the silent crisis1

7/31/2019 The Silent Crisis1

1/33

The Silent Crisis

Failure and Revival in Local Democracy in Scotland

Eberhard Bort, Robin McAlpine and Gordon Morgan

April 2012


2/33

Foreword

Whats the average budget o a community council in Scotland? Go on. Guess. Its 400.That says almost everything you need to know about local empowerment in Scotland. Ocourse money cant buy you democracy any more than it buys you love. But the near zerobudget or Scotlands community tier o governance matches its near zero powers andnear zero number o contested elections. This is not local democracy.

Meanwhile Scotlands local government is composed o the largest councils in Europe

physically and socially remote rom the meaningul places where we conduct the mostimportant parts o our lives. This means olk in St Andrews cannot decide how to run day-to-day aairs in the worlds home o gol. Andrew Carnegie and Adam Smith known acrossthe planet as capable, practical, visionary Scots were Fiers whose descendants arenttrusted to mount a commemorative plaque without permission rom distant council bosses.My mothers home town o Wick in Caithness is a three-hour drive rom its local councilheadquarters in Inverness and that city itsel is badly served by a Highland-wide councilwhich cannot concentrate exclusively on the urban needs o Britians astest growing city.

Governance in Scotland is wrong-sized. And yet debate in the next two years in Scotlandlooks set to be dominated exclusively by the independence reerendum. It seems to me

that the two are strongly connected. Its hard to see how people deemed incapable orunning their towns and villages uniquely in Europe will condently vote to run theirown country.

This thoughtul, well-researched, persuasive, provocative and long overdue report examinesthe undamental building blocks o Scottish society and explores sel governance in itsmost local and empowering context. The Silent Crisis shines a spotlight at the top-heavylocation o political power in Scotland at a particularly important moment in our story.

Lesley Riddoch


3/33

The Silent CrisisFailure and revival in local democracy in Scotland

Eberhard Bort, Robin McAlpine and Gordon Morgan

April 2012

Eberhard Paddy Bort is the Academic Coordinator o the Institute o Governance and a Lecturerin Politics at the University o Edinburgh. He is also Book Reviews Editor o Scottish Aairs.

Robin McAlpine is Director o the Jimmy Reid Foundation and Editor o the Scottish Let Review

Gordon Morgan worked at a senior level between 1980 and 2000 in Glasgow and Inverclydecouncils and subsequently worked as a parliamentary researcher in Holyrood


4/33

Page 1

IntroductionScotland, with its many diverse communities, is a nation with a rich and diverse local tradition.From the March Riding traditions o the Borders to the Viking-inuenced traditions o Orkney andShetland. From buzzing, cosmopolitan Glasgow to the slow pace o lie on many o the islands.Edinburgh is a city very dierent rom Aberdeen, and Aberdeen is dierent rom Dundee. TheHighlands and the Lowlands have their own very dierent histories, dierent religious traditions,dierent languages. Scotland may be a small country but it is in no way a homogenous country.

And so we might expect to nd localism alive and kicking in Scotland. But we dont. Instead wend a country which by many measures has one o weakest local democracies in Europe. The

distance between where people live and their rst local democratic structure is, in some cases,greater than the distance across entire EU nations. The number o people it takes to elect a singlecouncillor is ten times the European average. When local government in Scotland builds a localschool, it seems never to build just one. Instead it waits until it can build hal a dozen schools inone contract as i a big box approach is inherently better or everyone by dint o not being a localsolution.

The current local government structures in Scotland were in large party a Tory response to theways that local and regional government sought to reect the hostility o local communitiesand regions o Scotland to Thatcherite policies. The Tory approach took the big regionaladministrations and the small district administrations and merged them into the current medium-sized local authorities. While at the time many people agreed that the size and unwieldy natureo Strathclyde Region was unsustainable in a country the size o Scotland, there was real concernabout losing that local element.

Political debate has moved on. Since the establishment o the Scottish Parliament, there has beena continuing centralisation o the power o local authorities to make their own decisions. Thishas been the collective impact o a string o moves rom the ring-encing o elements o localauthority budgets to pressure to cede control o the Council Tax to the centralisation o unctionssuch as police and education. Devolution has made local democracy weaker, not stronger.

People have identied a democratic decit at the local level but the current dominant view isthat empowering communities can be some sort o antidote. And in the last two decades therelentless march o new public management has questioned the need or real local democracyaltogether. This report will argue that the scale o the democratic decit has been underestimatedand that voluntarist approaches (enabling communities which want to organise small localinitiatives) is no remedy. It will also argue that democracy matters and that the impact o turningour back on democracy at the local level will be the continued erosion o the kind o localism owhich Scotland is proud. It will also undermine eective decision-making.

Scotland must stand up or the value o democracy and must recognise just how importantlocalism is to the nation. National political debate has become detached rom the interests o

local communities and must reconsider its attitude to localism. And while the report ully acceptsthat local administration (the eciency with which local services are delivered) is pretty strong inScotland and that any benets o wholesale reorganisation o local government would be greatly


5/33

Page 2

outweighed by the cost and disruption, the democratic decit at a local level is an issue too greatto be ignored.

So this report calls on the Scottish Government to set up a commission to devise a systemo genuinely local democratic government which can be established beneath existing localgovernment structures without creating unnecessary disruption. It also calls or a widespreadreconsideration o the level o government at which key unctions should be delivered,underpinned by the assumption that powers should be devolved as close to the ground as ispractical and possible.

Scotland seems to have orgotten why local democracy matters. Unless we remember, we willprogressively lose our sense o what makes local local and end up in a homogenised, characterlessclone-town nation in which people eel alienated in and rom their own communities.

Scottish local democracy a brief recap

Some orm o local governance has existed in Scotland since the Royal Burghs were createdbetween the 12th and 18th century. However, Local Government in its modern orm as a majorprovider and regulator o essential services largely evolved ater the industrial revolution andparticularly the growth o cities in the 19th century. This period also saw the construction o manyo the buildings in which Councils continue to meet and the gradual extension o the ranchiseleading to representative local democracy.

There have been a number o reorganisations o Scottish Local Government:

The 1889 act established County Councils with responsibility amongst other thingsor County Roads, Justices o the Peace and police powers assumed rom very smallBurgh Councils.

The 1894 act established Parish Councils replacing parochial boards.

The 1929 act abolished Parish Councils, amalgamated small Burghs into new CountyCouncils and also amalgamated some County Councils into joint councils.

The 1947 act rationalised local government into 33 Counties, our Counties o Cities,27 large burghs and 172 small burghs. A total o 236 elected councils.The 1973 actabolished the previous set up and established nine mainland Regional Councils, threeIsland councils and 53 District Councils. It also established the right to set up communitycouncils which were to be purely consultative bodies with no decision making powers.The eect was a reduction to 65 elected councils excluding community councils.

The 1994 act abolished the previous set up and established 32 unitary authorities. Thisremains the current structure o Scottish Local Government.

There are 1200 community councils whose members, although nominally elected,are mostly elected unopposed.

Following the creation o the Scottish Parliament, the 2003 act established an STV election systemor council elections and also altered the duties and responsibilities o councils and councillors.


6/33

Page 3

Other Scottish government Acts have also modied these. (For a short history o local governmentin Scotland see Midwinter, 1995).

Developments in the post-devolution era are more subtle but signicant nonetheless. Therehave been three policy approaches rom Holyrood which have impacted on the ability o localauthorities to act independently according to local circumstances:

Ring-encing. This was an approach deployed largely by the Labour/Lib Demadministrations which ormed the then Scottish Executive or the rst eight years odevolution. This involved attaching conditions to local authority budgets meaning theywere given a proportion o their unding on condition that they used it or speciedpurposes. This had the eect o signicantly reducing the discretion o local authoritiesin how to prioritise their own budgets. Given that ring-encing took place in some othe most resource-intensive areas o local authority provision (such as education)this meant that the ability to pursue distinctive local strategies was pushed into moremarginal areas o the overall budget. The result was close to a de acto absorption osignicant aspects o the policy role o local government into central government.

Concordat. This was an initiative introduced by the SNP administration when itgained power in 2007. The approach to agree a set o outcomes between localand central government and then to leave local government to get on with achievingthem according to their own strategies was widely welcomed at the time. However,the eect was dierent; because a key Scottish Government aim was to reeze theCouncil Tax, and because this policy was introduced during a period in which publicsector budgets in Scotland were beginning to be squeezed ater years o expansion,the eect was again to greatly reduce local authority discretion. Being required todeliver the same outcomes within a squeezed budget and with no scope or increasingresources locally in act reduced the ability o local authorities to act independently.

