THE PURSUIT OF BISMARCK & THE SINKING OF H.M.S. HOOD

Preface

The spring of 1941 found Britain approaching the second year of war with the European Axis powers. Her situation was desperate: her closest ally, France, had fallen the previous summer. The United States, though providing weapons and other vital materials, was still months away from entering the war. Britain more or less stood alone. Though there had been some triumphs (Battle of Britain, sinking of the Admiral Graf Spee, etc.), the margin for failure and defeat was still large.

Britain, as an island nation, relied heavily on foreign imports. Much of her desperately needed war supplies had to be transported by sea. This fact was well known to the German Reich’s Navy, the Deutsche Kriegsmarine. Led by Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, the Kriegsmarine had mounted a serious effort to disrupt supply convoys – the goal being to strangle and starve Britain into submission.

The most effective German weapon in this effort were submarines, or 'U-boats'. Between September 1939 and May 1941 these had been responsible for the destruction of approximately 3,000,000 tons of Allied shipping. In addition to the U-boats, Germany also employed surface merchant raiders and surface warships. Though few in number and not as successful as the U-boats, these ships did pose a credible threat.

The most recent German sortie, 'Operation Berlin' (January 1941), was a reminder of their potential. In this operation, the warships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.(AKA 'the twins' or 'Salmon & Glucktstein') were responsible for sinking approximately 116,000 tons of Allied shipping. As a result, the Kriegsmarine surface units were monitored closely.

British Suspicions are Aroused

During the second week of May 1941 the British observed an increase in the number of German aerial reconnaissance flights between Greenland and Jan Mayen Island. It seemed likely that the reconnaissance was to ascertain the current limits of the pack ice in the region, but why this was vital to the Germans had to be determined. It was possible that the Germans were planning raids on Jan Mayen Island or Iceland itself. Another possibility was that this was a precursor to a breakout into the Atlantic by German surface warships – possibly even their newly worked-up battleship Bismarck.

On 14 May, Admiral John Tovey, Commander-in-Chief of the British Home Fleet, asked the British Flag Officer in Iceland for a report on the prevailing ice conditions as well as an assessment on the motive behind the German reconnaissance. The Flag Officer’s opinion was that the Germans were most likely planning for an Atlantic breakout by Bismarck.

Bismarck and Hood

Launched on 14 February 1939, Bismarck was the first of the new breed of ships that German leader Adolf Hitler and Grand Admiral Raeder hoped would herald the rebirth of the German surface battle fleet in the tradition of the Kaiser's High Seas Fleet. Although listed as 35,000 tons to ensure that she fell within the limits of the London Naval Treaty, Bismarck did, in fact, displace well over that. As the image Comparison of H.M.S. Hood and Battleship Bismarck (below) indicates, she was of comparable size and main armament to the largest British warship of that time, H.M.S. Hood.

Above- Rendering of Bismarck by Thomas Schmid.

Click on image to learn more.

Above- Rendering of Hood by Thomas Schmid.

Click on image to learn more.

Despite the basic similarities, there were nonetheless serious differences between the two ships: Bismarck was a modern battleship in the truest sense. Her critical spaces were well protected by excellent internal compartmentalisation and high quality heavy armour. She also boasted state of the art electronics plus highly accurate and rapid firing gunnery systems. She and her sister Tirpitz were arguably among the best ships at that time.

In comparison, Hood was well-built for her day (1920), but by 1941 was nonetheless an aged battle cruiser. She had adequate protection in some key areas, but not all. Because of her machinery, she was filled with large, somewhat open spaces. Though her speed had been reduced over the years, at 29 knots, she was still fast for her size. Her guns were deadly, but she suffered from outdated gunnery systems. She did boast advanced radar, but her crew hadn't much time to become proficient in its use.

Simply put, in a one-on-one fight, Bismarck could absorb more damage while firing faster and more accurately than Hood. Bismarck could take AND give more in battle.

Each ship had the ability to sink or severely damage the other, but the advantage clearly was with Bismarck. This is not totally a negative reflection on Hood, but simply an observance that Bismarck was 20 years more modern than she. Bismarck’s design reflected all that had been learned between the times the two ships were built.

Above - Comparison of H.M.S. Hood and Battleship Bismarck

Bismarck Prepares for Service

Bismarck was commissioned on 24 August 1940, under the command of Kapitän zur See Ernst Lindemann. She commenced her acceptance trials in Kiel Bay on 15 September. Certain teething problems arose and Bismarck returned to Hamburg that December for the necessary adjustments to be made. Following an exceptionally harsh winter, Bismarck returned to Kiel Bay for further trials in March 1941. Having passed these trials, she was sent to Gotenhafen (formerly Gdynia, Poland). There she teamed up with the modified Admiral Hipper class heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen commanded by Kapitän zur See Helmuth Brinkmann. The ships' systems were fine-tuned and the crews properly trained in the relative safety of the Baltic in preparation for their first mission.

Preparations for Operation Rheinübung

Raeder and staff were now making plans for that first mission – a commerce raiding sortie in the Atlantic: To lead the sortie Raeder chose Admiral Günther Lütjens. The stoic Lütjens was highly experienced and had a proven record as a fleet commander – his most recent success was as Commander of Gneisenau andScharrnhorst during the aforementioned 'Operation Berlin'. Raeder’s original plan of action was to send Bismarck and Prinz Eugen into the Atlantic where they would be joined by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. From there they would be able to attack and overwhelm even the largest of convoys. Such a fleet would be a menace the like of which the British had not had to contend with before during this war.

Unfortunately for Raeder, the plan had to be changed – neither of the 'twins' would be available: Scharnhorst had experienced boiler troubles and was undergoing repairs that would take weeks to complete. Gneisenau was damaged on 6 April during a torpedo attack by units of Britain’s Coastal Command. Her damage would take at least 6 months to repair. Accordingly, neither ship could be repaired in time to sortie during Raeder’s preferred time frame. As the Admiral in command of the force, Lütjens was consulted. He favoured postponement of the mission until Scharnhorst was repaired or the newly commissioned battleship Tirpitz was worked-up. Raeder however, was simply not willing to postpone the venture any longer. It was decided that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen would go it alone. Thus it was that on 18 May 'Operation Rheinübung' commenced in earnest.

Following a morning inspection by Admiral Lütjens, Prinz Eugen left Gotenhafen harbour followed sometime later by Bismarck. The vessels exercised in the bay off Gotenhafen and departed the area independently that evening. The two ships and a number of escort vessels linked up the following morning off the cape of Arkona.

Potential Escape Routes.

Click to enlarge.

Bismarck had sailed 200 tons of fuel short of a full load as there had been an accident during her last refueling- a hose burst creating a large messs which had to be cleaned. Once things were in order, there was not enough time to finish fuelling. There was also some worries about fumes following the deaths of several Polish labourers whilst cleaning her oil tanks. Gruppe Nord (German Naval Group Command North, or 'Group North') had advised Lütjens that the best course of action would be to proceed to Bergen in occupied Norway. A stop there would allow both ships to be refuelled before entering the Atlantic. This was especially critical for Prinz Eugen as her endurance was not as great as that of Bismarck. They also suggested that fuel could be further conserved by entering the Atlantic via the Iceland/Faeroes passage.

Lütjens, however, decided not to follow Group North’s recommendation: Instead of stopping at Bergen, he intended for the ships to proceed directly to the Arctic and refuel from the tanker Weissenberg, stationed near Jan Mayen Island. From there, with full tanks, they would attempt a breakout into the Atlantic via the Denmark Strait. The likely reason for this change of plans was that Lütjens had an unfavourable experience using the Iceland/Faeroes route during 'Operation Berlin' – his ships had been detected there by the British cruiser Naiad. Having reversed his course, he then successfully entered the Atlantic undetected via the Denmark Strait. This route had also been used by other

Kriegsmarine vessels during the early years of the war. The weather in the Strait was frequently poor and could possibly provide the cover needed to breakout.

