the international dimension of the ethnic conflict in sri lanka

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This article was downloaded by: [University of California Davis] On: 15 November 2014, At: 15:29 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/csas20 The international dimension of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka V. Nithiyanandam a a Massey University , Albany Published online: 08 May 2007. To cite this article: V. Nithiyanandam (1997) The international dimension of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 20:s1, 51-82, DOI: 10.1080/00856409708723304 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00856409708723304 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 1: The international dimension of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka

This article was downloaded by: [University of California Davis]On: 15 November 2014, At: 15:29Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

South Asia: Journal of South Asian StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/csas20

The international dimension of the ethnic conflict inSri LankaV. Nithiyanandam aa Massey University , AlbanyPublished online: 08 May 2007.

To cite this article: V. Nithiyanandam (1997) The international dimension of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, South Asia:Journal of South Asian Studies, 20:s1, 51-82, DOI: 10.1080/00856409708723304

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00856409708723304

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable forany losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use ofthe Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: The international dimension of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka

South Asia, Vol. XX, Special Issue (1997), pp. 51-81

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THEETHNIC CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA

V. NithiyanandamMassey University at Albany

EVER SINCE ETHNICITY IN SRI LANKA REACHED 'CRISIS' PROPORTIONS IT h a snot failed to attract international attention. Apart from the violent natureof the conflict, slow but steady migration of Sri Lankans, predominantly

Tamils closely followed by Sinhalese to almost all parts of the globe, has beenthe main force behind this. It has gradually come to provide an internationaldimension to the problem which in itself has greater implications for thesubsequent stages of the evolution of the conflict. Today, internationalmediation is, in fact, being mentioned as one of the options for resolving theconflict.

Although it is possible to identify several sources through which theinternational dimension has gained strength, the most common and also easilythe most important of all has been the mass media. This essay has, therefore,intentionally chosen the mass media and analyses their role in the globalprojection of Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis.

Among other things, '...the mass media', according to Keith Griffin andJohn Knight, '...exercise an enormous influence over what people know, howpeople interpret and understand the world and what values people adopt andact upon.1 Their view assumes added significance when applied to a majorityof Third World issues about which the international audience relies almostentirely on the mass media for its knowledge and understanding. It is from this

1 Keith Griffin and John Knight, 'Human development: The Case for Renewed Emphasis', inKenneth P. Jameson and Charles K. Wilber (ed.), The Political Economy of Development andUnderdevelopment (New York, McGraw Hill, 1996), p. 616.

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perspective that this essay proposes to examine the role of the internationalmedia in portraying the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.

In so doing, it is not the intention of the essay to study the manner inwhich the conflict has been covered by the whole gamut of the masscommunication media over a stipulated time frame. Instead, it takes acomprehensive view of the conflict and analyses how its different dimensionshave either caught or escaped the attention of the media. Such an analysisreveals that a whole range of issues, basic to a proper understanding of theconflict, have escaped media attention. Such issues form the 'non-news'syndrome and have been examined in the first part of the essay. Even whenthe international media were attracted towards Sri Lanka, their interest andscale of reporting have differed depending mainly on the particular phase ofthe conflict and features associated with it. It has gone from a 'hot' to a'hot...hot' stage and, then, has waned into a 'stale news' syndrome. Themanner in which these stages evolved and the reasons behind them becomethe focus of attention in the next three parts. The final part of the essaysuggests two primary ways in which the international media could make acontribution towards resolving the conflict.

The 'non-news' syndrome

No conflict is without its historical roots and these are usually embedded inthe political economy of a country.2 Yet, ironically enough, Sri Lanka's ethnicconflict reached virulent proportions only in the post-independence era.3 Evenduring the colonial period, until about the 1920s, there is very little evidenceto show the existence of any visible confrontation between the Sinhalese andTamils. In fact, the two races had, for much of this period, been referred to as

2 The political economy of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has been the focus of analysis bythe author. See V. Nithiyanandam, The Political Economy of Sri Lanka 1948-1956: Classand Ethnic Perspectives (Jaffna, Faculty of Arts, Univ. of Jaffna, 1989). Two separatepapers, one from a national perspective and the other from the viewpoint of the Tamils, alsodwelled on this subject. See V. Nithiyanandam, 'The Political Economy of Ethnicity inThird World Nations: The Case of Sri Lanka', Seminar Paper, Economics Seminar Series(Massey Univ. at Albany, 1996) and V. Nithiyanandam, 'Political Economy of Ethnicity withSpecial Reference to Sri Lankan Tamils', Conference Paper, Conference on Tamils in NewZealand (Wellington, 1996).

