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Appealing to his Inner Angels and Demons: Robert Muldoon’s Anti-Interventionist

Stance in the 1981 Springbok Tour

The year of 1981, particularly the months leading up to the tour, revealed much about

Robert Muldoon’s political personality. The ultimate decision that he took as prime minister

to not interfere in the 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand consequently saw Muldoon

preside over a damaged and divided New Zealand. This study will identify the particular

characteristics of Muldoon that shaped his decision to not interfere with the procession of the

Springbok Tour by applying the political leadership theories provided by Erwin C. Hargrove

to the case of Muldoon’s leadership in 1981. This analysis of Muldoon will refer to and

analyse the skills that Hargrove identifies in his presidential analysis, which feature the

reputation a political leader gains and the skills of bargaining, rhetoric, heresthetics,

character, cultural leadership and teaching reality. The actions Muldoon took as a prime

minister who oversaw the Springbok Tour were guided by his political motivations. In 1981,

Muldoon acted with his possible re-election in mind, whilst simultaneously striving to uphold

and protect the democratic rights of New Zealanders.

Similarities can be drawn between the political leadership of Robert Muldoon in 1981

and the analysis of presidents provided by Erwin C. Hargrove. This essay is split into three

sections, with each section being devoted to one of the skills outlined by Hargrove in his

analysis of presidential leadership. Each skill will then be applied to the political leadership

that Muldoon demonstrated during the Springbok Tour and in the months leading up to it.

Firstly discussed is the reputation that Muldoon built for himself as a prime minister who

stuck to his word to not interfere in the tour by allowing the tour to continue, and not follow

in his predecessor, Norman Kirk’s footsteps. Secondly, Muldoon combined the skills of

bargaining and rhetoric in feeble attempts to persuade the Rugby Union and New Zealanders

to adopt the anti-tour position he initially had. He also defended the democratic rights of New

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Zealanders by combining these two skills effectively. Muldoon’s transformation of the 1981

Tour issue into a law and order issue, as well as his bullying of anti-tour protestors are

examples of Muldoon’s employment of heresthetics.

The second half of this study will examine four more of Hargrove’s theories. Analysis

of Muldoon’s character will begin the second half by discussing the pivotal role that

Muldoon’s refusal to stray from the anti-interference position he had established for himself

played. His character caused him to not be open to compromise with the National party

members, heads of governments and tour protestors who all advised him to cancel the tour.

An additional skill, discernment, is the most important skill that Muldoon exhibited, for he

successfully judged the social conditions of New Zealand which saw him side with the

segment of New Zealanders who would re-elect him in 1981. Muldoon’s skill of cultural

leadership is seen by his determination to fight for the preservation of democratic rights in

New Zealand, such as the right to protest peacefully. Lastly, Muldoon can be said to have

used the tour as a distraction method to ensure his re-election, and combined with his

desensitised view of the tour, this was how Muldoon taught reality.

This study will consult the leadership theories that Erwin C. Hargrove puts forward in

The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature. Hargrove cited the

presidencies of Ronald Reagan, Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon B. Johnson, to demonstrate

his theories by separating effective leadership skills from the ineffective ones.1 In particular,

Hargrove identifies reputation, bargaining, rhetoric, heresthetics, character, discernment,

political culture and teaching reality as the skills that contribute to successful presidencies.2

Although Hargrove reserved his theories of political leadership for American presidents,

Hargrove’s comprehensive analysis is directly transferable to Muldoon’s prime ministership

1 Mark Bennister, Prime Ministers in Power: Political Leadership in Britain and Australia (Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 8-9.2 Erwin C. Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998), vii.

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and the skills Muldoon that possessed which influenced his motivation to not interfere in the

tour. Hargrove’s analysis will help answer the question that this essay proposes, that is,

whether Muldoon used the 1981 Springbok Tour to satisfy his need for political gain, or to

protect the rights of New Zealanders. Put differently, it will be examined whether Muldoon’s

motivations were guided by his inner angels or inner demons.

An analysis of the political personality of Robert Muldoon would not be complete

without offering conflicting opinions about the bloke. The perceptions of the New Zealanders

and non-New Zealanders who knew Muldoon personally or impersonally as an up-and-

coming politician, prime minister or a disgruntled backbencher, are few and far between.

Since 1981, authors, scholars, protestors, pro-tour supporters, policemen and colleagues of

Muldoon have formed varying opinions of him and his lack of inaction towards stopping the

Springbok Tour. This essay will attempt to provide a balanced supply of negative and

positive opinions on the Robert Muldoon that led New Zealand in 1981.

The two dominant views of Muldoon included in the analysis of his political

leadership in 1981 must be firstly introduced. On one hand, a picture popularly painted of

Muldoon in his second term as prime minister portrayed him as a Machiavellian leader whose

political motivations caused him to refuse to intervene in the tour for the purpose of seeking

votes for the upcoming election to be held later that year. Many observers of the proceedings

of the 1981 Springbok Tour saw that Muldoon was using the tour as a political tool to serve

his individual political interests, despite the ramifications that New Zealand would suffer as a

result. Although many New Zealanders accepted this particularly negative perception of

Muldoon, an alternative perception that is an antithesis to the first perception of Muldoon was

adopted by his supporters, such as his supporters in “Rob’s Mob.” This less popular image of

Muldoon paints him in a better light as an Aristotelian statesman, a political leader who lived

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up to his promise and National's election commitment by not interfering in the tour, and by

doing so, defending the democratic rights of New Zealanders.

Before jumping into what this study refers to as a “Hargrovian” analysis of Muldoon,

context of the 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand will be provided to help explain the

decisions that Robert Muldoon made regarding the future of the Springbok tour. Context will

come in the form of the Gleneagles Agreement and Muldoon’s promise to not mix politics

and sports. Beginning with the Gleneagles Agreement, Muldoon made sure that New Zealand

was among the group of Commonwealth countries that agreed to follow the newly created

Gleneagles Agreement.3 The Agreement was established to govern the sporting relations that

the Commonwealth countries shared with South Africa. The parties involved agreed that their

respective governments would avoid sporting contacts with countries that support apartheid,

namely South Africa, in a stand against sporting competitions that allowed athletes to be

chosen solely by their ethnicity to compete.4 For an agreement that was established to combat

one particular issue, it was only to create several more due to the conflictual avenues of

interpretation that it enabled.

The Gleneagles Agreement proved to be more problematic than efficient in creating a

united front against apartheid. The problem laid in its different interpretations.

Commonwealth countries were given the liberty to interpret and implement the Agreement as

they wished, without any fear of reprisal for taking actions that were seen as contrary to its

principles since the agreement was not a legally binding document.5 The true meaning of the

Gleneagles Agreement was interpreted differently according to different political leaders.6

Muldoon, for example, took a rather unperturbed approach and interpreted the Agreement as

3 David McCraw, “From Kirk to Muldoon: Change and Continuity in New Zealand’s Foreign-Policy Priorities,” Pacific Affairs 55, no. 4 (1982-3): 647. 4 R.D. Muldoon, Muldoon (Wellington: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1977), 206.5 Neil Macfarlane and Michael Herd, Sport and Politics (London: Willow Books, 1986), 110.6 McCraw, “From Kirk to Muldoon: Change and Continuity in New Zealand’s Foreign-Policy Priorities,” 647.