Merging o services. There has been a cross-party attitude in Scotland that hasavoured aggregation as a general strategy on the assumption that the merger osmaller entities must inevitably increase eciency and reduce duplication (despitemuch evidence to the contrary, or example Association or Public Sector Excellence,2012). Currently proposals to amalgamate the existing police orces into a singlenational orce, re services into a single nation service and proposals to create anational education quango are being considered. Both o these will simply reduceurther the powers and responsibilities o local authorities.

The reduction o the powers and independence o local authorities rom above has also been

matched by a process o internal hollowing out o the unctions o local authorities. Outsourcingo services has been a part o the Scottish local government environment since the 1980s butthe last ten years have seen an increase in the outsourcing o core unctions. The best knownmodel or this is the creation o Arms Length Executive Organisations (ALEOs) which are privatecompanies set up by a Council to carry out what where previously core unctions o that Council.The ALEOs have little direct oversight by the elected local authority but instead are governmentby the appointment o individual councillors onto governing bodies (oten with little democraticaccountability and oten involving additional nancial reward or the councillors concerned). Thisprocess has urther reduced the power and the democratic accountability o local governmentin Scotland, and has been exacerbated uther still by the increased use o party whipping in localgovernment.


7/33

Page 4

Is local government working?

Is local government in Scotland working? To answer this it is important to be clear what is meantin this context by local government. We take eective local government to be a combination otwo things:

Eective representation o the hopes, views and needs o the population served in thedevelopment o actions and strategies

Ecient and transparent achievement o those actions and strategies

I the latter is not in place you risk corrupt and inecient government which ails to secure thecondence o the population and ails to deliver. I the ormer is not in place you risk a managerialistadministration which ails to reect the interests and views o the population, also leading to a lacko condence in government. While there are dierent possible terms or these two aspects, thisreport shall consider them in terms o the democratic element and the administrative element.

A key starting document or an assessment o whether local government in Scotland is working isthe annual Overview o Local Government in Scotland report produced by Audit Scotland or theAccounts Commission. The 2012 report ollows recent reports in suggesting that local governmentin Scotland is delivering well against auditable measures such as eciency, nancial managementand internal governance. As a starting point, we nd no disagreement with this broad assessment.We would express greater concern at some aspects o local authority perormance in areas lesseasy to audit: or example, in some unctions such as the legal negotiations around PFI contractsthere are greater concerns about the capacity o local authorities (Cuthberts, 2011). Nevertheless,in general service provision any aws are not undamental.

However, this is an assessment almost wholly ocussed on the administrative aspect o local

government; while it alludes to strong leadership and the role o councillors in representingconstituents, the overwhelming emphasis is on the role o elected and unelected ocials inensuring good corporate governance.

So how can the democratic element o local government be assessed? Below we put orwarda series o possible measures which we believe collectively provide an eective picture o thecomparative state o local democracy in Scotland. But the act that so little attention is paid to thedemocratic element o local government when so much attention is paid to the administrativeelement is revealing in itsel. This reects a drit towards the New Public Management approachto government which rom the 1980s onwards attempted to proessionalise public managementby encouraging it to behave like a system o market-orientated corporate governance.

Thereore, to set the scene it will be helpul to undertake a thought experiment to test thedemocratic credentials o Scottish local government:

Consider your local community however you dene it. This might be the collection ostreets around the one you live in in a large city or a larger subdivision. It might be part orall o a large town, the whole o a small town, the collection o villages around you. Nowimagine that every single member o your community agreed on an issue. Perhaps you allwant to create a air trade community or pursue a local carbon neutral strategy. Perhapsyou want to renovate the high street and encourage more diverse, specialist local retailersto encourage people to come and shop. Perhaps you want to invest in acilities to boost

local tourism or to pitch your community as an arts hub with cheap access to resources orartists and writers. Irrespective o which community you consider or which collective goalyou wish to achieve or that community, how could you do it?


8/33

Page 5

A voluntarist approach might be open you could set up a local voluntary group and tryand raise money. A lobbyist approach could be taken you could mount a campaign tomake your local authority pursue the strategy. A commercial approach might be possible you could try and encourage a private sector company to lead the work or you. But isthere a democratic route that you can imagine? Is there a way you could vote or it with areasonable expectation that a successul vote would deliver a successul outcome?

It is likely that whatever you consider to be your local community, whatever idea or goal youimagine and irrespective o how much support you suppose, the greatest democratic power youwill have is to elect one councillor (or perhaps a small group o councillors) to sit on a much largerlocal authority. Even i they have the ull democratic mandate rom your community to pursue thecollective aspiration o that community, they will quickly be reduced to a lobbying role as a singlemember o or minority group within a much larger local authority. At the local community level itis dicult to identiy a unctioning democratic process.

This is mainly because Scottish local authorities are very large and are in no really meaningul senselocal, certainly not at community level. In them there is no way to ensure the democratic wishes

o any individual community. Below them there is virtually no democratic structure whatsoever,and where there are (elected community councils still unctioning) those structures have verylittle power and virtually no budget.

This could be expected to have a knock-on eect: i you have no ability to shape or inuenceyour community rom inside that community, to what purpose is debate or discussion aboutwhat you would like to achieve? Since a local councillor is able to promise to achieve very littleother than to ght or (take a lobbying role), it is dicult or councillors to stand on a meaningulplatorm or maniesto or a local area. Since this provides no ocus or community debate, theonly real option or discussing the nature and uture o a community is via some orm o voluntarystructure such as the community council or local campaigns or action groups. However, by their

very voluntary nature they cannot be properly democratic. This means that Scotland would beexpected to demonstrate a very low degree o inormed discussion about strategies or local areas.In turn, it is reasonable to expect that this would result in a low level o public condence in localdemocracy to reect their views or represent their interests as a result o the disempowermento their community.

Flowing rom this, i there is little public condence in the ability o local democracy to changeanything or reect the views o the community then you would expect to see a weak level ointerest in entering or engaging with community politics. You might expect to nd a dearth opeople entering democratic community politics and little sense o active citizens at the locallevel.

So weak local democracy might be expected to generate three results at the community level:

A weak culture o debate and discussion o community issues and low levels oexpectation o what local government will achieve

A low level o public interest in local politics

A poor rate o people standing or local elected politics

It would require a very signicant piece o work to be able to make a meaningul statement on

the qualitative issues o whether there is healthy debate about local politics or what level oexpectations people have o Scottish local government. However, it is easier to make assessmentso whether people are interested and engaged in local democracy either by voting or standing.


9/33

Page 6

Comparing Scottish local democracy

To make a measured assessment o the health o local democracy in Scotland a number oindicators should be considered.

There is a lot o talk about localism and empowering o local communities. Yet, Scotland has

the largest average population per basic unit o local government o any developed country(Michael Keating, 2005). Some European comparisons will show how out o kilter Scotland reallyis when it comes to local democracy (or a comprehensive review see Council o Europe 2007).Seven indicators will be compared:

Population size o local authority area

Geographical size o local authority area

Turnout (as a proxy or the interest in local democracy rom local people)

Numbers o local and regional tiers o governance

Number o electors per local elected ocial

Number o candidates as a proportion o the population (indicating public interest ingetting involved in politics)

Number o candidates contesting each seat (as a measure o how plural competitivelocal democracy is)

The ollowing provides a snapshot o how Scotland compares to other European countries acrossthese indicators.

Population size

Treated in isolation, a crude ratio o representative to electorate is an unreliable indicatoro democratic quality This is because there are other actors that are important; rstand oremost the powers and responsibilities that come with the job o councillor, thequalications councillors bring to the job, the unding o local councils, and the wayrepresentative democracy is augmented by ways o direct democracy and e-democracy tomake it more participative, i.e. how councils share their power with the community. All theseactors are important, but comparative research, on Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and

the UK has shown that the amount o trust is related to the size o local government. In thatrespect, clearly, the number o elected representatives is a key aspect o local democracy(all reerences Kingsley Purdam et al, 2008).

