the philosophy days in uppsala / filosofidagarna i uppsala ... · the philosophy days in uppsala /...

ThePhilosophyDaysinUppsala/

FilosofidagarnaiUppsala

25—27August2017

Bookofabstracts

Preliminaryversionof18August2017

BOOKOFABSTRACTS2

ThePhilosophyDays (Filosofidagarna) isabiennialevent. Itwas firstarranged inUmeå in1995.SubsequentcongresseswereheldinLund(1997),Göteborg(1999),Stockholm(2001),Linköping (2003), Uppsala (2005), Umeå (2007), Lund (2009),Göteborg (2011), Stockholm(2013), and Linköping (2015). The conference is organized by Uppsala University, withspecial support from the Civis Sum research project, the Anderz Karitz Foundation, theTheoriaFoundation,AestheticsatUppsalaUniversity,andLetterstedtskaföreningen.

ORGANIZINGCOMMITTEE2017

TomasEkenberg,UppsalaUniversity

Lars-GöranJohansson,UppsalaUniversity

OlleRisberg,UppsalaUniversity

RysiekSliwinksi,UppsalaUniversity

RebeccaWallbank,UppsalaUniversity

ABSTRACTSCOMMITTEE2017

PerAlgander,UppsalaUniversity:Ethics

EmilAndersson,UppsalaUniversity:PoliticalPhilosophy

KarlBergman,UppsalaUniversity:PhilosophyofMind

TomasEkenberg,UppsalaUniversity:HistoryofPhilosophy

NilsFranzén,UppsalaUniversity:Logic&PhilosophyofLanguage

JensJohansson,UppsalaUniversity:PhilosophyofReligion

Lars-GöranJohansson,UppsalaUniversity:Epistemology&PhilosophyofScience

SebastianLutz,UppsalaUniversity:Epistemology&PhilosophyofScience

PatriciaMindus,UppsalaUniversity:PhilosophyofLaw

OlofPetterson,UppsalaUniversity:Phenomenology&Existentialism

SebastiánReyesMolina,UppsalaUniversity:PhilosophyofLaw

OlleRisberg,UppsalaUniversity:ValueTheory

HenrikRydéhn,UppsalaUniversity:Metaphysics

ElisabethSchellekensDammann,UppsalaUniversity:Aesthetics

RebeccaWallbank,UppsalaUniversity:FeministPhilosophy

ThisbookofabstractswasdesignedandtypesetwithMicrosoftWord.Allcopyrightsremainwiththeoriginalauthors.

THEPHILOSOPHYDAYS 3

TABLEOFCONTENTS

AESTHETICS............................................................................................................9

SIMONCOP–OntheEpistemicValueofElectronicMusic 10

MARIAFORSBERG–RebuttingThomasson’sargumentfromreference 11

VENDELAHAVILAND–AbstractPaintingandtheKantianNotionofArtisticSublimity 13

IRENEMARTÍNEZMARÍN–Appreciating(without)feeling:thecaseofnostalgicexpression 14

JEREMYPAGE–TextandReaderinaccountsoftheCognitiveandEthicalValueofLiterature 15

ANDREPATRÃO–AHistoryofPhilosophyandArchitecture:WhenandHowTheySpokeAboutandWithEachOther 16

VICTORPERSSON–InaWorldofAestheticPerception 17

MIKAELPETTERSSON–SeeingDepictedSpace(OrNot) 18

AXELRUDOLPHI–ThePhilosophyofPerformanceArt 19

REBECCAWALLBANK–ReconsideringArtisticValue 20

ANDREASWIKBLOM–AestheticFormalism 21

EPISTEMOLOGY&PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE........................................................22

SVENOVEHANSSON–Sciencedenial,factresistanceandalternativefacts–whatisthisallabout? 23

ERIKJANSSONBOSTRÖM–VadärproblemetmedMaxWebersidealtyper? 24

JESPERJERKERT–Theultimateargumentforrandomization? 25

ERICJOHANNESSON–Simplicity,probabilityandstrength 26

ALEKSKNOKS–Higher-orderevidenceandrationalityrequirementsbywayofdeonticlogic 27

SEBASTIANLUTZ–EmpiricallyAdequatebutObservablyFalseTheories 28

GUNNARMOBERG–SomeremarksonCatherineElgin’sepistemology 29

ERIKJ.OLSSON–TheGeneralityProblemNaturalized 30

VASILPENCHEV–Metaphorasentanglement 31

AMANDATHORELL–Gränsenmellanfrisktochpatologisktochproblemetmedvanligasjukdomar 32

MARCOTIOZZO–TheLevel-SplittingView:AHappyCompromiseBetweenConciliatoryandSteadfastViews? 33

ETHICS.................................................................................................................34

BOOKOFABSTRACTS4

JESPERAHLIN–TheImpossibilityofReliablyDeterminingtheAuthenticityofDesires:ImplicationsforInformedConsent 35

SARABELFRAGE–Hurvifaktisktbryrossompersonligintegritet 36

JANERIKCHRISTENSEN–ASustainableFuture?ConfucianPhilosophyandClimateChange 37

KARINENFLO–Kvantitet,kvalitet,jämlikhet 38

ANTONERIKSSON–CausalResponsibilityforEmissionsinGlobalSupplyChains 39

FRITSGÅVERTSSON–TheCostofConvictioninJohnWilliams’sStoner 40

JOHANGUSTAFSSON–PopulationAxiologyandthePossibilityofaFourthCategoryofAbsoluteValue 41

KARIMJEBARI&NIKLASOLSSONYAOUZIS–AGameofStars 42

KARSTENKLINTJENSEN–WeakSuperiority,ImpreciseEqualityandtheRepugnantConclusion 43

NIKLASJUTH–Doesgeneticmodificationofembryosaffecttheirfutureidentityandwouldthatbeamoralproblem? 44

SANDRALINDGREN–Ånger-ettförsvarstal 45

DAVIDM.LYRESKOG–AlternativesinAbolishingAlzheimer’s:Astructuredapproachtocomplexvaluetrade-offsinfuturetreatmentsforneurodegenerativedisease 46

BENJAMINMATHESON–ResponsibilityforthePast 47

PER-ERIKMILAM–ReasonstoForgive 48

JESSICAPEPP–Assertion,Lying,andFalselyImplicating 49

OLLERISBERG–ConsequentialismandCoordinatingWithYourselfandOthers 50

SIMONROSENQVIST–ObjectiveAct-Consequentialismandthe“OughtImpliesCan”Objection 51

PERSANDIN–ExceptionalistEnvironmentalEthics 52

LISAFORSBERG–OnAdolescentRefusalsofLife-ProlongingMedicalTreatment:AWelfaristProposal 53

OLLETORPMAN–MoralUncertaintyandSubjectivizationofIntertheoreticComparability 54

RYANWINES–FillingtheAlleged'Gap'inKant’sDerivationoftheCategoricalImperative55

FEMINISTPHILOSOPHY........................................................................................56

MARTINAREUTER–DidWomenContributetotheInventionofAutonomy? 57

QASIRSHAH–AreSexandGenderSocialConstructs?AnexplorationofJudithButler’sideas 58

HISTORYOFPHILOSOPHY.....................................................................................59

THEPHILOSOPHYDAYS 5

ERIKÅKERLUND–Densitethosnågrabarocktänkare 60

JOHANBOBERG–KantonErkenntnisandWissen 61

LORENZOCASINI–VarAristotelesdeterminist?NågraanmärkningaromPietroPomponazziskritikavAlexanderfrånAphrodisiasPeriheimarmenes. 62

THANASSISGKTAZARAS–WhatcausesthegenerationofthehumanbodyinPlato’sTimaeus? 63

HENRIKLAGERLUND–WasThereSuchathingastheRenaissance?ASketchofHistoriographicalNihilism 64

PAULINAREEMES–MedicinesDrenchedinHoney:OlympiodorusontheMethodofPlatonicPhilosophy 65

HALLVARDSTETTE–Filosofi:Enlekmedord? 66

INGE-BERTTÄLJEDAL–AntonioRosminiomegennamnsreferensochuppkomst 67

LOGIC&PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE...................................................................68

ARVIDBÅVE–Fine-tuningdispositionalismaboutcontent 69

GISELABENGTSSON–Enkel,kraftfull,sträng 70

NILSFRANZÉN–EvaluativeDiscourseandEmotiveStatesofMind 71

ANANDIHATTIANGADI–LogicalDisagreement 72

BJÖRNLUNDGREN–WhatisCulture? 73

ALBINASPLESNYS–Liarrevisited:whereFregewasrightandTarskiwaswrong 75

LIZHANG–Choicerevision 76

METAPHYSICS......................................................................................................77

TOBIASALEXIUS–Core-CognitionandPhilosophicalDisputes 78

EINARDUENGERBØHN–CompositionasIdentity:whatitisandsomethingsitentails 79

ELISABETHFURBERG–Isthereananthropocentricbiasinthepersonalidentitydebate? 80

PAULGORBOW–Explainingtruthsfundamentally 81

HELGEMALMGREN–Omfärgersförmentaoförenlighet 82

HENRIKRYDÉHN–MetaphysicallyOpaqueGrounding 83

JONATHANSHAHEEN–FunctionlessDesertLandscapes 84

FRANCESCOSPADA–AscriptionandtheRegressofInstantiation 85

YLWASJÖLINWIRLING–Supportingnon-uniformismaboutmodalepistemology 86

EVANWOODS–AMany-OneIdentitySolutiontotheProblemoftheMany 87

PHENOMENOLOGY&EXISTENTIALISM.................................................................88

BOOKOFABSTRACTS6

ANNAPETRONELLAFOULTIER–BodilyIntentionalityandAestheticSpatialityinDance 89

REBECCAHARRISON–ThePhenomenologicalPointofView:AMerleau-PontyanPerspective 90

RAUNOHUTTUNEN&LEENAKAKKORI–HeideggerasDasManWhenDefendingHisPrinciplesofAcademicEducationagainstNaziAccusation 91

BURCUOZDEMIR–SuicideandModernity:PhilosophicalSuicideasaPotentialFormofResistancetotheModeofExistenceDictatedbyModernity 92

CHARLOTTAWEIGELT–Phenomenologyandtheproblemofcausality 93

PHILOSOPHYOFLAW...........................................................................................94

ÅSAÅGREN–Rationalitetsbegreppetochmiljöbalkensrimlighetsavvägning 95

TOMMASOBRAIDA–Isadministrativedetentionofstatelesspeoplebasedonaprincipleofresponsibilityforidentity? 96

DALEBROWN–IsGrantingExecutiveClemencytoThoseWhoKillDuringNon-ConfrontationalActsofSelf-DefenseEnough? 97

WILLIAMBÜLOW–DeservedDelayedRelease?OntheCommunicativetheoryofPunishmentandIndeterminatePrisonSentences 98

KARLDAHLSTRAND–Endomstolspedagogiskansats 99

ELISABETHENEROTH–TheRelationofPowerbetweentheLevelsoftheLaw 100

ÅKEFRÄNDBERG–Onthefoundationsofjuridicalthinking 101

HÅKANGUSTAFSSON–Faktaresistenträttsteoriellerkontrafaktiskrättsfilosofi? 103

CYRILHOLM–BetydelsenavÖstenUndénsanalysavrättighetsbegreppetförSAP'sfaktiskapolitik 104

JANKELLGREN–Denavgörandetidpunktenijuridiken:enförbisedd,mencentral,fråga 105

SEANKERMATH–TheChoice-of-EvilsDefense:JustifyingtheLeastEvilApproach 106

BRIANLEITER–JustifyingAcademicFreedom:MillandMarcuseRevisited 107

MAXLYLES–Materia,formochinnehålliChristopherJacobBoströmsrättslära-svenskidealistiskrättsfilosofiiljusetavenpositivistiskrättsvetenskap 108

PATRICIAMINDUS–Funktionelltmedborgarskapijaktenpåenallmänteoriommedborgarskap 109

GUILHERMEMARQUESPEDRO–ThePoliticalTurninthePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity 110

ELENAPRATS–Whatcanphilosophysayaboutiuspecuniae(acquisitionofcitizenshipinexchangeformoney) 111

JULIETAA.RÁBANOS–Astrange(conceptual)loop:whoreallymakestheLawintheend(orinthebeginning)?AbriefanalysisoftheconceptofLaw(andtheconceptofAuthority)throughtheeyesandthewordsoflegalpositivismandlegalrealism 112

THEPHILOSOPHYDAYS 7

SEBASTIÁNREYESMOLINA–OnLegalInterpretationandConstitutionalTheory 113

ELLIKASEVELIN–FactsintheLaw:TheLaw/FactDistinctionintheLegalPositivisticConceptofLaw 114

TORBENSPAAK–TheScopeofLegalPositivism 115

GUSTAVSTENSEKE–Vargarnaochrätten–etträttsfilosofisktavhandlingsprojekt 116

JUANPABLOSTERLINGCASAS–OptimisticHermeneuticsandDialogueasLimittoLegalArbitrariness 117

CAROLINESTRÖMBERG–Presentationavlicentiatavhandlingen”Etikochnormkonflikterinommiljörättsliglagstiftning” 118

WANNASVEDBERG–Straffrättenikollision-varför,ochhurgörvidåmeddesjälvkörandefordonen? 119

SIMONWALLENGREN–TitleTBA 120

PHILOSOPHYOFMIND.......................................................................................121

GUNNARBJÖRNSSON–Cross-modalidentificationandtheabsurdityofphysicalism 122

JANSCHEFFEL–Theunsolvabilityofthemind-bodyproblemliberatesthewill 123

JULIUSSCHOENHERR–LuckyJointAction 124

ALVASTRÅGE–Canneurosciencerefutefolkpsychology? 125

PÄRSUNDSTRÖM–Vadservi? 126

GALYEHEZKEL–Reason,Desires,andEnds 127

PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION.................................................................................129

FRANCISJONBÄCK–Anti-theodicyandtheGarytheGreatAnalogy 130

MARIASVEDBERG–TheValueofImmortality 131

POLITICALPHILOSOPHY.....................................................................................132

EMILANDERSSON–LiberalLegitimacyandJustifiabilitytoAll 133

KATHARINABERNDTRASMUSSEN–Discrimination,harm,andmeritocracy 134

ERICBRANDSTEDT–TheFutilityofReflectiveEquilibrium 135

ÅSABURMAN–Aresocialentrepreneursmoral?Questioningtwofundamentalassumptionsinsocialentrepreneurship 136

MARKUSFURENDAL–Equality,ParetoandCohen'sEthos 137

KALLEGRILL–Acaseforlargerfamilies 138

SIRKKUHELLSTEN–Theriseandfallofliberaldemocracyandpoliticalliberalism:whathappenedtoenlightenedcitizenship? 139

LARSLINDBLOM–MillonLabouranditsClaims 140

BOOKOFABSTRACTS8

JASMINANEDEVSKATÖRNQVIST–AnEnvironmentWorthyofFutureGenerations:TowardsaClassicalNaturalLawApproachtotheNon-IdentityProblem 141

NIKLASOLSSONYAOUZIS–Onobscuring:acriticismofRawlsianpoliticalphilosophy 142

ATTILATANYI–ConsequentialismandItsdemands:TheRoleofInstitutions 143

THEORIAKEYNOTESPEAKER..............................................................................144

JOHNBROOME–Reason 145

VALUETHEORY..................................................................................................146

JANS.ANDERSSON–Subjektivismvsexpressivism:enmeningslösmatch? 147

EMMABECKMAN–Twoargumentsformoralerrortheory 148

RAGNARFRANCÉN–Anewaccountofmoraldisagreement 149

MATSINGELSTRÖM–ADilemmaforWell-beingMeasurement 150

ANTTIKAUPPINEN–Prudence,Authencity,andtheChangingSelf 152

VICTORMOBERGER–TristramMcPhersonomnon-naturalismochsuperveniens 153

SARAPACKALÉN–Subjectivism,assertoriccontent,anddisagreement 154

EIRIKJULIUSRISBERG–Empathy,MoralJudgement,andMoralDisjunctivism 155

H.ORRISTEFÁNSSON–Indefenceofrisk-freeutility 157

CHRISTIANTARSNEY–TwoRegressProblemsforRationalChoiceunderNormativeUncertainty 158

INDEXOFSPEAKERS...........................................................................................159

THEPHILOSOPHYDAYS 9

AESTHETICS

BOOKOFABSTRACTS10

SIMONCOP–OntheEpistemicValueofElectronicMusic

UppsalaUniversity|[email protected]

This paper examines electronic sound recordings as possible sources of information.Epistemicworriesaboutelectronicmusicusuallyderivesfromtheimpressionthatelectronicsoundsrevealnothingofinterestaboutthecircumstancesofitsproduction.Iwillarguethatwhenlisteningtoelectronicsounds,weobtainperceptualknowledgeaboutnon-perceptualentities, i.e. algorithms. Thus, the epistemic value of electronic music is its capacity toprovideinformationaboutwhatasoundfeelslike,withoutrevealingitssource.

Meskin & Cohen (2008) claims that sound recordings have an epistemic status similar tophotographs. They argue that sound recordings provide information about the aurallydetectablepropertiesofobjectswithoutprovidinginformationaboutthespatiallocationofthoseobject(withregardstothelistener).AlthoughIbelievethatMeskin&Cohenisrightabout the epistemic status ofacoustic sound recordings, their analysis cannot explain thedistinctepistemicstatusofelectronicsoundrecordings.

TheclaimthatIwilldefendinthispaperisthatourknowledgeofelectronicsoundsdependsonthekindofsignalprocessinginvolvedwhenrecordingthosesounds.Therefore,Iproposeadistinctionbetweensymmetricsignalprocessingandasymmetricsignalprocessing.Whenlisteningtoarecordingofacousticsounds,thephysicalwaveformswehearareperceptuallyindistinguishable fromthephysicalwaveformsrecorded.This isacaseofsymmetricsignalprocessing.However,whenlisteningtoarecordingofelectronicsounds,physicalwaveformsappear for the first time. Prior to our hearing of electronic sounds, they exist solely asalgorithms. A unique feature of asymmetric signal processing is that it allows for non-perceptualentities,suchasalgorithms,tobeperceivedbythesenses.Thismakeselectronicsoundrecordingsepistemicallyvaluable.

THEPHILOSOPHYDAYS 11

MARIAFORSBERG–RebuttingThomasson’sargumentfromreference

UppsalaUniversity&StockholmUniversity|[email protected]

Manyphilosophersthinkthatpaintingsaresingularworks.(Wollheim1968,Goodman1972,Davies2003,cfDavies2010)Acommonargumentforthisviewisthatpaintingsaresingularworksifandonlyifwetreatthemassingularworks,whichistosaythatwemakeclaimstothe effect that any work in painting was created when the artist created the original, islocatedinexactlythesameplaceastheoriginal,andwillbedestroyedwhentheoriginalisdestroyed,andthatweactuallytreatpaintingsassingularworks.(Wollheim1968,Goodman1972,Davies2003)

Currie,however, thinksthatpaintingsaremultipleworks. (Currie1989,cfDavies2010)Healsothinksthatthecommonargumentfails.Onereasonthattheargumentfailsisthatitisfalsethatpaintingsaresingularworks ifandonlywetreatthemassingular.Even ifwealltreatpaintingsassingularworks,itdoesnotfollowthattheyare;”itispossiblethatwearemistakenaboutthis”(Currie1989:87,cfThomasson2004)

Thomassonarguesagainst theclaimthatpaintingscanbemultipleworkseven ifwe treatthemassingularworks.Sheclaimsthatwhenweaskontologicalquestionsaboutpaintings,weareusingtermslike“painting”.Thismeansthatwecanrephrasethequestionsasaskingwhat sort of thing the term “painting” picks out (see e.g. Thomasson 2004, 2005, 2006).Whatdetermineswhatsortofthingthetermpicksoutthen?Apurecausaltheory(Kripke1972,Putnam1975)willnotdosinceitsuffersfromthe“quaproblem”(DevittandSterelny1999, cf LaPorte 2004 and Soames 2002). The needed disambiguation is provided by thegroundersoftheterm“painting”havingaconceptionofwhatsortofentitytheyaretryingto name (see e.g. Thomasson 2004, 2005, 2006). The way in which they treat paintingsrevealstheirconception.(Thomasson2006)Sincetheirconceptiondetermineswhatsortofentity the term refers to, if it refers at all, it cannot turn out that paintings aremultipleworksifweallinfacttreatthemassingularworks(seee.g.Thomasson2004)

DoddattacksThomasson’smetaontologicalstanceaswellasheraccountofhowreferenceis fixed (Dodd 2012, 2013). In this paper, I argue that even if her stance and account arecorrect,itstilldoesnotfollowthatpaintingscannotturnouttobemultipleworksifweallinfacttreatthemassingularworks.Ialsoshowhowananalysisofthewayinwhichwetreatnotonlypaintingsbutalsootherartworks,andaphilosophicaltheoryaboutaestheticvalue,canbeusedtojustifytheviewthatpaintingsaremultipleworksinsuchcircumstances.

References

Currie,G.(1989)AnOntologyofArt.NewYork:St.Martin’sPress.

Davies, D. (2010) ”Multiple instances and multiple ’instances’. The British Journal ofAesthetics,50:4,411-426.

Davies,S.(2003)”Ontologyofart”inJerroldLevinson(ed.),OxfordCompaniontoAesthetics.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Devitt,M.andSterelny,K.(1999)LanguageandReality.2ndedn.CambridgeMA:MITPress

Dodd, J. (2012) Defending the discovery model in the ontology of art: A reply to AmieThomassononthequaproblem.TheBritishJournalofAesthetics,52,75-95.

BOOKOFABSTRACTS12

Dodd, J. (2013) Adventures in themetaontology of art: local descriptivism, artefacts anddreamcatchers.PhilosophicalStudies,165,1047-1068.

Goodman,N.(1972)ProblemsandProjects.IndianapolisandNewYork:Bobbs-Merrill.

Kripke, S. (1972) Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UniversityPress.

LaPorte, J. (2004)NaturalKindsandConceptualChange.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Putnam,H. (1975) Themeaning of ‘meaning’, inMind, Language and Reality. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Soames, S. (2002) Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming andNecessity.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Thomasson, A. (2004) “The ontology of art”, in Peter Kivy (ed), The Blackwell Guide toAesthetics.MaldenMA:BlackwellPub.

Thomasson, A. (2005) The ontology of art and knowledge in aesthetics. The Journal ofAestheticsandArtCriticism,63:3,221-228.

Thomasson, A. (2006) Debates about the ontology of art: what are we doing here?.PhilosophyCompass,1:3,245-255.

Wollheim,R.(1968)ArtanditsObjects,2ndedn.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.


VENDELAHAVILAND–AbstractPaintingand theKantianNotionofArtisticSublimity


The abstract expressionist paintings of Mark Rothko have captivated and awed manyspectatorsforyears.Theircolors,sizeandapparenttransparencyseemtoevokesomethingwithinus,whichwecannotexplain.Yet,thecontentofthepaintingsshowsnothingclearlyrecognizable to the viewer.What could account for our fascinationwith these seeminglyunrecognizableworks?

There seems to be amystery concerning the appreciation of abstract art. In experiencingRothko's artworks, art historians and philosophers have pointed to a feeling of sublimity.Cantheage-oldaccountofkantiansublimityexplainoursenseofwonderandadmirationfortheseartworks?Ifso,howcanwearguethatthisisthecase?

Theaimofthispaperistoexaminethepossibilityofthekantiannotionofartisticsublimityin relation to abstract paintings, focusing on the works of Mark Rothko. This views thekantiantheoryofsublimityinanewlightandshowstherelevanceofhistheoryinamoderncontext. My work will therefore conjoin to the larger discussion of the appreciation andaesthetic experience of abstract art. The following questions will be addressed: Can theconcept of the kantian sublime be applied to abstract painting?What are the necessaryconditions for the sublime toappear in reaction to suchanartwork?Are therepropertieswithinanabstractartworkthathavetheabilitytoevokethesublime?

Iwillargue that thekantiannotionof thesublimecanbeevokedbyabstractpaintingsbyRothko for two reasons. Firstly, the visual intrinsic properties of abstract painting play animportantrole,inthatitpresentsitselfratherthanpresentingsomethingelse.Thuswecanexperiencetheartworkinitself,andnotanimageofsomethingelse.Figurativepaintinghasthevisual intrinsicpropertyofaimingatpresentinganimageofsomethingelsethanitself.Therefore it has a finite end and thus provides the conditions for a perceivableunderstanding.However,having thepropertiesofabstractionalonecannotbea sufficientcondition for evoking the sublime. Given that the abstraction is presented in a visuallysimplemanner,thecontentoftheabstractimagemightnotbecomprehensible.Inthiscase,however,theartworkprovidesuswiththeconditionsforaperceivableunderstandingoftheform.A toosimplisticvisualpresentationwill thereforebeperceivably comprehensible forour imagination.Sincethekantiannotionofsublimityrequiresanexperientialcomponent,thevisualpresentationof theabstractionmustplayadecisive role indeterminingwethertheartworkhastheabilitytoevokethesublimeornot.

BOOKOFABSTRACTS14

IRENE MARTÍNEZ MARÍN – Appreciating (without) feeling: the case ofnostalgicexpression


It is widely thought that having affective responses to artworks is an important part ofunderstandingandappreciatingart.Thecapacityofaworktoprovidesuchresponsesispartofwhat is valuable about them (Robinsson, 2005; Feagin, 1996). That is, being affectivelymovedbyanartworkrequirestoidentify,understand,andtofeeltheemotionsexpressedinit.

The importance attributed to emotional experience has been questioned wheneveremotionshavebeenconsideredasanextrinsicorinstrumentalelementofthevalueofart.Thosewhosuspectoftheimportancewegivetoourfeelingsarguethatthesignificanceofan artwork resides in its intrinsic artistic features (Lamarque, 2009). Properties like unity,coherence,mattersofstyle,orthethemesexplored, iswhatappearstobethemainfocuswhen assessing questions of value. In that case, weeping for Anna Karenina is seen assomethingcontingenttothework.However,Iconsiderthatouremotionalresponsesrelyonthe internal aimsof anartwork. For that reason, Iwill argue that thevalueof anartworkdepends onhow an emotion is expressed, rather than in the capacity of the audience totrulyfeelthatemotion.

Ibelievethatthisdebateshoulddealwithtwoimportant issues:howmuchdoweneedtofeel in order to be in a good position for aesthetic appreciation? anddoes our emotionalresponsehavetobethesamethantheemotionexpressedinart?HereIwillarguethatthequestion of value is not necessary connected to the relation between recognizing anemotion and feeling that same emotion. Just like in real life tomake sense of the othersemotionisnotnecessarytoexperienceityourself,andalsounlikelytofeelitwiththesamedegreeofintensity.

Nostalgia will be presented as a special case of expression. I undertake the nostalgicemotionnotasameredeliberatedfantasyaboutthepast,butasareflectiveemotionaboutpersonalmemories that needs tobe incorporated to theown self sensationof being in aspecific space transported by your own memories. It is assumed that autobiographicmemories are always auto-referential, where the “I” is always tied to an exact time andspace(Casey,1987).Thismakesmeconsiderthatfeelingnostalgiamaynotbeessentialforaestheticappreciationduetothedifficultyofengagingwithexternalrecollections.

IwillanalyzedifferentworksofJosephCornell,J.D.Salinger,andWesAndersoninordertoexemplifytowhichextentwecanappreciatethemjustbyidentifyingthenostalgictonethatcolours their creations. In conclusion, I hope to reveal that the value of these artworksresides intheircapacityofsettingus inaspecificmood,ofpromptingaffectiveresponses,likewonderortenderness,whileaskingustoyearnforothersmemoriesmaybeaskingustofeeltoomuch.


JEREMY PAGE – Text and Reader in accounts of the Cognitive and EthicalValueofLiterature


Thethesisthatliteraturecontainssubstantivecognitivecontentisoftenchallengedbythosewho point out the disanalogies between works of literature and paradigmatic modes ofinquiry; i.e., the fact that literature does not seem to provide evidence or formulateargumentsasdoparadigmaticmodesofinquiry.Tomeetthischallenge,NoelCarroll(1998&2016)hasarguedthatthepowerofargumentsfromdisanalogyfadesoncewerealisethattheprimarycognitivevalueofourexperienceofliteratureliesnotinitsaddingtoabodyofknowledge,but instead intheopportunity itprovides forustoreflecton,anddeepenourunderstandingof,knowledgewealreadypossess.However,accountssuchasCarroll’sareindanger of placing too much emphasis on the reader’s pre-existing knowledge and thereader’sownreflectionattheexpenseofassigningasubstantiveroletothetext itselfanditsaestheticfeatures.Thisprovokesquestionsconcerningwhatspecifically it isthatmakesliterature well-suited to embody and communicate cognitive insights of ethical import.Conversely, accounts, such as that given byGibson (2009),which seek to treat text itself,includingitsaestheticfeatures,asthelocationofcognitive(particularlyethical)insight,areleft with fewer resources to explain how it is that the communication or transfer of thecognitiveinsightfromthetexttothereaderoccurs.ThisisparticularlypressingforaccountssuchasGibsonwho (on thispoint followingCarroll) casts the cognitive valueof literatureprimarily in terms of its capacity to add, or deepen, understanding associated with thereader’spriorknowledge.ThispaperbuildsontheworkofbothCarrollandGibsonbygivinganaccountoftherelationbetweenthetext,viewedasauthoritativeandasthelocationofcognitiveinsight,andtheroleofpriorknowledge,engagementandreflectiononthepartofthe reader. Through providing a largely Gibsonian reading of the literary features of twoworksbyDavidFosterWallace, IwilldemonstratehowWallace’s techniqueof invitingthereadertoadoptsomethinglikethepositionoftheauthorintheirinteractionwiththetext,suggestsanenlighteningaccountoftherelationbetweentextandreader.FollowingGibson,Iunderstandtheauthortobeinvolvedinthedramaticactivityofacknowledgingaspectsofour shared world (particularly ethically relevant aspects) in the text, and in so doingdemonstratingherunderstandingoftheseaspectsofourworldandhowtheyfittogether.Wallace’s technique invites the reader into the dramatic position of the author and in sodoing shows how we should understand the reader as thus demonstrating theirunderstanding intheir interactionwiththetext.Theaccount Idevelopalongthese lines isabletomaintaintheauthorityandcognitivevalueofthetext,whilstalsoexplaininghowthereader’sengagementcanresultinagenuinedeepeningoftheirunderstanding.

BOOKOFABSTRACTS16

ANDREPATRÃO–AHistoryofPhilosophyandArchitecture:WhenandHowTheySpokeAboutandWithEachOther

EcolePolytechniqueFédéraledeLausanne|[email protected]

There is an abundanceof literature – architectural andphilosophical, and especially post-modern – in which a relation between architecture and philosophy is at work, with oneengaging the other directly, or simply in a marginal or implicit manner. Especiallycontemporary architectural discourse, be it by theoreticians, practitioners, or critics,frequently resorts to philosophical thought, themes, and references in order to discover,clarify, and express deeper dimensions of the architectural work. Indeed, for architects,philosophy seems implicit to some point of architectural activity, and especially of itsthought;whileinphilosophyithasgrownfromasporadicfootnoteormetaphoricreferenceinto an attractivemystery for andbeyond aesthetics, aswell as onemodeof its practicalconsequential engagement upon the world. Though of tremendously distinct natures,architectureseemstoinstinctivelycallforphilosophy,andphilosophyhasrespondedmoreandmore.

Despitethisimportance,anyinquiryintothisrelationisimmediatelyandsurprisinglystruckby themanifest lackof literatureabout the relation itself and its implications. How doesarchitecture resort to philosophy? And why at all? How has philosophy regardedarchitecture?Whytherecentincreasedinterest,andwhataboutit?Intheend,whatcomesabout for each discipline? What are the recurring problems, what are the appealingpromises,whataretheunexploredpotentials?

The proposed presentation shall engage these questions by offering a rare historicaloverview upon various key moments of significant contact between architects andphilosophers.Thesemaybecategorizedunderthreehistoricaldynamics:thefirstprecedingarchitecturalmodernism,whenmost instancesof the relationcorrespond tophilosophicaltextsmarginallyreferencingarchitecture,butalsoincludingexceptionalarchitecturetheoryworks fromwhich philosophical contribution, though alsomarginal,may be extrapolated;second,themodernistmovement, inwhichphilosophyfirstexplicitlybecomesathemeforarchitects – though diluted as resources for their main work –, aligned with the majorintellectual and especially social concerns of the time; third, the post-war and post-modernistperioduptotoday,duringwhicharchitecturalreferencetophilosophybecomesabundantandvariedbothintheoryandpractice,philosophicalinterestinarchitectureshiftsfromafootnoteofaestheticstoanissueinitself,andarchitectsandphilosopherscometoworktogether.


VICTORPERSSON–InaWorldofAestheticPerception


Anartworkisanartefactthatoftenreliesonaestheticfeatures.Artworksarealso,accordingtoHannahArendt,asufficientartefactinhumanlifebecauseofthefactthattheyoutliveusandinthatsensemakeusfeelathomeintheworld.

Iaimtoshowthatourrelationwiththeworldisdependingonanaestheticperceptionoftheworld. Inordertodothis, Ineedtoinquireandexplainsomenecessaryconditionsforthisrelation. At first, to sketch an understanding of the concept of subjectivity. In short, it’spossibletoseethisintwoways.Ontheonehand,thatweownoursubjectsandwiththatourfreedom.Orontheotherhand,thatwegainoursubjectsintheprocessoflivinglifeandinthatsensefreedomisnotsomethingweownbutsomethingwecreate.I’lljointhelattersolution which is grounded in a discussion derived partly from a western philosophicaltradition with emphasis on Augustine, Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt and John Dewey,partlyanIndian-philosophicaltraditioncenteredonthetermdarśan–adivinevision.ThisisbecauseIwanttoconnecttheconceptofsubjectivitywiththeconceptofperception.

With this notionofperception, I hope to showhow the interactionandengagingwith anartwork take formandwhat this requires. Inmyview,aestheticperception isavariantofdarśanandcanbeseen in threesteps:Firstly,yougiveyourself to theartwork–you lookand you listen. Secondly, you aremetwith silence. Thirdly, this forces you to an indirectreflectiveexperience–youaregivenyourselfback.Younowsee,younowhearandmoreimportantlyyounowunderstand(somethinggreaterthanyourself).Thismeansthatyouaregivenyourfreedombecauseitcreatesa(re)actionwithinyou,anactionthatdoesn’tfeelasyourownbutinsteadas“given”toyouand,hence,the(re)actionforcesyoutojudge

IntheendI’lldrawtheconclusionthatweneedtoliveimmanent,intheworldofaestheticperception,tohavethepossibilitytotranscendent,thatisto(freely)judge.Thisentailsthatartworkshavethepowertocultivateoursensesthatareactivewhenwejudgeandthatwefromthiswayoflivingcanmaketruesenseofhowartworksgenerateaworldinwhichwefeelathome.

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MIKAELPETTERSSON–SeeingDepictedSpace(OrNot)

LingnanUniversity|[email protected]

Whatis ittoseesomethinginapicture?Mostaccountsofpictorialexperience—or,touseRichardWollheim’s term, ‘seeing-in’—seek, in variousways, to explain it in terms of howpictures somehowdisplay the looks of things.However, some ‘things’ thatwe apparentlyseeinpicturesdonotdisplayany‘look.’Inparticular,mostpicturesdepictemptyspace,butemptyspacedoesnotseemtodisplayany ‘look’—at leastnot in thewaymaterialobjectsdo. How do we see it in pictures, if we do? In this talk, I offer an account of pictorialperceptionofemptyspacebyelaboratingonWollheim’sclaimthat‘seeing-in’ispermeableto thought. I end by pointing to the aesthetic relevance of seeing—or not seeing—emptyspaceinpictures.


AXELRUDOLPHI–ThePhilosophyofPerformanceArt


Traced back to the live art events of the early 20th century’s avant-garde, only to havestarted establishing itself as a recognized form of art during the 1970’s, performance artnow seems to occupy a given but also increasing space in today’s art scene, with newperformance art festivals popping up all over the globe andmuseums hosting large-scaleperformanceartexhibitionsattractinghundredsof thousandsofvisitors.Despite this fact,onlyafewworks inthephilosophical literaturehavesofartakenonthetaskofexaminingtheparticular characteristics of this interesting art form, andaccounts from the analyticaltradition seemconspicuouslymissing. In awish to startoff theprocessof gradually fillingoutthistheoreticalgap,Iwill,basedonsomeofthefewearlierwritingsonperformanceartand the philosophical literature on conceptual art (with which the performance art iscommonlylumpedtogether),aswellasmyownparticipationintheartform,presentsomeinitial findingsconcerning theontologyandepistemologyofperformanceart,and therebyhopefully provide some basis for further investigation in the field. The conclusions ofmyresearch show that performance art normally include elements which distinguish it bothfrom other ”dematerialized” forms of art as well as from traditional art forms such assculpture, dance and music, and that philosophical aesthetics may need to assemble adifferentlycomposedtoolboxinordertoproperlyaccountforthiskindofliveart,thanhasbeenusedbefore.