Bismarck’s Baltic Passage. Click to enlarge.

Throughout 19 and 20 May, the German force and their escorting aircraft continued north and west through Scandinavian waters. Although Group North had attempted to keep the route clear of shipping in order to preserve secrecy, they were unsuccessful. Much to Lütjens’s dismay, there was a hole in Group North’s net: At approximately 1300 hours on 20 May, the neutral Swedish cruiser Gotland appeared on the horizon near the Swedish coast. For several hours, she steered a course parallel to the German fleet. Additionally, a few small fishing vessels were in the area.

Lütjens realised that his force had been exposed even before entering the North Sea. He knew that it was almost certain thatGotland would report what she had seen. It was highly likely the British would find out. As it turns out, this is exactly what happened: News of the German force’s movements had indeed been relayed to the British Admiralty – unofficially via representatives of the Swedish government and Norwegians in exile. Resistance operatives in Norway also monitored their progress up the Norwegian coast.

At this point, Lütjens once again changed his mind – the force would now follow part of Group North’s recommendation and put into Bergen, Norway. Though his motives are unclear, it is possible he felt that since his ships had been sighted and almost certainly reported by Gotland, he had lost the impetus and element of surprise. It would be best to refuel at Bergen and then later escape undetected under the cover of bad weather.

The German force eventually reached Bergen on the morning of 21 May. Bismarck anchored in Grimstad Fjord and Prinz Eugen anchored farther to the north in Kalvanes Bay. During the short stay at Bergen, both ships had their colourful Baltic camouflage and national markings (swastikas) painted out or otherwise covered.Prinz Eugen was refuelled from the tanker Wollin; Bismarck, for reasons unknown, did not refuel. This decision would later prove to have fatal consequences forBismarck and doom 'Operation Rheinübung' to failure.

Tovey’s Dilemma

Meanwhile, back at Scapa Flow, Admiral Tovey was considering the best means of

covering a German warship breakout: On 18 May, the cruiser H.M.S. Suffolk, on patrol in the Denmark Strait, was ordered to keep a special watch on the passage close to the ice pack. On 19 May, H.M.S. Norfolk, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral (RADM) W.F. Wake-Walker, RADM Commanding First Cruiser Squadron (CS1), was ordered to proceed from Hvalfjord, Iceland and relieve Suffolk. Suffolk was to return to Hvalfjord to refuel and then rejoin Norfolk on patrol in the Denmark Strait.

On 21 May, Tovey received the report that Lütjens had suspected had been sent: The Admiralty reported that two large German warships in company with 11 merchant ships had been spotted the previous day near the Kattegat on a northward bound course. Later that day, came a further report that an RAF Spitfire on a reconnaissance mission had identified and photographed the enemy ships at Bergen – a Bismarck Bismarck class battleship in Grimstad Fjord and an Admiral Hipper Admiral Hipper class heavy cruiser in Kalvanes Bay.

Although the threat was positively located and identified, Tovey still had doubts as to the exact nature of the enemy intentions. If they were attempting a breakout into the Atlantic it seemed unlikely that they would stop at Bergen. However, dispositions were made based on the assumption that a breakout was planned. The following orders were issued:

Suffolk, refuelling in Hvalfjord, was ordered to delay her sailing to rejoin Norfolk to coincide with the earliest possible time of arrival of the enemy.

Birmingham and Manchester were on patrol in the Iceland-Faeroes passage and were ordered to Skaalefjord to refuel before resuming their patrol

Hood (commanded by Captain Ralph Kerr, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral (VADM) Lancelot E. Holland, VADM Commanding Battle Cruiser Squadron/Second-in-Command, Home Fleet) and the new battleship Prince of Wales (commanded by Captain John C Leach) were ordered to sail for Hvalfjord. Accompanying them would be the destroyers: Electra, Anthony, Echo, Icarus, Achates, and Antelope.

Arethusa was on her way to Iceland and was ordered to remain there at the disposal of RADM Wake-Walker (RADM Commanding First cruiser Squadron in H.M.S. Norfolk).

Tovey himself would remain at Scapa Flow in his flagship King George V until the situation became clearer. Also at Scapa were the cruisers Galatea, Aurora,Kenya, Neptune, together with the destroyers Active, Punjabi, and Nestor.

The new aircraft carrier Victorious was also at Scapa Flow but was due to sail as part of the covering force for the Mediterranean bound troop convoy 'WS8B'. However, due to the threat from the German warships, Victorious was placed at Admiral Tovey’s disposal.

Lastly, the battle cruiser Repulse, moored in the Clyde, was taken off 'WS8B' and also placed at Tovey’s disposal.

Apart from these initial ship dispositions it was critical that the movements of Bismarck and her consort continue to be tracked. To this end Tovey arranged for the RAF to undertake an extensive aerial reconnaissance from Trondheim to Kristiansand South early during 22 May. A bombing attack was also to be made on the enemy vessels. The weather however, was to thwart the RAF’s efforts: Eighteen bombers flew from Wick to attack the German ships at Bergen. Due to the rapid deterioration in weather conditions, only two of these found the target area. Thick clouds prevented them from seeing anything of substance and they were forced to release their bombs in the vain hope of a lucky hit. The reconnaissance aircraft had encountered similar conditions and could offer Tovey no additional information. He had to assume that the ships might have departed.

Hood’s Departure

Hood, Prince of Wales and their destroyer escorts, weighed anchor at 2356 hours. They departed Scapa Flow at midnight, 22 May, enroute for Hvalsfjord. They cleared Scapa’s Hoxa Gate at 0050 hours. Shortly thereafter, the destroyers were divided into two divisions- one to screen Hood and the other to screen Prince of Wales. The vessels then commenced zigzagging (for anti-submarine purposes) and assumed a heading of 310°. Sometime that morning, VADM Holland informed his commanders of the gunnery policy he wanted: 'If the enemy is encountered and concentration of fire required, the policy will be G.I.C. (individual ship control); if ships are spread when enemy is met they are to be prepared to flank mark as described in H.W.C.O. 26'. Due to the implementation of strict radio silence, these orders were never communicated to Suffolk or Norfolk.

Hood’s course, 21-24 May 1941.

Click to enlarge.

Between 1130 and 1307 hours, a Range and Inclination Exercise (RIX) was successfully conducted. The first destroyer division continued to screen Hood and the second continued to screen Prince of Wales. Afterwards, all vessels resumed their zigzagging on a heading of 310°. This continued until 1855 hours, when the course was altered to 283°.

By noon, 23 May, the vessels would be at 62° 55' N 02° 14.8' W and on a heading of 270°. Shortly thereafter, another successful RIX was conducted. At 1400 hours, the destroyers Anthony and Antelope, short on fuel, parted company with the force and headed for Iceland. As the day wore on for the remaining vessels, the weather grew cloudy and the sea swells became heavier. The monotony was briefly broken at 1708 hours, when Prince of Wales's radar detected an aircraft. It turned out to be friendly.

The Veil is Lifted

Back at Scapa Flow on 22 May, Tovey was now faced with a decision about whether to sail himself. If the German fleet had left Bergen, they may already be nearing a breakout into the Atlantic. If he delayed sailing, then he may not be in time to assist in the battle to prevent the German breakout. On the other hand, if he sailed now and Bismarck was still waiting at Bergen for an improvement in the weather, he may find himself returning to port for lack of fuel at a critical moment.

To Tovey’s assistance came the small Naval Air Training Station at Hatston, Scapa Flow. The commanding officer, Captain Henry St. John Fancourt, thought it possible for a single aircraft to fly to Bergen to ascertain whether or not the German ships had sailed. Lieutenant Noel Goddard volunteered to pilot one of the base’s Marylands that were used for target towing. Accompanying Goddard would be the highly experienced navigator and observer Geoffrey Rotherham. Tovey’s permission for the venture was obtained, and at 1630 hours the aircraft took off. After a daring flight close to the sea, Goddard and Rotherham arrived at Bergen to find that the German vessels were no longer there. An urgent message was sent back to Hatston that Rotherham was able to confirm in person when he returned just before 2000 hours that evening.