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requiring the New Zealand government to merely boycott sporting ties with South Africa.7

Muldoon personally believed that he satisfied the provisions outlined in the Gleneagles

Agreement by giving the responsibility that the government had to decide whether the tour

should continue to a sporting organisation in New Zealand, the Rugby Union.8 Other heads of

governments interpreted the agreement as strictly requiring nations to cut all sporting ties

with South Africa.9

A second factor that contributes to the context of Muldoon’s political leadership in

1981 is the promise that he made to prevent the assimilation of sports and politics. Muldoon

assured New Zealanders that he would remove politics from the equation when it came to

New Zealand’s sporting relations with South Africa. Whilst Muldoon perhaps had good

intentions, he lacked the capacity to execute such an ambiguous goal and his attempt to live

up to this promise failed dismally. Muldoon was perhaps setting himself up for imminent

failure by making this commitment so early on in his career when he was not yet aware of the

complexity involved with such a troublesome goal.10 Emeritus Professor at Victoria

University, Bob Gregory told an interviewer that politics was a natural part of life in New

Zealand, as was sport.11 Hence, it would be an impossible task to separate sport from politics

as the two went hand in hand. Mr. Hector Monro shared a similar perspective and argued that

to think that politics and sports are not integrated is a “naïve” perspective to have, for when a

South African sporting team is involved, issues of its apartheid system inevitably become

involved too.12 Muldoon had already set a precedence that contradicted this commitment a

year before the 1981 Tour began.

7 McCraw, “From Kirk to Muldoon: Change and Continuity in New Zealand’s Foreign-Policy Priorities,” 648.8 Muldoon, Muldoon, 207-8.9 New Zealand Affairs Review 31, no. 2 (1981): 60 in McCraw, “From Kirk to Muldoon: Change and Continuity in New Zealand’s Foreign-Policy Priorities,” 648. 10 Bob Jones, Memories of Muldoon (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 1997), 101.11 “New Zealand As It Might Have Been: Bob Gregory,” Nights, Radio New Zealand (Wellington: RNZ, January 3, 2011).12 Richard Shears and Isobelle Gidley, Storm Out Of Africa: The 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand (Auckland: Macmillan, 1981), 68, 77.

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In 1980, New Zealand athletes, the Commonwealth Games and Olympic Associations

were persuaded by the National Government headed by Muldoon to boycott the upcoming

Olympic Games in Moscow.13 The motivation for this decision came from the government’s

siding with Britain and the United States over the issue of the Soviet Union’s recent invasion

of Afghanistan.14 Consequently, the New Zealand team that attended the 1980 Olympics

comprised of only four athletes.15 Muldoon’s and National’s decision was politically

motivated, whereby New Zealand sided with two of its traditional allies to make a stand

against the Soviet Union’s blunder. Muldoon’s unsuccessful attempt to separate politics and

sports in 1980 was a sign of what was to come a year later. This context of the tour provides

insight into the Hargrovian analysis that this study will employ, beginning with Muldoon’s

reputation.

Reputation

The first theory of leadership that will be analysed in this study is the ideal of

reputation provided by Hargrove, who references the ideas of Richard Neustadt and James

MacGregor Burns in his literature. Neustadt and Burns, in their respective analyses, offer

their own ideas on reputation and its importance to political leaders. In his analysis, Neustadt

proposes that presidents should recognise that the political actions they make today will

affect the political actions that they make in the future.16 In other words, every action a

president takes sets a precedence to his people who will expect him to make similar actions

from that point onwards, given that the situational context the president finds himself in is

13 “1980 Moscow Olympics boycott,” Ministry for Culture and Heritage, accessed April 28, 2016, http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/photo/moscow-olympics-boycott.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.16 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 27-8.

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akin to the situational context that he took his initial action in.17 It is through the process by

which a president chooses what political actions to take that he gains a particular reputation

for himself, according to how the public perceives him.18 Neustadt notes that the reputation a

president gains will impact the likelihood that he will succeed in the political arena.19

Adding to this analysis of a political leader’s reputation, in James MacGregor Burns’

literature on leadership, succinctly titled “Leadership,” he proposes that presidents have the

potential to outperform their competitors. Presidents can make up for their flaws by becoming

what Burns calls “transformational” political leaders.20 These political figures look to the past

and learn from the lessons that previous presidents provide and shape their political decisions

and morals accordingly.21 The presidents who engage in this behaviour are expected to

outperform their predecessors.22 In Muldoon’s case, he learned from the decision that

Norman Kirk made in 1972 to go against a promise that he made to New Zealand.

Robert Muldoon built a reputation for himself as someone who kept his word by

taking an anti-interventionist stance towards the tour. Although some would debate the

degree of Muldoon’s honesty, it must be recognised that his strict loyalty to National’s policy

promises in 1981 earned him a reputation for being truthful, at least in the case of the

Springbok Tour. Muldoon honoured the commitment that he made to New Zealand, whereby

he promised New Zealanders that he was not, at any point, to interfere in the tour and cancel

it. Many New Zealanders gained trust for Muldoon by viewing him as a political leader who

practiced what he preached. This type of reputation was only gained as a politician who

practiced the virtue of honesty.23

17 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 28.18 Ibid.19 Ibid.20 Ibid., 30.21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.23 Neale McMillan, Top of the Greasy Pole: New Zealand Prime Ministers of Recent Times (Dunedin: McIndoe, 1993), 80.

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Politicians, new and old, were advised by Muldoon himself to build honest

reputations for themselves by honouring the virtue of honesty over deceit.24 Bob Jones

confirms this view of Muldoon. Jones used the term “sacrosanct” in his biography of

Muldoon to describe the faithfulness that Muldoon demonstrated to the promises his party

made regarding the Springbok Tour.25 Muldoon was one of the few politicians who honoured

election promises to such a high degree, contrary to Norman Kirk when he found himself in a

similar position to Muldoon in 1972.26

In 1972, Norman Kirk adopted a non-interventionist stance identical to the one

adopted by Muldoon, which was quickly dropped by the prime minister when it was realised

that the anti-tour protest movement posed a risk to the security of New Zealand.27 The 1973

Springbok Tour of New Zealand was consequently cancelled by Kirk, who cited the issue of

the lack of police power and potential need for military intervention to restrain the protestors

as the justification for his decision.28 Muldoon openly criticised Kirk for failing to stand by

the commitment he made to New Zealand to stay out of the tour’s proceedings.29 Political

rivals in parliament, Muldoon valued Kirk as a great politician and acknowledged that his

former rival was someone he much admired, however he did not respect Kirk’s decision to

intervene in the Springbok Tour.30 It would have been easy for Muldoon to change his mind

on his policies and follow in Norman Kirks’ footsteps, intervening in the tour before it had

begun. However, this was an action that Muldoon did not take. He had learned from Kirk’s

decision to break his promise and decided that he would stand by his commitment until the

1981 Springbok Tour ended.

24 McMillan, Top of the Greasy Pole: New Zealand Prime Ministers of Recent Times, 80. 25 Jones, Memories of Muldoon, 200.26 Ibid.27 Ibid., 199-200. 28 1981, The Tour: Ten Years On. Documentary. Directed by Bryan Bruce. New Zealand: Red Sky & Television, 1991.29 Ibid.30 McMillan, Top of the Greasy Pole: New Zealand Prime Ministers of Recent Times, 13.

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Muldoon allowed the tour to continue as a statement to New Zealand that he was not

willing to destroy the reputation National had gained as a party that did not interfere in New

Zealand’s sporting relations. National had spent just under a decade building a reputation for

itself to be seen by New Zealanders as a party that supported and encouraged sporting

competitions between New Zealand and South Africa. National had taken an anti-sport

involvement stance since 1972.31 The party’s campaigns particularly began to focus on its

support for the Springbok tour in 1973.32 National began to try repair New Zealand’s and

South Africa’s relations over sports in 1975 before finally promising to stay out of sporting

decisions involving New Zealand in 1978 and 1981.33 This promise is evidenced by the

slogan written on bold on the front of National’s 1978 General Election Policy Report, the

promise that “We’re (National) Keeping Our Word.”34 It is clear that National, like its leader,

prided itself on adhering to the policy commitments that National promised New Zealand.35

1. Skill in Context

To demonstrate how Hargrove’s analysis can cross over from analysing the political

leadership of American presidents to prime ministers like Robert Muldoon, this study will

first discuss the skills in the category of “Skill in Context.” There are three skills that fall

under this first category. Included are rhetoric, heresthetics and bargaining. To be successful

in the realm of politics, Hargrove suggests that politicians master these three skills.36 As this

essay will discuss, Muldoon employed the use of all three skills during 1981, in an attempt to

win the support of the New Zealand public and to persuade the Rugby Union to cancel the

tour. He experienced varying degrees of success ranging from effective to extremely

31 Trevor Richards, Dancing on our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and Racism (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1999), 145.32 Ibid., 245.33 Ibid.34 National Party, 1978. National Party 1978 General Election Policy.35 Shears and Gidley, Storm Out Of Africa: The 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 11.36 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 47.