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REBECCAWALLBANK–ReconsideringArtisticValue


Onedebatethatcurrentlyholdsprominenceintheliteratureconcernswhethermoralvaluecanberelevanttoourassessmentofanartwork’svaluequaart.Inrelationtothisdebate,frequent questions that are commonly asked include: ‘Can a moral defect lessen artisticvalue?’;‘Canamoralvirtueinturnenhanceartisticvalue?’;‘Ifsuchinteractiontakesplace,does it do so systematically?’, and; ‘Canamoraldefect, in fact, enhanceartistic value.Ofthosewhoanswer in theaffirmative,manymotivate their claim throughanappeal to thenotionofawork’s‘internalaims’;theyarguethatmoralvaluecanaffecttheachievementofwhatisinternaltotheworkquaart,herebyaffectingit’sartisticvalue.YetIsuggestthatthedebate seems to have developed such that it no longer simply concerns the relevance ofmoral value forartistic value,but it also concerns theextent towhichmoral valuecanberelevant for artistic value.More precisely, an apt question to ask is as follows:what roledoesmoral value play in the assessment of artistic value? Indeed this gains pertinence inlight of the claim made by Eileen John that moral value has dominance over otherconsiderations–particularlytheachievementofawork’sinternalaims–whenassessingthevalueofanartwork.SointhispaperIwouldliketostarttoreconsiderthewaysinwhichanartwork’svalueistobedetermined;itremainstobeseenwhatkindofroletheachievementofawork’sinternalaimscanappropriatelyplayintheevaluationofanartwork;itremainstobeseenwhyweshouldcareabout‘internalaims’atall;whethermoralvaluehasdominanceover other considerations, and; whether it is coherent to even describe one of theseconsiderations as having dominance at all. Yet, even more pertinently, it needs to beclarifiedwhat itmeanstosuggestthatmoralvaluecanbeartisticallyrelevant.Thedebatehas,sofar,beennarrowlyfocusedinitsconceptionofwhatcancountasamoraldefectorvirtue for a work of art, and it has also been narrowly focused in the artforms that areconsidered.Byexpandingthediscussionheresomeoftheabovequestionscanstarttobeaddressed.


ANDREASWIKBLOM–AestheticFormalism


AestheticFormalismhasfordecadesbeenunderattackfromdifferentphilosopherssuchasArthur C. Danto, Richard Wollheim, Kendall Walton and Noël Carroll in favour of theContextualist approach which is today the dominant strategy for understanding andappreciating art. The issues concerning Formalismwith its Kantian roots have lately beenrevitalizedbyNickZangwill’scontributiontothedebateinhisMetaphysicsofBeauty(2001).AccordingtoZangwillthereisatruthinformalism,andthistruthiswhatIwilldiscussinthispaper.Myoutlinewillbethat(a)Formalismappealstoacommonsensewayofapproachingart inagreementwithaestheticempiricism.Butontheotherhand(b)manifestpropertiesareundoubtedlyinsufficientforunderstandingandappreciatingsomethingasartaccordingto contextualism.My suggestion here (c) is that there is indeed a truth in formalism buttherearetwophilosophicalfieldswhichareconfusedinZangwill’sdiscussion:(i)Zangwill’ssuggestionconcernsthemetaphysicalfoundationoftheaestheticpropertybeauty,whereas(ii)thecontextualist,suchasWalton,discussestheconditionsforknowingthatsomethingisarttoappreciateitproperly.Amoderateformalistmayberightaboutformalistpropertiesof artworks but wrong in the judgement of it as an artwork as art. So the question istherefore:Canwebelieveinaestheticformalism?

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EPISTEMOLOGY&PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE


SVENOVEHANSSON–Sciencedenial,factresistanceandalternativefacts–whatisthisallabout?

KTHRoyalInstituteofTechnology|[email protected]

Recently,sciencedenial, factresistance,andvariousformsofdisinformationhavebecomeincreasinglyprominent inpublicdiscussions.Thesephenomenagive rise tonew issues forthedemarcationofsciencevs.pseudoscience.Howissciencedenialrelatedto"traditional"pseudoscience? Do "alternative facts" on issues outside of the domain of science haveanythingtodowithpseudoscience,oraretheyadifferenttypeofdeviationfromcommonnormsof rationality?Sinceclimatesciencedenialistscall themselves"climatesceptics"weshould also ask ourselves if these anti-scientific tendencies have any connection withphilosophical scepticism. This presentation proposes answers to these questions within aframeworkthatseesscienceasoneofseveralfact-findingpracticesinhumansocieties.

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ERIKJANSSONBOSTRÖM–VadärproblemetmedMaxWebersidealtyper?


IdéenomidealtypiskabegreppärkanskeettavdetydligasteavtryckensomMaxWebergetti samhällsvetenskaperna. Idealtypiska begrepp återkommer ständigt inom densamhällsvetenskapliga litteraturen och de formuleras och används ofta på ett nästansjälvklartsättsomomdeintebehöverennärmarepresentation.

Detta är dock paradoxalt därför att inom själva Weberforskningen finns det en utbredduppfattningomattingenegentligenlyckatsförståvadWebermenarattidealtyperär.

Så sent somår2014 skriver till exempelGerhardWagnerochClaudiusHärpferattWebermisslyckadesmedatt klargöra sin idéom idealtypenochkonstaterar: ”The result: endlesscontroversy over the question what an ideal type really is. – a discussion that has lednowhere.”(WagnerochHärpfer,OntheVeryIdeaofanIdealType,2014).

Så, vadärdetegentligen somär så svårt att förståmed idealtypen? Idennapresentationämnar jag peka ut ett par av de svårigheter som vi stöter på om vi tittar på vadWeberfaktiskt säger om idealtyper och peka på vilken typ av vetenskapsfilosofiska frågor somidealtypenhängerihopmed.Måletärattvecklautenkartaöverdentypavfrågorvimåstebesvaraförattförståidealtypen.

DettakommerfördetförstaattvisaattWeberintebaraserformulerandetavidealtypiskabegreppsomenavmångamöjligametoderförsamhällsvetenskapernautanattdeivissafalläroumbärliga förattnåobjektivkunskapomsociala fenomen.Detbetyderattvi intekanförståidealtypenutanattsamtidigtadresserastörrevetenskapsfilosofiskafrågorsåsom;Vadinnebär objektiv kunskap om sociala fenomen? Hur ska vi nå den? Och vad ärsamhällsvetenskapernasrelationtillvärden?

För det andra verkar vi inte kunna åberopa etablerade uppfattningar om kunskap ochobjektivitet därför att ”vi måste diskutera vad det på vårt område kan betyda, att densanningvieftersträvarharobjektiv’giltighet’.”(Weber,Samhällsvetenskapernasobjektivitet,1904)


JESPERJERKERT–Theultimateargumentforrandomization?


Experimentalrandomizationistheallocationofexperimentalunitsintodifferentconditionsusingsomerandommechanism.Inamedicaltrialsetting,the“experimentalunits”aretrialparticipants(patients),andtheconditionsaretypicallythesetwo:(a)gettinganewmedicaltreatment;or(b)gettinganoldorinerttreatmentbelievedtoinducethesamenon-specificeffects as the newone. The epistemic benefits of experimental randomization have beendebatedparticularlywithregardtosuchmedicaltrialsduringthelastdecades.Manyclaimshave been invoked on behalf of randomization, the following believed to be a near-exhaustivelist:

(1) Randomization is a prerequisite for performing statistical hypothesis testingwhereanullhypothesisismodeled.

(2)Randomization isaprerequisite for (plausible) causal inference fromtreatmenttoeffect.

(3) Randomization contributes to the baseline balance of groups by randomlydistributingconfounders.

(4) In a Bayesian framework, randomization provides an epistemically acceptableandconvenientwayofachievingapriordistributionofcovariates.

(5)Non-randomizedstudiestendtoexaggeratetreatmenteffects.

(6) Randomization avoids bias associated with having participants themselvesselectingtheirtreatments(“self-selectionbias”).

(7)Randomizationavoidsbiasassociatedwithhavingexperimentersselectingwhichparticipantwillgetwhattreatment(“allocationbias”).

Theoneclaimthatappearsthemostdiffculttoquestionis(7).Canwethussettle,onceandforall, thatrandomization isepistemicallygoodinamedicaltrialbecause itcontributestotheavoidanceofallocationbias?No,thisisstillnottheultimateargument,becausewealsoneedtobecertainthatrandomizationdoesnothaveepistemicallybadconsequencesthatoutweigh the benefits. I argue that a bias introduced by the very act of randomizing—stemming from the fact that some potential participants do not like being subject torandomization—hastobetakenintoaccount(“randomizationbias”),andthatthisissoeventhoughrandomizationbiasarguablyaffectstheexternalvalidityonly.

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ERICJOHANNESSON–Simplicity,probabilityandstrength

StockholmUniversity|[email protected]

It’sapopularideathat,amongtwocompetinghypothesesthatareequallycompatiblewiththe evidence, one should choose the simpler one. This principle is usually calledOccam’srazor. As it stands, however, it obviously requires somequalification.Oneparameter thatneeds to be taken into account is strength. If one of the competing hypotheses is a lotstrongerthantheotherbutonlyslightlymorecomplicated,onemaystillchoosethatone.If,for instance, one hypothesis is Newton’s three laws of motion (considered as universallyquantifiedstatements),andtheotherhypothesisisthenegationofoneoftheselaws,then(on any reasonable measures of simplicity and strength) the latter is both simpler andweakerthantheformer.ButforNewton,bothhypotheseswereequallycompatiblewiththeevidence. Should he really have chosen the simpler one? A more plausible version ofOccam’srazormightthereforegoasfollows:

(1)Amongtwocompetinghypothesesofequalstrengththatareequallycompatiblewiththeevidence,oneshouldchoosethesimplerone.

Bothsimplicityandstrengthareofcoursetrickynotions.Asfarasstrengthgoes,allwecansay for sure is that an hypothesis is at least a strong as another hypothesis if it logicallyentailstheother.Butoften,asthecaseofNewtonsuggests,weliketocomparethestrengthof mutually exclusive hypothesis, neither of which logically entails the other. As far assimplicity goes, there’s even lesswe can take for granted. Arguably, the bestmeasure ofsimplicity is something like Kolmogorov complexity. Relative to some language, theKolmogorov complexity of an hypothesis is the length of the shortest description of thehypothesisinthatlanguage.

TheproblemIwanttoaddresshastodowiththerelationbetweensimplicity,strengthandsubjectiveprobability.WeknowthatifPisaprobabilitymeasure,HandH’aretwomutuallyexclusivehypotheses,EisevidenceandP(E|H)=P(E|H’),then

(2)P(H|E)<P(H’|E)ifandonlyifP(H)<P(H’).

In other words, among two competing hypotheses that are equally compatible with theevidence, one should choose one over the other if and only if that one has higher priorprobability.InBayesianterms,Occam’srazorthusamountstothefollowing:

(3) Among two competing hypotheses that are equally strong and equallycompatiblewiththeevidence,oneshouldassignahigherpriorprobabilitytooneofthemifandonlyifthatoneissimpler.

However, given certain reasonable assumptions about the relevantmeasuresof simplicityandstrength,Ishowthatthisprincipleisincompatiblewiththelawsofprobability.


ALEKSKNOKS–Higher-orderevidenceandrationalityrequirementsbywayofdeonticlogic

UniversityofMaryland|[email protected]

One of the highlights of recent epistemology is the problematization of evidence aboutevidential relations or higher-order evidence, as it is usually called. Paradigmatic casesdiscussed inthe literature involveagentswhoreceiveverystrongbutmisleadingevidencesuggesting that they are failing epistemically. These agents reason correctly about their(first-order)evidenceyet theyhaveoutstanding reasons to think that theydon't.Casesofthissorthavebeendiagnosed(andtreated)invariousways,butthemostrecentsuggestionis that they are symptomatic of a deep conflict between two types of rationalityrequirements—see [Lasonen-Aarnio, f,Worsnip, f]. First, there's the requirement that youadopt an attitude if and only if your evidence supports it. And, second, there are therequirementsthatyourattitudescoherewitheachother.Arguably,whattheparadigmaticcases show is that you can't always respect every rationality requirement that applies toyou.Thus,higher-orderevidencegivesrisetoapuzzleaboutrationality.

InthistalkIapproachthepuzzleformally,bywayofdeonticlogic.Ipresentalanguagethatallowstostatetherelevantrequirements,describesomeparadigmaticcases,andformalizethereasoningleadinguptothedisconcertingresult.Theformalizationservestwopurposes.First, itprovidesadesignspaceforclassifyingandexploringresponsestothepuzzle—Iwilldiscusssome.Second,itallowstomakeuseoftheresourcesofdeonticlogicinsolvingthepuzzle.My own solution draws on somework on deontic conicts that goes back to [vanFraassen, 1973]. Is it amerely formal solution then? The answer is no. Iwill argue that itsupports an appealing philosophical view about the nature of rationality requirements. Inthe lastpartof thetalk Iwilldiscussthemeritsof thisview,defend it fromsomepossibleobjections,andcompare it tosomeotherproposals fromthe literature.Timepermitting, Iwillexplainhowitbearsonthedebateaboutthenormativityofrationality.

References

[Lasonen-Aarnio, f] Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (f). Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to lovemismatch.PhilosophicalStudies.

[vanFraassen,1973]vanFraassen,B.(1973).Valuesandtheheart'scommand.Thejournalofphilosophy,70:5–19.

[Worsnip, f] Worsnip, A. (f). The conflict of evidence and coherence. Philosophy andphenomenologicalresearch.doi:10.1111/phpr.12246.

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SEBASTIANLUTZ–EmpiricallyAdequatebutObservablyFalseTheories


I show that a theorymay be empirically adequate according to van Fraassen’s definitioneven though it can be observationally determined that the theory is false. I suggest amodificationofempiricaladequacythatavoidsthisresult.


GUNNARMOBERG–SomeremarksonCatherineElgin’sepistemology

[email protected]

CatherineElgin isan interestingepistemologistwithapositionwhichdiverges fromaveryfar-reachingcoherentismbutismoreadequatethantraditionalfoundationalism.Shewritesherself:"Iwill...defendcoherentismand/orweakfoundationalism"(Elgin2014p.267).

Asakindofbasicbeliefsshespeaksinmanypassagesof"initiallytenablebeliefs"or"initiallycredible". Ishallexaminewhatshemeanswith"initially"? Initially inthestartofa limitedinvestigationorinamoreextensive?

Ishallalsopresentsomecriticalremarksonpartsofherreasonings:

1) Shewrites: "Contrary towhat foundationalists contend, the justification for privilegingperceptionderives from the relationofperceptual judgments to the restofour theoryofourselves as cognitive agents interacting with a mind-independent world" (Elgin 2014 p.251)

I find it possible to start in a simpler way with my spontaneous experience to be inimmediate contactwith theworld, albeit it is possible that this immediate contact is notvalidwhenthetheoryofknowledgeisconstructed.

2)Elginclaimsalsothateverythingissubjecttorevision.Itconcernsbothparticularbeliefsandsystemsofthoughts.Butthroughoutherphilosophyshehasanintersubjectivebasis.

Isthisbasisalsoopentorevision?Either it is,andElgin isfacingaproblemofothermindswhich she finds inappropriate and misleading (Elgin 1996 p. 220) or she is postulating astarting-pointwhich isnotrevisable.But inthe lattercase itwouldbeanadvantagetobeable to have an argumentation which shows that the skeptic in some sense is self-contradictory or incoherent. However I have found no such argumentation in herphilosophy.

3) In linewith the starting-point in "we" she argues in a similarwaywhen it concerns tojudge statements from other people. Concerning news sources she writes that thejustification is "derivative and conditional on the trustworthiness of themedium and thetenabilityofthemediumandthetenabilityofthemessage."(Elgin1996p.113).SofarIcanagree.ButIhaveanegocentricstarting-pointandItrytoshowhowIcanmyselfjudgetheknowledgesources.ForElgin,however,itisclearthatherultimatestarting-pointisweandnotI.

References

Elgin,C.Z.(1996).ConsideredJudgment,PrincetonUniversityPress

ElginC.Z.(1997).BetweentheAbsoluteandtheArbitrary,CornellUniversityPress

Elgin,C.Z. (2010). SkepticismAside inCampbell J.K. (ed.)KnowledgeandSkepticism,MITPress

Elgin, C. Z. and Van Cleve, J. (2014). Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone?(secondedition)inSteup,M.(ed.)ContemporaryDebatesinEpistemology,Wiley-Blackwell

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ERIKJ.OLSSON–TheGeneralityProblemNaturalized

LundUniversity|[email protected]

The generality problem concerns how to determine the type of a belief forming process.Howwetypeaprocessmaydetermineitsreliability.Therefore,reliabilisminepistemology,as famously defended by Alvin I. Goldman (1979) and others, is thought to be seriouslyincompleteabsentasolutiontotheproblem.Goldmanhasaddressedtheissueinnumerousplaces,though(untilrecently,seebelow)withoutconvergingonadefinitesolution.

Iarguethatwhilethegeneralityproblem,asstandardlyadvanced,isnotagenuineproblemforreliabilism,thereisaversion,duetoConeeandFeldman(1998),whichdoespresentanimmediatethreat.Thisversionaimstoprovethatreliabilismishopelessbecausepeoplewillwidelydisagreeabouthowtotypeprocesses.Theargumentreliesonthispremise:

“The only way in which a type may be become salient in a conversational context is bysomeonementioningthetype.”

Drawing on the robust basic level tradition in cognitive psychology (Rosch et al, 1976), Ihypothesizedinearlierworkthatthepremiseisfalse(Olsson,2012;seealsoOlsson2016).The hypothesis was then confirmed in an empirical experiment on typing done at LundUniversity(Jönsson,2013).Finally,IcommentonthefactthatGoldmannowadvocatesthepresentapproachto thegeneralityproblem(GoldmanandMcGrath,2014), thoughwithatwist(Goldman,2016).

References

Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman. 1998. “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism.”PhilosophicalStudies,89:1-29.

Goldman,AlvinI.1979.“WhatisJustifiedBelief?”InJustificationandKnowledge,editedbyGeorgePappas,1-23.Dordrecht:D.Reidel.

Goldman, Alvin I. 2016. “Reply to Olsson”. In Mclaughlin, Brian P., and Kornblith, Hilary,GoldmanandhisCritics,197-199,WileyBlackwell.

Goldman, Alvin I., and McGrath, Matthew 2014. Epistemology: A ContemporaryIntroduction.OxfordUniversityPress.

Jönsson, Martin L. 2013. “A Reliabilism Built on Cognitive Convergence: An EmpiricallyGroundedSolutiontotheGeneralityProblem.”Episteme,10(3):241-268.

Olsson, Erik J. 2012. “Reliabilism as Explicating Knowledge.” In Epistemology: Contexts,Values, Disagreements: Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig WittgensteinSymposium, edited by Christoph Jäger and Winfred Löffler, 189-202. Frankfurt: OntosVerlag.

Olsson, Erik J. 2016. “A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem.” InMclaughlin,BrianP.,andKornblith,Hilary,GoldmanandhisCritics,178-196,WileyBlackwell.

Rosch, Eleanor, Carolyn B. Mervis, Wayne D. Gray, David M. Johnson, and Penny Boyes-Braem.1976.“BasicObjectsinNaturalCategories.”CognitivePsychology,8:382-439.


VASILPENCHEV–Metaphorasentanglement

BulgarianAcademyofSciences|[email protected]

Theconceptofentanglementiscoinedbythetheoryofquantuminformationtodesignatethatspecialcorrelationoftwoormorequantumentities.Furthermore,itmeansanexactlydefinedmathematicalstructuregroundedonHilbertspacesandunderlyingallphenomenaofentanglementstudiedbyquantummechanics.

Thatsamestructurecanbeutilizedforamathematicalmodelofmetaphorasaspecialkindcorrelationbetweenthemeaningsandsensesoftwoormorewords.Thephilosophicalcoreofthemodelcanbedescribedso:Metaphorrestrictsthemeaningofatermbythemeaningofanotherterminaprobabilistic,loosewaycallingforinterpretation.

The introduction of that underlying mathematical structure allows of establishingunambiguouscorrespondencebetweenmetaphorandentanglementinanabsolutelyexact,mathematical way, after which measurement in quantum mechanics corresponds tointerpretation in language: This determines some interpretations of a givenmetaphor asmoreprobable,butnoonecanbeexcluded.

The term utilized asmetaphor restricts the area ofmeaning of its object to a small truesubsetofit.Thatsetcangroundtheessentialfeatures,propertiesorrelationsoftheobjectofthemetaphorpioneeringthescientificorevenformaldefinitionofthetermservingastheobjectofthemetaphoratissue.Thussomemetaphorfoundsanyscientificnotiontherefore“erasing” the grounding metaphor and the rest interpretations except one of them. Thecorresponding phenomena in quantum information is the process of de-coherence, afterwhich the interacted object is cut off from its environment just as a rigorously definednotioniscutofffromitscontexttodesignateoneandthesameinanycontext.

Theopposedprocesscanbeobservedbothbythetheoryofmetaphorandthatofquantuminformation:Anotionbeginstoloseitsclearoutlinescoinedineverydayspeechandmediaaccumulatingnewandnewinterpretationsanduses.Aquantumentityanalogicallystartstolosethemeasuredvaluesof thequantitiesas ifdissolving in thecommonand inseparablewhole of the universe. The suggestedmathematical structure describes equallywell bothprocessesrepresentingitsinterpretations.

The outlined approach allows a common philosophical viewpoint to the physical world,language and some mathematical structures therefore calling for the universe to beunderstood as a joint physical, linguistic and mathematical universum, in which physicalmotionandmetaphorareoneandthesameratherthanonlysimilarinasense.

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AMANDA THORELL –Gränsenmellan friskt och patologiskt och problemetmedvanligasjukdomar


Hurvälolikamekanismerikroppenutförsinfunktionvarierarmellanoss.Närdetkommertillenvissgränsbedömerviattenmekanismfungerarsådåligtattdenärpatologisk.Menvadbestämmervargränsengårmellandetfriskaochdetpatologiska?

En teori somgöranspråkpåatt svarapådettaärChristopherBoorsesbiostatistiska teori,somsyftartillattanalysera’hälsa’och’patologi’somteoretiskabiologiskabegrepp.Tankenäratttillhandahållaenexplikativanalysavbegreppeninomfysiologiochpatologi.Enligtdenbiostatistiska teorin bestäms en mekanisms funktion av dess bidrag till organismensöverlevnad och/eller reproduktion. Ett typiskt hjärta har funktionen att cirkulera blod iegenskap av att därigenombidra till dess bärares överlevnad och reproduktion. Hos olikaindividerutförhjärtatemellertiddennafunktionmedvarierandeeffektivitet.Detär,enligtBoorse,näreffektivitetenhosenmekanismärovanligtlågsomdenärpatologisk.

Vadinnebärdetdåatteffektivitetenärovanligtlåg?EnligtBoorsebestämsdettastatistiskt.Han tänkersigattvariationen ieffektivitet fören typavmekanism, inomenreferensklass(baserad på kön och ålder), ofta kan beskrivas som normalfördelad, d v s som enklockformadkurva.Idennafördelningkannormalaeffektivitetsvärdenskiljasfrånonormalavärden någonstans i kurvans avtagande svansar. Statistiskt vanliga värden, runtmedelvärdet,ärnormala,ochstatistisktovanligavärden,uteisvansarna,äronormala.Denbiostatistiska teorin definierar onormalt låga värden som patologiska, medan normalavärdensamtonormalthögavädrendefinierassomfriska.Menexaktvarlinjenmellanfrisktoch patologiskt dras är en konventionsfråga. En vanlig punkt att dra linjen är vid -2standardavvikelser. Då definieras ungefär 2,5 procent av referensklassen som patologiskavseendemekanismenifråga.

Detta sätt att dra gränsenmellan friskt och patologiskt stämmer i många fall relativt braöverensmedhurfysiologer/patologerklassificerartillståndsomfriskaellerpatologiska.Detfinnsemellertidvissatydligaundantag.Vissatillstånd,sompatologerövertygatklassificerarsom sjukdomar, är betydligt vanligare än 2,5 procent. Ett exempel är Alzheimers demenssom drabbar 16 % av alla över 85 år. Här måste Boorse acceptera den kontroversiellaimplikationenattpatologerfelaktigtklassificerarAlzheimersdemenssomensjukdom.

Föratt lösadettaproblemföreslår jagenmodifieringavBoorsesteori.Förslagetärattdragränsenmellanfrisktochpatologisktutifrånfaktiskskillnadieffektivitet.Iställetföratt,somBoorse, definiera en viss andel av referensklassen som sjuk, så definieras demekanismervarseffektivitetärsignifikantnedsattsompatologiska.


MARCOTIOZZO–TheLevel-SplittingView:AHappyCompromiseBetweenConciliatoryandSteadfastViews?

UniversityofGothenburg|[email protected]

The key question in the debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement regardswhattodoifyoudiscoverthatyouareinadisputewithanepistemicpeer.Ironicallyenoughthere has been extensive disagreement amongst philosophers about how to best answerthis question and the debate has been raging for more than a decade now.Conciliatoryviewsmaintain thatoneshouldbesignificantly lessconfidentabout thedisputedbeliefatissuewhileSteadfastviews,ontheotherhand,maintainthatoneshouldretainconfidenceinthedisputedbeliefdespitepeerdisagreement.Asitstandsneithercamphasbeenabletoprovideargumentstoconvincetheothersideofthesupremacyoftheirposition.

Inmy presentation, I suggest that either side of the debate is right about one thing andwrongaboutanotherthing.Conciliatoryviewsarecorrectabouttheevidentialforceofthehigher-orderevidencebutignorestheevidentialforceofthefirst-orderevidence.Steadfastviews are correct about the evidential force of the first-order evidence but ignores theevidential force of the higher-order evidence. Both views suffer from a Level-ConfusionFallacy,i.e.toconflatethefirst-andthesecond-levelofknowledge.WhatIsuggestinsteadisthatweoughttoconsiderthe“Level-Splittingview”.Thatistoallowfordivergentverdictsonthefirst-andthesecond-levelofknowledge.

At first sight the Level-Splitting view appears to be a happy compromise between theConciliatory and the Steadfast view. The Level-Splitting view appears to have all theadvantagesandnoneofthedisadvantagesoftheotherviews.However,ithasbeenarguedthattheLevel-Splittingviewhassomeverycounterintuitiveconsequences.Iwillarguethattheseworriesareoverstatedsincethesameproblemwillinexorablyafflictallnorms.Intheend,IthereforethinkthattheLevel-Splittingviewisworthtotakeintoseriousconsiderationasafruitfulmiddlewayinthepeerdisagreementdebate.

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ETHICS


JESPERAHLIN–TheImpossibilityofReliablyDeterminingtheAuthenticityofDesires:ImplicationsforInformedConsent


Informed consent is a patient’s or research subject’s valid authorization of a medicalinterventionor researchparticipation.Theconcept isusuallyunderstoodas shorthand forinformed,voluntary,anddecisionally-capacitatedconsent. Itcanbearguedthatconsent isinvalid unless it stems from the patient’s or research subject’s “genuine,” “real,” or“authentic”desires,i.e.,thebasiccomponentinpreferenceforming.Thatis,thatinformedconsentshouldalsoincludeanelementofauthenticity.

Theargumentassumesthattheauthenticityofdesirescanbereliablyobserved;ifitcannot,authenticity should not be part of informed consent (as interventionswith patients’ livesand libertiesmust be justified). Therefore, I investigate the problem of reliably observingauthenticity. I conclude that it is impossible to reliably determine the status of desires intermsofauthenticity.

This has been concluded before, though only of some theories of authenticity in somecontexts.However,Iemployamethodthatallowsmetodrawthestrongerconclusionthatno theoryofauthenticitythat ispresent incontemporary literatureonpersonalautonomycan produce reliably observable consequences, and that the authenticity of desiresthereforecannotbepartofinformedconsentinanycontexts.

The method builds on a taxonomy of characteristics displayed by different theories ofauthenticity that I have developed. In that taxonomy, which takes a three-by-two shape,theories of authenticity can display sanctionist, originist, and coherentist characteristics.These are the taxonomy’s categories. In sanctionist theories, i.e., theories built oncharacteristicstypicalofsanctionistideals,authenticityconcernsthedesire-holder’sattitudetoward her desires. In originist theories, authenticity concerns the origin of a desire. Incoherentisttheories,authenticityconcernsthecoherenceofadesire-holder’ssetofdesires.Furthermore, the characteristics can be either cognitivist or non-cognitivist. In cognitivisttheories, authenticity is a matter of rational deliberation; non-cognitivist theories do notcommittothat.Thesearethetaxonomy’sclasses.Atheorycandisplaycharacteristicsfromdifferentcategories (todifferentdegrees),but theclassesaremutuallyexclusiveso thatatheoryiseitheroneortheother.

Although I believe that my conclusions hold, the taxonomy is by itself a contribution toautonomy theory. It neatly orders theories of authenticity in contemporary literature onpersonal autonomy, and provides a conceptual apparatus that enables theorists to treatauthenticitymoresystematicallythanbefore.

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SARABELFRAGE–Hurvifaktisktbryrossompersonligintegritet

KarolinskaInstitutet|[email protected]

Inomdenfilosofiskalitteraturen,enradandraforskningsområdenocharbetentillgrundförlagstiftning, har olika idéer om informationsintegritet, dvs. personlig integritet medavseendepåprivat information (informationalprivacy), lagts fram.Dethandlaromteorierom när den personliga integriteten är skyddad, vad som är privat, vad som är känsligt,huruvidaintegritetärvärdefulltochisåfallomdenärdetisigellerblottinstrumentellt.Detfinnsocksåenväxandelitteraturomintegritetsskyddetsrelativavärde,dvs.näravvägningargörsmotannatsomocksåtillskrivsvärdesåsomförbättradhälsa,säkerhetellerekonomiskvinning.

I detta föredragberättar jagomvad jagkommit fram till då jaganalyserat vadmänniskoruppgivit i grupp-och individuella intervjuer som rört synenpåpersonlig integritetnärdetgäller information om vård och hälsa. Jag visar hur resonemangen förhåller sig till de ilitteraturen förekommande uppfattningarna – vilka idéer ansluter sig människor de factotill? Jagvisarocksåhurdeuppfattningarellerpreferenserpersonersjälvaangerattdeharförhållersigtillhurdetdevärderarskullekunnabeskrivasutifrånteoretiskaskiljelinjer.

Jag vill också lyfta frågor av metodologisk karaktär när det gäller empirisk etik, ellervärderingsforskning, i allmänhet och undersökningar av synen på personlig integritet isynnerhet.Jaghoppaspådiskussioneromdessaspörsmålliksomomhur,omalls,akademiskfilosofi bör bidra till att belysa de värderingar befolkningen hyser gällande moraliskafrågeställningar.


JAN ERIK CHRISTENSEN – A Sustainable Future? Confucian Philosophy andClimateChange

[email protected]

This paper addresses the need for an awareness of our relatedness with the rest of theecosystem. I argue that Confucian thought facilitates a vision of sustainability and acorrective to thecrisisofmind thathas separatednature fromhumanity, informingusonseven levels: 1. Stressing the continuity between humans acting from the ‘humaneheart/mind’(renxin仁心)andnature,thusweareinanethicalrelationshipwiththerestofthe ecosystem (‘all things,’wanwu萬物). 2. Rejecting the dualistic either/or thinking (i.e.anthropocentric/ecocentric, humans/nature) that has dominated the discussion ofenvironmental issues in theWest.3.Rejecting theview thatnaturehasonly instrumentalvalue. 4. Taking care of the fundamental needs of the people is a premise for ecologicalsustainability.5.Rejectingseeking‘personalbenefits’(li利)thatarenot‘righteous’(yi義).6. Seeing ‘unselfish’ (gong公) behavior as a premise for becoming a better citizen. 7.Increasing the awareness of how external forces that propagate ecological destructionimpedeourpotentialtoactfromthe‘humaneheart/mind.’

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KARINENFLO–Kvantitet,kvalitet,jämlikhet

LuleåUniversityofTechnology|[email protected]

Åtminstonetrefaktorerharansettspåverkavärdetavenpopulation:dentotalakvantitetenindividuellvälfärd,kvalitetenhosvarjeindividsvälfärdochhurjämliktdentotalakvantitetenvälfärdärdistribueradmellanpopulationensindivider.Demestkändamåttenpåvärdetavenpopulationbrukaroftakritiserasjustförattdeintetarhänsyntillenellerfleraavdessatrefaktorer.Utilitarismenstotalsummemåttharkritiseratsförattinteadekvattahänsyntillkvalitetoch intealls tahänsyn till jämlikhet.Dess främstakonkurrent, genomsnittsmåttet,harkritiserats förattvarkentahänsyntillkvantiteteller jämlikhet.Bådadessamåttskullekunnamodifieras så att de tar hänsyn till jämlikhet genom att aggregera den individuellavälfärden med en konkav funktion. Då får man dock andra problem. Det modifieradetotalsummemåttetskulleexempelvispremieraflerlägrevälfärdsvärdenframförfärrehögre,och därmed rangordna en stor populationmed individer med låg positiv välfärd över enmindre populationmed individermed hög positiv välfärd, även givet samma totalsummavälfärd.Dettaskulletillochmedvaramermotbjudandeändenmotbjudandeslutsatsen.

I föredraget presenterar jag ett alternativtmått som tar hänsyn till kvantitet, kvalitet ochjämlikhet, och som kan användas på både positiva och negativa välfärdsvärden. Måttetuppfyllerflerarimligavillkor,blandannat:

i)ettkvantitetsvillkor,enligtvilketadditionenavenindividmedpositivvälfärdalltidresulterar ienbättrepopulation(medanadditionenavenindividutanvälfärdellermednegativvälfärdalltidresulterariensämre);

ii) ett kvalitetsvillkor, enligt vilket en population med högre genomsnittlig välfärdalltid rankas som bättre än en population med lägre genomsnittlig välfärd, dåpopulationernaharsammatotalavälfärdochsammatotalajämlikhetsgrad;

iii)ett jämlikhetsvillkor,enligtvilketenpopulationmedenhögregradav jämlikhetalltid rankas som bättre än en population med lägre grad av jämlikhet, dåpopulationernaharsammatotalaochgenomsnittligavälfärd;

samt(relaterattilldetsista):

iv) ett prioritetsvillkor, enligt vilket det alltid är bättre att höja välfärden för enindividsomhardetsämreänförenindividsomhardetbättre,givetmöjlighetenatthöjavälfärdenförnågonindividenbestämdkvantitet.

Avslutningsvis tar jag upp några problem med måttet. Generellt viktar måttet kvantitethögre än kvalitet och kvalitet högre än jämlikhet, vilket resulterar i vissa tveksammarankningar.


ANTON ERIKSSON – Causal Responsibility for Emissions in Global SupplyChains

UniversityofSheffield|[email protected]

The production and consumption of internationally traded goods plays a large role in theoccurrenceofclimatechange.Thegreenhousegasesthatresultfrommanufacturingcertainproductsmakeup for a considerable amountof total global emissions. Suchemissions, inturn, cause harm to current and future generations. This begs the question of who isresponsible for the emissions and the harm they bring about. The debate on moral andcausalresponsibilityforgreenhousegasemissionshastypicallyfocusedonstatesand—toalesser extent—on individual consumers. So far, an explicit investigation into theresponsibilityofproducers,andhowthisrelatestothatoftheconsumer,hasbeenlackinginthis context. In this talk, I will look at the role played by those involved in global supplychainsincausingharmthroughemissions.Theaimistoestablishhowcausalresponsibilityfor emissions ought to be shared between different actors in the production andconsumptionofemission-heavyproducts.Inordertodothis,onemustfirstestablishwhichagents are causally efficacious with regard to emissions. An extraordinary number ofpersonsare involved in the supply chainofanyoneproductandan increasingnumberofproducts are manufactured in more than a single country. Processes of supplying rawmaterials, combining the basic material, selling the product and purchasing it take placeacross a large number of national borders. A second issue relates to how the actions ofagents interplayatdifferentstagesofproductionandtrade.Canwe,for instance,saythatthe actions of consumers are causally pre-empted by the actions of manufacturingcompanies? Or do consumers constitute a cause in virtue of the demand they createthrough purchases? A final issue relates to degrees of causation: even though we canestablish that agents have some causal input with regard to the emission of greenhousegases,itisunclearwhetherwecanascriberelativeshares,ordegrees,ofcausalcontributiontodifferentagents.

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FRITSGÅVERTSSON–TheCostofConvictioninJohnWilliams’sStoner


IarguethatgivenaplausiblereadingofJohnWilliams’sStoner(1965)thenovelthrowslightonthedemandsandcostofpursuingastrategyforself-realisationalongthelinesoutlinedinBk.10ofAristotle’sNicomacheanEthicswhichseeksunificationthroughtheadoptionofasingleexclusiveend.Ifurtherarguethatastrengthofthenovelisthatitdoesnotexplicitlyargueeither fororagainstsuchastrategybut rathervividlydepicts itsdifficulties,appeal,andlimitationsthusleavingtheultimateevaluationuptothereader.


JOHANGUSTAFSSON–PopulationAxiologyand thePossibilityof a FourthCategoryofAbsoluteValue

UniversityofYork|[email protected]

Inadditiontothegood,thebad,andtheneutral,thereisanoverlookedfourthcategoryofabsolutevalue,whichprovides,Ishallargue,asolutiontothecentralproblemofpopulationethics, namely, how to avoid various repugnant conclusions. The possibility of thisoverlooked category of absolute value enables a new variation of critical-rangeutilitarianism,which isa slightlymore intricatevariantof totalutilitarianism.Between thegood and the bad levels of well-being, there is—instead of a single neutral level of well-being—arangeof levels thatarenotgood,notbad,andnotneutral.Thisvariationavoidsrepugnantconclusionsnotonly intheaggregationofthevalueof lives inapopulationbutalsointheaggregationofthevalueoftimesinalife.Henceitdeliversapopulationaxiologywithoutrepugnance.