3 Historically, it is possible to argue that in the pre-colonial period prior to the sixteenthcentury, the existence of three indigenous kingdoms within Sri Lanka, namely, the JaffnaKingdom of the Tamils, the Kotte and Kandyan Kingdoms of the Sinhalese did not lendmuch leeway for a conflict to arise. If one likes to traverse even further into history, despitethe depiction of hatred and struggle between the Sinhalese and the conquering South IndianTamils in the ancient Buddhist chronicles the Culavamsa and Mahavamsa, recent researchhas shown that the Sinhalese started drawing connections between the South Indian Tamilsand their Sri Lankan counterparts only from the nineteenth century. See Stanley JeyarajaTambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?: Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago andLondon, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992).

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'majority communities' vis-a-vis other races in the country. A change isobserved only from the beginning of the 1920s when a rift between thecommunities occurred over the question of carving out a communal electoratefor the Tamils of the Western Province which eventually led to the departureof Ponnambalam Arunachalam from the Ceylon National Congress in 1921.4

Nevertheless, it has to be recognised that, with the inception of British rule, agradual process of change in the political economy of Sri Lanka had set inwhich, in later years, exploded into communal politics, eventually graduatinginto an ethnic crisis.

The unfolding of communal politics in Sri Lanka inclined to an externalas well as an internal dimension. The former could be identified with the pre-and immediate post-independence periods. Whereas the latter dominated muchof Sri Lanka's politics in the post-1956 era. Although the manifestations ofboth were political, they had a close relationship with socio-economic factors.As far as media coverage is concerned such socio-economic developments hadremained outside its scope and could be described as 'non-news'. They couldnot find space in, leave alone the international, but even the national media ofSri Lanka. Yet, they form the nucleus to the understanding of the conflict.This section of the essay consists entirely of such 'non-news' phenomena.

The Colebrooke Reforms of 1833 are, in many respects, considered to bethe starting point of a transformation process in the history of Sri Lanka.5

When they opened up the country for capitalistic enterprise, the country as awhole had not yet attained the necessary maturity to receive it with enthusiasmand plunge into activity. Neither was capital forthcoming from those at the topof the social hierarchy nor was there any clamour among those (peasants) atthe lower levels to sell their labour. It was, therefore, left to the Britishthemselves to utilise the freely available investment opportunities. The need ofthe hour for them was primary commodities for an emerging industrial societyin Britain and Sri Lanka soon became one among the many other plantationcolonies which adorned the British Empire.

4 K.M. de Silva, "The Ceylon National Congress in Disarray, 1920-21; Sir PonnambalamArunachalam Leaves the Congress', Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies, N.S.Vol. 2, no. 2 (1972), pp. 97-117; and K.M. de Silva, 'The Ceylon National Congress inDisarray II, The Triumph of William Manning, 1921-4', Ceylon Journal of Historical andSocial Studies, N.S. Vol. 3, no. 1 (1973), pp. 16-39.

5 The Reforms were put forward by a commission of inquiry called the ColebrookeCommission. The initial task of the commission was to find ways and means of balancing thecolonial budget of Sri Lanka which had, from the time the island became a crown colony in1802, continuously been in the red. The commission, however, decided to take a long termview of the problem and submitted recommendations in political, economic, and judicialspheres. These proposals not only were accepted readily by the then British colonialgovernment, but also served as the basis for any further reforms in Sri Lanka up to, perhaps,the time of independence.

