the psychology of coercion: merging psychology of coercion: merging airpower and prospect ......

Download THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COERCION: MERGING PSYCHOLOGY OF COERCION: MERGING AIRPOWER AND PROSPECT ... MERGING

Post on 05-Jul-2018

214 views

Category:

Documents

1 download

Embed Size (px)

TRANSCRIPT

  • THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COERCION:

    MERGING AIRPOWER AND PROSPECT THEORY

    By

    JON A. KIMMINAU, MAJOR, USAF

    A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF

    THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES

    FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

    SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES

    AIR UNIVERSITY

    MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

    JUNE 1998

    ByrdjoDistribution A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

  • Disclaimer

    The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do

    not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of

    Defense.

    ii

  • About The Author

    Major Jon A. Kimminau is a 1982 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy

    (USAFA). After receiving a Masters in Public Policy from the John F. Kennedy School

    of Government, Harvard University, in 1984, he attended basic intelligence officer and

    signals intelligence officer training enroute to becoming a flight commander with the

    6912th Electronic Security Group, Berlin, Germany. From 1987 to 1990, he served as an

    assistant director of operations with the European Electronic Security Division, Ramstein

    AB, Germany, and was a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School at Maxwell

    AFB in December 1987. Changing theaters, he became the Director of Operations for the

    6990th Electronic Security Squadron, Kadena AB, Okinawa, Japan, operating the RC-135

    reconnaissance platform for theater and national requirements from 1990 to 1993. In

    June of 1993, Major Kimminau became the airborne reconnaissance programs manager at

    the Cryptologic Support Center, Kelly AFB, Texas, moving in 1994 to HQ Air

    Intelligence Agency as a lead acquisition staff officer for reconnaissance programs with

    the Directorate of Plans and Programs. From June 1995 to June 1996 he served as the

    Executive Officer to the Commander, Air Intelligence Agency. He was a distinguished

    graduate from Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, in June 1997, and

    graduated from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies in June 1998. He is currently

    attending Ohio State University in pursuit of a Ph.D. in Political Science.

    iii

  • Contents

    Page

    DISCLAIMER .................................................................................................................... ii

    ABOUT THE AUTHOR.................................................................................................... iii

    LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................. vi

    LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................vii

    PREFACE ........................................................................................................................viii

    ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... ix

    INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 1

    COERCION AND RATIONALITY................................................................................... 6

    The Mechanism of Military Coercion........................................................................... 8

    Rationality and Coercion ............................................................................................ 10

    Summary..................................................................................................................... 13

    PROSPECT THEORY...................................................................................................... 14

    Four Axioms of Prospect Theory................................................................................ 16

    The Meta-theory for Prospects.................................................................................... 21

    Summary..................................................................................................................... 23

    MERGING AIRPOWER AND PROSPECT THEORY................................................... 25

    Alternatives, Framing, and Evaluating ....................................................................... 27

    Interpreting the Model ................................................................................................ 29

    Airpower Factors and Variables ................................................................................. 34

    Risk and Decision ....................................................................................................... 37

    Summary..................................................................................................................... 39

    AIRPOWER COERCION................................................................................................. 41

    The Domain of Gains: An Adversary with Advantages ............................................ 42

    The Domain of Losses: Bleak Horizons .................................................................... 47

    Small Probabilities: Trapped in Dire Straits .............................................................. 53

    Summary..................................................................................................................... 59

    CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................... 61

    iv

  • What the Model Reveals............................................................................................. 62 What the Past Reveals................................................................................................. 64 Tools for the Future .................................................................................................... 68 Final Word .................................................................................................................. 70

    BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 72

    v

  • Illustrations

    Page

    Figure 1. Papes General Coercion Model ........................................................................ 25

    Figure 2. A Prospect Theory Decision Model................................................................... 29

    Figure 3. Relation of Airpower Strategies to Coercion Variables (Notional)................... 37

    Figure 4. A Prospect Theory Airpower Coercion Model.................................................. 39

    Figure 5. The Contrast of Decision Models ...................................................................... 63

    vi

  • Tables

    Page

    Table 1. Factors of Framing .............................................................................................. 31

    Table 2. Coercion Variables.............................................................................................. 33

    Table 3. Domain of Gains Coercion.................................................................................. 47

    Table 4. Domain of Losses Coercion ................................................................................ 53

    Table 5. Small Probabilities Coercion............................................................................... 59

    Table 6. Insights from Prospect Theory............................................................................ 65

    vii

  • Preface

    This thesis serves a dual purpose: it scratches an itch in a particular academic area,

    and it tries to expand thinking on a topic of immense practical importance to the Air

    Force. The itch concerns prospect theory: from my first reading of the original, though

    technically oriented, article that proposed the theory, I became fascinated with the

    implications of this particular bounded rationality model of decisionmaking. Coercion

    provided me an appropriate field for applying many of the implications of the theory.

    found in developing my ideas that this is more than just a convenient exploration to meet

    a thesis requirementI believe the merger of these two areas produces a usable and

    consistent air power concept. I hope the reader will agree.

    While all the faults of this paper are certainly mine, I owe a great deal to at least four

    of the faculty of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Lt Col Clayton Chun

    provided the initial inspiration with a side reading in his excellent Primer for Strategists

    course, while Dr Hal Winton encouraged and challenged my intense interest in theories.

    Maj Mark Conversino served as my research advisor, and inspired me with words of

    wisdom whenever he turned his coffee cup. Finally, Professor Karl Mueller acted as a

    mentor in the field of political science, in addition to serving as my research reader. To

    all, and the remaining members of the faculty, I owe heartfelt thanks for a hard but well-

    spent year.

    Most of all, I owe thanks to God for all his blessings, the top of the heap being my

    wife and partner Trish, and my kids, Bekah, Erin and Riley.

    viii

    I

  • Abstract

    This paper examines a model for thinking about coercion that explains airpowers

    role in achieving national objectives. Coercion is the use of power to achieve objectives,

    not by imposing the desired conditions upon an adversary, but rather by convincing the

    adversary to

Recommended

View more >