Table 2Results of the Senate elections in Argentina, June 2009.

Party Votes Votes (%) Seats Seats (%) Overall seats Change

Civic and Social Alliance (ACyS) and RadicalCivic Union (UCR)

2,477,688 40.5 12 50.0 25 þ5

Front for Victory (FPV) and Peronist party (PJ)allies

1,212,255 19.8 8 33.3 36 �4

Anti-Kirchner Peronist dissidents 710,580 11.6 2 8.3 2 þ0Union for Cordoba 429,364 7.0 0 – 0 þ0Republican Proposal (PRO) and allies 342,449 5.6 2 8.3 2 þ1Worker’s Party 58,890 1.0 0 – 0 þ0Other parties with less than 1% 545,570 8.9 0 – 2 �2Other provincial parties 84,567 1.4 0 – 5 �1Total 5,861,363 100.0 24 100.0 72

Blank votes (% of total votes) 144,798 (2.4)Null votes (% of total votes) 116,602 (1.9)Votes under judicial review (% of total votes) 12,235 (0.2)Total votes (turnout) 6,122,763 (72.2)Registered electorate 8,474,844

Source: National Electoral Directorate, Ministry of the Interior (http://www.elecciones.gov.ar/inicio.htm).

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 171–195 177

its place. What is certain is that, whichever Kirchnerchooses to run in the 2011 race, he or she is likely to facestrong challenges from the likes of Cobos, Macri, and Reu-temann, either in the primaries for the Peronist candidacyor in the election itself. Argentina’s next presidential racewill not be a repeat of Fernandez’s sweep to victory in 2007,particularly since she now faces the difficult task ofwinning back her popularity while having to share power.

* Tel.: þ44 (0)161 295 5614; fax: þ44 (0)161 295 2818.E-mail address: a.aghrout@salford.ac.uk

References

Bonvecchi, A., Giraudy, A., 2007. Argentina: crecimiento economico yconcentracion del poder institucional. Revista de Ciencia Polıtica 27(1), 29–42.

Brusco, V., Nazareno, M., Stokes, S.C., 2004. Vote buying in Argentina.Latin American Research Review 39 (2), 66–88.

Singer, M.M., Fara, C., 2008. The presidential and legislative elections inArgentina, October 2007. Electoral Studies 27 (4), 756–760.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2009.09.007

The presidential election in Algeria, April 2009

Ahmed Aghrout*

European Studies Research Institute, Crescent House, University of Salford, Salford, Greater Manchester M5 4WT, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 20 August 2009Accepted 21 September 2009

1. Background turmoil of the 1990s, needed to be adapted to the reality of

This poll, Algeria’s fourth multi-candidate presidentialelection, took place against a backdrop of debate oversignificant constitutional reforms. The incumbent president,Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who had been in power since 1999,had on a number of occasions expressed his displeasure withthe 1996 constitution. His central claim was that thatconstitution, drawn up in the context of the domestic

Algeria’s restored stability and security.In the absence of a real public debate about consti-

tutional reform, such discussions were confined to onlya few political circles (parties and civil society organisa-tions). At this level, the debate was polarised betweenthose who supported and those who opposed the Presi-dent’s planned reforms. On the former side was theruling coalition, commonly referred to as the ‘presidentialalliance’ – the Front de Liberation Nationale (NationalLiberation Front, FLN), the Rassemblement National Dem-ocratique (National Democratic Rally, RND) and theMouvement de la Societe pour la Paix (Islamist Movement

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 171–195178

of Society for Peace, MSP) – and the FLN’s satellite massorganisations.1 Ranged on the opposing side were thesecular Berber-led parties – the Front des Forces Socialistes(Socialist Forces Front, FFS) and the Rassemblement pourla Culture et la Democratie (Rally for Culture andDemocracy, RCD) – and a group made up of intellectuals,journalists, artists, lawyers and trade unionists wholaunched the Initiative Civique pour le Respect de laConstitution (Civic Initiative for the Respect of theConstitution) (Metaoui, 2008).2

Describing them as only ‘partial and limited’, Boute-flika formally announced his proposals for revising theconstitution on 29 October 2008. The most importantamendment was about the removal of the mandatorylimit of two presidential terms. This was plainly aimed atenabling the incumbent to extend his rule by running fora third term. Similar moves had been made in neigh-bouring Tunisia under Ben Ali’s regime and, morerecently, in Azerbaijan, Bolivia and Venezuela (Aghroutand Zoubir, 2009).