Average Population Size o Municipality

Austria 3,560

Denmark 56,590

Finland 15,960

France 1,770

Germany 7,080

Italy 7,470Spain 5,680


10/33

Page 7

UK 152,680

Scotland 163,200

EU Average 5,630Council o Europe 2010, Scottish Government 2010

Geographical size

Similarly, geographical size o municipalities on its own may reect actors such as densityo population and not just density o democracy. However, it clearly aects how theelectorate experience their local government.

Average Geographical Size o Municipality (sq km)

Austria 36

Denmark 440

Finland 1,006

France 17Germany 31

Italy 37

Spain 62

UK 601

Scotland 2,461

EU Average 49Council o Europe 2010, Scottish Government 2010

Turnout

When considering the issue o participation rates in elections it is important to bear inmind that lots o actors contribute to the ups and downs o turnout how competitivethe election is, the type o electoral system, sociological actors (wealth, education, etc),size (ie. what inuence a vote has), whats on oer (i.e. is there real choice). However it isgenerally accepted that participation rates at elections vary according to voter perceptionso how important that election is and many o these actors relate directly to the questiono whether voters consider an election to matter. Participation rates are thereore areasonably proxy or how important an electorate perceives a given layer o government tobe. (There are numerous academic reerences or this, including Edwards, 2006, Banducci

and Karp, 2003. Fiorina, 1976 and Blais, 2006.)

It is a little dicult to make an accurate assessment o how participation rates in Scottishlocal government elections compare internationally because Scotland has been unusual inthat over the last 12 years it has held local government elections at the same time as thenational elections to the Scottish Parliament. This has clearly boosted participation ratesbeyond what might be expected in stand-alone local government elections. Nevertheless,even with this articial boost to participation rates Scotland (and indeed the whole UK) haveparticipation rates signicantly below those o other European nations.

Voter Turnout at Local Election

Austria (2004) 73%

Denmark (2005) 69%


11/33

Page 8

Finland (2008) 61%

France (2004) 64%

Germany (2008) 60%

Italy (1999) 75%

Spain (2007) 73%

England (2009) 39%Scotland (2007) 54%Adapted rom David Wilson and Chris Game, 2011

Tiers of governance

Another way o looking at it is to compare the number o local and regional tiers ogovernance in a selection o European countries:

Number o sub-national governments

Local tier Borough/County Regional tierFederal States

Austria 2,357 99 9

Germany 11,553 301 16

Unitary States

Denmark 98 5

Finland 336 2

France 36,697 101 27

Italy 8,094 110 20

Spain 8,116 52 17UK 406 28 3

Scotland 32Council o Europe, 2011/12

Ratio of electorate

With the aorementioned caution that the ratio o citizens to politicians is not in itsel anindicator o greater responsiveness o local government, nevertheless the ability to engagewith an elected councillor is clearly aected.

Ratio Elected Councillors Citizens Represented

Austria 1 : 200

Denmark 1 : 2,000

Finland 1 : 500

France 1 : 125

Germany 1 : 400

Italy 1 : 600

Spain 1 : 700

UK 1 : 2,860Scotland 1 : 4,270Adapted rom David Wilson and Chris Game, 2011


12/33

Page 9

Participation in local politics

Eective local politics is about people getting involved as candidates as well as peoplegetting involved as voters. Data on the proportion o the population which stands orelection (and competition or elected position) is not as routinely collected as some o theother data used above. However, i we look at a smaller sample o comparators we nd:

Proportion o the population standing in local elections

Country Population

(million people)

Candidates

in all local

elections

Proportion o

population standing

as candidate

Finland 5.4 38, 509 1 in 140

Norway 4.8 59,505 1 in 81

Baden-Wrttemberg 10.7 75,726 1 in 141

Sweden 9.4 64,810 1 in 145

Scotland 5.4 2,607 1 in 2,071

Reerences or Norway and Baden-Wrttemberg as case studies below. Sweden Statistiska Centralbyrn 2012,

Finland: Statistics Finland, 2012

Competition for elected position

It is also important to consider how competitive an elected post is to identiy the degree ocontest and debate required to gain a seat.

Number o candidates contesting each seat

Country Candidates in

local elections

Number o

seats

Number o candidates

contesting each seat

Finland 38, 509 10,412 3.7

Norway 59,505 10, 785 5.5

Baden-Wrttemberg 75,726 21,279 3.6

Sweden 64,810 14,631 4.4

Scotland 2,607 1,222 2.1Reerences or Norway and Baden-Wrttemberg as case studies below. Sweden Statistiska Centralbyrn 2012,

Finland: Statistics Finland, 2012.

Some conclusions on the indicators

None o these indicators in and o themselves prove anything conclusive. Some are moretelling than others a geography measure is a reection o population density while apopulation measure is more proportionate. Some individually demonstrate a clear problem(i only two candidates stand or each seat there is little real competition), while some dont(there is no correct number o tiers o government).

However, it is impossible not to note the cumulative story told by these indicators: exceptingthe turnout indicator (which as noted is disproportionately high in Scotland because o thetrack record o holding local and national elections on the same day), Scotland comes

bottom in every single indicator o local democracy. We have the ewest councils, the ewestcouncilors, the largest constituencies (even including somewhere as sparsely populated asNorway or Finland), the highest ratio between the population and councillors, the lowest


13/33

Page 10

proportion o the population engaged in local politics, the least competitive elections and(barring England and even with the distorting eect o dual elections) the lowest turnout.

There is no indicator this report was able to identiy which does not suggest that Scotlandis Europes least democratic nation at the local level. And this appears to demonstrate thatthe chain o consequences outlined above is indeed demonstrated there does appear tobe a weak culture o debate and discussion o community issues, there does appear to bea very low level o interest in local politics and the population as a whole does appear to beremoved rom active local politics.

A note about 2012

All the data required to update these statistics or the 2012 local elections is not yet available(particularly a turnout rate which will not be distorted by dual elections). However, there isreason to believe that there will be a urther decline in indicators. In the recent past the 1,222council seats were contested: in 1999, by 3,934 candidates, in 2003, by 4,195 candidates, in2007, ater the introduction o STV, by 2,607 candidates (Denver and Bochel, 2007). In 2012there are 2,497, a drop o another 110.

The 2012 election will involve even ewer candidates per seat on average - there are2,497, a drop o another 110. By city, Edinburgh (486,000 pop.; 58 councillors) is elding127 candidates and Aberdeenshire (245,000 pop; 68 councillors) has 129 candidates. OnlyGlasgow with the high-prole battle or the city and the split in the Labour Group looks tobe moving signicantly in the other direction with 225 candidates or 79 councillors (or acity with a population o 592,000)

It will thereore be worth revisiting these indicators when that additional data is available.

How does this match to perceptions of localdemocracy in Scotland?

It would be possible to ll a report o this size with quotations alone - rom people indicatingthere is a crisis in local democracy. The ollowing is a small selection:

Over the last 20 years, turnout in local elections has averaged around 40 per cent. Not onlydoes this put the country at the bottom o the European Union league table or turnout insub-national elections, it means that it is the only country in the EU where sub-nationalelections regularly engage the active interest o less than hal its citizens. Moreover, inrecent years turnout has allen to an even lower level, with only around 30 per cent o votersturning out to vote in local elections held in 1998 and 1999. In short it does not seem to bean exaggeration to talk o a crisis o local democracy in Britain. (Curtice, 1999)

The powers and unctions o UK local government have been steadily eroded over thepast ty years Voters are not sure that local elections decide anything. But then they are

not sure that they want local councils to have much reedom to decide anything anyway.Until and unless local government can persuade its citizens that it should have a degreeo autonomy rom the central state, it is likely to nd it dicult to persuade them that the


14/33

Page 11

local democracy that helps justiy the exercise o any autonomy is worth their attention.(Loughlin, 2001)

The [2012] campaign has drited along almost unnoticed (Macdonell, 2012)

[the] drab dowdiness o Scotlands local government elections seems to put Scots o romparticipating something has to change or the Scottish council elections to capture thepublics imagination. (Peterkin, 2012)

The concordat between the councils and the SNP government was supposed to setcouncils ree again ater decades o servitude to the central government. They were tobe allowed to spend more o their allotted unds as they saw t, not have it ring-encedaround the governments priorities. But instead we have them tied into single outcomeagreements covering all sorts o central government targets, including a council tax reeze.The result is that councils are let paring away at their services, not able to make one boldcut like closing under-utilised schools, or pulling out o nursery provision or care homes.Nor are they able to go the other way and increase taxes. (Knox, 2010)

Take Highland Council, which covers an area the size o Belgium with a population thesize o Belast. Councillors drive hundreds o thousands o miles a year to create a sense oconnection through meetings, surgeries and local events. Despite such superhuman eorts,many remote communities eel largely negative, reduced to questioning, suspecting andvetoing whatever emanates rom Inverness. (Riddoch, 2010)

We have a situation in my constituency where councillors can decide planning applicationsor projects hundreds o miles away and where spending decisions are made by ocials withlittle or no knowledge o the places they are aecting. Ordinary olk in the Far North eeldisconnected rom their council, and many businesses and voluntary groups eel rustrated

by the lack o local involvement in Council matter. This must be addressed. (Gibson, 2011)Local government is dying in Scotland, as turnout alls and central government increasinglydiverts the local revenue and tells councils what to do. The only thing that will keeplocal government alive is democratic engagement the active support o the people.(Macwhirter, 2011)

There appears to be something approaching universal concern about the state o local democracyin Scotland.