So Admiral Tovey was at last certain that the German ships were no longer at Bergen, but the uncertainty about enemy intentions still remained. Various explanations could be offered about what might be taking place:

The German ships may be leading a convoy containing important stores or troops to northern Norway.

They may be part of a raiding force bound for Iceland. They may be attempting to break out into the Atlantic.

He felt that the last possibility was still the most likely. It was also the one that posed the greatest potential risk. Tovey knew that the German ships would wreak havoc on the convoys if they were to succeed in breaking out into the Atlantic. Also, once out they would be almost impossible to track down. They had to be stopped before they got into the Atlantic.

New plans were urgently formulated to give the Home Fleet the greatest possibility of intercepting the German ships before they broke out. It had been 29 hours sinceBismarck had last been sighted at Bergen – depending on when they had sailed, they may, even at that moment, be close to achieving their Atlantic objective. The following directions were issued to update Tovey’s previous disposition orders:

Suffolk at Hvalfjord, was ordered to sail immediately to join with RADM Wake-Walker in Norfolk, on patrol in the Denmark Strait.

The cruiser Arethusa, also at Hvalfjord, was to join Manchester and Birmingham. The three cruisers were to patrol the Iceland/Faeroes passage.

VADM Holland’s squadron of Hood, Prince of Wales and the destroyer screens were on their way to Hvalfjord to refuel before commencing their patrol. They were now ordered to proceed immediately to their patrol. They were to operate north of 62 degrees latitude and would be ready to react and cover the German ships should the cruisers patrolling either the Denmark Strait or the Iceland/Faeroes passage locate them.

Tovey himself sailed from Scapa Flow in his flagship King George V at 2245 hours on 22 May. They were accompanied by the aircraft carrier Victorious, the cruisersGalatea, Aurora, Kenya, and Hermione. The squadron also included seven destroyers (Inglefield, Intrepid, Active, Punjabi, Windsor and Lance). The group would be further reinforced off the Butt of Lewis when the battle cruiser Repulse and three more destroyers joined from the Clyde.

This latter squadron would act as a further backstop, operating behind Hood and Prince of Wales, south of the line of 62 degrees North latitude. Tovey gave consideration to detaching two of the cruisers of his squadron to patrol the Faeroes/Shetlands passage but decided against this. The chance of this passage being used by the German ships was small due to the proximity of the Home Fleet base at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys.

The naval units would be supported in their search by air reconnaissance patrols between Greenland and the Orkneys as well as sweeps along the Norwegian Coast.

Bismarck Leaves Norway

Lütjens’s force had sailed from Bergen during the early evening of 21 May. The poor weather conditions were perfect for an undetected departure. The question remains as to why he did not refuel Bismarck. It is possible that he initially intended to refuel from the tanker Weissenberg in the Arctic. It is also possible that as the hours passed, he felt it wiser to make for the Denmark Strait as quickly as possible, lest they lose the cover of the bad weather. Whatever his reason, it was another decision he would later regret.

During the morning of 22 May, the escorting destroyers parted company with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Lütjens’s force continued to steam north until the early afternoon, when the course was altered to northwest in preparation for the run through the Denmark Strait. The foggy weather continued to provide a shield from observation by British aircraft or surface vessels. At just before midnight the southwest turn that would take them through the Denmark Strait was executed. Later the speed of the squadron was increased to 24 to 27 knots in an attempt to ensure that the breakout was achieved before the favourable weather turned. This was the most dangerous part of the operation so far – the navigable channel was only 30 to 40 miles wide at this time of

year. If the British had discovered their intentions there would be patrols. If the fog held, they might be lucky and slip through despite these. Unfortunately for the Germans, the conditions were changing. In the late afternoon the fog lifted and visibility increased to 3 to 10 miles.

Norfolk and Suffolk’s Patrol in the Denmark Strait

RADM Wake-Walker had arranged for Suffolk to join him at Isafjordur on the north west coast of Iceland after she had completed her refuelling. The two cruisers would then commence their patrol of the Denmark Strait. Their role would, of course, be to locate Bismarck and Prinz Eugen and keep contact with them – there was no question of Wake-Walker’s ships engaging the German squadron as they would be clearly outgunned. The cruisers would patrol down the Strait in a south westerly direction and then reverse course towards the north west. This would continue until the German ships were seen or enough time had elapsed to ensure that they were not heading out into the Atlantic via this route. It was always possible of course that the German ships would be located using another route and that Wake-Walker would be called to assist.

The patrol began mid-morning of 23 May. Both cruisers were fitted with radar equipment (R D/F) but that on Suffolk was far superior to that on Norfolk. Suffolk’s radar was multi-directional with a range of 13 miles which enabling her to sweep in all directions except a blind spot at her stern. In contrast Norfolk was fitted with fixed R D/F allowing her to see ahead only. For this reason Suffolk was chosen to patrol on the Greenland side of the Strait. She would keep the ice at the limit of her radar, which would allow her room for manoeuvre should the German ships be sighted. This protection was further enhanced by the fog conditions that day – it was clear over Greenland and the ice pack, but a bank of fog was clinging to the Icelandic coast. This fog would provide a blanket of protection into which the British ships could slip once contact with the enemy was established. Norfolk, with her fixed equipment, patrolled from the Iceland side of the Strait only.

The patrol continued throughout the day and into the early evening. At roughly 1915 hours, whilst Suffolk was on her south-westerly run, the uncertainty was suddenly ended: Able Seaman Newell was on duty as the starboard after look out. He was there to cover the 'blind' zone in Suffolk’s radar coverage astern. As he scanned the horizon he saw Bismarck, and then Prinz Eugen roughly 7 miles away. He immediately called out 'Ship bearing green one four oh', followed seconds later by 'two ships bearing green one four oh'. The reaction was swift as Suffolk heeled over to port to seek the cover of the fog bank. Further encouragement was found by the fact that Bismarck did not open fire on Suffolk. Signals were sent out to say that contact with the enemy had at last been made.

Norfolk, hiding within the safety of the fog, picked up Suffolk’s report. She steered to take up position at the edge to the fog to assist in keeping contact. She strayed too close to the edge of the fog bank however, and cover was briefly lost. Bismarck spotted her and immediately opened fire. Norfolk was straddled, but was able to safely regain the cover of the fog bank. It was the first time the new German battleship had fired

salvoes in anger and it served as a warning to the British of the deadly accuracy of Bismarck’s guns.

Luck seemed to be running with the British: Contact with the enemy squadron had been achieved. Although the Germans knew that they been found, neither British ship had been damaged in making contact. Furthermore, contact could be safely maintained by means of Suffolk’s radar from the cover of the fog bank. It was now just a question of ensuring that British heavy ships could be guided towards the enemy.

Hood Leads the Chase

By 2000 hours, Hood’s force was at 63º20N' 27º00'W. Shortly before this, at 1939 hours, Vice-Admiral Holland ordered his vessels to raise steam for full speed and to change course to 295º. Shortly thereafter, at 2004 hours, he had the news he had been waiting for: Suffolk had positively sighted Bismarck and its consort in the Denmark Strait. This was followed-up by a report from Norfolk at 2040 hours. Plots put the Germans approximately 300 miles to the north of Holland’s force.

Holland’s battle plan at this point appears to have been for Hood and Prince of Wales to engage Bismarck in one of two fashions:

a. The first option was to cross the Germans’ "T" - i.e., cut across their bows on a westward course whilst they headed south. This would allow all the British guns to bear on the German ships whilst the enemy would only be able to fire at the British squadron with their forward guns. Of course, such a move could be easily countered.

b. The second choice was for Holland’s ships to cross the German squadron’s path well ahead, then swing around and approach from the west. This would would silhouette the Germans against the morning sky and considerably ease range finding for the British. It is evident that VADM Holland was hoping that Norfolk and Suffolk would engage Prinz Eugen whilst the two British capital ships fired on Bismarck, though this was evidently never communicated to them.

