the most significant passage in aristotle's rhetoric

Rhetoric Society of America

The Most Significant Passage in Aristotle's RhetoricAuthor(s): William L. BenoitSource: Rhetoric Society Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter, 1982), pp. 2-9Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3885695 .

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The Most Significant Passage in Aristotle's Rhetoric: Five Nominations

Edited by Richard Leo Enos Carnegi e-Mellon University

These essays were originally presented on the program, "The Most Significant Passage in Aristotle's Rhetoric." The panel was sponsored by the American Branch of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, chaired by Richard Leo Enos of Carnegie- Mellon University, and convened during the Speech Communication Association Convention in Anaheim, California, November 1981. These synoptic views are intended to serve as a basis for discussion of one of the most significant theoretical statements in the history of rhetoric.

Contributors (in order of presentation)

William L. Benoit, B Keith V. Erickson, Texas Tech Universit Gerard A. Hauser, Pennsylvania State Univers Wayne N. Thompson, Texas Medical Center Library Otis M. Walter, University of Pittsb

The Most Significant Passage in Aristotle's Rhetoric

William L. Benoit Bowling Green State University

Aristotle's Rhe has played a long and distinguished role in the history of rhetoric as one of the earliest systematic investi- gations into the nature of the art of persuasion. While in some eras it may have suffered undeserved neglect,1 the importance of this treatise cannot be disputed. The task of further illuminating a document which has received the scrutiny accorded the Rhetoric over the centuries is not one to be undertaken lightly. After establishing criteria for assessing the importance of an idea, a passage will be selected as the most significant one of this work on the basis of those criteria.

Criteria Four convergent criteria will be employed to judge the signi-

ficance of a selected passage. First, it should present a new idea (or, possibly, an old idea in a new perspective). The significance of a passage would be highly questionable if another author has originated the idea developed therein. Of course, since few of the earliest rhetorical treatises are extant, we may not be able to determine with certainty whether a particular notion found in a



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passage of the Rhetoric is actually original, but this should not deter us from making the effort. The lost Snao Technon provides ample evidence that Aristotle was familiar with other rhetorical works,3 and thus would be in a position to evaluate the originality of his own contributions to this field.

A second criterion is that the selected passage should contain an idea which Aristotle considered important. Again, his familiarity with other treatises in this area of endeavor places him in a position to evaluate the importance of his ideas. Any passage which Aristotle considered important is likely to be a significant one.

Third, the passage should be an integral part of the Rhetoric. Ideas which are not developed are likely to be of less importance than those which are more fully fleshed out in the work. The ideas of most significance would then tend to be ideas which order or influence a large proportion of the work. This is not to say that a certain measure of an idea's importance is the number of pages devoted to it, only that an idea which permeates or structures a large portion of a work is likely to be a significant part of that treatise.

A fourth criterion for assessing the significance of a passage is the influence exerted by the idea contained within it. The appropriateness of this criterion should be readily apparent.

These criteria are not independent, of course. We would expect that Aristotle might consider his original contributions (criterion one) to be important (criterion two). Similarly, an idea which is an integral part of the Rhetoric (criterion three) probably has been influential in the history of rhetoric (criterion four). Therefore, I consider these to be convergent criteria-different, though quite possibly related, indicators of the significance of an idea. With these four convergent criteria in hand-original contribution, importance to Aristotle, integral to the Rhetoric, and influence in rhetorical history-in hand, we can turn to the Rhetoric and my nomination of its most significant passage.

The most significant passage in Aristotle's Rhetoric can be found in Book I, Chapter 2, at 1356b1-7:

With regard to persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof; just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction the enthymeme is a syllogism and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism; and the example a rhetorical induction. Everyone who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way.4

Each criterion will be considered in turn in order to support the thesis that this is the most significant passage of this treatise.