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KARIMJEBARI&NIKLASOLSSONYAOUZIS–AGameofStars

KTHRoyalInstituteofTechnology&StockholmUniversity|[email protected],

[email protected]

Among scholars dedicated toSearch for Extra-terrestrial Intelligence(SETI), the risks andpossibilitiesofactivelycontactingextra-terrestrials(METI)havebeenwidelydiscussed.Yet,some fundamental philosophical problems concerning the mere possibility of translationhave hardly been raised in this context. The SETI project assumes that, would an extra-terrestrial intelligent (ETI) entity choose to contact us, they would use radio signals toconvey a codedmessage. Thismessagewould, for obvious reasons, be conveyedwithoutcontext andwithout the possibility formeaningful interaction. However, according to themostinfluentialresearchprograminthephilosophyoflanguageinanalyticphilosophy,themeaning of an utterance is derived from its use in a context. Therefore, while radicaltranslation, i.e. learning an unknown language, is possible, it requires contextualizedinteraction where semantic behavior can be observed. This has in turn some importantgame-theoretical consequences. A scenario analysis of theGame of Starssuggests thatinterstellarcontactisanunderestimatedexistentialrisk,asthelackofcommunicationmayleadtheplayersintoaHobbesianTrap,wherefearimpelstheplayerstomutualdestruction.Aninformalgametheoreticalanalysisofthisunlikelybutpossiblescenarioisdescribed.


KARSTEN KLINT JENSEN – Weak Superiority, Imprecise Equality and theRepugnantConclusion

UmeåUniversity|[email protected]

Consider a sequence of possible populations A, B, C, …, Z, where eachmember containsmore people than the preceding, but their quality of life gets worse. Z represents apopulation, by Parfit considered repugnant, inwhich verymany people lives a life barelyworthliving.

Parfit suggests that, for any pair of adjacent populations in the sequence, the first is notlexicallysuperiortothesecond;butacrosssomegap,sayfromPtoZ,PislexicallysuperiortoZ.Healsoassumesanindependenceconditiontotheeffectthatcombiningworthlivinglives intoapopulationhasnon-diminishingvalue.This implies(roughly)thatthevalueofapopulationisthesumofthevaluesofthelivesitcontains.

In an earlier paper, I have demonstrated that, under these conditions, lexical superioritycollapsesintosomethingstronger,whereonelifeinPislexicallysuperiortothepopulationZ.AnotherresultbyArrheniusandRabinowitzaddsthat, in thiscase,adiscontinuitymustsetinbetweenlivesinsomepairofadjacentpopulations.

Parfit accepts the standard objection to lexical views that there cannot be a very greatdifference in value between otherwise very similar outcomes. But this implication onlyobtains under the assumption of full comparability. Once the notion of imprecisecomparabilityisintroduced,Parfitclaims,thestandardobjectionfails.Thus,fromsomePinthesequence,hesuggestthatthesucceedingpopulations,nomatterhowmanypeopletheycontain,cannotbebetterthanP,butatmostimpreciselyequaltoP.

However, Ishalldemonstratethe,evenundertheconditionof imprecisecomparability,ananalogue to my earlier result can be proved. Thus, if Q or later population is at mostimpreciselyequaltoP,nomatterhowmanypeopletheycontain,theywillalsobeatmostimpreciselyequaltoonlyonelifeinP.Thus,contrarytowhatheargues,evenwithimprecisecomparabilityParfitisforcedtoacceptasharpdiscontinuity.

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NIKLAS JUTH – Does genetic modification of embryos affect their futureidentityandwouldthatbeamoralproblem?

KarolinskaInstitutet|[email protected]

Thepossibilityofdoinggeneticmodificationhasundergonearevolutionduringthelastfewyears. Through CRISPR-cas9 genetic modification is cheaper, more rapid, efficient andreliable than ever before. Hence, it is more urgent than ever to ponder the ethicalimplicationsofusingthistechnology.TheethicallymostcontroversialuseofCRISPR-cas9istochangethehumangenomesothatthechange is inheritedtofutureoffspring,socalledgerm-linemodification.Germ-linegeneticmodificationisappliedonsexcellsorveryearlyinthedevelopment of the embryo, preferably at theone cell stage, implying that it is donebeforeorinconjunctionwiththestartoftheexistenceofahumanbeing.Hence,germlinegeneticmodificationgivesrisetothemetaphysicalquestion:ifthesexcellorearlyembryoissubject to geneticmodification,will the individual that comes into existence be someoneelse than she would have been if nomodification had beenmade? Against the receivedwisdom, it is argued that the answer to this question is no formost conceivable geneticmodifications, in analogy with genetic modifications of already existing individuals. Theethical implicationsof this arepresented. Furthermore, it is argued that regardless of theanswertothemetaphysicalquestion,theethicalproblemsrelatingtoidentityarenoworsefor germ-line genetic modification than for somatic genetic modification, for instancevarious forms of genetic therapy. Actually, if the metaphysical claim argued for here iswrongandgeneticgerm-linemodificationwouldbe identityaffecting, theethicalproblemwith suchmodification is likely less than for somatic geneticmodification, due to Parfit’swell-knownnon-identityproblem.


SANDRALINDGREN–Ånger-ettförsvarstal


Deflestaavossvåndasiblandöversakervihargjort,ellerkanskelåtitbliattgöra.Vikännerångersomenreaktionpådetviiefterhanduppleversomettdåligtagerande,ochönskarattvihadegjortannorlunda.Dåångernärplågsamsamtidigtsomdeninteärvidarebehjälpligiatt göra gamla misstag ogjorda kan vi ställa oss frågan om vi borde försöka sluta kännaånger.

Envanligtankeärförståsattångerspelarenviktigroll iatt fåossattundvikaattupprepasammamisstag i framtiden.Här kundemandock tycka att själva sviterna av våramisstagtorderäcka förossattdra lärdom.SomblandandraSpinozapåpekatverkarångersnarastutgöra enöverflödig fördubbling av vårt lidande: Inte nogmed att vi plågas av själva deneländigasituationvigenomvårtmisstaghar försattossellerandra i,ångern innebärattvidessutomplågas över atthabegåttmisstaget ifråga. Det är en empirisk fråga hur effektivsjälva ångern är när det gäller att undvika att upprepa misstag. Frågan jag ska försökabesvaraär istället följande:Givetattvikan läraossavvåramisstagutanatt lidaavånger,finnsdetändåettvärdeiattkännaånger,ochhurskaviisåfallförstådetvärdet?

Jagkommerattargumenteraförattdetfinnsettvärdeihurångersignalerarattenpersonharendjupare insiktomdetfelaktiga isittagerande.Detfrämstaskälet förattvi intebörstänga av eller träna bort vår förmåga att känna ånger är emellertid att detta vore attalienera oss från vår egen tillvaro, en tillvaro som innehåller såväl positiva som negativavärdeinslag, och som vi tar in via våra positiva och negativa känslor. Att enbart plågas avkonsekvensernaavensagerandeochsamtidigtvaraoberördinfördetfaktumattmansjälvhadekunnatundvikarådandesuboptimalascenarioärattinågonmånavskärmasigfrånsinegen tillvaro.Detär att gåmisteomendimensionavdenmänskligaexistensen.Möjligenvorevilyckligareomviintekändeångerochandranegativakänslor,påliknandevissomvimöjligenvorelyckligareomvivisstemindreomvärlden.Menförmåganattkännaångerärendel iattkunnahaenadekvatupplevelseavsintillvaroochdetansvarmanharförden.Dettaärvärdefulltpåliknandevissomkunskapärvärdefulltobeaktatomkunskapengörosslyckliga.

BOOKOFABSTRACTS46

DAVIDM.LYRESKOG–Alternatives inAbolishingAlzheimer’s:Astructuredapproach to complex value trade-offs in future treatments forneurodegenerativedisease

UniversityofTwente|[email protected]

Aspopulationsgrowolder,theoccurrenceofage-relatedneurodegenerativediseasessuchasAlzheimer’sdiseasearepredictedto increase.Notoriouslyhardtotreat,and impossibleto cure so far, Alzheimer’s disease has devastating effects on those suffering from it andtheirlovedones.However,anumberoftechnologiesarecurrentlybeingdeveloped,thatarebelieved to provide great leaps in the quest for fighting age-related neurodegenerativedisease.Lab-on-a-chiptechnologiesthatrequireonlyapico-litersamplessizeandcancrossthe blood-brain-barrier may be able to detect early and pre-symptomatic biomarkers forAlzheimer’s disease; optogenetics offers unprecedented control over neural and cellularactivity, growth, and repair; emergingmethods for 3D printing human neural tissuemayallowtailoredbioprostheticsfordamagedareasinthebrain.

In choosing between different treatment methods, a barrage of ethical dilemmas arises,wherecorevaluesmayconflictbothwithothervaluesand internallywiththemselves.Forexample, while early biomarker detection for Alzheimer’s disease with Lab-on-a-chiptechnology may enable effective treatments that ensure future independence andautonomyofthepatient,itmayatthesametimehaveanegativeimpactonherwell-beingduetoearlymedicalization,continuousmonitoring,oranxiety.Here, the futureautonomyof thepatient seemingly stands in conflictwithher currentwell-being.Value conflicts likethese generate situations where complex trade-offs will have to bemadewith regard towhichvaluestofavor,when,andforwhom.Furthermore,whileinvaluabletoconsiderinadecisionmaking process, themyriad of ethical issuesmight be difficult for patients, care-takers,andmedicalteamstohandle.

Tofacilitateethicallysounddecision-makingprocessesconcerningwhichtreatmentstouseandwhen,astructuredframeworkaddressingthemaincorevaluesatstakeforthepatientsisneeded.Iproposeasetofvaluesthatsuchaframeworkshouldcontain,andhowitshouldbe organized in order to facilitate choices in shared decision-making processes in futuremethodsforpreventingandtreatingAlzheimer’sdisease.Iarguethattheframeworkshouldallow for certain values to be given prevalence depending on a number of variables,includingpatientgroups,andprospectsaftersuccessfultreatment.


BENJAMINMATHESON–ResponsibilityforthePast


Inthispaper,Idefendtheviewthatwarcriminalscanstopbeingmorallyresponsible,inthesense of being praiseworthy or blameworthy, for past actions they were once morallyresponsible for. I argue that ceasing to be morally responsible for an action does notnecessarilydischargeallourobligationswithrespecttothataction.Insuchcases,Iproposethatanindividualissocially(butnotmorally)responsible.Suchresponsibilityentailsthatanindividual has a duty to apologise, and she may express her apology in part throughexperiencingnegativeemotions,suchasguiltorregret.

ConsideraNaziprisonguardwhotorturednumerouspeopleintheprisoncamptheywereguarding.Let’sassumethattheyhadnoreservationsaboutthis;theywantedtodoit,andtheywantedtowanttodo.Moreover,theywereappropriatelyresponsivetomoralreasons;they knew it was wrong, all-things-considered, but ignored this reason not to torture. Inshort,imaginetheworsekindofpersonwhosomehowremainsamorallyresponsibleagent.Somepeoplefindithardtoimaginethatsuchaperson–nomatterhowmuchtheychange–couldceasetobemorallyresponsible (orblameworthy) fortheatrocitiestheycommitted.However,Iwillarguethatthemorallyreformedwarcriminalonlyseemsmorallyresponsiblebecausetheyareresponsibleinanothersense–namelysociallyresponsible.

Iendthepaperbyextending individualcasesofsocialresponsibilitytocollectivecases.Aswellasbeing individuals,wearealsopartofcollectives.Onesuchcollective isanationorcountry. Sometimes the collectives we are part of have done terrible things before weexisted.Ofcourse,wewerenotalivewhensomeoftheseterriblethingswerecommitted,andyetsomeofusstillfeelguiltorregretforthosepastevents.Itmightevenbethatourcollectiveisnotnowmorallyresponsibleforthepastevent,butthatdoesnotmeanitisnotnow socially responsible for thosepast events. I propose that collectiveswearepartof –such as our country – owe apologies for past crimes, even if they are no longermorallyresponsible for thosecrimes.Whetherornotourcountry isno longermorally responsiblefor its past crimes will depend on whether our country has changed significantly (e.g.whetheritsvalueshavechangedsignificantly).And,asmembersofthatcollective,wemayinheritanobligationtoapologiseforeventsbeforewewereborn.

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PER-ERIKMILAM–ReasonstoForgive


Whenweforgive,wedosoforreasons.Oneofthemainchallengesforforgivenesstheoristsistoidentifyreasonstoforgiveanddistinguishthemfromotherconsiderations.Iarguethattheonlyreasontoforgiveisaperceivedchangeofheartonthepartoftheoffender.

First,Ishowthatweforgiveforreasons.Trytoimaginearbitraryforgiveness—i.e.,forgivingfornoreason.SupposeDutchisn’tsurewhethertoforgiveDillonandflipsacointodecide.Thisisodd.EvenifDutchceasestoblameDillon,itseemswrongtodescribewhathe’sdoneasforgiving.

Second, I showthatnot justany reasonwilldo. Imagine thatSimonceases toblameJohnbecausehelikesJohn’shaircut.Anicehaircut isareasontogiveacomplimentortogetasimilarhaircutoneself,butit’snotareasontoforgive.IfSimontellsHansthat’she’sforgivenJohnbecausehelikedhishaircut,HansshouldthinkthatSimondoesn’tunderstandwhatitmeanstoforgive.

Third,Iarguethatthebestwaytodistinguishforgivenessfromsimilarphenomenaisbythereasonsthatdrivethevictim’schangeofattitude.Considerthedistinctionbetweenforgivingand letting go. Suppose Ripley hears Burke make an offensive remark about immigrantsduringapoliticalconversationwithfriends.Ripleyisupset,butquicklythinkstoherself,“It’snot worth blaming him. Our relationship isn’t worth the frustration of confronting him.”RipleynolongerblamesBurke,butitseemsclearthatshehasn’tforgivenhim.Herchangeof attitude was driven by the wrong kind of reason, by prudential concerns rather thanBurke’sremorse.

Finally, I evaluate candidate reasons to forgiveandargue thatmanyareeither thewrongkindofreasonorelsereducetoanotherreasonoftherightsort.Havingidentifiedcandidatereasons to forgive, I show that some candidates reduce to others. For example, apology,remorse, repentance, and making amends are all instances of the same kind of reason,namely,achangeofheartonthepartoftheoffender.NextIshowthatsomecandidatesarereasonstorelinquishblame,butnotreasonstoforgive.Forexample,intentionbearsonthewrongness of an action, so the fact that an offender had good intentions is a reason toconsider their action justified (or partially justified) rather than to forgive. I conclude bybriefly discussing the significance of my argument for how we understand and practiceforgiveness.


JESSICAPEPP–Assertion,Lying,andFalselyImplicating


There is an intuitive and seemingly significant difference between lying and falselyimplicating.Thisdifferencehasreceivedscrutinybothhistoricallyandrecently,mostlyinthecontextofthefollowingtwoquestions:

• First,howshouldlyingbedefinedsoastodistinguishitfromfalseimplication?

• Second,isthedifferencebetweenlyingandfalselyimplicatingreallysignificant,andifso,howandwhyisitsignificant?

Answers to the first question typically invoke assertion, claiming (roughly) that to lie istoassertsomething you take tobe false,whereas to falsely implicate isnot toassert, butmerelytoimplicate,somethingyoutaketobefalse.Thetaskthenistospellouttheaccountof assertion that is needed for a satisfactory definition of lying. Answers to the secondquestion divide over whether the difference between lying and falsely implicatinghasmoralsignificance.

InthistalkIwill(briefly)reviewandcriticallyevaluatethecurrentstateoftheliteratureonthesetwoquestions.Oneconclusionwillbethatitisnotclearthatlyingcanbedefinedbybreakingitdownintothecomponentsofassertingsomething,ontheonehand,andtakingthatwhichisassertedtobefalse(ornottrue),ontheother.Anotherconclusionwillbethatthereisagenuinepuzzleaboutthesignificanceofthedifferencebetweenlyingandfalselyimplicating.On theonehand, there is a strong intuition,bornoutby thewidespreadandseeminglymorallymotivatedpreferenceforfalselyimplicatingoverlying,thatthedifferenceis a moral one. Alternative, non-moral explanations of this preference are generallyunsatisfying. On the other hand, compelling explanations of what the moral differenceconsists inareelusive. Iwilldevelopthesuggestionthatthedistinctionbetween lyingandfalsely implicating iscloselyanalogoustothedistinctionbetweendoingharmandallowingharm,and that the rightaccountof the significance (or lack thereof)of the formerwouldthusparalleltherightaccountofthesignificance(orlackthereof)ofthelatter.

Finally,aneffortwillbemadetolinkthetwoquestionsnotedattheoutsetbyexaminingtherole that norms for assertion might play both in defining lying and in explaining thesignificanceofthedifferencebetweenlyingandfalselyimplicating.

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OLLE RISBERG – Consequentialism and Coordinating With Yourself andOthers


No matter our views about the ultimate plausibility of consequentialism, there is animportantintuitionthatsupportsthetheory:Surely,morallyspeaking,whatreallymattersissimply that wemake the world as good as possible. However, while this intuition seemsadmirably simple, it is surprisingly difficult to accommodate. I shall illustrate some of thedifficulties by discussing two moral questions that in isolation have received a lot ofattention,butwhichhaverarelybeenconsideredtogether:

1.What ought I to do when the outcomes of my actions depend on what otheractionsIwillinfactperform(e.g.,inthefuture)?

2.What ought I to dowhen theoutcomesofmy actions dependonwhat actionsotherpeoplewillperform?

Thereisaseriousproblemwhichariseswhenwetrytoanswerthesequestionsinawaythatcohereswiththeconsequentialistintuition.TheproblemisduetothefactthatperformingagivenactionA1mightbenecessarybutinsufficientforachievingthebestpossibleoutcome.To achieve the best outcome, itmay be that another actionA2must also be performed.When this holds, there is a powerful argument for thinking that A1&A2 ought to beperformed:PerformingA1&A2 issimplywhatwehavetodotoensurethattheworldisasgoodaspossible.

Supposefurthermorethatthepossibleoutcomescompareinvalueasfollows:

(A1&A2)≻(¬A1&¬A2)≻(A1&¬A2)∼(¬A1&A2)

Inotherwords,supposethatthebestoutcomeisthatbothactionsareperformed;thatthesecondbestoutcomeisthatneitheractionisperformed;andthattheworstoutcomesarethetwooutcomesinwhichonlyoneoftheactionsisperformed.1Supposealsothatnoneoftheactionsareperformedintheactualworld(i.e.,thatthesecondbestoutcomeobtains).Whenthisholds,thereisapowerfulargumentforthinkingthateachofA1andA2oughtnottobeperformed:PerformingA1wouldonlymaketheworldworse,sowecertainlyshouldnotperformit;andthesamethingcanbesaidaboutA2.

Theseconclusionsarepuzzlingincombination.HowcanitbetruethatweoughttoperformA1&A2eventhoughweoughtnottoperformA1andoughtnottoperformA2?Ishowthatthese conclusions are not only puzzling: given two further assumptions (namely, anagglomeration principle for ought and aweak version of ought implies can) they entail acontradiction. I also explain that many of the coordination-related problems from theliterature, involving both coordinating with oneself and with others, share this generalstructure. In lightof this, Iarguethataunifiedsolutiontotheseproblems ispreferable tothepiecemealapproachthathasbeenmostcommoninthedebate.

1Cases of this kind involving multiple agents are discussed in depth by Donald Regan,Utilitarianism and Co-Operation (1980). Cases of this kind involving only one agent takecenter stage in the debate between actualists and possibilists; see for example MichaelZimmerman,TheConceptofMoralObligation(1996:ch.6).


SIMON ROSENQVIST – Objective Act-Consequentialism and the “OughtImpliesCan”Objection


FrancisHoward-Snyderhasobjectedtoobjectiveact-consequentialismonthegroundsthatit contradicts theprinciple thatought implies can.Her example involves a gameof chess:you cannotdefeata chess champion inagameof chess; similarly, she claims, youcannotproducethebestconsequences.Inbothofthesecases,welacktheabilitytocarryouttheact.Butthen,bytheprinciplethatought impliescan, it is falsethatyououghttoproducethebestconsequences,andsoobjectiveact-consequentialism,sheclaims,mustbefalseaswell.

Inthispaper,IdiscussHoward-Snyder’sobjectionandsomerepliesintheliterature.First,Iargue that Howard-Snyder’s objection is plausible only on a specific way of formulatingobjectiveact-consequentialism–as(a)atypeofgeneralinstructionratherthan(b)alistofparticularactsthatitinstructustocarryout,or(c)abiconditionalplusexplanatoryrelation.

Second, I argue that even when formulated as a general instruction, objective act-consequentialism is defensible, since modal verbs such as can and ought are multiplyambiguous.Thereisbothaphysicalandacontrolsenseofcan,aswellasanobjectiveandsubjective sense of ought. Moreover, there are two corresponding and plausible oughtimpliescanprinciples:thatobjectiveoughtimpliesphysicalcan,andthatsubjectivelyoughtimpliescontrolcan.Objectiveact-consequentialism,Iclaim,shouldbeformulatedassayingonly that we objectively ought to produce the best consequences; where this is alsosomethingthatwephysicallycando.Consequentialismsoformulateddoesnotconflictwithanyoughtimpliescanprinciples.

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PERSANDIN–ExceptionalistEnvironmentalEthics

SwedishUniversityofAgriculturalSciences|[email protected]

‘Special permissions’ are moral permissions to do what is ordinarily morally prohibited(Statman 2006). Positions allowing special permissions can be termed ‘exceptionalism’. Arelated term is ‘threshold deontology’. Such positions are introduced when a normativepositionwithadeontological structure facesextremesituations inwhich the theoryyieldscounterintuitiveresults

Therearewell-knownproblemswith thresholddeontology and some standardargumentsagainst it.Oneis lackofcoherence,anotherisarbitrariness. Ifconsequencesjustifycertainmeasures in extreme situations, why could they not justify the measures taken in lessextreme situations as well? Nevertheless the position is prevalent enough to warrantcomments like theoneofCassSunsteinandAdrianVermeule, that ‘moderndeontologiststypicallysubscribetoaconsequentialistoverrideorescapehatch,onethatmakesotherwiseimpermissibleactionsobligatoryifnecessarytopreventmanydeaths…’

In the years around 1970, the idea of an environmental apocalypse (due to populationgrowth or chemical pollution) was prominent. A number of authors argued that extremeemergencymeasuresweremorally justifiedgiventheperceivedextremityofthesituation,e.g. the ‘lifeboatethics’ofGarrettHardin.This isan instanceofexceptionalism,andsomeradicalenvironmentalistpositionsareconsistentwithexceptionalism.Attimes,concernsofthis developing into ‘ecofascism’ have been raised. Radical environmentalism, and inparticular environmentally motivated instances of ‘justifiable wrongdoing’ has not beenmuch discussed, let alone propagated, in academic philosophy. Young (2001) argues thatsome acts of ‘ecosabotage’ might be justified according to a version of constrainedutilitarianism.Turner(2006)iscriticaltotheconsequentialistapproachandpointsoutthatthe arguments used by advocates of ecosabotage are not consequentialist but ratheranalogoustoself-defense.

Onlyveryoccasionally,however,thethemesofenvironmentalethicsandexceptionalismarebroughttogether.For instance,e.g.an intergenerational ‘self-defense’argumentregardingclimate change has been discussed by Gardiner (2010). In this paper I argue thatexceptionalist arguments are as viable in environmental ethics as in other fields, and Ioutlineathresholddeontologicalnon-anthropocentricethics.

References

Gardiner, S. 2010. Saved by disaster? Abrupt climate change, political inertia and thepossibility of an intergenerational arms race. In S. Skrimshire, (ed.) Future Ethics: ClimateChangeandApocalypticImagination.London::Continuum.

Statman,D.2006.Supremeemergenciesrevisited.Ethics117:58-79

Turner, D.D. 2006.Monkeywrenching, perverse incentives and ecodefence.EnvironmentalValues15:213-232.

Young,T.2001.Themoralityofecosabotage.EnvironmentalValues10:385-393.


LISA FORSBERG – On Adolescent Refusals of Life-Prolonging MedicalTreatment:AWelfaristProposal

YorkUniversity|[email protected]

Insomejurisdictions,adolescentconsenttolife-prolongingmedicaltreatmentistreatedasnormatively conclusive, while refusals of such treatment are not. In such jurisdictions, acourt or someone with parental responsibility possesses the power to authorize medicaltreatmentevenwhenanadolescentvalidly refuses. InseveralCanadianprovincesaminorunder16yearsofagemaybetreatedoverhervalidrefusaloftreatmentifacourtrulesthatthe treatment is in her best interests. In England andWales, a minor who is consideredcompetent to refuse life prolonging medical treatment may be treated against her validrefusalifapersonwithparentalresponsibilityconsents,oracourtrulesthatthetreatmentisinherbestinterests.

Whatmightjustifytreatingtherefusalsofadolescentsaslessnormativelyweightythantheirconsents?Weinvestigatethisquestionbyexaminingthreeviewsthatattemptto justify it.The first twoare versionsof transitional paternalism, onwhich the asymmetry is justifiedbecause the normative power an adolescent has to consent to life-prolonging medicaltreatment is shared with another. The third view seeks to justify the asymmetry on thegroundsthat,becausethelimitationsonthepoweradolescentshavearegroundedintheirbestinterestsandoccurearlyoninlifeaspartofaperiodofpreparationforanautonomouslife,thelimitationsdonotinterferewiththeabilitytoliveaself-directedlife.Therefore,theyarejustified.

Theseviewsfocusinonthenatureofadolescentautonomyanditslimitations.Werejectallthree views.Noneof them is suited to supply a compelling justification for limitations onadolescentrefusaloflife-prolongingtreatment.Whattheseviewsfailtoprovideisareasontolimitrefusalsofthismagnitudeandimportancewhileatthesametimeaccountingforthevalidity of adolescent consent. Against these views, we argue that adolescent well-beinginvolvesdistinctgoods,andthatthesejustifytheasymmetry.Amongthegoodsthatmightbereliedontojustifytheasymmetryareautonomyandasortofcarefreenessorameasureof freedomfrommakingcertain, impactfuldecisions.Thisviewexplainswhybothconsentandrefusalhaveanimportantroleinmedicaldecisionmakinginvolvingadolescents.

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OLLETORPMAN–MoralUncertaintyandSubjectivizationof IntertheoreticComparability


Arecentdebate inethicsconcernssocalledmoraluncertainty.Thisdebatedealswiththequestionofwhat isrationaltodoforamorallyconscientiousperson– i.e.apersonwhoisprimarily concerned with overall moral obligation –when she is uncertain which moraltheory is true. Among the debaters, there is a dispute about whether intertheoreticcomparisons – i.e. comparisons of the cardinal rankings of actions provided by differentmoraltheories–arepossibleornot.Theissueofintertheoreticcomparabilityisconsideredrelevant to moral uncertainty, since what is themorally conscientious thing to do undermoraluncertaintyissupposedtobedependentonwhetherintertheoreticcomparisonsarepossible.Ifintertheoreticcomparisonsarepossible,itseemsappropriatetoperformtheactwhose expected moral choiceworthiness is highest. If intertheoretic comparisons areimpossible, thenmaximizingexpectedmoralchoiceworthinesswouldbe impossible,and itwould instead seem reasonable to follow the prescriptions of the most credible moraltheory,orsomethingalongthatway.

Interestingly, the question about intertheoretic comparability has so far been widelyunderstood as anobjectiveissue – about whether or not such comparability isinfactpossible(similarlytohowmoraltheoriesaretypicallyregardedinthefieldofnormativeethics). Ineffect,theprinciplesthathavesofarbeenproposedonhowtoactundermoraluncertainty have all been objective in this regard. However, as I argue in this talk, theobjectiveperspectiveisimplausibleconsideredwithinthecontextofmoraluncertainty.Thequestionofintertheoreticcomparabilityshouldratherbeunderstoodasasubjectiveissue–abouttheagent’scredencesconcerningintertheoreticcomparability(similarlytohowmoraltheories are regarded within that same context). Indeed, it is a fact that agents aresometimesjustasuncertainaboutintertheoreticcomparabilityastheyareuncertainaboutmoral theories, and principles for decision-making under moral uncertainty should besensitive to this fact. I argue that only the subjective perspective on intertheoreticcomparability allows for this sensitivity. Moreover, only the subjective perspective iscapableofprovidingtheaction-guidancethatthemoraluncertaintydebateislookingfor:Itoffersaprincipleforchoice-makingundermoraluncertaintythatcandealwithcaseswherethe agent justifiably believes that intertheoretic comparisons are possible/impossible, aswellascaseswheretheagentisuncertainwhetherintertheoreticcomparisonsarepossibleornot.


RYAN WINES – Filling the Alleged 'Gap' in Kant’s Derivation of theCategoricalImperative

Bernadottegymnasiet,Stockholm|[email protected]

In thesecondpartof theGroundworkof theMetaphysicsofMorals,Kantclaimstoderivecontentforthecategorical imperativebyanalyzingtheconceptofacategorical imperativeassuch(GMS,420-1).ThisanalysisrenderstheFormulaofUniversalLawformulationofthecategoricalimperative(FUL),whichcommandsustoactonlyonthosemaximsthatwecouldat the same time will as universal laws. This argument is generally taken to be areformulationofasimilarpassageinGroundworkI(GMS,402).

BruceAunehasobjectedthatthereisagapbetweentwoprinciplesinKant’sargument,thefirst being “Conform your actions to universal law” and the second being “Act only onmaxims that you can will as a universal law.” (1979, 30). According to Aune, the firstprinciplelacks“practicalimport,”butthesecondprincipledoesnot.Thefirstprinciplesays“dowhateverthelawtellsyouisgoodtodo,”butwithoutdeterminingwhatthisgoodnessconsistsin. Thesecondprincipledoestellusthis:thegoodnessofamaximconsistsinthepossibilityofitsbeingwilledasuniversallaw.

Commentatorshaveadoptedvarious strategies for addressing this allegedgap. However,AllenWoodexpressesthegeneralconsensusthatKant’sargument,asitstands,isafailure:“DoeitherFULorFLNfollowmerelyfromCIorfromtheideaofacategoricalimperativeorobjectivelygroundedprinciple? Theanswer to thisquestionunfortunately is,No, theydonot.”(1999,81).

ThispaperarguesthatKant’sargumentsucceedsoncethestartingpointandendingpointofhis argument are clarified. Kant’s argument begins with the concept of a categoricalimperative.Generally,animperativerepresentsthenecessitationofthewillbyanobjectivelaw of reason (GMS, 413), and specifically, the categorical imperative represents theabsolutenecessitationofthewillbythemorallaw(GMS,420-1).Kant’sargumentendswiththe Formula of a Law of Nature formulation of the categorical imperative (FLN). Theformulation furnishes the form or nature of a teleologically organized moral order, theRealmofEnds(GMS,436).ThusKant’sderivationofcontentforthecategoricalimperativeshould end with just such a teleological form in FLN. This paper shows how such ateleological form can be derived from the concept of a categorical imperative, thusremovingtheallegedgap.

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FEMINISTPHILOSOPHY


MARTINAREUTER–DidWomenContributetotheInventionofAutonomy?

UniversityofJyväskylä|[email protected]

In his influential The Invention of Autonomy (1998), J.B. Schneewind examines the EarlyModernhistoryofmoralphilosophyupuntilImmanuelKant.HeemphasizestheunprecedednoveltyofKant’scategoricalimperative,butarguesthatwemustinterpretKant’sinventionin thehistorical contextof thephilosophicalproblemsheattempted tosolve.Schneewindtraces the Early Modern development as a history of morality as self-governance, whichgradually“rejecttheinequalityofmoralcapacityamonghumansthatwasastandardpartofconceptionsofmoralityasobedience” (1998,6).Thus, themoderndevelopment isguidedbyanegalitarianspirit,whichquestionsprevioushierarchies.

Schneewind’s detailed study hasmany philosophical and scholarlymerits, but one crucialblindspot.Hedoesnotdiscussthefactthathierarchiesofmoralcapacityweremostoftengenderedandthattheelementofobediencewasoftendoubledinthecaseofwomen,whowere required to obey external moral authorities as well as male authorities in theirimmediate social settings. Schneewind’s story shows how the tendency to exclude thetheoretical question of gender goes hand in handwith the exclusion of women thinkers.Though he gives a broad picture of the canon of moral philosophy, including “minor”thinkerssuchasMarquisdeSade,hedoesnotincluderelevantfemalemoralphilosophers,suchasCatherineMacaulayorMaryWollstonecraft,whowouldhavebroughtwiththemanexplicationofthequestionofgender.

My aim in this paper is threefold. First, I discuss how implicit biases may affectinterpretations of the history of philosophy. Research on implicit biases has shown thatpeople who hold explicit and sincere egalitarian views may simultaneously hold implicitbiases,whichaffect theirevaluationof theperformancesofmembersofdisadvantagedormarginalizedgroups.IarguethatSchneewind’sstoryabouttheinventionofautonomyisatelling example of this tendency. Second, I present some core aspects ofWollstonecraft’smoral philosophy and discuss in what sense they can be claimed to contribute to theinventionofmoralautonomy.

Finally, I ask if Schneewind’s overall story about the invention of autonomy would havechangedifhehadincludedthequestionofgenderanddiscussionsofwomenthinkers.Thisquestion iscrucial,because if it isthecase, itshowsthattheexclusionofgenderfromthehistory of philosophy is not “only about gender”, but has a profound impact on theinterpretationofgeneralphilosophicaltopicssuchastheinventionofautonomy.

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QASIR SHAH – Are Sex and Gender Social Constructs? An exploration ofJudithButler’sideas

UniversityCollegeLondon|[email protected]

Thenouns ‘sex’and ‘gender’whenapplied to humans in ordinary usagewould appear tocause littleproblemformostpeople. Incommonparlance,sex isdichotomisedasmaleorfemaleon thebasisof reproductive function,whilst gender follows thedimorphic linesofmasculinityandfemininity.ThispaperexploresButler’scontentionthatbothsexandgenderare cultural constructs and itwill see how she arrives at this conclusion. To gain a betterunderstanding of the conceptualisation of the terms sex and gender, Butler’s contentionswill be testedempiricallywith reference topsychological, andbiologicalperspectives, andphilosophically in relation to TorilMoi's theory of the 'lived body'. It is argued thatwhatButler seeks is to challenge and thus to free humanity from the heterosexual patriarchalhegemony with its fixed notions of sex and gender, and to transcend theheterosexual/homosexualbinary,toreachapositionwherewewouldalljustbepeoplewithvarious bodies with a spectrum of desires. For Butler, if men and women are seen asfundamentallydifferentandseparatethentrueequalityisimpossible.Thishasledhertoseegender not as an expression of what one is, but rather as something that onedoes. Shefurtherarguesthatwhenoneseessexascultural,thesex/genderdistinctionwill“turnouttobenodistinctionatall”.Bothbecometheproductofthesamediscursivenorms.Sexisnolonger the basis of gender but its effect. Butler is amodern day Nietzsche, challenging agenealogy: the heterosexual hegemony. In order to do so she has to subvert people’sunderstandingofwhat sexandgenderare.Mostpeoplewould find the idea that sexandgenderaresimplysocialconstructsquitepreposterouswhenpresentedwithbiologicalandpsychologicalevidencetothecontrary.ButperhapswhenonegoesbeyondtheinitialshockofButler’sthesisandreflectsuponherideasandpossiblemethods,herideaswillresultinamorechallengingandilluminatingexperience.(330)


HISTORYOFPHILOSOPHY

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ERIKÅKERLUND–Densitethosnågrabarocktänkare

NewmanInstitute|[email protected]

Hur redogör man för ett fenomen som densitet, eller för skeenden som förtätning ochförtunning (exempelvis vid fasövergångar)? Dessa frågor behandlades på olika sätt avtänkare under slutet av 1500- och början av 1600-talet, utifrån deras olika filosofiskaramverk. I föredraget presenteras några olika ingångar till frågorna: senskolastikers(Francisco Suárez), atomisters (Johannes Chrysostomos Magnenus, Pierre Gassendi),senskolatiska atomisters (Rodrigo de Arriaga) och slutligen René Descartes, som väl harsvårast att redogöra för detta. Frågan om densitet, respektive förtätning och förtunning,visarsigvaraettfruktbartämneatttittanärmarepå–såskalldetiallafallargumenteras–där begrepp rörande materia, utsträckning, plats, rum, kvantitet och tyngd kommersamman. Frågorna är också under denna tid nära kopplade till centrala frågeställningarrörande relativ rörelse och acceleration, något som kan utgöra en nyckel för att förståDescartesredogörelserpåområdet.


JOHANBOBERG–KantonErkenntnisandWissen


Scholars of the work of Immanuel Kant routinely complain that the old Kemp Smithtranslation of Critique of Pure Reason systematically elided the distinction betweenErkenntnis and Wissen, by translating both terms as “knowledge,” and thus insertedambiguityattheveryheartoftheKantiansystem.ContemporaryKantiansknowbetter,theysay,andnowdistinguishbetween“cognition”and“knowledge.”

The crucial problem with the old translation was, we are told, that is misconstruedErkenntnis,which actually falls short of knowledge. This because (i) Kant allows for “falseErkenntnis” (A58/B83, A709/B737), which is taken to suggest that Erkenntnis in fact isneutralwithrespecttotruth,andhencewecannotbedealingwithknowledgehere;and(ii)Kant seems to be saying (A320/B376-7) that intuitions and concepts are species ofErkenntnis(characterizedas“objectiveperception”),andsinceonlyjudgments(accordingtoKant)arebearersoftruth,Erkenntniscannotmean“knowledge.”Asaresult,“cognition”isgenerallytakentobeamoresuitabletranslation,designatinganyconsciousobject-relatedrepresentation. Having thus downgraded Erkenntnis, many interpreters find in Kant’sconcept ofWissen the proper counterpart of the contemporary notion of knowledge asjustified true belief, since Wissen, according to Kant, (i) has an objective ground(justification),(ii)istrue,and(iii)isheldtobetrue(belief).