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ineffective. Before discussing Muldoon’s attempt to use these three skills, it will be first

explained what each skill involves, beginning with the skills of bargaining and rhetoric.

To convince one’s citizens to support him, political leaders should add the tool of

persuasion, or what Hargrove calls “bargaining,” to their political repertoire.37 It is an

essential skill that presidents and prime ministers alike should rely on to convince the public

to support them.38 It is also a skill that links strongly with rhetoric.39 A president should

bargain to form alliances with the public, use tactics to out-perform their opponents and win

over people by persuading them to their cause through persuasion and rhetoric if they want to

be successful.40 In his literature, Hargrove wrote about rhetoric and bargaining as two

separate ideals, however, the interconnectedness of Muldoon’s rhetorical skills with his

bargaining skills help to explain his anti-interventionist stance towards the 1981 Tour.

There are limits to a politician’s use of rhetoric, however. Hargrove observed that

presidents who use rhetoric to gain political support often draw support from only the groups

of society which supported him initially.41 Rhetoric is a skill that more often than not has only

the effect of appealing to like-minded citizens and struggles to covert people who hold

differing political opinions and views to those held by political leaders.42 Muldoon discovered

this in 1981. Through his numerous attempts at persuasion, Muldoon’s support base stemmed

from New Zealanders who were pro-tour, whose support he had since the time that the issue

of the tour emerged, while anti-tour New Zealanders were still, if not more, opposed to the

tour after Muldoon attempted to win them over through persuasion. Muldoon’s failure to use

his rhetorical skill is exemplified in his appeals to the Rugby Union.

37 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 27.38 Ibid.39 Ibid., 34.40 Ibid.41 Ibid., 69. 42 Ibid.

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Muldoon lacked use of a strong rhetoric in his pleads to the Rugby Union in which he

attempted to persuade the sporting organisation to call the tour off.43 Once the Rugby Union

gave the tour the nod, Muldoon endeavoured to persuade it to change its mind in several

attempts that have been described as dismal failures, including the appeal that Muldoon made

to the Rugby Union in 1981. It has been noted by observers of this plea that Muldoon merely

informed the Rugby Union that he personally was not in support of the tour and proposed that

it too should adopt a similar perspective.44 Despite his efforts, the response of the Rugby

Union’s chairman, Ces Blazey directed at Muldoon was a solid "no."45 In his appeal, not once

did Muldoon use the abrasive vocabulary and manner of rhetoric that he was well known to

possess to pressure Blazey and members of the Rugby Union to conform to his views.

Muldoon provided evidence for his weak rhetoric in a statement that he made about the

Springboks whereby he confessed “I don’t want them to come.”46 Muldoon was known to be

able to reduce his colleagues to tears but in 1981, he failed to firmly tell the Rugby Union

that it must cancel the tour. Muldoon’s attempt to put pressure on the sporting body can be

described as being weak at best.47 Muldoon’s appeals to the Rugby Union also stretched to

the medium of television and radio.

On numerous occasions, Muldoon exploited the medium of television to convey

effective political messages to the New Zealand public but this was a trend that he failed to

continue in 1981. During a popular television viewing time, Muldoon popped up onto the

television screens and radios in homes around New Zealand.48 The purpose of his television

address was to express a final plea to the Rugby Union to stop the tour. On June 6, Muldoon

43 Barry Gustafson, His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2000), 312.44 1981, The Tour: Ten Years On. 45 Ibid.46 Shears and Gidley, Storm Out Of Africa: The 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 11. 47 1981, The Tour: Ten Years On. 48 D.J. Boswell, Election 81 (Wanganui Newspapers: Wanganui, 1981), 96; Tom Newnham, By Batons and Barbed Wire: A response to the 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand (Auckland: Graphic Publications, 2003), 8.

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outlined why the National government would not intervene in the tour before merely

suggesting that the Rugby Union “think before” deciding whether or not to cancel the tour.49

He also reminded spectators of the graves belonging to New Zealand soldiers that laid beside

those of South African soldiers in Italy, reiterating the historic relationship that the two

countries shared.50 Despite his public message being conveyed with a sense of emotion, the

disingenuousness that he demonstrated in the reading of his speech failed to persuade anti-

tour New Zealanders to his cause, no more than the Rugby Union.51 If anything, Muldoon

managed to persuade New Zealand that the tour would certainly take place.

Robert Muldoon also used rhetoric to defend his anti-interventionist position from

claims that he was politically motivated and to suggest to his critics that he was fighting to

preserve democratic rights in New Zealand. The main difference between his use of rhetoric

to express his determination to protect the rights of New Zealanders and his appeals to the

Rugby Union laid in the severity of which Muldoon employed his rhetorical prowess.

Muldoon used verbal rhetoric to persuade critics of his anti-interference position that he was

doing what he saw as being the right thing for his country and was remaining true to his

promise by honouring the commitments National had made regarding the Springbok Tour.

Under the International Sport heading in National’s 1978 General Election Policy, the

National party made three promises.52 It firstly promised to honour the Gleneagles

Agreement, secondly, to stay out of sporting relations between New Zealand and other

countries and to allow all decisions regarding sporting relations to be made by sporting

organisations and lastly, National was not to reject the visas of athletes travelling to New

Zealand to compete.53

49 Gustafson, His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon, 312.50 Boswell, Election 81, 96; Newnham, By Batons and Barbed Wire: A response to the 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 8. 51 Boswell, Election 81, 96.52 National Party, 1978. National Party 1978 General Election Policy.53 Ibid.

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During the South Pacific Forum conference, a reporter asked Muldoon what he

thought the expected impact would be on the New Zealand government if it didn’t allow

South African athletes to enter New Zealand by not accepting their visas.54 Muldoon gave a

strong, assertive response. He reminded the reporter that his government had promised it

would not resort to that action and that “there was never a chance that we would have done

that. Never.”55 As prime minister, Muldoon held the power to make the visas of the

Springboks void, thus preventing their tour of New Zealand, but he opted not to take this

action in order to honour the policy commitment National made in 1978 to allow athletes

from other countries to travel freely to and from New Zealand.56 Muldoon’s successful use of

rhetoric to verbally defend the rights of tourists visiting New Zealand was a stark contrast to

his ineffective use of rhetoric in his appeals to the Rugby Union.

Heresthetics is the last skill analysed by Hargrove in his first category of leadership

skills. William Riker explained this term as being a strategic tool a political leader can use to

deceive foes who pose a threat to him, force their submission, and defeat them by shaping the

political environment to his liking.57 The political leaders who will use this tactic will be

those who value success over defeat and engage in the logical behaviour of heresthetics to

defeat their enemies.58 Heresthetics is a fourth skill that Muldoon used in 1981 to setback the

challengers of his anti-interference stance, the anti-Springbok Tour protestors, and saw him

make the Springbok Tour an issue of law and order in New Zealand.

The troublesome relationship that Muldoon shared with anti-tour New Zealanders

exhibited his use of heresthetics and his bullying nature. True to his being a threatening and

assertive individual, Muldoon would select victims to be subjected to his bullying behaviour.

When he received criticism from any group or individual, he often would immediately adopt

54 Shears and Gidley, Storm Out Of Africa: The 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 94. 55 Ibid.56 Muldoon, Muldoon, 196.57 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 32.58 Ibid.

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a defensive position and lash out at those who delivered it as a natural, first-step response.59

Muldoon handled his rivals by mocking and provoking them.60 The protestors and protest

organisations in 1981 did themselves no justice by antagonising a prime minister who was

known to take his anger out on those who frustrated him. In the case of the 1981 Tour,

Muldoon's firing line found the anti-tour protestors and two organisations strongly associated

with the protest movement, Halt All Racist Tours (HART) and the Citizens Association for

Racial Equality (CARE).61

Muldoon’s anger towards the protesters was fuelled by an incident where two protest

organisations appealed to Brian Talboys to release the details of a conversation that Muldoon

had with a reporter from South Africa.62 In their discussion, Muldoon was believed to have

revealed that if he was re-elected for 1981, he would support a Springbok Tour, a comment

HART and CARE were anxious to share with the New Zealand public to damage Muldoon’s

political prospects.63 Pamphlets were also released by these protest organisations claiming

that the New Zealand government was racist for allowing its national rugby team to play the

Springboks, which selected its members on the basis of their race rather than skill.64 Muldoon

was provoked by their releasing of propaganda about the New Zealand government and his

leadership in the years leading up to 1981 so that by the time the tour rolled around,

Muldoon’s pent-up anger was released with the protestors, CARE and HART as his target.65

Muldoon unleashed verbal attacks directed at anti-tour protestors and their associated

organisations in an attempt to put an end to the protest movement that was sweeping the

country, threatening the continuation of the Springbok Tour. The prime minister tried to

diminish any legitimacy that the protestors had by claiming that they belonged to the

59 Jon Johansson, Two Titans: Muldoon, Lange and Leadership (Wellington: Dunmore Publishing, 2005), 228-9.60 Jones, Memories of Muldoon, 94. 61 Richards, Dancing on our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and Racism, 2. 62 Ibid., 153. 63 Ibid.64 Muldoon, Muldoon, 199.65 Ibid., 200.

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“extreme left” and were “technical fascists,” representing a “disruptive, anti-establishment,

anti-government movement.”66 The verbal abuse suffered by the protesters proved to be a

hindrance to their protest efforts, but they were not dissuaded from their ultimate goal of

stopping the tour.67

A second example of Muldoon’s strategic use of heresthetics to extend his political

longevity was his transformation of the 1981 Springbok Tour into an issue of law and order

in New Zealand. What James Harvey Robinson noted about political campaigns, particularly

how they can “distract attention from the real issues involved,” can be applied to Muldoon’s

use of the 1981 Springbok Tour as a political tool to secure his re-election.68 Images of the

division and destruction caused by the tour were glued to the front of the minds of New

Zealanders in 1981. Photographs and recordings of the battle scenes involving the police and

pro-tour Kiwis fighting protestors who were storming rugby fields and the streets of New

Zealand dominated television screens, radio broadcasts, the front pages of newspapers and

the conversations of New Zealanders. Muldoon exploited the threat that the 1981 Springbok

Tour protests posed to his government’s ability to uphold law and order in New Zealand. It

was a threat that the government increasingly struggled to contain as the protest movement

intensified.

In 1981, anti-tour protests began as non-violent movements that soon transpired into

bloody battles between protestors and the police and pro-tour rugby enthusiasts. Early on in

the tour, during the Hamilton game, anti-tour protestors marched onto the rugby grounds

which they occupied and refused to move from.69 Police Commissioner Bob Walton and his

fellow policemen tried to persuade the protestors to vacate the rugby field.70 After the

protestors failed to move, the police began to carry them away, but this was the extent to

66 Shears and Gidley, Storm Out Of Africa: The 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 75. 67 Richards, Dancing on our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and Racism, 193. 68 Boswell, Election 81, 145.69 Newnham, By Batons and Barbed Wire: A response to the 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 5. 70 Geoff Chapple, 1981: The Tour (Wellington, Reed, 1984), 97.

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which the police went to in order to remove the protestors from Rugby Park.71 A few days

later, when protestors were marching down Molesworth Street to parliament and approached

lines of armed policemen, they were met by swinging fists, hefty kicks and the brutal use of

batons.72

Policemen were armed with tactical training, batons and helmets, the protestors with a

hotchpotch of articles of protection gear.73 As for their weapons, anything that could be

hurled at the police became their arms, such as garbage, metal scraps and bottles.74 Little did

the protestors know, they would depend heavily on their protection gear to defend themselves

against the batons and brutality of the police in their violent protests. The violence inflicted

on the protesters was unlike anything that they had experienced in their lifetime.75

One would only need to look as far as the Auckland protest of the final tour match to

witness the violence that became the anti-tour demonstrations. To match the batons that the

police were equipped with, protestors picked up metal objects that resembled clubs.76 It was

noted that in this protest, a policeman’s baton broke after meeting a protestor’s body with

such great force.77 Over seven thousand anti-tour protestors clashed with lines of policemen

which comprised of half of the police force in a struggle that spanned several hours.78

The use of the tour was a method of distraction that Robert Muldoon and the

government used to hide its fiscal failures from New Zealand.79 Muldoon used the tour and

the turmoil it created to divert attention away from his economic policy failures that Michael

71 Ibid., 98. 72 Michael M. Roche, “Protest, Police and Place: The 1981 Springbok Tour and the Production and Consumption of Social Space,” New Zealand Geographer 53, no. 2 (1997): 52; Chapple, 1981: The Tour, 141. 73 Roche, “Protest, Police and Place: The 1981 Springbok Tour and the Production and Consumption of Social Space,” 53.74 Redmer Yksa, “Inside the 1981 Springbok Tour,” New Zealand Listener 229 (2011).75 Roche, “Protest, Police and Place: The 1981 Springbok Tour and the Production and Consumption of Social Space,” 52.76 Gustafson, His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon, 314.77 Richards, Dancing on our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and Racism, 224.78 Ibid.79 Juliet Morris, With All Our Strength (Christchurch: Black Cat, 1982), 112.

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Bassett believed Muldoon was losing fortune with.80 The fiscal issues Muldoon sought to

hide included taxes, high unemployment, inflation and decreasing wages.81 Muldoon

succeeded making the tour an issue of law and order as it was to become the biggest election

issue that consumed the 1981 election.82

Jim Anderton subscribed to a particularly negative view of Muldoon and his use of

the tour as a distraction method. He commented that National won the 1981 general election

by bringing the Springboks to New Zealand, an action that was inspired by Muldoon’s

apparent need for personal political gain.83 The New Zealanders who voted for National were

not thinking rationally at the polling booth, according to Anderton, as their attention was

diverted away from the issues that Muldoon’s government was struggling to grapple with and

consequently, they “voted in a sheep-like fashion.”84 However cold this critique of National

and Muldoon was, Anderton was correct in linking Muldoon’s use of the tour as a law and

order issue to a strategy of heresthetics to gain the much needed political support he needed

to win the 1981 election and extend the two terms he had served as prime minister to a third.85

A political leader’s character is another component of Hargrove’s analysis that this

study will analyse as it helps to explain how the character of Robert Muldoon had an effect

on his stance as a non-interventionist in the Springbok Tour. Hargrove saw that a political

leader’s character determined how they conveyed themselves to the people that they

governed.86 A major part of a political leader’s character is his confidence, for it is confident

leaders who project their self-assurance onto the public, and consequently win the trust of the

people to handle any issue that they may confront.87 Muldoon invested so much confidence in

80 The Grim Face of Power, interview with Michael Bassett, Communicado, 1994 in Jon Johansson, Two Titans: Muldoon, Lange and Leadership (Wellington: Dunmore Publishing, 2005), 66. 81 Morris, With All Our Strength, 112.82 Alan McRobie, “1981: A Win Is a Win Is a Win.” in From Muldoon to Lange: New Zealand Elections in the 1980s, eds. Stephen Levine and Alan McRobie (Rangiora: MC Enterprises, 2002), 78.83 Ibid., 98.84 Ibid.85 Ibid., 86.86 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 35.87 Ibid.

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his anti-interventionist stance that he refused to depart from it and refused to remain open to

compromise or listen to advice that was contrary to his established position.

Compromise appeared to be an unfamiliar concept to Muldoon in 1981, just as it had

been throughout the previous years he had served as prime minister. Muldoon refused to

compromise with the three groups of people who particularly put pressure on him to call off

the tour. Advice to reverse the Rugby Union’s decision and pay heed to the Gleneagles

Agreement was given to Muldoon by his fellow National Party Members, political leaders of

other countries and by New Zealanders.

Within the National caucus, a minority of anti-tour party members containing Marilyn

Waring, Peter Shearer, Aussie Malcolm and Brian Talboys advised Muldoon to stop the tour

and warned him of the dangers that it would pose to New Zealand.88 In addition to his

colleagues, the then-president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda and Prime Minister Seaga of

Jamaica strongly recommended that Muldoon neglect his anti-interference position and

prevent the continuation of the tour.89 Moreover, New Zealand, under the leadership of

Muldoon, was throwing away the Gleneagles Agreement and was advocating apartheid

regimes, according to Commonwealth Secretary General Shridath Ramphal.90 Most notably,

Malcolm Fraser and Margaret Thatcher asked Muldoon to stop the tour. Muldoon was

warned by a worried Margaret Thatcher about the disastrous consequences the tour could

impose upon the Commonwealth.91 Fraser too paid Muldoon warning about his concerns of

New Zealand’s sporting relationship with South Africa, concerns which were also ignored.92

Muldoon risked his relationship with Fraser and New Zealand’s relationship with

Australia in favour of his promise to stay well away from the proceedings of the Springbok 88 Hugh Templeton, All Honourable Men: Inside the Muldoon Cabinet 1975-1984 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), 159.89 Templeton, All Honourable Men: Inside the Muldoon Cabinet 1975-1984, 163.90 Statement made by the Commonwealth Secretary General, 16 September 1890, MP in Gustafson, His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon, 310.91 Shears and Gidley, Storm Out Of Africa: The 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 12.92 Malcolm Templeton, Human Rights and Sporting Contacts: New Zealand’s Attitudes to Race Relations in South Africa 1921-94 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), 199-200.

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Tour.93 It was later revealed that the Australian government thought about allowing the 1982

Olympic Games in Brisbane to continue without a New Zealand Olympic team.94 However,

this action was not adopted, a choice regarded as a wise response by Jon Johansson because it

likely would not have had any effect on Muldoon’s mind on the matter.95 It was clear that

once Muldoon decided that his government was not going to interfere, that was the position

he was to stick to from the start of the tour to its conclusion. Just as the suggestions that

Muldoon recieved fell on deaf ears, the pressure that New Zealanders tried to place on

Muldoon was ignored by the prime minister as well.

As for internal pressure, the protest movement that inundated nearly every New

Zealand city and town attempted to reverse Muldoon’s decision to not interfere in the

Springbok Tour. Protestors took to the streets, rugby fields, airports and motorways to voice

their opposition of the racist tour and place pressure on the government to act. The protestors

and Muldoon locked horns over the issue of the tour. Neither were willing to relinquish their

fight and let the other side win.96 There was nothing that the protestors could do to force

Muldoon to change his mind once he became committed to let the Springbok Tour continue.

A second factor involved with character is a political leader’s “intellectual and

emotional security.”97 The presence of this characteristic in a political figure, according to

Hargrove, has the potential to bring about his political success.98 Emotionally secure political

leaders are those who willingly pay attention to the opinions and ideas that his people offer,

even if they go against their personal opinions, whereas leaders who lack this characteristic

see themselves as victims of criticism and will fight back at those whom they see as verbally

attacking them.99 The protestors of the Springbok Tour fell victim to the lashings of 93 Natalie Finnigan, “The 1981 Springbok Tour and explosive relations,” New Zealand Listener 234, no. 3762 (2012): 21-23.94 Ibid.95 Ibid.96 Richards, Dancing on our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and Racism, 188. 97 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 35.98 Ibid.99 Ibid.

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Muldoon’s tongue, as this essay previously discussed, and were never taken seriously by the

prime minister.

In an interview, Muldoon explained his perception of the individuals who partook in

the anti-tour protest in Auckland.100 According to Muldoon, these people were not fuelled by

any anger that they felt towards the tour but rather feelings of excitement for a chance to fight

the police.101 These groups made of so-called extremists were treated like terrorist

organisations, with various protest groups being investigated for their actions.102 The Security

Intelligence Service was enlisted by Muldoon to release a report examining the supposed

treasonous deeds and motivations of these such groups and the risk they posed to the security

of New Zealand.103

Muldoon’s character saw him lack the restraint to not fight back at anyone who

criticised him. He did not possess the emotional and intellectual faculty to listen to advice and

criticism. This is evidenced by the verbal attacks he unleashed on the anti-tour protestors who

expressed views on the tour that stood in opposition to his own. Muldoon referred to the anti-

tour protestors as incompetent “rent-a-demo people” who recklessly were endangering their

welfare and the welfare of others in their violent demonstrations.104

Discernment is a crucial characteristic of cultural leadership that can make or break

political leaders. It is the “rudder” that can direct a political figure’s ship to the edge of a

waterfall or safely to shore.105 It is also the building block that comprises all of the other skills

in Hargrove’s analysis, thus it is essential for a political leader’s political longevity.106

Political leaders must have the ability to read and judge the conditions of the environment

that they find themselves governing in.107 This is a task that the public ask of their political 100 1981, The Tour: Ten Years On. 101 Ibid.102 Shears and Gidley, Storm Out Of Africa: The 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 108. 103 Ibid. 104 Shears and Gidley, Storm Out Of Africa: The 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 94-95.105 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 35.106 Ibid.107 Ibid.

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leaders as they are given political positions because they are deemed wiser and more

knowledgeable than the people that they govern.108 Their perceived intelligence and

experience is drawn from the discernment that their political actions and decisions are

apparently directed by.109 They are expected to make accurate judgements and implement

efficient decisions.110 A political leader’s skill of discernment is based upon his ability to read

the current social environment to stay in touch with the people he governed, something noted

by prime ministers in the advice book written by Neale McMillan.111

In Neale McMillan’s Top of the Greasy Pole: New Zealand Prime Ministers of

Recent Times, advice is provided by former prime ministers of New Zealand, men who have

ascended the greasy pole and fallen from it. One such individual is David Lange, who, in this

book, noted the essential skill that prime ministers must have to sense the attitudes that the

New Zealand populace held about them, and pointed out that a prime minister must possess

what he called a “sensitive antenna” to read these emotions.112 In this book, Muldoon’s own

advice regarding of discernment is offered.113 Muldoon commented on the contradiction

whereby it is easy for a prime minister to distance himself from potential voters by making an

unpopular decision on a difficult issue and lose his job, whilst it is difficult to make popular

political decisions on matters that will allow him to stay in favour of the public.114 The

following section of this essay will demonstrate that Muldoon’s antenna was finely tuned to

the will of the people, at least those who were pro-tour, as evidenced by his success in the

1981 election.

Discernment can be used by political leaders to guide their understanding that some of

the political decisions that they must make will cause a divide between those who will

108 Ibid., 39.109 Ibid., 41.110 Ibid., 35.111 McMillan, Top of the Greasy Pole: New Zealand Prime Ministers of Recent Times, 22.112 Ibid.113 McMillan, Top of the Greasy Pole: New Zealand Prime Ministers of Recent Times, 22.114 Ibid., 23.

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support their ultimate decision and those who will not.115 Hargrove outlines the identification

of attractive solutions to remedy societal issues that would win the favour of the public as a

core responsibility of political leaders.116 If a leader chooses to implement a popular solution,

as deemed popular by the people he governs, he will likely win the support of most of his

people.117 In situations where a political leader must make a decision that will create a

division among the public, they should choose their decisions carefully.

Muldoon took a calculated risk based on his discernment which demonstrated that

appealing to the pro-tour New Zealanders by not interfering in the tour would bring him

political success. In 1981, Muldoon employed his skill of discernment by comparing the

expected political outcomes of both decisions that he could take in regard to the 1981

Springbok Tour. Muldoon was faced with the decision of either retracting his promise to not

interfere in the tour and stop the Springboks from touring New Zealand or remaining by his

original position and letting the tour proceed. He chose the latter option, for it provided him

with a greater chance that he would win the 1981 election.118 Muldoon aligned with what

would be later proven to be the “right” segment of New Zealand that saw him become

re-elected.

In 1981, the support that Muldoon lost from the anti-tour protestors in New Zealand,

was made up for by the political support provided by what is called Muldoon’s “Ordinary

Blokes.” Muldoon was able to win the support of this group of pro-tour New Zealanders by

presenting himself as one of them, an ordinary Kiwi bloke through and through. The

“Ordinary Bloke” persona helped Muldoon relate to these New Zealanders as they shared

similar experiences and values.119 These working class males predominantly from rural areas,

115 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 33.116 Ibid., 38.117 Ibid., 25.118 “New Zealand As It Might Have Been: Bob Gregory.” 119 “Gleneagles Agreement,” Ministry for Culture and Heritage, accessed April 29, 2016. http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/culture/1981-springbok-tour/gleneagles-agreement.

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of a similar age as Muldoon, were to become what was known as “Rob’s Mob.”120 They made

up Muldoon’s generation of New Zealanders had lived through the Second World War and

the Great Depression.121 Muldoon recognised that he shared their passion for rugby and won

their support by allowing the Springbok Tour to take place.

Rugby is a value that many New Zealanders hold in great esteem, particularly

Muldoon’s “Ordinary Blokes”.122 New Zealand was in 1981, as it still is now, a rugby mad

country that views rugby as a form of religion. It this religion that Muldoon defended against

protestors and critics of the tour.123 One right that Muldoon sought to protect in 1981 was the

right of New Zealanders to watch rugby.124 Muldoon recognised that avid rugby spectators

were angered by the cancellations and disturbances of the tour matches by anti-tour protests

and demonstrations.125 These people didn’t care for the stand that the anti-tour protestors were

making, they only wanted to see the rugby games proceed. To win the support of this crucial

group, Muldoon adopted his anti-interference position and verbally abused the anti-tour

protestors, as demonstrated by the cruel comments he delivered publicly about the protest

movement, to discourage them from continuing to disturb the tour.

A final poll in 1981 concluded that 54 percent of New Zealanders opposed the tour

whereas 42 percent supported it, according to the New Zealand Herald.126 Realising that the

tour split New Zealand in half, Muldoon decided to side with the group whose votes he most

depended on, the pro-tour New Zealanders. The importance of Muldoon’s reliance on his

“Ordinary Blokes” was the potential impact that their votes could have in the 1981 election.

Muldoon realised that there were enough of the pro-tour side of New Zealand to rely on their

120 Ibid.121 Ibid.122 Ibid.123 Richards, Dancing on our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and Racism, 132.124 Shears and Gidley, Storm Out Of Africa: The 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 39.125 1981: A Country at War. Directed by Rachel Jean and Owen Hughes. Auckland: Frame Up Films, 2000.126 New Zealand Herald (12 October, 1981) quoted in Richards, Dancing on our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and Racism, 229.

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votes, for they were the individuals that bought out all of the seats in the stands of the rugby

fields where the matches were held.127

Many pro-tour New Zealanders were located in rural areas and regions that Muldoon

recognised as being crucial for National’s success in the 1981 national election. Polls

monitoring the anti-tour and pro-tour sentiment of the New Zealand public found that most

support originated from provincial regions and most opposition came from urban areas.128 It

was the support of the marginal provincial areas that Muldoon targeted for votes.129 There

were many pro-tour supporters in regions that were crucial to National’s success that would

have swung their votes from National if Muldoon had stopped the tour.130

Strategically positioning himself as anti-tour but failing to intervene in it, Muldoon

read the tumultuous social environment in New Zealand well and used it to his political

advantage. Muldoon employed his skill of discernment to analyse the risks involved with

cancelling the tour, or interfering in it, to discern whether this would be the path he would

follow. He ultimately recognised that he would only harm his chances of being re-elected for

a third term if he was to stray from his anti-interference stance.131 It would be political suicide

for Muldoon to break the promise National had made to not interfere in politics. Muldoon

would pay the political price, losing the support of his “Ordinary Blokes,” entering the

election as an unpopular candidate and consequently, would leave the 1981 election a

defeated man.132 The expected outcome of the election, if Muldoon interfered in the tour,

would see National and Muldoon make way for the successful Labour party headed by Bill

Rowling.133

127 1981, The Tour: Ten Years On. 128 Newnham, By Batons and Barbed Wire: A Response to the 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 7.129 Templeton, All Honourable Men: Inside the Muldoon Cabinet 1975-1984, 163. 130 Shears and Gidley, Storm Out Of Africa: The 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 13.131 Richards, Dancing on our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and Racism, 189. 132 “New Zealand As It Might Have Been: Bob Gregory.” 133 Ibid.

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Muldoon helped solidify his political support from pro-tour Kiwis by conveying to

New Zealanders as someone who had a good sense of what ordinary people wanted.134

Muldoon had the ability to authentically read and reflect the ideals that these ordinary Kiwis

possessed.135 Muldoon’s skilful exploitation of his relatability, by appearing to be genuinely

relatable to ordinary New Zealanders won him their loyalty, their votes, and consequently,

three consecutive national elections.136

The responsibility that political figures have to make political decisions that would

receive the greatest expected support from his people without knowing the outcomes in the

future is a taxing task. What they make up for in terms of experience and knowledge, political

leaders lose in their inability to predict future outcomes. Their responsibility is a risky one,

for Hargrove noted that it is only when a leader makes a particular decision that he learns

whether or not that was the right decision to make.137 What separates political figures who

make effective decisions from those who do not lies in their ability to discern the setting they

are ruling in and foresee consequences, both positive and negative, that their political

decisions could have.138 Understandably, the ability one has to discern will have a direct

impact on his career.139

Muldoon’s discernment guided his prediction that he would be the winner of what

would become a very close election. In fact, it was initially anticipated by Muldoon that

National would be more successful in the 1981 election than the 1975 election by winning a

significantly larger share of the vote.140 Thanks to his appeal to “Rob’s Mob,” National was

expected by Muldoon to significantly make up more votes than it lost in urban areas.141

134 1981: A Country at War.; Johansson, Two Titans: Muldoon, Lange and Leadership, 223.135 Johansson, Two Titans: Muldoon, Lange and Leadership, 118.136 Ibid.137 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 41.138 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 41.139 Ibid., 42.140 Stephen Levine, “Continuity and Change in New Zealand Politics.” in From Muldoon to Lange: New Zealand Elections in the 1980s, eds. Stephen Levine and Alan McRobie (Rangiora: MC Enterprises, 2002), 44. 141 Templeton, Human Rights and Sporting Contacts: New Zealand’s Attitudes to Race Relations in South Africa 1921-94, 202.