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Once plantations were established, British investors quickly had toresolve the question of cheap labour supplies without which plantationagriculture could never survive - a proposition true to this day. They had here,behind them, the already established practice of drawing from the vast humanreservoirs of Africa and the Indian sub-continent. When the local labour, for avariety of reasons, hesitated to accept plantation work, the British, under nomoral obligation either to create job opportunities for the indigenous or toencourage them to take these up, readily fell on the adjoining India for theirlabour needs.6

It is this unpreparedness on the part of Sri Lanka to accommodate theliberal ideology of the Colebrooke Commission and the manner in whichBritain and its entrepreneurs chose to exploit the lacuna which went a longway in shaping the socio-economic structure of the country and in determiningher political options both during and after the colonial rule. An initial as wellas a crucial outcome had been for Sri Lanka to become simultaneously tied upeconomically with a plantation mode of production and socially with animmigrant population that could not readily be absorbed into the existingsocial system. This gave rise to strictures of several sorts at a socio-economiclevel. When Sri Lanka inherited this socio-economic structure from theBritish, its independent rulers, incapable of formulating the right kind ofstrategies to find their way out, ended up aggravating it by creating new andmore acute problems for the country. An additional reason had been theWestminster political structure Sri Lanka adopted and the way in which partypolitics evolved under it. The ethnic conflict while standing out as onecrowning all other problems also epitomises the combined outcome of allothers.

While the British were engaged in plantation activities, the absence ofany production oriented investments from the local well-to-do did not meanthat they were in any way unmotivated by profit considerations.7 On thecontrary, they were very receptive to profit earning notions and onceopportunities, in the given context, opened up they were fast to utilise them.Such opportunities under a plantation system showed up at two levels. On theone hand, there were vertical linkage activities both before and after plantationoperations on which one could easily prosper. On the other hand, Britishinvestments themselves could create a demonstration impact and activateinvestments on the same lines. Both were exploited by the indigenous oneafter the other.

6 For a detailed analysis of these reasons, see S.B.D. de Silva, The Political Economy ofUnderdevelopment (London, Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1982), pp. 210-73.

7 Apart from a certain amount of lethargy with respect to initiative, the factor endowment ofSri Lanka too did not much help the locals. It was mainly agrarian in character and did notcontain any mineral or energy based resources.

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The well-to-do in Sri Lanka, usually referred to as the elites, mostlypossessed inherited wealth from the land and had already invested a part of itduring the Dutch era in services like food catering, supply of buildingmaterial, and arrack distillery.8 It was the capital accumulated and experiencegained through these activities that served them well during the Britishplantation era. Now, they came forward to offer linkage services mainly in theclearance of jungles, construction of both factory and residential buildings,and the provision of transport facilities.9 Profits generated through these, inturn, prodded them towards plantation investments. The British investors wereprepared to accommodate them to the extent that they did not directly competeand erode into their (British) own profits. Consequently, local investmentsmostly concentrated in coconut and rubber where English interest wasrelatively small.10

What is, however, relevant from the point of view of the ethnic conflictare two key developments emerging out of the above discussion:

• The same class of investors came to the forefront of political activities inSri Lanka during the British colonial period. In 1948, when the countrygained its independence, it was again they who inherited power under theWestminster model. In order to activate the model there was a need toform themselves into a political party. The United National Party (UNP)was, thus, constituted in 1946. Along with this, there arose also the needto woo the electoral support of the Sri Lankan people, consisting mainlyof peasants and other urban and (at this stage) estate workers.

• The elite rulers were convinced that the economic prosperity of thecountry lay in the production of primary commodities. This, in turn,meant that they had to continue their dependence on the Indianimmigrant labour which had by now become entrenched in the country'spopulation. It could not, nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, assimilatewith the local Sinhalese or Tamil population. The immigrants were sonear, yet so far.

The elite plantation owners were, due to their concurrent roles in both politicsand economics, called upon to endure a difficult relationship with the Indianlabour force. Economically, they continued to place the Indians (despite the

8 The wealth accumulated, similar to what one observes in a majority of other countries, didnot emanate from any major production activity. It is due to this reason that the use of theterm 'capitalist' has been avoided in referring to this class of people.

9 Michael Roberts, 'Élite Formation and Elites', in K.M. de Silva (ed.), University of Ceylon,History of Ceylon, Vol. 3 (Colombo, Univ. of Ceylon Press Board, 1973), p. 268.

10 V. Nithiyanandam, 'The Development and Impact of the Primary Commodity Sector inCeylon 1920-1950, with special reference to International Marketing Agreements' (Ph.D.thesis, Univ. of Reading, 1975), pp. 360-5.