Article 176 of the constitution allows the president toresort to the parliamentary procedure to push theconstitutional reforms through provided that they winthe support of at least three-quarters of the members ofboth chambers of parliament (the Assemblee PopulaireNationale and the Conseil de la Nation). Two weeksfollowing Bouteflika’s announcement, both chambers didindeed overwhelmingly approve the constitutionalamendments that he had proposed. The opposition andseveral private newspapers denounced the whole processand criticised parliament for having acted merely asa rubber stamp: ‘there was no debate or intervention. TheMPs went to the Palais des Nations only to raise theirhands in support of the change’ (Benakli, 2008). With thishurdle removed, Bouteflika was free to announce hiscandidacy for a third presidential term in February 2009,three months after the necessary constitutional amend-ments had been adopted.

This announcement drew a predictably mixed reac-tion. Bouteflika’s supporters – particularly in the FLN –hailed the decision to run for a third term as a ‘responseto the desire of Algerians to see him complete what wasinitiated within the framework of the national reconcili-ation, development and the consolidation of Algeria’s rolein the international fora’ (Bey, 2009). Opponents, such asthe RCD, talked of ‘a new blow after the one dealt to theconstitution on 12 November’ (Hani, 2009). Some oppo-sition groups refused to participate in and called fora wider boycott of the election. Yet this had little impacton the course of events. It is clear that a real oppositionhas yet to emerge in Algeria, partly because of the

1 These included the Union Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens (theGeneral Union of Algerian Workers), the Union Nationale des PaysansAlgeriens (National Union of Algerian Peasants), the Organisation Natio-nale des Moudjahidines (National Organisation of War Veterans) as well asthe Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algerienne (National Union of AlgerianYouth).

2 Its main slogan was ‘L’heure est a l’application de la constitution, pas asa revision’ (this is the time for the application of the constitution, not itsrevision).

weakness and fragmentation of the current oppositionand partly because of the lack of an alternative politicalproject.

2. Electoral system

In accordance with the 1997 electoral act (Ordon-nance, 1997), the president is elected by direct universalsuffrage to serve a five-year renewable term in a two-ballot absolute majority system. If none of the candidatesachieves the majority required in the first round ofvoting, then a second round is organised two weeks later.This takes place between the two highest vote winnersfrom the first round (Articles 155 and 156). Following therecent constitutional amendments, a president may nowserve an unlimited number of consecutive five-yearterms.

Presidential candidates must fulfil one of twolegal requirements in order to stand. The first is the collec-tion of at least 600 signatures of support from elected offi-cials – local, provincial or parliament – in more than half (25or more) of the country’s 48 wilayas (provinces). Alterna-tively, candidates must obtain 75,000 signatures fromeligible voters in at least 25 or more of these wilayas, and theminimum number of signatures required in each one shouldnot be less than 1500 (Article 159).3 Nomination papers forthe presidential election are delivered to the nine-memberconstitutional council which vets aspiring candidates.

A supervisory institution, the Commission PolitiqueNationale de Surveillance de l’Election Presidentielle(National Political Commission for the Monitoring of thePresidential Election, CPNSE) was set up in February 2009(Decret Presidentiel, 2009). The CNPSE consisted of24 members, including representatives of political partiesand candidates. Presided over by a former justice minister,Mohamed Teguia (1993–1995), the CNPSE was entrustedwith the vital task of monitoring the electoral process in allits phases, particularly ensuring the neutrality of itsadministration and ensuring respect for the rights of bothvoters and candidates (Article 7).

