the longbow and its military use marcin

8/22/2019 The Longbow and Its Military Use Marcin

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Masaryk University

Faculty of Arts

Department of English

and American Studies

English Language and Literature

Michal Marcin

The Longbow and Its Military Use

Bachelors Diploma Thesis

Supervisor: PhDr. Lidia Kyzlinkov, CSc., M.Litt.

2013


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I declare that I have worked on this thesis independently,

using only the primary and secondary sources listed in the bibliography.

..Michal Marcin


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AcknowledgementI would like to thank my supervisor PhDr. Lidia Kyzlinkov, CSc., M.Litt.

for her valuable advice and guidance. I would also like to thank my family andmy friends, particularly Wouter Konijn, for their encouragement.


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Table of Contents

1 Introduction 5

2 The Longbow and Its General History 7

3 The Longbow in Medieval England 15

3.1 The Beginnings the Saxons, the Normans or the Welsh? 15

3.2 Edward I and the Birth of the English Military Longbow 18

3.3 The Slumber of the Longbow During the Reign of Edward II 22

3.4 Edward III and the Ripening of the Military Longbow 24

4 The Golden Age of the Longbow 29

4.1 The Battle of Crcy 29

4.2 The Battles of Poitiers and Agincourt 30

5 The Decline of the Military Longbow 33

6 The longbow in fiction 39

6.1 Viking: King's Man by Tim Severin 39

6.2 Azincourtby Bernard Cornwell 43

7 Conclusion 47

Bibliography 50

English Resum 52

Czech Resum 53


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1 Introduction

The aim of this work is to create a compact guide to people wishing to learn

about the longbow and its origins, introduction to the English army, military history and

eventual decline, and also to prove that the longbow was in a considerable use for a far

wider period of time than merely the commonly supposed Hundred Years' War

(henceforth mostly referred to as the War). There already is a great amount of texts

concerning the War or some of the battles in particular, therefore, rather than to

summarise these texts, I decided to cover the history of the longbow in a much wider

extent.

The longbow is a peculiar item. In some people it evokes a glorious past, to

others it is a bitter reminder of a once mightiest kingdom's defeat and suffering and to

still others it remains a trusty companion, be it for spare time or as a tool necessary for

their lives. To most people these days, however, it is a nearly forgotten relic of the past,

although this is not the first time people thought so. The longbow is a very simple

weapon. In its typical construction it is, with the exception of the size, no different from

other self-bows, i.e. bows made from a single piece of wood. Therefore, when a more

sophisticated ranged weapon became common, the old-fashioned longbow was expected

to be abandoned. Far from that, it rose to become a core element of a new type of armies

and left most of medieval Europe wide-eyed in astonishment at its deadly effectiveness.

The first chapter of the thesis describes the very beginnings of the bow and its

types, the earliest findings of longbow fragments, and discusses some theories about the

weapon's reoccurring disappearance throughout the history. It also demonstrates the

earliest military usage of the longbow in the world and in Europe, particularly the

Germanic tribes. At the end of the longbow historical background, the use of the

longbow outside Europe after the Middle Ages is briefly mentioned.

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The thesis further discusses possible nations responsible for bringing the bow

into England, the introduction of the longbow into the English army and the person most

responsible for it, as well as its role in the evolution of the way armies were formed and

battles fought.

The Golden Age of the longbow is briefly outlined, along with the three most

important battles of the War Crcy, Poities and Agincourt. However, rather than give

lengthy accounts of the battles, some events preceding and following them are written

about, along with the effects lasting for longer periods of time.

The decline of the longbow is dealt with next, starting with the late stages of the

Hundred Years' War. The role of the longbow in the Wars of the Roses is described, as

well as the increasingly desperate attempts to keep the weapon a part of the English

army, particularly during the reign of Henry VIII. This proved to be the final effort, after

which the use of the longbow steadily declined, without any notable achievement. The

thesis lists some of the main reasons for the inevitable decline and the eventual

abandonment of the longbow in the military.

In the final chapter, two pieces of historical fiction regarding the use of the

military archery in certain battles are analysed. The Battle of Stamford Bridge, which

features in Viking: King's Man by T. Severin (first published in 2005), is barely known

in this respect. The depiction is examined, along with some theories on the use of the

longbow in that period. The portrayal of the Battle of Agincourt by B. Cornwell in his

novelAzincourt(2008) is studied next, as well as some aspects of the life of a common

longbowman, as represented in the text.

The chief sources are Longbow: A social and military history by R. Hardy, a

detailed study of the weapon, and The Hundred Years War by D. Seward, selected for

additional information on the longbow in regard to the War.

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2 The Longbow and Its General History

It is often thought that the main catalyst of the change in the way wars were

fought in the late1 Middle Ages and the early modern history was the gunpowder. This

notion, probably based on the belief that changes are always the outcome of new

technologies, not merely new ideas for items already commonly in use, is wrong. While

some cannons or handguns were in use as early as the middle of the fourteenth century

(Seward 55-7), it still took a few centuries2 rather than decades for them to be

commonly used, and still few more centuries to actually surpass the effectiveness of the

longbow3. Cornwell mentions two wise men wishing the longbow was still widely used

in their time: Benjamin Franklin, who "believed that if the American rebels had been

armed with the longbow then the revolution would have been over in a matter of months

rather than years" and, a few decades later, Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington,

who "wanted to raise a Corps of Longbowmen to fight Napoleon", but failed to do so

due to a shortage of trained men (Hardy, foreword). In short, longbows were still the

deadliest weapon for a long time after they fell out of military use, and also for a very

long time before they came to be massively used in the Hundred Years' War, for the

history of the (long)bow is, in great part, the history of humanity itself.

The beginnings of the bow in general are closely tied to the beginnings of

mankind. Early on humans figured out it was safer to attack from a distance, and have

ever since kept improving upon the idea. Throwing spears with fire hardened points

were already in use half a million years ago, having replaced stones and sticks (Hardy

11). It is likely that by observing a tree bending in the wind, and by realizing the force1 Meaning about the second half of the Middle Ages, from some 1000 CE on. Not to be confused with

Late Middle Ages (from roughly 1300 CE on).2 While several cannons were used during Henry V's conquest of Normandy, it was only for sieges.

However, despite being fairly powerful, they were highly erratic and it still took a few weeks to breachthe walls. Seward states that "their chief weakness seems to have been unreliable powder" (172).

3 For instance, Hardy believes that where the rate of fire is concerned, the rifle surpassed the longbowonly as late as by the time of the World War I (75).

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with which a sapling would lash out after being bent and released, humans eventually

came to the idea of creating a bow (Hardy 11). The oldest preserved arrowheads, made

of stone, flint or obsidian, small enough not to be used for spears (bows were made from

organic material and have perished over the time) are estimated to be roughly 50,000

years old (ibid. 12).

There are two types of bows: self-bows, i.e. made from a single piece of wood,

and composite. The composite ones are, as the term implies, pieced together from parts.

As humans learnt the properties of various materials other than wood, such as that horn

compresses and sinew is elastic, they started using it for their benefit. They would make

the centre of the bow from wood, then glue sinew to its back (the outer side, facing the

target) and horn on its belly (the inner side, facing the archer) (ibid. 14). Therefore,

when the bow was drawn, the horn would compress and the sinew expand, and upon

firing the two outer layers would quickly revert to their original state, thus greatly

enhancing the capabilities of the bow. Properly executed, this design would outperform

even the best of the wooden bows. This is proven by the fact that modern bows are

based on this design, the only difference being the use of fabricated and more efficient

materials (ibid. 14). The reason why those more sophisticated bows were not used all

over the world is simply that they were the outcome of necessity: in many parts of the

world there was not enough timber available to create self-bows, unlike the more

temperate regions, where wood was plentiful (ibid. 14).

The oldest preserved bows, or parts thereof, were found in Germany and

Switzerland, and they are believed to be from the Late Stone Age (ibid. 17), presumably

between 4000 and 3000 BCE. These were made entirely of yew wood, the best timber

for bows due to its mechanical properties (Kapar 12). They were measured, and the

longest that can be estimated with certainty is 69 inches long (175 cm), but it is believed

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that "another of 67 in would probably have been 70 in originally, and another well over

80 in [(203 cm)]" definitely longbows (Hardy 17). "They are all of a deep section,

none is a flat bow," and "any of these weapons," Hardy further claims, would "to an

English bowman of the 15th century [CE], or to a member of the British Long Bow

Society today, be instantly understandable and familiar" (17).