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indispensable nature of their labour), at a very inferior status.11 But politically,due to the numerical strength of the Indian labour force, the elites had to also,in order to be in power, bank on its votes. Obviously, a reality never to theliking of the elites. It was this fundamental contradiction which led to the firstmajor step towards communal politics in Sri Lanka, coming on the heels ofindependence.

The three Acts enacted by the then Ceylon Parliament The CeylonCitizenship Act of 1948, The India Pakistan Residents (Citizenship) Act of1949, and The Ceylon Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act of 1949were all linked to one another and had the ultimate objective ofdisenfranchising the large Indian population.12 Although it was an outwardlycommunal measure it encountered very little opposition and had relatively asmooth adoption. Two reasons could be mentioned for this. First, it was aimedtowards safeguarding elitist class interests and to that extent succeeded ininvoking class solidarity among the upper layers of the society irrespective ofother ethnic or religious differences. Thus, it is not surprising that the Actseven received the blessings of a section of the indigenous Tamil community.Secondly, the purporters of the Acts had skilfully garbed the actual objectivewith what is known as the Ceylonisation principle, which had its origin amidstthe labour class itself a couple of decades ago. In this context, it is pertinent tonote that, initially, in the mid-nineteenth century when the urban sectoropened up, middle and low level (unskilled) employment, like plantationlabour, was deserted by Sinhala peasants and thus passed into the hands of theIndians who had spilled over from the estates. Subsequently, however, withdeterioration gradually setting in the peasant sector, when the Sinhaleseultimately turned their attention towards the urban sector they found that muchto their chagrin job opportunities being dominated by the Indians. They had nooption but to play second fiddle to the Indian labour. During the GreatDepression years of the late 1920s and early 1930s, when employmentopportunities became acutely scarce, the trade unions of that time with apredominantly Sinhalese membership advanced the Ceylonisation principleand made a strenuous effort to preserve the available job opportunities to itsmembers.13 This could, in fact, be described as the first instance of acommunal ploy being used to overcome an economic difficulty. The cover,

1 1 There is an abundance of literature available on this aspect. Moreover, this is somethingwhich is starkly evident to any casual visitor to 'coolie lines' in the estates of Sri Lanka eventoday. Moldrich provides a vivid account of the manner in which the Indian labour wasrecruited and maintained in Sri Lankan plantations. See Donovan Moldrich, Bitter BerryBondage: The Nineteenth Century Coffee Workers of Sri Lanka (Kandy, Co-ordinatingSecretariat for Plantation Areas, 1989).

1 2 For details, see S.U. Kodikara, Indo-Ceylon Relations Since Independence (Colombo, TheCeylon Institute of World Affairs, 1965).

1 3 Kumari Jayawardena, Ethnic and Class Conflicts in Sri Lanka (Dehiwala, Centre for SocialAnalysis, 1985), pp. 16-27.

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however, had been the externality of the victims; or, in other words, thenationalistic concept. With the Citizenship Acts, the same principle had beenrevived, but, now, by a superior clan at a political level with a long lastingeffect. Nevertheless, the two put together can be mentioned as the externaldimension of communalism in Sri Lanka.

The Indians, however, comprised just one component of the total votingpopulation in the country. There were two other groups which need to bereckoned by the elites. One, a small, yet fast growing urban working class, andtwo, the peasants who easily formed the largest majority in the country. Thecharacteristics of the two differed widely with implications for the elites.While the working class was already organised under the Marxist orientedtrade unions, the latter was neither organised nor politically articulated andremained a very passive lot. The elites had to confront the two on their ownmerits and adopt approaches different from the policy of complete suppressionused against the Indian labour.

The urban working class had from the beginning, in addition to beingorganised, also exhibited a fair degree of political consciousness. The firstpolitical party in Sri Lanka, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), originatedin its midst in 1935. The urban workers, unlike their estate counterparts or thepeasants, had to, therefore, be considered as players already in the politicalfield, in fact, much earlier than the elites themselves. They and the partiessupporting them thus formed the main opposition to the elites. But curiouslyenough, the elite opposition did not confine itself to politics alone.14 It soonextended to economic policy levels too, a sequel to the realisation that theactual support base for the leftist parties lay in the industrial work force of thecountry. The elite rulers, therefore, decided to restrict the growth of this basethrough a policy of curtailing industrial development. The UNP governmentdrew strength for its decision from the recommendations of the World BankMission of 1952 which, after studying growth options for Sri Lanka,concluded that, at that juncture, large scale public sector investments shouldbe discouraged.15 With the private sector capital already securely tied toplantations, this meant that industrial investments in Sri Lanka would virtuallybe at a standstill. Politics prevailed over long term economic considerationswith far reaching implications for the country. In a remote sense, as willbecome evident in the next section, the ethnic conflict itself could be traced tothis short sighted decision on the part of the elite rulers.