I argue that this interpretation fails.With regard toErkenntnis, sincea careful lookat thesources suggests that (i) “false Erkenntnis” for Kant, following Georg Friedrich Meier,designates something that merely has the appearance of being knowledge, and (ii) Kantnever meant to say that intuitions and concepts on their own suffice for Erkenntnis.Erkenntniscouldsurelybesaidtocorrespondto“knowledge”intheordinaryEnglishsenseoftheword.Furthermore, IarguethatWissen shouldbereadagainstthebackdropofthestandard Aristotelian-Scholastic distinction between two forms of proof: certain,demonstrativeproofs (scientia,Wissen),on theonehand,andprobable,dialecticalproofs(opinion,Meinung),ontheother.WissencorrespondstotheLatinnotionofscientia,anddidnotjustmean“knowledge,”butknowledgeinaqualifiedsense,namely,certainknowledgeofconclusions towhichweassentwhentheyareprovenfromourpriorknowledgeof thepremises.

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LORENZO CASINI – Var Aristoteles determinist? Några anmärkningar omPietroPomponazziskritikavAlexanderfrånAphrodisiasPeriheimarmenes.


PietroPomponazzi(1462-1525)varenav1500-taletsmesttongivandearistoteliker.Hösten1520 färdigställde han skriftenDe fato, de libero arbitrio et de praedestinatione, sombetraktas som en av renässansens viktigaste arbeten kring problemen om förenlighetenmellan människans fria vilja och ett gudomligt ordnat universum. Textens tillkomstföranleddes av 1516 års publicering av den latinska översättningen av den senantikearistoteliske kommentatorn Alexander av Aphrodisias skrift om ödet. Pomponazzis verkbeståravfemböcker ivilkahankritiserarAlexandersuppfattning,erbjuderenomfattandeöversiktochkritikavdeviktigastefilosofiskaståndpunkternagällandeförenlighetenmellanödet och den fria vilja, samt diskuterar ingående människans fria vilja, den gudomligaförsynen och predestination. På grund av dess invecklade struktur är detta Pomponazzismest komplexa verk. Han växlar mellan doxografi, exegetik och filosofisk analys, samtnärmar sig problemen om frihet och determinism från såväl naturfilosofins som dennaturliga teologins perspektiv. Bland moderna forskare har verkets dubbla karaktärgenererat flera olika tolkningar. En del har argumenterat för att den deterministiskavärldsbild som målas upp i de två första böckerna utgör Pomponazzis egen ståndpunkt.Andragörgällandeattdetrörsigomettverkavaporetiskkaraktär.ImittföredragkommerjagattbegränsamigtillendiskussionavPomponazziskritikavindeterministiskatolkningaravAristoteles.


THANASSISGKTAZARAS–WhatcausesthegenerationofthehumanbodyinPlato’sTimaeus?

UniversityofIoannina|[email protected]

In Plato’sTimaeus, thehumanbody ismadeby lesser gods, not by theDemiurgehimself(41b ff.). Apparently, human beings are copies made on the basis of a model, which iseternal and indeed an archetype for all species of living things (30c). Thus we have thefollowing two issues : 1) Why does the Demiurge create only the immortal part of thehumansoul,refusingtocreatealsothehumanbody?2)Whatexactlyisthemodelaccordingtowhichlessergodscreatethehumanbodies?

Concerning(1),itismosthelpfultotakeintoaccounttherelationbetweencauseandeffect: ‘It is unlawful for the best to produce anything but the most beautiful’ (30a6-7). Sincehumansaremortalandnotthemostbeautifulgeneratedbeings,theyshouldnotsharethesame causewith immortal generated gods.However, a part of their soul is immortal andresponsibleforthebesthumanactivity(i.e.discursivethought),thereforeitislegitimatetosupposethatitistheDemiurgehimselfthatisthecauseofthispart.

Thesecondissueismorecomplicated.For,ontheonehand,theeternalmodelincludesallanimalspecies likeHuman,Horse,Shark,Sparrowetc.However, ifthis isthecase, it isnotentirely clear inwhich sensean immaterial and timelessmodel includes species that theircomprehensionpresupposesnotionslike‘earth’,‘water’,‘flying’,thingsthataretheresultoftheDemiurge’sworkwithhismaterial.Andontheotherhand,wearespecificallytoldthatthemodel forthecreationofthehumanhead is theroundshapeofthesensibleuniverse(44d3-6),whiletherestofthehumanbodyiscreatedaccordingtothepurposeitserves(i.e.itisjustaservantofthehead-44e).

Mysuggestionisthatweshouldconsiderthepatternforthecreationofthehumanbodyassomething that is also designed by lesser gods. They design it, in accordancewith a) theDemiurge’swill to create something as good as possible; b) eternal Forms (e.g. Forms ofgeometricalshapes);c)generatedthings(e.g.theshapeoftheuniverse);andd)restrictionsimposedbyNecessity (48a ff.).Whenwereadaboutaneternalmodelof living things,weshouldtake itasthe‘FormofLife’,somewhatalongthe linesoftheFormofJustice intheRepublic : being one and the same thing, its manifestation diversifies depending on thevarioussituationsinwhichitoccurs.

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HENRIKLAGERLUND–WasThereSuchathingastheRenaissance?ASketchofHistoriographicalNihilism

UniversityofWesternOntario&StockholmUniversity|[email protected]

Inthistalk,IwilldevelopanapproachtothehistoryofphilosophythatI,forlackofbetterwords,willcallHistoriographicalNihilism.Itistheviewthathistoricalperiodsaremereconventionsanddonotcorrespondtoanythingreal.Itultimatelyholdsthatallhistoriographicalconceptsareexactlythat,namely,mereconcepts(orwords)thatartificiallydivideuptheindividualoccurrencesoreventsthatmakeupthepast(orwhatwecallhistory).Itisthehistorianwhoimposestheseconceptsorthisartificialorderontopastevents.IwillinthistalkusetheRenaissanceasanexampleofsuchaconcept(orword),andIwillarguethatasfarasphilosophyisconcernedtherewasnothinglikewhatwehavecometocalltheRenaissance.


PAULINA REEMES – Medicines Drenched in Honey: Olympiodorus on theMethodofPlatonicPhilosophy


In recent decades, Plato scholarship has seen a development, one that has also lead to adangerousdivide.Theso-calledliteraryreadingofPlatohas,rightly,highlightedthewayinwhich the dialogues are complex literary compositions that have to be treated as unitaryholes. In the case of Plato, one cannot merely extract an argument. The interlocutor'sperson, the dialogical situation and other literary devices in use have to be taken intoaccount. But the literary approach sometimes overlooks the fact that the dialogues haveclear philosophical goals, thus obscuring Plato's argumentative intentions. The divide hasgrown into opposition of the so-called argumentative-philosophical reading and literaryreading. This presentation will show how an early Platonic interpreter, Olympiodorus,conceives of Platonic methodology of doing philosophy. He argues, in a surprisinglycontemporary fashion, that the distinctiveness of hismethod lies in context- and person-sensitivity. But inOlympiodorus' view there are epistemological-metaphysical foundationsbehindthismethodology. Inhiseyes,argumentative-philosophicaland literaryarepartsofthesameproject,partsthatcannotbestudiednorunderstoodinseparation.Person-relativemethodologygrowsoutofacommitmenttodiscussantsasindividuals,ofunderstandingofrationality as social, and out of the Platonic theory of the epistemic resources of aphilosophicaldiscussion.

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HALLVARDSTETTE–Filosofi:Enlekmedord?


IFaidrostrekkerSokratesflerestederetskillemellomlekogalvoribrukenavord.Ettersinandretale,ogsåkjentsomPalinoden,hevderSokratesatutoverdetatendialektiskmetodekom til uttrykk i den, bør talen i all hovedsak betraktes som en lek, og altså ikke særligalvorlig.(265c)Mennårvivetatengoddelsubstansiellfilosofinettoppforekommeridennetalen—om sjelens natur, om formene, ommenneskelig erkjennelse—, blir vi tvunget til åtenke over hvor alvorlig vi egentlig skal ta denne tilsynelatende strikte dikotomien. Ogsåsenere i dialogen kommer Sokrates tilbake til lek-alvor dikotomien, denne gangen iforbindelsemed en betrakting av det skrevne ord, som i hans øyne ikke kan regnes somannet enn lek i sammenligning med en levende samtale. (276a–278b) Legger vi dette tilgrunn,skalvidaforstådetslikatPlatonbetraktetsinegentekstproduksjonsomenlekogikkesærligalvorlig? Igjentror jegatenrefleksjonoverdennemulighetentvingerosstilenrevurderingavdetdikotomiskeskillet.SelvSokratesantyderattingikkeersåklaresomhanharlattdeseutsom,ogbidraritekstentilåkludretildistinksjonennårhankarakteriserersinogFaidros’samtaleomforskjelligetyperavordbruksomenlekogforlystelse.

I foredraget vil jeg sepåhva sommenesmed “lek” i Faidros, i tillegg til å undersøkehvaslagsromfilosofienharfor lek.Jegvilargumentereforatfilosofibørbetraktessomenlekmedord,mendariktignoksomenalvorliglek.


INGE-BERT TÄLJEDAL – Antonio Rosmini om egennamns referens ochuppkomst


AntonioRosmini (1797–1855)publicerade1830volym I avNuovoSaggio sull’OriginedelleIdee,hanstredeladekunskapsteoretiskaarbete.Hanhävdardärattkunskapenemanerarursinneserfarenheten,men–kritiserandeLockeochandrarenasensualister–attdenformelltförutsätterenmedföddidé,essere(ellerente;vara).

VidsidanavdettahuvudtemapresenterarRosminiiNuovoSaggioävenenspråkteori,somöverensstämmer med Mills i dennes tretton år senare utgivna A system of logic. SompåpekatsavSearl (”ProperNamesandDescriptions”, iTheEncyclopediaofPhilosophy), ärdetoftaMillsomförknippasmedåsiktenattegennamnsaknarkonnotationer.DetärtillMillsom Kripke hänvisar i en historisk bakgrundsteckning till sin teori om direkt referens(NamingandNecessity).AttRosmini skrevpå italienskahar troligenbidragit till att det ärfögakäntattden”Millska”teorinredanfinnsiNuovoSaggio.

Syftet med föredraget är att presentera Rosminis uppfattning om egennamns ochappellativersreferensochomhurdetvåtypernaavnominaförhållersigtillvarandraidenhistoriska och individuella språkutvecklingen, samt likheterna mellan Rosmini och Mill. Ikritiskmotsättning till Adam Smith (The theory ofmoral sentiments. Towhich is added adissertationontheoriginof languages)ochDugaldStewart (Elementsof thephilosophyofthe human mind) anser Rosmini att appellativer inte utvecklas ur egennamn, utan attegennamnentvärtomuppkommersenareänappellativerna.Jagkommerocksåattdiskuteravarifrån Rosmini kan ha fått uppfattningen att egennamn refererar direkt och inte kanreduceras till beskrivningar. Fastän samma tanke finns hos Reid, och fastänNuovo Saggioägnar åtskilliga sidor åt Reids kunskapsteori, tycks Rosmini vara obekant med Reidsuppfattning om språk. Rosmini refererar upprepade gånger tillAn inquiry into the humanmind,menbiblioteksdatatalarföratthaninteharlästEssaysontheintellectualpowersofman,därReidskriveromnominasreferens.JagföreslårattRosminiiställetharpåverkatsavTomas av Aquino, som Rosmini torde ha studerat grundligt och till vilken han refereraråtskilligagångeriNuovoSaggio.RosminisättervisserligenintesjälvTomasisambandmedsin teoriomnominas referens,men iSumma theologica (I:13:9) finnsen i sammanhangetintressant passus. Tomas menar där att termerna ”gud” och ”sol” ha fungera både somegennamn,refererandepåett”ickekommunicerbart”sätttillrespektiveunikasuppositum,och som appellativ, refererande till en gudomlig respektive solär natura. SuppositummotsvararRosminisindividualità,tillvilkaegennamnenlikasårefererardirekt.

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LOGIC&PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE


ARVIDBÅVE–Fine-tuningdispositionalismaboutcontent


Semantics dispositionalism is the view that someone’smeaning something by a word, orpossessinga certainconcept,etc., is constitutedby theirbeingdisposed todosomething,e.g.,inferinaccordancewithacertainrule.Themostseriousobstacletosuchtheoriesisthefactthatthereseemtobemanyandverydisparateexceptionstosuchtheories.Peoplemayfail to infer as required, for instance, because of inattention, drunkenness, confusion, orbecause of some deviant philosophical theory or logic, or for some entirely non-psychological reason, e.g., some neural glitch. My version of dispositionalism is aninferentialist account stating possession conditions on concepts, and I exemplifywith thesimplecaseofconjunction. Iarguethatthetheoryisattractivelysimpleandnon-adhocinspiteofeschewing “ceterisparibus” clauses.Thepsychologicalexceptions, I argue, canbehandled merely by taking the stimulus condition to involve (1) the person’s consideringmakingthe inferenceand(2)hernothavinganyreasonagainstmakingthe inference.Thenon-psychological, neural exceptions are handled by requiring that the inferentialdispositionbemanifested sufficientlyoften. Imake this conditionmorepreciseandarguethatitaccommodatessomeimportantintuitionsaboutconceptpossession.

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GISELABENGTSSON–Enkel,kraftfull,sträng


Medorden”enkel,kraftfull,sträng”beskrivsGottlobFregesstilavGeorgeHenrikvonWrightiartikeln”Analytiskfilosofi.Enhistorisk-kritiskbetraktelse”(1991).HärlåtervonWrightendistinktion mellan två olika mänskliga intellektuella förhållningssätt få en central plats iskissenöverdenanalytiskafilosofinsursprungochutveckling:denmellandetvetenskapligaförhållningssättet som söker kunskap om sanningen, och det filosofiska förhållningssättetdärklarhetärdetöverordnademålet.EnligtvonWrightpräglasdenanalytiska filosofinavett växelspel och motsättningar mellan dessa förhållningssätt. Han placerar utan tvekanBertrandRussellsomenföreträdarefördetförstaförhållningssättetochG.E.Mooresomenrepresentant för det andra.OmFrege - vars stil påverkadeWittgenstein i stark grad (Z: §712)-uttryckersigvonWrightmerförsiktigt.Idenhäruppsatsenundersökerjaghurvikanplacera Frege i förhållande till distinktionen som von Wright hämtar från FriedrichWaismanns ”Was ist logische Analyse?”, 1940. Att svaret inte är givet står klart när vibetraktardencentralaplatssanninghariFregesprojektjämsidesdenviktighethantilläggerklarhet.EftersomFrege’sprojektärvetenskapligtsyftardettillattfrämjakunskapochhanframhållergångpågångattordsom”sann”visarvägenför logik.Men i förhållandetillenannan distinktion som används iMax Blacks artikel ”Relations between Logical PositivismandtheCambridgeSchoolofAnalysis”(1939)–denmellandesomfrågar”Ärdetsant?”ochde som frågar ”Vadbetyderdet?”–kundemanpåståatt Frege ställerden senare frågan.Hanvillframställa,påettsåtransparentsättsommöjligt,dedragvidettpåståendesomharbetydelse för logiskhärledning. Svårigheten i attpresenteradessadrag såattde framstårklartfinnsidetnaturligaspråketsomärutformatenligtolikaslagsmålviharnärvianvänderdet.”Enstordelavfilosofensarbetebeståri–ellerbordebeståi–enkampmedspråket”,skriverFregeiensenuppsats(NSs.270).BrevväxlingenmellanFregeochWittgensteinomTractatusformarenbakgrundförminundersökning.


NILSFRANZÉN–EvaluativeDiscourseandEmotiveStatesofMind


Expressivists maintain that evaluative discourse expresses desire-like states of mind insimilarwaytohowordinarydescriptive languageexpressesbeliefs.MarkSchroeder(2008)calls “this the basic expressivistmaneuver”. A fundamental problem for this notion is thefollowing. Conjoining an ordinary assertion that p with the denial of being in thecorrespondingbelief-statethatpfamouslygivesrisetoMooreaninfelicity:

(1)#ItisrainingbutIdon’tbelievethatitisraining.

Ifthebasicexpressivistmaneuverisontherighttrack,conjoiningevaluativediscoursewiththe denial of being in the desire-like state ofmind that is presumably expressed by suchdiscourse, should give rise to similar infelicity. As several theorists have pointed out, thisdoesnotseemtobethecase:

(2)MurderiswrongbutIdon’tdisapproveofit.

(3)Murderiswrong,butI’mnotagainstit.

(4)Murderiswrong,butI’minfavorofdoingit.

Unlike(1),neitherof(2)-(4)areinfelicitous(Atlas,2005,pp.225–230;Finlay,2005;Woods,2014). This problem is, I think, specific instance of a general concern. Metaethicalexpressivimis,atbottom,athesisaboutapartofnaturallanguage.However,theargumentsthat has been offered for it are largely non-linguistic in nature (cf. Yalcin 2012). Naturallanguagehasbeentakentoofferlittlesupportfortheexpressivist’shypothesis.

In this talk, I aim to address the problem of the “Missing Moorean infelicity” forexpressivists,andmoregenerallytoarguethatthatakindofexpressivismcanbesupportedonlinguisticgrounds.Iarguethatthekindofmentalstatesascribedby‘find’inEnglishfitsthe expressivist’s bill. Conjoining evaluative assertions with the denial of being in thecorrespondingfind-stateofmindtriggersMooreaninfelicity:

(5)#Murderiswrong,butIdon’tfindmurderwrong.

Onthebasisofthefactthatitisunintuitivetoascribetruthandfalsitytofind-statesIarguethat these are noncognitive and emotive in nature. Similarly to how the infelicity ofstatementslike(1)aretakentoshowthatregularassertionsexpressbeliefs,theinfelicityofstatementslike(5)canbetakenshowthatevaluativediscourseexpressfind-statesofmind.

Bibliography

Atlas, J.D., 2005. Logic, meaning, and conversation: semantical underdeterminacy,implicature,andtheirinterface.OxfordUniv.Press,Oxford.

Schroeder,M.,2008.BeingFor.OxfordUniversityPress.

Yalcin,S.,2012.BayesianExpressivism.Proc.Aristot.Soc.Hardback112,123–160.

Woods,J.,2014.ExpressivismandMoore’sParadox.Philos.Impr.14,1–12.

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ANANDIHATTIANGADI–LogicalDisagreement

StockholmUniversity&SCAS|[email protected]

Whatdowedisagreeaboutwhenwedisagreeaboutlogic?SupposethataclassicallogicianandanintuitionistdisagreeabouttheuniversalvalidityoftheLawofExcludedMiddle(LEM:A∨∼A).Theclassicallogicianaccepts(1),whiletheintuitionistaccepts(2):

LEMDISAGREEMENT

(1)LEMisvalid.

(2)ItisnotthecasethatLEMisvalid.

Whatisitthattheydisagreeabout?Thesimpleanswer—thattheydisagreewhetherLEMisvalid—is complicated by the hypothesis that logic isnormative. As Frege put it, logic is a‘normativescience’,which‘prescribesuniversallythewayinwhichoneoughttothinkifoneistothinkatall.’ If logic isnormative,thenthedisagreementbetweenthe intuitionistandtheclassicallogiciandoesnotconcernthedescriptivequestionwhetherLEMisvalid,butthenormativequestionwhetheroneoughttoacceptallinstancesofLEM.

If logic is normative, then meta-ethics—the study of the semantics, metaphysics andepistemologyofnormativity—turnsouttobeoffundamentalrelevancetothephilosophyoflogic. One of the central questions in meta-ethics concerns whether there are anystraightforwardly objective normative facts or properties ‘out there’ in the world. Andskepticism about a straightforwardly objective normative reality is widespread. Thisskepticismgeneralizes:iflogicisnormative,andoneisananti-realistaboutnormativity,onemustbeananti-realistaboutlogicalvalidityalso.

But anti-realismabout logical validity raises a semanticpuzzle. If thereareno facts aboutlogical validity, then neither the classical logician nor the intuitionist can be factuallymistaken;theirdisagreementisfactuallyfaultless.Thisisoftentakentomeanthatboth(1)and (2) are true. But since (1) and (2) are inconsistent, how can both be true? Oneprominentresponsetothispuzzleisputforwardbycontextualists,whoclaimthatthetruth-values of normative judgments vary with a speaker’s context of utterance; a secondprominent response is put forward by relativists, who hold that the truth values ofnormativestatementsmustberelativizedtocontextsofassessment;andathirdprominentresponse is put forward by expressivists who claim that normative statements do notexpressbeliefs,butnon-cognitive,non-representationalattitudesofsomekind.

This paper investigates the application of these three prominent semantic approaches tologicaldisagreement.Iwillarguethatnoneofthesesemantictheoriesisabletoprovideanadequate account of what we disagree about when we disagree about logic. I go on toconsidertheimplicationsofthisresultforboththephilosophyoflogicandformeta-ethics.


BJÖRNLUNDGREN–WhatisCulture?


Despite the fact that the concept of culture is quite important for various philosophicalendeavors (see, e.g., Machery et al 2004, 2009, Martí 2009, Bloom & Keil 2001), itsconceptual nature have not been much discussed in philosophy. Also, despite thehypothesized link between cultures and cognition “Cognitive science has also neglectedculture,butinrecentyears,thathasstartedtochange”(Prinz2016).

If the conceptof culturehasbeen ignoredbyphilosophers then ‘organizational culture’ isnotevenconsideredbyphilosophers.Theconcept,however, iswelldiscussedinthesocialsciencesandsomeof theconceptualdiscussions in thesocial sciencesofferan interestingstartingpointforaconceptualanalysis.Roughlywecaninterpretorganizationalcultureasaconceptreferringtothecultureofaparticularorganization(cf.Needle2015:225f).This,ofcourse,doesnotimplythatthecultureishomogenous(cf.Cameron&Quinn1988).

By involving organizational culture into the conceptual analysis of culture (rather thanfocusingonlyonthelatter)theanalysisbenefitsforatleasttworeasons:

Firstly,statementsinvolvingculturearearguablyambiguousoverthesetwosense,e.g.,ifwetalk about ‘American culture’ (ignoring that ‘America’ is ambiguous, supposing that itindicatestheUnitedStatesofAmerica)thiscanreadasindicatingculturesimpliciter,i.e.theculture that has great influence all over the western hemisphere, or it can be read asindicatingorganizationalculture,i.e.theculturewithintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.Thesedifferentreadingofferdifferentscopesofanalysis,whosepartialover-lapallowsforfurtheranalysis.

Secondly, there is a discussion in the social science ofwhether there can be sub-cultureswithin anorganization, or if such supposed sub-cultures aremerely topic specific parts ofthe organizational culture. For example, can there be a safety culture that is a distinctculturewithanorganization,oristhesafetycultureismerelyadescriptionofapartoftheorganizationalculturethathastodowithsafety(cf.Guldenmund2000)?

Thesekindsofquestionsallowustoapproachtheconceptualanalysisofculturewithmorefruitful examples. On the basis of such examples I will offer a preliminary analysis of theconcept of culturewith the aimof supplying a definitionof themain concepts and a fewprinciples(suchasasimilarityandanidentitycriterionforcultures).

References

Bloom,P.&F.C.Keil.2001.ThinkingThroughLanguage.Mind&Language16(4):351-367.

Guldenmund, F.W. 2000. The nature of safety culture: a review of theory and research.SafetyScience34:215-257.

Macheryetal.2004.Semantics,cross-culturalstyle.Cognition92:B1-B12.

Macheryetal.2009.Linguisticandmetalinguistic intuitions in thephilosophyof language.Analysis69(4):689-694.

Martí,G.2009.Againstsemanticmulti-cultarism.Analysis69(1):42-48.

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Needle,D.2015.Businessincontext:anintroductiontobusinessanditsenvironment.Sixthedition.Andover:CengageLearning.

Prinz, J.2016.CultureandCognitiveScience.TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy (Fall2016Edition).

Cameron, K. S. & R. E. Quinn. 1988. Organizational paradox and transformation. In R. E.Quinn&K.S.Cameron(ed.)ParadoxandTransformation.Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger:1-18.


ALBINAS PLESNYS – Liar revisited: where Frege was right and Tarski waswrong

VilniusUniversity&UniversityofGlasgow|[email protected]

Intriguingfactabouttheliar’sparadoxisitssteadfastness:despitewidevarietyofsolutionsprovideditisstillapartofongoingdebates.Thereasonbehindthatiswhattheacceptanceofeachofthesolutionspertainsto:noaccountseemstogivesatisfactoryoutcomes.Inmyinvestigation,IprovideasolutiononFregeanlines,usinghistripartitelinguisticdivisionandprincipleofindeterminacyofreference(thelatterclaims,thatforasentencetohavetruthvalueallofitspropernamesmusthavereference).

The solution is generous in its outcomes, since it a) doesn’t claim inconsistency of theconcept of truth b) doesn’t appeal to hierarchical structures of languages c) doesn’t haveunwantedimplicationstotraditionallogic,i.e.,doesnotmakeuseof“thethirdtruthvalue”ordialetheistapproachesd)acceptsthemeaningfulnessoftheliar’ssentencee)allowstheexistence of self-referential propositions (to deny the existence of such propositions is apopularcontemporaryapproachtoliar’s).

Considering Frege’s tripartite distinction between wording (syntax), meaning (semantics)andreference(truthvalue)ofsentenceIclaimthatsensecanbeviewedasafunctionalruleassigningwording its truth value. Now let us take liar’s sentence “this sentence is false”.First,wewanttodistinguishusesofterm“sentence”,whichcanbetakentorefertoanyofthelevelsofthedistinction,i.e.,wording(asin“thissentenceisinsixwords”),meaning(asin“sentenceAspeaksnothingaboutarithmetic”)orto itstruth-value(as in“sentenceB isfalse”). Then I show why functional rules involving wording and meaning can be well-defined,butthoseinvolvingtruth-valuecan’t.

Finally, I showthatsuchaccount letsusholdthat innatural languagesconceptof truth is,contrary toorthodox (Tarskian)approach,consistent.Apparent inconsistency ratherstemsfromtheuseofemptypropernames.

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LIZHANG–Choicerevision


Belief change theory studies how an ideal rational agent should change her belief statewhenshe isexposed tonew information.The research in this fieldhas traditionallyhadastrong focusontwotypesofchanges:contraction inwhichaspecifiedsentencehas toberemoved from the original belief state, and revision in which a specified sentence hasinstead to be consistently added.Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) in theirseminal paper performed pioneering formal work on these two types of changes. In theAGMtheoryofbeliefchange, theagent’sbelief state is representedbyasetof sentencesfromsomeformallanguageL,usuallydenotedbyK.Thenewinformationisrepresentedbya single sentence inL. Belief revision and contraction are formally represented by twooperators fromP(L)×LtoP(L), each of which is axiomatically characterized with a set ofplausiblepostulates(AGMpostulates).

Inthiscontribution,wewillstudyageneralizedversionofbeliefrevisionoperation,namelynon-prioritized multiple revision. Multiple means that in this case the input is a set ofsentencesinsteadofasinglesentence.Non-prioritizedmeansthatinthisscenariothenewinformationhasnoprioritytotheoriginalbeliefs.Therearemanydifferentkindsofmultiplenon-prioritized revision. In this paper we will investigate one of them which could becalledchoice revisionand has been less concerned with in the literature. It is formallyrepresented by an operator∗con belief setKwith finite sets of sentences as its inputs.Intuitively,K∗cAmeanstochoosethemostplausiblesentencesfromsetAandaddthemtotheoriginalbeliefsetKinarationalway.

Wewillproposesomeplausiblepostulatesonthechoicerevisionandstudythederivabilityrelations between them.The operation∗chas the interesting characteristic that thestandardselect-and-intersectmethodusedinAGMapproachisnotingeneralapplicable.Inorder to develop a construction of choice revision,we therefore need to choose anotherstrategy: we will propose and investigate two modellings for choice revision basedondescriptorrevisionandmulti-believabilityrelationsrespectivelyandprovetheassociatedrepresentation theorems. Finallywewill have a look at some relevantwork and comparethemwithourwork.


METAPHYSICS

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TOBIASALEXIUS–Core-CognitionandPhilosophicalDisputes


In his (2014), Goldman suggests, in an attempt to naturalize metaphysics, that results incognitivesciencecanbeusedtoinfluencethecredenceofmetaphysicaltheories.Hisviewspartlydependonphilosophicallycontentiousdebunking-arguments,accordingtowhichtheevolvednatureofourcognitivesystemshouldleadustoembraceanti-realismaboutcertainphenomena(becauseourintuitionsprimarilytrackfitness,notreality).

InmytalkIarguefortwothesesrelatedto,butimportantlydifferentfrom,Goldman'sview:(I) that certain metaphysical disputes provide helpful evidence for theories in cognitivescience – or, weaker - constitute good starting points for formulating testable empiricalhypotheses about cognitive structures, and (II) that cognitive science, rather than directlyaffecting the credence of specific metaphysical theories, can help us understand andcriticallyevaluatesomeofthemethodsemployedbymetaphysicians.Both(I)and(II)canbeestablished without relying on classical debunking arguments, and so bypass criticismsdirectedtowardssucharguments.

Morespecifically,Iarguethatphilosophicaldisagreementscansometimesserveasempiricalevidence of cognitive contradictions rooted in a plurality of core-cognition systemscompeting for the same cognitive function (each of which results in differentrepresentationaloutputs).Theexistenceofsuchcontradictionsiswelldescribedinempiricalliterature, but focus has traditionally been on simple cases in perceptual cognition (seeCarey2011foranoverview),notonmetaanalysisofphilosophicaldisputes.Mysuggestionisthatcertainintuitionalimpasses-locationsinthephilosophicaldialecticswhereproponentsof different theories are engaged in little more than a war of intuitions – are (often)symptoms/evidenceofcore-cognitiveconflicts.

Iofferananalysisofcentraldisagreements inthe literatureonpersonal identityalongtheabove lines. According to this analysis the intuitions supporting bodily and psychologicaltheoriesofpersonalidentitystemfromdifferentcognitivesystemsthatusedifferentcuestoform judgements about the identity of agents. The result is not a proven thesis, but anempirical hypothesis concerning the nature of particular cognitive structures. Not only issuchanhypothesis scientifically interesting, it also constitutes an important startingpointformeta-philosophicalreflectionabouttheintuition-pump-method.

References

Goldman (2014) “NaturalizingMetaphysicswith the Help of Cognitive Science”, inOxfordStudies inMetaphysics (vol. 9, 2014), Editors: Bennett, K., and Zimmerman,D.W.,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford.

Carey,(2011)OriginofConcepts,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford.


EINARDUENGERBØHN–CompositionasIdentity:whatitisandsomethingsitentails

UniversityofAgder|[email protected]

ThethesisofCompositionas Identity (CAI) is theclaimthatawhole is identicalwithall itspartscollectively.So,forexample,mybodyisthesamethingasallthesub-atomicparticlesarrangedasit.CAIisahighlycontroversialthesis,oftendismissedasincoherent.Inthistalk,Iwill showhowCAI canbe trueand some things it entails. I beginby sketchingageneraltheoryofidentity,fromwhichIderivetheclassicaltheoryofcomposition,showinghowitisidentity.Ithenreplytosomestandardobjectionstosuchanaccount,beforeIsketchsomeinteresting consequences of it with respect to the possibility of emergent properties.Interestingly, it turns out that CAI might be committed to versions of panpsychism andpannormism,theviewsaccordingtowhichconsciousnessandnormativity,respectively,arepropertiesofbasicentitiesofreality.

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ELISABETH FURBERG – Is there an anthropocentric bias in the personalidentitydebate?


Therearemanyphilosophicalfieldsthatarerelevanttofrequentlydiscussedthemesinbothmedical ethics and bioethics. One such field ismetaphysics and the question of personalidentity. In this debate, there are twomain rival views: The view that we are essentiallypersonsand thatourpersistence conditionsarepsychological innature (thePsychologicalView or Neo-Lockean view), and the view that we are essentially animals and that ourpersistenceconditionsarebiological(Animalism).Thesedifferentmetaphysicalviews–itisoften argued – have very different implications in many ethical issues that concern thebeginning and end of life, such as for example the use of advance directives, the moralstandingofafoetusandthepossibilityharvestingorgansfortransplant.

BothAnimalismandNeo-Lockeantheoriesofpersonalidentityhaveintuitiveappealintheirimplications:Psychologicaltheoriesarewell-equippedtoexplain,forexample,whyawhole-bodytransplantwouldsavemylife,whereasanimalistaccountshavegreatappealbecauseit isdifficultgivenallweknowaboutnatureandevolution–todenytheclaimthatweareessentially animals. In this presentation I will explore the possibility of combining theseintuitiveappeals.Iwillargueinfavouroftheviewthatweareessentiallyanimals(theclaimthatIsuggestistheveryintuitiveforcebehindanimalisttheoriesofpersonalidentity),butIwill reject the further claim of the animalist that this fact determines our persistenceconditions.Iwill insteaddiscusstherarelynotedpossibilitythatsome(butnotall)animalsmay persist by virtue of their psychology. Iwill also suggest that this possibility has beenneglectedinthedebatebecauseofwhatcouldbeinterpretedasananthropocentricbiasinthepersonalidentitydebate.


PAULGORBOW–Explainingtruthsfundamentally


For any true sentence S one can form the question “Why S?”, potentially answered by“BecauseT.”,whereT isacollectionof truesentences.Butawhy-question,suchas“Whyarethedishesdirty?”,mightbeansweredindifferentways,e.g.:

A.“Becausewejustusedthemtoeatourlunch.”

B.“Becausethereissomeoilandstarchstucktothem.”

(A) is a causal explanation,pointingout anevent that caused thedishes tobecomedirty,while (B)pointsoutamore fundamental fact, invirtueofwhich, thedishesaredirty.Thistalk is concernedwith the second type of answer, which is usually called ametaphysicalexplanation.Suchexplanationsareoftenusedtomotivategroundingrelations,e.g.througha tracking relation. I introduce the notion of fundamentality explanation, and suggest acharacterization by which such explanations can be classified as physical, metaphysical,analytical, etc. This approach supports a conception of grounding as a genuswith severalspecies,eachofwhich ischaracterizedbyamodality.Herearethreeexamplesofhowthecharacterizationclassifies:

1.Ifitfollowsfromthemeaningof“dirtydishes”thatanydisheswithoilandstarchstuckonthemaredirty,then(B)isananalyticalexplanation.

2.The follow-upquestion“Why is thereoil and starch stuck to thedishes?”hasaphysicalexplanationalongthelinesthatthedishes,oilandstarchconsistofcertaintypesofmoleculesinteractingwitheachotherthroughelectromagneticforces.

3. However, causal explanations like (A) do not satisfy the conditions for beingfundamentalityexplanations.Thus,Iurgeforcautionwhentransformingsuccessfulaccountsofcausalexplanationintoaccountsofanyofthespeciesoffundamentalityexplanations.

Groundingismeanttosupportageneralphilosophicaltechniqueusede.g.inthedebateonphysicalism,whereonemightdefend the view thatmental facts are grounded inphysicalfacts. By varying the modality, one can vary the strength of such a claim. Accordingly, Iproposephysio-psychologicalphysicalismasaplausiblephysicalisttheory.

Moreover, based on the characterization, I put forth a general method for giving an M-explanation of an M-necessary truth, where M is an arbitrary modality. For example,“Crimson is a determinate of red.” satisfies the conditions for being a metaphysicalexplanationof“Bymetaphysicalnecessity,forallx,ifxiscrimsonthenxisred.”.

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HELGEMALMGREN–Omfärgersförmentaoförenlighet


Föredragetskabehandladetklassiskaproblemetomfärgersoförenlighet(inkompatibilitet).Varförkan inteenytavarasamtidigtheltochhålletblåochheltochhållet röd? (Ellerkanden det?) Bland filosofer som bekymrat sig över detta återfinns den tidigeWittgenstein.Enligt hans ”Tractatus” kan inte atomära påståendenmotsäga varandra.Men författarenlekerocksåmedtankenattpåståendenomenfläcksfärgäratomära.Ienartikelfrånslutetav20-taletförsökerhanbenautproblematiken,menmankanknappastsägaatthanlyckassärskilt bra. Man har antagit att detta var en viktig anledning till att den tidiga teorinövergavs.Mitt föredrag anknyter också till den senareWittgenstein, ochdå inteminst tilldiskussionen iden lillaboken”Omfärger”. I sambandmeddetkommer jagatt tavarapåmöjlighetenattspekuleraöverendelandrafrågorrörandefärger,t.ex.varförendryckintekan vara genomskinligt vit när rödvin kan vara genomskinligt rött (Wittgensteins fråga),varfördetintetycksfinnasnågotbruntljusfastdetfinnsgultochblåttljus,ochomdetkanfinnasbådeljusvittochmörkvitt(vilketvissabarnhävdarmedemfas).


HENRIKRYDÉHN–MetaphysicallyOpaqueGrounding


Recentmetaphysicshasseenagreatdealofinterestinthenotionofgrounding.Groundingissupposedtoanirreflexive,asymmetricandtransitiverelationofnon-causaldeterminationunderlyingmany“invirtueof”and“because”explanations inmetaphysicsandotherareasofphilosophy.