The two oldest bows found in England, in Somerset County, were yew longbows

as well. There were only found halves of them, but it was enough to undergo

radiocarbon dating, a technique using the decay of carbon to estimate the age of organic

items. The remains of the first, a flat longbow dated 2690 BCE, "suggest that it was

once over six feet long, or up to 190 cm" (ibid. 18). The other, dated 2665 BCE, is

smaller: "about 63 in long, or 160 cm", but is described as "rounded and deeply

'stacked'" and "much more like the medieval weapon than [the other bow]" (ibid. 18).

According to Hardy, from these findings can be deduced that in England in the third

millennium BCE "there already existed fine weapons of the two main types, flat

longbow and high stacked longbow" and that they coexisted together (18).

The oddity about bows is their reoccurring disappearance and emergence as time

passed (ibid. 21), as if mankind grew bored of them and tried other things, only to

eventually realize archery was still the safest way. It is estimated, by archaeological

traces, that the bow was a predominant weapon in Europe from about 10,000 to 1500

BCE (ibid. 19). This decline in use was probably connected with the rising amount of

bronze weapons and the change in the fashion of combat - men preferred to fight hand

to hand (ibid. 21). Hardy believes the bow was then probably neglected for a time and

only used as a hunting weapon, and he implies it was not improved for wars and

therefore, even if used, the arrows were often deflected by the emerging metal armours,

until the armour piercing arrowheads were introduced around 750 BCE (21). However,

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this theory of abandonment of the bow for military use does not seem probable, because

the arrowheads of the time would have very likely been made from bronze as well,

which is an easy alloy to work as it is possible to cast it into a mould, unlike the tedious

process of forging steel arrowheads, thus allowing for a mass production of items of the

same shape, size and weight (Kapar 13-14) a great advancement for the earliest

military machinery. Later on, as the protection of soldiers progressed and new armour

was gradually put into use, such as the mail armour (at first merely big rings sewn onto

leather garments) or the various predecessors of medieval plate armour (usually tiny bits

of plates held together by leather strings), a new arrowhead eventually emerged to match

them. Unlike the common broadheads, which had blades or "wings" on the side of the

point, for massive laceration, the new ones were sturdier and narrower (barely wider

than the arrow shaft), in order to focus all the force into a smaller area, therefore giving

the arrow higher chance for penetration and even though they caused lesser wounds to

an unarmoured target than a broadhead would, it was enough to put a fighter out of

combat (ibid. 15). These bodkin arrows were probably what Hardy meant by the

"armour piercing arrow" (21), but this is by no means a confirmation of his theory that

bows fell out of use until the invention of the bodkins.

In other parts of the world, such as Egypt, the bow was well established by 8000

BCE they used many different kinds of arrowheads even before the time of the

Pharaohs (Hardy 22). Composite bows were considered a better choice at the time, and

were often preferred as the weapon of war and hunt, at least to those who could afford

them, as they were mostly imported, while wooden bows were mostly employed by

neighbouring regions, such as by the Nubian mercenaries from the south of Egypt,

although the use of these bows likely spread among the Egyptian army too four

Egyptian longbows were found, dating between 2300 and 1400 BCE (ibid. 22). Those

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longbows were unusual in their rather low estimated draw weight only about "50 lb

(23 kg)" (Hardy 23). Hardy explains that the countermeasure for this was the use of

extraordinarily light arrows - "They weighed from 0.5 oz (14.5 gm) to 0.4 oz (10 gm)

the heaviest being [about] 37 in (94.6 cm) long, the lightest 34 in (86.4 cm)" 4, and this

more than made up for the seemingly weak bows, for the effectiveness of Egyptian

military archery of this era (around 1900 BCE) is well documented (ibid. 23). However,

one must bear in mind that this was at a time when there was barely any protection

available to the soldiers, and that the light arrows would probably be ineffective against

metal armour.

Bows enjoyed widespread use in other parts of the world in the Bronze and Iron

Ages as well, be it settled nations like Ancient Greece or China, where great workshops

for bows and arrows have been unearthed, dating back to the second century BCE, or

the nomadic nations like the Huns, who, in the fourth century CE, used to bury their

dead along with their bows, thus pointing out the high esteem in which these weapons

were held (ibid. 15).

The situation in central and northern Europe is not so clear, for there is little

evidence of the use of bows in the Bronze Age and they only started to appear again at

the beginnings of the "Christian era" (ibid. 21). A sizeable amount of bows excavated in

Denmark date from the late Iron Age, between "100 and 350" CE and "in general they

are longer than the height of the men who used them" (ibid. 21), so they can be safely

labelled as longbows. Of particular interest is a group of longbows recovered from ship-

burials at Nydam5, for these longbows were crafted with very similar ratio of depth to

width as the modern ones, but more striking is the fact that the ratio was the same (1 to

4 In the Middle Ages, merely the arrowheads (of the bodkin type) weighted from 14.2 gm to 49.6 gm(Hardy 54).

5 Located on eastern coast of the Jutland peninsula, southern Denmark, close to the border withGermany.

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1.1) as "the Mary Rose bows recovered from a ship of Henry VIII's navy, wrecked in

1545" (Hardy 21), which were probably the last bows made for significant military use.

Some of the Nydam bows had horn nocks (the slots at the ends of a bow for the string),

which are used even today, some had iron ones, possibly to be used as the last resort for

close combat, and some kept to the old fashioned self-nocking, i.e. slots cut into the

timber itself, and they were thinner than the Mary Rose bows, so they would not last as

long (ibid. 21). These are, however, only minor blemishes, if they can even be called

that, for they do not worsen the firing capabilities of the bow. The main difference was

in the use of heartwood and sapwood. Much like in the creating of a composite bow,

heartwood, which compresses, is used for the belly, while sapwood (the outer part of a

tree, as opposed to heartwood), which is more elastic, is used for the back. The Nydam

bows stick to this idea in their centres, but outside of that they "all taper gradually to the

ends, in [some cases] leaving almost no heartwood on the outer parts of the limbs. Later

bows . . . were made with the proportion between sapwood and heartwood kept more

nearly constant from handle to nock" (ibid. 22). This, however, still does not necessarily

make the Iron Age bows bad weapons, for the extra heartwood at the limbs merely

increases draw weight, not accuracy or any other shooting-related qualities, and the

extra draw weight was not needed, since the armour of the time was much worse than in

Henry VIII's time. Therefore, it could be argued, the Nydam bows were even more

effective than the Mary Rose war-bows, in their respective time periods.

The immediate question which may come to one's mind is how it was possible

for the Romans to conquer so much of Europe, if the Germanic tribes used those

powerful bows. The problem is that it is not known what bows the tribes used, but it is

very likely that the longbows of their Danish neighbours eventually found their way

south, for there are at least two instances of Roman attacks against Germanic territories,

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which were repelled by the use of archery: in 354 and 388 CE. Of the latter is said that

the "Roman attack on Neuss was repulsed by a hail of arrows 'falling as thick as if

thrown by arcubalistae6'. Shades of Crcy." (Hardy 21) Bearing in mind the big shields

the Roman infantry used, as well as the highly advanced and by centuries of war proven

testudo formation (Latin for "tortoise") made for warding off arrows and other lesser

projectiles, two theories may not be far from the truth. First, the bows used were indeed

longbows, for no lesser bow was likely to penetrate the shields, or at least cause enough

of an impact to force a shield aside for another arrow to fly in. Second, the tribal people

deployed them in huge enough numbers to cause the entire formation to falter and

retreat, for it is unlikely that the Romans would fall back after a few of their numbers

fell. A certain answer to the initial question may never be known, but it would probably

be one of the following: the tribes simply did not realize the power of the bow, they did

not know how to use it on a larger scale, they felt it disgracing to use it or they were

compelled by their beliefs to die with a sword (or other close combat weapon) in their

hands, lest they should not be allowed to enter Valhalla, although this belief was not

quite as widespread as among the Norsemen. A mix of these arguments, except the

religious one, was probably the main reason why it took almost another millennium for

the longbows to become the weapon of the late medieval warfare, despite the fact that

the longbow remained mostly the same.