In several places Aristotle asserts that this conception of the enthymeme and the example as the logical modes of persuasion is8 original.g Of course, he is8 no t arguing that no one had ever employed



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an enthymeme or an example prior to his discussion, but that his is the first theoretical discussion of this notion. This point is made quite clearly when he explains that

the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case.5

This point is also made at other points. In the following passage, he initially appears to be arguing that previous authors concentrated on judicial rhetoric to the exclusion of political. However, his concern turns to considerations of demonstration, which is the province of the logical modes of persuasion.

Hence it comes that, although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory, and although the former is a nobler business, and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, these authors say nothing about political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead in court. The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to talk about non-essentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In political debate the man who is forming a judgment is making a decision about his own vital interests. There is no need, therefore, to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory, thig is not enough: to conciliate the listener is what pays here.

Finally, he explains that previous writers who discuss organization fail to discuss the "orator's proper modes of persuasion."

It is evident that anyone who lays down rules about other matters, such as what must be the contents of the "introduction" or the "narration" or any of the other divisions of a speech, is theorizing about non-essentials as if they belonged to the art. The only question with which these writers here deal is how to put the judge into a given frame of mind. About the orator's proper modes of persuasion they have nothing to tell us; nothing, that is, about how to gain skill in enthymemes.7

Thus, Aristotle makes it clear that his treatment of the logical modes of persuasion, the enthymeme and example, is original. Earlier writers had discussed ways of arousing the audience's emotions, conciliation and flattery in legal oratory, and the divisions of a speech, but not the logical means of persuasion.

Other scholars consider Aristotle's conception of logical proof to be an original one. Solmsen considers it one of the "factors in Aristotle's own Rhetoric which are sufficiently original and characteristic to justify our singling them out as his peculiar



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contributions to the rhetorical sys em, " they are "basic and truly epoch-making methodological ideas." Clark asserts that "No other writer on rhetoric has paid so much attention to the public speaker's use of logical processes in argument as Aristotle, who, indeed, had introduced logic into rhetoric. "9 Kennedy observes that "Aristotle was the first to regard the enthymeme and the example as the two logical devices of rhetoric, but he did not invent the techniques nor the names."10 Thus, Aristotle's conception of enthymeme and example as the logical means of persuasion is an original contribution to rhetorical theory, and, as such, is significant.

Imranet Aristol Some of the previous passages suggest the importance of this

notion that persuasion can be achieved through use of enthymeme and example. In the passage in question, he exclaims that "Everyone who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way. 11 "Enthymemes," he declared, "are the substance of rhetorical persuasion,"*12 they are "the orator's proper modes of persuasion."13 Most telling on this point is his statement in Book I, Chapter 1, where he asserts that "Persua- sion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to be demonstrated. The orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion."14 It should be clear that this was considered to be an important idea by Aristotle, another indicator of its significance.

Ine8rl to te R ic Several considerations lead to the conclusion that the passage

selected here outlining the logical means of persuasion is integral to the Rhetoric. First, as Aristotle declares in the opening statement of this work, "Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic ."15 This relationship is exemplified in the passage nominated here, which indicates that dialectic's induction, syllogism, and apparent syllogism are paralleled in rhetoric by the example, enthymeme, and apparent enthymeme, respectively. This passage clarifies an important interrelationship in Aristotle's thought.

Second, there are three modes of persuasion avaiable to the rhetor.

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first depends on the personal character of the speaker, the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind, and the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself.16

The logical means of persuasion, enthymeme and example, are one of the three potential means of persuasion. Solmsen asserts that "the system of 'proofs' (xTLTEL,) may be called the core of Aristotle's Rhetoric."17 Of course, as suggested earlier, pragm4 (enthymeme and example) is the most effective of the three.