Does local democracy matter?

Overall, there appears to be a signicant problem. But rather than identiying this problem andseeing it as a priority issue or action, the mainstream debate has tended towards the erroneousview that since no-one seems to be interested in local democracy there must be no problem.This is accompanied by two statements that are made oten. The rst is that there is no appetiteor restructuring and the second is that the public does not want more politicians. However,

both these statements represent only the views o centralised politics and media. The lazy anti-democratic idea that because politicians are not always popular that equates to a public desirenot to have them is simply like suggesting that because people dont like the big six energy


15/33

Page 12

suppliers that they dont want gas or electricity. And while there is a good case or not completelyredesigning local government in Scotland rom scratch, that position is a long way rom one thatsuggests that nothing should be done. So lack o political will is in itsel no argument or the statusquo.

But i local administration is working while local democracy is ailing, does this collectivelyamount to a problem that requires action? Ater all, one o the ashionable viewpoints o recentpolitics is that what matters is what works i people are getting the services that they want, howthose services are specied and delivered doesnt matter. We would put orward seven importantreasons why local democracy very much does matter:

Perspective. It is very important to recognise that the evidence that local administrationis working well comes rom the broad perspective o a business accounting model.It has assessed that means o organisation, patterns o spending, overall nancialmanagement and so on are successul. It makes no claims that local needs are beingmet, that what is being done are the things that should be done, that people arehappy with the choices being made. The perspective o an auditor is to consider

administration rom above; this oers no guarantee that the actions match needor aspiration. So it is possible to audit the pumping o large amounts o pollutioninto public waterways and conclude that it was done eciency and eectively. Theonly real means we have to gain the alternative perspective (rom below) is electivedemocracy. Without some orm o eective local democracy it is simply impossible tomake any meaningul, rounded judgement on whether local government is workingor local people.

Eectiveness. It is widely accepted that eectiveness has to be a combination o doingthe right things and doing them well; it is impossible to consider eectiveness only interms o actions and not in terms o outcomes. But in the eld o local government

outcomes must serve the population. It is thereore impossible to consider whetheractions are eective without being able to inorm them by identiying the desiredoutcomes. I those desired outcomes are not inormed by the people the outcomesare supposed to serve then it is not possible to have condence that they are thecorrect outcomes. Both public and private sector administration is littered withactions that proved to be pointless because they bore no relation to the interests othe customer. In the private sector this leads to bankruptcy; in the public sector it ismore likely to result in civil service promotional documents explaining why ailures arenot really ailures at all. Local democracy is central to eective decision-making whichin turn is central to eective outcomes.

Eciency. It is widely accepted that there is a conict between democracy andeciency the approaches which are most resource-ecient may be unpalatableby an electorate with a dierent sel-interest. However, we must recognise that thereverse is also true the most resource-ecient approaches may lead to outcomeswhich are useless or the users. Thus it is that across Scotland it is easy to gather manyexamples o ecient delivery o public buildings that produce buildings not suitedto their purpose (hospitals with no parking, underspecied schools, libraries withinsucient space, planning decisions that blight peoples lives and so on). A projectwhich comes in under budget but produces an outcome that doesnt work is notecient. Local democracy is a crucial way o ensuring that the care that is put intonancial management is matched by adequate care in speciying projects in a waythat means they will unction when completed.


16/33

Page 13

Localism. I methods o eective corporate governance are taken as a substitute orlocal democracy, it ollows that the same corporate governance methods will beequally applicable everywhere. This would lead inexorably to a homogenisation oScotland. I we are to accept that people choose to live in dierent places or reasonslinked to the places themselves then we in turn must accept that dierent places havetheir own ethos and character. This is localism the idea that dierent places are,

well, dierent, and that they will want to do things dierently. This is only possible i itis possible to articulate in an inclusive way what exactly is dierent about a place and itis then possible to act on that dierence. Local democracy (and powers which residelocally) is the only way to ensure such an inclusive expression o localism. Without itthere is only central planning by proessional administrators.

Pluralism. There is more than one way to skin a cat; a small town might attract touristsby encouraging interesting and diverse retailers, or by making easily accessiblesurrounding natural beauty, or by investing in local leisure inrastructure. Public sectormanagement is not renowned or its inventiveness or creativity and, it is reasonableto argue, nor should it be given its role in delivering democratic priorities. But i there

is no proper democratic debate about these priorities then the risk is that we revert toa single way o skinning a cat. Local democracy encourages pluralist debates aboutwhat to do and how to do it. This in turn generates creative and innovative thought.I we lose the pluralism, we lose the creativity and the ability o people to expresstheir own views.

Political resilience. As with any industry, in politics there needs to be some orm osupply chain i there is to be a resilient industry. In most democratic countries thereis a process through which it is possible to map a route rom participants in local andcommunity politics through to the national political stage. But in Scotland there issuch a small and hollow local democracy that it is no longer seen as a route to national

politics and this is reected in the prole o many o the politicians emerging at thenational level. It now seems much more common to nd politicians emerging romwithin the existing national system, progressing rom political researcher to politicianwith little engagement with other orms o democratic politics. This does not oer aresilient structure or rereshing and renewing national politics. I elected politics isdistant, disconnected and insular, then we should expect distant, disconnected andinsular politicians.

Principle and precedent. Above all, i we are to accept the argument that yes, thisis a democratic ailure but weve learned to live without democracy, where does theargument end? With a minority o the population expressing a meaningless say in

national government which is run by proessional classes on the basis o their ownpriorities? Democracy must be protected or its own sake. The alternative is notattractive.


17/33

Page 14

What does the alternative look like: two case studies

It is rare or those interested in policy and politics in Scotland to have much knowledge aboutlocal government arrangements in other European countries. To demonstrate the extent towhich Scotland is minimalist in its commitment to local democracy it is worth looking at twocase studies.

Case Study: Norway

Norway with a population o 4.7m, a comparable population size to Scotlands 5.2m currently (as o 1 January 2012) has 429 municipalities. There are also 21 county councilswith 787 county councillors overall. The average Scottish council serves, as we have seen,over 163,00 people; the average Norwegian municipality has 11,000.

Municipal councils, elected or a period o our years, are the oundation o Norwegiandemocracy. For decades the devolution o central powers to local governments aimed toocus as much as possible on the municipal level. The philosophy behind this was thatdecentralisation is an expression o applied democracy, that it brings decision-makingcloser to those who are aected and promotes popular participation in local political aairs.In Norways three-tiered structure o governance, elected regional governments (regionalcouncils) are very weak and have ew administrative tasks. It is the central state and the435 municipalities that are important (Overbye, Vabo and Wedde, 2006).

Voters in Norway elect representatives to the municipal councils and county councils(according to the Representation o the People Act (Act N0. 57 o 28 June 2002)) on aproportional list electoral system. Lists must contain a minimum o seven candidates, theymay contain a maximum o six names more than councillors to be elected in the municipality.

The Local Government Act species the minimum number o representatives to be elected:

A municipality with a population under 5,000 is to have at least 11 members in its council with a population rom 5,000 to 10,000 at least 19 representatives are required. An equivalentsystem determines the size o the county council. But it is then up to the municipal counciland the county council to determine whether to increase the respective number o theirrepresentatives beyond the legal minimum. Quite oten, they opt to do so.