Longbows kept developing independently in areas outside of the Western world

as well, such as in the isolated regions of the native tribes of Brazil in the late twentieth

century. Their bows were examined and it was concluded that "almost every known

section shape to be found in European bows can be seen in the weapons of the Brazilian

Indians" (Hardy 24). In mid-twentieth-century Kenya, a game warden tried the typical

6 A repeated, and/or possibly multiple-shot, crossbow.

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bows of two native tribes. The first, a "short, simple-segment wooden bow of . . . about

3 ft (91 cm) long, of some 50 lb (23 kg) draw weight" (much like the Egyptian

longbows), he drew with ease7 (Hardy 25). "[The warden, who] was a big, powerful

man, used to hunting-weapons of all kinds," then checked the second, "but the first 5 ft

10 in (178 cm) . . . bow that he tried defeated him completely" (ibid. 25). This example

provides the evidence of the impressive craftsmanship the natives were capable of, for

"the drawing weight [of their bows] was on average over 100 lb (45 kg)", while it is

estimated that "[common] medieval war bows weighed from about 80 lb to 120 lb (36

kg to 54 kg)" (ibid. 26) and the Mary Rose longbows about 110 to 180 lb (50 to 80 kg)

(Kapar 10). To penetrate an armour from the first half of the sixteenth century, it is

estimated a draw weight of about 110 to 130 lb (50 to 60 kg) was needed (ibid. 10), so a

Kenyan native would stand a fair chance against a soldier of the era, provided he used a

proper arrowhead - which is, however, unlikely, for it is believed the iron the natives

used for their arrowheads came only from the European traders (Hardy 26). The

techniques the natives used to handle the bow nearly mirrored those of the European

medieval archers, including finesses like using three fingers to draw (ibid. 25), as well

as individual adjustments such as ensuring the length of "arrows would be suited to the

proper drawlength of each archer" (ibid. 27), and therefore it can be fairly safely

assumed that these "savages" were as good archers as their counterparts in more

developed parts of the world.

7 Nowadays, a person of average physique, new to archery, would be very tired after an hour-longtraining with a 30 lb bow, and it is very unlikely that the said person would even be able to draw a 40lb bow to its full effect, let alone fire properly.

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3 The Longbow in Medieval England

3.1 The Beginnings the Saxons, the Normans or the Welsh?

As Hardy explains, Roger Ascham, a tutor to Edward VI and to Queen Elizabeth

I and also the author of "the first archer's manual" (Hardy 138), believed the Saxons

first brought the longbow to England (Asham, qtd. in ibid. 29). He is partially right,

because the Saxons were a grouping of the Germanic tribes, among whom the longbow

was common, and it is more than likely that they did bring it with them to England.

However, the weapon then gradually fell out of use, up to a point where it seems it was

hardly used at all by the English during the Battle of Hastings1 (ibid. 32), let alone three

centuries later. Asham could not have known that the longbow had already existed in

England in the third millennium BCE (ibid. 29), as mentioned in the previous chapter.

What he probably did know, however, is that the descendants of those Stone Age

peoples, the Welsh, used it, and that the English adopted it for their own military use.

He may have merely been hesitant to credit such a huge accomplishment to any other

nation than the English themselves.

It may never be known whether the Welsh kept using the longbow continuously

since the earliest findings, or reinvented it long before they came into contact with

either the Saxons or the Danes2, but there are written sources of their use of the

longbow during the Early and High Middle Ages. The earliest mention is in 633, when

"Offrid, the son of Edwin king of Northumbria, was killed by an arrow in battle with the

Welsh and the Mercians."3 (ibid. 30) Another example, proving the continuous Welsh

use of the longbow in the military, is the English expedition into Wales in 1055. The

1 For some theories on the use of the longbow by the English during the battles in 1066, see section 6.1.2 There is also the possibility of adopting it from either of the two nations.3 Hardy clarifies that "we cannot be certain that the arrow flew from a Welsh bow, but . . . the inland

races in Britain" did not favour the use of the bow in the military (unlike the Welsh, whom he deemsthe original users of it in warfare) and he implies that the chances of any of the English using it arevery slim (30).

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horsemen were ambushed by the Welsh longbowmen and the attack was so well

organized that the English were routed before they even managed to fight back (Hardy

32). There are also mentions of the penetrating power of the Welsh longbows, such as

from the account of a certain Giraldus Cambrensis from the late twelfth century: "'One

of [the lord's] men, in a fight against the Welsh, was wounded by an arrow that

penetrated his thigh, the casing armour on both sides' - which would have been mail

armour - 'the part of the saddle known as the alva, and mortally wounded the horse.'"

(ibid. 36)

The Norman rulers seemed to have been more inclined to the use of archery. For

example, in 1138, the timely use of archers routed the Scots at the Battle of the Standard

near Northallerton, and "during the reign of Henry II Ireland was conquered by Anglo-

Norman forces, using many archers, led by Richard de Clare, Earl of Pembroke, the

famous 'Strongbow', who was so called because he was reputed to draw the strongest

bow in the kingdom" (ibid. 36). While both composite and self-bows were well known

to the English by the second half of the twelfth century, as was the fact that the best

material for self-bows was yew (ibid. 38), the bows were not yet considered for the

lords' armies, but rather remained the weapons of the common people. In fact, the

crossbow was becoming more popular than the bow, especially in Richard I's time and

during the crusades, since they fared better "in the heat of the Holy Land" (ibid. 35).

Hardy believes one of the main reasons why the crossbow did not completely replace

the other bows4 is that the weapon "[was not a] threat to the men who shot against it

with the longbow", i.e. the Welsh (35).

By this time, the common way of gathering an army was to call the lords

together, who came with their retinues of knights and men-at-arms, then they would

4 Simple and composite ones.

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move towards the enemy and levy as many common people as possible along the way,

to be used as surplus infantry. This form of levies was used up until Edward I's reign,

but Hardy believes that these men "would be dismissed almost as soon as collected,

because it was plain that such untrained and heterogeneous masses could do nothing but

hinder the success of a campaign" (Hardy 43). The first indication of a progress towards

the way the English armies were formed during the Hundred Years' War was the

extended Assize of Arms of 12525, which appointed constables who were to choose the

men to serve in the king's army "for an agreed amount of pay" (ibid. 38). Furthermore,

the men were to equip themselves according to their wealth, based on the land they

owned: the wealthier with "a steel cap, a buff coat of leather, a lance and a sword", the

poorest "must have a bow and arrows" (ibid. 38). This law was the foundation stone in

the reorganization of the army, but it still took almost a hundred years for this army

evolution to complete: it experienced its birth through the massive effort of Edward I, a

stagnation during the kingship of Edward II and its completion in the early stages of

Edward III's reign.

To understand the need for such an evolution, one must first look at the military

situation in contemporary Europe. While the military did develop throughout the history

in order to be more and more effective, for a considerably long time the approach to it

remained much the same within the Western world. For the most of the High and Late

Middle Ages, the heavy cavalry formed the core of armies. Not only it showed just

where the power and wealth rested, but it also was, especially early on, extremely

deadly against any enemy other than another heavy cavalry unit, for it was quite the

medieval tank and no infantry could withstand its charge. Therefore, peasant revolts

were regarded as mere nuisances, and wars against kingdoms who could not afford to

5 The original Assize of Arms of 1181 required some classes of commoners to swear allegiance to theking, to have arms and to answer a call to arms, among other irrelevant things.

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field a force of such soldiers were often not given sufficient regard. However, it was

only a matter of time before the infantry learnt to fight against the heavy cavalry.

England, due to its isolation from other major European powers and its focus on

conquering the two other kingdoms on the same island (Morgan 167-8), was to be the

first nation to learn the folly of underestimating seemingly inferior armies.

Churchill states that it is thanks to the experience gained from the wars with

Scotland and Wales, mainly in the times of Edwards I and II, that the military evolution

was hastened in Britain, when compared to the rest of Europe (333), for the Welsh

further developed their use of archery, the effectiveness thereof was already mentioned,

and the Scots learnt to better organize their pikemen into the schiltron formation 6 a

unit of soldiers pointing their spears or pikes outwards, usually in two or three lines and

to all sides, thus forming a nigh impenetrable barrier for the enemy cavalry. Those

lessons were often quite costly, but they proved their worth eventually, particularly

during the Hundred Years' War.

3.2 Edward I and the Birth of the English Military Longbow

Edward I, an unusually pragmatic ruler for his day, saw the brutal effectiveness

of the longbow and he may have envisioned the possibilities its adaptation for the

English army could create. While he had little success abroad it were his descendants

that were praised for their great military achievements such as at the battles of Crcy,

Poitiers or Agincourt it must be stressed, however, that without the King's efforts to

make the longbowmen a core part of his armies, unlike the supplemental role it played

until that point, none of the great archer armies of the Hundred Years' War would have

come into existence and, therefore, neither would the War as it is now known.

6 Also known as sheltron or schiltrom, probably based on Old English word for shield-troop,scild-truma (Bosworth and Toller 831). This formation was effectively used even during the Napoleonicwars, to defend against cavalry.

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During his reign, the English cavalrymen still thought themselves far superior to

the infantry and thus were very unruly during battles, much like the French during the

War (Hardy 42). This air of superiority comes as a surprise, since the English lost quite

a few battles to the other nations on the same island 7, including some major ones, even

in Edward's time, such as the Battle of Stirling Bridge in 1297 (ibid. 47). Had Edward

not come to personally command the army that marched to fight the Scots the following

year, the English would have been likely to lose the Battle of Falkirk too, because even

after "working for 20 years at creating an organised army", the impetuousness of the

cavalry nearly caused a defeat (ibid. 43). Hardy further explains that the cavalry did rout

the tiny force of the Scottish cavalry, as well as their unprotected archers, but they

proved useless against the schiltrons. They would have probably died trying to crush the

solid formation, leaving the English archers unprotected, but Edward forced them to

stay back and ordered the archers to attack, whose volleys quickly decimated the

Scottish ranks, especially since the soldiers were poorly protected against arrows (ibid.

48-9). The reoccurring experiences of this sort may have gotten him started on the idea

of reforming the army, as well as, throughout his reign, kept his resolve strong in this

matter.

Edward employed archers from the beginnings of his reign. However, those

soldiers were a mix of longbowmen from the friendly parts of Wales (ibid. 44) and

crossbowmen from Gascony (ibid. 47). Both were initially counted in hundreds, but

during Edward's reign the number of archers amounted to thousands, almost exclusively

longbowmen (ibid. 46). There were two arguments in favour of the longbow. The first

one was, in a way, also the cause of the eventual decline of the longbow: the price.

Crossbows in the late twelfth century cost from 3s to 7s, depending on the size, whereas

7 They were, after all, trying to conquer Wales and Scotland for quite some time already.

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longbows "even 50 or 60 years later were only 12d if made from bough-wood and 1s 6d

if from the better and stronger timber of the tree bole" (Hardy 44). The training was

long and hard, but at a time when a longbowman earned 3d a day (ibid. 42), about as

much as, or even more than, an artisan craftsman (ibid. 44), it was well worth it 8. The

other factor was effectiveness. Hardy claims that around the time of Crcy (1346) the

range of crossbows was 200 yards (75), while longbows reached some 350 yards (54).

Those crossbows used wooden bows. He further claims that later on, around the time of

Agincourt, there were crossbows with steel bows, reaching about 400 yards (ibid. 75).

However, with increased power also came longer reloading time, thus further increasing

the already "hopeless inequality of shooting speed" (ibid. 75).

The King took quite some pains to make his plan a reality. For example, in 1295,

he called in 25,000 men to be trained as archers, even though he knew that not many of

them would have the necessary aptitude for the weapons, and he also pardoned many

poachers and criminals who agreed to serve in the army (ibid. 45-6). Edward's efforts to

spread the use of the longbow among the English worked well in the longer term: in

1298 most of the longbowmen were Welsh, while in 1346 the majority were English

(ibid. 46). Taking all this into account, the title "father of the military longbow"

bestowed upon Edward by Hardy seems rather fitting (41).

Furthermore, as was already hinted at, the King made a lot of changes to

improve the organization of the army, slowly transforming it into something fairly

similar to a standing army. The chief change was the wages. Everyone was to be paid,

from an earl to a common soldier (ibid. 46). Some of the nobles were reluctant to accept

that, mostly out of fear of losing their independence or by feeling degraded to mere

mercenaries, but enough of the lords took the King's money to "make the gradual

8 They were also "remarkably well treated" and sometimes received extra wages after battles (Hardy46).

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abandonment of the feudal idea inevitable" (Hardy 47). Some sort of military hierarchy

started to be introduced: there were units of twenty among whom one was their leader, a

vintenar, units of one hundred men were led by a centenar, and some of those units were

in turn organized into thousands (ibid. 44). This idea of regular numbers and chain of

command was an "enormous advance from the largely disorganised rabble of the feudal

levy" (ibid. 44). This advancement in turn contributed a great deal to a better control of

the battlefield and thus laid the foundations for the future strategy of a combined force

of archers and heavy infantry (ibid. 41). In 1285 the Statute of Winchester was passed,

which helped in keeping track of available forces and also emphasised the duty of an

individual "'to have in his house harness for to keep the peace'" (ibid. 47). Oddly

enough, the longbow was not stressed Hardy guesses this to be a part of the idea to

keep the use of the weapon among the newly created professional soldiers, rather than

the levied troops (47). There is another interesting innovation: Edward was apparently

the first to introduce some kind of uniform, in this case a piece of cloth "bearing the

cross of St George", to be worn around one's arm9 (ibid. 45).

There were many opportunities to try out the gradually developing army. In 1282

at the Battle of Orewin Bridge, where the Welsh leader, Prince Llywelyn ap Gruffydd,

was killed, the "king's army was described as being a mixture of cavalry and archers"

(ibid. 47). The Battle at Conway in 1295 was even more important in the longbow

usage development, for not only "it seems there were no Welsh bowmen present on the

English side" but also the English failed in their opening cavalry charge and it was the

archers who joined in and "made havoc of the Welshmen's defensive stand", thus

helping to turn the tide of the battle (ibid. 47). The following battles with the Scots were

already mentioned: the disaster at Stirling and the near-disaster at Falkirk. Both clearly

9 "There is no record of any Welsh reaction to this issue of an alien identification." (Hardy 45)

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demonstrate two points. First, by this time the seemingly inferior infantry army learnt to

handle the heavy cavalry. Second, the proper deployment of archers was crucial. Both of

those findings were to prove invaluable to the English during the Hundred Years' War,

for at that time the standpoints would reverse and the English would be the ones

considered an inferior army. It can also be said that without Edward I, the "sustained

and, on the whole, extraordinarily successful - offensive . . . waged for over a century by

a poor and scantily populated little country against a richer, more populous and

ostensibly far more powerful enemy" (Seward 17) would not have been possible.

3.3 The Slumber of the Longbow During the Reign of Edward II

The reign of Edward II is forever marked by the Battle at Bannockburn (Hardy

49), the worst defeat of the English at the hands of the Scots. However, as far as the

longbow is concerned, his kingship10 could be considered somewhat positive, for it

seems it was his idea to implement the rule that the counties should pay for the archers'

armour (ibid. 50). This was quite an improvement, since the archers were peasants, and

it was unlikely that they could afford any armour prior to their service in the army.

Moreover, he continued the practice of pardoning criminals in exchange for serving in

the army, and the amount of archers requested for military service was proportionally

greater than in his father's reign (ibid. 50).

In 1314, Edward II gathered an army for the conquest of the Northern kingdom

(Churchill 313) and met the Scots at the Battle of Bannockburn. The English army was

unusually large, according to a BBC article on the battle, "by far the largest English

army ever to invade Scotland"11. However, the king was not quite the able military

10 Generally speaking, there is very little good to be said about the reign of Edward II. While some of hismodern portrayals, such as the very effeminate one in the filmBraveheart, are exaggerated, he stillwas, by most accounts, a weak king who lost much of what his father had achieved.

11 The article states that about 2,000 cavalry and some 12,500 infantry answered the summons, whereasthe Scottish army "numbered around 6,000, with a small contingent on horseback". Seward assumesup to 18,000 English (51). Hardy thinks the English were about twice as numerous as the Scots (49).Churchill states 25,000 English against 10,000 Scots (313).

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leader that was his father, Edward I. On the first day of the battle, whether brought on

by the lack of authority of Edward II and poor discipline of his barons, or by his

insufficient skills to command a vast force, and despite the failures of this strategy in

the past, the main part of the English army, the cavalry, charged the prepared ranks of

Scottish infantry armed with spears and pikes and suffered heavy casualties and

retreated (Hardy 50). Hardy further states that the Scots have learnt more from the past

mistakes than their enemy and on the second day of the battle their infantry charged the

confused lines of the English who were trying to get into position, and caught them

unready. The longbowmen moved forward to try and flank the Scots, but Robert Bruce,

their leader, was prepared for this and ordered his cavalry to attack them. Without

protection, the archers were easily pushed back (ibid. 50). According to Brown's

detailed account of the battle, the Scots then pressed the attack and forced the front line

of the English into the main body of their army and thus created much disorder, because

the English were now crushed together and had hardly enough room to fight properly.

Under this pressure, they began to give ground and flee (Brown 127). It can be argued

that, given better leadership, the army would have still won the day, since the English

infantry outnumbered the Scots, but "as [the] royal standard departed, panic set in"

(BBC) the rest of the army fled the field.

In this battle the English paid dearly for their stubbornness to learn from the past

mistakes, for the errors committed here were nearly the same as those made during the

late thirteenth century battles with the Scots. One cannot expect the heavy cavalry to

crush a solid line of pikemen without, to paraphrase a modern term, "archery

preparation", and neither can one expect a lot of support from archers unless they are

well deployed. There was one new lesson, however, one that should have been obvious:

unprotected archers stand no chance against the cavalry.

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3.4 Edward III and The Ripening of the Military Longbow

The following monarch, Edward III, seemed to have inherited more of his

grandfather's abilities than his father had, and he learnt from the mistakes made in the

times of his predecessors. He also continued with the development of the military

archery and the organization of the army right where his grandfather stopped. By the

1340s there was paid service for an agreed period of time12, based on the rank of a

soldier, as well as "a form of conscription . . . to raise definite numbers of men for

service from particular areas" (Hardy 79). Troops were now also paid prior to their

march towards the mustering point, to pay for the trip and to avoid the occasional

violence on their part (ibid. 81). The troops were paid even in the case of a delayed

transport across the Channel, and this time was often used for drilling not only the

archery itself, but also manoeuvres, as well as for getting used to the organization of the

army (ibid. 82).

The greatest achievement of the pre-War13 period of the reign of Edward III was,

however, the innovation in the way troops were deployed before a battle both the

positioning and the formations. The Battle of Dupplin Muir in 1332 saw the first use of

an early version of the tactics used during the War (ibid. 51). Until then, the common

way to fight battles was to march within a sight of the enemy, and then send the soldiers

forward, either in one great mass or in waves, one following the other

14

(ibid. 53).

However, the English found themselves greatly outnumbered, about four to one (ibid.

51), so this kind of battle was out of the question. Hardy describes the battle as follows.

The English took defensive positions: they formed a line of dismounted men-at-arms15

and positioned their archers at the flanks, angled a little forward so as to make it easier

12 At this point, a mounted archer was paid as much as a master craftsman, 6d a day. Foot archers earned3 or 4d a day. For more info about wages at this period, see Hardy 79.

13 i.e. the Hundred Years' War14 This is exactly what the French did in the three major battles of the War.15 Therefore, it was neither Henry V nor Edward III who originally employed this idea.

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for them to shoot, appearing a bit like horns of the main battle line. The Scots charged

the centre of the English line, but as the first volleys started falling into their ranks, the

soldiers on the sides tried to move towards the middle of their group in order to avoid

the arrows, which quickly turned the army into a disorganised throng. The initial charge

did push the English line a little back, but, the defenders being on a higher ground, they

eventually halted the attackers' progress. The archers continuously fired at the flanks of

the Scots, not only causing massive casualties, but also keeping them in a tight group,

therefore making it nearly impossible for the soldiers in front to fight properly, and they

thus became easy targets for the English men-at-arms 16. The Scots soon turned to run

and were massacred by the pursuing English cavalry. The attackers lost 76 knights,

1,200 men-at-arms and "an uncounted mass of infantry. . . . The English lost 33 knights

and men-at-arms and not one archer. No Scot had been able to reach them." (Hardy 51)

The Battle of Halidon Hill in 1333 was, in short, the perfection of the previously

described tactics. However, there are a few points worth mentioning. The base

positioning was just like at Dupplin. However, the effectiveness was almost tripled, as

can be seen from Hardy's detailed description of the deployment:

If three such Dupplin formations are put together, side by side, the

forward horns of archers on both flanks of the central, and each inward

flank of the outer divisions, join together and form a sort of triangular

wedge. Thus the whole formation presents the following appearance: left

flank archers inclining forward of the left-hand division, whose right flank

archers form half the triangle with the left flank archers of the central

division. The right flank archers of that same central division form half the

16 This particular depiction of frontal line of attackers made unable to fight properly by the oncomingmass of their fellow soldiers trying to avoid the volleys of arrows was a reoccurring scenario duringthe battles of the Hundred Years' War.

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triangle with the left flank archers of the right-hand division. The flank

archers of the right division incline forward, balancing those on the far left.

(Hardy 51-2)

The importance of the resulting increased shooting zone can hardly be stressed enough.

At Dupplin, the archers could release a few volleys at the frontal ranks of the enemy at

the beginning of the battle, but after that they had to shoot at the flanks, or else they

would risk hitting their own troops. Had the Scots been more coordinated and their

morale higher, they might have overpowered the English line of men-at-arms, for there

was nothing to hinder the frontal lines during the initial charge. Similarly, if this

deployment was used in the Hundred Years' War, the English would have been easily

overwhelmed by the far more numerous French, especially since, according to Seward's

description of the contemporary protection, they wore the plate armour a far superior

protection when compared to the chiefly mail armour of the English (Seward 51-2).

With the increased shooting zone, the enemy had to march through most of the

effective range of the longbow17 under nearly constant volleys of arrows18, while also

having to walk over their own dead, for the archers now easily covered the entire enemy

line. The archers could also easily switch their firing zone and apply crossfire at a large

enemy group, so that if those enemies turned to protect themselves from one side, they

would be hit from the other. The massive deployment of archers along the front line also

allowed for more of them firing directly, rather than in an arch, which was necessary in

order to shoot over their fellow soldiers. This was particularly important against the

17 350 yards (Hardy 54). It ought to be mentioned that, according to Prince Louis Napoleon, "a first rateEnglish archer who, in a single minute, was unable to draw and discharge his bow 12 times with arange of 240 yards and who in these 12 shots once missed his man, was very lightly esteemed" (qtd. inibid. 68).

18 The amount of arrows fired can be guessed. If we take a unit of some 2,000 archers shooting 10 arrowsa minute probably the lowest estimate (Hardy 68) at the same time for three minutes, which is alow estimate of the time it would probably take the infantry to get through the worst of the archery fire

Hardy estimates cavalry would take 90 seconds to cross 300 yards (68), we arrive an amount of60,000 arrows. That is likely at least four times the amount the Scots brought to the field.

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French, for while it has been proven that longbows can penetrate a plate armour19, it still

usually requires a direct hit, as close to the right angle as possible otherwise there is a

very high chance of the arrow sliding off.

Another important point is that young Edward III, aged twenty at the time, was

the commander of the English army during the Battle of Halidon Hill. It seems it was

the first time he commanded a large army, and he did rather well. He surrounded himself

with veterans, such as the commanders of the army at Dupplin20, who devised the

defensive tactics used there, and while it may never be known whether it was his or their

idea to further develop the Dupplin tactics (Hardy 53), it was essential that Edward

witnessed the English army in action and learnt to use it properly for future battles,

which in turn provided the necessary knowledge to future generations of commanders,

such as his son, the Black Prince, or Henry V.

To return to the battle of Halidon Hill itself, the defensive positions of the

outnumbered English (ibid. 52) were already described in great detail. It is unclear what

led the Scots to attempt an attack, since they failed miserably against a similarly

deployed army the previous year when they had proportionally far more soldiers, but

nevertheless, they did charge the prepared English lines. Thus the Scots had to go

through a hail of arrows so strong that they "were so grievously wounded . . . by the

[archers] that they could not help themselves, and quickly began to turn their faces away

from the arrow flights and to fall" (Lanercost 279). It seems that so few of them reached

the English lines that they were routed soon after and the rest of the Scottish army

quickly followed suit (ibid. 280). Hardy claims that the Scots barely even reached the

English lines (52). Only then Edward sent in the cavalry, to finish off remaining pockets

19 Hardy claims the arrowheads kept improving in order to penetrate the gradually improving armour(54). Other sources on the topic, Kapar (11) and Seward, agree as well, while Seward further clarifiesthat the approximate effective range is "about sixty yards" (53). This makes sense, since at this rangean archer has to start shooting in an arch and the arrow does not hit at the right angle any more.

20 "Edward Baliol, Gilbert Umphraville, Henry de Beaumont and David of Atholl." (Hardy 53)

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of fighters and capture or kill the rest (Lanercost 280). The victory in the battle of

Halidon Hill helped a great deal in restoring faith and pride of the English in

themselves, after the disastrous Battle of Bannockburn.

By this time, the composition of the English army changed a lot since the second

half of the thirteenth century, before the time Edward I started to reorganise it. No longer

were knights the main force, supplemented by whatever peasants or militia got levied

from the surrounding towns, plus the occasional band of mercenaries, but rather the core

of the army was formed by professional soldiers (Morgan 173), both men-at-arms and

longbowmen, especially the latter receiving unusually high pay21, allowing them

previously unheard-of luxuries such as a palfrey to transport them to battles (Churchill

332), therefore turning a much hated feudal duty into a fairly enviable, albeit dangerous,

job.

21 For they were, after all, still peasants, unlike men-at-arms, who were, for the most part, squires toknights or soldiers employed by earls therefore full-time warriors.

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4 The Golden Age of the Longbow

4.1 The Battle of Crcy

The outcome of the Battle of Crcy (1346) was an incredible shock to medieval

Europe. The English must have seemed to the French much like the Scots did to the

English a few decades ago: a tiny army of knights, even smaller in numbers than the

peasants following them. France was considered the greatest of European kingdoms for

a reason, for not only did there live five times as many people as in England (Seward

25), but it was also a very rich country and most of all, it had a mighty army: in 1340

Philip VI was able to raise 60,000 heavy cavalry (ibid. 34). However, much like the

Scottish pikemen decimated the English, now the English longbowmen were to

decimate the French. The English employed the same proven tactics as in Scotland

(Hardy 66-7), so there is no reason to describe any of the main battles 1. Nevertheless,

there are quite a few interesting points to make.

Crcy was by no means the first major battle of the War. There were the battles

of Cadsand in 1337 (ibid. 57) and of Morlaix in 1342 (ibid. 59), both decisive victories

due to the use of the archers. While it seems that no proper account of the battles

reached the French commanders, the English, on the other hand, acquired quite a

valuable experience from the second battle. Hardy states that the English positioned

themselves according to their typical defensive tactics and decimated first two French

attacks, both of which were more numerous than the English army. By the time the third

attack came, the archers were already low on arrows and the fight was mostly done in

close combat. The battle was not decided by dark, and as the French pulled back, the

English, sensing their chance, retreated (ibid. 59). The longbowmen carried only 36

arrows each if they had more, the third French attack would have likely been

1 Should the reader be interested in detailed accounts of the battles, the author recommends Hardy 65-74or Seward 60-68 for Crcy, Hardy 91-95 or Seward 86-91 for Poitiers and Hardy 101-104 and 113-119 or Seward 162-169 for Agincourt.

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decimated just like the previous two were (Hardy 59). It appears the English learnt their

lesson from this, for it seems that during later bigger campaigns each archer had nearly

100 arrows at his disposal (ibid. 85). It was needed it is suggested that just in the

Battle of Crcy some half a million arrows were fired (ibid. 69), and even then the

archers had to enter the battlefield to retrieve some of the arrows to keep shooting (ibid.

73). Hardy also comments on the legend saying that during the brief torrential rain prior

to the battle the archers unstrung their bows to keep the strings dry he claims that the

linen strings the archers used at the time would survive days in water without any

weakening (70).

The Battle of Crcy was a great turning point in that period. It was not only a

great shock to the chivalrous French, who must have found it unbelievable that their

mighty army was massacred by a force of peasants. It established the longbow as the

ranged weapon for the military. The army experienced remarkable boom in archer

recruits during the siege of Calais in 1346-7 Edward III commanded, by English

standards, an impressive army of 32,303 men, 20,076 of them being longbowmen (ibid.

76). The longbowmen themselves rose in prominence too the Black Prince's elite

guard consisted of those soldiers (ibid. 77). On the other hand, the battle completely

humiliated the other ranged weapon of the time, the crossbow, which was not used any

more at the next major battle at Poitiers in 1356 (ibid. 75). The War and the battle in

particular also helped a great deal in giving rise to a "national consciousness in England"

and it is also said that the "army [at Crcy] that was part Norman, Saxon, Angevin and

Celtic . . . in some way thought of itself as the army of England" (ibid. 78).

4.2 The Battles of Poitiers and Agincourt

The French were, after the Battle of Crcy, understandably reluctant to face the

English in the field. Nevertheless, face them they did, and the Battle of Poitiers was

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another disaster, perhaps even greater king John II and his son were captured, along

with heavy casualties in both dead and captured, for it is reported that some English,

even the archers, took five or six prisoners (Hardy 95). The English employed the same

proven tactics, and the outcome further magnified the fear of the longbowmen. The

following king, Charles V, was less chivalrous and more pragmatic. To avoid another

Crcy or Poitiers, he forbid his troops to "engage in [a] full-scale battle with the

English" and to make sure his guerrilla warfare strategy would actually be followed, he

made several "obscure men", some even former bandits, his commanders 2 (Seward

109). Thus it was that the only other major battle of the fourteenth century where

archery played a significant role happened not in France, but in Spain, in 1367, where

the English took part in the Battle of Najera3(Hardy 96).

The English were keen on keeping their one advantage over the French, and to

that end, further arrangements were made, such as Edward III's order of 1369 to ban

various games4 in favour of archery practice (ibid. 97). Oddly enough, the French did

not create an archer army of their own. There were many attempts, but Hardy quotes an

account of Jean Juvenal des Ursins5, who believed it was out of fear that should those

archers band together, their army would become stronger than that of the nobles (98).

Hardy further claims that "the French king's attitude is easy to understand", for "there

was more serious unrest in France than in England"6

(98). Therefore the way the French

fought battles remained much the same, while the English retained their longbow

2 Most notable of these was Bertrand du Guesclin, who became Constable of France (Seward 109).3 Military, the battle was a great achievement, but economically it was a disaster, for king Pedro, whom

the English helped gain the throne, was soon overthrown and killed, and thus not only the vision of anally in Castile was shattered, but also Pedro's debt, which was to pay for the campaign, was never paid(Seward 107).

4 Such as "the throwing of stones, wood, iron, handball, football, bandyball, cambuck, or cock fighting,[or] other such like vain plays, which have no profit in them . . . under pain of imprisonment" (Hardy97).

5 "writing shortly after Poitiers" (Hardy 98)6 James I of Scotland tried to introduce the longbow into his armies, too. There were even laws to own a

bow and practice archery, but it was too little, too late (Hardy 130).

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tradition not only to a point where Richard II could maintain a personal guard of some

4,000 longbowmen (Hardy 98), but also to a point where, after gaining the necessary

experience to effectively use the longbow in battle in "border warfare as Prince of

Wales" (ibid. 42), the continued tradition allowed Henry V to gather enough archers to

reignite the war with France and start a campaign which culminated in the Battle of

Agincourt.

It should be noted that, by this time, the French commanders were of noble birth

again and often lacked the necessary skills, unlike the veteran, albeit common, soldiers

who led the French armies during Charles V's reign. At Agincourt, there were "12

princes of the blood . . . vying for command" (ibid. 114) and "there was no proper

command-structure or leadership of any sort" (Seward 165), which may well explain

why nothing decisive was done to counter the deadly longbowmen. Henry V employed

the same tactics as Edward III at Halidon Hill or Crcy, and the results were similarly

devastating. The King then started a series of successful sieges and by the end of 1419

"the English were undisputed masters of all Normandy" (ibid. 177). The following year

the Treaty of Troyes was signed and Henry V "became Haeres et Regens Franciae

Heir to the French Throne and Regent of France" (ibid. 182). Without the longbow

victory at Agincourt, this would not have been possible.

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5 The Decline of the Military Longbow

The longbow remained a decisive factor throughout the rest of the War. This fact,

however, does not mean that the English kept winning. They grew overconfident after

Agincourt and the ultimate result of this folly was the Battle of Baug of 1421 (Seward

185). Duke of Clarence, the King's brother, charged off with some 1,500 men-at-arms

without waiting for the archers, engaged the enemy and got himself killed, along with

most of his army, thus proving that "the English still had to rely on their traditional

combination of archers and dismounted men-at-arms" (Seward 185-6). Next came

probably the last two grand victories of the English longbow, the battles of Cravant in

1423 and Verneuil in 1424 (Hardy 120). However, Seward offers a different account of

the latter, implying that the longbow was hardly a decisive factor (198-201). He states

that out of 9,000 English there was "a reserve of 2,000 mounted bowmen" (Seward 198)

to begin with, and that the archers on the right flank of the English failed to repel a

cavalry charge which got through them towards the reserve, and "many English turned

and run", presumably the foot archers (ibid. 200). The mounted reserve eventually

defeated the cavalry and joined the main battle, but probably without using their bows

so as not to risk hitting their own soldiers (ibid. 201). From this account can be assumed

that only the archers on the left flank, perhaps some one fourth of all the archers present,

got to use their bows to their full effect and therefore the battle cannot be considered a

victory of the longbow.