3. Main contenders

Of the thirteen nominations for the presidentialelection presented by the legal deadline of 23 February,the constitutional council accepted six candidates,including the incumbent president. On the word ofBoualem Bessaih, the constitutional council leader, theother candidates were disallowed because they did notmeet the criteria – either for not obtaining the requirednumber of signatures or for submitting incompleteapplications (El-Moudjahid, 2009). Four of the approvedcontenders were representatives of political parties:Mohammed Jahid Younsi (Mouvement El-Islah orMouvement du Renouveau National, Movement forNational Reform, MRN), Moussa Touati (Front National

3 According to his campaign director, Abdelmalek Sellal, Bouteflikacollected four million signatures.

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 171–195 179

Algerien, Algerian National Front, FNA), Louiza Hanoune(Parti des Travailleurs, Workers’ Party, PT) and Ali FewziRebaine (Generation de 1954 – Ahd 54, Generation of1954). That leaves Bouteflika, who stood officially as anindependent candidate, and Belaid Mohand-Oussaid,who was nominally an independent because his party,Parti pour la Liberte et la Justice (Party for Freedom andJustice, PLJ), while established in January 2009, has yetto be officially recognised.4

From the start, Bouteflika was more or less universallyregarded as the only plausible winner of the election. Inaddition to running a well-funded campaign, he was facedwith relatively unknown challengers (ridiculed in themedia as ‘rabbits’). Standing in the presidential election forthe second consecutive time, Hanoune, the veteran left-winger and only woman in the race, was viewed as the onlyother serious contender, although not to the extent ofmounting a real challenge to Bouteflika. Over the yearsHanoune had become renowned for her outspoken criti-cism of some aspects of the country’s policies of economicliberalisation.

Rebaine, like Hanoune, was also making his secondchallenge for the presidency. In spite of this, neither henor any of the other contenders were expected to farewell in an election widely regarded as a foregoneconclusion. These candidates represented political partieswhose ability to reach out to a larger public is verylimited, something which has earned them the reputationof appearing only for elections and hibernating inbetween times.

4. Election campaign

The official campaign, which ran from 19 March until7 April, saw more by way of rallies and gatherings thanopen debate about the issues (El-Massa, 2009). Also therewas no direct debate between the presidential candidates:Younsi’s challenge to a televised debate, issued to Boute-flika at the beginning of the campaign, went all butunnoticed.

The electoral campaign boiled down to a battle betweencontinuity and change.

Continuity was Bouteflika’s main theme, motivated inthis context by what his supporters regarded as a strongrecord over his ten-year period in power. Thus, hiscampaign was built around the need to consolidatepeace and national reconciliation and to continue withsocial and economic development. The focus oneconomic populism – the promises to spend $150 billionon development projects and to create three millionjobs – and the restoration of civil peace through theprospect of a general amnesty were Bouteflika’s chiefselling points during the electoral campaign.5 The

4 The PLJ is thought to be borne out of the banned Islamist-nationalistparty, Mouvement Fidelite et Justice – Wafa (Movement for Fidelity andJustice, MFJ), of the former foreign affairs minister, Ahmed TalebIbrahimi.

5 Previous pledges to increase wages and student grants and to writeoff the debts owed by farmers, even though made before the officialcampaign, were all clearly seen as part of Bouteflika’s electoral strategy.

president campaigned intensively, visiting 32 of thecountry’s 48 wilayas, and his supporters organised about8000 rallies.

The other candidates, less impressed by the perfor-mance of the regime, tried to concentrate their respec-tive electoral campaigns on the need for change. ‘Changetoday, not tomorrow’, ‘The need for radical change’ or‘Your chance to change’ were some of the slogans underwhich they campaigned. They all directed criticism atwhat they viewed as a lack of tangible progress in termsof political liberties and socioeconomic conditions duringBouteflika’s ten years in power. They all promised togrant more political freedom – in respect of expression,association and assembly – and to put an end to thestate of emergency that has been in effect in Algeriasince 1992.

Hanoune vowed to dissolve the parliament andreplace it with a ‘democratic constituent assembly’, andto reform and protect the national economy by reversingthe policies of privatisation and liberalisation of trade. Inparticular, Hanoune pledged to cancel both the associa-tion agreement with the European Union and the processof accession to the World Trade Organisation. Like Han-oune, Touati promised to dissolve the national assembly,describing it as being unrepresentative of the publicinterest. His campaigning was also focused on the need toencourage investment, particularly in the agriculturalsector to achieve self-sufficiency in food, regarded ascrucial for the country’s long-term stability. Younsiargued for a general amnesty for the remaining armedgroups, although only if backed by the population. Hestressed the need for investment to diversify theeconomy away from its strong dependence on hydrarbonexports. Rebaine and Mohand-Oussaid focused more oncriticism of the political establishment, the formerpromising ‘real democracy and pluralism’ via broadinstitutional reforms, while the latter called for a genuineparliamentary system and a return to the two-termpresidential limit. Finally, with almost 75% of those under30 being out of work, it was obvious that all the candi-dates would vow to offer better employment prospectsfor deprived youths and to improve living conditions ofthe population in general.

