creasing numbers. Roberts too contrib-uted to such books.

Roberts was well aware of the potential commercial value of images of Egyptian temples, Islamic mosques, and the ruins and landscape of the Holy Land. His sketches of them would make “one of the richest folios that ever left the East.” However romantic his response to the magnificent sights of the Orient, it was based on the sound practical knowledge that his journey would bring him fame and fortune, since no artist of his cali-ber had previously attempted such an ambi-tious topographical project.Roberts himself wrote in his Journal of Petra:

I am more and more bewildered with the aspect of this extraordinary City. Not only the city, which must be two miles in length by nearly the same in breadth, but every ravine has been inhabited, even to the tops of the mountains. The valley has been filled up with public buildings, temples, triumphal arches, and bridges, all of which, with the excep-tion of one triumphal arch and one temple, are prostrate... Though the ruins of this extraordinary place are immense, they sink into insignificance when compared with these stupendous rocks. I of-ten throw aside my pencil, in despair of being able to convey any idea of the scene.

But convey it he did. No publication be-fore The Holy Land & Egypt had presented so comprehensive a series of views of the monuments, landscape, and people of the Near East. His melancholy comparisons of past grandeur and present decay of the great monuments of the Orient were typical of his time, derived the Romantic attitude to ruins (and not only those of the Near East). Yet despite his exquisite drawing and per-fect composition, the accomplished Roberts was decidedly not an imaginative artist. His lithographs, watercolours and oils are not the inspired masterpieces Turner might have cre-ated. He is essentially a prosaic, professional Victorian, working within the conventions of his time. His great success lay in recognising his limitations and making clarity of percep-tion a virtue. That sheer professionalism ap-pealed to early Victorian England, with its connotations of honest, industrial toil.

Roberts has his detractors, and one of the accusations laid against him by art critics is that he ‘used’ people as foreground interest, and as just an addition to his central obses-sion with fallen buildings. John Ruskin, a trenchant Victorian art critic, disliked what was in truth a pictorial device of Roberts—to use people as foreground colour and scale—“thus we have been encumbered with caftans, pipes and scimitars, when all we wanted was a lizard or an ibis.”

But the genuine Roberts response might have been that human figures add interest and perspective, giving a further dimen-

sion to an otherwise austere landscape or ruin, and he readily admitted that figure painting was not his strong point.

Further artistic license was taken to achieve greater dramatic impact and to re-create the mood that the subject itself evoked—these were not mere topographi-cal records. Witness his exaggeration of the height and width of buildings, by al-tering proportions and reducing the scale of figures. He would also use colourful weather conditions to create stunning ef-fects. His most successful compositions seem to be those which combine his sense of drama, derived from his experience as a stage scenery painter, with his consid-erable powers of observation, perfected when depicting the intricate tracery of Gothic and Moorish architecture.

In the end, after this “great central epi-sode of his artistic life,” Roberts returned to England. Working with Louis Haghe, his lithographer, it took the two men nearly eight years to print the lithographs, which today fetch prices at auction that would simply have been unbelievable in Roberts’ day, even to a canny Scotsman.

Juliet Highet is a writer, photographer, editor and curator, Juliet Highet specializes in Middle Eastern heritage and contemporary culture. Ms. Highet is currently working on her second book, Design Oman, having published her first book, Frankincense: Oman’s Gift to the World, in 2006.

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Swiss artist Jean-Luc Marchina, who recently completed a six-month artistic residency in Cairo, wrote a letter addressed to the new

president of Egypt. It reads:“Today is a great day. Egypt has fi-

nally achieved the first free and fair elections for the presidency. Invited by The Swiss Arts Council Pro Helvetia as artist-in-residence in Cairo this year, it’s a privilege to congratulate you for being the new democratic president of Egypt. As you will be leading your country to democracy, I wish you full success in restoring stability, confidence, and to lead your country to prosperity. To suc-ceed in those honourable goals, you will face a lot of challenges; the biggest one is youth, who represents around half the population.”

The artistic fruit of Marchina’s resi-dency is on display at the Cairo Atelier, a small downtown exhibition space. The exhibition, entitled Dear Mr. President, is executed with very simple means: a few photographs showcasing the youth from the lower and lower middle classes, and a video installation presenting youth ad-dressing the president with their hopes for the future. It is possibly this striking sim-plicity that shocks the viewer, reminding us that Egypt that is still heading in new and unpredictable directions. Marchina’s letter, which accompanies the project, is his artistic quintessence that aims to draw the president’s attention to many issues troublesome to the Egyptian nation—and especially its youth.

Over the months before his residency, followed the events in Egypt through the international media. “Understandably, when I arrive to Egypt, everybody was speaking about the politics and especial-ly the upcoming elections,” Marchina

tells The Majalla. “I looked at the youth that is always hopeful and enthusias-tic, fighting for their future. I think it is youth that needs to be addressed first and chose them as protagonists of my artistic work.”

In his photography, Marchina tries to escape clichéd images. He looks at the lower middle class in known Cairo hotspots, giving them a different angle. He creates an interesting thematic jux-taposition by approaching children and teenagers who are surprisingly innocent despite the revolutionary backdrop. We find boys who apparently come from the impoverished social strata, playing on the street in front of the National Dem-ocratic Party building (the ruling party under Mubarak) that was burnt during the initial 18 days of protest. Another work presents boys eating Koshari, an Egyptian street food made of pasta and beans, beside the concrete wall erected by the army around Mohamed Mah-

Dear Mr. President, an exhibition organized by the Swiss Arts Council Pro Helvetia office in Cairo, showcases the fruits of a six-month residency in Cairo by Swiss artist Jean-Luc Marchina. Running from 29 July to 3 August at the

Cairo Atelier, the exhibition looks at the Egyptian youth and their expectations for the new president of Egypt.

Ati Metwaly

Dear Mr. President From the Egyptian Youth to the President

Boys play in front of the burnt out National Democratic Party building

Eating Koshari in front of a Mohammed Mahmoud street

barricade

Photos © Jean-Luc Marchina

Jean Luc Marchina

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Stills from a video installation byMarchina

moud Street. That neighbourhood faced the most violent encounters between the police and the protesters in Novem-ber and December 2011 and February 2012. We also see a family seated at the doorstep of their house; despite their striking poverty, there are smiles and hope on their faces.

Today, many Egyptians believe that the revolution that toppled Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 did not manage to dis-assemble the regime and did not realize many revolutionary goals. But the voices that are asking for change can no longer be silenced, and they reverberate on the streets on daily basis. In his short video, Marchina collected views of young peo-ple addressing the future president in the weeks and months prior to the elections.

Marchina addressed mainly students, the upcoming generation of young intellectu-als, and found in them a lot of faith and optimism. So many concerns are tackled by the youth in his interviews: piling social, religious, and political pressures, corrup-tion, injustice, lack of jobs, failing educa-tion, women’s rights that are not met, and the revolution’s unattained goals . . .

“I wish that the coming president would do his job,” states one young man in the video, possibly not realizing that this seemingly simple statement encompasses an endless list of demands that his genera-tion enumerates. “He should respect the dignity of human being,” says the same man reflecting on many young people’s call for core rights such as dignity, respect and basic human rights.

Another protagonist, a young woman, underlines need for education, pointing to ignorance that is apparent in many parts of the country, extending from lack of sci-entific knowledge to political ignorance. Women’s rights are among the topics

Even though today we know that Mo-hamed Morsi is the new president of Egypt, Jean-Luc Marchina’s exhibition does not look into a specific presidential figure. Dear Mr. President is rather an ex-hibition that looks into the major concerns of the Egyptian youth. Those concerns need to be addressed to the leader who claims or hopes to respond to—if not all, then at least a majority of—the demands expressed by Egyptians.

Ati Metwaly is a Polish/Egyptian journalist currently living in Egypt. She was co-founder and Editor in Chief of the first English language magazine on arts published in Egypt, The Art Review (2004-2009) and is now the Arts and Culture Editor of Ahram Online.

brought up by two women, opposing the discrimination that they experience in so-cial and academic circles.

One of the recurring demands is free-dom of expression. The video has numer-ous statements asking for the “freedom of thought, freedom of opinion, freedom of education,” and asks the president to ac-cept all forms of criticism.

Marchina believes that despite many daily worries, and they Egyptian youth remains optimistic. Sadly, one woman in the video thinks that her expectations are dreams be-yond reach. She mentions the fight against corruption and social injustice, and stresses that her revolutionary dreams are shat-tered. She is waiting for someone who will lift Egypt, who will lead it towards the future and would not drown it in the past.

Boys stand in front of one of the concrete barricades in Mohammed Mahmoud street


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A Life Cut Short House of StoneBy Anthony ShadidHoughton Miffl in Harcourt, 2012

House of Stone is both memoir and meditation; a distinctive contribution to Arab-American literature and Arab memoir generally.

This memoir is less about the author and more about his extended family members and their history in the village of Mar-jayoun, their travels, and their settlement abroad, primarily in the United States. It is also an informal refl ection on the his-tory and culture of Lebanon and the trag-edy of its confl icts.

Many emotional currents feed the memoir’s narrative; the longing for home and sense of loss of villagers who left Marjayoun and settled in new and distant lands. They faced a contradictory mixture of welcome and rejection, eventually in-tegrating into American society and life and developing a fi rm sense of belong-ing. The hope and optimism and labour of love that is Shadid’s reconstruction of his family home anchors the book’s narra-tive; this is contrasted with the decline of Marjayoun, the sadness and despondency of many of its residents, and the violence of Lebanon’s contemporary history and its relentless sectarianism.

Shadid is always generous and critical simultaneously in his writing. He brings a critical eye to his own profession of jour-nalism, describing its fl aws, particularly with regard to war reporting—so often an issue in Lebanon:

A long siege of death in progress; bombing prolonged over days or weeks of close battles and losses; fear unbroken: We can’t see the scars from these traumas or how far or where the im-pacts have penetrated. In the comfort of their living rooms, Americans see pictures of disaster but are routed toward new fronts before sympa-thies develop or questions become too compli-cated. Television and the craft I practice show us the drama, not the impact, particularly if the results are subtle and occur or become obvi-ous after the cameras and reporters with their notebooks have left. Our tendency is to consider the resolution of the battle or the war or the

“Americans see pictures of disaster

but are routed toward new fronts before

sympathies develop or questions become

too complicated.”

confl ict, not to take in the tragedies that outlast even the most fi nal sort of conclusion. We never fi nd out, or think to ask, whether the village is rebuilt, or what becomes of the dazed woman who, after one strange, endlessly extended mo-ment, is no longer the mother of children.

He romanticizes no one and nothing (including himself), except perhaps the era of the Ottoman Empire before Lebanon won its sovereignty.

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To his credit, Shadid acknowledges the harsher aspects of the Ottoman Em-pire, including its forced conscription of soldiers. Still, there is a sense of wistful nostalgia for a past which—given Leba-non’s history since its independence, with frequent paroxysms of violence, a lengthy and brutal civil war, and lack of politi-cal and social stability and common civic identity—is understandable.

Shadid describes the Levant as “more a culture than an expanse of land or group of nations or homelands. It was a way of living and thinking that bound Asia Minor to the Middle East and Egypt to Mesopo-tamia. It was, in essence, an amalgama-tion of diversities where many mingled, a realm of intersections, a crossroads of language, culture, religions, and tradi-tions. All were welcome to pass through territories and homelands within its land-scape, where differences were often cel-ebrated. In idea at least the Levant was open-minded, cosmopolitan”.

It’s not evident that Marjayoun and Lebanon ever actually had such an idyl-lic moment in time—or if they did, that it

Solutions for Sudan The Soufan Group attempts to propose sustainable solutions to the crises of North and South Sudan.11 July 2012

The ICG's recent report on Tunisia attempts to offer solutions to some of the problems facing the country in its transition from the Ben Ali era.

This report not only provides a comprehensive insight into the con-fl ict between North and South Sudan but also highlights the domes-tic confl icts and economic crises that the two nations face. It also con-siders possible solutions to these problems. How likely it is that these recommendations are implemented is another matter altogether.

It was hoped that the division of South Sudan from North Su-dan in July 2011 would stimulate economic growth and prosperity, due to the fact that the South acquired the majority of Sudan’s oil resources. The absence of pipelines in the South, however, means that South Sudan’s capital, Juba, is dependent on Khartoum for oil. According to the report, the pipelines in North Sudan allow Khartoum to charge Juba ‘oil transit fees,’ and whilst Khartoum is demanding US $30 per barrel, Juba is prepared to pay no more

than the international standard of less than a dollar. This has led to an escalation of confl ict between the two regions: Khartoum seized US $815 million of Southern crude, which prompted Juba to halt oil production. These political decisions have had an in-credibly damaging impact on the Sudanese economy, which has in turn led to an increase in austerity measures and a colossal drop in living standards. The South, meanwhile, is relying on its foreign currency reserves to survive—and it could run out of these reserves very soon. Corruption is also rife in the South: it was recently dis-covered that government offi cials had been stealing money from the national treasury. Eliminating this problem may take years.

The report also highlights the humanitarian disaster that is worsen-ing in Sudan day by day. It cites the examples of the northern states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, where the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are accused of killings on a mass scale. More than 150,000 people have fl ed and have no access to humanitarian relief. In the southern state of Jonglei, on the other hand, there is an ongoing feud between the Murle and Lou Nuer ethnic groups that has left thou-sands of Sudanese dead and as many as 100,000 people displaced.

The depletion of resources will end any possibility that Juba and Khartoum will go to war, according to the report. Instead, it envisages the rise of small-scale bloodshed in the border regions and an escala-tion of domestic tensions in the South. It also rules out the chance of a regime change in either the North or South as a result of the crisis, despite the fact that recent austerity measures led to a wave of protests

lasted very long. What is clear, however, is that in the past a greater sense of commu-nal obligation informed Marjayoun and other villages like it in Lebanon.

Where once there was cooperation and coexistence between religions and ethnic groups there is now more likely to be ten-sion, rejection, fear, hatred, and outright vio-lence whose specter menaces Lebanon as an ever-present possibility haunting daily life.

Shadid makes clear that he is sympa-thetic to critiques of the impacts of na-tionalism on Lebanon and the Middle East, which is why he looks back on the days of the Ottoman Empire with long-ing. However fl awed and exploitative that empire was, it wove together people of different backgrounds, and tolerated—sometimes embraced—difference.

On nationalism, he writes:

Artifi cial and forced, instruments themselves of repression, the borders were the obstacle, having wiped away what was best of the Arab world. They hewed to no certain logic; a glimpse at any map suggests as much. The lines are too straight, too precise to embrace the ambiguities of geography and history. . . Myths had to be imagined to join

a certain people to a certain land that was so long shared. Pasts were created and destines claimed. The borders reinforced the particulars of states with no ambition save the preservation of a petty despot’s power, or a people’s chauvinism, or a clan’s fear.

Shadid’s writing is lyrical without being overwrought—bringing to life light and landscape, communicating beauty and horror, illuminating the weathered faces and personalities of Marjayoun’s villagers and the range of their emotions, hopes, and frustrations.

In recounting ruthless violence and sec-tarianism, chauvinism, crude ethno-cen-trism, and feelings of religious superiority that characterize and feed much of Leba-non’s history and on-going social confl icts, Shadid maintains his ethical integrity and writes with care. He is emotionally indig-nant in response to injustice and violence against the innocent, but utterly uninter-ested and unwilling to retreat to the false comforts of romanticizing his own (or any other) ethnic or religious group in Leba-non, aware of the fallibility and culpabil-ity that resides in the human heart and has long informed the actions of all of



against President Omar Al-Bashir’s regime. The writers of this report believe this on the basis that President Bashir has weathered the storm of such uprisings before and will duly suppress any protests that may arise in the future. The report further argues that even if President Bashir is toppled, he will be replaced by a fellow member of his Na-tional Congress Party (NCP), which would not change or improve the situation in any way. Here the report may be wrong, as the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and, Libya were all unexpected—and they highlight the possibility of unprecedented occurrences in the Sudans. President Bashir may well be brought down and replaced by someone who is favoured by the Sudanese people.

Unless solutions are found and accomplished, the futures of both North and South Sudan seem bleak and impoverished. The report offers a solution in two parts: negotiations and an agreement on transit fees, combined with Chinese intervention. Economic and political tensions between the two states could be alleviated if they agreed on transit fees that would allow oil to flow again, and it is be-lieved that this would also improve the living standards of ordinary Sudanese civilians. Although the US and UN believe that Chinese intervention (Juba has a multi-million US dollar loan from the Chi-nese) would be beneficial, it has yet to be forthcoming.

Despite the fact that the solutions that this report offers are not incredibly feasible in the foreseeable future, it is a useful piece of research that provides a valuable insight into the economic and political issues that North and South Sudan face.

Lebanon’s ethnic and religious communi-ties. Respectful of his own Christian back-ground and faith, he is equally and vigor-ously so of the faiths of others.

His evocation of character and psycho-logical perceptiveness is acute and often yields funny, sharp, and unforgiving por-traits that have the accuracy of a photo-graph that is natural and has never been touched up; an unvarnished caustic truth communicated directly.

The details of his rebuilding of the home reveal the often dramatic personalities of the villagers and give energy and impetus to the book’s narrative arc. Interspersed throughout are extended commentaries on the experiences of Shadid’s relatives over the last century as they left Marjay-oun to seek their fortune elsewhere.

All are sensitively—often beautifully—rendered and add to the wholeness of the memoir that links Shadid to his larger family and community across generations. Some, however, become so detailed that the reader may lose interest or find hard to follow.

On the subject of war and its devastat-ing consequences, Shadid is particularly eloquent. Describing the tiles that once

decorated his home and that he will now try to use as he rebuilds it, Shadid states:

The tiles returned one to a realm where imagination, artistry, and craftsmanship were not only appreciated but given free rein, where what was unique and strik-ing, or small and perfect, or wrought with care was desired, where gazed-upon ob-jects were the products of peaceful hearts, hands long practiced and trained. War ends the values and traditions that pro-duce such treasures. Nothing is main-tained. Cultures that may seem as durable as stone can break like glass, leaving all things that held them together unattend-ed. I believe that the craftsman, the artist, the cook, and the silversmith are peace-makers. They instill grace; they lull the world to calm.

This is a work that is achingly honest and characterized by empathy, based on Shadid’s cathartic act of returning to the land of his ancestors and the village from which they came, and rebuilding a family home that had suffered the degradations of war, time, and abandonment. In so do-ing, it synthesizes the spatial and tempo-ral, physical and spiritual, past and pres-

ent, ideal and real. It contains sadness and tragedy, pain and loss and suffering – in no small measure. It is, in part, a lamentation for a lost Lebanon and a lost Levant.

The author, himself, tragically died of an asthma attack shortly after completing the book, while he was reporting from Syria.

The ultimate message of his final work is one of resilience and rededication, of connection across distances real and imag-ined, communicating across boundaries of hostility and fear and frustration and mis-understanding. It is also generously laced with a lacerating and liberating sense of humor and wit that breathes fresh air and creates space where staleness and claustro-phobia conspire. House of Stone is a work of genuine joy and integration—joy that is imperfect, as the stones that make up his now-completed home. Towards the end of the book, Shadid writes with love and grace about the imperfections of those stones, their distinctness, and the occasion-al coarseness accompanying their smoother parts. In the act of building and of writing, Shadid restored something in his heart and in his village; in this act of creativity the reader also finds himself renewed.

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In a recent interview the president of Tunisia, Moncef Marzouki, said that he does not even own a car and that his home is an old

house. When asked how it feels to carry out his duties in the presidential palace, he replied: “In all honesty, I am yet to discover this palace … every day I un-dertake the work I have to do in order to help the people … as for the décor or whatever, I do not care for this.”

