the theory of guerilla

8/8/2019 The Theory of Guerilla

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THEORYOF GUERRILLAtEdward F. Downey, Jr.

WARFAREMuch has been w rit ten about guer-ril[a w arfare, but most of it has been

concerned w ith the details of tact ics.The purpose of this art icle is to pointout the need for a comprehensivetheory of glt errilla warfare and t o sug-gest some major lines for it s futuredevelopment . The author has, there-fore, em phasiz ed t he st rat egic r-at he~than the t act ical aspects of guerm llaw arf are.Editor.

s INCE the blitzkrieg of the Germansin World War II, the major trend in war-fare has been toward greater mobility. Thelightning war of the Nazis would seempedestrian in comparison with the pres-ent destructive potential of the strategicair forces we have today. Tomorrow, in-tercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS)will relegate the jet bomber to the horseand buggy days. The increasing destruc-tive capacity of nuclear weapons has addedwings to the trend toward greater mobili-ty in war.In the Second World War the German

armored forces punched through the de-fense systems of country after country.France was felled in a shockingly shorttime because the French failed to evaluatethe new mobility of the blitzkrieg prop-erly, and with their theory of positionalwarfare were unable to defend themselves.Before France could devise new tactics,the war was over and she was defeated.Other countries suffered similar defeats.Experience with airborne tactics in

World War II in such places as Crete andBurma indicates that modern ground ar-mies equipped with transport planes andhelicopters can mount a three-dimensionalblitzkrieg today. Even the limited expe-riences of such tactics under unfavorableconditions in Korea substantiate this point.

Defense in DepthEvery country that has fallen before the

onslaught of a modern blitzkrieg bae col-lapsed because that country failed to de-velop an effective defense in depth. Oncethe Germans slashed through the perim-eter defense of the Polish and tbe French,the forces of those countriee became sodisorganized that effective inner defensewas impossible. For the Germans the bal-ance of the campaign was a mopping-upoperation. Aerial blitzkriegs were evenmore devastating because they started outby eliminating the neceesity for breakingthrough; they were mopping-up operationsfrom the start.It was well into the war before an ef-

fective concept of defense in depth de-,veloped. Then commanders were forcedto organize their districts into a patternof what might be described as modern mil-itary feudalism: districts organized aroundstrong points prepared for all-around de-femse. Even this concept was sketchy andpoorly applied. Later, in Korea, our dam-aging reverses at the hands of the ChineseCommunist blitzkrieg proved that, all toooften, American soldiers had forgotten, orhad never been taught, the importance ofdefense in depth.

Our guerrilla warfare capacitg should be developed now by a thoroughstudy of methods, accumulation of available material on the subject, andincorporating guerrilla warfare training into current ttaining programs


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Because we recovered from our setbacksKorea by massive military effort, we

d not have time to see a guerrilla move-ent develop among the South Koreans.uring World War II, however, everylied country that was invaded developedme type of resistance movement. The=tivities for the most part were spon-neous and slow developing. That theyd grow universally is a basis for theed of a theory to govern similar at-.ities. At present, there is no adequateified theory of guerrilla warfare.

Total WarNaturally, most Americans will thinkis discussion boringly academic since,everyone knows, we have a Strategic

ir Force equipped with nuclear weaponspable-of wiping out an enemy in a fewort hours. Such q force exists, and hase capability of doing just that. Theanger is that Americans generally be-eve that we will use this strategy.hether we do or not depends upon morean military factors. As Henry A. Kis-nger states in his book, Aac[rar Weap-ns and Fo~cign Policy :In sack a sit7{at ion, it is fut ile to speakp l{rc~u n li~i tar~ cons i~era t ion.s . FrontMr. Edw ard F. Downey, Jv ., served ine Massachllsct ts Nat ional Guard w ithe 12c?th Heavy Tank Bat talion, 26th In-nt?y Div ision, fvom1947 to 1950. Grad-ated fvomBoston Unit , crsitgs School ofducat ion in 1953, lIC w as commissionedthe A ir Force Rcscrvc, and called to ac-ve d>tty the same ycer. Unt il his ~elcascom the srrv ice in 1955, hc scw t,cd as anr polit ic oficcr toith the 125.4th Airransport Group (Special M issions), M il-ar~ Air Transport Srrvice, W ashmgfonat ;onal Ai~port . A member of the USir Forc~ R~setw c, he scrcrsas an airpo-ce officrrw lfh thr814th A iv Base Gronp,rategic Air Command, W estovcr Airrce Base. He t -cceived his Masteps de-ee from Bridgclrate~ State Tcachensollege (U 1958, and ispmw ent lyas s ignedprntctpal of the Holbrook Jw tior Highhool in Massachmct t s,