The challengers complained about a campaigningplaying-field which, in their opinion, was far from level.Bouteflika’s campaign saw the active involvement ofa number of central and local state officials as well as anarray of associations and public figures from various walksof life (notably business and sport). The other candidatesalso accused the outgoing president of using stateresources for his electoral advantage, with Rebainereported to have said ‘I’m a bit ashamed for my country thatthese kind of banana republic practices can still be takingplace’ (Liberte, 2009). In particular, they alleged that thestate-owned media offered him much more air-time thanthem. Preliminary results from media monitoring of theelection campaign – conducted by the Ligue Algerienne pourla Defense des Droits de l’Homme (Algerian League for theDefence of Human Rights), with the cooperation of theArab Working Group, over the period 1 March to 9 April –supported their case. In calculations based on eleven

Table 1Results of the presidential election in Algeria, 9 April 2009.

Candidate Votes Votes (%)

Abdelaziz Bouteflika 13,019,787 90.2Louiza Hanoune 649,632 4.5Moussa Touati 294,411 2.0Mohammed Jahid Younsi 208,549 1.5Belaid Mohand-Oussaid 133,315 0.9Ali Fewzi Rebaine 124,559 0.9Total valid votes 14,430,253 100.0Invalid votes 925,771Total votes cast 15,356,024Registered voters (turnout) 20,595,683 74.6

Source: Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne (2009, pp. 3–5).

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 171–195180

newspapers, two radio stations and one television channel,approximately 28% of the media coverage was devoted toBouteflika and a further 15% concerned officials supportinghis candidacy. Each of his five opponents received far lessmedia attention, estimated at around 10% per candidate.With less than 2% of coverage, those proposing a boycott ofthe elections went almost unmentioned (InternationalMedia Support, 2009).

Another prominent consideration during the electioncampaign was the spectre of mass abstention. This wasa major cause for concern for the Algerian regime, notonly because of opposition calls for voters to boycott theelection but also because the last two elections (legisla-tive and local) had seen record low turnout levels.Anxious to avoid a repeat, the regime launched anunprecedented ‘get-out-the-vote’ campaign.6 The scale ofconcern was made clear when, on the first day of cam-paigning, Bouteflika himself issued a plea for massparticipation: ‘You have to vote, even vote against us,even with a blank vote, but vote’ (Afrol News, 2009). Ina similar vein, as they were touring the country duringtheir campaigns, all the other candidates took the matterof voter abstention seriously, asking electors to turn outin large numbers on polling day.

5. Results and reactions

At the request of the Algerian authorities, internationalelection observers – more than two hundred of them –from the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organisationof the Islamic Conference and the African Union were sentto monitor voting. In a press conference following theelection, these international observer missions stressedthat the vote took place in a transparent manner andaccording to democratic norms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Algeria, 2009; OIC, 2009).

The official turnout figure, as proclaimed by theconstitutional council, was just short of 75%, roughly thesame as in the 1995 election and substantially higher thanthe approximately 60% recorded in the two interveningpresidential contests in 1999 and 2004. This could be seenas a significant accomplishment for Bouteflika, being thehighest turnout recorded since he assumed power, and wasall the more noteworthy given the 37% participation rate inthe most recent legislative election in May 2007. However,the opposition, including the defeated presidential candi-dates, disputed the official figure, claiming that it had beeninflated by the authorities. And those who boycotted theelection, such as the FFS and RCD, claimed that actualturnout was far lower – their estimates of participationrates ranged between 18% and 25% (Nouvel Observateur,2009). Table 1.