By 2054 hours, Hood’s force was proceeding at 27 knots on a heading of 295º. As the speed increased, the destroyers struggled to maintain station in the heavy seas. VADM Holland signalled to the destroyers "If you are unable to maintain this speed, I will have to go on without you. You should follow at your best speed".The four tiny destroyers did their best to keep up with the old battle cruiser fairly but took a horrendous buffeting in doing so.

At 2200 hours, the crews of Hood, Prince of Wales and their accompanying destroyers were officially notified of the Germans presence in the Denmark Strait. Interception and action was expected to take place between 0140 and 0200 hours that morning. All hands were ordered to be prepared to change into clean undergarments (to help prevent infection should they be wounded) and to don battle gear (life vests, flash gear, gas masks, helmets and, where necessary, cold weather gear). At 2230 hours, 'darken ship' was ordered. By 0015 hours, 24 May, crews aboard both ships had been called to

action stations and battle ensigns raised (note- Hood raised one battle ensign only). They were then an estimated 120 miles / 222 km south of the German ships.

Bismarck- Lost and Found on the High Seas Very late that evening, Suffolk lost contact with Bismarck: At one point it appeared to Suffolk that Bismarck had reversed course and was heading towards her. This being the case, Captain Ellis ordered an immediate alteration of Suffolk’s own course. By the time they had realised that Bismarck had not reversed course towards them and returned to their original bearing, the German vessels had disappeared into the snowstorm. Suffolk attempted to keep contact with her radar it proved impossible in the circumstances.

So it was that shortly after midnight, Suffolk reported that she had lost radar contact with the German vessels. Aboard Hood, VADM Holland, in his usual reserved fashion, calmly received the news. With no definite position or bearing for the German warships, he ordered that the crews to go to relaxed action stations (permission to sleep or at least relax at action stations) and a reduction in the ships’ speed to 25 knots. The heading changed to the north (340º) in order to cover any possible reversal of course by the Germans.

At this stage it was a guessing game for the British forces. It is often forgotten in articles on the loss of Hood that the relative positions of the ships at the time of the engagement was not entirely for VADM Holland to decide for himself. Loss of contact by Suffolk was a blow and suggested that the German squadron may well have altered course. This being the case, he had to decide what that course alteration might be. They may have decided that having been tracked it was likely that British forces would be concentrated to intercept them, and that it would be better to reverse course and disappear into the Arctic Ocean. Alternatively, they may have altered course to the south-east or the south-west. In any case, it seemed to Holland that the best course of action was to close the distance between his ships and the last known position of the German squadron as quickly as possible at this point.

Holland must have known that the worst possible scenario was for Bismarck and Prinz Eugen to slip by and out into the Atlantic to the east or west of his squadron as he hurried north. He therefore signalled to his force at 0030 hours that "If enemy is not in sight by 0210, I will probably alter course 180º until cruisers regain touch".He then once again signalled his battle plan: "Intend both ships to engage Bismarck and to leave [Prinz Eugen] to Norfolk and Suffolk". Of course, due to the ban on radio usage, this message was not transmitted to either Suffolk or Norfolk. At about this time, Prince of Wales intended to send up her Walrus seaplane for reconnaissance purposes. Unfortunately, the weather quickly deteriorated, forcing the flight to be cancelled. The Walrus was de-fuelled and put back in its hangar.

At 0147 hours, Holland signalled "If battlecruisers turn 200º at 0205 destroyers continue to search to the northward". Due to the poor weather and restricted visibility, it is not known if all four destroyers received the order. This order gives an indication of the

extent to which, just a few hours before the engagement took place the British forces were 'searching in the dark'. At 0203 hours, just before dawn (approximately 0300 hours in those latitudes at that time of year), Hood and Prince of Wales assumed a more southerly course of 200º at a speed of 25 knots. The destroyers then parted with the large ships to screen at 15 mile intervals to the north. This was to better the chances of locating the Germans should they successfully elude the Suffolk and Norfolk. Holland also ordered Prince of Wales to use her Type 284 gunnery radar to search 020 - 140º. Unfortunately, Prince of Wales’s Type 284 radar was experiencing troubles which rendered it more or less defective. Captain Leach therefore requested permission to use the somewhat more powerful Type 281 radar, but his request was refused, as the transmissions/emissions would have caused great interference to Hood’s own Type 284 radar.

At 0247 hours, Suffolk fortunately regained radar contact with the fleeing German vessels. Her reports placed the Germans approximately 35 miles/64.8 km north-west of Hood and Prince of Wales. Holland ordered another heading change, this time to 220º. Speed was gradually increased to 28 knots (as high as 28.8 knots per Prince of Wales’s log for 24 May 1941)..

Once More into the Breach By 0341 hours, both vessels were on a course of 240º. At 0450 hours, Prince of Wales took over guide of the fleet (i.e. positioned herself ahead of Hood). Why this temporary switching of position took place is not clear. It is recorded in Prince of Wales’s log as well as in the narrative of the operation written afterwards by Captain Leach but neither document explains the reason behind the move. Hood resumed guide at 0505 hours. Between 0500 and 0510 hours, Holland quietly ordered, "Prepare for instant action". The crews then went to the first level of readiness. The command crew trained their binoculars and strained their eyes to the north, as they silently waited for contact to be made. Over the past few hours the sky had grown lighter and visibility gradually increased, so that at roughly 0535-0536 hours, lookouts in Prince of Wales visually sighted smoke and mast tops of the enemy vessels at a range of at least 38,000 yards (18.75 nm / 34.7 km) .

By 0537 hours enough of the ships could be seen to confirm they were the Germans. Prince of Wales transmitted an enemy report at 0537 hours. Translated from code, it read: "Emergency to Admiralty and C in C Home Fleet. One battleship and one heavy cruiser, bearing 335, distance 17 miles. My position 63-20 North, 31-50 West. My course 240. Speed 28 knots". Hood sighted the Germans shortly thereafter, but did not transmit her enemy report until 0543 hours.

Face-to-Face with a Legend The Germans were well aware of the approach of the British warships: hydrophones (underwater sound detection devices) aboard Prinz Eugen had detected the sounds of fast moving turbine-driven vessels some time earlier in the hour. The initial German assumption was that they were probably cruisers. Knowing roughly where to look, spotters in Prinz Eugen and Bismarck first sighted the smoke plumes of the

approaching British vessels around 0535 hours. At 0537 hours, they intercepted Prince of Wales’s enemy report. Despite this, they apparently were not yet aware that they were being intercepted by major warships. An intercept of any kind was not apparent until 0543, when Hood was sighted and her enemy report intercepted. Though the foes were still thought to be cruisers, the alarm was finally ordered in both German ships.

After the alarm at 0545, the German crews - like their British counterparts - prepared themselves and anxiously awaited orders. These, however, were not soon to come: Admiral Lütjens was in somewhat of a quandary, as he had strict orders not to engage enemy warships unless absolutely necessary. His main priority was to get out into the Atlantic unscathed. If he took the time to engage the approaching vessels, it may delay him sufficiently to allow other British warships to join the fray. Worse, he could sustain damage or lose one or even both of his ships. He took no apparent action other than to order a possible increase in speed by Bismarck.

The Battle of the Denmark Strait At 0537 hours, VADM Holland had ordered his vessels to turn 40º to starboard together. This put the vessels on a heading of 280º, and placed the enemy fine off their starboard bows. The British ships were steaming at nearly 29 knots, with Prince of Wales roughly 800 yards/ 731.5 m off Hood’s starboard quarter. Unfortunately, rather than come out ahead of the Germans, Holland’s force had actually been on a diverging course. This was a result of the northern diversion the evening before as well as positional error in the regular reports from the British cruisers shadowing the Germans.