The capital Oslo is the largest municipality with 599,230 residents, while Utsira in Rogalandis the smallest with 216 residents. The average size o municipalities in Norway is justunder 11,500 residents. More than hal the municipalities have ewer than 5,000 residents.

Kautokeino in Finnmark is the largest municipality in area at 9,704 square kilometres whileKvitsy and Utsira in Rogaland are the smallest at six square kilometres. The municipalitiesare a undamental part o the inrastructure o the Norwegian welare state and they have awide-ranging responsibility or public welare services. What lies behind this is the principlethat tasks shall be perormed as close as possible to the residents:

The Government bases its policy on the principle that, as a system o government, democracymeans inuence and power being spread as widely as possible. A vibrant and decentraliseddemocracy based on broad participation is crucial i we are to address the challenges acingsociety.

Variations in size, both geographically and in number o residents, give the municipalitiesdierent conditions in which to exercise their role as service provider, social developer,local authority and arena or local democracy. The municipal sector is constantly acing


18/33

Page 15

challenges connected with the need to coordinate municipal activities across administrativeboundaries or the benet o residents. One challenge the municipalities ace is coveringthe lack o specialist expertise and keeping people in key positions. This applies in particularto the smaller municipalities. The lack o expertise and manpower can be a challenge orall the municipalitys roles. Inter-municipal collaboration or the merging o municipalitiescould be a solution to these challenges. But overall, as the Norwegian Minister or Local

Government and Regional development recently again emphasised:

The government wants municipalities and counties with room to manoeuvre. Goodand eective social welare services and vibrant local communities require a strongmunicipal sector with plenty o reedom. () The variations between municipalitiesand regions are substantial, and this is oten the case or the challenges as well. It isthereore important to ensure that it is the local democratically elected representativeswho make the decisions or the individual citizen, as they know the local conditionsbest.

As a result, civic participation and support or local government still is high in Norway.

Although, here too, there have been changes:

Support or local government as a political institution has declined, whereas peoplenow tend to stress the service delivery unction o local authorities. This developmentalso signies a change in peoples role orientations towards local government, romthe role o citizen to the role o user or consumer. Peoples participation turns rombroad civic involvement in local aairs to greater single issue orientation. (Aars andOerdal, 1998).

In the last local elections in Norway in September 2011, 10,7812 councillors and 787 countycouncillors were elected Scotland has 1,222. In Norway one out o 800 citizens is an

elected member o local or regional government in Scotland the ratio is in excess o 1: 4,000. Norwegian local councils raise 40 per cent o their revenue, Scottish councils 20per cent and they are urther curtailed in their power by the ongoing Council Tax reeze.Turnout in Norway in 2011 was 63.6 per cent - will we get more than 30 per cent in May?

(All reerences other than where stated: Norwegian Ministry o Local Government andRegional Development)

Case Study: Baden-Wrttemberg

Baden-Wrttemberg in the south-west o Germany is one o the 16 Lnder o the FederalRepublic, with a population o 10.7m people (almost exactly twice the population oScotland). Below the Landtag (the Baden-Wrttemberg Parliament in Stuttgart withcurrently with 138 MPs), there are 35 boroughs and nine city districts, and below that 1101municipalities each with an elected town council (and an elected mayor). In addition,the Greater Stuttgart region elects since 1994 the Regionalversammlung Stuttgart, 84councillors representing over two million residents.

At the latest local elections, in 2009, the total number o elected town councillors was19,006; 2,273 councillors were elected to the Kreistage (borough/county councils). Thenumber o candidates or the local elections was 60,182 or the ormer and 15,544 or the

latter on lists, with the possibility or voters to cumulate votes (up to three per candidate)and transer candidates rom one list to another, or put new names on the lists all up tothe number o councillors to be elected.


19/33

Page 16

Councils consist o eight to 60 elected members, depending on the size o the municipality:

Ratio o councillors to population in Baden-Wrttemberg

Municipalities Council members

under 1,000 people 8

1,001 2,000 10

2,001 3,000 12

3 001 5 000 14

5,001 10,000 18

10,001 20,000 22

20,001 30,000 26

30,001 50,000 32

50,001 150,000 40

150,000 400,000 48

over 400,000 60

Two-thirds o Baden-Wrttembergs municipalities have a population o less than 20,000;100 have more than 20,000 people; 23 have over 50,000 people (Witt, Krause and Ritter,2009).

Let us look more closely at some examples. Stuttgart, the capital, with just over 600,000residents, has 60 councillors. At the last elections, nine lists competed, with a total o 420candidates. In addition, Stuttgart has 23 sub-districts (Stadtbezirke), with a total o 322Beirksrte (roughly equivalent with Scottish community councillors). In bigger town theycould be elected, but no town in Baden-Wrttemberg has availed itsel o that right yet. Theyare proposed by the groups and parties represented in the council, and then installed by

the lord mayor (who is directly elected). Their role is to advise and make recommendationsto council and administration. Turnout in Stuttgart or the council elections in recent timeshave allen rom 57.5 and 64.3 per cent in 1989 and 1994 respectively to 47.7 per cent(1999), 48.7 per cent (2004) and 48.7 per cent (2009). Overall, the turnout in 2009 was 50.7per cent (a record low, down rom 52 per cent in 2004).

Freiburg (230,000) had eleven lists, with 528 candidates competing or the 48 seats on thecouncil (Freiburg also has 41 districts). Heidelberg (147,000) has 40 councillors, electedrom 10 lists (400 candidates), and registered a turnout o 48.8 per cent. Heilbronn, a towno 120,000, has 40 councillors, elected in 2009 on eight lists, with 320 candidates. Theturnout was 42.9 per cent. hringen, a smaller town with 23,000, has 38 councillors. At the

last election, there were ve lists with 139 candidates the turnout was 38 per cent.

Lauen (Neckar), with 11,000 residents, has 22 councillors, elected rom ve lists with 110candidates the turnout in 2009 was 53 per cent. Ilseld (8,500) has 20 councillors, electedon two lists (40 candidates), on a turnout o 59.2 per cent. Abstatt, a small town with 4,500residents, has 14 councillors, elected rom our lists (56 candidates) the turnout here was57 per cent. Mundelsheim, just 3,150 residents, has 12 councillors, elected rom our lists (48candidates) the turnout was 62.6 per cent.

The smaller the municipality, the higher tends to be the turnout; conversely, the biggerthe municipality, the greater the percentage o women councillors. 28.8 per cent o all

candidates were women; 22 per cent o the elected councillors in Baden-Wrttemberg arewomen. In 1984, the emale percentage had been nine per cent.


20/33

Page 17

Ratio Elected Councillors : Population

Stuttgart 1 : 10,000

Freiburg 1 : 4,800

Heidelberg 1 : 3,675

Heilbronn 1 : 3,000

hringen 1 : 605Lauen am Neckar 1 : 480

Ilseld 1 : 425

Abstatt 1 : 320

Baden-Wrttemberg 1 : 560

(All reerences other than where stated: Hin and Eisenreich, 2009)

A note on the Scottish Government CommunityCouncils Short Life Working Group

It is important to note at this point that the Scottish Government has recognised some o theseissues and has set up the Community Council Short Lie Working Group. The remit o this groupis:

Supporting Community Councils to play an active role in their communities (including

exploration o current legislative status) and to work together to share experience andgood practice;

Strengthening the role o Community Council Liaison Ocers in supportingCommunity Councils, including in the provision o training and development;

Increasing diversity o representation on Community Councils (including explorationo wider public perception and awareness o Community Councils);

Strengthening the link between Community Councils and Community Planning: and

Role o Community Councils in project/asset management and service provision.

These are all valuable aims, but they all short o ull democratic representation o local communities.It is also worth noting that the Association o Scottish Community Councils (ASCC) announcedin July 2011 that it was to close down. Its last president Vincent Waters noted that communitycouncils are dying o. He warns that the 9,000 community councillors have very little support,are ageing and that membership is dwindling (Shannon, 2011). It is also oten the case that whilenominally elected, community councillors are very oten simply appointed uncontested.

There are many problems with the community councils we have. With a ew exceptions (usuallywhere wind arm money has become available) they have virtually no money, power and are

even legally prevented rom owning an asset, hence the trend or local community acilities tobe owned and managed by development trusts. Community councils might be an eective sizeo representation or a small rural town but they may not be an eective decision-making unit


21/33

Page 18

in a city. And as is argued throughout this paper, eective local democracy must be more thanconsultative aspirations should go beyond something which appears more like a soundingboard or existing local authorities. The primary problem with community councils is that theyare mainly consultative bodies and the local authorities has no duty or requirement to reectwhat they are told by community councils.