a military point of v iew , nothing is moreeficient for cratering airfields, destroyingport facilit ies or e/in7inat it rg t rarz spOrt a-t ion cent rrs thais a megaton w eapon. B~t tt hecrucial pvolt lem of st rat egy is t he re-lat ionship bet ween pow er and the w illing-ness to vse it , betw een the physical andt he psy chological com poncnfs of nat ionalpolie~. Faced w ith the know ledge of theconseqaenccs of a t herm onuclear w ar, pol-icy )pakers w ill bc ~elactant to engage ina st rategg, the pcnalfg for w hich lnau WC(1bc social d isintegra t ion.Thus a$ least one author disagrees with

current thinking in regard to carrying outa modern war: Too few Americans haveconsidered warfare as anything other thana struggle for annihilation, while historyis largely the record of conflicts fallingshort of this ultimate objective. GeneralKarl von Clausewitz in his book On Warconsiders the relationship of polities towarfare when he writes:Wrsec, therefore, in the fivst place that

in all circumstances w e hauc to think ofw ar not as an indcpcndent thing, bl(t asa polit ical ivstrnmc?!t . And onlg by tak-ing this point of v iew can w e avoid fall-ing info contradict ion w ith tkc wholr ofm ilit ary hist ory . This alone oprns thegreat book to intelligent appreciat ion. Inthe second place, this same, point of v iewshow s ?{s how w ars mast difer accordingto the natnrc of t hri); mot iv es and of thecircamstanccs oat of w hich theu arise.From this discussion it appears that

there are two courses open to the UnitedStates in relation to offensive mobility inwar. The first is to launch an unrestrictednuclear offensive in case of attack. Thesecond is to carry out a war qr more con-ventional grounds, aqhieving mobility onthe structure of World War II tactics.Both of these policies Would be militarilypossible. Because of American disdain forthe theoretical, our military policy leanstoward the more easily grasped total


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THEORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE 47war concept of the first alternative; yetour experience in the postwar era hasforced us to practice the second concept,For Korea caught us completely unpre-pared not only militarily but above all indoctrine. All or NothingAt the present time Americans are in-

dulging in the luxury of an all or noth-ing theory of war. The prevailing think-ing is that we either win or we do not,but, whatever the case, we will know

for such a possibility. The United States,at the present moment, is like a winnirigfighter. Not having lost any fights, wehave not. prepared ourselves for that pos-sibility. Since the only recourse history of-fers a defeated nation, besides total sub-mission, isa resistance movement, we mustdevelop an adequate theory of guerrillawarfare so that we will have a preparedcourse of action.Clausewitz emphasizes the political char-acter of war. So do the statesmen of

A German fuel supply train is wrecked by Soviet partisans during World War IIshortly after the war breaks out. This istoo shallow an attitude to take towardn~.tional survival. No matter how destruc-tive the war, conventional or nuclear,chances are something will be left afterit is over. Supposing we were to lose ahuclear war; we would be like a fighterdown, but not out. If a fighter or a nationhas to think while it is on the canvas witha reeling head, the decisions are not likelyto be the best.A trained fighter and a trained nation

will have prepared and drilled on a plan1Hen r r A. Kis s inger , Nuc le a r WcmIonsavd Fov-eigx Foticw Harper & Bros.. New York 1957. P.