Now that his original intentions were no longer possible, Holland’s plan was to close the range as quickly as possible, then turn at short range to bring his full guns to bear. He would also keep his ships in close formation for gunnery concentration purposes. This meant both ships had to approach at an acute angle which masked their rear turrets. As a result, Holland would be going into battle with roughly half of his main armament. Heavy sea spray would pose a problem for his optical directors. The enemy vessels on the other hand, would be able to utilise their full compliment of main guns. Their optical equipment (already superior to the British types) would also suffer less from the effects of the wind and sea spray, as the wind would be on their disengaged sides.

Blunderer or Blighted by Fate? Click here to read Sean

Waddingham's review and click here to read Tim Woodward's dissertation

of VADM Holland's actions in the Denmark Strait

This approach has been the subject of much debate and criticism over the years. Most critics have benefitted from hindsight and inadequately considered what was and was not known to Holland at that time. Holland, an experienced gunnery and command officer, must have considered all of these negative factors that morning. He had hard choices to make, and he knew that for every action there was a calculated risk. In this

case, he had a chance to stop a potentially serious threat to British convoys. He absolutely had to seize the initiative and press the attack with the assets immediately available to him. He could not allow these ships to get loose and wreck havoc as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau did earlier in the year.

The sharp approach was dictated by the known deficiencies in Hood's armour and protection scheme. Holland would have been well aware of British armour efficiency studies that indicated Hood had virtually no immunity zone against 15" guns. Of course, the liklihood of a side penetrating hit could be lessened somewhat if Hood were at sharper angles in relation to the enemy. It was therefore critical that Hood close the range as quickly as possible but without allowing the Germans to slip ahead of his ships. In doing this, he would have tried to present as small a target as possible. Once the range had been closed,Hood would still be susceptible to enemy fire, but at such ranges the fire would come at flatter trajectories. If a somewhat oblique course were maintained, the side armour should stand up better to enemy gunfire. Presumably Hood's own gunnery would be more accurate at shorter ranges as well.

Above- Comparison of Ships Directly Involved in the Battle of the Denmark Strait, 24 May 1941

By 0552 hours, the range had decreased to roughly 25,000 yards / 12.3 nm / 22.8 km. The British vessels were now on a heading of 300º, a further turn of 20º towards the enemy having been executed at 0549. At 0550, Holland gave the order 'G.S.B. 337 L1' directing Hood and Prince of Wales to both engage the left hand German ship bearing 337º, which was presumed to be Bismarck. In reality, it was Prinz Eugen. Aboard Prince of Wales the mistake was realised fairly quickly. Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant Commander Colin McMullen, correctly identified the right-hand ship as Bismarck and ordered her to be targeted. Despite this correct identification, he had a difficult time in obtaining accurate ranges until just prior to the time fire was opened.

The reasons for the initial misidentification are quite understandable: First of all, it was assumed that the command vessel, Bismarck, would be leading the formation. They had no idea that the German vessels had switched position the previous day: Bismarck’s radar had been put out of action by the concussion of her main armament as she fired at the Norfolk on the the previous day. This being the case, Prinz Eugen was sent ahead in order that she could use her radar to search for any British vessels approaching from a forward bearing. Given the extreme ranges and angles at

which they were first sighted, the German ships were virtually indistinguishable due to their similar silhouettes. This was further compounded by the distance at which Bismarck was trailing Prinz Eugen (roughly between 1.5 to 2.5 km). This made the smaller ship look larger.

As the ships grew closer, the spotters in Hood realised their mistake. VADM Holland was informed and only moments before opening fire, he ordered 'GOB1'directing that fire be switched to the right hand German ship, Bismarck. This order was definitely communicated to Prince of Wales. It is also believed to have been meant for his own ship as well. Despite this, Hood's target remained the left hand ship, Prinz Eugen. The reason for this failure to switch targets is not exactly known. It may not have been possible to switch over quickly enough or there may have been communications problems.

Note: The timing of the order to switch targets is in some doubt. Hood survivors were sure that Hood shot at least two salvoes before VADM Holland ordered the target switch. On the other hand, Capt Leach of Prince of Wales insisted it came before fire was opened.

Hood Opens Fire. Drawing by Ian Johnston

Action commenced at 0552 1/2 hours, as Hood’s two forward turrets fired the first salvoes. Half a minute later, Prince of Wales’s forward turrets followed suit. Though it was at its extreme range, it is possible that Hood was attempting to use her Type 284 gunnery radar to direct her bombardment (this is subject to debate though). Prince of Wales, her Type 284 malfunctioning (attempts were made to use it, but it was believed to be defective) and unable to use an alternate radar such as Type 281 (VADM Holland denied permission for its use), was forced to shoot optically. Interestingly, Prince of Wales is believed to have attempted to use Type 284 or Type 281 later in the battle, but with poor results (this too is subject to debate).

Hood’s first salvo fell near Prinz Eugen but did not actually hit. Prince of Wales’s opening salvo was observed to be at least 1,500 yards over and to the right/aft of Bismarck. This was due to to incorrect estimates of the initial sighting range, course and bearing of Bismarck. The Germans, having seen the salvos, were shocked to learn that the approaching vessels were not cruisers, but were major combatants – a King George V class battleship (which they assumed was KGV herself, as Prince of Wales was thought to still be working up) and even worse, the famed and feared battle cruiser H.M.S. Hood (apparently the men aboard Bismarck knew it was Hood before the

crew of Prinz Eugen). Her legend and reputation were great and she was well respected in the Kriegsmarine. This is backed-up by the statements of Bismarck crew who were later quoted as saying that Hood, in particular, was the 'terror of their war games'.

Hood continued to fire on Prinz Eugen. Prince of Wales continued to engage Bismarck. According to Hood survivors, Hood switched targets to Bismarck after 2 or 3 salvoes. A German witness aboard Prinz Eugen thought otherwise and recounted that Hood shot only at Prinz Eugen. This is far different from the recollections ofBismarck survivors - they were sure Hood had engaged them accurately all along. Most of these men, however, were not in a position to actually see what Hood was shooting at and more than likely were accounting for the fire of Prince of Wales. With little to no fall of shot information availalbe, it points to the strong possibility thatHood shot most of her salvoes between the two German ships, never striking either one.

0555 hours- Bismarck opens fire

Aboard Bismarck, Admiral Lütjens' hesitance had started to place his ships in potential danger - though his gun crews were ready and requesting permission to open fire, Lütjens still would not act. At 0555 hours, after two minutes of British shelling, Captain Lindemann had finally had enough. He was rumoured to have said 'I will not let my ship get shot out from under my arse!' then give permission to open fire. Prinz Eugen shot first (see photo at right), followed shortly by Bismarck. Both vessels concentrated their fire on the lead British vessel, Hood.

Bismarck’s first salvo (4 guns) fell in front and slightly to starboard of Hood. Its second, fell directly between Hood and Prince of Wales. Its third salvo appeared to straddle Hood. Meanwhile, Prinz Eugen had loosed between 2 and 3 salvoes herself. One of these salvoes straddled Hood at roughly the same time that Bismarck’s third salvo fell. It is believed that either one 15inch shell from Bismarck or one or more 8inch high explosive (not armour piercing) shells from Prinz Eugen struck Hood near the base of the main mast on the port side of the shelter deck. It is widely believed that the hit was from Prinz Eugen rather than Bismarck. This conclusion is based on both eye witness testimony as well as the fact that a hit byBismarck’s 15inch shells would likely have caused considerably more damage.

Hood as seen from Prince of Wales

The hit on Hood started a bright fire that proceeded to spread across a portion of the shelter deck to port of the main mast and aft superstructure. Though it apparently did not reach the motor launches/boats, it did reach various ready-use ammunition lockers and began ’cooking off’ the munitions inside. The shelter deck soon became hellish as 4inch shells and 7inch Unrotated Projectile (UP) rocket mines began sporadically detonating. The detonations occurred both on the ship as well as in the air. Those who could not take cover in time were killed or wounded in the storm of fire and shrapnel.