The Battle of Patay (1429) is sometimes considered the worst defeat1 of an

archer army in the War. Both Hardy and Seward agree that the English were attacked

from a different direction than they expected and that the longbowmen unit on that

wing, having no flank protection, was quickly overwhelmed, but they also agree about

1 Fastolf, one of two English commanders, who retreated when the battle was nearly lost, was accused of"having lost the war in a single afternoon" (Hardy 124).

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the relatively low numbers of soldiers involved: Seward lists 3,000 English, including

"Parisian militia", against 8,000 French (217), Hardy "about 3,500" (123) and he

further states that the said wing unit amounted to some 400 archers (124). If one

assumes the traditional positioning of an English army, then there were another 400

archers on the other wing. A loss of 800 longbowmen can hardly be considered fatal for

the outcome of the whole war.

Among the various reasons responsible for the eventual defeat of the English in

the War, one can be related to the longbow: i.e. the amount of trained archers available.

The changes in the military organization that started occurring around the time of the

introduction of the longbow into the army and which contributed to the creation of the

great archer armies were now working against it. The organization became stricter. In

France, personal enterprises were discouraged, practices such as a monthly muster were

introduced and therefore, in short, "the carefree days of pillage and living off the land

were long past" (Hardy 122), thus greatly reducing the desire to serve there. The French,

on the other hand, put aside their past reluctance towards the longbow and by the end of

the War raised a considerable amount of longbowmen and thus evened out the odds. In

1448, for example, there was an edict to raise 8,000 archers2 (Seward 247). According to

Hardy, in the Battle of Formigny in 1450, a French army included a unit of some 800

longbowmen (124). Seward further states that the English could not afford large

overseas armies any more (246) he estimates the one at Formigny numbered some

4,000 (250). Therefore, the French longbowmen may have played a significant role in

the battle. The victory was a truly decisive one, for the "next morning the heralds

counted 3,774 English dead" (Seward 251).

2 They could have been, however, either crossbowmen or archers (Seward 247), presumablylongbowmen.

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The last conflict of the War, the Battle at Castillon in 1453, was significant due

to the use of gunpowder-based weapons. Hardy states that an English army of 3,000

men went against "more than 150 guns, a large army, and a number of [archers]" and "to

the roaring of the guns, in the smoke-filled river valley [the English] were slaughtered"

(125). Seward specifies that the odds were even more in favour of the French: the

English had, at the outbreak of the battle, only "500 men-at-arms and 800 mounted

archers", while the French "brought 300 cannon" (260). It is also his belief that those

cannons were in fact handguns3 (Seward 260). The weapons were powerful4, but their

effectiveness remains a dispute, for "despite impossible odds the [English] assault lasted

for nearly an hour" (ibid. 261). At that point a French reinforcement arrived and charged

the English flank (ibid. 261) and thus hastened the already inevitable outcome of the

battle (ibid. 262). Seward claims it was a "revolution in military technology", for

"French cannon prov[ed] more effective than English bows" (ibid. 253).

It appears that the aforementioned revolution did not reach England. The

longbow remained the main ranged weapon of the Wars of the Roses, for "the cannon

and the handgun were still principally weapons of siege" (Hardy 125). By now, the

protection of soldiers developed even further, "yet still the steel-headed arrows, driven

true, could pierce not only mail but the plate armour itself" (ibid. 128). The Wars of the

Roses decimated the numbers of the longbowmen far more than all the battles of the

Hundred Years' War combined. There were two reasons for this. First, the longbow was

used on both sides, and while it was not the decisive factor any more, since both sides

used it, "it was [still] the main contributor to the masses of dead and wounded" (ibid.

126). Second, the armies were much more numerous than previously, therefore the

3 Seward bases this notion on the explanation that the term culverin was used for both cannon andhandgun, and that the handgun's firing mechanism was called a serpentine, which was "also [a termfor] a type of small cannon" (258), which led to confusion: "perhaps chronicles were confused by'culverins with serpentines' and heard 'culverins andserpentines' instead" (ibid. 260).

4 " . . . because of the enfilade one shot killed no less than six men" (ibid. 261)

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casualties were higher. For example, in the Battle of Towton alone, in 1461, according to

Churchill "some accounts declare that a hundred thousand men were on the field", and

while he admits that "later authorities greatly reduce[d] these figures" (449), he states

that Edward IV, the leader of the Yorkists, "claim[ed] that twenty-eight thousand

Lancastrian dead had been counted" (ibid. 450). Hardy claims that in total "[about]

25,000 men were killed and wounded" (127). This amount far exceeds the typical battle

casualties of the English during the Hundred Years' War and it is not a wild exaggeration

to say that total combat casualties of the English during the whole War were not much

higher than those at the Battle of Towton.

The result of the Wars of the Roses, as far as the longbow is concerned, is that

there were fewer archers and the weapon became much harder to obtain, therefore the

raising of new corps was becoming a problem. One of the factors that initially greatly

contributed to the spread of the longbow, the price, became a reason for its decline, for

by the 1470s the weapon was so scarce and expensive that further laws had to be

adopted, such as the fixed low price of the bow and the forced import of bow staves 5

(Hardy 129-130). The Battle of Bosworth Field in 1485 saw the introduction of another

factor in the decline of the longbow - "a corps of 2,000 mercenaries from France armed

with handguns" (ibid. 130). While it is improbable that they played a decisive role in the

battle6

, they were, however, the first instance of "the slow abandonment of the longbow

in favour of . . . the musket" (ibid. 130).

Henry VIII, himself an outstanding archer7, was the last King to endeavour to

keep the longbowmen a part of the English army. There were two battles early in his

reign, in 1513, which were of importance to the longbow. The first one, the Battle of the

5 It seems to have been worth the effort, at least for the time being, since in "1475 Edward IV landed inFrance with . . . 15,000 archers" (Hardy 130).

6 Hardy claims that "the muskets of Waterloo 330 years later were [still] less efficient than the longbowin speed of shooting and in accuracy" (130).

7 "[Henry VIII] could outshoot his own archers of the guard" (Hardy 130).

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Spurs, was a symbolic skirmish rather than a proper battle 8, "so called because the

French cavalry, routed on their maddened horses by the English archers, used their spurs

to ride headlong away" (Hardy 131). The second one, the Battle of Flodden, was a major

conflict and the last one where it "could be said that without the longbow the issue

might have been different" (ibid. 131). The battle was, however, an important milestone

for the artillery, for not only were the cannons used effectively during a major field

battle on both sides, but it also "rained throughout the battle, and the guns still fired with

great effect" (ibid. 131), demonstrating significant technological development in the

recent years. Henry VIII tried various approaches to ensure the survival of the military

longbow, such as the purchase of 40,000 bow staves from Venice, the ban of the

crossbow and the handgun (ibid. 133) or the revival of the "old rules of Henry I

exempting from arrest or imprisonment any man who shot and killed or wounded a

person running between the shooter and the mark" during archery practices (ibid. 135),

but he could not stop its gradual decline.

There is no singular reason for the decline of the longbow. While the continual

development of the gunpowder-based weapons certainly played a part in it, it was not

due to their mechanical properties in this respect the firearm surpassed the longbow

only centuries later9. Rather, the reason was a mix of many lesser changes. One of those

was the change in the proportion of workforce the amount of peasants doing hard

physical labour lessened (Hardy 132-3), and therefore the traditional base of recruits

with it, for unusual strength was required for the carrier of a longbowman. There was

also the inflation and an inadequate raise in the wages of the archers (ibid. 133),

therefore the vocation was not nearly as desirable as it had been in the past.

8 The cavalry was probably only a detachment of the French army which unexpectedly encountered thewhole English army.

9 It is the author's belief that people were merely drawn to the new firearms because of their curiosity, asis the case with most new items, rather than stick to the somewhat old-fashioned bow.