This work is valuable and strengthening community councils will be a valuable interim exercise.However it is not a proper solution to the democratic decit identied in this paper and theweakened state and partial coverage o community councils suggests they may not be the beststarting point or reviving local democracy.

It is also worth noting a this stage the Scottish Governments planned Community Empowermentand Renewal Bill which is due in Parliamentary session 2013-14. This Bill will put orward proposalsor communities to have rights to buy, posses and manage derelict and unused assets or thebenet o the community. The principle is welcome and these powers could be used imaginativelyby local communities, but it has also to be pointed out that powers without democracy are asincomplete as democracy without powers.

A democratic structure for Scotland

As we can see rom the above case studies, there are a wide range o options or exactly howa new layer o local democracy might be implemented and many valid arguments one way orthe other on each. It is or this reason that this report recommends that a Scottish Government

commission should be established to resolve these and develop a complete proposal. However,it is possible to outline the skeleton on which a new structure should be devised, outline somekey principles on which it should be based and to identiy some o the main questions that mustbe resolved.

As has already been pointed out, there is no major ailing in the way that existing local authoritiesoperate (other than in ailing to reect the diversity o local democratic opinion). Any reorganisationthat resulted in upheaval o inrastructure or employment would be massively costly, time-consuming and demoralising; since there is no evidence o administrative ailure, even attemptingthat sort o wholesale reorganisation is entirely unjustied.

However, wholesale reorganisation is not what is required to address the issue. What is neededis a more democratic means o inorming the operation o local government. It is thereoreentirely possible to maintain the existing structures o administrative delivery but to increase thedemocratic means through which that unction is specied and monitored. What is required isa layer o democracy below the current local authority level. It would require little additionalbureaucracy; rather, the existing bureaucracy would simply be governed by dierent electedbodies according to the allocation o powers and unctions.

This layer o additional democracy would lie below existing local authorities (although it shouldbe pointed out that or the our big cities Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen thecurrent structure is similar to the one that would be expected in most European systems o local

democracy). There are many options or organising it, rom something that looked more like theold District Councils to something more like properly empowered and democratic CommunityCouncils (although as noted above the awed nature o the current community council


22/33

Page 19

arrangements do not make them a particularly promising starting point). And the experiencerom European comparators (and as can be seen in the case studies) is that there is no problemin accommodating dierent sizes and types o local council i that variety best suits the speciclocal conditions. For example, the local democratic body which was elected by a group o ruralvillages could look very dierent rom the local democratic body elected by a large regional town.

Depending on how powers and responsibilities were allocated across dierent levels ogovernment, it might also make sense to create a structure or some regional-level planning(or example in education and policing). However, it is less clear at this stage that there would besubstantial benet in seeking additional elections or this layer at this time. Rather this might beconstituted by a coalition o the existing local authorities.

There are a number o principles which should underpin the development o a more detailed planor such a reorm o local democracy:

Above all it is imperative that local democracy should be universal and not reliant ona community opting or democracy. A voluntarist approach avours communities

where people have time, sel-condence and experience oten this means afuentcommunities.

There must be a clear recognition that elected politicians are central to democracy;while modern technologies may oer new ways to gauge public opinion they do notoer a means o holding democratic institutions to account.

Ultimate responsibility must lie with the democratic body and not with paid ocials.The instinct o proessionals to prevent elected ocials making mistakes must becurtailed; communities must be ree to make their own decisions and live with theconsequences.

We should accept that consistency is not the primary goal and that dierent kinds odemocratic bodies suited to dierent areas and communities is ne.

Similarly, diversity o outcome is an inevitable and desirable result o democracy andmanaging out dierence should be avoided wherever possible

The assumption that homogeneity and size are synonymous with eciency mustbe rejected. Outcome must come frst; the role o eciency must be in deliveringdemocratic outcomes as well as is possible.

The principle o subsidiarity should be adhered to; powers should lie as close to the

aected communities as is possible.

However, it must also be recognised that there will also be a right to expect somenational standards o quality and that the nationally elected government has a clearlocus to set national priorities and policy rameworks

Local units o democracy should not undermine the principle o collective social

cohesion and must not become a means o promoting greater inequality betweenpoorer and richer communities. As in long-establishrd precedent, a mechanism orredistribution according to social need must be a central part o the system.

There are then a number o key issues relating to structure which should be considered:

A means must be ound o constructing constituencies or the new layer o democracy.There are some existing sub-local authority structures such as community councils


23/33

Page 20

and local area committees which may or may not contain a democratic element.However, these are currently certainly not universal and it may not be easy to buildup rom these structures to create a universal system. Other approaches should alsobe considered, or example by building constituencies out o existing jurisdictionswith universal geographical coverage such as primary or secondary school catchmentareas. In terms o the size o electorate there is extensive data rom European countries

to provide a basis or discussion. For example, there are many councils in Franceand Germany with ewer than 1,000 electors but ew o that size in Belgium or theNetherlands. However, across Europe it is clear that there are wide variations on thesize o electorates at the local level.

A means or identiying the number o politicians or each constituency should alsobe considered. Again, there is a wealth o experience o this in Europe where thevariations can be signicant.

In the UK there has been an increasing ocus on the question o elected mayors (orprovosts in the Scottish context). When we look at the European picture it becomes

clear that the UK concept o a mayor is only a single possibility. A town leader canbe anything rom a sort-o chie executive selected or the ability to administer localunctions to a sort o charismatic gurehead role in promoting the town. And theycan be directly elected or elected rom within the local council. Or o course there maybe no town leader at all. There are benets and dis-benets to each. However, whilean elected gurehead may orm part o a reorm o local democracy it is important tostate that a personal popularity contest is no substitute or proper local democracy.

While as a matter o principle local democracy must recognise and expect diversityo outcome, nevertheless there are certain core services and service levels that mustbe guaranteed irrespective o which community you live in. Means o identiying ways

to ensure minimum service coverage and quality (such as a binding service contract)should be explored.

The means o ensuring that a single bureaucracy working to dierent elected bodiesdoes not mean duplication and conusion should be explored. However, this problemmust not be exaggerated and the clear division o powers and responsibilities shouldbe the major way in which this issue is resolved.

Finance

It is generally accepted that the current ncial mechanisms or unding local government areawed. For example, the report o the Local Government Finance Review Committee whichreported to the then Scottish Executive in 2006 concluded:

First, there is the undamental question about what the relationship between central andlocal government should be. There is long-standing and unresolved debate about theirrespective roles. The Committees view is that it is essential that the Scottish Parliament, the

Scottish Executive and local authorities grasp the nettle and resolve what appears to be acorrosive argument about their relationship. (Burt et al, 2006)


24/33

Page 21

The incoming SNP Scottish Government rejected the recommendations o that report in avouro the establishment o a Local Income Tax but was unable to secure a parliamentary majority orthat proposals. The issue thereore remains unresolved.

The excessive reliance on central government grants to und local government in Scotland isproblematic and should be resolved. However, it is beyond the scope o this paper to explore whatthat resolution might involve. For the present, this report would simply suggest that an additionaltier o local democracy might easily be accomodated within the central grant mechanism orunding local government until a more comprehensive solution was achieved.

There would o course need to be a system o distribution o resource (or responsibilty overresource) to any additional tier o government. This would need to have an element o sucientsupply (or example, i childcare arrangements are devolved to the local layer, sucient resouceto make that possible is required) and redistribution according to social need. However, these areactors already embedded in local government nance.

There are many possible options or nancial arrangements and quite a ew models to draw

rom. Generally, it is preerable or elected councils to be responsible or raising as much o theirown resource as is practical (subject to a redistribution mechanism to deal with transers to areaswith greatest social need). A power o General Competence would in itsel open up a number opossibilities such as being able to introduce parking charges, litter nes, bed tax or hotels or toenter into commercial partnerships.

However, this report would want to emphasise a particular principle: it does not propose alibertarian method o nance which would enable wealthier communities to raise more romwithin themselves at the expense o poorer communities with less capacity to raise incomeinternally. As above, two mechanisms should be explored to resolve this:

A means o ensuring minimum quality and coverage o service, such as a bindingservice contract

A means o redistribution according to need

Above all, local democracy must not become a means or exacerbating the already unacceptablelevels o inequality in society quite on the contrary, it must become a mechanism or addressingthem.