our day. The ideological conflict betweenthe democratic nations of the West andthe communistic nations of the East istbe factor which, if anything, will touchoff a cataclysmic nuclear war. If thisshould happen, and if we should lose sucha war, the ideological differences wouldstill exist. Providing the differences in be-lief are sufficient to cause such a bloodyconflict, they are worth defending even ifwe are defeated temporally. Should thedifferences not be worth the destruction,we should accept the Communist beliefsand avoid the struggle. This is a coursewhich would not be taken by Americans.Therefore, we must develop a plan for


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our defense in depth in case we are de-feated. Because of the increasing mobilityof warfare, the only practical solution isthe development of a guerrilla capacity.And development of a guerrilla capacityis dependent on the existence of a sQundtheory of guerrilla warfare.

CulturaI AspectsSo fir the ideas related to the need for

a guerrilla theory have been concerned al-most exclusively with military considera-tions. Another need, which has grown inth~ last few years, exists in the politicalsphere. In fuct, it has social and culturalsignificance. The rise of communism hasresulte{i in a political ideology differinggreatly from our beliefs. .Vow we are fight-ing an enemy bent on our annihilation.He i~ concerned not with a military anni-hilation, but with the attempt to displaceall the political, social, and cultural con-cepts of our society that vary with dicta-torial materialistic socialism. This politi-cal aim of our enemy should warrant ourgreatest concern, but receives almost noattention. Should we be defeated in battle,and should we lack a comprehensive theoryof ~uerrilla warfiare, we would be helplessin the face of an organized attempt tochan~e the political and cultural com-plexion of our people.That Communists feel this way is evi-

dent in their writings. In Tht, State andRrro/nt;/,/t, Lenin signals the changes thatmust come:f?iftit+,ict at o~ship of t hr p>olct flrift t

i. e., thr prrsscd as t he ruling class for thepurp(mr af crush ing the opprcssars-can-

. y70t pmdt fcr mrm-lzI an crpansion of 7fe-mocvacp. . . . 11c must cr)w h thcm ioov drr t o free h?{manit y from woge-slaiwg;thci~ msistancc must be broken bg force;it is clrav t hat where t hcrv is s7{pprcssionthrrc is also violcncr, there is ]ZOlibert ~,w o dcmocraev.W e read so much today that is written

by the dead leaders of communism thatsome people questio~ whether this think-ing is still prevalent. To show that it is,and to sample perhaps the most authori-tative criticism of communism availabletoday, the following statements have beenextracted from The N cw Class by MilovanDjilas, former Vice President of Yugo-slavia:From theory and pract ice, Communist s

know that theg art - in con ffict w ith allother classes and ideologies, and behaveaccordinglll. They arc fight ing a9ail~st ?Iotonl~ &taal bat also pot ent ial opposit ion.In the Balt ic counfries, thoasands of peo-ple w ere liqi{idat cd ov ernight on t he basisof rfocumrnt s indicat ing prrvio?t sl~ heldideological pnd polit ical v iew s. The mas-sacre of scvrral thousand Polish officrrsin the Katyn Forest w as of similar ci!a~-actcr. In the case of Commt(nism, long af-t er t he rcv olt (t ion is over, t cmorist amlopprcssiv r met hods cont inae t o bc used.On intellectual freedom Djilas writes,

The Communist system, as a rule, stiflesand represses any int~llectual - activitywith which it does not agree; that is every-thing that is profound and original.

Communist AimsPerhaps the most effective indication ofwhat the United States must expect from

communism is apparent in the followingevaluation by Djil?s:Absolt ft c brut alit y, or m se of anv m rrfns,is in accord w ith thv grandiosity , cucn the

nnm -a!it y of Commnnist aim s.By rcvo11(tio?7ary mran.s , contcmporav~

Communism has snccccdcd in demolishingot7 r form of societ y and set t ing VP anot hrr.At jirsf it w as gt(ided by the most beaat i-f,(l, primordial haman id~as of eq7{a[it uand bmthcvhood: only latrr did it concealbehind t hese ideas the est ablishment of it sdominat ion by w katcvcr mcan8.* * * * *!lhns, b~ j?t st if~it tg t he m eans becansc