Finally, much of the discussion in Books I and II of the Rhetoric concerns the basis of arguments. For instance, in Book I, Chapter 2, he explains that ' the ma terial s of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs,"*18 so that the ensuing discussion of these



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latter two concepts ultimately stems from the idea contained in the passage nominated here. The discussions of Book I, Chapters 4-14, and Book II, Chapters 1-18, are also relevant. "We have, in fact, already ascertained the lines of argument applicable to enthymemes about good and evil, the noble and the base, justice and injustice, and also to those about types of character, emotions, and moral qualities."119 Book II, Chapter 20, concerns argument by example, while Chapter 21 concerns maxims, which are "the premises or conclusions of Enthymemes."*20 Chapter 22 discusses enthymemes in general, and Chapter 23 explicates the 28 topoi and the nine apparent enthymemes. Chapters 25 and 26 concern refutative enthymemes and amplification and deprecation. So, a substantial portion of Books I and II of the Rhetoric is directly related to the passage selected here, another index of its significance.

Influence in Rhetorical The Tracing the enthymeme and the example through subsequent 1

rhetorical texts is one method of confirming their importance.2 Another indicator is the body of contemporary literature on this topic. Numerous articles on the enthymeme and several articles on the example exist. Hauser observes that "Students of Aristotle are familiar with the emphasis he placed upon the doctrine of loical proof and its two great instruments, enthymeme and example." 2 This easy familiarity of course comes from their influence on rhetorical theory. Aristotle's doctrine of the logical modes of persuasion has been influential, yet another indicator of its significance.

Aristotle's testimony, as well as that of rhetorical scholars, establishes that his discussion of enthymeme and example as the logical forms of persuasion was original. He considered it to be an important idea, the most effective means of persuasion. Internal evidence reveals that it was an integral part of the Rhetoric (Books I and II). External evidence demonstrates that it was an influential concept. Ample rationale exists, on the basis of these four convergent criteria, for the claim that the passage at 1356bl-7 is the most significant in Aristotle's Rhetoric.

Notes

1See, e.g., James J. Murphy, "Aristotle's Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 52 (April 1966): 1O09-15.

2See, e.g., Keith V. Erickson, Aristotle's Rhetoric: Five Centuries of Phi!lo al Research (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1975).

3See Cicero, De Inventione, II.6; De Oratore, II.38.160; Brutus, 12, and Keith V. Erickson, "The Lost Rhetorics of Aristotle," Communication Mono ,a hs, 43 (August 1976): 232-34.



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4Aristotle, The Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts (New York: Random House, The Modern Library, 1954), 1356bl-7. All quotations from Aristotle are from this edition.

5Ibid., 1354a11-19.

6Ibid. 1354b23-40.

7Ibid.,s 1 354bl15-22 -

Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric,," American Journa 62 (January 1941), p. 36.

9Donald Lemen Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (New York: Columbia University, 1957), p. 78.

10George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Pr

11 Aristotle, 1356b5-.7.

12Ibid., 1354a14-15.

1Ibid., 1 354b2l-22.

14Ibid., 1 355a3-8.

1Ibid., 1354al.

16Ibid., 1356bl-4.

17Solmsen, p. 39.

18Aristotle, 1357b31.-35.

19Ibid., 1396b31l-35.

20Ibid., 1394a26-27.

21See, e.g., John David Thomas, "The Example in Ancient Rhetorical Theory," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Florida, 1960; Marsh McCall, Ancient Theories of Simile and Comparison (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

22Gerard A. Hauser, "The Example in Aristotle's Rhetoric: Bifurcation or Contradiction?" a e 1 (1968), p. 78. A partial bibliography of works on the enthymeme and on the example follows:

Bower, Aly, "Enthymemes: The Story of a Lighthearted Search," Speech Teacher, 14 (November 1965): 265-75.



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Alan Rowe Anderson and Nuel D. Belnap, "Enthymemes," Journal of Philosoph, 58 (November 1961): 713-23.

Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," :Quarterly ournal of Speech, 45 (December 1959): 399-408.

George P. Boss, "The Stereotype and Its Correspondence in Discourse to the Enthymeme," Communication Quarterly, 27 (Spring 1979): 22-27.