Powers

The powers wielded and services provided by Local Government have changed dramaticallyover the past 25 years and continue to change. Apart rom reorganisation and a moving oresponsibilities between tiers o government there have been several main drivers o change:

Sell o by Local Authorities, or example Strathclyde Buses and Glasgow Airport (soldby Glasgow Corporation in 1975).

Removal o services rom local authorities by the Scottish Government; or example theorced ballot to transer Glasgow housing to GHA and its subsequent dismembermentinto local housing associations. At one swoop a major component o councillors


25/33

Page 22

surgeries - housing matters - was removed. The earlier removal o Further Educationrom councils had a similar eect. Frequent changes to the economic developmentregime have hampered councils economic development. Proposals over Police andFire could urther reduce local accountability to elected members.

Technological change; or example computers, have made many tasks more ecientthus requiring ewer sta, but also allowed services to be shared between councils,carried out in dierent ways and also created the scope or new services to be provided.

Competitive tendering and its successor best value which was imposed as a duty inthe 2003 act. Best value is dened as a continuous improvement in the perormanceo the authoritys unctions. Although eectiveness is given as one parameter o thedenition, the key measures are cost and the aim was the out-sourcing o services.There was no mention in the denition o democratic oversight. Where out-sourcinghas occurred, either to private companies or council ALEOs this has oten resultedin eective monitoring and democratic control being restricted by commercialcondentiality

New targets, monitoring and eedback requirements imposed by Holyrood,Westminster or Brussels. The list is long but class sizes targets and the wide range oguidance targets set by Holyrood restrict exibility in unding.

Financial restrictions such as ring encing, Concordat, grant cuts and removal o NonDomestic Rates have restricted councils reedom to both raise and spend money inline with local needs. Given that savings rom technological innovation and rethinkingservices have largely been done these budget restriction mean most councils havelittle choice but to impose arbitrary cuts in services not designated essential oralready subject to commercial contracts e.g. PPP/PFI schemes.

Changes to Regulatory Powers. The denationalisation o electricity, gas, rail andtelecoms and the reorganisation o Scottish Water and NHS Scotland have changedthe regulatory ramework, mostly by removing powers rom local authorities. Busderegulation has had a similar eect. With regard to transport and utilities, requentservice disruption (particularly to roads) and public rustration appears the mainconsequence.

In most European countries, local government has the power (general competence) to act onbehal o their communitys citizens, while in the UK local government is given certain powers toundertake specied activities and to deliver clearly dened services. In most European states, the

position and status o local government are guaranteed in the national constitution, dening theirright to look ater the aairs o their citizens and run and regulate their community, in compliancewith the principle o subsidiarity.

Town planning, water supply and sewage, waste management, childcare and primary educationand social services are the main areas o local responsibility in most European states, althoughgreat dierences arise in the scope o local authorities responsibilities. In Norway, or example,the responsibility or primary healthcare is devolved to the municipalities. These cover healthpromotion, primary health care, care o the elderly, care o the handicapped and mentallyhandicapped, childcare and primary school education, social work (child protection and socialprotection), water, local culture, local planning, and local inrastructure. By giving local authorities

both the autonomy to set the level o service provision and the economic means to providethe services, the aim was that this decentralised model would provide a more ecient serviceprovision and serve local needs better than a centralised model. That is why the Norwegian


26/33

Page 23

law leaves a large mandate or local health care services to take part in shaping the local socialstructure.

A Council o Europe Report on the relationship between central and local authorities (Council oEurope, 2007A) came to the ollowing conclusions on the main areas o local responsibility andtrends in the relationships between central and local authorities:

Legislation and setting o criteria is a central (State/regional) responsibility.

Funding is, in many cases, a central responsibility, although municipalities can raisetaxes and there is joint-unding or some issues.

Supervision o legality is also a central (State/regional) responsibility and there arerequent budgetary compliance controls.In shared responsibilities there are sometimescentral perormance controls.

Mandatory consultation with municipality associations in relation to local statutes,budgets and other signicant issues concerning local responsibilities exists in most

States.

Formal consultation structures (general or sectoral) exist in many member states toacilitate interlocution in those areas.

De-concentrated central bodies are usually in charge o inormation and supervisioninteractions.Inormation and advice to municipalities in the main areas o responsibilityis the most requent orm o interaction.

Local authorities usually eed-back inormation to central authorities thus deliveringperormance indicators and other data.Inormation relationships tend to be more

inormal and to be held by civil servants and individual local authorities.

Co-operation mechanisms are established especially in areas where the nature olocal tasks or the amount o investment needed goes beyond the municipalitiespossibilities.

Central-local agreements to promote eciency, improve perormance or deneunding are starting to be set up in some countries.

More detailed inormation on how powers are distributed in dierent countries can be ound inthe Council o Europe report on local authority competences (Council o Europe, 2007B).

Clearly a new structure o democracy will require some consideration o the allocation o powers.This may involve legislative change but equally it involves a change in the relationship betweenthe Scottish Parliament and Local Authorities and changes in the relationship o councils and theirconstituents. Scotland is part o the EU and the principle meant to be at the heart o EU decisionmaking is subsidiarity; i.e.Under the principle o subsidiarity, in areas which do not all within itsexclusive competence, the Union shall act only i and in so ar as the objectives o the proposedaction cannot be suciently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regionaland local level, but can rather, by reason o the scale or eects o the proposed action, be betterachieved at Union level.

Applying this principle to the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Government should only takeaction i it is clearly impractical or councils acting individually or collectively to achieve the sameobjective. Because there is a shared competence between Local Authorities and the ScottishGovernment in so many areas, the onus should be on the Government to ca canny where it acts.


27/33

Page 24

I a proper additional layer o elected democracy is put in place below the level o the currentlocal authorities, the same principle must apply to the relationship between those two tiers. Theonus should be on local authorities to allow the lower tier o government to lead on issues directlyrelating to local communities unless there is a demonstrable reason or that role to be carried outat a higher level.

The second principle is a power o general competence, so that councils can do anything theyare not expressly orbidden to do. English councils since 18th February 2012 have this power whichwas established in the UK Localism Act 2011. Under the UK Bill councils are specically allowed to:

carry out any lawul activity;

undertake any lawul works;

operate any lawul business; and

enter into any lawul transaction.

Scottish councils should have the same power, and indeed the Community Empowerment andRenewals Bill which is under preparation may encompass this. A power o General Competenceis one which should apply to the lower tier o local government as much as it should to currentlocal authorities.

Some aspects o the 2003 Local Government Act and its statutory instruments require looked atand changed as the whole aim o the Best Value regime appeared to many o us to restrict theactions o local government. This seems the antithesis o General Competence. The powers ocouncils to invest were relaxed in April 2010, to take account o Prudential Borrowing. However,even this guidance should be reviewed.

Finally the Scottish Government should look critically at the nancial strictures and targetsimposed on local government, particularly Council Tax reezes and retention o NDR. I localismmeans anything, councils wishing to modiy taxes should be able to do so reely and answer totheir constituents.

CostOne o the most common arguments against reorm o local democracy is the assumption thatit would be prohibitively expensive (whether the cost o democracy is an acceptable reason tocircumvent it is a separate question, but it is important to consider the cost o reorm).

The rst thing to make clear is that as has already been pointed out, the range o dierent possiblestructures and arrangements or local government is virtually endless. This means that makingany kind o meaningul estimate o the running cost o a reormed system o local democracy inScotland is open to an enormous number o possible actors. However, since the last reorm olocal government in Scotland cost coming on or 1 billion it is worth making clear that the kind

o reorm proposed in this report would cost nothing like that to run.To make an estimate, let us consider the details o the case study o Baden-Wrttemberg (allreerences as above). I we pick out hringen and build it rom there we discover that the 38


28/33

Page 25

councillors receive a monthly basic amount o recompensation o 50 (42), plus 30 (25) orevery council or committee meeting. There are ten to 12 meetings o the council, and roughlythe same number o committee meetings which gives us a total o just over 70,000 per year.The monthly allowance or councillors varies slightly, rom a basic rate o 20 per month inSigmaringen to the top rate in Stuttgart o 1,200. On top o that, there are payments per councilor committee meeting, o 20 to 120.