Onereasonthatgroundinghasbeentakentobesoimportantinmetaphysicsisthatithasgenerallybeenconceivedasanextremely intimaterelation,closelytiedtotheessencesofthings and generating reductive explanations where the grounded is “nothing over andabove”itsgrounds.Inthisvein,KitFinewritesthat“Thereare[…]manyotherexplanatoryconnectionsamongtruths.But therelationofground isdistinguished fromthembybeingthetightestsuchconnection.[…]Itistheultimateformofexplanation.”

In this talk, I want to draw attention to a phenomenon I call “opaque grounding” --grounding connections without any accompanying relation of essential involvement ormetaphysical analysis -- thatwould be in conflictwith this popular line of thinking aboutgrounding. I will show how certain fairly widespread metaphysical theories are naturallyinterpreted in terms of opaque grounding claims, and examine some implications theseclaimswouldhaveforthegeneraltheoryofgrounding.

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JONATHANSHAHEEN–FunctionlessDesertLandscapes


This paper investigates two interesting presuppositions ofWhittle (2016)'s argument thatwearenotinapositiontoknowtheprincipleSIZE!FUNCTION,oreventhenearbyprincipleSIZE*!FUNCTION.

SIZE! FUNCTION: For any setsA andB, ifA is the same size asB, then there is abijectionfromAtoB.

SIZE*!FUNCTION:Forany setsA andB, ifA andBhave the samecardinality, thenthereisabijectionfromAtoB.

Iarguethatatleastthelatterprincipleistrue,andthatwecanknowit.

ItiscrucialtoWhittle'sargumentationthatwecanmakejudgmentsaboutwhatistrueinaworld where the sets {0, 1} and {2, 3} exist, but no function between them exists. Inparticular,wearesupposedtobeabletojudgethat,intheworldinquestion,thesets{0,1}and{2,3}arethesamesizealthoughnobijectionbetweenthemexists.

ThefirstofWhittle'spresuppositionsisthatthemetaphysicallyimpossibleworldinquestionisconceivable.Yet,fortheretobea(bijective)functionfromonesettoanotherisplausiblynothingoverandabovethe first set'sbeing (bijectively)mappable to thesecond.This isadispositionalpropertyofthefirstset.Asthetitularphrase“functionlessdesertlandscapes"suggests,then,theQuineanmetaphysicianenamoredofdesertlandscapesneednotincludefunctions in her ontology at all. Further, bijective mappability dispositions are solely amatter of the sizes of the relevant sets. So it's unclear thatWhittle's impossibleworld isconceivable.

Setting that aside, Whittle's second presupposition is that the method of consideringmetaphysicallyimpossibleworldshelpstodeterminewhethertwopropositionsdescribethesamefeatureofreality(seeRayo(2013)).Whittleclaimsthat it is,whileWilson(201X)hasarguedthatgroundingentailsnon-trivialcounterpossibility.ButIarguethatweneedtotakecare,lestwesubscribetoatoopowerfulmethodinWhittle'stest.

References

Rayo,A.(2013).TheConstructionofLogicalSpace.OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford.

Whittle,B.(2016).SizeandFunction.VancouverSummerPhilosophyConference.

Wilson, A. (201X). Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non-Triviality. Philosophy andPhenomenologicalResearch,pages1–16.


FRANCESCOSPADA–AscriptionandtheRegressofInstantiation

UNIMORE,UniversityofModenaandReggioEmilia|[email protected]

Ontheassumptionthattherearepropertiesandrelationsbesidesobjects,andinstantiationisagenuinerelation,an infiniteregressnaturallyarises:a isF iffa instantiatesF-ness iffaand F-ness instantiate instantiation iff etc. This paper is an attempt to explain why theregress of instantiation arises in the first place and explore some consequences of theexplanation.TheexplanationIproposerestsonthetheoryofascriptionthatIdevelop.Thetheoryofascriptioncomprisesthefollowingtenets:

(ASC1)Theactofascriptionshouldbedistinguishedfromtheeventofascription.TheagentwhoascribesRntox1,…,xnisresponsiblefortheeventwhichistheascriptionofRntox1,…,xninthesamewayasheorshewhodrownsPaulisresponsibleforthedrawingofPaulandheor shewhomoves theball towardS is responsible for themovementoftheballtowardS.

(ASC2)Theeventofascriptionistelic:itcanculminateorsucceed.

(ASC3) The ascription of Rn to x1,…,xn succeeds iff Rn (x1,…,xn). And Rn (x1,…,xn)becauseofthesuccessoftheascriptionofRntox1,…,xn.

(ASC4) TheascriptionofRn to x1,…,xn succeeds iff the ascriptionof instantiation tox1,…,xnandRnsucceeds.

(ASC5)LetusRnbean-placerelationdistinctfrominstantiation.Then,theascriptionofRntox1,…,xnistheproductionofatropeofRnbetween/inx1,…,xn.

(ASC6)eachoftheinfiniteascriptionsof instantiationthathappenifftheascriptionofRntox1,…,xnhappensistheproductionofatropeofRnbetween/inx1,…,xn.

(ASC3)and(ASC4)togetheraccountforthegenesisoftheregressof instantiation.Theideabehindthemisthat, if theascriptionofRntox1,…,xnsucceeds,thenx1,…,xn receiveRn;andx1,…,xnreceiveRn iffx1,…,xn instantiateRn.(ASC5)and(ASC6)accountfor(ASC3)and(ASC4).The following are some of the consequences of the theory of ascription: the regress ofinstantiation is harmless; instantiation is not a non-relation tie but a genuine relation;instantiationdoesnothaveinstances;wecananswerBradley’svexedquestion:whatisthedifference between a relating relation and a relation which does not relate? Rn relatesx1,…,xniffRnsuccessfullyascribestox1,…,xn.

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YLWA SJÖLIN WIRLING – Supporting non-uniformism about modalepistemology


The notion of a “non-uniform” modal epistemology has attracted some attention in theepistemology of modality literature. Non-uniformism has been characterised as the viewthatthereismorethanonesourceofmodaljustificationandistobeunderstoodincontrasttouniformism,whichisthestandardviewthatallmodaljustificationhasoneandthesamebasicsource.Despitetheincreasinginterest innon-uniformism, it isnotclearexactlywhatkindofthesisitisandwhatconsequencestherearetoadoptingit,andthereisnotmuchofan argument in favour of it. In this talk I aim to clarify two things: First,what the line ofconflict between uniformism and non-uniformism is. Second, what a defence of non-uniformismrequires.Inanutshell,Iarguethattheissueisreallyoneofexplanatoryscopeasadesideratumin theory-selectionand thata sturdyargument in favourofnon-uniformismshouldproceedfromtheclaimthatitisindependentlyplausiblethatthephenomenontobeexplainedbyamodalepistemology,i.e.modalknowledge,isfragmentedinanepistemicallyrelevantway.Ialsobrieflysuggesttwoverydifferentwaysinwhichsuchanargumentcouldbemounted:ontheonehandintermsofametaphysicaldifference,ontheotherintermsofadifferencebetweendifferentconceptionsof’justification’.


EVANWOODS–AMany-OneIdentitySolutiontotheProblemoftheMany

OhioStateUniversity|[email protected]

The problem of themany threatens to show that there aremanymore than one personreadingthisusingyoureyes,thatthereisneverasinglecatonanymat,andthat,ingeneral,therearefarmoreordinaryobjectsthanyoumighthavethought.Ipresentandmotivateasolutiontothisproblemwhichusesmany-oneidentity.

Theproblemofthemanyarisesfromtheseemingincompatibilityofthreeclaims:

ABUNDANCE:Therearemanycandidatesforbeingidenticaltoacat,say.

PARITY:Ifanyoneofthecandidatesisidenticaltoacat,thentheyallareidenticaltodistinctcats.

CONSERVATISM:Thereisjustonecatonthemat.

If all threeare trueon theirnatural readings, then therearemany cats, and justone cat.Conservative solutions must give some way to accept CONSERVATISM. Thus, conservativesolutionsmustdenyeitherABUNDANCEorPARITY,orelseofferreadingsofthoseprinciplesonwhichtheyarenotreally inconflictwithoneanotherandsomereadingofconservatism. Iutilize Einar Bøhn’s (2009) account of many-one identity to present a solution to theproblemaccordingtowhichthemanycandidatesaremany-oneidenticaltoasinglecat.ThisallowsmetomaintainCONSERVATISMandABUNDANCEwhilerejectingPARITY.

I argue that this solution has several advantages. First, it straightforwardly and literallycaptures the widely-shared intuition that the many candidates are the same cat. Forinstance,PeterGeach(1980:216)holdsthat“noneof[the]lumpsoffelinetissueisthesamelump…asanother,[but]eachisthesamecatasanyother.”DavidLewis(1999:177ff.)holdsthatthecandidatesaremany,but“almostone”cat.AndThomasSattig(2010)holdsthatthemanyarerepresentedasone.

Second, some, e.g. Lewis (1993) and C.S. Sutton (2014), have argued that solving theproblemofthemanyrequirescountingbysomerelationotherthanidentity.However,thepresentproposalmaintainsthatwecountbyidentity,therelationweallknowandlove.

Third, thepresentproposal ismore ideologically parsimonious than someother accounts.For instance, E.J. Lowe (1982, 1995), Mark Johnston (1993), Ólafur Jonsson (2001), andNicholas K. Jones (2013, 2015) solve the problem by appeal to a relation of constitution,thoughttobearelationotherthanidentity.Thepresentproposalemploysonly identity,arelationwe’reallalreadycommittedto.

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PHENOMENOLOGY&EXISTENTIALISM


ANNAPETRONELLAFOULTIER–BodilyIntentionalityandAestheticSpatialityinDance


In a recent book, Embodied Philosophy in Dance: Gaga and Ohad Naharin’s MovementResearch, 2016) Einav Katan discusses the dancing body as a means of expression. Sherelatesitsexpressivenesstotheattunementthatdancershaveacquiredtowardstheirownphysical,perceptualaswellasemotionalcapacities,throughthepracticeofGaga(“Gaga”isIsraelichoreographerNaharin’smovementlanguageandworkout,fordancersaswellasforordinary people). In Katan’s analysis, the dancer’s intentionality is directed to “theprocedureofdoingratherthantoitsexternalpurpose”(p.79)–shedoesn’tstretchoutforaglassasmuchasshetriesto“comprehendthephysicaldynamicsofgraspingaglass”(p.80).Theintentionalityinquestionhereisbodilyormotorintentionality,anotionintroducedbyMerleau-PontyinPhenomenologyofPerception(1945),andcloselyrelatedtothatofthebodily schema. It is the bodily schema that accounts for the dynamic unity of the livingbody,where our previous experiences and actual skills have their roots. This also impliesthatthespatialityofthebodyis“situational”ratherthanpositional(PP116):itisopentoanindefinite range of positions defined by the tasks that we might potentially engage in.Merleau-Ponty develops his understanding of this primordial spatiality – neitherobjectivism’s space of physical things, nor a Kantian pure form of sensibility – in thediscussion of “anthropological” or cultural spaces (PP 333 f), based on pathological casestudies as well as perceptual experiments by e.g. Max Wertheimer and Albert Michotte(Merleau-Ponty,LeMondesensibleet leMondede l’expression,2011). In thispaper, Iwillexplorefurthertherolethatbodily intentionalityplays inaestheticexpression, intermsoftheparticular–aesthetic–spatialitythatisopenedupbydance,anchoredinconcretespacebutyetcreatinganother,imaginaryrealm.

References

FriedesGalili,Deborah.“Gaga:MovingbeyondTechniquewithOhadNaharinintheTwenty-FirstCentury”,DanceChronicle,38:3(360–392),2105

Katan,Einav.EmbodiedPhilosophyinDance:GagaandOhadNaharin’sMovementResearch,PalgraveMacMillan,London,2016.

Merleau-Ponty,Maurice.Phénoménologiedelaperception,Gallimard,Paris,1945.

–––– Le Monde sensible et le Monde de l’expression. Cours au Collège de France, notes,1953,MetisPresses,Geneva,2011.

Vassileva,Biliana.“Réflexionssur lapratiquede ladanse ‘gaga’en Israël”,CIRRAS,29May2016,http://cirras-net.org/?p=1199

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REBECCA HARRISON – The Phenomenological Point of View: A Merleau-PontyanPerspective

UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside|[email protected]

There has been debate among contemporary phenomenologists and phenomenologicallyinclinedphilosophersofmind in recentyearsabout theperspectivalnatureofperception,andhowtoaccountforthethree-dimensionalityofwhatwesee.Totakeapopularexample,consideraspinningcoin:onemightwonderhowtoexplainwhatandhowweperceivewhenweperceivethecoinatanangle(seee.g.Kelly2005;Noë2012).Onemightdebateaboute.g.whetherweeveractuallyseethecoinaselliptical,orhowtoaccountforthewaythatallthedifferentpossibleanglesofthecoinformpartofonewholeexperienceofthesamecoin,but what is typically not up for debate is the basic idea that perception is necessarilyperspectivalinsomeway.Thisistypicallytakentomeanthatperceptionnecessarilyinvolvessomecontext:perceptionisalwaysfromthe“pointofview”ofaperceiver.Butwhatthesediscussions seem to assume is that this context is primarily a matter of relative spatialorientation. Evenwhen discussing the difference between e.g. distance as a standardizedspatial measurement (e.g. 200 ft) and distance as we perceive it on a Merleau-Pontyanphenomenological account (e.g., something Iwouldneed towalk towards inorder to seebetter — Kelly, 2005), the presumption is that a “point of view” is characterized by itsspatiality.

I argue thatMerleau-Ponty’s senseof a “point of view” is amuch richernotion, one thatincludesnotjustthesubject’sorientationinspacebutalsoherorientationinhistoricaltime,in culture, in personal history and values. In the Phenomenology of Perception,Merleau-Ponty describes the relationship between the world and the experiencing subject as an“intentionalarc,”writingthat“perceptual life…isunderpinnedbyan“intentionalarc”thatprojects around us our past, our future, our human milieu, our physical situation, ourideological situation,andourmoral situation,or rather, thatensures thatweare situatedwithinalloftheserelationships.”(PoP)Inthispaper,IwillexplorewhataMerleau-Pontyan“pointofview”lookslike,andwhatconsequencesthisrichernotionofa“pointofview”hasforhistheoryofperception.Iwillarguethat,forMerleau-Ponty,theperspectivalnatureofperceptionmeansthateachindividualhasprivilegedaccesstouniqueaspectsoftheworldin virtue of their particular socio-cultural and personal situation. I will conclude with adiscussionof someepistemic, social, andmoral consequences suggestedby thismodel ofperspectivalperception.


RAUNO HUTTUNEN & LEENA KAKKORI – Heidegger as Das Man WhenDefendingHisPrinciplesofAcademicEducationagainstNaziAccusation

University of Turku & University of Eastern Finland | [email protected],[email protected]

It iswellknownfactthatthegreatGermanphilosopherMartinHeideggermadeonegreatmistake.ThatmistakewasjoiningtotheNSADPinMay31933.Heneverpubliclyapologizedorexplainedhisaction.AfterthewarHeideggerwasaccusedofindoctrinatingstudentswithNazi propaganda. Freiburg University formed its own Committee on De-Nazification andHeideggerwasobligatedtogiveverbalreportrelatedtoNazi-indoctrinationaccusation.ThisreporthasbeenpublishedonlyinEnglishin2002as“HeideggerontheArtofTeaching”.Thisunique historical document reveals valuable information about Heidegger’s educationalprinciples.Thereisnoothercontextortext,whereHeideggerpresentsowidelyhisideasoneducationingeneralandespeciallyonhighereducation.EvenHeidegger’sinauguralspeechin1933isnotsoinformativeonhisphilosophyofeducation.

Whether or not Heidegger was a Nazi-indoctrinator as a university teacher, is not ourresearchquestion.Ourquestion:HowdidHeideggerdefendedhimselfandhiseducationalprinciplesasDasMan.OurpointofviewistostudyHeideggerasDasMan.Howthegreatphilosopher who created the notion of Das Man would himself speak like Das Man?Nevertheless, as acting and speaking like Das Man in this context, Heidegger createsinterestingnotionsonmodernuniversity.ThesenotionsareevermoreactualintodaywhenthefoundationofBildunguniversityiscollapsing.

Our analyzing method is phenomenography combined with philosophical (Gadamer) andcritical (Habermas) hermeneutics. In order todophenomenographic studyonHeidegger’stext,onemusthavegoodknowledgebothonHeideggerandphenomenography.Thatiswhyonepresenter(LeenaKakkori)isHeideggerscholarandotherpresenter(RaunoHuttunen)isphenomenographyscholar.Outcomeofouranalysis is findingof103meaningunitswhichare divided into four non-hierarchic main categories of descriptions: 1) Heidegger’sconceptions on education in general (41 meaning units), 2) Heidegger’s conceptionsuniversity(34meaningunits),3)Heidegger’sownteachingprinciples(18meaningunits)and4)Heidegger’sdefensiveclaimsagainsttheindoctrinationaccusation(10meaningunits).Inthis presentation we talk about Heidegger’s conceptions university and his own teachingprinciples(categories2and3).Category2)wehavedividedintofoursub-categoriescalled2.1) University and Theory; 2.2) Grammar, Poetry and Rhetoric; 2.3) Teacher-studentrelationshipand2.4)Historyofuniversity.

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BURCU OZDEMIR – Suicide and Modernity: Philosophical Suicide as aPotential Form of Resistance to the Mode of Existence Dictated byModernity

UniversityofAlberta|[email protected]

Theprimaryaimofthispaperistoarguethataparticularformofsuicidecanbeseenasaradicalrejectionofthemodeofexistencedictatedbymodernity.Herein,modernitywhichisusuallyspokenofasatemporalepochisregardedasanethos—“asamodeofrelatingtothecontemporaryreality”1inFoucauldiansense.Anexplorationofthisethoswhichimposeslifeasthemostessentialandunconditionalaffirmationanddeathastheabsoluteoppositeoflifeallowsmetoanalyzetheextremepathologizationofsuicideinmodernsociety.

Inorder tograspwhymodernityglorifies life inopposition todeath, I critically reconsiderthepeculiarityofmodernformofpowerfromaFoucauldianperspective.AsFoucaultstatesin modern society “it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power establishes itsdominion;”2.Therefore, inmodernsociety inwhichpoweradministers life,deathbecomes“power’slimit”3.Onthislimit,suicidegainsitspeculiarity,thatistosay,inasocietyinwhichtechnologiesofpowercenterslife,self-killingremainsexceptionallyanungovernableissue.Iarguethattheextremepathologizationofsuicide inmodernsociety isboththecauseandtheresultofitsexceptionalungovernability.

More importantly, I reflect upon the potential of suicide to resist the first and themostessentialorderofmodernitywhichsayslive.Toemphasizethecriticalityofthispotentialofresistance immanent to suicide, I posit a hypothetical category of philosophical suicidewhich refers to an existentialist denial that sees nothingness in being and being innothingness. Inthispaper,philosophicalsuicide isconsideredasapotencywhichcouldbekilled only by itself. Thus, this particular form of suicide is suggested, in this study, as aradicalpotentialtoresistthemodeofexistencedictatedbymodernity.

1 Foucault, Michel. “What is Enlightenment?” In The Foucault Reader, edited by PaulRainbow.NewYork:PantheonBooks,1984,p.39.2Foucault,Michel.The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction,translatedbyRobertHurley.NewYork:PantheonBooks,1978,p.138. 3Ibid.


CHARLOTTAWEIGELT–Phenomenologyandtheproblemofcausality

SödertörnUniversity|[email protected]

Den klassiska fenomenologin, så som den utarbetas hos Husserl och hans närmasteefterföljare, utgår i hög grad från övertygelsen att den normativa sfären är irreducibel:frågor rörande rättfärdigande,mening och överhuvudtaget subjektivitet kan inte besvaraspåetttillfredsställandesättmedhjälpavkausalaförklaringar.Desenareharsinrättmätigaplatsinomdesåkalladepositivavetenskaperna,vilkapådethelatagetföljervårnaturliga,”naiva”inställningtillvärlden.IsittsenaförfattarskapgårHeideggertillochmedsålångtatthanhävdarattsjälvaföreställningenomkausalitetsomenrelationmellanorsakochverkanär intimtförbundenmedmodernitetens”tekniska”projektionavvärlden,enligtvilkendensenare väsentligen är något som låter sig beräknas och kontrolleras. Vad vi till vardagsspontant uppfattar som en objektiv egenskap hos den naturliga världen – dess kausalaordning–ärsåledesisjälvaverketrotatiettspeciellt,historisktbetingatförhållningssätthosdetmänskligasubjektet.

Samtidigt har emellertid fenomenologin själv, återigen med början redan hos Husserl,utvecklats i en genetisk riktning, vilket har motiverats av övertygelsen att den så kalladestatiskafenomenologin(somutgårfrånden”färdiga”,konstitueradevärlden)väckerfrågorrörande tid, historia, konstitution,osv., somden själv äroförmögenattbesvara.Menvadexaktärengenetiskanalysomdenintefåråberopasigpåkausalarelationer?Omdenlyckasundvika att så att säga falla tillbaka in i en ”mundan”, det vill säga empirisk och kausalförklaring av subjektivitet ochmening, så verkar det som att den i stället löper risken attförvandlastillettstyckespekulativmetafysik,ochmerprecistövertaHegelsföreställningomenrentimmanentochteleologisktstrukturerad”andlig”historia.Idettaföredragställerjagfråganomintefenomenologinstöteremotsinaegnagränsernärdengersigsjälvuppgiftenatt spåra den genetiska konstitutionen av världen och jaget. Jag kommer att särskiltuppmärksammaHeideggersförsökattundkommadeproblemsomnämntsovangenomettåtervändande till den antika, och i synnerhet den aristoteliska förståelsen av kausalitet, isyfte att försöka förstå vad det skulle kunna innebära att tänka kausalitet på ett icke-antropomorft sätt, det vill säga utan att i tysthet utgå från en idé om det mänskligasubjektetsförmågaattgripainiochbearbetasinomvärld.

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PHILOSOPHYOFLAW


ÅSAÅGREN–Rationalitetsbegreppetochmiljöbalkensrimlighetsavvägning

KarlstadUniversity|[email protected]

Beslutsfattandeochrationalitet

Irättsvetenskapligteoriärutgångspunktenattdomstolarnaanvändersigavdensåkalladejuridiskametodenisinaprövningarförattfattalegitimabeslut.Juridiskmetodbyggerpåattdetfinnsrättskällorsomkangedomarnadenvägledningsombehövsförattdeskakunnatasinabeslut,exempelvisförarbetensomgervägledningihurlagstiftningenskatolkas.Ävenidefalldårättskällornaärbristfälligaochintegervägledningskadomarnaisinaprövningarkommaframtillbeslut.Fråganärvaddomarnautgårifrånidessafall.

Enutgångspunktärattdomarnaharenföreställningomattdeanvändersigavsittförnuftnärvägledningintekangesfrånrättskällor.Deharenföreställningomattderasprövningarutgår frånnågon formavmönster, inteärhelt godtyckligaeller slumpmässiga. Fråganomrationalitet blir därmed av intresse. Flera rättsteoretiker ser även ett samband mellanrationalitetochdetjuridiskabeslutsfattandet.AulisAarnioskriverisittförordtillRättenochförnuftet, ”Ett förnuftigt-rationellt-handlande är ett viktigt mått på allt vad vi anser somrättenisamhället.”AleksanderPeczenikgörenliknandekopplingmellanförnuft,rationalitetochbeslutsfattandesomAarnio.

Miljöbalkensrimlighetsavvägning

Härärmiljöbalkensrimlighetsavvägning(2kap.7§miljöbalken)specifiktavintresse.Dettaärenavvägningsbestämmelsesomförenklatgermark-ochmiljödomstolarnautrymmeattväga miljöintressen mot ekonomiska intressen. Även om det finns andraavvägningsbestämmelser i det svenska rättssystemet är bestämmelsen unik i flerahänseenden, exempelvisomfattardessprövningolikanormssystem,detmiljömässiga,detekonomiskaochdeträttsliga.

Rationalitetochrimlighetsavvägningarna

Rimlighetsavvägningenäravsärskiltintressevidengranskningavrationalitetsbegreppetiderättsliga prövningarna. De avvägningar som domstolarna gör kan inte förstås utifrån dentraditionella juridiska metoden. Här kan sägas att bestämmelsens utformning är vag ochlitenvägledningkanfåsfrånrättskällorna.

Fokusliggerhärpådomarnasföreställningaromrationalitetochmåletärattfåmerkunskapombeslutsfattandetviddeaktuellaavvägningarna.Beslutsfattandet tarsinutgångspunkt itre olika rationalitetsföreställningar, ekonomisk, ekologisk och rättslig, eftersom de olikanormsystemen som de aktuella avvägningarna omfattar inkluderar olika föreställningar.Syftetärattfåmerkunskapomärhurinteraktionenserutmellandeekonomiskaintressenaochmiljöintressenaimark-ochmiljödomstolarnasrimlighetsavvägningar.

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TOMMASOBRAIDA– Isadministrativedetentionofstatelesspeoplebasedonaprincipleofresponsibilityforidentity?


Under Article 5§1(f) of the ECHR, migrants may be deprived of liberty only to preventunauthorisedentryintothenationalterritoryorforthepurposeofexpulsion.TheECtHRiscalled upon to determine whether the conditions of the applicants’ detention can beregarded as “inhuman or degrading treatment” within the terms of Article 3 of theConvention, taking into consideration, among other criteria, the specific vulnerabilityinherenttothecategoryofasylum-seekers,whichisduetotheabsoluteuncertaintyoftheircondition.Forthesamereason,specificvulnerabilityshouldbeinherenttotheconditionofstatelessaswell.

AccordingtotheECtHRwell-establishedcase-law,administrativesanctionscanbequalifiedas‘criminal’providedtheso-named‘Engelcriteria’aremet,amongwhich:ifadministrativesanctions show a deterrent and punitive scope, they are assessed as being ‘criminal’ innature,andtheguaranteesprovidedbytheECHRtocriminalpenaltiesbecomeapplicable.

Inlightofthis,thispaperaskswhatisthenatureoftheadministrativedetentionofirregularmigrants in light of common European stagnating expulsion policies? The purpose of thesystemof administrative detention doesn´t seem to aim at curbing irregular immigration,consistinginsteadofasymbolic“confinement”ofatemporaryphenomenonwithaviewtocontain it.The inconsistencybetweentheexplicitand implicitaimsofmigrationdetentionproducedahotbedforinefficiencyandviolationsofhumanrights.

Statelesspersonsareoftensubjectstoadministrativedetentionforoneormoreyears,theyare subject to violationsof their right to anationality, and to several otherhuman rights.Given their specific vulnerability, shouldn’t administrativedetention for unlimited timebequalified as afflictive, therefore criminal in nature? If it is so, “a person who is notconsideredasanationalbyanyStateunder theoperationof its law”,when incarcerated,would be subject to a criminal measure on the grounds of her identity. This is clearlyinconsistentwith theprincipleofmateriality (responsibility foractoromission) impliedbytheprincipleoflegality(Art.7§1CEDU,Art.49§1EUCharter).

Theupshotofthissituationisthatifstatelesspersonsaresubjecttosystemicviolationsofhumanrightson thebasisof their lackofnationality theyshouldbegranted internationalprotectionaccordingto1951GenevaConvention.Hence,thispapersuggeststhattherightto internationalprotectioncouldbecomplementarytothe internationalprohibitionofthecreationofstateless.


DALE BROWN – Is Granting Executive Clemency to ThoseWho Kill DuringNon-ConfrontationalActsofSelf-DefenseEnough?

WesternMichiganUniversity|[email protected]

Foradefendantwhoismorally,butnotlegallyjustifiedinkillinghisorherwould-beattackerin a non-confrontational setting, appealing to executive clemency is a partial solution atbest. Some mitigating factors include the type of clemency employed (e.g., pardon,commutation, reprieve,etc.), thegeographic location inwhich theactwasadjudicated,aswellas thecurrentsocialandpoliticalatmosphere.Partoneof thispaperprovidesabriefoverviewoftheself-defensedoctrineandthearchetypicalcaseswhichmotivateourpresentinquiry into the issueofclemencyefficacy.Part twoexaminesand refutesapro-clemencyargumentput forthbyMartinVeinsreideris.Part threeprovides further reasonsas towhyclemencyfailstoprovidequalifieddefendantssufficientpost-convictionrelief,especially inlightofthepotentialformajorfluctuationsinsocialandpoliticalnorms.

Despitethestatutoryvariationswithinthedoctrineofself-defense,wecanassumethatthemain prongs of the doctrine include (a) reasonableness, (b) necessity, and (c) imminence.Particularlywithrespecttotheimminenceprong,acertainsetofcasesmotivateourpresentinquiry:those inwhichmostpeoplewould intuitthatthedefendant inquestion ismorallyjustified in killing his or her would-be attacker during an act of non-confrontational self-defense,yetwherethe lawdemandsaconviction. Inotherwords, it isperfectlyclearthatthereisalackofimminenceinthesecases,yetmostagreethatthedefendantoughttohaveactedastheydidinneutralizingthewould-beaggressor.Thiscausesadilemmaforourlegalsystem,which IhavetermedtheNormanMoralDilemma.1Interestingly, thereareat leastthree main types of cases to which this dilemma applies: battered women, batteredchildren,andprisonerssubjecttoviolence.

Myriadsolutionshavebeenpositedbyacademicsandlegalpractitionersalikeastohowtobest deal with these sets of cases involving the Norman Moral Dilemma. This paperevaluatesonesuchproposedsolution. Inthearticle,“TheProspectiveEffectsofModifyingExisting Law to Accommodate Preemptive Self-Defense by Battered Women," MartinVeinsreiderisclaimsthatinsteadofchangingsubstantivelaw,weshouldappealtoexecutiveclemency as an effective means of post-conviction relief. This paper seeks to refute thisargument by rejecting the premise that an appeal to executive clemency is an e_ectivemeansofpost-convictionreliefforNormanMoralDilemmacases.

1Althoughthismonicker isaclearreferencetoStatev.Norman, it ismeanttoencompasssimilarsuchcases,asnotedbelow.

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WILLIAM BÜLOW – Deserved Delayed Release? On the CommunicativetheoryofPunishmentandIndeterminatePrisonSentences


Indeterminate sentencing is a sentencing practice where the offender is sentencedto arangeofpotentialimprisonmentswiththeactualreleasedatedeterminedlater,typicallybya parole board. Although indeterminate sentencing of this sort is taken to be morallyproblematic froma retributivist pointof view,MichaelO’Hear (2011)hasprovidedanewmodel for indeterminate sentencing that is grounded inthe communicative version ofretributivismdevelopedanddefendedbyAntonyDuff(e.g.,Duff2001).DrawingfromDuff’sconcept of imprisonment as a back-up sanction,O’Hear argues that indeterminatesentences can be conceptualized asdelayed releaseand arejustifiable as retributiveresponsestowillfulandpersistentviolationsofprisonrules. Inhisproposedview,aparoleboard may delay an inmate’s release if and only if they've found that the inmate hasengagedinpersistentandwillfulviolationsofprisonrules(O’Hear2011,1266ff).Itshouldbenoted that delayed release does not mean that incarceration can be indefinite. Rather,delayed release is only permitted within the parameters set by the indeterminatesentence.These parameters should equally be based on considerations ofretributiveproportionality. Granted that retributive judgements cannot be precise, O’Hear’s accountaccepts thatdeservedcensurecanbeexpressedasa range, suchas six-to-nineyears,andthat delayed release within this range is permitted as a form of retributive response topersistentandwillfulviolationsofprisonrules(2011,1264-1269).

In this presentation I argue that the communicative theory is not easily combinedwithindeterminate sentencing along the lines thatO’Hear envisions. I raise two challenges toO’Hear’sargument.First,ifdelayedreleaseisjustifiedasaretributiveresponsetopersistentandwillfulviolationsofprisonrulesitisnotobviouswhytheinmatemustbereleasedwhenthemaximum term set bythe indeterminate sentence has been served. Instead it seemsthat this argument, rather than favoring indeterminate sentencing of the sort O’Hearsuggests, opens up for the possibility of indefinite prison sentences, which is deemedproblematicfromaretributivistpointofview.Second,O’Hearfailstoaddresswhyviolationsofprisonrules,evenifwillfulandpersistent,areseriousenoughtowarrant imprisonment,eventhoughtheoriginalcrimewasso.InparticularIarguethattherearereasonsinherentto the communicative theory which suggests that many of the examples of prison ruleviolationsgivenbyO’Hearshouldnotmeritimprisonment.


KARLDAHLSTRAND–Endomstolspedagogiskansats


Wittgensteins(1953)privatspråksargumentutmanarförståelsenvaddetinnebärattkorrektföljaregler.Paradoxenärattdetinteverkarfinnasnågonmöjlighetattlogiskthävdaattenförklaring av en regel kan binda framtida tillämpningar. Argumentet utmanarregelförståelsen. Enligt Wittgenstein är regelföljande en praxis och inget som utgår fråntolkningar.Kripke (1982)menarattpraxis intekanvaradenenskildes regelförståelseutanpraxisärensocialpraktik–dåkanregeltillämpningenbedömasvaraienlighetmedvaddetinnebär att följa regeln. Fråganomden språkliga tillämpningenharmeningochbetydelseavgörs av språkanvändningen som social praxis. Wittgenstein visar således atträttfärdigandetavolikapåståendenärrelativochsituationsbunden(Svensson,1992).Efterdenspråkligavändningen(Rorty,1967)beskrivsrätteniblandsomspråkspeldärreglernarörspråkanvändningen och dess funktion för mening inom en praktik (MacCormick, 1981;Cotterrell,1989;Harris,1997;Galligan,2007).EnligtWittgenstein följerspråketsbetydelseav användningen i ett sammanhang,Wittgenstein använderordet "livsform" (jmfHusserlslivsvärld).DåWittgensteinserspråketsomenformavregelföljandeharbeskrivningenfåtträttsteoretisk betydelse (Aarnio, 1978; Aarnio 1987; Hart 1997; Coleman 2001). Det finnsregelskeptiska uppfattningar som menar att en regel inte kan ange den korrektatillämpningen (Hart,1997).Rättsligautsagor i endomstolharvidareperformativkaraktär;de är inte deskriptiva enligt den traditionella referentiella meningsteorin (Hart, 1949).Traditionelltsettärjuridikenregelstyrdverksamhetdärdistinktionenmellansakfrågorochrättsfrågormöjliggörsgenomensynpåspråketsomavbildande.Mennärnågontexdömsför ett brott beskrivs inget faktum bortom rättsprocessen och ingen slutsats följer på defakta som bevisats utan processen är ett handlande under vissa omständigheter. Omrättsprocessen är ett språkspel, med otydliga gränser mellan vardagsbetydelser och denjuridiska professionens språkliga praktik (som kan liknas vid en familjelikhet mellandomstolsspråketochparternasspråkbruk)uppkommerfråganvilkenmeningochbetydelseprocessenhar,hurdettaavgörsochavvem.Reglerförståsfråninsidan(Hart,1997)ochavspelarna som förstår spelets idé (Hydén, 1985). Det finns därför ett kunskapsintresse attrelatera parternas uppfattningar om processen, utifrån ett betydelse- ochmeningsperspektiv, för att relatera resultatet till frågor om rättens sociala funktioner attklandra,verkakonfliktlösande,prevention,upprättelseetc.UtifrånWittgensteinkanfråganställas om parterna i rättsprocessen delar de grammatiska språkreglerna rörande korrektspråkbruk som domstolsspråket följer. Dessa frågor aktualiseras särskilt när de allmännadomstolarnamöterpartersomleverienlivsformsomtydligtskiljersigfrånrättens.

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ELISABETHENEROTH–TheRelationofPowerbetweentheLevelsoftheLaw

LundUniversity&GoetheUniversityFrankfurt|[email protected]

ThegeneralstartingpointforthispresentationismymonographCriticalsubstantivevaliditytestingoflegalnorms.Theexampleofhomesforcareorresidence(2016).Ihaveelaborateda legal analytical tool for critical substantive validity testing of legal norms. The tool is aconversion of Kaarlo Tuori’s critical legal positivism and his conception of legal validity(Critical Legal Positivism, 2002) and Jürgen Habermas’s method rational reconstruction(“WhatisUniversalPragmatics?”inCommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,1979)intopractical use in legal philosophy. The tool won support in application on the example ofhomesforcareorresidence(orinstitutions).

The specific starting points for this presentation are two research results in my earlierresearch,partlythe identificationoftherelationofpower(myterminology)asaprevailingrelationbetweenthelevelsofthelawasmediatedinthelegalpractice(s)andbythelegalactor(s)throughlegalconcepts,legalprinciplesandpatternsoflegalargumentationintheiractor-specific text(s), partly the identification of a certain relationship between theidentifiedrelationofpowerandtheprevailingrelationofcriticismbetweenthelevelsofthelawasmediatedinthelegalpractice(s)andbythelegalactor(s)intheiractor-specifictext(s)throughthelanguageofthelawinthelevelsofthelaw.

The purpose of this presentation is elaboration of the relation of power as a relationbetween the levelsof the law,whichshallcomplement the legalanalytical tool for criticalsubstantivevaliditytestingoflegalnormsasregardstherelationsbetweenthelevelsofthelaw. It shall be used in reconstruction of the legal actor’s practical knowledge of legalconcepts, legal principles and patterns of legal argumentation in the sub-surface levels ofthe law. Focus is on power inherent in the levels of the law. The relation of power shallconstitute thebasis forelaborationof therelationshipbetweentherelationofpowerandtherelationofcriticismbetweenthelevelsofthelaw.Focusisonpowereffect(s)createdbythelevelsofthelaw.