Whilst there was never any doubt about Bouteflika’sre-election for a third term in office, the scale of hislandslide victory – having obtained 90.2% of the vote –chimed with his repeated insistence that ‘A president

6 This campaign was conducted through a huge range of channels – thestate-owned media, mosques, social networks, public rallies and gather-ings among many others.

who does not obtain an overwhelming majority is nota president’ (Kebir, 2009). Again, though, the recordedmargin of victory raised suspicions – and, in the case ofhis opponents, direct accusations – of vote irregularities.His nearest rival, Hanoune, who only won 4.5% of thevotes, expressed shock at her result and vehementlydenounced what she described as fraud on a massivescale (Aziri, 2009).7 She was reported to have said ‘I rejectglobally and in detail the official results’ and, referring tothe purported vote share won by Bouteflika, became thesecond contender to describe electoral practices as‘worthy of banana republics’ (Agence France Presse, 2009;Makedhi, 2009). Based on her party’s own calculations,Hanoune claimed that she had actually obtained over 30%of the vote.

The other candidates’ electoral performance was stillworse, the four (Rebaine, Younsi, Touati Mohand-Oussaid)winning little more than 5% of the vote between them.Rebaine, who came bottom of the poll, reacted mostsharply to the declared results. He disputed both theturnout and the vote share attributed to Bouteflika, con-tending that these results heralded ‘the birth of theBouteflika kingdom’ which is ‘reminiscent of that ofEmperor Bokassa’ (Semmar, 2009). He also hinted at thepossibility that he would complain directly to the UnitedNations. Along similar lines, Younsi spoke of large-scalevote rigging, citing instances of ‘phantom votes’ indistricts where there were more ballots cast than regis-tered voters and contesting the participation rate which,he avowed, was only about one third of the official figure(Beljenna, 2009).

Touati and Mohand-Oussaid were, publicly at least,readier to accept their electoral fate. The former’s campaignmanager stated that ‘the party has nothing to say in relationto the vote results’ (Menacer, 2009). This deadpan responseto the election outcome became another point of conten-tion in the continuing debates over Touati’s leadership ofthe FNA. The party remains plagued by internal dissent andthe leadership question has been its major preoccupationsince the election results (Le Soir d’Algerie, 2009). Mohand-

7 Hanoune’s party claimed to have filed some 174 appeals with theconstitutional council. The council maintained that only 57 appeals werereceived and upheld none of them, either because of their lack ofconformity with legal stipulations (53 appeals) or on grounds of lack ofevidence (4 appeals).

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 171–195 181

Oussaid, on the other hand, was the only candidate whooffered congratulations to Bouteflika on his victory. Notcoincidentally, he was also the only contender who, fromthe start, had acknowledged that he had no hope ofwinning the election. From Mohand-Oussaid’s perspective,the outcome of the election was relatively unimportant; thekey point was that, by participating in the race, he couldpromote his new political party (PLJ) and assess hismilitants’ capacity to mobilise and campaign.

6. Outlook

Whatever the controversy that surrounded the presi-dential election – including the revision of the 1996constitution in order to end presidential term limits – thefact remains that this election delivered Bouteflika asweeping victory, enabling him to serve a third consecutiveterm in office. Many voters, disenchanted with the statusquo, were disappointed by the election outcome. Evenamong those who supported Bouteflika, his re-election islikely to be appreciated more for the stability it promisesthan for any hopes it might offer of significant change.

Such change is unlikely for as long as the ‘political space’– that is, the opportunities for those outside the regime toform political groupings and to participate freely in publicaffairs – continues to be restricted. It is not clear, therefore,how long this state of affairs will last. Making the politicalspace more accessible implies a higher level of tolerance forfreedom of association, speech and political expression –necessary ingredients for a pluralistic democratic system toflourish. For this to come about, it is also imperative for theforces of opposition to move away from their currentmarginal status by reaching out to broader segments ofsociety and being more responsive to the needs of thewider electorate. Only then are they likely to mobiliseenough popular support to challenge the incumbentadministration. And only then can Algeria move into a freshphase of democratisation, including peaceful transfer ofpower between legitimate governments.

Addressing the socioeconomic problems besettinglarge sections of the population is the other major chal-lenge facing the elected president during his upcomingterm. For a country heavily dependent on fuel exports forits revenue, the currently depressed world energy pricesare already making their impact felt.8 Achieving theplanned infrastructural projects, building one millionhousing units and creating three million jobs – all part ofBouteflika’s election platform – will require a hugefinancial commitment. It is likely to be impossible tomake that commitment should oil prices remain at theirpresent level. Social stability, already fragile, could wellbe sacrificed as a result.