On the Compass Platform, Squadron Gunnery Officer Commander Gregson stepped outside to examine the situation. He reported to VADM Holland and Captain Kerr that Hood had been hit on the boat deck (shelter deck) near the main mast and that there was a fire in the Ready Use lockers. Simultaneously with this, emergency calls began to flood the bridge. Realising the danger the fire and exploding ammunition posed to damage control parties on the shelter deck, Holland ordered the fire left alone until the ammunition had been fully expended. Accordingly, all personnel with exposed action stations were ordered to take cover. Most huddled in the large open area at the rear of the main superstructure’s base. The fire raged on for another minute or two before it finally started to die down. It should be noted that amongst the flood of damage reports coming in, there was nothing from the torpedo areas or the engine rooms. These areas were very likely unaffected by the fire.

Captain Kerr tried to contact the observers in the spotting top but was unable to get through. Quite possibly, there was no one there to talk to – Midshipman William Dundas later commented that he saw bodies falling from the spotting top at about that time. It is possible that a shell from Bismarck had passed through without detonating. This would have had a devastating effect on the observers and possibly her radar operators. This could have severely hampered targeting/sighting efforts by forcing Hood to rely upon her single main optical rangefinder, or worse, her drenched turret rangefinders.

Bismarck trained her 5.9" / 15cm secondary armament to Prince of Wales, but kept her main guns fixed on Hood. Prinz Eugen switched fire totally to Prince of Wales after her 6th salvo. Prince of Wales fired her 14" and 5.25" armament at Bismarck. Hood continued to shoot somewhere between the two German ships.

Above- Map of the battle. Click to enlarge.

Note: To view a more detailed version of the battlemap, please see Antonio Bonomi's Denmark Strait battle reconstruction.

The Loss of Hood

VADM Holland must have realised that the situation was getting desperate: The Germans had already found the range and Hood was taking hits. He was also suffering casualties on the burning shelter deck. Worst of all, neither of his own ships appeared to be scoring any decisive hits on the enemy. Hood, having made the error of initially opening fire against the wrong ship was only now getting the correct range for Bismarck. Things were going horribly wrong – he needed to improve his odds.

At 0555 hours, believing that he was likely out of the danger zone for plunging fire (or believing he was within acceptable gunnery range), VADM Holland ordered the flag signal 'Blue 2' (20° turn to port) to be hoisted. The ships turned to port in an attempt to 'open A arcs' (i.e. allow the rear turrets to be brought into action). This turn opened Prince of Wales’s A arcs at her 9th salvo. It apparently also opened Hood’s A arcs as one or more of her aft turrets was seen to fire sometime after the completion of the turn. Once the range was down to approximately 14,500 yards/ 7.2 nm / 13.3 km, VADM Holland ordered another 20° turn to port.

This turn was executed sometime between 0559-0600. Sometime during the first moments of the execution of this turn, Hood was dealt her death blow- Bismarck’s5th salvo had straddled, with one or two shells likely striking Hood somewhere around the main mast, or possibly through a narrow weak zone in her side (possibly even underwater). Aboard Prince of Wales, Captain Leach happened to be looking at

Hood: "...at the moment when a salvo arrived and it appeared to be across the ship somewhere about the mainmast. In that salvo there were, I think, two shots short and one over, but it may have been the other way round. But I formed the impression at the time that something had arrived on board Hood in a position just before the mainmast and slightly starboard. It was not a very definite impression that I had, but it was sufficiently definite to make me look at Hood for a further period. In fact I wondered what the result was going to be, and between one and two seconds after I formed that impression, an explosion took place in the Hood, which appeared to me to come from very much the same position in the ship. There was a very fierce upward rush of flame the shape of a funnel, rather a thin funnel, and almost instantaneously the ship was enveloped in smoke from one end to the other."

Hood explodes. Drawing by Ian Johnston

Although there was naturally some variation in the reports that witnesses gave, most agree that a tall, slim geyser of flame, similar in appearance to a welding torch, shot up from the area around the main mast (possibly venting flame/gas shooting up from the engine room vents). At the same time, a gigantic, strangely quiet, explosion or conflagration wracked the entire aft end of the ship. Large pieces of debris were observed in the air. As the flames turned into a mushroom cloud, the entire ship became wreathed in heavy smoke. She slowed to a stop and heeled heavily to starboard.

On Hood’s Compass Platform, a bright flash was seen to sweep round outside and everyone was thrown to the floor. As they regained their footing, the Officer of the Watch notified VADM Holland and Captain Kerr that the compass had gone. Kerr ordered that control be switched over to emergency steering. No sooner than that was said, the ship momentarily righted itself, then began an alarming roll to port – a roll from which she never recovered. As she rolled to port, she began to go down by the stern. The bow began to swing sharply upwards – Hood was going down and doing so quickly. In his book Flagship Hood, survivor Ted Briggs records that VADM Holland, sat dejectedly in his seat, with Captain Kerr attempting to stand at his side, and that no order was given to abandon ship – it really was not necessary. Everyone seemed to realise what was happening. Those that could do so, very calmly left their stations in an attempt to clear the foundering ship.

Hood sinking, as seen from Prinz Eugen

Those able to see the action on Prince of Wales, Norfolk and Suffolk, as well as their German adversaries, could not believe their eyes: The 'Mighty Hood', most famous of all warships, had just been devastated by a massive explosion. It truly was unfathomable if not nightmarish to all who watched. This spectacle resulted in a momentary lull in the battle. The section of the ship from just before the main mast aft to "Y" turret was laid waste – a mass of largely unrecognisable steel and twisted framework. They watched in horror as the remains of the stern, twisted, swung vertical and quickly sank.

Who Sank the Hood and How? For a detailed look at the likely

cause of Hood’s sinking, see Bill Jurens' article "Loss of H.M.S. Hood".

Also see SNAME's A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

The forepart swung high into the air at an angle between 45º and vertical and began to pivot about as it rapidly sank. According to the Germans, as the bow rose into the air,Hood’s forward turrets were seen to fire one last salvo. If this is true, it is likely due to a short or a mechanical failure. Another possibility is that they were venting flames from an internal fire or smaller scale explosion.

The Retreat of Prince of Wales

Prince of Wales meanwhile, had continued to execute the turn and now found the sinking Hood directly in her path. The ship had to take immediate evasive action to starboard in order to avoid the wreckage. In her aft gunnery director tower, Lieutenant Commander Brooke recalled the ship (Prince of Wales) heeling over to starboard on execution of the Blue 2 (20º to port) signal, then violently heeling in the opposite direction. The starboard turn was so severe that it seemed to some as ifPrince of Wales would roll completely over. Fortunately, she soon steadied herself. A momentary lull ensued as the Prince of Wales’s own guns were silenced by the loss of aim that these movements caused the gun directors. The emergency turn to starboard also, unfortunately, placed Prince of Wales immediately between Hoodand the German vessels – in short, she was directly in their sights. The close formation that the British

ships had taken up now meant that Bismarck's gunners quickly and accurately switched fire to Prince of Wales.

Prince of Wales passes Hood

Within moments, Bismarck, her elated crew now focused on the battle once more, was scoring hits on the new battleship: The first 15inch shell to find its mark went struck the lightly armoured compass platform, killing or mortally wounding all personnel except Captain Leach, the Chief Yeoman of signals, and the Navigating Officer. All three were understandably dazed. Although severe in its effects, this hit was mitigated by the fact that the shell passed completely through without detonating. It was not a dud, as is often claimed, it had merely not encountered enough of a mass to trip its fuse. Control of the ship was passed to the upper conning tower immediately below the compass platform. Further hits followed in rapid succession: Four more 8inch and two more 15inch. These included a 15inch hit below the waterline beneath the armoured belt. This shell, which was potentially fatal to the ship, did not explode and was not discovered until the ship docked at Rosyth after the operation had concluded.