Theelaborationoftherelationofpowerandtherelationshipbetweentherelationofpowerand the relation of criticism provides an alternative critical approach for analyzing therelationship between law, power and criticism in legal science. It is an example of theperformanceofacritical-practical-legaltheory.


ÅKEFRÄNDBERG–Onthefoundationsofjuridicalthinking


Myfirsttenetisthatisvitaltokeeplaw(inSwedishrätt)andjuridicalthinking(inSwedishjuridik) apart. Law is the content of legal rules and the systems of legal rules. Juridicalthinking is the handling of law by lawyers, and juridical thinking is the topic of thispresentation.

Awood-carverfashionsthingsoutofwood.Piecesofwoodformtheobjectofhiswork,thematter he works with. In order to perform this work he needs tools: a saw, a chisel,sandpaper,etc.Healsohasinhismindcertainideasaboutwhatmakesgoodwood-carving.For both the material tools and the standards of good wood-carving he has a certainterminology–the(technicalandevaluative)languageofhiscraft.

Byanalogy, the lawyerhashisobject, thematterheworkswith– the law.Thedifferencebetween thewood-carver and the lawyer is that the latter´smatter is ideas expressed inlanguage.Likethewood-carver the lawyer, inadditiontothat,hasa languageofhiscraft,technical as well as evaluative. Logically, the language of the law and the language ofjuridical thinking are two different languages. Butwhile the tools of thewood-carver arematerial things, the tools of lawyers are ideas as well. For that reason the distinctionbetween the law-languageand the juridical language isoftenblurred.Toa certaindegreetheymayoverlaponeanotherextensionally,buttheverydistinctionbetweenthemisclear.

My second tenet is that juridical thinking has two foundations, one of an intellectual(juridical-technical)nature,theotheroneofanevaluativenature.

InaccordancewiththefirsttenetImakeadistinctionbetweenconceptswithalaw-statingfunction(law-concepts,conceptsoflaw;L-conceptsforshort)andconceptswithajuridical-operativefunction(conceptsaboutlaw,juridical,orjurisprudential,concepts;J-conceptsforshort).

In accordancewith the second tenet I distinguishwithin the category J-conceptsbetweentwo main groups: technical-juridical concepts and ideological-juridical (or evaluative-juridical) concepts. The former are concernedwith the purely intellectual handling of thelaw,anddonotcompriseanyothervaluethanthatofintellectualstringency.Thelatter,ontheotherhand,containastheirmostimportantingredientavaluatingattitudetowardsthejuridical handling of the law. This distinction mirrors the basic and important fact thatjuridicalthinkingisaninextricableamalgamationoftechnicaldevicesandevaluativeideas.

Within the category technical-juridical concepts at least the following four types areessential:

1. Concepts that help us to structure the law in a logical and functional way. I call themmorphological J-concepts. Examples: “Legal system”, “legal rule”, “(pre)requisite-legalconsequence”, “right”, “duty”, “competence (or power-conferring) rule”, “primary” and“secondaryrule”andthenormativemodalities“shall”,“ought”,“may”,and“mustnot”.

2.Conceptsthathelpustoindicatethephenomenatowhichthelawisapplicable,andalsotoseparatefromeachothertheareasofapplicationfordifferentlegalsystems–conceptsthatindicatethe“topology”ofthelaw.IcallthemtopologicalJ-concepts.Examples:“Legalcase”, “operative fact”, “sphere of operation (of a legal rule)”, and “collision” and“competence(betweenlegalrules)”.

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3.Concepts thathelpus to speakclearlyandarticulatelyabout the relationsbetween lawandaction–be it lawfulorunlawfulactions. I call suchconceptspraxeological J-concepts.Examples: “follow” (“observe”, “comply with”) a legal rule”, “application of law”,“qualification”,and“evaluationofevidence”.

4.Concepts thathelpus todescribe inaprecisemanner themethodsof theprofessional-juridicalhandlingofthelaw(inthefirstplaceapplicationoflawandlegislation).Icallsuchconceptsmethodological J-concepts.Examples: “source of law” and the principles guidinglegal reasoningsuchas“literal”, “linguistic”, “subjective”, “intentional”, “teleological”,and“consequentialistinterpretation”.

Lawyersdonotonlyneed conceptsby thehelpofwhich they canhandle law technically.They also examine law from an evaluative view-point – and, indeed, should do so. It is amatterofcomparingactuallawandlaw-handlingtocertainstandardsofgoodlawandlaw-handling. For that purpose certain instruments are needed. Such instruments consist offruitful andprecise concepts, ideological-juridical concepts.Among themwe findconceptslike“Rechtsstaat”(“law-state”),“theRuleofLaw”,“legalcertainty”,“legalequality(before,in, and through the law)”, “legal security”, and “legal accessibility” – all of which arefundamental to our juridical culture. (These concepts are investigated in my book FromRechtsstaattoUniversalLaw-State,Springer,LawandPhilosophyLibrary109,2014.)


HÅKAN GUSTAFSSON – Faktaresistent rättsteori eller kontrafaktiskrättsfilosofi?


Ett, å ena sidan, vanligt sätt att karakterisera juridiken och det rättsliga vetandet, är attframhävadessförmågatilldiskursivhegemoni,varigenomdensk’verkligheten’(detsociala,värderingar, faktabeskrivningar osv) filtreras och återskapas med rättsliga begrepp ochjuridiskmetodik.Dennakognitivadissonansbrukaråtergesmedbegreppen’förrättsligande,’’rättsliggörande,’’juridifiering’menockså,utifrånsystemteoretiskasynsätt,genombegreppsom rättens enhet eller kognitiva/normativa slutenhet. I det förra fallet innebär det atträtten avgränsar bort sådant som kan anses vara av relevans och medför att tolkningenenbartbliravstriktjuridiskkaraktär,vilketinnebärennegativinverkanpådenursprungligakonfliktens lösning. I det senare fallet upprätthåller rättssystemet stabilitet och enhet viainterna selektiva mekanismer, dvs genom binära koder såsom relevans/irrelevans,rättsligt/icke-rättsligtetc,förattbemötaochförsökaförståomgivningen(’verkligheten’).

Manskullemedmodernahögaktuellamedialatermer,medvissöverdrift,kunnahävdaatträtten–somdiskurs,vetandeochsystem–ivissutsträckningärfaktaresistent.Ochdetpåtvåsätt,delsatträttenharsvårtattförståellerinkorporeravissafakta,mendelsatträttenjust därigenom producerar en viss rättsliggjord verklighet (eller, den upprättar, en viss’sanningsregim’).

Menett, å andra sidan, kritiskt och legalstrategiskt förhållningssätt har inom rättsfilosofinockså tagit som uppgift att utmana den vedertagna rättsliggjorda verklighetsbilden. Dettainnebär ett epistemologiskt ifrågasättande av den gängse juridikens olika kategorimisstag(den liberala myten om individens autonomi, till exempel), men också en epistemologiskinspiration i att införa realitetsmoment i rättsfilosofin, med andra ord att medvetetdejuridifiera vetandet och påvisa hur en verklighetssyn kan och kunde vara annorlunda.Denna kritiska rättsfilosofi – med utgångspunkter i t.ex. strukturella, intersektionella ochsocialkonstruktivistiska perspektiv – frammanar därmed de kontrafaktiska möjligheterna itolkandet.Detsökerdenkognitivaassociativaförmåganiatttasamhälleligafaktapåallvarochexponerademinomramenfördeträttsligavetandet.

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CYRIL HOLM – Betydelsen avÖstenUndéns analys av rättighetsbegreppetförSAP'sfaktiskapolitik


Den skandinaviske rättsrealisten och politikern, Östen Undén, både justitieminister ochutrikesminister i olika perioder, analyserade begreppet rättighet (1917, 1928) - inspireradochCassirerochVahinger-påettsättsomavvekfrånHägerström.Undénsanalysfickstorbetydelse för hur SAP intellektuellt kom att förstå hur en progressiv omvandling avsamhälletutanrevolutionvarmöjlig,samtävenförhurrättenkomattanvändassomettavflerainstrumentförattpraktisktrealiseravälfärdsstaten.UndénsanalysärmerbekantidenformdenfickavAlfRosssomialltväsentligtfullföljdeUndénstankegångar.JagkommeratttalaomdedelaravUndéns(ochRoss)analyssomfickbetydelseförSAPochvälfärdsstaten,och mer precist på vilket sätt dessa delar av analysen kunde vara av praktiskt politisktintresse.


JANKELLGREN–Den avgörande tidpunkten i juridiken: en förbisedd,mencentral,fråga

LinköpingUniversity|[email protected]

Encentral fråga föralla regler somrelaterar till förhållanden ienyttreverklighet, t.ex.attnågotskahahäntellervarapåettvisstsätt,ärnärdetskahavaritpådettavis.Jämfört.ex.uppsåtsbrott, som förutsätter ett uppsåt i ett tidsmässigt samband med en straffbelagdhandling.

Inombeskattningenärlegalitet,förutsebarhetochlågriskiekonominviktigamålsättningar.Dettalarförattförhållandenaisambandmedentransaktion(elleregentligenstraxinnan)ärviktiga–föromdetärförhållandenefteråtsomavgörbeskattningensåkanjudensomgörinvesteringeninteförutsebeskattningenochmåstedåkrävahögreförväntadavkastning,förattgörainvesteringen.

Emellertid finns stora osäkerheter runt det nämnda och i flera fall tar juridiken fasta påförhållanden långtefteren eventuell transaktion, t.ex. när utgifter och inkomster skaperiodiseras till kostnader och intäkter. Det förekommer också s.k.eftersyn(dvs. atttransaktioner m.m. bedöms i efterhand, när man ”vet hur det gick”) – vilket utmanarlegalitetsprincipen. Inom vissa andra rättsområden är det istället alldeles klart attbedömningenbörskejustsånärainpåendomstolsavgörandesommöjligt,vilketnaturligtvisgårutöverförutsebarhetenivanligmening,menändåkanvaramotiverat.

Klartärattdensomskatillämpaenregelmåsteavgöravartdessavgörandetidpunktligger–ochdetframgårmycketsällanexplicit.Lagstiftarenharettlikartatbehoviavattavgöravarden avgörande tidpunkten ska placeras. Ytterst synes frågan böra besvaras av argumentfrånetiken och rättssystemets grundläggande ändamål och värden– men det är alls intesjälvklarthurde ska besvaras. Det är också viktigt att avgöra om reglerharsubjektiva(insikter eller avsikter) ellerobjektiva(hur det är eller var, mer ”objektivt”)rekvisit,fördetkanvidvarjegiventidpunktfinnasenskillnadmellandessa.Imångafallärsubjektivarekvisitmerrättssäkra.

Men när den avgörande tidpunkten väl är klarlagd väntar nästa fråga:Vilken betydelsetillmätshändelserefterdennatidpunkt?Iredovisningenfinnssärskildaregleromdetta;desvårtolkade reglerna om händelser efter balansdagen. Troligen saknas motsvarigheter iandra sammanhang. Klart är dock, att det är centralt att skilja mellan förändradeförhållanden (efterdenavgörandetidpunkten)ochsådanaefterkommandehändelsersom(be-)visarhurdetvarviddenavgörandetidpunkten.Gränsdragningenärmycketsvår.Hurbörman t.ex. sepås.k. transaktionskedjor,därden första transaktioner f.n.bedöms i vissmån i ljusetavdeefterkommande, trotsattdessavgörande tidpunktegentligen liggervidtidpunktenförsjälvatransaktionen.Iblandfinnsocksås.k.framtidavillkor,somalltsåmåsteuppfyllasiefterhand.Ocksådessaärivissmånproblematiska.

Här finns enmängd svåra frågor, av stor betydelse för rättssystemet och det ekonomiskalivet. Jag vill problematisera, jämföra och diskutera olika tänkbara lösningar. Grunden äregentligen(förutomjuridikenochdesshärrättkomplexalogik)etiken,menhärkommerviocksåinpåkunskapssynm.m.

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SEAN KERMATH – The Choice-of-Evils Defense: Justifying the Least EvilApproach

WesternMichiganUniversity|[email protected]

While rarely successful in practice, thenecessity (or choice-of-evils) defensehas in recenttimeshasbeenenmeshedinacademicdebate.Inthejurisdictionswhichallowit,aswellastheModelPenalCode(MPC),thechoice-of-evilsdefenseisalegaljustificationwhichallowsanactortocommitanotherwiseillegalactifsuchanactwouldcausealesserevilthaniftheactordidnotact.Thiscommonformulation—theideathatanactmustbealesserevil—isdisquietingtome.Itwouldonlyseemrightthatforanillegalactortobejustified,theactormust have picked the least of all possible evils. This articlewill argue that on normativeutilitariangrounds,theformulationofthedefenseonnecessityshouldonlyjustifytheleastevilactionineachsituation.Notonlyisthisthemorallycorrectthingtodo(andonewouldhope the law tracks morality), it is the practical thing to do. As it stands currently, thenecessitydefenserarelytriumphsincourtintherarecircumstancesthatitevenreachesjurydeliberation. Sectiononeof thispaperwill layout thehistoricutilitarian justifications fornecessity fromthecommon law reformer JeremyBenthamto theMPC-era legal reformerGlanvilleWilliams.Havingshownthatthemodernformulationsofthechoice-of-evilsderivefromutilitarianhands,sectiontwowillspelloutwhytheonlymoralchoiceistheleastevil.Itisherethephilosophicalgroundworkofthedefensewillbelaidbare.Oncethisisargued,section threewill contendwith critics in the literature, suchas LarryAlexander,whoholdthat the leastevil is too stricta standard. Afteranydissentersareadequatelydealtwith,sectionfourwillproposeanewformulationofthedefenseofnecessityandshowwhyit isnot only moremorally sound but also more practically sound. One would hope that bycreatingamorerefinedformofthedefense,itwillgainmoretractioninthecourtsandnotbesosummarilydismissed. All thatsaid,byrestrictingthenecessitydefensetoonly leastevils,itwillbemoremorallysoundandpracticallyuseful.


BRIANLEITER–JustifyingAcademicFreedom:MillandMarcuseRevisited

UniversityofChicago|[email protected]

Iarguethatthecoreofgenuinelyacademicfreedomoughttobefreedominresearchandteaching,subjecttodisciplinarystandardsofexpertise.IdiscussthelawintheUnitedStates,Germany, and England, and express doubts about the American view that distinctivelyacademic freedom ought to encompass "extramural" speech on matters of publicimportance(speakersshouldbeprotectedfromemploymentrepercussionsforsuchspeech,butnotbecauseoftheirfreedomquaacademics).

I treat freedom of academic expression as a subset of general freedom of expression,focusing on theMillian argument that freedom of expressionmaximizes discovery of thetruth,oneregularlyinvokedbydefendersofacademicfreedom.MarcusearguedagainstMill(in1965)that"indiscriminate"tolerationofexpressionwouldnotmaximizediscoveryofthetruth. I show thatMarcuseagreedwithMill that freeexpression isonly truth-andutility-maximizingifcertainbackgroundconditionsobtain:thusMillarguesthattheBritishcolonyinIndiawouldbebetteroffwith"benevolentdespotism"thanMillianlibertyofexpression,given that its inhabitants purportedly lacked the maturity and education requisite forexpression to be utility-maximizing. Marcuse agrees with Mill that the backgroundconditionsareessential,buthasanempiricaldisagreementwithhimaboutwhatthoseareand when they obtain: Mill finds them wanting in colonial India, Marcuse finds themwantingincapitalistAmerica.

Perhapssurprisingly,Marcusebelievesthat"indiscriminate"tolerationofexpressionshouldbe the norm governing academic discussions, despite his doubts about the utility-maximizingvalueoffreeexpressionincapitalistAmerica.Whythinkthat?Hereisareason:where disciplinary standards of expertise govern debate, the discovery of truth really ismore likely, but only under conditions of "indiscriminate" freedom of argument, i.e.,academic freedom. This freedom is not truly "indiscriminate": its boundaries are set bydisciplinarycompetence,whichraisesanadditionalquestionItrytoaddress.

In sum, the libertarians (Mill and Popper) and the Marxists (Marcuse) can agree thatacademic freedom is justified, at least when universities are genuine sites of scientificexpertiseandopendebate.

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MAX LYLES – Materia, form och innehåll i Christopher Jacob Boströmsrättslära- svensk idealistisk rättsfilosofi i ljuset av en positivistiskrättsvetenskap


EnligtdensvenskefilosofenChristopherJacobBoström(1797-1866)ärvärldentillsittväsenöversinnligeller andlig.Denna strikt idealistiskaoch rationalistiska/förnuftiga filosofi utgörenligt dess upphovsman ett skarpt brottmot varje annat filosofiskt system (inbegripandeKant,Fichte,SchellingochHegelsrespektivesystem)somhistorienhitintillsvilkasamtligaär”behäftademednågotrealistisktochempiriskt”.1

Boströms system har enligt dess upphovsman på grund av sin befrielse från realism ochempiri den fördelen framför andra system att detta system kan undvara den osäkra ochendast skenbart säkra empiriska verkligheten vid en analys av världsordningen, varvidBoström, utan att vilseledas av empiriska fördomar, kan tolka och förklara världensystematiskt och koherent. Omdömenas giltighet och sanning är således en funktion avomdömenas logisktmöjligaplacering ihans systemsnarareändessaskorrespondensmedexterna(sinnliga,empiriskaellerpositiva)fakta(såsomexv.stödipositivlagförgiltighetenavetträttsfilosofisktomdöme).

Sett i förhållande till den under 1800-talet allt tydligare utvecklingen av en positivistiskrättsvetenskap, enligt vilken rättsvetenskapens giltighet prövas mot de rättsvetenskapligasatsernasgrund ipositivarättssatsersnarareändessas logisktmöjligaplats iett filosofisktsystem blir det allt tydligare att en klyfta riskerade skapas mellan rättsfilosofi ochrättsvetenskap; en klyfta mellan rättsvetenskapens vetenskapliga grund ochrättsvetenskapensjälv.

Givet det faktum att Boström erkänner att den rationella rätten (filosofiska lagen)måstegöras positiv för att få en bindande verkan i sinnliga (empiriska) samhällen, så är denfilosofiska rättsläran, systemet, beroende av den empiriska verkligheten för att bli socialtgällande. Med andra ord måste det filosofiska systemet av logiska rättsliga möjligheteromvandlas till ett faktiskt systembeståendeav faktiska lagar. Settur ett rättspositivistisktperspektiv blir osinnliga, filosofiska, systemet beroende av det sinnliga, positiva, rätteniställetförtvärtom.

Ipresentationenavser författarenattbelysade rättsvetenskapligakonsekvensernaavdenBoströmskarättsfilosofins läraomförhållandetmellanrationellrättochpositivrättgenomenanalysavförhållandetmellanrationellochpositivrättmedutgångspunktfrånfrågoromden boströmska idealismens läror och rättspositivismens respektive läror om dels rättensmateria, form och innehåll dels dessa kategoriers logiska, materiella och juridiskaförhållandentillvarandra.

1C.J.BoströmochHansPhilosophi,s.481.


PATRICIAMINDUS–Funktionelltmedborgarskapijaktenpåenallmänteoriommedborgarskap


Går det att upprätta en allmän teori ommedborgarskap? Eller är vi hänvisade till att gerättsdogmatiska svar på frågan om vad medborgarskap är? En allmän teori ommedborgarskapförattvarasådanmåstekunnabeskrivarelationenmellanrättsligtinnehållhosstatusenochtillträdeskravsombestämmertillvilkadennastatusförlänas.Härföreslåsen funktionell teori om medborgarskap som en allmän teori ämnat att möjliggörakvalitetstestande samt de lege ferenda analys av nationalitetslagstiftning. Denna teoribeskriver relationen mellan rättsligt innehåll och tillträdeskrav som en relation mellanintension och extension. Extensionen utgörs av svar på frågan "vemärmedborgare?" därfråganbesvarasgenomattställauppenförteckningöverkriterierförförvärvochförlustavdenstatussombehandlas.Dessakriteriergeossinformationomvilkapersonersomräknassommedborgareienvissrättsordning.Intensionenbestämsavsvarenpåfrågan"vadärenmedborgare?" där frågan besvaras genom att ange en uppsättning rättsliga positioner,vanligenenuppsättningrättigheterochskyldigheter.Intensionen,medandraord,definierarde egenskaper som betecknar medborgarskap i en viss rättsordning. Både intension ochextensionvarierar.Attdevarierarärdock inte–pace jurisconsulti–ettskäl föratt troattman inte skulle kunna förstå hur de varierar. Detta ovannämnda faktum har föranlettdiverserättsteoretikerattdraslutsatsenattenallmänteoriommedborgarskapet intekanställasupppågrundavattvi intekanvetanågontingomvariationen i förväg,utandennasägskunnabestämmasblottiefterhand.Jagargumenterarförattdennaslutsatsärfelaktig.Detvådimensionernavarierarintepåettobestämtsätt.Derasvariationärbegripligochkanstuderas.Illusionenavobestämdhetochrationellokontrollerbarhethosvariationenavbådestatusensinnehållochdekriteriersombestämmertillvilkastatusenförlänasharuppståtttillföljd av attman åtskilt en dimension avmedborgarskap från den andra i de studier somutförts. På basis av denna insikt utvecklar jag två teser: tesen om medborgarskapetskonstitutionella känslighet samt tesen om korrelationen mellan medborgarskapetsdimensioner.

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GUILHERME MARQUES PEDRO – The Political Turn in the PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity


Thispaperargues that the transcendental-pragmatic reappraisalof theso-called ‘linguisticturn’opensthedoorformoresubstantialcontributionsfrombothpoliticalandlegaltheorythantheonesofferedsofarbytheproponentsof‘discourseethics’.Habermas,forinstance,assumesthattheshiftfromsemanticstopragmaticsisthenaturalfollow-upofthelinguisticturn,aftertheHumboldtianemphasisonthecommunicative-alongwiththecognitiveandexpressive-roleoflanguage.Thisemphasisgetslost,inhisview,intheGermanandFrenchadaptations of theological hermeneutics to continental phenomenology, as well as in theAnglo-saxon turn to logical semantics and mathematics as the explanatory model of thearticulation between language, thought and world. Surprisingly, Habermas argues that inbothcases, thefocusofthesetraditionson languagereducesphilosophytothesearchforconceptual meaning and neglects the role of social validation in philosophical enquiry.‘Discourseethics’ thusrehearsesapragmatic turnthatcanaccount forsocialmediation inthoughtand language,under theclaimthatphilosophymustnotonlysearch for thetruthconditions of assertions, but also for the communicative conditions of agreement amongspeakers.ButHabermasimmediatelycaststhis‘pragmaticturn’intermsofadialoguethatisasmeaningfulasitisconductedamongequals.Hisviewofphilosophicalenquiryisthatofan‘idealposition’wherespeakersareequallyentitledtouttertheirviewsaccordingtocriteriawhich are linguistically pre-given. He never concedes that replacing the assertoricway ofdoing philosophy with a dialogical one must include a specific analysis of how powerimbalances within the linguistic community affect the socially-constituted search formeaning.Theseinequalitiesmustbegraspedbeforecommunicativeactioncanbesuggestedas a legitimate model of philosophical enquiry. Hence, in order to know how thelinguistically constituted lifeworld of discourse is construed we cannot simply resort to‘discourseethics’.Weneedtoemploythetoolsofpoliticalandlegalphilosophyinordertounderstand how discourses of power, authority, legitimacy and decision succeed inestablishingtherulesofcommunicationandindeterminingwhocanspeaktoandforwhom.


ELENAPRATS–Whatcanphilosophysayabout iuspecuniae(acquisitionofcitizenshipinexchangeformoney)


One of the characteristics of the institution of citizenship is its function to distinguishesbetween insiders and outsiders. Namely, those considered insiders are conferred withspecific rightsanddutiesdenied tooutsiders.Althoughcitizenship isusuallyacquiredasabirthright (ius soli/ius sanguinis) countries usually admit the possibility of acquiringcitizenshipthroughnaturalizationforoutsidershavingaspecialbondwiththecountry(long-term residents, spouses, orphans of unknown parents, etc.). However, since 1984 a newaccess way to naturalization has become increasingly popular : ‘ius pecuniae’. The termreferstodifferentstatesprogramsthatensurenaturalization inexchangeforaneconomictransaction(donation,investment...)andthatprovideanextraandfastwaytonaturalizeforthosewhocanaffordit,allowingoutsiderstobecomeinsidersbyusing(copiousamountsof)money.

The booming of ius pecuniae programs has led to an increasing number of scholarsinterested in the topic. Thus, especially since 2012, well-known scholars, mainly, fromsociology,politicalscienceandlawhavebeeninterestedinunderstandingthephenomenonandmanyhavealsoelaboratednormativeargumentsforandagainsttheuseofiuspecuniaeprograms.Yetmostauthorsdonothaveabackground inphilosophyandnormativeethicsthat the topic requires. The current state of the art is plagued by conceptual confusion,unverified assumptions and a general lack of insight into the nature of the phenomenon(e.g.we currently have no generally accepted definition). In this paper, I suggest taking aphilosophical approach to ius pecuniae. The aim is to elucidate what ius pecuniae is andwhatitisnot.

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JULIETAA.RÁBANOS–A strange (conceptual) loop:who reallymakes theLawintheend(orinthebeginning)?AbriefanalysisoftheconceptofLaw(and the concept of Authority) through the eyes and the words of legalpositivismandlegalrealism

UniversityofGenoa|[email protected]

ThequestionaboutwhatisLaworwhatLawmeansisnotjustoneofthemostcontroversialquestions in legal theory and legal philosophy, but is alsomaybe onewhose controversywouldnever come toanend.To rejectdoinganontological analysisand try focusing inaconceptual-onlyone,unfortunately,doesnotdiminishtheuncertainty:itremainsnotonlyintermsofitscontent,butalsointermsofitsstatus.Isthereonlyoneconcept,theconcept,ofLaw?Are theremany?Should thecriteria tochooseoneof thembeoneofusefulness,oronlyoneofpersonalpreference?

Here, I will try to offer a conceptual-only analysis of Law, through its relation with theconceptofAuthority.Fordoingthis, Iwillconsidersomeviewsregardingthetopicastheyareheldbysomelegalpositivistsandlegalrealists, inparticulartheirviewsaboutLawandlegalsystems,andtheirrelationwithsocialfactsconcerning(particularly)theissuancebyanauthority.

I will argue that, even if it could be true that legal positivists and legal realists hold theconceptofLawas intrinsicallyconnectedwiththeconceptofAuthority,theymightbenotonlyusingaslightlydifferentconceptofAuthoritybutalso(eveniftheyareusingthesameor a similar one) they might be identifying different authorities altogether. I will furtherarguethat,inthecentreofthesedifferences,hideswhatIthinkthatistheverycoreofthediscussion: the rapport between issuance and interpretation (between law-makers orlegislatorsandinterpretersoradjudicators).Inthissense,legalpositivismandlegalrealismseemtomainlyplace“authority” inoneof thesetwosidesof thequestion, relegatingtheotherplayasecondary(albeitimportant)rolebutwithotherdifferentstatus.

It will be my main aim to suggest that these views of legal positivism and legal realismconsidered here do not offer an adequate answer to this rapport between issuance andinterpretation.Becauseofthis,becauseoftheirapparentlyflaweddefinitionofAuthority,Iwill suggest that theirconceptsofLawcanbeseenas flawed in thesamesense,and thattheyareprisonersofastrange(conceptual)loop.


SEBASTIÁN REYES MOLINA – On Legal Interpretation and ConstitutionalTheory


Legal interpretationtheoryandconstitutionaltheorydonotoftencommunicatewitheachother. However, the overlapping of issues addressed by these disciplines is of commonoccurrence.Oneoftheseissuesistheso-calledjudicialreviewofthelegislation(JRL).

InbroadstrokesJRListhecompetenceofthecourtstoexamineifsomelegislationand/orits application infringes constitutional norms. In some legal systems courts have thecompetencetoexpeltheunconstitutionalnormfromthatparticularlegalsystemactingasanegativelegislator.Inothers,itpreventsthecourtstoapplylegalnormsbecauseitseffectsareunconstitutional.ThesetwomodelsarecommonlyreferredtoastheAustrianmodelandtheAmericanmodelrespectively.

FromthesideofconstitutionaltheoryJRLhasbeenexaminedandcriticizedforitsseeminglyundemocratic implications. How can we make sense that a legal provision enacted by ademocraticorgan,i.e.,parliament,canbecontrolledbyanundemocraticorgan,i.e.,courts?

Thisisthemainclaimofthecounter-majoritariandifficulty(CMD).TheCMDbringstolightthefollowingproblem:totheextentthatdemocracyentailsresponsivenesstopopularwill,howcanweattestforthejudiciary,whosemembersareunaccountabletothepeopleandcanoverturnlaws?Atthecoreofthisobjectionliestheproblematictensionbetweenanon-democraticinstitution,suchasthejudiciarypower,anddemocraticgovernment.

Butisthisso?InthispaperIclaimthatwhentheCMDisdirectedattheAmericanmodelofJRLitmissesitsmarkbecausethereisnodemocratic-undemocratictension.

InordertobackupthisclaimthispaperanalysestheCMDfromthestandpointofarealisttheory of legal interpretation. A realist theory of legal interpretation introduces thedistinction between general legal norms and particular legal norms. The former arestatutoryor precedent-base legal norms. The latter are the result of the interpretationofgenerallegalnormswhenbeingappliedbythejudge.

It also acknowledges the indeterminacy of law and it claims that a general legal rule canhave several meanings, i.e., particular legal rules. Thismeans that an individual case canhavemorethanonesolution.Becausegenerallytherearenometa-rulesthatbindthejudgetointerpretgeneral legalnorms,theselectionofthemeaningistheresultofthedecision-makerexercisingdiscretion.Hencethecreationoftheparticularlegalruleisnottheresultofdemocraticprocess:itisthecreationofthejudge.

IclaimthatinthecaseoftheAmericanmodelthereisnodemocratictensionbecausebothoftheorgansengagedinthisprocessarenon-democraticandthustheCMDlosesstrengthtothepointofnotbeingsuitabletocriticizethistypeofJRL.

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ELLIKA SEVELIN – Facts in the Law: The Law/Fact Distinction in the LegalPositivisticConceptofLaw


ThepresentationconcernstheresultsofmythesisthatIamtodefendat28thofApril.Thethesisconcernsthelaw/factdistinctioninlaw.Theinterestittakesinthedistinctionisnotpractical, but conceptual. It more specifically concerns the questions: “What is it that isconceptuallyassumedaboutsomethingwhenit iscategorizedas ‘of law’or ‘offact’?”and“Whatisconceptuallyassumedaboutthelawwhenlawisdistinguishedfromfactbytheuseofthelaw/factdistinction,andinparticular―howisthisassumptioncompatiblewith legalpositivism?”Itapproachesthequestionbothdescriptivelyandnormatively.

Descriptely, it sets out to structure the existing scholarly discussions on the law/factdistinctionintodifferentconceptions,whichareexemplifiedandanalyzed.Itfindsthattheexistingconceptionsofthelaw/factdistinctionconnectsthisdistinctiontotheapplicationoflawtonon-law;butalsothatthelaw/factdistinctioncannotbereducedintothedistinctionbetween law and non-law. Further, it finds that the vast majority of conceptions of thelaw/factdistinctionentailsaconceptualassumptionofthe lawthat isnotcompatiblewithlegalpositivism.

Thethesisfurtherpresentsanewtheoryofthelaw/factdistinction,whichaccountsfortheconceptual assumptions found in the existing conceptions and which is compatible withlegal positivism. In order to do so the extended concept of law is introduced. On theextended concept of law, law is defined as Primary and Secondary Rules, LegalRepresentationsoftheNon-law(adjudicatedfacts)andLegalConclusions.Thus,thetheorystandsoutfromearlierconceptionsofthelaw/factdistinctioninthat itconceptualizestheadjudicatedfactsaspartofthelaw,ratherthanassomethingdistinctfromlaw.Adjudiactedfacts are conceptualized as legal representations of the legally relevant non-law. Anadjudicatedfactentailsthatthecourtshallproceedasifitcorrespondstotheactualstateofthenon-law.Further,anadjudicatedfactisclaimedtobe,directlyorindirectly,conditionalforalegalconclusion.Hence,itisclaimedthatitcanbesubsumedunderalegalrule.


TORBENSPAAK–TheScopeofLegalPositivism


The theory of legal positivism has beenmuch discussed over the years, and able writershavedefendedcompetingversionsof it.Thesewritersdisagreenot justaboutdetails,butalso to some extent about the interpretation of the main tenets of legal positivism: thesocialthesis,theseparationthesis,thethesisofsocialefficacy,andthesemanticthesis.Asaresult,thereissomeuncertaintyaboutthescopeoflegalpositivism.Thereis,inparticular,thequestionofwhetherthesocialthesisappliesnotonlytothelevelofthesourcesoflaw,butalsototheleveloftheinterpretationandapplicationoflaw.Inthisarticle,Iamgoingtoargue (i) thatweshouldconceiveof legalpositivismasa theoryabout thesourcesof law,not as a theory about the interpretation and application of law, (ii) that this is howparadigmaticlegalpositivistslikeHansKelsenandH.L.A.Hartunderstoodlegalpositivism,and(iii)thatiflegalpositivistsadopttheviewexpressedin(i),theycaneasilyavoidRonaldDworkin’swell-knownsemanticstingobjection.

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GUSTAV STENSEKE – Vargarna och rätten – ett rättsfilosofisktavhandlingsprojekt


Idén om naturen som ett objektivt observerbart annat, utanför människan, har längekritiseratsavforskarefrånolikadisciplinerochfleragångerharnaturendärförproklameratsvaradöd.Närviprataromnaturenärdenalltidfrånbörjaninbäddadiensocialochkulturelldiskurs.Detta innebäratt juridikenaldrigkanbyggapåen idéomennaturensgrundnormutanfördetpolitiskaochvikandärförinteförväntaossattjuridikenskaräddaplaneten.Enobjektiv miljörätt som enbart implementerar vetenskapliga fakta är inte möjlig. Snarareriskerardetattledatillenförtäcktavpolitiseringavmiljöfrågorsomdöljergroendepolitiskakonflikter.

Samtidigt som det finns ett behov av att undvika avpolitisering av naturen innebärklimatkrisenochmassutrotningenav arter att behovet av globalaöverenskommelsermedrättsliga implikationer för miljöfrågor kanske är större än någonsin. Ett övergripandeproblemsomjagundersökerärdärförhurmankantänkaochgöramiljörättpåettsättsominteavpolitiserarekologinmenintehellerrelativiserarbehovetavstarkamiljöskydd.

EnföreteelsesomjagstuderarärdenrättsligahanteringenavlicensjaktenpåvargiSverige.Det största hotetmot den svenska vargstammen är illegal jakt och den illegala jakten ärstarkt sammankopplad med motståndet mot vargförvaltningen i vissa sociala sfärer. Ihanteringen av vargfrågan är det inte tillräckligt att skydda vargen utifrån ekologiskapremissereftersomdetärkonflikterna isamhälletsomärdetstorahotet.Medinspirationfrån filosofen GIlles Deleuze, post-humanistisk teori och landskapsforskning studerar jagiställetvargensomenkroppiettsocio-ekologisktlandskapdärdetekologiska,politiskaochrättsligaärhoptrasslatiettkomplextrhizom.

Internationellaavtal,EU-direktivochnationellaartskyddsreglerharvaritextremtviktigaförskyddetav just stora rovdjurochvargenssnabbaåterväxtmenslutenheten iden juridiskametod som präglar den rättsliga hanteringen av vargfrågan är problematisk. Metodensberoende av koherens, enhet och ursprung är svårförenlig med en verklighet där deträttsliga,detsociala,ochnaturligaintekanupprätthållassomskildaontologiskakategorier.Förattkunnatänkaochresonerarättsligtomexempelvislicensjaktpåvargbehövervidärförtänka rättsligt utan idéer om koherens och enhetlighet. Definitioner, slöjor och stelnadpolitikmåstemjukasupppåettsättsominteignorerardeunderliggandekonflikterna.

Iminpresentationdiskuterar jag juridikenkring licensjaktpåvarg idetkomplexa landskapsomdenärendelav.Därmedhoppasjagkunnasynliggörarättsligatillkortakommandenochkommamednyaidéeromhurmankangörarättsligaundersökningar.


JUAN PABLO STERLING CASAS – Optimistic Hermeneutics and Dialogue asLimittoLegalArbitrariness

UniversidadPontificiaBolivarianaseccionalBucaramanga|[email protected]

This paper aims to indicate how the claim of hermeneutics has become a legitimizingelement of judicial decision. The single authority, derived from the text and its origin, inordertofindandjustifya"rightanswer"injudicialpracticeisnotenoughtolegitimizetherole of the judge as the person who concretes the law; hence it is necessary to placeconfidence in the hermeneutics to build a concrete legal legitimacy in his speeches. Theevolution of the state, the concept of fundamental rights, the vagueness of the legallanguage and the consequent need to interpret and justify rationally rules and courtdecisionsareelements that aim to recognize theneed for ahermeneuticmodelof law inmodernity.Forthisitisnecessarytoretakethesensethatcalled"optimistic"hermeneutics(starting with authors like Schleiermacher and Gadamer) which considers useful to theextent that can correct the chaos that eventually generate the multiple and arbitraryinterpretations (opposite position or "pessimistic"). Thus hermeneutics involves, first,overcomingapurelygrammatical tospendmodel tooneofdialogueandconfrontationofprejudices in which the text is not a finished text or definitive, in this scenario thepsychological interpretationbecomes investmentof rhetoricallowinghermeneuticssearchauthor intent, which is not always present in the text; secondly, hermeneutics allowsdynamicinterpretationmodelthatputstheinterpreterfacetofacewiththetextgeneratinga meaningful relationship building where the same interpreter provides elements thatultimatelyaffecttheoutcome.Hermeneuticsviewlikethisisanexerciseinwhichbuildswhoplays both the correct answer in the context of an exhibition of prejudice, which can bepreserved or removed once the process of dialoguewith the other end. This process is alimittotheeventualjudicialarbitrariness,whileallowingmoredebate,controlandvarietyintheinterpretiveprocess.