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Something that was grossly underestimated and not predicted by anyone was just how

National came to losing the 1981 election. The results of the election are a stark contrast to

the outstanding victory Muldoon accomplished in the 1975 election. It was only one Member

of Parliament, after assigning the speaker, that gave Muldoon the majority he needed to

secure his third term as prime minister.142

What this analysis has not yet acknowledged is a counter-argument to the claim that

Muldoon’s decisions regarding the 1981 Springbok Tour were politically motivated. As an

individual who knew Muldoon personally, Bob Jones used his biography of Muldoon to

clarify many misconceptions that are believed about his former colleague. One such

misconception of Muldoon is his apparent use of the tour as a political weapon to secure

votes for the 1981 election. Jones rejects this claim completely by stating that it was

completely ridiculous.143 Muldoon did not have the support of the better half of New

Zealanders, Jones argued, so it was not guaranteed that he would even win the 1981

election.144 Jones claims that criticism of Muldoon’s political motivations in 1981 came from

complainants who failed to grasp the illogicality of the allegations they were making.145

Jones’ argument speaks to a truth on the matter. Muldoon did not go into the election

knowing that he had the political support of more than half of New Zealand. Both he and

National were lucky to win the 1981 election. This study argues that Muldoon’s skill of

discernment fuelled the political motivation he had to use the tour as a political weapon.

Muldoon turned the tour, which began as an event that Muldoon did not want to proceed, into

a tool that he could exploit to bring about his third term as prime minister. Before the tour

began, it was a defeated Muldoon who admitted that he could “see nothing but trouble”

142 “New Zealand As It Might Have Been: Bob Gregory.”143 Jones, Memories of Muldoon, 201.144 Jones, Memories of Muldoon, 201.145 Ibid.

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stemming from the Rugby Union’s verdict to let the Springboks tour New Zealand.146 His

demeanour was low-spirited when hearing of the sporting body’s result but from that point

onwards, Muldoon’s attitude brightened, perhaps sensing that he could use the tour to his

political advantage. Muldoon made many comments to the media and his colleagues that

suggest that he accurately predicted the tour being given the greenlight. Muldoon later

acknowledged in his autobiography, Number 38, that he was certain the Rugby Union would

not withdraw its invitation to the Springboks.147 Muldoon would later not be able to disguise

the satisfaction he felt towards the tour going ahead. In an interview, he admitted that he felt

"pleased" when the decision was made that the tour would continue.148 Muldoon may have

not gone into the 1981 election assured that he had enough political support to win the

election but he tried to win as much support for himself by using the tour as a political tool.

2. Cultural Leadership

Cultural leadership is the second category of Hargrove’s presidential analysis.

Hargrove based his analysis of cultural leadership partly on the ability that political leaders

had to reflect the ideals possessed by the public. A sense of common national identity can be

evoked by presidents who, as Dixon Wecter believed, jumped aboard the “bandwagon to the

star of American idealism.”149 Political leaders can build a following for themselves by

establishing a sense of shared national identity with their citizens. 150 Muldoon appealed to

pro-tour New Zealanders by bandwagoning with them in their support for the 1981

Springbok Tour. Muldoon’s decision to not intervene in the tour was also based on the need

146 Gerald Hensley, “Muldoon and the World.” in Muldoon Revisited, ed. Margaret Clark (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2004), 149.147 Robert Muldoon, Number 38 (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), 42.148 1981, The Tour: Ten Years On. 149 Dixon Wecter, The Hero in America: A Chronical of Hero-Worship (New York: Scribner, 1941), 487 in Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 51.150 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 51.

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he felt to protect the democratic rights of New Zealanders, like the right to protest peacefully,

which saw Muldoon gain political support in the process.

Protestors accused Muldoon of being desensitised to the regime of apartheid in South

Africa and even supporting it because of his decision to let the tour go ahead. Muldoon was

very aware of the apartheid that took place in African countries but remained adamant that

democracy would be upheld in New Zealand. In Number 38, he acknowledged that coloured

South Africans experienced racial discrimination and were treated as inferior beings by the

so-called superior white South Africans.151 These people were the subject of violence and

discriminatory laws that established their position in society as belonging to the lowest social

class.152 However, Muldoon did not see why New Zealand should be punished for South

Africa’s preferred system of governance.153 He saw no reason to give up the democratic

freedoms of New Zealanders because of the lack of freedom and rights that people in South

Africa were experiencing. New Zealanders and its tourists had certain freedoms and rights

guaranteed by the government, like the right to protest peacefully.154 Muldoon was certain

that apartheid was not going to change that.

Muldoon was determined to protect the democratic rights of New Zealanders during

the tumultuous Springbok Tour of 1981. Although he was a bully to anti-tour protesters and

attempted to weaken their legitimacy to stop their efforts devoted to cancelling the tour,

Muldoon recognised the right that they held to express their views through protests and

demonstrations. Up until the protest movement engaged in acts of violence, Muldoon

respected the right that New Zealanders had to protest against the 1981 Springbok Tour. He

believed that the government should allow protests to happen on the grounds that they did not

151 Muldoon, Number 38, 43.152 Ibid.153 Ibid., 44.154 Spiro Zavos, The Real Muldoon (Wellington: Fourth Estate Books, 1978), 208.

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cause any issues with the law.155 New Zealanders were free to express their discontent of the

tour as long as they protested peacefully.156

Protest organisations like HART and CARE advocated non-violent protests as a key

principle of theirs but what erupted in New Zealand as a result of the protest movement

beginning from the Hamilton match was anything but peaceful. In fact, these protest

organisations and their members created a violent struggle that was on the verge of becoming

a civil war. Some would argue that the battle that took place on the streets and rugby fields in

New Zealand in 1981 was, in fact, a civil war. Muldoon attempted to appeal to anti-tour New

Zealanders by guaranteeing them a fundamental democratic right. However, his protection of

the right that New Zealanders had to protest was thrown in his face by the anti-tour protestors

who rejected their right to protest peacefully in favour of using violence to express their

political voice.

3. Teaching Reality

The third category of Hargrove’s analysis is Teaching Reality, another skill that

Hargrove recommends political leaders possess. Political leaders are tasked with informing

the public about the plans of action they intend to launch, in addition to the state of the

environment that the territory they rule over is currently in.157 The success to which a

politician employs this skill is decided by the people whom the teachings are directed at, for

it is the public who determines whether the message their political leader conveys was a

precise and truthful description of the current context or not.158 The teaching of reality is

155 Jones, Memories of Muldoon, 199.156 Ibid.157 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 42.158 Ibid., 43.

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subjective to a leader’s particular perception of what reality is and what they regard as being

the truth.159

Hargrove acknowledges that there are two avenues a political leader may follow to

teach reality. In his analysis, he differentiates between two methods that can be used to teach

reality, the Machiavellian method of teaching reality and the Aristotelian method. Hargrove

expresses his preference for the Aristotelian approach of teaching reality.160 This method

requires political leaders to communicate to the people that they govern their impartial,

honest perspective of reality.161 Hargrove advises presidents to be truthful because it is

morally right and an easier task than to be purposefully deceitful and a demagogue.162 If

people can trust that a political figure is honest and capable of telling the truth, that leader

will likely win their support.163 This method is not always political leaders’ preferred way of

teaching reality. Hargrove admits that the idealistic political figures who use this method are

not guaranteed to win support from the public because people do not always want to hear the

truth, nor subscribe to it, especially if it is unfavourable to them.164

Leaders who are solely interested in maintaining political power will adopt the

Machiavellian approach of teaching reality.165 The success to which a political leader

experiences in his adoption of this realist approach lies in the ability he has to lie and

persuade. This method requires political leaders to teach a biased form of reality rather than

teach a truthful perception of reality using the idealistic approach that Hargrove suggests

political leaders take. Leaders who adopt the Machiavellian approach feed a biased reality

159 Ibid., 42.160 Ibid., 23.161 Ibid., 44.162 Ibid., 23.163 Ibid., 35. 164 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 44.165 Ibid., 46.

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that is customised to the opinions of a large sector of society to win their political support.166

The public are deliberately deceived by what Hargrove calls a “demagogue.”167

A demagogue is a manipulator, someone who abuses power to retain their grasp on

control. They are Machiavellian leaders who resort to deceiving the people they govern and

their opposition in order to win political support. Machiavelli himself proposes that a leader

must become a demagogue in situations where his power is threatened. The evil actions that a

political leader may take to maintain their hold on political power is justified by their pursuit

of power. Leaders who purposely lie to their citizens for their own benefit are known as

demagogues to Hargrove, and political figures should rise above such a status.168 Muldoon’s

failure to rise above this is evidenced by the Machiavellian approach he took to teach New

Zealand his desensitised view of the Springbok Tour.