of the end, the end it self becomes incvcas-


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,-THIZORY OF GUERRII.Lk wARFARE 49

iv aly mow dist ant and I{?l?calist ic, while and social reconstruction particularly ef-thir;ght f?fl rralit y of thr m~ans brcom es fective and dangerous today is the highincrcasivgl{l obvious a)~d intolcmblc. degree,of organization and interdependence!trhe~ ~ve read this from the pen of a of our society. Once an enemy can break

mm only recently }ice President of a down the delicate interrel~tionshipsof ourCommunist country, and even now in a social order effectively, as he tries to doCommunist prison, we can judge the truth in a blitzkrieg attack, he can conquer us. ,of what so many others have written. We This done he can set about reconstructingcan also gauge the fearful implications bur social world, He gains control of thefor our country if we should be defeated communication media, he uses secret police

The white coveraR gown and head covering. worn by Soviet partisan blends with terrainwhile lacking a plan for opposin~r an or-xanized attempt to remodel our society.Thus we have developed, in addition tomobility of modern warfare, a secontl

trend of modern times: the attempt to re.]Ilake a conquered country along the polit.ical, cultural, and social lines of the coll-qu~,ror. Some will object that this has beent long-standing historical trend, but fewill deny that never before has the at.enlpt been made in such an or~anized andetermined manner and with such a vari-ty of techniques. And fewer still willeny that we have planned no defense foruch an eventuality.JVhat makes this trend toward political

to hunt down subversives, he controls theeco]]omy, he eliminates the dangerous andl)otentially dangerous leaders, he sets upcontrols for schools, and he revises text-books. Every repressive technique is used.

Planned Resi~tanceNaturally, any society which has lost a

war to protect its social values shou]d havedevised some means of continuing its cul-ture in the face of organized social change.The answer is a resistance movement:guerrilla waerfare, Obviously, a concept ofguerrilla warfare envisioning the guer-,rills organization as the transmitter ofculture as well as a military force is a


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50.,

MILITARY REVIEW MAY 1969concept of partisan warfare far advancedover the cowboy and Indian theory heldhy most people. As far, as can be deter.mined, no extensive investigation has beenmade into this political sphere of guerrillawarfare.There are, nevertheless, historical prece-dents to indicate this trend. Every coun-

try which developed a guerrilla movementestablished schools to train partisans.These schools were basically technical, bu~the same type of activity could have beenused for political and cultural purposes.Perhaps the activities of Communist cellsoffer thehest examples of political projectsthat could be assigned guerrillas.Any country that is brought to its kneesin an international conflict must expect along, hard, up-hill struggle to recovery.It must plan for a protracted resistance,and unlike most guerrilla resistance ofWorld War II, it must plan for a re.sistance without outside help. Most of thecurrent ideas about guerrilla warfare pre-suppose outside assistance.Communist China offers the best exam-ple of the political and cultural aspect of

guerrilla warfare. In his Red Star Ovei-China, Edgar Snow writes:Under, inst it at iol~al educat ioa t he R eds

alreadg claim ed t o hav e, est ablished obout200 pri?narg schools, and thc~ had onenormal school for primary teachers, oneagrica~t aral sc~t ool, a te.rti{e school, at radew t ion school of five grades, and aPart v school, with some 400 st adent s.Courses in all of these last ed onlu aboutsix ?noat lls.Other cultural activities are indicated

by Snow in that Chinese Communistsmaintained a central printing plant atKian with 800 workers, producing books,magazines, and the national newspaper,the Red China Dailv Aew s. In addition,he states that they set up factories, how-ever primitive, to produce their own goods,a-rid established armories to repair andmanufacture weapons and explosives.

Therefore, after considering the militaryand political conditions that point to theneed for a unified the~ry of guerrilla war.fare, we may conclude that greater mo-bility in war and the conquerors attemptto impose his political and social structureon the conquered nation demand that wedevelop a defense in depth. Experience

iindicate thqt the only effective defense

rin dept est blished during World WarII was t~e r sistance movement. The slowdevelopment of this movement and its va-riety indicate that a sound theory isneeded. Before this theory can be devel-oped, h%wever, we must uncover certaintrends that will point the way for furtherresearch.

Identifiable TrendsSince there is no all-encompassing

theory of irregular warfare, there is nosound definition for the words guerrillawarfare. A common definition, An irreg-ular mode of carrying on war, by theconstant attacks of independent bands isinsufficient. Confusion develops betweenpartisan bands operating in their ownhomeland and commando t~pe raiders. Arethey both guerrillas? In most militaryliterature they have been grouped to-gether. Yet there is considerable cliffer-ence between these forces despite the sinl-ilarity of their tactics. A comprehensivetheory will separate these forces and con-cern itself only with those operating withintheir own countrie%Commando type raiders usually arehighly organized, superbly trained troops.

They come from an area beyond that inwhich they operate. They usually are sup-plied by forces outside the battle area, ofthey carry their own supplies. When theyconduct operations they do, so mostly inareas where the p~pulation is hostile oruntrustworthy. Normally, they have a lim-ited objective which they destroy by a rapidconcentration of superior force. As soonas their objective is eliminated, they at-tempt to return to the regularly organized


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THEORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE 61rces of their country. They are not ir-gulars; they are elite regulars operat-g independently of the main body ofoops. Therefore, they will no longer bensidered witbin the scope of this article.If the guerrillas are people operatingithin their homeland, then we are be-nning to limit the definition. If they alsoerate normally within their own locale,s is stated by Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixonnd Otto Heilbrunn in their study Comm-nist Guerrilla W a~farr, then we may

War. Considering the possibility of fight-ing the Turks with Arabian guerrillas, hewrote in his Seven Pillars of W isdom :My w it s, host ile to the abstract , took

refuge in Avabia again. Translated intoArabic, the algebraic factor w ould firsttake pract ical account of the area w ew ished to deliver, and I began idly to cal-culate how many square miles: sixty:eight y: one hundred: perhaps one hundredand fort~ thousand square miles. And howw ould the Turks defend all that? No dcubt

Soviet partisans wait inambusb along atrailin the woodsssume guerrilla warfare to be a form ofefense. Thus it would seem that defensef the homeland is the strategic objectivef guerrilla warfare. The tactics of tbe

however, are offensive. Theyperate like commandos, trying always toe stronger than their enemy where theghting takes place. Their major objective,ctically, is to achieve superiority of forcet tbe decisive point.

LawrenceThe first great theorist on guerrilla war-re was T. E. Lawrence who thoughtbout guerrilla combat while serving ine Arabian Campaign of the First World

bv a trench line across the bot tom, if w ecame like an army w ith banners; but sup-pose w e w ere (as w e might be) an influ-ence, an idea, a t hing ifz fassgible, invulner-able, w it hout front or back, drift ing aboutlike a gas? Armies w ere lik e plants, im-m obile, firm-rooted, nourished throughlong stems to the head. W e might be avapor, blow ing w here w e listed. Our k ing-doms lay in each mans mind; and as w ew anted nothing material to live on, so w em ight offer not hing mat erial to the k illing.Itseemed aregular soldier mighf be help-less w ithout a target , ownimg only whathe sat on, andsubjt {gat ing only w hat , byorder, he could poke his rifle at .


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MILITARYLawrence figured that in order to de-nd Arabia from a guerrilla attack inepth the Turks would need a post everyour square miles. Each post would haveo have 20 men. Thus the Turks wouldeed 600,000 men to defend Arabia prop-rly. Naturally, this would be an impossi-ly large number. .Yet the trend indicated by Lawrence de-eloped during the Second World War asitnessed in the following report by B. H.iddell Hart in The Rcd A rnt~]. .The siti(afion iH t he immediat e t ,icinit ~f the railw ay lines show ed thrt t the Ger-an occt{pat ion anthorit ics hrld onl~ thearger adnt inist rat ivc ccntcrs and thoseailw a~js and voads w hich servrd as theain lines for the front . W ho(e dist rict sn t he rear ucw b?iv nt o?{t and ut ?inha bit ed,he roacis w ere not bciag ma ia ta inccl, noridge *as Irft intact , zrhilc the railw ayssrcondav~ import.once carrim i no t rafic.n the othrr hand, the wild forests andut -o f -7hc-way mav shg wgions ?L,orc filledth Iifc. They harbou red the populat ionf the cratrrs occupied by the Grrmans,nd thr actnal lords of these forests: the

Gu err illa Opera tion sOnly guerrillas can operate in a country

hat is conquered by the enemy. Unlike aational army, they are not dependentpon supply bases and fixed communica-ions. I$ormally, they do not try to de-end specitic land areas. They do not re-ain concentrated. They are dispersedhroughout the countryside and concen-rate only to accomplish a military ob-ective. Once this mission is effected, theyisperse, into the anonymity of the coun-ryside. Enemy troops are sent to catchhem, but exhaust themselves chasing thevapor thst Lawrence described: Manyurks on our front had no chance all thear to fire on us, and we were never onhe defensive except by accident amd inBecause guerrillas choose the time and

REVIEW MAY 1959place of attack, they always hold the ini-tiative. Melting into the countryside afteran attack, they demoralize the enemy whochases a shadow army.-By attempting to be superior at the de-

cisive point, guerrillas always attack un-der favorable circumstances. As they be-come more active, the enemy is forced toconsolidate his forces to prevent theirpiecemeal destruction. The more the con-queror must concentrate his forces, themore he must surrender the countrysideto the guerrillas. Take any small town,for example. How many troops could aconquero$ spare to occupy it? If any,the number would be small, and theywould be a perfect target for guerrillas.In order to prevent the destruction ofthese occupying squads and platoons, theenemy would .be forced into the largernearby centers of population, From thesefocal points he could send out patrols, butfor the most part would have surrenderedthe countryside to tbe guerrillas.Gaining control of the countryside,therefore, is one of the major objectives

of the guerrillas yet this is, a trend thathas not been adequately appreciated inthe current theory. That this trend exists,however, is history. In Secret Forces,Ferdinand Otto Miksche writes:VcrV primitiuc and poorl~ cq?fippcd at

the start , as t ime w ent on the resistanceorganiz at ion im prov ed to s7t ch an cltcntthat towards the end of the w ar it hadalmost at tained the standards of a regu-lar armg. Whereas in the spring of 1941the Germans required only tw cntg div i-sions to destroy the Yugoslau and Greekarmies w ithin a fcw days, the st~bseqnentoccupat ion and polici?t g of the conntriescallrd for the employment of jifteen Ger-man and thirty [ta[ian, Bulgarian, andCroat ian div isions. Territories the siz e offfelginm w ere governed by Yngoslav par-tisans.When the guerrillas control large ter-

ritories they can train their men more


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THEORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE 53ectively, since they can do it openly.oreover, they can carry out their polit-l mission more efficiently. They cantablish local governments, tax inhabit-ts, conscript troops, and engage openlythe social and cultural activities pre-

ously pointed out.Regular OrganizationAnother overlooked trend in currenteory is the tendency of guerrillas to de-lop an army organized along regulares. As soon as the guerrillas can con-l territory, they must begin to thinkong offensive as well as defensive lines.ars cannot be won by defense alone.hen -the resistance forces gain freedomoperation, they must begin the transi-n toward a new national army so thatentually they can assume the offensived drive the enemy frog their country.is trend has been largely overlooked inrrent theory. Yet it is logical they shouldeate forces capable of tackling largerncentration of enemy troops.Again the historical example exists.eneral Barr in a report to the Depart-ent of the Army in which he discusses40 percent increase in the strength ofe Chinese Communist Forces over theationalists in one year says, The expan-on was accompanied by continued re-ganization along more uniform and or-odox lines. Further substantiation ofis development may be found in thisatement from Riggs Red Chinas Fight -g Hordes;The Red Army of Chhta fo?{ght a guer-lla war against the Japanese; a division

against the Nat ionalist s; and nowey arejight ing an army w ar against theforces in Korea.

To any country interested in nationalrvival, this overlooked development oferrilla warfare merits the closest at-ntion. Guerrilla warfare gives a de-U,~t~ .S?atesRelatio,zsW ithChina: With Spe-Referen ce to. th e Per iod 1944 -1949 , Depa rtm en tS ta te Pu b lics@ 3573, U. S . Governm en t Pr in t-O ffic e, Was hmgtm, D. C., 1 94 9.p . 3 22 .

feated country a chance to engage its en-emy along conventional lines and te riseagain as a national power. The offensiveitself could not be guerrilla warfare, butthe resistance movement would make pos-sible the transition toward a higher levelof military organization.Chinese CommunistsPerhaps the most searching inquiry intoguerrilla strategy and tactics has beenmade by the Chinese Communists. Thebest source of information on all aspectsof Chinese Communist guerrilla strategyand tactics, including the political ap-proach, ie Snows Red Star Over China.Some of the principles developed by MaoTse-tung and related by one of his officersare listed by Snow as follows:1. Fight no losing battles. Refuse en-gagements that cannot be won.2. Use surprise. Avoid static battleswhere the advantage is with the enemy.3. Since superior maneuvering ability is

vital to guerrillas, enter no battle withouta carefully detailed attack plan, and, par-ticularly, a carefully planned retreat.4. Local defense forces must be won overpolitically, or defeated militarily.5. Always outnumber your enemy in aregular engagement. Experienced guer-

rillas may hit larger units that are march-ing, resting, or poorly guarded.6. In case enemy strength has been mis-calculated, or some other mishap in-tervenes, guerrillas should be able todisengage the enemy as fast as they at-tack them. Reliable subordinates must beavailable to replace leaders.7. Pretend to attack in the east whileattacking in the west.S. Avoid fighting the main force of the

enemy; concentrate on the weakest or mostvital link.9. Prevent the enemy from locating the

guerrillas main forces. Partisans shouldavoid concentrating when the enemy isadvancing, and should shift positions asoften as two or three times a day just


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. . .~~ MILITARY REVIEW MAY19S9-before an attack. Secrecy in movement is & understanding. Again, we have re-vital. The plans for dispersal after an at- turned to the need for further research.tack should be as well worked out as the We must attempt to disqover trends as yetplans for assembling for the attack. uncovered in this method of warfare. We10. Besides superior mobility and mass must verify or denounce yopular prejudiceat the decisive point, the guerrillas must that has too long stood for fact.have superior intelligence. Multiple linesof gathering intelligence must be estab-lished and all must be protected.11. Support of the inhabitants is ab-

solutely necessary. The inhabitants arethe base of the armv.The information j&t cited is of tacti-

cal as well as strategic valve. Actually,the guerrillas cannot be separated fromtheir tqctics, since, to a large measure,tactics are so interwoven into their strat-egy.One of the most significant aspects ofguerrilla warfare pointed out here is thatthe people form their base. A guerrillamovement will be short-lived if the peopledo not actively, or passively, support itsobjectives. Inasmuch as the guerrillas arenot dependent on physical supply depots,they live off the country and off the peo-ple. Unless their activities have widespreadpopular support, they are doomed to de-feat.This. {acet of guerrilla warfare is well-apprec]ated in the current theory but hasbeen evaluated improperly by militaryforces. It is interesting to note this state-ment made by Goebbels in his diary:April 25, 1942: The inhabitant s of the

Ukraine w ere at first more than inclinedto regard the Fuehrer as the savior of Eu-rope and to w eleome the German Wehr-macht most cordiall~. This at t itnde haschanged completclg in, the course ofmonths. W e have hit the R7w sians, andespecially the Ukrainians, too hard on thehead w ith our manner of dealing w iththem. A c{ont on the head is not alw a@za convincing argurnent~nd that goes too,for bhe Ukrainian and Russians. Even in this limited aspect of guerrilla

waffare there is not complete agreement

.