1 4 Although LSSP had always been the major party representing them, a split in the party ranksresulted in the formation of a United Socialist Party in 1939. In 1943, this became the CeylonCommunist Party (CP). In independent Sri Lanka, however, both the LSSP and the CP hadfunctioned together on major issues.

1 5 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Economic Development of Ceylon,2 parts (Colombo, Government Press, 1952).

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When it came to the peasants, they were far too big a variable in thepolitical equation. Their electoral approval was of paramount importance forany government to be in power. The way in which this approval could beobtained has always posed a dilemma for the players of politics in Sri Lanka.16

In the process, it had also become one open to intensive competition amongthe various political parties. Initially, at least, the easiest of means was soughtand the peasantry was 'bribed' through a programme of social welfaremeasures. While this ensured peasant support, it killed whatever competitivespirit the peasants had and turned them into a class devoid of any economicand, consequently, political aspirations. They had thus become a lot everdependent on the protection offered by the state.

The internal dimension of communalism and its subsequent exponentialgrowth can be traced to this phenomenon of wooing the peasantry. In thebackground of this attempt were two forces which made it more concrete andcontinuous. One was the gradual but steady decline of the economy and theother was the competitive party politics among the majority Sinhalesecommunity. The beginnings, however, have to be found in the latter.

The UNP, during the early stages of its formation, demonstrated, true toits name, a close unity and an exclusiveness within the elitist ranks. Some ofthe party's later leaders like J.R. Jeyawardene and R. Premadasa were ofopinion that the trend continued at least until 1973.17 Yet, the periodimmediately after independence had been an exception, an exception which, inthe long run, proved fatal for Sri Lanka. The primary reason for this cruciallapse had been the struggle for leadership. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, a leadingmember of the UNP at that time, had hopes of inheriting the leadership fromthe incumbent D.S. Senanayake. But, by about 1951, when it became clearthat the position would, in fact, pass into the hands of Senanayake's sonDudley, Bandaranaike decided to leave the party.18 In the meantime, he hadbeen nurturing within the UNP an organisation called the Sinhala MahaSabha. Its main objective had been to support and promote the language,religion, and culture of the Sinhalese. When Bandaranaike quit the UNP, theSabha also went out and, with the formation of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party

1 6 The Sri Lankan peasantry, on the other hand, with its predominant position of over fifty percent of the population, never came forward to utilise its numerical strength and promote itsown interest. It rather chose to permit others do the job for it. This, in fact, has been the focusof analysis in one of the studies on the Sri Lankan peasantry. See Mick Moore, The State andPeasant Politics in Sri Lanka (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985).

1 7 Opinion expressed by such leaders to the effect that the UNP, until 1973, had been confinedto certain families and was managed like that of a 'limited liability company' has been citedby Manor. See James Manor, 'The Failure of Political Integration in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)',Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XVII, no. 1 (1979), p. 43.

1 8 Although this had been the actual cause, in the open, SWRD Bandaranaike alleged that theUNP was not doing enough towards the promotion of the Sinhala language and declared thisto be the reason for his quitting the party.

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(SLFP), the ideals of the Sabha were taken over by the new Party. Thus, theSabha became an obsolete body and was disbanded in 1951. Bandaranaikewas, now, poised for the induction of (Sinhala) language, (Buddhist) religionand (Sinhala-Buddhist) culture into party levels and bring in the communaltwist in the politics of Sri Lanka. How did this come about?

In the first instance, it is rather surprising that a national political partyshould explicitly proclaim the promotion of an indigenous language, religion,and culture as one of its policy measures. In the normal course of events it issomething which would have been taken for granted. But in colonial SriLanka and in the period immediately after it, both the rightist as well as theleftist elements, given the Western oriented background, had not sufficientlyemphasised the indigenous cultural tenet. A gap had thereby been createdwhich could be manipulated at a political level. SWRD Bandaranaike, whohad already given indications of his intentions through the Sinhala MahaSabha, when the opportune moment arrived, decided to expand the scope.