As a political opportunist, Muldoon deliberately taught a falsified version of reality by

twisting the situation that New Zealand found itself in during the tour and shortly afterwards,

to his own political advantage. He blatantly lied to the New Zealand public to maintain his

control and his hold on power that he perhaps felt was slipping out from his reach.169

Muldoon taught the desensitised view that he held towards the negative social and financial

scars that the tour left on New Zealand during 1981 and for years afterwards. These costs

originated from his decision to not interfere in the tour. Although Muldoon attempted to

ignore the true costs which were placed upon New Zealand in 1981, the burdens that New

Zealand suffered as a result of the tour could not be ignored.

Muldoon admitted that his "feeling about the whole thing is a relaxed one.”170

Throughout the tour, Muldoon said that “No one, as far as I'm aware was killed nor seriously

166 Ibid., 44. 167 Ibid., 154.168 Ibid., 2.169 Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, 36.170 1981, The Tour: Ten Years On.

Severn 32

injured. Some property damage was done, there was some cost in police time.”171 Muldoon

taught a biased version of reality that downplayed the true costs of the tour. In reality, over

150,000 people participated in over two hundred protests held up and down New Zealand.172

Of those participants, approximately 2000 protestors were arrested and there were scores who

sustained injuries.173 It has been suggested that Muldoon and the police were very lucky that

no one was killed as a result of the tour. Had the tour continued for just a few more weeks,

the increased severity of police tactics used against the protestors would have certainly

caused several deaths.174

New Zealand was brought to its knees in a dispute over a rugby tour which saw that

no person in New Zealand was disaffected by the turmoil that the tour kicked up. The

ideological issue of the tour and differences of opinion ravished New Zealand. Urban areas

nor rural areas were free from the social divisions that the tour created. Conversations and

disputes regarding the tour took place in churches, universities, school grounds and

workplaces and family homes. Dining room tables saw the alienation of family members over

the issue of the Springbok Tour. The tour was a topic of conversation some families tried to

avoid at all cost for the sake of not embroiling Sunday dinners with bitter arguments.175 One

family in particular saw its two sons, one a member of a protest organisation, the other a

policeman, struggle ideologically over the issue of the tour.176 When both sons were

preparing to attend a protest, for very different reasons and on two opposing sides, their

mother warned the policeman that if he came across his brother in the protest, he was not to

hurt him.177

171 Ibid. 172 Roche, “Protest, Police and Place: The 1981 Springbok Tour and the Production and Consumption of Social Space,” 52.173 Ibid. 174 1981: A Country at War. 175 1981: A Country at War.176 Ibid.177 Ibid.

Severn 33

Muldoon also was desensitised to the police tactics used against the anti-tour

protestors. He did express any compassion towards the protestors when they fell victims to

police force during the intensified demonstrations. Rather, Muldoon expressed his gratitude

for the police adopting brutal tactics to restrain the protestors that he began to dislike more

and more as the tour dragged on.178 According to Muldoon, it was only reasonable that the

police use violent tactics against protestors who were engaging in reckless, unnecessary acts

of violence in the first place.179 The victimisation of anti-tour protestors, in addition to the

financial and social burdens that the tour created, were significantly downplayed by Muldoon

and were not acknowledged by the prime minister in his teaching of reality.

While Muldoon lived up to the quintessential nature of a politician by struggling to

admit his failures, there were specific actions that he pinpointed as being regrets of his in his

later life. Excluded from his list of regrets is the 1981 Springbok Tour. The biggest regret that

Muldoon had, after considering his momentous three terms as prime minister, was his calling

of the 1984 snap election.180 It was a decision that Muldoon believed cut his career short and

had it not been called, the election would have taken its rightful place in November, in which

case, Muldoon perhaps would have won.181 Ironically, Muldoon’s biggest regret was the

action he took that stripped him of his political power. The Springbok Tour, which provided

Muldoon with political power and a third term as prime minister, was left out of the regrets

that mentioned he had. Muldoon’s disregard for the tour is exemplified by the lack of

information that Muldoon provides on the issue in his many autobiographies.

While Muldoon may have been quick to forget the disastrous effects that the tour had

on this country, the events of 1981 should not be forgotten by New Zealanders, those who

experienced the tour first-hand and especially by the generations who were born after the

178 Shears and Gidley, Storm Out Of Africa: The 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, 121.179 Ibid. 180 McMillan, Top of the Greasy Pole: New Zealand Prime Ministers of Recent Times, 86.181 McMillan, Top of the Greasy Pole: New Zealand Prime Ministers of Recent Times, 86.

Severn 34

tour. Thirty-five years have passed since the tour ended and the Springboks departed New

Zealand. Thinking about the legacy that the tour left is an important thought to ponder as it

reveals much about the effects that the 1981 Springbok Tour had on New Zealand. The five-

week series began on July 22nd and ended on September 14th.182 Throughout that period, the

All Blacks faced the Springboks in fifteen matches, with the Kiwi side scoring more points

than the Springboks, ultimately going on to win the series.183 To this day, this is not the tour

outcome that springs to mind when observers of the tour think back to what happened in

1981. New Zealanders remember watching from the stands of rugby fields and crowded

around television screens, the stadiums and streets of New Zealand be occupied by thousands

of protestors in a clash against policemen and rugby supporters. South Africans too watched

the protests unfold from thousands of kilometres away from the action via television.184

Although decades have passed since the disastrous tour ended, it is important to recognise

that the 1981 Springbok Tour is an event that should not be forgotten in New Zealand, for if

an event of this magnitude is forgotten, history is doomed to repeat itself.

Robert Muldoon once spoke of a vision he had for New Zealand early on in his

political career. He told an interviewer that he was committed to seeing New Zealand off in

the same condition that he received it in during his first term.185 Years later, while in

retirement, Muldoon’s response to a similar question which asked him how he would like to

be remembered by history was quite the contrast.186 Muldoon merely mentioned that how he

would go down in history was not a concern of his, in fact, it was something he did not care

about at all.187 This study has attempted to discern the way that history remembers Robert

Muldoon, the prime minister who presided over the 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand. 182 Roche, “Protest, Police and Place: The 1981 Springbok Tour and the Production and Consumption of Social Space,” 52. 183 Ibid. 184 John Nauright and Timothy J. L. Chandler, eds., Making Men: Rugby and Masculine Identity (Great Britain: Routledge, 1996), 213.185 Jones, Memories of Muldoon, 101.186 McMillan, Top of the Greasy Pole: New Zealand Prime Ministers of Recent Times, 61.187 Ibid.

Severn 35

The analysis that it provides on the political leadership of Muldoon focused on his

motivations, which were shaped by his inner angels and demons and resulted in his decision

to not interfere in the Springbok Tour.

The argument that framed this analysis is based upon the political leadership theories

provided by Erwin C. Hargrove. These theories were applied to Robert Muldoon’s political

leadership in 1981. The theories that this study made reference to include the reputation a

political leader has and the skills of bargaining, rhetoric, heresthetics, character, cultural

leadership and teaching reality. The key question proposed at the beginning of this study

highlighted the purpose of this analysis on Muldoon as prime minister in 1981. This question

asked whether Muldoon’s decision to adopt an anti-interference stance was motivated by his

inner angels or demons. This study argued that Muldoon was not guided by either his inner

angels or demons, but both. Muldoon listened to the demon that sat on one of his shoulders

and the angel that sat on the other, combining the advice that the two creatures provided.

History must remember that Muldoon’s motivations in 1981 were mixed. Whilst he was

driven his desire to extend his political power to a third term as prime minister, Muldoon also

strived to protect the rights of the people that he governed.

Severn 36

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