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CAROLINE STRÖMBERG – Presentation av licentiatavhandlingen ”Etik ochnormkonflikterinommiljörättsliglagstiftning”

LuleåUniversityofTechnology|[email protected]

Ennormkonflikt försätter rättssubjektet i en svår sits.Vissanormkonfliktermedför tillochmed att ett rättssubjekt inte på något sätt kan agera helt och hållet lagenligt, så längekonflikten inte är löst. Detta innebär bland annat brister i rättssäkerhet samt atträttsreglerna inte lyckas guida rättssubjektets beteende, vilket brukar anses vara en avlagens viktigaste egenskaper. I min licentiatavhandling har jag diskuterat frågor omuppkomst av, problem med samt hantering av normkonflikter inom miljörätten. Tvåfallstudier har använts för att diskutera olika typer av normkonflikter som förekommer imiljörättslig lagstiftning. Jaghar konstaterat att det ena fallet är ett exempel på att lagenbådeförbjuderochtillåtersammabeteende,ochattdetandrafalletärettexempelpåattlagen både förbjuder och föreskriver samma beteende. Vidare har jag föreslagit attmotstridiga etiska antaganden som kan tänkas ligga bakom bestämmelserna kan utgöradelförklaringar till att normkonflikterna uppstår, och att det kan vara rimligt att användaetiska teorier vid tolkning av lagen i fall där det förekommer oklara till synes normativauttryck i lagen. Att sådana uttryck förekommermedför svårigheter att avgöra rättsreglersinnebörd.Exempelpåvidareforskningskullekunnavaraattutredafrågoromnär,hurochvarföretikböranvändasvidavgörandetavrättsligabestämmelsersinnehåll.Exempelviskanmetodendiskuterasirelationtillrättskälleläran,teorieromrättensnaturochteorieromvadjuridiskaochmoraliskanormeruttrycker.


WANNASVEDBERG–Straffrättenikollision-varför,ochhurgörvidåmeddesjälvkörandefordonen?

SwedishNationalRoadandTransportResearchInstitute|[email protected]

Denna abstract baseras på en publicerad rapport, Nya och gamla perspektiv på ansvar(Svedberg 2016) samt en nyligen avlämnad forskningsrapport, En rättslig konstruktion förstraffrättsligt ansvar gällande självkörande fordon (feb. 2017), somutförts på uppdrag avden statliga utredningen om självkörande fordon på väg (dir. 2015:114). Syftet med denförraärattanalyseraderättsligaförutsättningarnaföransvargällandesjälvkörandefordonpå väg, att inom utvalda rättsområden synliggöra och problematisera rättsligakonstruktioner kring ansvar samt de begrepp och principer som anses följa därav iförhållande till den kunskap som kommit att utvecklas främst inom ramen för Artificiellintelligens (AI).Nuvarande regelverkutgår frånen fysiskperson,ett rättssubjekt, somkanställastillsvarsförsinahandlingar.Ettproblemärattteknikenisigavserattheltellerdelvisersätta föraren. Rapporten visar att konstruktionen för straffrättsligt ansvar, genomallmännaregler,begreppochprinciper,inteäravpassadförsjälvkörandefordon.Vidareattnormen förmänskligt varande i rätten är en autonom individ somär rationell och fri ochsom inte låter sigpåverkasavyttre faktorerDet rättsligasynsättet skiljer sigmarkant frånhurautonomi förstås inomAI.Gradenavautonomihosenrobotavgörsavvarmänniskanbefinner sig, d.v.s. inuti, ovanför eller utanför beslutsloopen – den utgår från relationenmänniska-robot. Tekniken utmanar på olika sätt de grundläggande rättsligaförutsättningarnakringfråganomansvar,menocksårättenssynpåmänniskanochhennesegenskaperochförmågor.Studienvisarävenattdetärmöjligtattförsesjälvkörandefordonmedenetiskkompass.GenomenvidareutvecklingavAsimovslagarpresenterasfyraetiskanormersomframförattvärderalivikvalitativsåvälsomkvantitativmeninginriktarsigpåattundvika kollision. Vad är ett rättssubjekt, förutsätter ansvar ett rättssubjekt och hur lösermandettanärdetgällersjälvkörandebilar?Idensenarerapporten,varssyfteärattutvecklaenrättsliginfrastrukturförettlångsiktigthållbartochtrafiksäkerttransportsystemsominteger avkall på grundläggande rättsliga värden, presenteras en rättslig infrastruktur för hurrättenkanhanterastraffansvarochrättsliga relationer fören introduktionavsjälvkörandefordon på allmän väg. Rättslig infrastruktur definieras här som det eller de regelverk somomgärdar en viss typ av verksamhet och för dess verksamhet grundläggande rättsligarelationer. I rapporten lämnas förslag på ny lag, legitimationsyrke, straffbestämmelse(r)m.m. Vidare behandlar den hur en framtida ”brottlighet” kan ta sig uttryck till följd avteknologin.

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SIMONWALLENGREN–TitleTBA

MalmöUniversity|[email protected]

Swedenhasexperiencedamigrationwavethatsubsequently inheres theriskofpeopleofdifferentethnicoriginsbeingsubjectedtovictimization.ThisincludesthosepeopletravellingbetweenEU-memberstates,manyofwhichsupportthemselvesbybegginginpublicspace.The crimes that these “socially vulnerable EU citizens” are exposedmay bemotivated by“hate” for different attributes that are protected in Swedish hate crime law, such asethnicity.Although,itislikewisepossiblethatcrimesaremotivatedbyotherattributesthatare not protected, for example the act of begging. This study used thematic analysis toexplore 28 socially vulnerable EU citizens’ who support themselves by begging in publicspace inMalmö-Swedenandtheirexposureto(hate)crimeandhowwellestablishedhatecrime praxis functions to protect theminority population. Study participants claimed thattheirethnicitybutrathertheirgroupbelongingas“beggars”togetherwithalabelas“None-Swedish”mainlydonotmotivatetheirvictimization.Thestudyresultsgivesusanindicationthat it is important for researchersnot to focuson individualmotivesandspecificgroup’sconsequencesofvictimizationbutratheruseanintersectionalperspectivetostudygroups'vulnerability. This knowledgehas practical implications for the criminal justice systembutalsothedevelopmentofhatecrimetheory.


PHILOSOPHYOFMIND

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GUNNAR BJÖRNSSON – Cross-modal identification and the absurdity ofphysicalism


Let“physicalism”denotetheviewthateverystate,event,property,orprocessconstitutiveofwhatsomethingislikeforasubjectisidenticaltosomephysicalstate,event,propertyorprocess. This view has struck critics as “objectively unreasonable” (Chalmers), but evendefendershaveacknowledgedthattheviewcanseem“absurd”(Papineau),“crazy”(Perry),or just incapableofdoing justiceof thephenomena (Armstrong). (Fora recentdiscussion,see e.g. Sundström 2017, ‘How physicalists can—and cannot—explain the seeming“absurdity” of physicalism’, in PPR). Suppose that what David Chalmers calls the “easy”problemsofconsciousnesshavebeensolved,problemsofexplaininghowvariousphysicallyidentifiable events (including subject’s reports of what things are like for them) arecorrelatedandcausallyconnected.Thiswouldseemto leave intact the“hard”problemofexplaininghowthephysicalgivesrisetothesubjective.

Inthistalk,Iproposeanewindependentlymotivatedphysicalist-friendlyexplanationofwhyasolutiontothe“easy”problemsofconsciousnessseemtoleavethehardproblemintact,orofwhytheideaofidentificationoffersintuitiveormorepreciselyimaginativeresistanceeveninlightofevidencewhichwouldbeconvincinginotherdomains.Ifthisexplanationiscorrect, this resistance is to be expected given physicalism, and so provides no evidenceagainstit.

Thesuggestionbuildsonthefollowingthreeprinciples:

IMAGINATIVERESISTANCE:Weencounter imaginativeresistancewhenwe lackmechanisms for(co-)identificationinvolvingdifferentmodesofrepresentation.

AVAILABILITY: We have mechanisms for cross-modal identification where and only whereinformation available in different modes of representation have tended to be richlycorrelated such that information in one mode has reliably supported expectationsconcerninginformationinothermodes.

INTROSPECTIVE INSULATION: Experience simply does not afford richly coordinated streams ofinformation about the physical (neurophysicological) states, events, etc. that physicalistsidentify with subjective states, events, etc. through introspection, on the one hand, andextrospective modes of perception guiding our intuitive grasp of physical reality, on theother.

I defend the first two principles with reference to their capacity to explain variations inresistance inavarietyofcasesofcross-modal identification, i.e.caseswhereweacceptorreject the identification of what is perceived or imagined in one modality with what isperceivedorimaginedinanother.


JAN SCHEFFEL – The unsolvability of themind-body problem liberates thewill


Themind-bodyproblemisanalyzedinaphysicalistperspective.Bycombiningtheconceptsofemergenceandalgorithmicinformationtheoryinathoughtexperimentemployingabasicnonlinearprocess,itisarguedthatepistemicallystronglyemergentpropertiesmaydevelopin a physical system.A comparisonwiththe significantlymore complex neural network ofthebrain shows that also consciousness isepistemically emergent in a strong sense. Thusreductionistunderstandingofconsciousness appears not possible; themind-bodyproblemdoes not have areductionist solution. The ontologically emergent characterofconsciousnessisthenidentifiedfromacombinatorialanalysisrelatingtosystemlimitssetby quantummechanics, implying that consciousness is fundamentallyirreducible to low-levelphenomena. In the perspective of amodified definition of freewill, thecharacter ofthe physical interactions of the brain's neural system issubsequently studied. As anontologically open system, it is asserted that itsfuture states are undeterminable inprinciple.Wearguethatthisleadstofreedomofthewill.

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JULIUSSCHOENHERR–LuckyJointAction


In this paper, I argue that joint actions canbe lucky. The cases I have inmindexhibit thefollowing structure:eachparticipantbelieves that the intentionsofeach support the jointaction in amodally robustway. Thesebeliefs turnout tobe false.However, due to luckycircumstances,thediscordancebetweentheseintentionsneveremerges.Thediscussionofthese cases yields one positive and one negative upshow. The positive upshot is that theparticipants' intentions (but not their beliefs about these intentions) are modallyunconstrained.Hence,while eachparticipantneeds tobelieve that the satisfactionof herintention is possible and that the intentions of each will persist under a range ofcounterfactualcircumstances,thisdoesn'tactuallyhavetobethecase.Thenegativeupshotisthatitisbroadlymistakentopresupposethatjointlyactingagentsmustpursuethesamejointgoalunderconditionsofcommonknowledge.


ALVASTRÅGE–Canneurosciencerefutefolkpsychology?


Some have argued that neuroscientific research points in the direction that the ways inwhichwenormallyunderstandeachothersmental lives andactions, andholdeachotherresponsible for these things, are deeply unjustified practices. According to theneuroscientific model of human cognition and action, we seem to be determined bybiologicalandphysical factorsnotpossible forus to control, facts that seemunaccountedforinourresponsibilitypracticesastheyappeartoday.Thismeansthatourmoralandlegalpracticesareunjustifiedandinneedofrevision. Let’scallthepeoplesupportingthisviewrevisionists.

In response to this, others have argued that the evidence provided by neuroscience isentirelyirrelevanttothequestionofwhetherourmoralandlegalresponsibilitypracticesarejustifiedornot.ForexampleStephenMorseclaimsthatthecriminallaw“isathorouglyfolkpsychological enterprise that is completely consistent with the truth of determinism oruniversal causation”. (Morse, 2013, p. 27) Let’s call the people supporting this viewconservatives.

Therevisionistargumentcanbespelledoutasfollows:

(P1) Moral and legal responsibility practices are based upon a folk psychologicalunderstandingofpeople’smentallivesandtheiractions.

(P2) Neuroscience give us reasons to think that folk psychology is a seriouslymistakentheory.

C: Neuroscience give us reasons to think that our moral and legal responsibilitypracticesareunjustified.

Folkpsychology as I use it here is the psychological theory constituted by the platitudesaboutthemindthatordinarypeopleareinclinedtoendorse.Revisionistsandconservativesagree about (P1), but the conservatives denies the truth of the conclusion. Thedisagreementseems,hence, toconcern (P2): theclaimthat folkpsychology isa“seriouslymistakentheory”.

Myaiminthistalkistopresentanovelsuggestionregardingthelocationofthebasicsourceofthisdisagreement.Iwillarguethattherootofthedisagreementinthedebatehastodowith criteriaofexplanations. More specifically, it lies inan implicitdisagreementofwhatcriteria an explanation of human cognition and action must fulfill in order to be (1) anexplanationatall,and(2)abetterexplanationthananotherone.

References

Morse, S. J. (2013). Common Criminal Law Compatibilism. In N. A. Vincent (Ed.),NeuroscienceandLegalResponsibility(pp.27-52).NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

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PÄRSUNDSTRÖM–Vadservi?


EnligtSusannaSiegel(2006;2011)harvisuellaerfarenheter”rika”innehåll:virepresenterarvisuelltintebaraegenskapersomfärger,formerochrörelse,utanävent.ex.egenskapenären tall. Hennes argument fokuserar på kontraster mellan experters och icke-expertersvarseblivningar.Siegelutgårifrånattdetfinnsen”fenomenellkontrast”—enkontrastihurdetärfördetvarseblivandesubjektet—närenexpertrespektiveenicke-expertvarseblirentall. Och hon argumenterar för att den bästa förklaringen till denna kontrast innehållerantagandetattexpertenvisuelltrepresenteraregenskapenärentall. Jagskaargumenteraföratt(i)Siegelinteharidentifieratdetstarkastealternativettillhennesegetförslag,ochföratt(ii)dettaalternativgerenbättreförklaringänSiegelsteoritilldeaktuellakontrastfallen.


GALYEHEZKEL–Reason,Desires,andEnds

TheSapirAcademicCollege&TheOpenUniversityofIsrael|[email protected]

Accordingtoacommonviewofhumanagency,desiresdetermineatleastsome,ifnotall,oftheends thatagents set for themselves.This seems tobe theviewthat isexpressedbyawell-knownquotefromHume'sATreatiseofHumanNature:"Reasonis,andoughtonlytobe theslaveof thepassions,andcanneverpretend toanyotheroffice than toserveandobeythem"(1978,415).

Criticismsof the instrumentalconceptionofpractical reasonandof theHumeantheoryofmotivation are not new (see, for example, Hampton 1998; Korsgaard 1998; Lebar 2004;Wallace 2006). However, no one seems to challenge the assumption that desires aredirectedtowardsends,whicharethusatleastsuggested,ifnotimmediatelydetermined,asends for agents. Some writers go as far as to regard desire as a certain type of goal(Castelfranchi 2014, 103); treat desires and ends as interchangeable terms (Darwall 2001,136); argue thathavingagoal (that is, anend) is justdesiring (Smith1987,54);or simplydefineanendassomethingdesiredforitself(Black1994,75).

In my lecture, I argue that the view that desires can determine, or even suggest ends,independently of reason, is false. Hence, desires cannot fulfil the role that is ascribed tothem in the instrumental conception of practical reason and in the Humean theory ofmotivation. I make two distinct claims. First, I argue that desires cannot by themselves,without the help of reason, identify ends for an agent. Furthermore, this is true even ifreasonissupposedtoservemerelyaninstrumentalrole,thatis,todeterminethemeanstoan end.Hence, only reason can explain the teleological aspect of agency. Second, I arguethatevenifanagentcanrelyon(instrumental)reasoninordertodeterminethemeanstoanendandactsinlightofhisorherdesire,thisdesiredoesnotpersedeterminetheendforthe agent. Furthermore, ends that are determined in light of desires are not necessarilyidenticalwiththeobjectsofdesires,andhencetheseendsarenotevensuggestedbythosedesires.Infact,inmanycasestheendistoremovethosedesires,ratherthanto"serveandobey"them.Hence,onlyreasoncandetermineourends,andthusexplaintheteleologicalaspectofagency.

References

Black, Oliver. 1994. "Ends, Desires, and Rationality." International Philosophical Quarterly34(1),75–88.

Castelfranchi,Cristiano.2014."IntentionsintheLightofGoals."Topoi22,103–116.

Darwall,StephenL.2001."BecauseIWantIt." InEllenF.Paul,FredD.MillerJrandJeffreyPaul(eds.)MoralKnowledge.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,129–153.

Hampton, Jean E. 1998. The Authority of Reason. Edited by Richard Healey. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Hume,David.1978.ATreatiseofHumanNature.EditedbyLawrenceAmherstSelby-Bigge.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Korsgaard ChristineM. 1998. "TheNormativity of Instrumental Reason." InGarrett CullityandBerysGaut(eds.)EthicsandPracticalReason.Oxford:ClarendonPress,215–54.

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Lebar,Mark.2004."Ends."SocialTheoryandPractice,30(4),507–533.

Smith,Michael.1987."TheHumeanTheoryofMotivation."Mind96(381),36–61.

Wallace,JayR.2006.NormativityandtheWill.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.


PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION

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FRANCISJONBÄCK–Anti-theodicyandtheGarytheGreatAnalogy


Advocates for the view called Anti-theodicy argue that the enterprise of formulatingtheodicies ought to be rejected. One reason for this is that one is immoral by beinginsensitivetothevictimsofsufferingwhenformulatingandadvocatingtheodicies.AnotherreasonisthatthewholeprojectpresupposesananthropomorphicconceptionofGod.Inthispaper, I present a fictive story about Gary who is put before a court accused of notinterveningwhenafriendsuffersimmensely.ThosewhoknowGarysaythatGaryisagreat,resourceful and very knowledgeable friend who would intervene and comfort his friendunlesshehadareasonfornotdoingso. I thenformulateananalogyarguingthat ifone isimmoral when defending God by formulating theodicies, then one is immoral whendefendingGary.However,surelyoneisnotimmoralwhendefendingGary.Thereforeoneisnot immoral when defending God. I then go on to another reason advocated by anti-theodicists, namely that theodicies presuppose an anthropomorphic conception of God.According to this lineof reasoningGod isnota thing in theworldbut ratherconsiderablydifferentthanGary.IarguethatifGodismuchdifferentthenGaryandcannotbedescribedin terms of beingmaximally knowledgeable, powerful andmorally good, then onewouldlosesomegroundsforhopingthatGodexists.


MARIASVEDBERG–TheValueofImmortality


Wouldan immortal lifebebetter foranagent thanamortal life?BernardWilliams (1973)answers this questionwith a “no”, by arguing that either the agentwould eventually andirrevocablysufferfromsevereboredom,ortheagentwouldhavetoundergochangestotheextentthattheindividualthatsheeventuallybecomeswouldbesodifferentfromherthatshe would not recognize that individual’s goods as hers. These contentions have beenquestionedanddiscussedbymanyphilosophers,includingJohnMartinFischer(2012),whoarguesthatcertainkindsofimmortalitycouldbeappealingtohumanbeings.MichaelCholbi(2016) challenges Fischer’s claims and argues that mortal lives are generally superior toimmortallives.

Myaimhereis,firstly,toshowthatCholbi’sargumentagainstFischerfails.Secondly, Iwillarguethat theversionsof immortality thatFischeradvocatesarenotnecessarily themostappealing.Iwillidentifyanumberofconditionsthatanimmortallifemayormaynotmeet,and Iwill contend that determiningwhat kind of immortal life thatwould be best for anagentdependsonwhetherornot theagenthascertainspecific traitsofpersonality. Iwillthenargue thateven ifwewouldknowthatanagenthasaspecificpersonality, therearesomefactorsthatmakeitextremelydifficulttoassesswhetherthebestpossibleversionofanimmortallifeforthatagentwouldindeedbebetterforherthananordinarymortallife.My qualified guess here is that while there are a few people with a very specific set ofpersonality traits forwhom immortalitymightbebetter thanmortality, themajorityofusarebetteroffasmortals.

References

Cholbi,M.2016.“ImmortalityandtheExhaustibilityofValue.”InM.Cholbi(ed.)ImmortalityandthePhilosophyofDeath,London:RowmanandLittlefield,pp.221–236.

Fischer,J.M.2012.“Immortality.”InB.Bradley,F.Feldman&J.Johansson(eds.),TheOxfordHandbookofPhilosophyofDeath,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.336‒54.

Williams,B,1973.”TheMakropolusCase:ReflectionsontheTediumofImmortality.”InhisProblemsoftheSelf,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.82‒100.

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POLITICALPHILOSOPHY


EMILANDERSSON–LiberalLegitimacyandJustifiabilitytoAll


According to John Rawls’s Liberal Principle of Legitimacy, it is a necessary condition forpoliticallegitimacythattheexerciseofpoliticalpowerisjustifiabletoallcitizens.Further,ithastobejustifiableevenassumingthefactofreasonablepluralism:i.e.thefactthatcitizensdisagreeonfundamentalmattersofphilosophy,religion,andthegoodlife.Thechallengeforaproponentofthisprinciple,whoisneitherananarchistnoralibertarian,istoexplainhowtointerpretthisrequirementoflegitimacysothatitimpliesthelegitimacyofliberalpoliciesand institutions.Howcan justifiability toallbeachieved,andthe legitimacyofcore liberalpoliciesandinstitutionspreserved,ifreasonablepluralismisthecase?

Presently,thereceivedviewamongRawlsiansisthattheprinciplehastobeinterpretedinawaythatsignificantlyqualifiestheideaofjustifiabilitytoall.Ithasbeensuggestedthatonlyjustifiability to the subsetof the citizenswhoare reasonableorqualifiedmatters (Estlund2008),andeventhattherelevantconstituencyisahypotheticalandhighly idealizedgroupofreasonablecitizens(Quong2011).Thoughthesemovesmaybeabletoavoidmakingtheprincipleimplyanarchisticorlibertarianconclusions,theycomewithaseriouscost.Thiscostis that they depart from, and effectively abandons, the feature of the view thatmade itappealinginthefirstplace:thatitmakeslegitimacydependonjustifiabilitytoallthoseoverwhompoliticalpowerisexercised.

Byheavilyqualifyingandrestrictingwhoaretobeincludedinthegroupreferredtobythenotionof“allcitizens”, these interpretationsoftheLiberalPrincipleofLegitimacy ineffectadmitsthattheidealofjustifiabilitytotrulyeveryoneoverwhompoliticalpowerisexercisedcannotbeachieved.Thisnotonlymakestheviewlessappealing,butitalsoseemtogiveanadvantagetothealternativelibertarianinterpretation(Gaus2011;Vallier2014)whichstaysclosertotheidealofjustifiabilitytoallintheoriginalsenseoftheidea.

I argue that Rawlsians can preserve the intuitively appealing idea of justifiability to trulyeveryonebyadoptingadifferentunderstandingofwhat justifiabilitytoaparticularpersonamountsto.Thereasonastowhyitmayseemasifwemayhavetoabandontheambitionof achieving justifiability even to the illiberal or unreasonable ones is an unmotivatedassumptionthatjustifiabilitytoapersonisdependentonthatperson’sbeliefsandepistemicsituation.Onceweabandonthis idea,andconstrue justifiability inadifferentway,wecanavoidaseriousdrawbackofthecurrentlydominantinterpretation.This,Iargue,resultinamoreplausibleunderstandingoftheLiberalPrincipleofLegitimacy.

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KATHARINABERNDTRASMUSSEN–Discrimination,harm,andmeritocracy

UppsalaUniversity&InstituteforFutureStudies|[email protected]

According to a recent account of group discrimination, the disadvantageous treatment ofindividuals,quamembersofsociallysalientgroups,is(primafacie)wrongbecauseitharmsthese individuals: itmakesthemworseoffthantheywouldhavebeen,hadtheynotbeensuchmembers. Theaccount’s relianceonacomparative, counterfactual,welfarist conceptof harmhas not been sufficiently examined, as of now. I argue thatitmakes the accountvulnerabletosome–thoughnotall–oftheproblemsthatarefamiliarfromdebatesabouttheconceptofharm.Ithendevelopahybrid,partlynon-welfaristconceptofharmthatcanhelp theaccountavoid theseproblems.Thishybrid concept is structurally similar toharmconcepts used in other contexts, e.g. debates concerning theHarmPrinciple, or theNon-IdentityProblem.

Oneupshotofmyargumentsisthatthethusimprovedanalysisofgroupdiscriminationanditswrongnessalsohelpsusre-engineerourconceptofharminawaythatprovesconsistentwith its use in other contexts. I suggest that this “bottom-up” strategy of conceptualengineeringpointstowardsamoregeneralwayofsalvagingthecontestedconceptofharmasbothusefulandanalysable.

Anotherupshot isthatweshouldrethinkthemoralstatusofpracticesthatareworrisomefromameritocratic (anti-discriminatory)perspective,suchasaffirmativeaction(e.g.givingpriority to black applicants in order to decrease workplace segregation), reactionqualification(e.g.givingprioritytoyoungerapplicantsinordertoappeaseageistcustomers),andstatisticalprofiling(e.g.givingprioritytonon-femaleapplicantsongroundsofstatisticalgeneralisationsaboutgenderedcaregivingpatterns).Iarguethattheimprovedharm-basedaccount of the wrongness of discrimination gives us the tools to both acknowledge andhandletheseworries.


ERICBRANDSTEDT–TheFutilityofReflectiveEquilibrium

LondonSchoolofEconomics&LundUniversity|[email protected]

Reflective equilibrium is a most common ideal for normative justification. If a principlecoheres with intuitive judgments at all levels of generality, which have been elicited byrelevantly described hypothetical cases, then it is said to enjoy the strongest possiblesupport. But understood in this way, as a coherentist ideal of justification, reflectiveequilibrium is unsatisfactory: it is just too disconnected from the practices in which itreasonably shouldplayaguiding role. Imagine thatafterhaving testedvariousalternativeprinciples,atheoristconcludesthattheprincipleofequalityisbestsupported–anytensionhasbeenresolvedbygivingupcontrariousparticularjudgmentsorbyaccommodatingtheirconcerns in revised versions of the general principle. The principle thus is in reflectiveequilibrium.Butisitthereforejustified?

Consider a real-life case, such as the climate negotiations under UNFCCC, whererepresentativesof 197nation statesdiscusswhat is a fair distributionof theburdens andbenefits of climate changemitigation. Theagentsbring to the table a seriesof normativecomplaints: that investments made prior to the date when climate change was publiclyrecognisedasamajorpoliticalproblemshouldbecompensatedfor;thatbasicneedsshouldbe protected from the adverse effects of climate change; that economic developmentshouldnotbe jeopardised in theefforts tomitigateclimatechange; that thebenefitsofatechnologicaltransitionshouldbenefittheircountry;etc.Wouldtheegalitarianprincipleinanywayguidethisgroupofagents?

Inthispaper,Iwillarguethatthestandardwayofsearchingforreflectiveequilibriumleadsto practically inept normative principles. It produces barebone ideas aboutwhatmatters,whicharepoorguidestoactioninreal-lifecases,wherethereisaneedforsomethingthatisless abstract and better connected to concerns on the ground. The obvious rejoinder, ofcourse, is that normative justification is about truth, not action guidance. The latter is anissuethatisrelatedtotheimplementationofnormativeprinciples,whichisanissuethatisfullyseparated from justificationandbasicallyaphilosophicallyuninterestingpracticality. Iwill counter this by highlighting how normative justification is intimately connected withimplementation and action-guidance. The upshot is that reflective equilibrium is a futileidealofnormativejustification.

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ÅSA BURMAN – Are social entrepreneurs moral? Questioning twofundamentalassumptionsinsocialentrepreneurship


Social entrepreneurship, as a phenomenon and as a research field, is growing rapidly.AccordingtoAshoka-themostwell-knownorganisationinthefield-asocialentrepreneuris an individual with ethical fiberwho has an innovative systems-changing idea, andwhomanages to implementandscale it.Examples includeMuhammedYunus (GrameenBank),Jimmy Wales (founder of Wikipedia), and Johan Wendt (founder of Mattecentrum)providingfreemathtutorialstoSwedishschoolchildren.OtherorganisationslikeKinnevik-owned Reach for Change emphasises the business component and views a socialentrepreneur as someone who solves a social problem through business methods, thusmixingabusinesslogicwithasociallogic.

I will question two fundamental and implicit assumptions in the field of socialentrepreneurship;first,thatsocialentrepreneursareperdefinitionmoral;andsecond;thetendencytoviewthemoralfromautilitarianperspective.Theaimofthecriticalpartofthepaperisbothtodrawattentiontoandcriticizeimplicitassumptionsthatshapeandlimitthefield insomerespects, suchas failing todistinguishbetweenthesocialandthemoralandbuildingonasometimescrudeandmistakenunderstandingoftheoriesinmoralphilosophy.This part of the paper thus serves to lay the foundation of a more constructive piece inclearly distinguishing between the social and themoral, aswell as adding differentmoraltheoriestothediscussion.

In the more constructive piece, where moral theory is viewed as extrinsic to socialentrepreneurship,Iarguethatadeeperandmorecomplexunderstandingofdifferentmoraltheories - adding Kantianism and virtue ethics to the discussion - can help socialentrepreneurs to navigate commonmoral dilemmas. In some cases, it will turn out thatwhatsocialentrepreneursperceivedasgenuinedilemmaswereonlyapparentwhilesomedecisions that they did not regard as that problematicmight in turn show up as genuinedilemmas.Inotherwords,theoverallaimofthispaperistointroduceacentraldiscussionofmoralphilosophy into socialentrepreneurshipand to introducemoralphilosophers to thefieldofsocialentrepreneurship.


MARKUSFURENDAL–Equality,ParetoandCohen'sEthos


G.A.Cohenhassummarizedhis“egalitariancampaign”againstJohnRawls’sconceptionofjusticeasdefendingtheclaimthat“equalityconstitutesdistributivejustice”.PaceRawlsandother defenders of a moral division of labor between institutions and individuals, Cohendefendstheideaofanegalitarianethos,which(mostassume)requirestalentedpersonstoa)choosea (sufficiently)productiveoccupationandb) todosoata rateofcompensationthatdoesnotupsetequality.Ifpeopleweretrulycommittedtothedifferenceprinciple,theeconomicincentivesusuallythoughttobesanctionedbyitwouldthusbesuperfluousand,additionally,notbedeemedjust.Cohen’sposition isarguablyattractivesince itmakestheideally just societymore equal than other views, and it is distinctive since it is based onCohen’sequality-basedviewofwhatdistributivejusticeis.

IarguethatthereisapriorpuzzleinCohen’sconceptionofjustice,whichcreatesadilemmathat strips his view of either its attractiveness or distinctiveness. If Cohenmaintains thatdistributive justice is equality, then he can at most defend b), and possibly a) incircumstanceswheretakingamoreproductivejobwouldleadtoequality.Butifdistributionis equal, this conception of distributive justice cannot yield a duty like a). Put in generalterms,Cohenfacesanindifferencechallenge,sincehecannotsaythatanequaldistributionwhereallhavemoreofthecurrencyofjusticeispreferableoveranequaldistributionwhereeveryonehaveless.Andinrelationtotheideaofanethos,talentedindividualsmighthaveaduty not to bargain theirway into inequality-generating incomes, but they cannot have adutyof justice touse their talents at amoreproductive level,whether they receiveextracompensation or not. He can only make the weaker claim that if they decide to workproductivelytheycannotdemandincentivesfordoingso.

IreviewandrejectanumberofwaysforCohentoavoidthedilemma,beforesuggestinganoveltakeonhowweshouldthinkoftheideaofanethos.InsteadofviewingtheethosasrealizingCohen’sequality-basedconceptionof justice,wecouldsee itasakindof“ruleofregulation”basedonseveralvalues,includingsomekindofmaximizingprinciple.ThismeansCohencouldretaintheequality-basedconceptionofdistributivejustice,andstilldefendanethosthatrequiresbotha)andb).

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KALLEGRILL–Acaseforlargerfamilies


Overthepastcoupleofdecades,liberalneutralistshavearguedthatmarriageinitscurrentform unjustifiably favors some life choices over others: it is restricted to two persons, toromantic or sexual relationships, and to lifelong or presumptively lifelong relationships.Indeed, the legal recognition of any personal relationshipsmay unjustifiably disadvantagethosewhoarenotinsuchrelationships.

One reason for legal recognition that would be consistent with liberal neutrality is theprotectionof the interestsof children tobe continuouslyandcapably cared for. Empiricalstudiessuggestthatchildrendobetterinfamiliesthanininstitutionsbutthatwehavelittlereason to prefer any particular family structure, not even two parents over one, whencontrollingforsocioeconomicstatus.However,atleastsomeofthesestudiesfailtoconsiderfamilieswheretheparentorparentsarenotavailableforinclusionbecausetheyareeitherdeadorotherwise impossibletocontact.Theseparentstypicallydonotcarewell fortheirchildren.

Ifchildren's interestsshouldmotivatepoliciesaroundfamilystructure,thenoneimportantfactorisresilienceorstability.Thisistypicallyfoundinnumbers:twoparentsarebetterthanoneandthreearebetterthantwo.Thereisalimittohowmanypeoplechildrencanhaveacloseemotionalbondswith.Developmentpsychologyindicatesthatthisupperlimitisnotattwoorthreepeople,however,butpossiblyatfiveorso.Agroupofaroundfiveadultswouldbe less vulnerable to losses and would decrease each adult' s work load of caring andprovidingandsoenablemoresupportforchildren.

Larger families could also have other benefits. They allow more and richer adult-adultinteraction, including in the way of romantic and sexual relationships. Families maythereforebemoreresilientandself-sustained,andprovideitsmembersgreaterbenefitsintermsofcommunityandsocialsatisfaction.Manytwoadultfamiliessufferfromdeficits intheseregards.Largefamilieswouldalsomeanthatmorepeoplecanbeparentswithfewerchildren, facilitating decreased population and so decreased pollution and use of naturalresources.

Insummary,therearemanyreasonsforwhygovernmentsshouldpromotelargerfamilies,intermsofthenumberofadults.Atleastsomeofthesereasonsareconsistentwithliberalneutrality.


SIRKKU HELLSTEN – The rise and fall of liberal democracy and politicalliberalism:whathappenedtoenlightenedcitizenship?

NordicAfricaInstitute&UniversityofHelsinki|[email protected]

This paperwill analyze the global failure of the social contract approach in setting liberaldemocracyastheframeworkforglobaljusticeintheoryandinpractice.SinceWorldWarII,‘liberaldemocracy’ and its theoretical frameworkofcosmopolitanpolitical liberalism havebeensetastheidealsandgoalsforglobaldevelopment.TheircorevaluesandprinciplescanbefoundinmanyUNdeclarationsaswellasinMDGsandSDGsindevelopmentpolicies.

Despite the heavy push from the West, we currently see various formulations ofauthoritarianneo-liberalismonriseacrosstheglobe.NotonlyintheSouth,butalsointheNorth,political liberalism and liberal democracy have been losing their normative power.Even in Europe as well as in the US we have seen populism, right wing extremism, and(religious)neo-conservatismrisingand leading towardsmoreauthoritarian leadership thatneverthelessisrunwiththeprinciplesofmarketeconomy,i.e.,economicliberalism.Insteadof focusing on enlightened citizenship, enhancement of critical thinking, valid and soundreasoning based on solid facts and consistent consideration of various sides of politicalissues;inpoliticaldecision-making,wenowseewidespreadrejectionofscientificandfactualinformation as well as sound argumentation. Opinions are formed and choices aremadebasedoninformationthatstrengthensone’sownbeliefsystems,nomatterhowunreliablethesesourcesmaybe.

Inthispresentation,Iwillfirstanalyzethefailureofliberalsocialcontracttheoryinsettingprinciples for global justice. Second, I will consider how to bring ‘enlightened citizenship’backtothepoliticalframeworkandrevivepublicreasonthatisbasedonautonomousmoralagencyratherthanmajorityruleindemocracy.

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LARSLINDBLOM–MillonLabouranditsClaims


Thispresentationoutlines JohnStuartMill’sviewsonunionismasmoralproblem. Itstartsby presentingMills economic analysis of unions, and then proceeds to explain his moralapproach. ForMill, unions performan important social role, but there are normative andeconomicconstraintsthatmustbekeptinmindwhiletheyaredoingso.Iwillthenfocusonthree core normative issues for Mill’s account, and both suggest some problems for hisviewsandsomesolutions.Theinsider-outsiderproblemistheproblemthatunionmemberscancreatenegativeeconomicexternalitiesforothers,suchastheunemployed,bybetteringtheirownpositions.Mill’ssolutiontothisproblemsistoextendunionmembership,whichseems reasonable as a policy, but leaves unresolved a second problem, which is thedistributive problem. I will discuss two issues regarding this problem. First, how toconceptualize thedistributiveproblem,and second, tentatively,how to solve it.However,Mill’sidealofthelabormarketisafuturewithoutunions,wheretheeconomyispopulatedby worker-managed cooperatives, and the conflict of interest between employer andemployeehasevaporated. Iwill argue thateven ifMill’s hopeswere tobe fulfilled, therewould still remain a useful social role for unions, since they have other functions thannegotiatingwages.Unionsalsoprovideaformofseparationofpower intheworkplace. InthiswayunionssolvewhatIshallcallthecontestabilityproblem.


JASMINA NEDEVSKA TÖRNQVIST – An Environment Worthy of FutureGenerations:TowardsaClassicalNaturalLawApproachtotheNon-IdentityProblem


In thiswork, I introduceaclassicalnatural lawapproach to thenon-identityproblem,andclaimthattherearedutiestoensureanenvironmentworthyoffuturegenerations.

Overtime,theglobalsea-level isexpectedtorisearoundsevenmeters,asglobalwarmingcauses the West Antarctic Ice Sheet to melt. The Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange(IPCC)predictsthatthiswillhappengradually.Mostoftherisewillnotoccurinourcentury,butoverthecourseofmorethanathousandyears.ClimatechangemayalsocausetheThermohalineCirculationtoshutdown,cuttingofftheGulfStreamtoWesternEurope,buttheIPCCdoubtsthatthiswilltakeplacebefore2100.Predictionsliketheseraiseseriousethicalquestionsaboutdistantfuturegenerations.Dowehavemoraldutieswithregardtotheirenvironment?Howcanandshouldsuchdutiesbeformulatedandhowextensivearethey?

The non-identity problem consistutes a fundamental rejection of such intergenerationalduties. This philosophical problem puts in questionwhetherwe can actmorallywrong inrelationtofuturepeople.Itproceedsfromtheobservationthatsincetheidentitiesoffuturepersons depend on our actions, e.g. the choice to live sustainably or not, future personscannotberenderedworseoffbyourgivingrisetoanyparticularworldinthefuture.Manyethicaltheoriesthereforeseemtoimplythatwewoulddonothingwrongbyleavingbehindan unsustainable environment. Such a conclusion excludes the existence ofintergenerationaldutiesandiscounterintuitive.

I argue that a natural law approach allows us to make an original as well as promisingargument in favourof intergenerationalduties.Natural law’s requirementtorespectbasicvalues provides an account ofwronging that avoids pitfalls of contractualism’s respectingpersons,aswellastheutilitarianapproachtomaximizevalue.Atthesametime,thenaturallawsolution to thenon-identityproblemspeaksagainstusingpublic institutionson futurepeople’sbehalf.Itisa”paralysing”conclusion,asacommonassumptionisthatthepracticalproblemofclimatechangeshouldbesolvedpolitically.Irefertothisastheinstitutionalnon-identityproblem.

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NIKLAS OLSSON YAOUZIS – On obscuring: a criticism of Rawlsian politicalphilosophy


Most criticismof JohnRawls’ (ATheoryof Justice 1971)work focuseson showing thathisconception of justice as fairness is wrong. Another criticism is that it obscures importantformsofinjustices.

Forexample, IrisMarionYoung(JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference1990:21)arguesthatthe focus on the distribution of wealth, income, and positions “tends to obscure theinstitutionalcontextwithinwhichthosedistributionstakeplace,andwhichisoftenatleastpartlythecauseofthepatternsofdistributionofjobsandwealth”.

Similarly, Charles Mills (“Ideal Theory” as ideology 2005, Contract and Domination 2007,Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls 2009) argues that Rawls’ use of ideal theory and focus ondistributive justice obscure important injustices in contemporary societies. Mills (2005)claims that because ideal theory uses an idealized social ontology that abstracts fromrelations of structural domination, exploitation, and coercion, it is difficult to use thisframework to describe injustices that involve these types of relations. In support of thisclaim,Mills (2009)goesthroughmorethan2000pagesofRawls’majorworksandnoticesthatifallmentionsofracismandracewouldfitonaboutsixpages.

Althoughtheexpression“toobscure” isoftenusedcolloquially, thereare fewattemptstoexplainwhatitmeansandwhyitisalegitimategroundforcriticism.Thelittlethathasbeenwritten suggests that it’s a relation between beliefs and social facts. Tommie Shelby(Ideology,Racism,andCriticalSocialTheory2003)mentionsthatbeingobscuringisonewayan ideological formof social consciousness canbeepistemicallydefective. Similarly, JasonStanley (HowPropagandaWorks2015:198)haverecentlydefined ‘flawed ideologies’asaset of beliefs that prevent us from gaining knowledge about (i.e., obscure) importantfeaturesof reality. Theprimaryharmaccording to Stanley is that thesebeliefspreventusfromgainingknowledge.Onthisview,theproblemwithRawls’ATheoryofJusticeisthatitmaycausepeopletoadoptbeliefsthatpreventthemfromformingtruebeliefsaboutotherimportantsocialfacts.

AdefenderofRawlscanrightlyobjectthatthefactthatabookmaycausereaderstoforgetaboutcertaininjusticesisn’tenoughtodismissit.It’suptothereadertorememberthatintherealworldthereareimportantsocialinjusticesthatneedtobesortedout.Rawls’scan’tbe held responsible for a reader’s inability to remember the racial injustices that marAmericansociety.

InthistalkI’llproposeanalternativeinterpretationofobscuringthatfocusesonutterancesmadeinanappropriatecontext.Shiftingfocusfrombeliefstoutterancesmakesitpossibleto use insights from pragmatics and speech act theory to examine whether truthfulutterancecanbesaidtoobscureasocialfact.I’lluseMaryKateMcGowan’s(ConversationalExercitives and the Force of Pornography 2003) theory of conversational exercetives toarguethattheutterancesofpoliticalphilosopherscananddo(insomecontexts)constitutespeech acts that determine the set of appropriate and inappropriate topics in politicalphilosophicalcontexts.I’llclaimthatifanutterancemakesitinappropriatetocallattentiontocertainimportantsocialfacts,thentheutteranceobscuresthesesocialfact.

I’llendthetalkbycallingattentiontosomeconsequencesofthechangeoffocus.


ATTILATANYI–ConsequentialismandItsdemands:TheRoleofInstitutions

UniversityofLiverpool|[email protected]

Consequentialistmorality imposes obligations on individuals that can be very demanding.Canthismoralitybesodemandingthatwehavereasonnottofollowitsdictates?Accordingto many, it can. This paper takes the plausibility and coherence of this objection – thedemandingness objection – as a given.Our question, therefore, is how to respond to theobjection.Weputforwardaresponsethatwethinkhasnotreceivedsufficientattentioninthe literature: institutional consequentialism. This is a consequentialist view that requiresinstitutional systems,andnot individuals, to followtheconsequentialistprinciple.We firstintroduce the demandingness objection, then explain the theory of institutionalconsequentialismandhowitrespondstotheobjection. Intheremainderofthepaper,wedefend the view against the objection that institutional consequentialism cannot alleviateworriesaboutdemandingnessontheglobal level.Global issuessuchaspoverty,peace,ortheprotectionoftheenvironmentgenerateburdensomeresponsibilities,yet,thereseemtobe no global institutions to carry them out. It seems, then, that it is left to betteroffindividuals to devotemost of their resources to humanitarian projects.We argue againstthisobjectionthatthereareseveralglobalinstitutionsthatcanbeusedforthepurposesoffulfillingconsequentialistrequirements.Inourcurrentinstitutionalworldorderincludingthestate system aswell as transnational institutions consequentialist demands on individualsaremitigated. Institutions thatare sufficientlywell functioning spread thin theburdensofcomplianceacrossa greaternumberofpartiesand reduce theburdenson thosewhoaredisposed to shoulder their share of the consequentialist task. They also reduce costs byclearly allocating responsibilities and coordinating the manner agents implement them.Finally, they easemotivational strains by providing assurance that responsibilities will bemutually honoured. In ending the paper, we evaluate in some detail two more radicalproposals: thatwe need aworld government to successfully deal with themost pressingglobal concerns or, to the contrary, thatwe should switch to a diffuse systemof regionalorganization (‘neo-mediavilism’) instead of building large, centralized state structures.Although we find positives in both proposals, we ultimately argue against them onconsequentialistgrounds.

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JOHNBROOME–Reason

UniversityofOxford|[email protected]

One sense of theword 'reason' appears inHume's remark ''Tis not contrary to reason toprefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger'. Here 'reason'means the same as 'rationality'; it is the name of a property that can be possessed bypeople.Aquitedifferentsenseof'reason'appearsin'Davidhasnoreasonnottopreferthedestructionofthewholeworldtothescratchingofhisfinger'.Here'reason'isamassnounthat corresponds to the countnoun 'a reason'; it is used todescribe anormative relationthat canobtainbetweenaperson (suchasDavid) andanactionor anattitude (suchas apreference).

Philosophers frequently confuse these two senses of 'reason': the rational sense and thenormative sense. Indeed, the distinction between rationality and normativity is not wellunderstood.Iaimtoclarifyit.

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VALUETHEORY


JANS.ANDERSSON–Subjektivismvsexpressivism:enmeningslösmatch?

[email protected]

I denmetaetiskadebattenharav tradition förekommit två rivaliserande teorier sombådaantarattvärdeutsagorpånågotsätt”handlarom”dentalandesinställningellerattityd.Denenabrukarkallassubjektivismellerdensjälvbiografiskateorin,somhävdaratttalarenmeddessautsagorpåstårnågotomellerbeskriver sinmoraliska inställning.Denandra innebärattmanantar att talarenuttrycker ellermanifesterar sin inställning till något.Den senareharförekommitiolikavariantersomemotivismellerpreskriptivism.Numeraföredrarmaniallmänhetdenövergripandebeteckningexpressivismfördessateorier.

IenuppsatsriktarJamesDreierkritikmotettförslagfrånMichaelSmithommeningenhosvärdeutsagor.EnligtSmithbetyder“xisgood”detsammasom“xissuchastobeapprovedofbythosewhoshareourmoralviewpointundersuitableconditions”.Dennateori liknardensubjektivistiska självbiografiska teorin som antar att värdeutsagor är påståenden omtalarensmoraliskagillande.Smithbetraktarteorinsomenvariantav”subjectivedefinitionalnaturalism”.DreierskritikavMSTkansammanfattassåhär:

EnligtSmithsanalysärdetsåattnärMarshasäger:”Skattesänkningärbra”,såsägerhonattskattesänkning är något som hon, och andra som är som hon, skulle gilla omomständigheterna vore de rätta. Om teorin är riktig gör hon då en förutsägelse att honskullegilla skattesänkning ienviss situation.Men i ställetärdet såattMarshasuttalandeinte är en förutsägelseutanett uttryck för gillande.NärMarsha yttrar ”Skattesänkning ärbra” behöver vi inte undra om det hon säger är sant för att dra en slutsats om hennesattityd.Dettaberorpåatthennesuttalandeintehandlaromhennesattitydavgillande.Detär inte ett påstående om att hon, och andra som hon, skulle gilla skattesänkning omomständigheternavarde rätta.Snarareärdet såattyttrandetuttryckerhennesattitydavgillande.

ImittföredraggörjagentolkningavsubjektivismensomgördetmöjligtfördennaattundgåDreiers kritik. Jag menar också att denna tolkning gör att vi inte behöver betraktasubjektivismochexpressivismsomrivaliserandeteorier.Subjektivismenkansesomenteoriom värdeutsagors semantik medan expressivismen är en teori om deras pragmatiskafunktion.Mankandåvarasubjektivistisemantikenochexpressivistipragmatiken.

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EMMABECKMAN–Twoargumentsformoralerrortheory


Moral error theory is the thesis that moral thought and discourse aims at truth butsystematicallyfailstosecureit.InthistalkIdiscusstwoargumentsforerrortheory.

Accordingtothefirstargument–whichIrefertoastheargumentfromauthority–moralitylandsinerrorbecausemoralrequirementshaveauthorityregardlessofwhetheranyagentmaking the requirement can be identified. Joyce (2011:523) argues that moral discoursepresupposesnon-institutionaldesire-transcendentreasonsandnon-institutionalcategoricalimperatives,whileallgenuinedesire-transcendentreasonsandcategorical imperativesareinstitutional. I challenge this argument by, first, exploring the possibility of interpretingmoral practice as an institution, differing fromother normative frameworks like etiquetteand chess not in kind, but only in scope and degree, and, second, suggesting that theauthorityofmoralityenterspragmatically intomoralconversationsso thatnormallywhenwe make moral statements, we operate under the assumption that all parties to theconversation give practical weight to moral requirements and reasons, and give moralconsiderationsprecedentinpracticalintra-andinterpersonaldeliberation.

According to the second argument – which I refer to as the argument from normativeirreducibility – morality lands in error because moral thought and discourse involves acommitmenttoirreduciblynormativefavoringrelationswhileitisfarfromclearthatthereare,orcanbe,suchrelations(Olson2016:401).Olson(2014:124)suggeststhatmoralclaimsare or entail claims about irreducibly normative reasons. He defends this claim byresponding to Finlay’s (2006, 2008) relativistic account of moral thought and discourse. Ichallenge Olson’s argument by challenging his response to Finlay. Even granting thatirreduciblynormativefavoringrelationsare,orwouldbe,queer,moralclaimsdonotentailclaimsaboutqueerrelationsunlesstheyentailclaimsabout irreduciblynormativefavoringrelations,anditisunclearthattheydo.

References

Finlay,S.(2006),“Thereasonsthatmatter”,AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy,84(1):1-20.

Finlay,S.(2008),“Theerrorintheerrortheory”,AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy,86(3):347-369.

Joyce, R. (2011), “The Error in ‘The Error in the Error Theory’”, Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy89(3):519-534.

Olson, J. (2014),Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Olson,J.(2016),“PrécisofMoralErrorTheory:History,Critique,Defence”,JournalofMoralPhilosophy13(4):397-402.


RAGNARFRANCÉN–Anewaccountofmoraldisagreement


WhenAthinksthat,say,stealing ismorallywrongandBthinksthatstealing isnotmorallywrong, they disagree. At least, this is a commonly shared intuition about moraldisagreement.Therearetwodominantkindsofexplanationsofthisintuition.Theabsolutistaccount explains it in termsof beliefswith conflicting cognitive contents:A andBbelievepropositionsthatcannotbothbetrue.Thisaccountpresupposesthatthecognitivecontentof moral beliefs is invariant between different judges and contexts in such a way that,alwayswhenAbelievesthatϕismorallywrongandBbelievesthatϕisnotmorallywrong,they have beliefs with mutually inconsistent contents. This presupposition is highlycontroversial and philosophers who have argued that it should be rejected (e.g., non-cognitivists and contextualists/relativists) have instead suggested the attitude account,accordingtowhichmoraldisagreementsshouldbeconstruedasdisagreementsinattitude:A and B have clashing practical attitudes, e.g., desires that cannot both be satisfied. Thisaccount presupposes thatmoral judgments are always accompanied by or consist of therelevantkindsofattitudes,apresuppositionwhichisalsohighlycontroversialandrejectedbymanyphilosophers.

Suppose that we find the arguments against both presuppositions at least prima facieplausible. Thenwe have reason to look for an alternative account ofmoral disagreementwhich commits to neither presupposition. In this talk Iwill present a new account of thissort, building on the idea that moral judgments have practical direction in the followingsense:evenifitmightnotbethecasethatourmoraljudgmentsalwaysmotivateustoactinaccordancewith them, they are judgments thatwe can (or can fail) to act in accordancewith.Foreachmoralrightness-orwrongness-judgmenttherearewaysofactingthatareinaccordance (in line) with the judgment, and ways of acting that are in disaccordance (inconflict)withthejudgment.Iarguethatmoraldisagreementscanbeunderstoodintermsofpeoplehavingmoraljudgmentswithconflictingpracticaldirections.

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MATSINGELSTRÖM–ADilemmaforWell-beingMeasurement


Manytodayholdthatpsychometricsubjectivewell-being(SWB)measurementscanbevalidmeasuresofwell-being.IwanttoclarifyandchallengethispositionbyposingadilemmaforproponentsofthevalidityofSWB-measures.

Broadly speaking, there are two competing accounts of the nature of measurements:measurement-realism andmeasurement-nominalism. According to measurement-realism,measurements aim to identify/discover real nonnumerical properties or relations that arecharacterizedindependentlyofthemeasurementprocedure.ChangandCartwrightexplainsthis accountas: "For the realist,measurement is anactivity aimedatdiscovering the truevalue of a specified quantity that exists independently of how we measure it, and thequestion of the correctness of method is certainly not vacuous." (2008, 368–369).Measurement-nominalism is the rejection of measurement-realism. On this account, themeasuredpropertiesorrelationsarenotcharacterizedindependentlyofthemeasurementprocedure. Instead, measurements define or regulate the usage of a concept within ascientificfield.

Briefly,myargumentrunsasfollows:

1.Eithermeasurement-realismormeasurement-nominalism.

2.Ifmeasurement-realism,thentheproblemofnomicmeasurement(Chang2004)mustbehandled.Theproblemarisessincewecannotdirectlyobservethequantityweareinterestedin,butinsteadweneedtorelyonindirectobservation.Howcanweknowthattheindirectobservation provides accurate information about the true value of the quantity we areinterested in?Theproblemofnomicmeasurement is a generalproblem forpsychometricmeasurement, but it is particularly serious for SWB-measures because ‘quantity of well-being’isnotatheoreticalconceptinternaltothefieldinwhichitismeasured.Rather,itisaconceptthatalreadyplaysasignificantroleinvaluetheoryandpolicyevaluation.Themostpromisingwayofavoidingtheproblemofnomicmeasurementistoabandonmeasurement-realismandoptforsomeformofmeasurement-nominalism.

3.Ifmeasurement-nominalism,thenitisdifficulttoaccountfordifferentexplanationsofthephenomenaofresponse-shift(Oortetal.2009;McClimansetal.2013).Aplausibleaccountof well-being should be sensitive to different explanations of response-shifting.Furthermore, if SWB-measuresarenotaimingatdiscovering the truequantityofpeople’sindependentlycharacterisedwell-being, thentheevaluative relevanceofSWB-measures islessclearthanproponentsoftenseemtoassume.Themostpromisingwayofaccountingforresponse-shift and to guarantee the evaluative relevance is to abandon measurement-nominalismandoptforsomeformofmeasurement-realism.

References

Chang, Hasok. 2004. Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress. OUP,USA.

Chang,Hasok,andNancyCartwright.2008.‘Measurement’.InTheRoutledgeCompaniontoPhilosophyofScience,editedbyStathisPsillosandMartinCurd,1edition,367–384.London;NewYork:Routledge.


McClimans,Leah,JeromeBickenbach,MarjanWesterman,LiciaCarlson,DavidWasserman,andCarolynSchwartz.2013. ‘PhilosophicalPerspectivesonResponseShift’.Qualityof LifeResearch22(7):1871–78.

Oort,FransJ.,MechteldR.M.Visser,andMirjamA.G.Sprangers.2009.‘FormalDefinitionsof Measurement Bias and Explanation Bias Clarify Measurement and ConceptualPerspectivesonResponseShift’.JournalofClinicalEpidemiology62(11):1126–37.

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ANTTIKAUPPINEN–Prudence,Authencity,andtheChangingSelf

UniversityofTampere|[email protected]

Thechoiceswemakenowcanhaveanimpactonourlivesinthefuture.Onechallengeformaking such future-affecting choices rationally is thatour attitudes–preferences, beliefs,andvalues–maywellchangeovertime,perhapsasaresultofourverychoicesnow,sothattheutilitywewillassigntoafuturestateofaffairsisdifferentfromtheutilitywenowassignto it. How can we make prudentially rational and authentic decisions in light of suchdiachronicpreferenceconflict?

Inmy talk, I discuss various candidate principles for prudential and authentic (true to theself)choiceincasesofdiachronicconflict,andarguethattheirappealisrootedindifferentconceptions of the self. First, on an experiential conception of the self, on which we arefundamentally subjects of first-personal experience (see Paul 2015), distinct from anyparticularpreferenceorvaluewehappentohold,thefollowingprinciplesseemappealing:

Preference Neutrality: Prudence requires giving equal weight to any present orfuturepreferenceregardinganoutcomeattwhenassigningutilityfortheoutcomeatt.

ConcurrentPreferencePriority:Prudencerequiresassigningutilitytoanoutcomeattonthebasisofthepreferencesonewillhaveatt.

Second,onanevaluativeconception,accordingtowhichitisourvaluesoridealsthatdefinewhoweare(seeBrink2011),thefollowingprinciplewillseemtoberight:

IdealEgalitarianism:Prudencerequiresgivingequalweighttoanyseeminglyequallywell-supportedpresentorfutureideal-basedpreferenceregardinganoutcomeatt,regardlessofwhenitisheld,whenassigningutilitytheoutcomeatt.

Third, I argue thatwhile bothof these approach capture somethingofwhowe are,whatmatters most in the context of decision-making is the practical conception of the self,according to which it is our commitments that define who we really are (Bratman 2009,Korsgaard 2009). By their very nature, commitments involve taking a stance on futureattitudes, anddon’t allow for temporal neutrality. Indeed, from this perspective, the verytalkofa‘futureself’anda‘presentself’andrelatedintrapersonalanalogiesofinterpersonalrelations are highly misleading. So if we take this view of the self, we should endorsesomethinglikethefollowingprincipleasgoverningdiachronicconflicts:

PresentCommitmentPriority:Prudencerequiresassigningvaluetofutureoutcomesonthebasisof(reasonable)presentcommitmentstofutureoutcomes,iftheyexist,regardless of possibly different future preferences, ideals, or commitments forconcurrentoutcomes.

IclaimthatthisprincipleyieldsrightverdictsaboutallthecasesIdiscussinthepaper.Tobeauthentic,wemustsometimesactinwayswewon’tendorseinthefuture.


VICTOR MOBERGER – Tristram McPherson om non-naturalism ochsuperveniens


Non-naturalisteromnormativitetanserattdetfinns(instantierbara)normativaegenskaper,och att dessa egenskaper ärmetafysiskt diskontinuerligamed naturliga (eller deskriptiva)egenskaper. Samtidigt råder utbredd enighet om att det normativa supervenierar på detnaturliga, på så sätt att inga metafysiskt möjliga objekt eller världar kan skilja sig åt inormativtavseendeutanattskiljasigåtinaturligtavseende.

Ienuppmärksammadartikel (2012)dammarTristramMcPhersonavmisstankenattdennasupervenienstesärsvårattförenamednon-naturalisterssynpånormativaegenskaper.MerspecifiktmenarMcPherson att det är svårt att se hur non-naturalister ska kunna förklaravarförsuperveniensrelationenifrågaråder.Tillskillnadfrånsinanaturalistiskamotståndarekannon-naturalisterinteåberopanågonformavreduktivförklaring.McPhersonmenardockatt ingen annan tillfredsställande förklaring står till buds. Non-naturalister skulle därmedbehöva anta att det råder en oförklarad, eller ogrundad, metafysiskt nödvändig kopplingmellan diskontinuerliga egenskaper. Enligt McPherson är ett sådant antagande mycketkostsamt.

JagdiskuterarnågraolikastrategierförattbemötaMcPhersonsresonemang.Tvåavdessamisslyckas, men en tredje är mer framgångsrik. Avslutningsvis jämför jag McPhersonsargumentmedettrelateratargument,framförtavJ.L.Mackie(1977).Lärdomenavdennajämförelse är att om non-naturalister är förbundna till en ogrundad superveniensrelationmellannormativaochnaturligaegenskaper,såställsdeinförbetydligtstörresvårigheteränMcPhersonförutser.

Referenser

Mackie,J.L.(1977).Ethics:InventingRightandWrong.Harmondsworth:PenguinBooks.

McPherson,T.(2012).”EthicalNon-naturalismandtheMetaphysicsofSupervenience”,iR.Shafer-Landau (red.),OxfordStudies inMetaethics,Volume7, ss.205–234.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

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SARAPACKALÉN–Subjectivism,assertoriccontent,anddisagreement


BysubjectivismIintendthefollowingsemanticthesisconcerningnormativelanguage.Letcbe the context of utterance and let sc be the speaker of the context of utterance.Furthermore,letFbeapredicateofaction.Semanticclausesfornormativesentencesthenhavethefollowinggeneralform:

(1)⟦F-ingiswrong⟧c=1iffscdisapprovesofF-ing

(2)⟦F-ingisright⟧c=1iffscapprovesofF-ing

‘Disapproval’and‘approval’aresupposedtobeplaceholdertermsforsomesuitable ‘pro-’and‘con-’attitudes,characterizableinnon-normativeterms.

The subjectivist semantic clauses have three characteristics. First, assuming that approvaland disapproval in themselves are non-normative properties, the right hand sides of theequivalencescontainonlynon-normativeterms.Hence,subjectivismisanaturalistpositioninthatthetruth-conditionsfornormativesentencesaregiveninnon-normativeterms.Thissets subjectivism apart from non-naturalist semantic frameworks, according to which thetruth-conditions of normative sentences contain irreducibly normative terms. Second,according to subjectivism, normative sentences have truth-conditions in the sameway asdescriptive, non-normative sentences. This sets the position apart from expressivistpositions,accordingtowhichnormativesentencesdonotstatefactsabouttheworldorthespeaker’sviewsbutratherexpressanattitudeorastateofmindofthespeaker.Thirdandfinally,normativesentencesareindexicalaccordingtosubjectivisminthatthetruthvalueofnormativesentencesvarywiththecontextofutteranceandinparticularwiththespeaker.Thisfinalfeatureisthesourceofthesemanticproblemsthatarethefocusofthispaper:themodalproblemandtheproblemofgenuinedisagreement(Schroeder,2008:16-17).

If subjectivism is truewecangiveauniformnaturalistandtruth-conditionalsemantics forbothnormativeandnon-normativelanguage.(I’mheremakingtheassumptionthatsuchasemantics can be given for non-normative language.) Arguably, this feature is virtuousenough to take theposition seriously andattempt to solve theproblemsarising from theindexicality.

Ibeginbypresentingthetwoproblemsandexplainwhytheyarise.Igoontopresentatwo-dimensionalsolutiontothemodalproblem,suggestedbyDaviesandHumberstone(1980).Thatsolutionisbasedonadistinctionbetweentwokindsofmeaning:assertoriccontentandcompositional semantic value. I argue that their solution succeeds in solving the modalproblemandthatsubjectivism isaviabletheoryofassertoriccontent. Ialsoarguethatanadditional featureof theaccount is that itallowsforasolutiontotheproblemofgenuinedisagreement.

References

Davies, M. and Humberstone, L. (1980). Two notions of necessity. Philosophical Studies,38(1):1–31.

Schroeder,M.A.(2008).BeingFor:EvaluatingtheSemanticProgramofExpressivism.OxfordUniversityPress.


EIRIK JULIUS RISBERG – Empathy, Moral Judgement, and MoralDisjunctivism

FalstadCentreforDemocracyandHumanRights|[email protected]

Over the past decade, there has been a surge in interest in the question of what roleempathyplays inmoral reasoning.MichaelSlote, for instance,hasarguedthatempathy isthe “cement of the moral universe” (2010: 4). Yet, while empathy has received muchattentionintheon-goingdiscussionbetweenmoral internalistsandmoralexternalistsovermoralmotivation, the role it plays inourmoral reasoning – inmoral judgement – has, asAnttiKauppinen(2013a)notes,notreceivednearlyasmuchattention.Attemptingtorectifythis oversight – and against critics, which takes empathy to be an aberration of moralreasoning(e.g.Prinz2011)–Kauppinen(2013a)hasarguedthatregulatedempathycananddoesplayanimportantrole,bothinexplainingandvindicatingmoraljudgement.

However,whileitmaybeeasytoseehowempathyplaysacausalrole–andperhapsevenanexplanatoryroleinmoralreasoning–itmaybehardertodefendtheclaimthatempathyalsovindicatesourmoral judgements.Onthefaceof it,andasseveralcriticshavepointedout(e.g.Prinz2011),empathyiseasilycorruptibleandseemstofavourthosenearanddear.Againstthis,however,Kauppinenhasarguedthatratherthantoshunempathy,theansweris“touse itwisely”(Kauppinen2013a:32): ifwedoso,“wewillreflectivelyendorse thosemoralconvictionsthatresultfromideal-regulatedempathy”(Kauppinen2013a:32).

The process of regulating empathy and of approximating a wide reflective equilibriumhowever, are both processes of tempering or countering the emotional response thatcharacterizesempathy,i.e.ofcurtailingempathywithreason.Thus,whileempathymaystillplay a role in moral motivation, it seems that the process of emotion regulation andobtainingareflectiveequilibriumareprocessesthatruncountertotheattempttovindicatethe role of empathy in making moral judgements. The problem, as Kaupinnen sayselsewhere (2014), is “fitting together the representational and practical aspects of moraljudgement.”Attemptingtosolvethisproblemhedefendswhathecallsmoraldisjunctivism,according to which we must distinguish between moral intuitions – “spontaneous andcompelling non-doxastic appearances of right or wrong” – and judgements, “which areordinarybeliefsaboutamoralsubjectmatter”(Kauppinen2013b:1-2).Whileaninterestingattempt I argue that treating moral intuitions and beliefs as disjunct phenomena, theproposalseverstherelationbetweenempathyandmoraljudgement.

References

Kauppinen,Antti (2013a). “Empathy, EmotionRegulation, andMoral Judgement”, inHeidiMaibom(ed.)EmpathyandMorality,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Kauppinen,Antti(2013b).“IntuitionandBeliefinMoralMotivation”,inGunnarBjörnssonetal.(eds.),MotivationalInternalism.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Kauppinen,Antti (2014). "MoralSentimentalism",TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), URL =<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/moral-sentimentalism/>.

Prinz,Jesse(2011).2011,“AgainstEmpathy,”SouthernJournalofPhilosophy,49:214–233.

Slote,Michael(2010).MoralSentimentalism,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

BOOKOFABSTRACTS156


H.ORRISTEFÁNSSON–Indefenceofrisk-freeutility

InstituteforFuturesStudies&StockholmUniversity|[email protected]

Theaimofthistalkistodefendthenotionof“risk-free”cardinalutility.Arisk-freecardinalutilitymeasureisconstructedwithoutmakinganyassumptionsaboutriskyprospectsbeingordered. Instead, it is assumed that differences between risk-free outcomes are ordered.Many moral philosophers assume (and some explicitly state) that utility cannot becardinalized without making assumptions about how risky prospects are ordered. I willexplainwhythis isnotcorrect,andIwillshowthatrisk-freecardinalutilitycanbeusedtoilluminatedebatesinnormativeethics.

BOOKOFABSTRACTS158

CHRISTIAN TARSNEY – Two Regress Problems for Rational Choice underNormativeUncertainty


Philosophers have recently begun taking up the question of how to act when you'reuncertain about basic normative principles. One challenge is the regress problem: If,whenever I am uncertain about some norm, I cannot act on that norm straightaway butmust account for my uncertainty by means of some higher-order norm, then practicalreasonersseemdoomedtoconsideraninfiniteseriesofhigher-ordernormsbeforereachinganydecision.Thispaperproposesasolution.First, Idistinguish twoaspectsof theregressproblem,aproblemof ideal rationality (howan ideallyrationalagentshouldchoosewhensheisuncertainaboutnormsateveryorderinaninfinitehierarchy)andaproblemofnon-ideal rationality (how ordinary agents, who cannot form rational beliefs about thewholeinfinitehierarchy,shouldapproximateidealrationality).Ithenarguethatphilosopherswhothink that the requirements of rationality are sensitive to an agent's normative beliefsshouldneverthelessconcedeaweakversionofthe“normativeexternalist"thesisurgedbycriticslikeBrianWeatherson,accordingtowhichatleastsomenormsareincumbentonanagentregardlessofhernormativebeliefsorevidence.Ifsomesufficientlythinprinciple,e.g.that agents rationally ought to choose options with maximal expected choiceworthiness,havethis“external"status,thentheregressproblemreducestoanepistemicproblem,e.g.of estimating the expected choiceworthiness of options. This does not resolve the idealproblem,butsuggeststhatitcanbesubsumedintoamoregeneralepistemologicalproblemofhigher-orderevidence.Concerningthenon-idealproblem,acceptinganexternalistnormlike“maximizeexpectedchoiceworthiness"suggestsausefulanalogywithaproblemfacedby consequentialists under empirical uncertainty: My limited power to predict theconsequences of my actions forces me to adopt heuristics to approximate thoseconsequences.But since I ought to adopt thebestheuristics, and cannot fullypredict thevalue of a given heuristic, I must adopt second-order heuristics to select among possiblefirst-orderheuristics,andsoon.Butthisproblemistractable:Anagentbeginswithstandingbeliefs about which of her options has highest expected utility and about the expectedmarginal cost and value of further deliberation, then updates these beliefs as shedeliberates until she judges that the marginal cost of further deliberation exceeds themarginalvalue,atwhichpoint it is rational to stopdeliberatingandact straightaway.Thismeans that there is no need for non-ideal agents to perform the impossible task ofcontemplatinganinfinitehierarchyofmeta-heuristics.Iarguethat,givenacommitmenttoweak normative externalism, the same story can be told about the regress problem fornormativeuncertainty,resolvingthenon-idealaspectoftheproblemoutright.


INDEXOFSPEAKERS

ÅGREN,Åsa 95

AHLIN,Jesper 35

ÅKERLUND,Erik 60

ALEXIUS,Tobias 78

ANDERSSON,Emil 133

ANDERSSON,JanS. 147

BÅVE,Arvid 69

BECKMAN,Emma 148

BELFRAGE,Sara 36

BENGTSSON,Gisela 70

BERNDTRASMUSSEN,Katharina 134

BJÖRNSSON,Gunnar 122

BLACK,Isra 53

BOBERG,Johan 61

BØHN,EinarDuenger 79

BRAIDA,Tommaso 96

BRANDSTEDT,Eric 135

BROOME,John 145

BROWN,Dale 97

BÜLOW,William 98

BURMAN,Åsa 136

CASINI,Lorenzo 62

CHRISTENSEN,JanErik 37

COP,Simon 10

DAHLSTRAND,Karl 99

ENEROTH,Elisabeth 100

ENFLO,Karin 38

ERIKSSON,Anton 39

FORSBERG,Lisa 53

FORSBERG,Maria 11

FOULTIER,AnnaPetronella 89

FRANCÉN,Ragnar 149

FRÄNDBERG,Åke 101

FRANZÉN,Nils 71

FURBERG,Elisabeth 80

FURENDAL,Markus 137

GÅVERTSSON,Frits 40

GKTAZARAS,Thanassis 63

GORBOW,Paul 81

GRILL,Kalle 138

GUSTAFSSON,Håkan 103

GUSTAFSSON,Johan 41

HANSSON,SvenOve 23

HARRISON,Rebecca 90

HATTIANGADI,Anandi 72

HAVILAND,Vendela 13

HELLSTEN,Sirkku 139

HOLM,Cyril 104

HUTTUNEN,Rauno 91

INGELSTRÖM,Mats 150

JANSSONBOSTRÖM,Erik 24

JEBARI,Karim 42

JENSEN,KarstenKlint 43

JERKERT,Jesper 25

JOHANNESSON,Eric 26

JONBÄCK,Francis 130

JUTH,Niklas 44

KAKKORI,Leena 91

BOOKOFABSTRACTS160

KAUPPINEN,Anti 152

KELLGREN,Jan 105

KERMATH,Sean 106

KNOKS,Aleks 27

LAGERLUND,Henrik 64

LEITER,Brian 107

LINDBLOM,Lars 140

LINDGREN,Sandra 45

LUNDGREN,Björn 73

LUTZ,Sebastian 28

LYLES,Max 108

LYRESKOG,DavidM. 46

MALMGREN,Helge 82

MARTÍNEZMARÍN,Irene 14

MATHESON,Benjamin 47

MILAM,Per-Erik 48

MINDUS,Patricia 109

MOBERG,Gunnar 29

MOBERGER,Victor 153

NEDEVSKATÖRNQVIST,Jasmina 141

OLSSONYAOUZIS,Niklas 42,142

OLSSON,ErikJ. 30

OZDEMIR,Burcu 92

PACKALÉN,Sara 154

PAGE,Jeremy 15

PATRÃO,Andre 16

PEDRO,GuilhermeMarques 110

PENCHEV,Vasil 31

PEPP,Jessica 49

PERSSON,Victor 17

PETTERSON,Mikael 18

PLESNYS,Albinas 75

PRATS,Elena 111

RÁBANOS,JulietaA. 112

REEMES,Paulina 65

REUTER,Martina 57

REYESMOLINA,Sebastián 113

RISBERG,EirikJulius 155

RISBERG,Olle 50

ROSENQVIST,Simon 51

RUDOLPHI,Axel 19

RYDÉHN,Henrik 83

SANDIN,Per 52

SCHEFFEL,Jan 123

SCHOENHERR,Julius 124

SEVELIN,Ellika 114

SHAH,Qasir 58

SHAHEEN,Jonathan 84

SJÖLINWIRLING,Ylwa 86

SPAAK,Torben 115

SPADA,Francesco 85

STEFÁNSSON,H.Orri 157

STENSEKE,Gustav 116

STERLINGCASAS,JuanPablo 117

STETTE,Hallvard 66

STRÅGE,Alva 125

STRÖMBERG,Caroline 118

SUNDSTRÖM,Pär 126

SVEDBERG,Maria 131

SVEDBERG,Wanna 119

TÄLJEDAL,Inge-Bert 67

TANYI,Attila 143

TARSNEY,Christian 158

THORELL,Amanda 32


TIOZZO,Marco 33

TORPMAN,Olle 54

WALLBANK,Rebecca 20

WALLENGREN,Simon 120

WEIGELT,Charlotta 93

WIKBLOM,Andreas 21

WINES,Ryan 55

WOODS,Evan 87

YEHEZKEL,Gal 127

ZHANG,Li 76

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