At this point in time, the Germans were also preparing to use another weapon against Prince of Wales: long range torpedoes from Prinz Eugen. Captain Brinkmann of Prinz Eugen ordered that torpedoes be fired as soon as the range was reached. Bismarck remaining astern of Prinz Eugen to avoid masking the target. The torpedoes were never launched, however, due to the inexperience of the torpedo officer and the next actions of Prince of Wales.

Bismarck engages Prince of Wales

Despite the numerous hits sustained and the ever increasing problems with her own guns Prince of Wales is believed to have scored three straddles containing hits on Bismarck – one of which was to effectively end Bismarck’s participation in 'Operation

Rheinübung'. Some experts attribute Prince of Wales’s success to the use of Type 281 radar (which she had switched to after Hood’s demise), although Captain Leach himself later reported this was found to be malfunctioning at that time (again, radar use is subject to debate). Regardless, she was soon in dire straits, and sometime between 0602 and 0603, following her 18th salvo, Captain Leach (or the Officer in Charge of the ship in the moments immediately following the hit on the Compass Platform) made the wise decision to lay down a smoke screen and break off the engagement. In the midst of this turn away, the aft turret ("Y" turret) managed three more salvoes (a total of 4 rounds) under local control. All are believed to have fallen short. After turning away and circling to port, Prince of Wales later joined up with Norfolk in the shadowing of the Germans.

Why did Prince of Wales retreat? As we review these events some 60-plus years after they took place, it will seem to most readers that Captain Leach was entirely justified to have broken off the action. Unfortunately, in 1941, he came under very close scrutiny by no less than Winston Churchill for doing so. Fortunately he was backed up both by Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker (who himself came under similar scrutiny) as well as Home Fleet Commander in Chief, Admiral Tovey. Leach based his decision upon several factors: the ship was clearly not in fighting condition due to her mechanical problems and shell damage. The crew was still a bit "green" and needed more time to get used to the ship and each other. She had also lost 13 men 14 men by the following day) in her Compass Platform, Air Defense Platform and aft radar office, plus numerous other casualties. He felt it was wiser to regroup and live to fight another day. There would be time to effect a more decisive concentration of British forces against Bismarck later. He was correct. Continuing the battle would have been a senseless waste of lives and of a potentially valuable asset.

Why was Hood's Gunnery Poor? Click he an excellent look at Hood’s

antiquated fire control systems, see the article "Hood’s Fire

Control System- An Overview" by William Schleihauf.

Meanwhile, the German vessels had other issues to contend with: Around 0603 and again at 0607 and 0609 hours, underwater sound detection devices aboard Prinz Eugen picked up approaching sounds. The noises were assessed to be incoming torpedoes. Although the range was still extreme, the belief appears to have been that Hood may have fired torpedoes before sinking. Due to the angle of approach as well as the range involved, the German ships first turned away. They then settled back on their approximate previous course. Minutes later, at 0607 and 0609 hours, additional "torpedo" noises were detected and also responded to with evasive maneuvers. Although it is certain that Prinz Eugen executed these evasive turns, it is also highly likely that Bismarck did likewise as there was a potential threat and it would be dangerous to steam by a cruiser maneuvering so close at hand.

"Schmalenbach" Battle Film To view the actual German film of Operation Rheinübung, to include the famous footage of the battle with Hood and Prince of Wales,

please click here.

Both ships continued firing their guns at the fleeing Prince of Wales in the process. During the course of these manoeuvers,Bismarck approached fairly close to Prinz Eugen (astern and to starboard). She later crossed Prinz Eugen’s wake towards the port side. The sweeping torpedo avoidance maneuvers executed that morning account for the fact that photos/film of the event show her to both sides of Prinz Eugen.

It should be noted that the British hadn't really fired torpedoes: Of the British combatants directly involved, only Hood had such a capability. It is highly unlikely that she would have launched from such an extreme range. Even more unlikely that they would actually come close to the German ships. It should also be noted that British witnesses do not recall any orders being given to launch torpedoes. It could not have been the nearby British aircraft either as they were no so-equipped. There were also no known British submarines in the area. Prinz Eugen most likely detected the sound of collapsing bulkheads and wrenching steel coming from the sinking Hood...at this point she was well on her way down to the ocean floor and was being torn apart.

During this timeframe, there was also an aircraft alarm, due to the appearance of a Sunderland flying boat (Z201 of 201 Squadron, piloted by Flt Lt. Vaughn). Following the completion of the third anti-torpedo manoeuvre, Bismarck, now off Prinz Eugen's port quarter, advanced forward. She came between Prinz Eugen and the retreating Prince of Wales. She was in this position when the surface battle ended at 0609. In order to resume her leading position (Bismarck still had no forward radar and the known threats were now all to the rear), Prinz Eugen had to increase speed to maximum. By the time the antiaircraft barrages ceased at 0620, Prinz Eugen had already begun to pull well ahead of Bismarck. The German ships ultimately resumed their pre-battle positions.

Admiral Lütjens was satisfied with the outcome of the battle. He ignored suggestions from Capt Lindemann that they pursue and destroy the damaged Prince of Wales. He felt that any delay would likely bring more British warships to the area and potentially risk more damage to Bismarck – it was best to make a quick get away, fully assess and repair the existing damage then fulfill the mission objectives.

Survival Hood was gone. Out of her crew of 1,418 men, only three, Midshipman William Dundas, Able Seaman Robert Tilburn and Signalman Ted Briggs remained: Midshipman Dundas had escaped the Compass Platform by kicking out one of the starboard windows. He squeezed through to safety just as the sea reached him. Moments earlier, Ted Briggs had exited the Compass Platform by the starboard side door. As Ted reached the door, the Squadron Navigator, Commander John Warrand,

smiled and selflessly moved aside and gestured for him to leave first. Though he was sure that Commanders Warrand and Gregson had also made it outside, he was never to see either of them again. As Ted climbed down the ladder ways, the sea overtook him. He came to the surface a short time later. Meanwhile, on Hood’s port forward shelter deck, Able Seaman Bob Tilburn escaped by climbing down onto the forecastle deck and diving into the sea. He narrowly missed being fatally trapped by Hood’s plunging superstructure. After being dragged down some distance, he freed himself and reached the surface.

There was absolutely no trace of the other 1,415 crewmen alive or dead. Of Hood herself, all that remained on the surface was a morass of floating debris and an oil slick 4inch deep. Fire flickered here and there among the debris.

Why Such a Heavy Loss of Life? Click here to learn about factors

which may have contributed to the high death toll.

The three men had each quickly found their way to recently installed small grey 3ft square rafts (not Carley Rafts, but a different design) floating in the wreckage. They then managed to link up with one another. They were thoroughly soaked, caked with stinging oil and in a state of shock. As they sat in the frigid air, they watched as Prince of Wales steamed by attempting to continue the battle. They could also see smoke from Norfolk quite a way off when it eventually passed the scene. For around three hours they fought off the effects of hypothermia – only the persistence of Dundas, through non-stop talking and singing (especially "Roll Out the Barrel"), kept the men coherent and alive.

Nevertheless, as time wore on, the cold began to take effect despite Dundas’s best efforts. At one point a passing aircraft (Sunderland Z201 most likely) managed to bring them back to full alertness, but as it did not see them, they soon began falling victim to the cold once more. Some two hours had passed and the men eventually drifted apart and began to give up hope. Fortunately, it was then that destroyer H27, H.M.S. Electra (later to play a role in rescuing Prince of Wales’s survivors on 10th December 1941), arrived on the scene. She quickly picked up the three men, searched for other survivors, found none, then departed the scene. The men were landed at Reykjavik, Iceland late on 24 May. They were then transferred to a hospital for one day, and then to the merchantman Royal Ulsterman for transport back to Britain.