American Military PolicyWhile we are improving the theory andtactics of irregular warfare, we cannotremain idle. The United States must de-velou a guerrilla Botential as auickly aspossible, base~ u~on the best - avaiiableinformation and experience. We have seenhow unp~nned partisan movements haveprovided other nations with defense indepth. At the same time, we have seenthat defense in depth came too late formost of these countries. Therefore, sincelack of action van be fatal, we must de-velop our guerrilla capacity NOW.Naturally, the first step should be an

exhaustive study of guerrilla warfare.Our objectives and the means of accom-plishing them must be outlined clearly inour own minds. We must create a soundtheory for a resistance m?vement, anddetermine the most suitable tacticS andorganization to implement it. To accom-plish these objectives we must glean everylesson from existing guerrilla literature.More than this, we must search out guer-rilla leaders who have not published theirexperiences. Full development of anytheory waits upon accumulation of in-formation. ,An adequate theory of guerrilla war-

fare exists, but it is hidden in the pagesof history. Like the theory of gravity be-fore Newton, it has not yet been fullyseen, interpreted, and accepted. Even ifguerrilla movements in an emergency dodevelop eventualtu, they was}e valuablemen and time. Given a sound theory fromthe start, many preparations can be elim-inated before hostilities. By establishinga chain of command, conflicts betweenleaders will be minimized in time of ad-versity. By training peacetime guerrillas,


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. .THEORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

e would prepare wartime potential, Byoncentrating stores of arms and supplies,e would use effectively equipment nowecoming obsolete for regulars, but stillaluable for partisans. In the light of ourresent, knowledge of guerrilla warfare,ese things should be done now.Considering the fact that untrainedeoples throughout the world have builtuerrilla armies, we must concede thatorkable tactics can be grasped easily anduickly. There is no reason why we cannotncorporate guerrilla indoctrination intoll phases of our current military train-ng. The skills taught in our militarychools would be needed by guerrillas. Weould not have to increase the trainingime, we would merely give perspectiveo the training by showing how thesekills could be used by guerrillas. In thisay we would prepare our Armed Forcesith their high personnel turnover fordditional duty as citizen-soldiers. Pro.essional military men would be preparedor the day when their organized militarynits might be destroyed or disbanded.One of the greatest sources for guer-illa units lies in the vast pool of Reserveersonnel not affiliated with Active Re-

serve organizations.military experienceable manDower DOO1

55These men with theiroffer the best avail-for a ~uerrilla armv.

For this-reason, drastic c~tbacks in tienumber of these reservists are unwise.There is no rWson why our Governmentcould not establish a basic guerrilla train-ing program for these men. With theirvaried military and civilian backgrounds,the entire activity would be enriched. Per-haps, above all the Reserve programs nowexisting, this would provide the greatestreturn as insurance against disaster.

ConclusionAdditional study will indicate otherpractical applications of guerrilla theory,

but for the moment we may safely con-clude that the United States would bestrengthened materially if we develop aguerrilla capacity. Our defense in depthwould be assured, our social institutionswould be safeguarded, and our ability torebound from disaster would be enhanced.With the development and application ofan adequate theory of guerrilla warfare,we would place the ultimate responsibilityfor our Nations defense where it belongsyin the hands of our citizens.

With theincreasing Soviet capability, arising level of Communist provoca-tion rather than a reduction of activity appears probable. In the face of thisthreat, what types of military forces are required?

We need deployed forces in being in critical areas of the world to providethe Soviets with convincing evidence of our determination, to bolster the moraleof our allies, and fight in place, or be redeployed rapidly if necessary. . . .

Weneedto extend the effects of these deployed forces by providing assist-ante in material and training to indigenous forces. . . .

We need a mobilizatiofi base sufficient to maintain a general war postureeven while participating in limited wars. This places particular emphasis onthe requirement for Reserve component,forces in a high state of training andproperly equipped. General Bruce C. Clarke

the theory of guerilla

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