Bearing in mind that o the 1,101 Baden-Wrttemberg municipalities nearly 1,000 have below20,000 residents, this gives us a grand total o 50m or all municipal councillors; we may addanother 3.5m or the county councillors, and another (generous) 300,000 or the GreaterStuttgart regional assembly. That would make it, say, 55m or 21,363 councillors.

There are, o course, also 1,101 directly elected mayors and lord mayors in Baden-Wrttemberg.Their period o oce is eight years. In municipalities with a population o under 2,000, themayoralty can be a honorary position, i the council does not decide to make it a ull-timesalaried post. As rom municipalities o 20,000 residents and more, the post is that o a lordmayor. The pay scale or elected mayors runs rom 3,120 per month or the smallest to 10,950

per month or the largest (mayors get paid more during their second term in oce). However,in Baden-Wrttemberg, the directly elected mayors have a strong position not only as chair othe council and all council committees, but also as head o the administration. They are also thelegal representatives o the municipality they serve. Thus in this context mayors would not becomparable to elected councillors as they are ull-time and part o the executive.

As we have seen, Baden-Wrttemberg has a ration o elected councillors to population o 1:560while Scotland has a ratio o 1:4,270. To match the Baden-Wrttemberg ratio (admittedly at thetop end o the scale) would require something like an additional 8,000 councillors. Scotlandscouncillors all 1,222 o them earn a total 22.8 m per year and also claim more than 3ma year between them on top o their taxpayer-unded wages. The dierence between Baden-

Wrttemberg and Scotland is, o course that, in Germany as in most parts o Europe (and inEngland, or that matter), councillors are unsalaried, only receiving expense allowances, whilebeing a Scottish councilor is a ull-time occupation.

While there may be a number o options or how to structure compensation or the new tiero local democracy, we would argue that there is certainly no case or ull-time councillors atthe community council level. I a compensation rate similar to that o Baden-Wrttemberg wasused it might proportionately result in a total cost o sustaining councillors o approximately anadditional 19m. As this proposed structure does not imply an automatic or inherent increasein the volume o services provided by local government any change in volume o service wouldresult in the democratic decisions o the new democratic structures which would in turn mean

reprioritisation o existing resources or that a council would be elected on the basis o proposalsto generate additional income. So the only remaining running cost would be any additionaladministrative support required by the new structures. However, as these are new structures odecision-making and not o administration or service delivery, it is important not to overstate anylikely cost o additional administration. As one academic study put it:

Clearly a greater number o councillors is likely to increase the administration supportcosts, however this may lead to savings in the longer term as a result o more eectivepolicymaking and use o resources as councillors are more likely to be in close contact withresidents and have a greater understanding o their views and concerns. (Kingsley Purdamet al, 2008, p.15))

At this point it is important to make clear that we are not suggesting there are no cost implicationso democracy. A local community might choose to improve or make more ecient certain


29/33

Page 26

elements o service provision or to add new services or undertake additional projects. Thesewould all potentially have positive or negative nancial implications. However, it would be orthe electorate to vote according to the proposals and the cost o the proposals which wouldgenerally all on that community to bear (or to reprioritise budgets accordingly). These are costsresulting rom the ouctomes o democracy and while it is to be expected that communitiesgenerally will not want to organise (or example) their own bin collections at much greater cost

due to diseconomies o scale, that democratic option would be open to them. This section reersto the cost o the administration o democracy, the price or it to exist.

So, to put this all into perspective, i Scotland wished to become one o the most democraticcountries in Europe and to provide airly generous expenses or those in the new tier ogovernment, even at this top end the cost o running such a system might be no more than twoto three times the current running cost o the Scotland Oce or less than the current salaries billo chie executives and senior directors o existing local authorities.

Conclusion

It is time we ully recognised the state o democracy in Scotland. Below the national level,Scotland is the least democratic country in the European Union; some have argued that it is theleast democratic country in the developed world. We elect ewer people to make our decisionsthan anyone else and ewer people turn out to vote in those elections than anyone else. We havemuch bigger local councils that anyone else, representing many more people and vastly moreland area than anyone else, even other countries with low density o population. In France one in

125 people is an elected community politicians. In Austria, one in 200. In Germany one in 400. InFinland one in 500. In Scotland it is one in 4,270 (even England manages one in 2,860). In Norwayone in 81 people stand or election in their community. In Finland one in 140. In Sweden one in145. In Scotland one in 2,071. In Norway 5.5 people contest each seat. In Sweden 4.4 people. InFinland 3.7 people. In Scotland 2.1. In every single indicator we were able to identiy to show thehealth o local democracy, Scotland perorms worst o any comparator we could nd.

In most o Europe community politics is normal people you know, your riends and amily orneighbours will routinely contest elections to represent your community. In Scotland we havecreated a system where community politics is strange and distant you probably dont knowmany i any people who are involved in local politics. You probably dont vote. You certainly endup with a council which is by ar the most distant and unrepresentative o your community o anycomparable country. And you wonder why condence in local democracy is low?

This is an existential crisis or local democracy. I we do nothing to address this very clear problemwe will end up with a nation in which politics is the preserve o a tiny cadre o proessionalpoliticians who are separate rom the rest o society. We will continue to live in a countrywhere proessional managers make decisions oryour community with little reerence to yourcommunity, and they will continue to do it in job lots not building a school or you but buildinghal a dozen schools or a standardised notion o what a community is. And these blanket policiesapplied across diverse communities will simply dilute diversity and create homogenous clone

towns. Disillusionment and alienation will continue to rise and the gap between politics and thepeople will continue to widen.


30/33

Page 27

In Scotland we have been kidding ourselves on that a ew successul audits o local authoritybureaucracy have shown there is no problem. But worse than that, the letters pages o manynewspapers suggest that we arent even widely aware o our status as the least locally democraticnation in the developed world. This cannot be allowed to continue indenitely.

So there are three core conclusions rom this report:

Local democracy is important in principle and in practice

There is a clear democratic decit in Scotland at the local level

To resolve this the Scottish Government should set up a Commission to devise a layero democracy which can be established below the level o the existing local authorities

In considering how that might be done the report recommends:

There is no justication or any major restructuring o the administrative bureaucracyo existing local authorities; what is needed is not an extra layer o bureaucracy but

an extra layer o democratic decision-making to guide and instruct that bureaucracy

There are some core principles that must be adhered to in devising that layer odemocracy, central among which is that democracy must be universal and notvoluntarist

The proposals should be bold in ollowing the principle o subsidiarity we shouldtrust communities to make as many as possible o the decisions which impact onthem themselves, which means making sure they have the maximum possible power

However, it is important to also make clear that national government does have an

important role in establishing national policy rameworks and in ensuring nationalminimum standards.

It also seeks to set the debate in context:

Cost should not be seen as a deterrent: as there is no proposal or restructuring theadministrative unction o existing local authorities the cost o introducing democraticcouncils should be no more than a ew tens o millions o pounds at most

Fear o competence must not inhibit the debate: the tendency o some proessionalpoliticians and administrators to assume communities are not capable o managing

their own aairs is clearly contradicted by the experience rom across Europe This is not a low-priority issue: the current structure which sees politics and decision-

making take place distant rom and with little reerence to the people the decisionsaect lies at the very heart o many o the major problems o disillusionment withdemocracy that are regularly identied in Scotland and the UK as a whole

We believe that this is a matter that should command strong cross-party support and urgepoliticians o all parties to support these calls or reorm.


31/33

References

Jacob Aars and Audun Oerdal, Local Political Recruitment in Crisis? A Comparison o Finland and Norway,Scandinavian Political Studies, Bind 21 (New Series) (1998) 3, pp.207-228, p.208; .

Association or Public Sector Excellence, The Front Line Starts Here, Unison, March 2012

Susan A. Banducci and Jeery A. Karp, How Elections Change the Way Citizens View the Political System: Campaigns,Media Eects and Electoral Outcomes in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2003

Andr Blais, What Aects Voter Turnout? Annual Review o Political Science Vol. 9: 111-125, June 2006

Sir Peter Burt et al,A Fairer Way, Report by the Local Government Finance Review Committee, The Scottish Executive,2006 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/153766/0041377.pd

Michael Clarke and John Stewart, The Choices or Local Government or the 1990s and Beyond, London: Longman,1991, pp.76, 74.

Council o Europe, The relationship between central and local

the silent crisis1

Documents