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The SKB Spent Fuel Disposal Project License Application Olle Olsson SKB

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Nuclear Sweden 10 (12) operating reactor units at 3 sites ~45 % electricity 12,000 tonnes of spent fuel SFR; Final Repository for Short- lived Radioactive Waste Clab; Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel SKB

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Authorities and legislation The Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste Environment Court Municipality The Government The Nuclear Activities Act The Radiation Protection Act The Planning and Building Act The Swedish Environment Code The Financing Act Swedish Radiation Safety Authority SKB

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Funding of nuclear waste management in Sweden Approx 43 billion SEK in 2010 0.01-0.02 SEK per kWh of nuclear electricity Owners Financing 4 Responsibility of the reactor owners Reviewed by SSM SKB

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5 40 years of development 1976 1984 1993 2000 2011 Canister Laboratory The government approves KBS-3 for the start-up of new reactors The Nuclear Fuel Safety (KBS) Project starts Encapsulation plant and deep repository Methodology development Feasibility studies Site investigations Detailed characterization, repository construction sp Hard Rock Laboratory SFR in operation Clab in operation m/s Sigyn in operation Application to build a repository 2006 Application to build an encapsulation plant SKB

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6 Nuclear power plant Healthcare, industry and research Final repository for short-lived radioactive waste Central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel and encapsulation facility Final repository for spent nuclear fuel High-level waste Low and intermediate-level waste The Swedish system

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7 Typomrden 19771985 versiktsstudier 1990-tal Frstudier 19932002 Spent Fuel Repository at Forsmark Encapsulation plant in Oskarshamn License application submitted March 2011 for Backfill Rock Buffer Canister SKB

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SKB is applying To continue interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and reactor core components. The amount of spent nuclear fuel may reach a maximum of 8000 metric tons (calculated as uranium). To construct and operate a facility (Clink) to store spent nuclear fuel and core components and for encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel. Capacity of approximately 200 canisters per year. To construct and operate a facility for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste (construction material in the fuel assemblies) Final disposal of the spent fuel that is currently stored in Clab and future fuel that will arise from operating the ten reactors that currently have a permit to operate Final disposal according to the KBS-3 method with vertical placement of the canisters (KBS-3V) Water operations that are needed to build and operate the facilities Storage for rock aggregate 8 SKB

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The legal framework Two laws The Environmental Code The Nuclear Activities Act Two nuclear facilities at two different sites Two different Environmental courts Submitted to the court in Stockholm Evaluation of if the proposed facilities and activities meet the stated aims and are in accordance with legal requirements SKB

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Strategic crossroads A single coherent Environmental Code application for the entire final repository system that is processed at a single environmental court The applications, 'top documentation', will offer a comprehensive and not merely well-informed intelligible description and overview of the operations being applied for and comprehensive argumentation for satisfying the requirements A common EIA for the entire final repository system for all three applications The safety reports will also be included in the Environmental Code application to the Environmental Court Particularly central issues justify detailed background documentation and separate appendices for Choice of method Site selection 10 SKB

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The Nuclear Fuel Project and other work within SKB Research Technology development Site investigations and modelling Facility project planning Final repository Encapsulation facility Environmental Impact Assessments Dialogue and consultation Safety analysis Application documentation 11 SKB

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Stakeholder involvement Going from protests to dialogue 12 SKB

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Siting studies 1977-2009 Geology and society 13 Study areas 19771985 Regional studies 1990s Feasibility studies 19932002 Site investigations 20022009 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Oskarshamn sthammar Possible feasible bedrock SKB

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3 rd of June 2009 - SKB selects Forsmark for the repository for spent nuclear fuel Photo composition of a repository for spent nuclear fuel at Forsmark Main reason for selection of Forsmark: Considerably better conditions for long term safety of a repository 14 SKB

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SKB has selected the KBS-3 method Primary safety function: Complete containment Secondary safety function: Retardation SKB

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KBS-3-method development and verification SKB full-scale laboratories 16 Bentonite Laboratory, in operation since 2007 sp Hard Rock Laboratory, in operation since 1996 Canister Laboratory, in operation since 1998 SKB

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Purposes of the SR-Site project Role of SR-Site report in licence application: To demonstrate that a KBS-3 repository at the Forsmark site is safe in the long term. The main purposes of the SR-Site project were To assess the safety, as defined in applicable Swedish regulations, of the proposed KBS-3 repository at Forsmark; To provide feedback to design development, to SKBs R&D programme, to detailed site investigations and to future safety assessment projects. SKB

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General development of the reference evolution Initial transient caused by excavation of host rock and construction and presence of repository. Transients can be anything from years to thousands of years Long-term evolution characterised by changes induced by the changing external conditions. SKB

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General outcome of the analysis of the reference evolution The outcome of the analysis of the reference evolution implies that The vast majority of the 6,000 deposition positions will experience favorable mechanical, hydrogeological and chemical conditions throughout the one million year assessment period. As a consequence, the vast majority of the 6,000 canisters are expected to maintain their containment capacity throughout the assessment period However, canister failures cannot be entirely ruled out due to Enhanced corrosion in deposition positions where advective conditions prevail after buffer loss due to erosion Earthquake induced secondary shear movements in fractures intersecting deposition holes Both are low probability phenomena SKB

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Risk curves for the two contributing scenarios Central conclusion A KBS-3 repository that fulfils long-term safety requirements can be built at the Forsmark site The calculated risk for a final repository at Forsmark is below the regulatory risk criterion with a margin, even in a million year time perspective. 20 SKB

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Confidence in the conclusions in SR-Site The reliance of the KBS-3 repository on a stable and favourable geological environment at repository depth - mechanical stability, low groundwater flow rates and favourable groundwater composition, and the use of sufficiently durable materials (copper and bentonite clay) for the engineered barriers The understanding of the phenomena that affect long-term safety, resulting in a mature knowledge base The understanding of the characteristics of the site through several years of surface-based investigations of the conditions at depth The detailed specifications of the engineered parts of the repository and the demonstration of how components fulfilling the specifications are produced in a quality assured manner 21 SKB

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22 The Government Licensing 2011-2015 (?) Five yes are needed The municipality of Oskarshamn The municipality of sthammar The Environmental Court The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Scientific community, environmentalists and other opinion formers SKB

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From License application to deposition of canisters Application A-PSAR Government approval PSAR Permit Construction SAR 1 Permit Test operation Permit Operation SAR 2 ~15 years SKB

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24 The Nuclear Fuel programme Licensing process Start construction Start operation Safety Report PSAR SAR Technology development Industrialized design Production system Quality control system Construction projects Spent fuel repository Encapsulation plant 4 years 2 y after construction initiation 6 years SKB

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25 To manage the licensing process To move from RD&D to industrialization To further strengthen the scientific basis for the safety case To keep and develop the public confidence Challenges 25 SKB