Hood Avenged- The Defeat of Bismarck While the survivors were recovering from their ordeal, Hood was finally avenged. In a truly epic naval 'fox hunt on the high seas', Bismarck was hunted down and thoroughly defeated by the Royal Navy: Following the morning’s success against Hood and Prince of Wales, the damage to Bismarck was fully assessed. She had taken three 14 inch shell hits from Prince of Wales. The combined effects of two of these hits resulted in a serious fuel leak and reduced speed capacity. Surely Lütjens regretted not

refuelling Bismarck at Bergen. Now there was no viable way for the operation to continue as planned – Rheinübung in its present form was over. Though Hood was lost, VADM Holland had achieved the objective of stopping Bismarck’s mission.

The decision was made that Prinz Eugen should escape and attempt commerce raiding on her own, whilst Bismarck proceeded to occupied France. On the afternoon of 24th May, Bismarck turned back towards her shadowers – this disrupted their coverage long enough to permit Prinz Eugen to escape undetected. Shots were exchanged between Bismarck and Prince of Wales, but no hits were scored. Bismarck then resumed her course. Late that evening, Swordfish aircraft fromH.M.S. Victorious, were launched against Bismarck. Although they did score one torpedo hit, no significant new damage was achieved. It only succeeded in slowingBismarck down a bit (the temporary repairs made after the Denmark Strait battle had come loose or were damaged as Bismarck manoeuvred to dodge the torpedoes).

On 25th May, Bismarck was once again able to shake off her pursuers, this time by cleverly looping around them. After losing radar contact with Bismarck, the British attempted to locate her using radio direction finding gear. Based on misplotted raw direction finder data, it was erroneously assumed that Bismarck had turned north to effect a return to Germany. Accordingly, Tovey turned his force in that direction. Meanwhile, Bismarck had actually continued on course to France. For reasons unknown, Bismarck foolishly poured out long radio messages to Germany. Once again using radio direction finding gear, the British soon got a better (but still rough) idea of Bismarck’s position. Based on this, Tovey realised that Bismarck had not turned and was apparently headed directly for France. By the time this mistake was realised, Bismarck had a lead of at least 150 miles. Unless something was done to slow her down, it would soon be within the range of U-boat and Luftwaffe protective screens.

On the morning of 26 May, Bismarck’s precise position and heading were at last confirmed by an American exchange officer piloting a British Catalina flying boat. Meanwhile, Tovey, in King George V had linked up with the battleship Rodney and began to pursue Bismarck, which was 130 miles / 240 km ahead of them. That evening, the cruiser Sheffield caught up to and began shadowing the wounded German giant. Also that evening, another Swordfish torpedo attack was launched, this time from Ark Royal. Unfortunately, the aircraft mistakenly attacked the Sheffield! Luckily for everyone concerned, all of the torpedoes had faulty magnetic firing mechanisms and exploded prematurely on contact with the ocean. The mistake realised, the Swordfish returned home and were made ready for another attack – this time with contact fuses on the torpedoes. In addition to the near fratricide incident, Sheffield also came under fire from Bismarck that evening. She received notable splinter damage and several casualties (3 men died).

Swordfish from Ark Royal struck once more that evening – this time with significant results: At least one hit was achieved on Bismarck’s stern. The result was that one or more of its rudders were jammed to port. Attempts were made to free the rudders and to steer using her screws, but to no avail. Virtually unmanoeuverable,Bismarck soon

began to turn in the direction of Tovey's battleship force. To make matters worse for Bismarck, there would be no rest for her weary crew- the wounded behemoth was continuously harassed by British destroyers through the night. Though not directly struck, the destroyers received damage and suffered casualties (including 2 fatalities). Bismarck was untouched, but her crews psychological state was certainly affected.

Bismarck during her final battle.

During the morning of 27th May, a combined British force, led by King George V and Rodney, finally caught and engagedBismarck. The German battleship, its rudders jammed, was unable to manoeuvre effectively. Neither she nor her tired crew was in peak condition at this point. The result of this was that in the ensuing action, Bismarck was quickly and inevitably overwhelmed.

She did manage to straddle both Rodney and King George V early on, but scored no direct hits. The British made quick work of the crippled ship and it was soon a slowly sinking, blazing wreck. At approximately 1039 hours, it was at last sent to the bottom by combination of the torpedoes of H.M.S. Dorsetshire, and earlier German scuttling efforts. Who actually sank the ship is a moot point in that by this point she was already defeated and permanently out of action.

In the end, the German death toll was approximately 2,131 (per a recent German recount of Bismarck casualties). Only 115 of her men survived. Of these, 110 were rescued by British warships (1 of which died the following day) and 5 were picked up by German/Axis-friendly ships. The death toll would have been somewhat lower, but the British were forced to break-off their rescue attempt – a suspicious 'smoking discharge' was sighted in the water and the rescue vessels departed the scene for fear of U-boat attack. This understandable but highly controversial and regrettable action left hundreds in the cold water. Some estimates put the number as high as 800, but this is mere speculation. The abandoned men either drowned, died of hypothermia or from their wounds. Although relieved that the German threat had been nullified, the survivors of Hood were not overjoyed at the news - they fully understood what the crew of Bismarckhad gone through.

Above- The Primary Ships Involved in Bismarck's Final Action

As for Prinz Eugen, she had no success on her own. Suffering from engine/mechanical problems, she was forced to steam into Brest, France on the 1st of June. Thus ended 'Operation Rheinübung'. As it turned out, Hood’s loss aside, 'Operation Rheinübung' had proved a total failure for the Germans. In fact, in some ways, it was a victory for Great Britain, albeit an extremely bitter and costly one – Hitler never again allowed his surface fleet to attempt such an ambitious operation. Though they would still be used in the Baltic and in the waters off Norway, they were never again a realised threat to Atlantic shipping.

Homecoming

The three survivors of the Hood were disembarked at Greenock on 29 May. After being provisioned with new uniforms and gear, they were whisked by train to London. After an interview with Vice-Admiral Whitworth, formerly of Hood himself, the men were all placed on indefinite survivors leave. They were told not to report until told to do so (for the enquiry). Ted Briggs was in fact to return earlier than this. Note: Anyone interested in Ted’s unique first hand recollection of his time in Hood, both good and bad, should buy a copy of his book 'Flagship Hood' (or read the transcript here).

The First Board of Enquiry

The first enquiry was convened in early June. They quickly reached the conclusion that one or more shells from Bismarck had managed to penetrate Hood’sarmour/protective plating and detonate her aft magazines. Although it was a logical conclusion, the proceedings came under scrutiny: As it turned out, very few witnesses were called, and of the Hood survivors, only William Dundas gave evidence. Verbatim records of the evidence were not made and to make matters worse, the appropriate experts (on explosives, etc.) had not been called. It was not long before the Admiralty decided that a second board would have to be convened.

The Second Board of Enquiry

The second Board convened on 27th August 1941 under the Chairmanship of Rear-

Admiral H.T.C. "Hooky" Walker, himself a former Captain of Hood. This board called two of the three survivors (Ted Briggs and Bob Tilburn), numerous eyewitnesses from Prince of Wales, Suffolk and Norfolk. It also called experts in the fields of construction and armament/explosives. Although far more comprehensive and thorough than the first enquiry, the second Board ultimately reached much the same conclusions as the first Board – A salvo from Bismarck penetrated Hood’s vitals and detonated the aft magazines. Other possibilities exist, but a shell from Bismarckwas felt to be the most likely cause.

The Discovery of Hood’s Wreck

In July 2001, a team led by David L Mearns located Hood’s wreck approximately 9,200 feet below the surface of the Denmark Strait. The team also visited the wreck of Bismarck. In the case of Hood, the condition of the wreck confirmed that a catastrophic event involving the aft magazines did indeed cause the destruction and sinking of the ship. The damage was actually much more severe than initially expected- not only was the stern detached, but the bow (seen in the photo to the right) was separated from the main hull as well.

For detailed photos and an in-depth description of both the Hood and Bismarck wrecks, please see our article on The July 2001 Channel 4 Expedition to Locate and Film the Wrecks of Hood & Bismarck. You can also consult the findings of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME) review of wreck materials - A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck.