The Philebus to 36C. Philosophy 190: Plato Fall, 2014 Prof. Peter Hadreas Course website: ses/Plato Platos.

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The Philebus to 36C. Philosophy 190: PlatoFall, 2014Prof. Peter HadreasCourse website:

Platos Academy, a mosaic in the Museo Nazionale, Naples, (Photo: Giraudon)

Cosimo di Giovanni de' Medici (1389 1464) was the first of the Medici political dynasty. They were the de facto rulers of Florence during much of the Italian Renaissance. He was known "Cosimo Pater Patriae" (Latin: 'father of the nation'). His power derived from his great wealth as a banker, and he was also a great patron of learning, the arts and architecture.The Death of Cosimo de Medici1As Cosimo lay on his deathbed in the late July we learn from Ficino himself in a letter to Lorenzo that at last Cosimo heard the Philebus: So, as you yourself know since you were there, he died not long after we had read him Platos dialogues on the one principle of things [the Parmenides] and on the highest good [the Philebus]. It was as if he did not want to wait to enjoy fully the good which had been the theme of the discussion. The not long after was, in Ficinos recollection, twelve days.

1. Marsilio Ficino: The Philebus Commentary, A critical edition and translation by Michael J. B. Allen, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 6:

Once again, this is evidence for the felt connection between the two dialogues, though, parenthetically, Ficino was to postpone the commenting on the Parmenides until much later. From the ensuing discussion on the Philebus and the other nine dialogues which Ficino manages to complete before Cosimo died, Marcel suggests the meetings of the Academy as a religio-philosophical society were informally inaugurated among Cosimos frends. Till then the Academy had been simply an unrealized ideal.1

1. Ibid.

Characters of the Philebus:

SocratesProtarchusPhilebusProtarchus is a young man, son of Callias (19B), pupil of Gorgias, the famous teacher of rhetoric and sophistic philosopher (58Aff.). I see no reason to doubt that he is the Protarchus mentioned by Aristotle at Physics 197B as the author of an apparently sophistic argument.

1. Robin A, H. Waterfield in the Penguin Edition to the Philebus (Plato, Philebus, London: Penguin, 1986), p. 10, The Character of Philebus

It is not certain whether Philebus was a real or fictional person. But, since both Socrates and Protarchus are real people, it would be odd for Philebus not to be so also. His name is appropriate for his hedonism (Mr. Loveboy, as one commentator has put it) is neither here nor there: a better translation might be Youth-friend. The portrayal of Philebus is just vivid enough to make it likely that Plato has a real person in mind: he is sullenly stubborn (12A-B), a bad loser (11C) and, of course a hedonist. He might be an older man (16B), or of a similar age, to Socrates.

1. Adapted from Robin A, H. Waterfield in the Penguin Edition to the Philebus (Plato, Philebus, London: Penguin, 1986), p. 10.

Aristotles reference to Protarchus, Physics 197b1:

Chance and what results from chance are appropriate to agents that are capable of good fortune and of action generally. Therefore necessarily chance is in the sphere of actions. This is indicated by the fact that good fortune is thought to be the same, or nearly the same, as happiness, and happiness to be a kind of action, since it is well-doing. . . . Thus an inanimate thing or a beast or a child cannot do anything by chance, because it is incapable of choice; nor can good fortune or ill fortune be ascribed to them, except metaphorically, as Protarchus, for example, said that the stones of which altars are made are fortunate because they are held in honour, while their fellows are trodden under foot.

In the opening sentence of the argumentum, Ficino in his commentatary on the Philebus talks of the wonderful order Plato employed in composing the Philebus. All but the most recent editors of the Philebus have had great reservations.1 Ficinos twelve parts presumably correspond to the following in the Stephanus pagination:Part I: 11A-11DPart II: 11D-15CPart III: 15C-20APart IV: 20B-23BPart V: 23C-27CPart VI: 27C-30A

Part VII: 30A-31BPart VIII 31B-55CPart IX: 55C-59CPart X 59C-61CPart XI: 61D-66APart XII: 66A-67B

1. Marsilio Ficino: The Philebus Commentary, A critical edition and translation by Michael J. B. Allen, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)Statement of the issue: The Good for Man (11A-12B )11B, p. 399: Socrates: Philebus holds that what is good for all creatures is to enjoy themselves to be pleased and delighted and whatever else goes together with that kind of thing. We contend that not these, but knowing, understanding and remembering, and what belongs with them, right opinion and true calculations, are better than pleasure and more agreeable to all who can attain them; those who can, get the maximum benefit possible from having them, both those now alive and future generations. Isnt that how we represent our prospective opinions, Philebus?II. 12B-13D Pleasure as a generic unity, containing a variety of species.Socrates: . . . But as to pleasure, I know that it is complex and, just as I said, we must make our starting point and consider carefully what sort of nature it has. If one just goes by the name it is one single thing, but in fact it comes in many forms that are in some way even quite unlike each other. Think about it: we say that a debauched person gets pleasure, as well as a sober-minded person takes pleasure in his very sobriety. Again, we say that a fool, though full of foolish opinions and hopes, gets pleasure, but likewise we say a wise man takes pleasure in his wisdom. But surely anyone who said in either case that these pleasures are like one another would rightly be regarded a fool. (p. 400, 12D)III. 13E-15C: The Problem of the One and the Many. Socrates States His MethodBeginnings of the explanation of dialectic:14C, p. 402: Socrates: It is this principle that has turned up here, which somehow has an amazing nature. For that the many are one and the one many are amazing statement, and can easily be disputed, whichever side of the two one may want to defend.Protarchus uses for an example of unity his own personal identity. The issue of personal identity and the unity of the self is a perennial problem in philosophy. It has become elemental to distinguish different senses of personal identity, for example the empirical ego, the transcendental ego, the moral ego, etc.

But Socrates at this point dismisses the issue as a childish question. You, dear Protarchus, are speaking about those puzzles about the one and many that have become commonplace. [Socrates may be thinking of the puzzle of the ship that was sent to Delos.] They are agreed by everybody, so to speak, to be no longer even worth touching; they are considered childish and trivial but a serious impediment to argument if one takes them on. (p. 402,14E)15A, 403: Socrates restricts the issue of the one and many to those things which are not generated and perish.

Protarchus: But what other kinds of such puzzles [such as an objects identity over time] with respect to the same principle do you have in mind, Socrates, that have not yet admittedly become commonplace?

Socrates: When, my young friend, the one is not taken from the things that come to be or perish, as we have just done in our example. For that is where the sort of one belongs that we were just discussing, which we agreed is not worthy of scrutiny. But when someone tries to posit man as one, or ox as one, or the beautiful as one and the good as one, zealous concern with division of these unities and the like gives rise to controversy. Socrates is aware that pleasures differ qualitatively, not only quantitatively a distinction in modern philosophy associated with Jeremy Benthams hedonism versus J. S. Mills. Socrates even claims that pleasures may be opposite to themselves.12E: Socrates: Just as color is most like color! Really you surprise me: Colors certainly wont differ insofar as each of them is a color; but all know that black is not only different from white but is in fact its very opposite. And shape is most like shape in the same way.IV. The Manner that DialecticShpould Proceed in Relation to the One-and-the- Many (15D-17A)The entrance of the dialectic15D, p. 403: Socrates: Quite so. Now, where should we make our entry into that complex and wide-ranging battle about this controversial issue? Is it best not to start here?Protarchus: Where?Socrates: By making the point that it is through discourse that the same thing flits around, becoming one and many in all sorts of ways, in whatever it may be that is said at any time, both long ago and now. And this will never come to an end, nor has it just begun, but it seems to me that this is an immortal and ageless [customary epithet of the gods in the Iliad, cf. Iliad viii.539] condition that comes to us with discourse. Whoever among the young first get a taste of it is as pleased as if he had found a treasure in. [continued on next slide]The entrance of the dialectic [continued]15D, p. 403: Socrates: [continued] He is quite beside himself with pleasure and revels in moving every statement, now turning it to one side and rolling it all up into one, then again unrolling it and dividing it up. He thereby involves first and foremost himself in confusion, but then also whatever happens to be nearby, be they younger or older or of the same age, sparing neither his father or his mother nor anyone else who might listen to him. He would almost try it on other creatures, not only humans being, since he would certainly not spare any foreigner if only he could find an interpreter somewhere.Son: Well then, isnt it right for me to be equally fond of you, and there hit you, if as you say being fond of a person is the same as hitting him? If I used to get whacked such a lot it wouldnt be proper for you to go scot-free, would it? Im a free man just as much as you are, you know I expect youll say that its the custom only for children to be beaten; but my answer to that is that old men are in their second childhood and that they ought to be beaten more than the young because they have less excuse for being naughty.

cf. Aristophanes satire of Socratic method in the Clouds (ll. 1400-1430 approx.):Son: Please answer this question: did you ever hit me when I was small?Old Man: Yes, but only for your own good and because I was fond of you. Aristophanesc. 446 c. 386 BCcf. Aristophanes satire of Socratic method in the Clouds (ll. 1400-1430 approx.) [continued]:O. M. But all over the world its against the law for a son to beat his father.Son: But wasnt that law instituted by a man just like you or me? And didnt he have to win over out ancestors to get it adopted? Why shouldnt I be able to pass a new law, that in future some should hit their fathers back? Take roosters and other creatures like that look at the punishing they give to their fathers. And theyre no different from us, are they?... O. M.: Well, if you want to model yourself on a rooster, why dont you go eat dirt or go and roost on a perch?Son: Dont be absurd. Thats got nothing to do with it; Socrates wouldnt think so anyway. The immortal and ageless condition of the wandering flitting about -- that comes with discourse.

Some diverse philosophical complaints of this condition:

Words impede me and I am nearly deceived by the terms of ordinary language.Descartes Meditations, Second Meditation.

The immortal and ageless condition of the wandering flitting about -- that comes with discourse.

Some diverse philosophical complaints of this condition.The Cambridge School of Analysis as led by Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein The paradigm of analysis at this time was Russells theory of descriptions, which (as we have seen in relation to Russell and Wittgenstein above) opened up the whole project of rephrasing propositions into their correct logical form, not only to avoid the problems generated by misleading surface grammatical form, but also to reveal their deep structure. Embedded in the metaphysics of logical atomism, this gave rise to the idea of analysis as the process of uncovering the ultimate constituents of our propositions (or the primitive elements of the facts that our propositions represent).1

1. Beaney, Michael, "Analysis", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), URL = .Confucianism and the Rectification of Names1Social and Political Ramifications of shifting meaningsHere is a father but look at what he does! he is a drunkard, he allows his lodgings to fall into disrepair, he does not care about his appearance. Yes, he may have a family but everyone in the village knows that he does not truly deserve the name of father.And so there is this concern in Confucianism for things to truly correspond to the name given to them. Here is a quote from The Analects:Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about government.Confucius replied, There is government, when prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son.Good, said the duke, if indeed; the prince be not prince, the minister not minister, the father not father, and the son not son, although I have my revenue, can I enjoy it?Confucius, Analects12.11.1. Dowloaded 11/16/2014 from and the Rectification of Names1Social and Political Ramifications of shifting meanings

And so the Rectification of Names was a means by which things were either to be called their correct names (that is, the name corresponding to behaviour), or people are meant to live up to the name that they have. Either the people go about calling that government official a thief or he behaves like a government official should!This was important for Confucius in the task of governing the state. Unless this is done, affairs cannot be carried on to success.

1. Ibid.16A, p. 404 Protarchus rallies in defense of the young.

Protarchus points out that the crowd hes speaking to is young.

Protarchus: . . . And are you not afraid that we will gang up against you with Philebus if you insult us? Still, we know that you want to say, and if there are some ways and means to remove this kind of disturbance from our discussion in a peaceful way, and to show us a better solution to the problem, then just go ahead, and we will follow you as best we can. For the present question is no mean thing, Socrates.Platos Revision of the method of Collection and Division, as sketched in the Phaedrus, and the Method of Diaeresis (Bifurcation) as used in the Sophist and Statesman16C, p. 404: Protarchus: What is this way? Let us have it.Socrates: It is not very difficult to describe it, but extremely difficult to use. For everything in any field of art that has ever been discovered has come to light because of this. See what I have in mindProtarchus: Please do tell us.Socrates: It is the gift of the gods to men, or so it seems to me, hurled down from heaven by some Prometheus along with a most dazzling fire. And the people of old, superior to us in living closer proximity to the gods, have bequeathed us this tale, what whatever is said to be consists of one and many, having in its nature limit and unlimitedness. Platos Revision of the method of Collection and Division, as sketched in the Phaedrus, and the Method of Diaeresis (Bifurcation) as used in the Sophist and Statesman16C, p. 404. Since this is the structure of things, we have to assume that there is in each case always one form, and for every one of them, and we must search for it, as we will indeed find it there. And once we have grasped it, we must look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for three or some number. And we must treat every one of these further unities in the same way, until it is not only established of the original unit that it is one, many and unlimited, but also how many kinds it is. For we must not grant the form of the unlimited to the plurality that lies between the unlimited and the one. Only then is it permitted to release each kind of unity into the unlimited and let it go.

Platos Revision of the method of Collection and Division, as sketched in the Phaedrus, and the Method of Diaeresis (Bifurcation) as used in the Sophist and StatesmanWhat we calling the Method of Dialectic in the Philebus is a refinement of the method of collection and division, in the Phaedrus. It departs from the Method of Diaeresis in the Sophist and Statesman, where the method of division presumes successive bifurcations. In this final method there is no termination at the sought after kind. One keeps on dividing up until one gets to an unlimited. Platos Revision of the method of Collection and Division, as sketched in the Phaedrus, and the Method of Diaeresis (Bifurcation) as used in the Sophist and Statesman[continued from previous slide]This the doctrine that Aristotle attributes to Plato in Metaphysics I, 987b23-29:

But he [Plato] agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying that the One is substance and not a predicate of something else; and in saying that the numbers are the causes of the substance of other things. He also agreed with them; but positing a dyad and constructing the infinite out of great and small, instead of treating the infinite as a one, is peculiar to him; and so is his view that the numbers exist apart from the sensible things, while they say that the things themselves are numbers, and do not place the objects of mathematics between Form and sensible things.

. . . hurled down from heaven by some Prometheus along with a most dazzling fire. 404, 16D

Jan Cossiers,17th century V. 17A-18D Illustrations of the Limit and Unlimited17B, p. 405: Example #1: Articulated speech

Socrates: What I mean is clear in the case of letters, and you should take your clue from them, since they were part of your own education.Protarchus:? How so?Socrates: The sound that comes out of the mouth is one for each and every one of us, but then it is unlimited in number. Whats the meaning of

The sound that comes out of the mouth is one for each and every one of us, but then it is unlimited in number. 1. One in the sense of articulated speech a type of sound?2. Unlimited in the sense of combinations of articulate syllables into speech?V. 17A-18D Illustrations of the Limit and Unlimited18C, p. 406: Example #1, revisited through an Egyptian myth. Socrates: . . . as the tradition in Egypt claims for a certain deity called Theuth. He was the first to discover that the vowels in that unlimited variety, are not one but several, and again that there are others that are not voiced, but make some kind of noise, and that they, too, have a number. As a third kind of letter he established one without sounds we now call mute. After this he further subdivided the ones without sound or mutes down to every single unit. In same same fashion he also dealt with the vowels and the intermediates, until he found out the number for each of them, and then he gave all of them together the name letter. As he realized that none of us could gain any knowledge of a single one of them, taken by itself without understanding them all, he considered that the one link that somehow unifies them all and called it the art of literacy.Current Phonetic Division as Established as the International Phonetics Alphabets

There Seems To Be An Indeteminate Sound Which Does not Fit into Socrates Scheme: The Schwa-- Symbol:

The schwa (also spelled shwa) refers to the mid-central vowel sound denoted by the International Phonetics Alphabet symbol , or another vowel sound close to that position. An example in English is the vowel sound in the 'a' of the word 'about'. Schwa in English is mainly found in unstressed positions, but in some other languages it occurs more frequently as a stressed vowel.In some languages other than English, the name "schwa" and the symbol is some other unstressed and toneless neutral vowel, not necessarily mid-central.

V. 17A-18D Illustrations of the Limit and Unlimited17B, p. 405: Example #2: Musical IntervalsSocrates: And the very same things leads to the knowledge of music.Protarchus: How is that?Socrates: Sound is also the unit in this art, just as it was in writing.Protarchus: Yes, right.Socrates: We should now posit low and high pitch in two kinds, and equal pitch as a third kind. Or what would you say?Protarchus: Just that.V. 17A-18D Illustrations of the Limit and Unlimited17B, p. 405: Example #2: Musical Intervals[continued] Socrates: But you could not yet claim knowledge of music if you knew only this much, though if you were ignorant even about that, you would be quite incompetent in these matters, as one might say.Protarchus: Certainly.Socrates: But you will be competent, my friend, once you have learned how many intervals there are in high and low pitch, and what character they have, by what notes the intervals are defined, and the kinds of combinations they form all of which our forebears have discovered and left to us, their successors, together with the names of these modes of harmony. V. 17A-18D Illustrations of the Limit and UnlimitedDigression on Example #2: Musical Intervals. Schopenhauers AppropriationArthur Schopenhauer(1788 -1860 ). . . all harmony of the notes depends upon the coincidence of their vibration So long as the vibrations of two notes have a rational relation to each other, which can be expressed in small numbers, they can be connected together in our apprehension though their constantly recurring coincidence.

Schopenhauer, Arthur, On the Metaphysics of Music, in The World as Will and Idea, Vol III, (Boston: Ticknor and Company, 1887), pp. 235-6.

39Arthur Schopenhauer(1788 -1860 )If, on the other hand, that relation is an irrational one, or one which can only be expressed in larger numbers, then no coincidence of the vibrations which can be apprehended occurs . they resist being joined together in our apprehension.

Schopenhauer, Ibid, p. 236.

40So we apprehend easily the musical ratios of 1:2, 2:3, 3:4, 4:5, as in the octave, perfect fifth, perfect fourth, major third, etc. But what does this have to do with the Will?41Arthur Schopenhauer(1788 -1860 )Now the connection of the metaphysical significance of music with this its physical and arithmetical basis depends upon the fact that what resists our apprehension, the irrational relation, or the dissonance, becomes the natural type of what resists our will; and, conversely, the consequence, or the rational relation, which easily adapts itself to our apprehension becomes the type of the satisfaction of the will.

Schopenhauer, Ibid, p. 236.

42Arthur Schopenhauer(1788 -1860 )And further, since that rational and irrational element in the numerical ratios of the vibrations admits of innumerable degrees, shades of difference, sequence, and variations, by means of it music becomes the material in which all the movements of the human heart, i. e., of the will, whose essential nature is always satisfaction and dissatisfaction, although in innumerable degrees, can be faithfully portrayed 1. Schopenhauer, Ibid, p. 236.

43Arthur Schopenhauer(1788 -1860 )Therefore the affections of the will itself, thus actual pain and actual pleasure, must not be excited, but only their substitutes, as a picture of the satisfaction of the will1, and that which is more or less repugnant to it, as a picture of greater or less pain.

1. als Bild der Befriedigung des WillensSchopenhauer, Ibid, p. 237.

44An Extremely Developed Contemporary Taxonomy Which Would Concur With Platos Method in the PhilebusThe hierarchy of biological classification's major eight taxonomic ranks. A domain contains one or more kingdoms. In biological taxonomy, a kingdom or regnum is a taxonomic rank in either (historically) the highest rank, or (in the new three-domain system) the rank below domain. Each kingdom is divided into smaller groups called phyla (or in some contexts these are called "divisions"). Currently, many textbooks from the United States use a system of six kingdoms (Animalia, Plantae, Fungi, Protista, Archaea, and Eubacteria), while British and Australian textbooks describe five kingdoms (Animalia, Plantae, Fungi, Protista, and Prokaryota or Monera). The classifications of taxonomy are life, domain, kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species.Change in Planets in the Solar System: How did Pluto lose its status a Planet?As of August 2006, Pluto was denied planetary status: For an object to be a planet, it needs to meet these three conditions defined by the International Astronomical Union:1. It needs to be in orbit around the Sun Pluto, passes.2. It needs to have enough gravity to pull itself into a spherical shape Pluto passes.3. It needs to have "cleared the neighborhood" of its orbit Pluto does not pass.Question: Consider the dialectical conversation that led to Plutos removal from the planets in the solar system. VII. 20C-22C Strategy of Determining the Good Life: The good life cannot consist exclusively either of Pleasure or of IntelligenceA. Preliminary Delineation of the Problem -- Neither Pleasure nor Thought alone is the Good for Man (20C-22C)20E, p. 408: Socrates proposes to look at pleasure and knowledge separately. 21D, p. 409: Concludes that the life of only pleasure is unacceptable: You would thus not live a human life but the life of a mollusk or one of those creatures in shells that live in the sea.VII. 20C-22C Strategy of Determining the Good Life: The good life cannot consist exclusively either of Pleasure or of Intelligence20B-C, p. 408: Socrates: It is a doctrine that once upon a time I heard in a dream -- or perhaps I was awake -- that I remember now concerning pleasure and knowledge, that neither of the two is the good, but that there is some third thing which is different from and superior to both of them. But if we can clearly conceive now that this is the case, then pleasure has lost its bid for victory. For the good could no longer turn out to be identical with it. Right? VII. 20C-22C Strategy of Determining the Good Life: The good life cannot consist exclusively either of Pleasure or of Intelligence [further continued]

Thus neither of the two would be the good, but it could be assumed that that one or the other of them is its cause. But I would be even more ready to contend against Philebus that, whatever the ingredient in the mixed life that makes it choiceworthy and good, reason is more closely related to that thing and more like it than pleasure; and if this can be upheld, neither first nor second prize could really ever be claimed for pleasure. She will not even get as much as third prize, if we can put some trust in my insight for now. (22E, p. 410 )VII. 20C-22C Strategy of Determining the Good Life: The good life cannot consist exclusively either of Pleasure or of Intelligence [continued]21E, p. 409: Socrates: . . . Let us inspect the life of reason . . .Protarchus: What kind of life do you have in mind?Socrates: Whether any one of us would choose to live in possession of every kind of intelligence, reason, knowledge, and memory of all things, while having no part, neither large nor small, of pleasure or pain, living in total insensitivity of anything of that kind. Protarchus: To me at least either of these two forms of life seems worthy of choice, nor would it to anyone else, I presume.VIII . (23C-26D) The Relative Significance and Place of Pleasure and Thought in the Good for Man: The Fourfold Classification of All Existents. The need for a fourth kind, in explanation23D, p. 411:Socrates: Let us now take these as two kinds, while treating the one that results from the mixture of these two as our third kind. But I must look like a fool with my distinction into kinds and enumerations!Protarchus: What are you driving at?Socrates: That we seem to be in need of yet a fourth kind.Protarchus: Tell us what it is.Socrates: Look at the cause of this combination of those two together, and posit it as my fourth kind in addition to those three.27D, p. 415 Socrates: . . . We declared the life that combines pleasure and knowledge the winner. Didnt we? . . . We will, I think assign it to the third kind, for it is not a mixture of just two elements but of the sort where all that is unlimited is tied down by a limit. It would seem right, then, to make our victorious form of life part of that kind.

The best life is of the third kind, combines pleasure and knowledge. We should distinguish between a combination and mixture, cf. salt and pepper, versus a compound, Na and Cl. Chlorine as a gas in poisonous but in the exact measure a compound ration a 1:1 ratio we have table salt. Or consider beneficence for life of the ratio of 2:1 in hydrogen and oxygen. VIII. Pleasure and pain do not have a limit27E, p. 416: (Philebus reenters the conversation)Socrates: That is settled, then. But how about your kind of life, Philebus, which is pleasant an unmixed? To which of the established kinds should it by right be assigned? But before you make your pronouncement, answer me the following question.Philebus: Just tell me!Socrates: Do pleasure and pain have a limit, or are they of the sort that admit of the more and less?Philebus: Certainly the sort that admit the more, Socrates! For how could pleasure be all that is good if it were not by nature boundless in plenty and increase.IX. 26E-31B The affinity of Intelligence to the Cosmic Cause, and to the cause of goodness in the Mixed Life.29C, p. 417: Socrates: . . . There is something called fire that belongs to us, and then again there is fire in the universe.Protarchus: No doubt.Socrates: And is not the fire that belongs to us small amount, feeble and poor, while the fire in the universe overwhelms us by its size and beauty and by the display of all its power?Protarchus: What you say is true.Socrates: But what about this? Is the fire in the universe generated, nourished and ruled by the fire that belongs to us, or is it not quite the reverse, that your heat ad mine, and that every animal, owe all this to the cosmic fire?The role of the cause in organizing even pleasure and painp. 418, 29E Same is true for body of universe and our sustenance.[continued] Protarchus: It is not even worth answering the question.Socrates: Right. And I guess you will give the same answer about the earth here in the animals when it is compared to earth in the universe, and likewise about the other elements I mentioed a little earlier. Is that your answer?Protarchus: Who could answer differently without seeming insane?Socrates: No one at all. But now see what follows. To the combination of all these elements taken as a unit we give the name body, dont we?The role of the cause in organizing even pleasure and painp. 418, 29E Same is true for body of universe and our sustenance.[continued] But what about the following, it this also a question not worth asking?Protarchus: Tell me what the question is.Socrates: Of the body that belongs to us, will we not say that it has a soul?Protarchus: Quite obviously that is what we will say.Socrates: But where does it come from, unless the body of the universe which has the same properties as ours, but more beautiful in all respects, happens to posses a soul.Protarchus: Clearly from nowhere else.

The role of the cause in the organization of our souls (30B, p. 418)

Socrates: We surely cannot maintain this assumption, with respect to our four classes (limit, the unlimited, their mixture and their cause which is present in everything): that this cause is recognized as all-encompassing wisdom, since among us it imports the soul and provides training for the body and medicine for its ailments and in other cases order and restitution, but that it should fail to be responsible for the same things on a large scale in the whole universe (things that are, in addition, beautiful, pure), for the contrivance of what was so fair and wonderful in nature.Protarchus: That would make no sense aty all.30C, p. 418Socrates: But if that is inconceivable, we had better pursue the alternative account and affirm, as we have said often, that there is plenty of the unlimited in the universe as well as sufficient limit, and that there is, above them. a certain cause, of no small significance, that order are coordinates the years, seasons and months, and which has every right to the title of wisdom and reasons. Protarchus: The greatest right.

Note: This is not an argument by intelligent design argument for God. Rather it is a macro-microcosmic argument by analogy. As the bodily aspect of ourselves and world is a part in kind of the universe, so similarly is the soul, or self-moving part of ourselves to the soul of the universe. X. The Psychology of Pleasure and Pain (31A-53C)XA: 31b-32B Pleasure as replenishment of wastage31E Pleasure as restoration of a bodily balance harmony.XB: 32B-36C Pleasures of anticipation; the part played in them by sensation, memory and desire. First, memory is added it in replenishment, with sense of being empty.In p. 423, 35B-C there is shift to desire which is analyzed as the need for physical replenishment which is understood along with hope of attaining replenishment.35B, p. 423: Socrates: He does, then not have a desire for what in fact he experiences. For he is thirsty, and this is a process of emptying. His desire is rather for filling.Practicing the Dialectic described in the Philebus.

Consider one of the following types and determine1) what might be the genus under which it falls2) what might be logically distinct divisions of the type in question.3) if applicable, further consider those divisions, or sub-types into a further level or levels of divisions.

Possible types or kinds:

soupstextsSJSU studentscomediesdemocraciesa posteriori knowledgethe egopleasuremeaningbeingsSlide #2; portrait of Cosimo de Medici:'_Medici#mediaviewer/File:Cosimo_di_Medici_(Bronzino).jpg,slide #18, bust of Aristophanes: #33, table of phonetic alphabet: #35: picture of tongue positions for vowels:


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