Gary L. Crornkhite, "The Enthymeme as Deductive Rhetorical Argument," Western Speech, 30 (Spring 1966): 129-34.

Jesse G. Delia, "The Logic Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, and the Enthymeme: A Search for the Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (April 1970): 140-48.

Walter R. Fisher, "Uses of the Enthymeme," S, 13 (September 1964): 197-203.

Daniel Goulding, "Aristotle's Concept of the Enthymeme," Journal of the American Forensics Association, 2 (September 1965): 104-08.

Nancy Harper, "An Analytical Description of Aristotle's Enthymeme," Central States-Speech Journal, 24 (Winter 1973): 304-09.

Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymeme," Quarterly Journal of &eech, 66 (October 1980): 251-65.

Richard L. Lanigan, "Enthymeme: The Rhetorical Species of Aristotle's Syllogism," S-ee Communicatio urnal, 39 (Spring 1974): 207-22.

Edward H. Madden, "The Enthymeme: Crossroads of Logic, Rhetoric, and Metaphysics," Philosophical Review, 61 (July 1952): 368-76.

James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Mono&-raj~s 3 (1936): 49-74.

_ "Some Recent Interpretations of the Aristotelian Enthymeme,' Papers of the Michigan Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters, 21 (1936): 489-500.

Arthur B. Miller and John D. Bee, "Enthymemes: Body and Soul,," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 5 (Fall 1972): 201-14.

Charles S. Mudd, "The Enthymeme and Logical Validity," Quarterly Journal of Se, 45 (December 1959): 409-414.

R. C. Seaton, "The Aristotelian Enthymeme," Classical Review, 28 (June 1914): 113-19.



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Solomon Simonson, "A Definitive Note on the Enthymeme," American Journal of Philol , 66 (1945): 303-06.

Edward D. Steele, "Social Values, the Enthymeme, and Speech Criticism," Western Speech, 26 (Spring 1962): 70-75.

Wayne N. Thompson, Aristotle's Deduction and Induction: Introducto Analysis and Synthesis (Amsterdam: Rodopi NV, 1975), especially pp. 68-77.

Earl W. Wiley, "The Enthymeme: Idiom of Persuasion," Quarterly J, 42 (February 1956): 19-24.

John Cook Wilson, "The Possibility of a Conception of the Enthymeme Earlier than that Found in the Rhetoric and the Prior Analytics," Transactions of the Oxford Philological Soci (1883-84): 5-6.

The literature on the example is more limited, but still indicative of the importance of this topic.

William Lyon Benoit, "Aristotle's Example: The Rhetorical Induction," Quarterly-Journal of Speech, 66 (April 1980): 182-92.

Scott Consigny, "The Rhetorical Example," Southern Speech Commuca- tion Journal, 41 (Winter 1976): 121-32.

Gerard A. Hauser, "The Example in Aristotle's Rhetoric: Bifurcation or Contradiction?" Philosophy and Rhetoric,, 1 (1968): 78-90.

Wayne N. Thompson, Aristotle's Deduction and Induction: Introductory Analysis and Synthesis (Amsterdam: Rodopi NV, 1975), especially pp. 89-96.

Aristotle's Rhetoric 13C5ha1-11: Art, Dialectic, and Philosophical Rhetoric

Keith V. Erickson Texas Tech University

Aristotle's Rhetoric is generally regarded as the most important rhetoric of classical antiquity.1 But why? Is this a modern-day myth given that the work failed to directly influence but a handful of subsequent rhetorics? Aristotle's impact on rhetorical theory, for example, is slight compared to the far reaching influence of Cicero's works. Ironically, Aristotle, who was more than likely only marginally interested in rhetoric (even though he authored four "books" on the subject2) and was not himself an orator, is much revered for his views of the rhetorical process. Isolating a single



the most significant passage in aristotle's rhetoric

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