Displays of modesty, and going against “protocol” by steering clear of manifes-tations of power and sultanic splendor, have become fashionable amongst a number of political figures who have risen to power during the last year, fol-lowing the seismic events of the “Arab Spring”. The Egyptian President Mo-hammed Morsi, for example, undertakes dawn prayers at a public mosque and re-fuses to block traffic for his motorcade. He prefers to stay at his residence at Tagammu Al-Khamis, Heliopolis, rather than move to a presidential palace.

Supporters of such initiatives argue that these displays are spontaneous and genuine. Some suggest that they are im-portant in order to break the stereotype created by former presidents and leaders who previously portrayed themselves as highly arrogant individuals obsessed with the trappings of power. In addition, those who support such initiatives argue that the humility of the president also instils a sense of modesty among his senior offi-cials. An oft cited example is the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Rafik Abdul Salam, who was photographed at the last Ennahda party conference sleeping on the floor in the conference hall, after a long day of heated, partisan debate.

But does “humility” in itself mean bet-ter policy-making? When can we differ-entiate between what is spontaneous and what is contrived? In his book “The Lan-guage of Politics” (2000), Adrian Beard, having spent several years studying the

Arab LeadersFalse modesty and the trappings of power

rhetoric and statements of political lead-ers, and comparing these with their politi-cal stances, indicates that politicians—no matter how much they display qualities of humility and asceticism—are ultimately individuals who are fond of power and want to maintain it for as long as possible. Of course, there are exceptional cases whereby individuals indifferent to power have assumed control; individuals who have sought to diminish power’s psycho-logical influence on their own personality, but they are very few in number.

Beard asserts that most people involved in politics often portray themselves as de-voted individuals who have never sought to use power personally, but rather to serve their fellow citizens. Some of them may actually live in modest homes and their living conditions may not be overly materialistic, but they are not ascetics when it comes to the political powers granted to them.

In contemporary Arab history, there are many examples of leaders who lived in modest environments, and were known to have—relatively—clean hands, at least according to the accounts of their sup-porters. However, their policies were di-sastrous for their citizens and directly re-sulted in wars and regional conflicts, take the examples of the late presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser, Abd Al-Karim Qasim, and others. Even the “Arab Spring” states that witnessed popular uprisings were not ruled by despotic tyrants in their early eras, in the same manner that they seemed to be at the end.

A president displaying humility at the beginning of his reign does not mean he will adopt good policies, and perhaps these manifestations of modesty might mask financial corruption and political abuse. Some would argue that the Is-lamists, because of their religious faith and conservative, ideological discipline are more likely to be humble rulers with grounded policies. This is not necessari-

ly true, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the most humble of all Iranian presidents in terms of what he eats and drinks—and the fact that he only owns a rickety old Peugeot car—but this does not mean that he is interested in developing his country. The poor presi-dent—as he has been called—has made the Iranians even poorer during his reign. Furthermore, reports published in conservative Iranian newspapers have accused the President and his aides of financial corruption involving billions of dollars. The Prime Minister of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, who continues to rule over the Gaza Strip after an armed coup, also excels in his calculated dis-plays of modesty. He delivers the Friday sermon, leads the prayer, and consumes his meals sitting on the floor as the poor do, but Gaza during his reign has be-come a place full of scandals of corrup-tion and power abuse. On 19 April, a Washington Post report indicated that some Hamas leaders were running their own underground trade and smuggling rackets, at a time when the Palestinians are becoming increasingly poor, and the Hamas Prime Minister is calling for an “Islamic Caliphate.”

If he cannot provide security and wel-fare to the citizens of Gaza, how can he participate in the establishment of a fu-ture empire? It is necessary to point out that whenever a president puts on an ex-hibition of humility, the reality is that the government will incur additional expens-es to ensure his safety, regardless of the gains in his popularity as a result. The lesson does not lie in the appearance, even if it seems impressive, because real humility is manifested in efficient poli-cies and delivering promises. A president who gambles the future of his country on foreign agendas, whilst his citizens are suffering from international sanctions, can never bring prosperity to his country even if he appears humble.

Adel Al-Toraifi

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the us and the muslim brotherhood: losers in the defamation game?

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