8 Algeria’s trade balance surplus dropped from $19.8 billion in the firsthalf of 2008 to only $1.0 billion during the first half of 2009.

References

Afrol News, 2009. Algeria launches election campaign. 20 March.Available at. http://www.afrol.com/articles/32748.

Agence France Presse, 2009. Algerie/presidentielle: Hanoune rejette lesresultats, denonce des fraudes. 11 April. Available at. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jNEHwwWjXuxhFxhgVVzMrANZUt3g.

Aghrout, A., Zoubir, Y.H., 2009. Introducing Algeria’s President-for-Life.Middle East Report Online. 1 April. Available at. http://merip.org/mero//mero040109.html.

Aziri, R., 2009. Hanoune denonce une ‘fraude massive’. Nouvelle Repub-lique, 12 April, pp. 3.

Beljenna, R., 2009. Ces resultats sont ceux de la fraude. El-Watan, 12 April,pp. 6.

Benakli, N., 2008. Revision de la constitution – 500 parlementaires disent‘oui’. L’Expression, 13 November. Available at. http://www.lexpressiondz.com/article/2/2008-11-13/57842.html.

Bey, S., 2009. L’Alliance presidentielle pres du sacre. L’Expression,14 February. Available at. http://www.lexpressiondz.com/article/2/2009-02-14/60657.html.

Decret presidentiel (no. 09-61), 2009. Instituant une commission polit-ique nationale de surveillance de l’election presidentielle du 9 avril2009. 7 February, published in Journal Official de La RepubliqueAlgerienne (JORA), vol. 48, no. 9, 8 February 2009, pp. 13–16.

El-Massa, 7 April 2009, p. 2.El-Moudjahid, 2009. 6 candidats retenus par le conseil constitutionnel.

3 March. Available at. http://www.elmoudjahid.com/accueil/presidentielles2009/28007.html.

Hani, T., 2009. Apres 10 ans au pouvoir, Bouteflika brigue un troisiememandat. France 24 Online, 12 February. Available at. http://www.france24.com/fr/20090212-algerie-election-presidentielle-bouteflika-politique-campagne-electorale.

International Media Support, 2009. Algeria media monitored duringelection. 15 April. Available at. http://www.i-m-s.dk/?q ¼ node/658.

Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne, 2009. 15 April. Available at.http://www.joradp.dz/J02000/2009/022/F_Pag.htm.

Kebir, K., 2009. Election presidentielle a l’ere du pluralisme politique – duvote refuge au ‘plebiscite’. Liberte, 10–11 April, pp. 2.

Le Soir d’Algerie, 2009. Front National Algerien: Un parti au bord del’explosion.14 July, pp.4.

Liberte, 6 April 2009, p. 2.Makedhi, M., 2009. Elu de cette maniere, c’est un president fragilise. El-

Watan, 12 April, pp.5.Menacer, L., 2009. Reactions des candidats aux resultats proclames par le

conseil constitutionnel – Le dossier clos? Le Soir d’Algerie, 15 April,pp. 1–3.

Metaoui, F., 2008. Projet de revision de la constitution – Les opposants surle terrain. El-Watan, 24 February, pp. 1 and 6.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Algeria), 2009. Presidentielle du 9 avril:dans la transparence et selon les normes democratiques. 14 April.Available at. http://193.194.78.233/ma_fr/stories.php?topic ¼ 09/02/14/5604031.

Nouvel Observateur, 2009. Algerie: y a-t-il eu fraude electorale? 11 April.Available at. http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/actualites/international/afrique/20090411.OBS3020/algerie_y_atil_eu_fraude_electorale.html.

Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 2009. OIC extols Algeria’scommitment to democracy by holding free, transparent and openelections. News, 11 April. Available at. http://www.oic-oci.org/topic_detail.asp?t_id ¼ 2102&x_key ¼ Algeria.

Ordonnance (no. 97-07), 1997. Portant loi organique relative au regimeelectoral. 6 March, published in Journal Officiel de la RepubliqueAlgerienne, vol. 36, no. 12, 6 March 1997, pp. 3–22.

Semmar, A., 2009. Fewzi Rebaine denonce une election presidentielleentachee de fraude. La Tribune, 12 April, pp. 3.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2009.09.008