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Furthermore, there was a general change of attitude towards the weapon, which is, along

with the complicated training of an archer, well portrayed in the sermon of Bishop

Latimer in 1549:

The art of shooting hath been in times past much esteemed in this

realm. . . . But now we have taken up whoring in towns, instead of shooting

in the fields. . . . In my time, my poor father was as diligent to teach me to

shoot as to learn me any other thing, and so I think [did others]. He taught

me how to draw, how to lay my body in my bow, and not to draw with

strength of arms as other nations do, but with strength of the body. I had my

bows bought me according to my age and strength; as I increased in them, so

my bows were made bigger and bigger, for men never shoot well, except

they be brought up in it. (qtd. in Hardy 135)

The reign of Henry VIII saw the final effort to keep the longbow a part of the English

army, and after his death (1547) the use of the weapon in the military quickly declined,

for William Harrison wrote in 1577: "In times past the chief force of England consisted

in their longbows. But now we have . . . given over that kind of artillery" (qtd. in Hardy

139). Nevertheless, Hardy believes that the last recorded use of the longbow in a war

was some one hundred years after Henry VIII's death10 (136).

There is a paradox concerning the legacy of the longbow and medieval archery

in general. While no longbow from the medieval period survived to the present day,

since the items were very common and "[o]nce a bow was no longer serviceable it

would be thrown away or used as firewood" (Hardy 55), a "[p]eculiar [law] allowing the

killing of Scotsmen in York (providing they are carrying a bow and arrow) . . .

survived . . . yet again" and by 2007 was still very much in effect (Wainwright).

10 Presumably the skirmish at Bridgnorth in 1642, during the English Civil War.

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6 The longbow in fiction

Historical fiction can be divided into two categories. Both take some historical

entity and build their story around it, but while the authors of the first kind also take

care to portray the surroundings accurately, often after an extensive research of the

related era, the others merely follow the well-known key facts and fill in the rest

according to their imagination. The following two sub-chapters analyse a book of each

of the types, both relevant to the military archery.

6.1 Viking: King's Man by Tim Severin

As the title suggests, the story is told from the point of view of a Norseman. He

serves in the Varangian Guard1 of Constantinople, where he meets Harald Sigurdsson2

and, believing him the right man to restore the old ways in Norway, pledges to serve

him. He helps him gain fame and wealth in the Byzantine Empire, as well as escape,

since the Varyags3cannot leave the service as they please, and eventually aids him in

gaining the Norse throne.

The final part of the book focuses on the invasion of England in 1066. The

narrator serves as an envoy to the duke of Normandy, William the Bastard4, to form an

alliance, while also observing as much as he can about the army to find some advantage

for the possible fight between the two nations, should there be a disagreement about the

division of spoils after they defeat Harold Godwinson, the English King. During

observing the training of troops, he concludes the archers are merely meant to force the

enemy to stay in one place until the main force, the cavalry, is ready to attack (Severin

239). The horsemen training described consists of light cavalry riding towards the

targets to throw spears and withdraw, followed by a charge of heavy cavalry (ibid. 240).

1 The elite infantry of the Byzantine Empire, bodyguards of the emperor2 Also known, especially after his reign, as Harald Hardrada ("the cruel", trans. from Czech)3 Members of the Varangian Guard4 As he was, according to Severin, then known. Later called William the Conqueror.

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Next, a feigned retreat followed by a sudden counter-attack is practised (Severin 240).

All of these Norman tactics are remarkably, or perhaps conveniently, similar to those

Severin attributes to the Anglo-Saxons during their battle with the Vikings as well.

In Severin's depiction of the Battle of Stamford Bridge, the Vikings, caught

unaware with about half of their forces present and waiting for almost all the horsemen

and most of the archers to arrive, are forced to form a shield wall to protect themselves

from the enemy cavalry. However, instead of the expected charge, the Vikings

experience a continuous harassment: the cavalrymen ride in near the shield wall, throw

a spear and ride away, and only rarely attack in close combat, thus slowly bleeding the

Vikings out (ibid. 270). The Norsemen grow restless, and when they see the enemy

cavalry pull back they understand it as them fleeing the field, break the shield wall and

charge the seemingly abandoned infantry. The Anglo-Saxon foot soldiers are fresh, but

despite that the battle seems balanced, until the point when Harald dies and the cavalry,

having only feigned the retreat, attacks, and the battle quickly turns into a rout (ibid.

272-3).

While it is probable that the Anglo-Saxons and the Normans shared some parts

of their strategy, it is very unlikely that it was as identical as Severin describes,

especially since they were on the brink of war at the time. The Vikings had, by the time

of the battle, been raiding the English coast for some two and half centuries, so it can be

assumed they knew what to expect and how to fight the English. So they did, Severin

actually agrees to that: shortly after the landing the Vikings fought a battle with the local

English lords, and won without much trouble (253). Severin describes this battle as the

classic clash of two armies, where one runs into the other, and whoever has more man

standing at the end wins. Therefore, the use of such sophisticated tactics as ascribed to

the Normans preparing for the invasion or to the Anglo-Saxons during the Battle of

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Stamford Bridge, for example the hit and run tactics of the cavalry and the feigned

retreat, seems rather out of place. There still remains the possibility of Harold being an

extraordinary military leader and, upon hearing of the disaster which befell the northern

lords, quickly devising a new strategy and putting it in practice, despite the long and

hurried march north and the inherent impetuousness of the nobles and knights forming

the core of his army. However, the faithfulness of Severin's portrayal of the battle is

undermined even further by the misinterpretation of one crucial thing archery.

There are few clear leads to the use of archery in either of the two major battles

in 1066, but a lot can be deduced from these sources. The only thing in the book

regarding archery that can with a reasonable certainty be considered correct is the death

of Harald by an arrow (Severin 272), for Hardy states that "according to the

Heimskringla (the Lives of the Norse Kings) . . . the Norse King fell, with an arrow

through his throat" (32). Little is said about the use of archery during the main part of

the Battle of Stamford Bridge in King's Man. Both sides had some archers, but the

decisive factors in the weakening of the Vikings' shield wall were the spear-throwing

light cavalry and the hit-and-run tactics of the heavy one (Severin 270). During the

chase of the surviving Norsemen the pursuers encountered one of the Norse

reinforcements, a large group of archers, and, according to Severin, the pursuing cavalry

suffered so much damage so as to start to falter until the archers ran out of arrows (278).

To hold off the cavalry without any prepared obstacles would be quite a feat, and one

would expect the use of the longbow, for no other bow could have so devastating an

effect. While there were laws ordering Norse warriors to include bows as a part of their

equipment, it was a secondary weapon mostly meant for naval battles, when close

combat was not possible (Hardy 28), and there is no evidence of levies similar to those

used by the Anglo-Saxons. Based on that, it can be safely assumed that those bows were

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not longbows5, for an archer untrained in their use would not be able to draw them.

Therefore, while the late Norse reinforcement group of archers would cause some

casualties among the pursuing Anglo-Saxons, the almost-heroic last stand Severin

created for them would be very improbable to happen, at best.

It was a different Viking nation, the Danes, who used the longbow more

extensively. The numerous findings of the weapons in Denmark, particularly of the

bows of advanced design found at Nydam ship-burials (ibid. 21), were already

mentioned. It is likely that their use spread south to the Germanic tribes, where it

probably played a crucial role in the repelling of at least two Roman invasions (ibid.

28), as well as during the Saxon king Vortigern's invasion of England in 449 CE (ibid.

29). Furthermore, the Danes brought it with them during their own invasion of England

in the ninth century, and it is very likely that the use of the longbow became much more

common among the local population during the Danelaw, an almost century-long period

in which northern England was ruled by the Danes (ibid. 29). Therefore, by the time of

the Battle of Stamford Bridge, King Harold Godwinson would have been able to levy a

large amount of archers6 to fight the Norwegians (Hardy 32), who were likely the

decisive factor of the battle7. This being said, it is hard to consider Severin's portrayal of

the Battle of Stamford Bridge anything else than romantic.

As for archery in the Battle of Hastings, which in King's Man is mentioned only

very briefly, it is believed it played only a minor role (Hardy 32). The Bayeux Tapestry8

shows some archers using bows of varying sizes, but it is unclear whether it is to be

5 While this weapon was unusual among the Norsemen, they too had their longbow-archer heroes, suchas Einar Tambarskjelve (or Thambarskelfir), mentioned in "King Olaf Tryggvesson's Saga" part of the

Heims

the longbow and its military use marcin

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