It was not, therefore, altogether surprising that the SLFP should declareitself as the champion of the Sinhala-Buddhist culture. But what is intriguinghad been the rapid transformation of such harmless pro-cultural traits intoawfully dangerous political weapons soaked in communalism and threateningthe whole body politic of the country. There were two major reasons,supplemented, in the process, by two other minor ones which had beenresponsible for this. One of the major reasons had been the realisation bySWRD Bandaranaike that his chosen strategy could prove successful farbeyond his expectations. His common and simple emphasis of culturalaspects, therefore, quickly turned into a hyper emphasis. To mention onecrucial example, the first manifesto of the SLFP declared that both Sinhaleseand Tamil should be the official languages of Sri Lanka. But at the AnnualConvention of the party in 1955, it was ratified that Sinhala alone should bethe official language of the country. The other reason was the reaction of theUNP to the policy measures adopted by the SLFP. Although reaction of somesort was inevitable, it ultimately turned into an over-reaction. Instead ofviewing the SLFP threat within its own policy framework and devisingcounter strategies, the UNP panicked and meandered into a completelydefensive approach. At the Annual Convention of the Party in February 1956,it too decided to adopt Sinhala as the only official language of the country.The over-reaction did not stop with that. In order to publicise the change ofpolicy and win support for the new program, John Kotalawela, the then primeminister, decided to advance the parliamentary elections due in 1957 to 1956.

The most notable outcome of these manoeuvres had been the competitioninitiated between the two parties in safeguarding the Sinhala-Buddhist culture.When one tried to outdo the other, it could not but end up, eventually, as athreat to other cultures. It is during the initial stages of this process that the

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two minor factors helped to accelerate the tendencies. One was the Westernimage created by Kotalawela himself. He was portrayed by his opponents asone who would not compromise on his elite way of life. It was, therefore, nowonder that the Buddhist activists considered him as, if not a threat, a misfit tothe Sinhala-Buddhist culture. In contrast, they were naturally more impressedwith SWRD Bandaranaike's posture and policies. The other factor was theworldwide Buddha Jayanthi celebrations signalling the two thousand fivehundredth anniversary of the birth of the Buddhist religion. Religious feelingswere, obviously, at their peak. Buddha Jayanthi vis-a-vis Kotalawelaleadership underlined, as far as the majority of the Buddhists were concerned,the need for a change in leadership. When Kotalawela himself offered aninstant opportunity by bringing forward the elections this became a reality.

This change meant that the 'non-news' syndrome was fast coming to anend. 1956 election itself was significant enough to attract worldwide mediaattention.19 For the first time a coalition between a centre-right party and theleftists was confronting the traditional right. But more important than this wasthe fact that Sri Lanka's history was entering a communal politics mode. Oneevent after another was to make the country more popular and newsworthyover.

From 'non-news' to 'hot' news

Although communal politics pursued by successive governments with theexplicit objective of promoting a Sinhala-Buddhist culture was central for SriLanka to move away from the 'non-news' syndrome, ammunition for this driftcame from two related sources. The first consisted of actions and reactionsdirectly linked to the communal politics practised during this period. The otherwas the general failure of the economic program which indirectly contributedtowards bringing out the malevolent nature of communal politics. Let us firstconsider the latter mainly because this had highly influenced the former.

The primary features of Sri Lanka's economic policy in the immediatepost-independence period and the political motives associated with these havealready been mentioned in the previous section. Now, it is time for us to turnto their long term implications which become crucial from the point of view ofthe ethnic conflict.

The main threads of the economic policy were:

1 9 Apart from media attention, the elections also, subsequently, came under academic scrutiny.Two studies, in this respect, are worthy of note: I.D.S. Weerawardana, Ceylon GeneralElections 1956 (Colombo, M.D. Gunasena & Co., 1960) and W Howard Wriggins, Ceylon:Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1960), pp.326-69.

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• plantation agriculture under private ownership to remain as the keyproductive sector of the economy generating export revenue,

• peasant agriculture embracing the majority of the population to bepreserved on the basis of a social welfare program spreading to botheconomic and social levels, and

• the government to keep out of any large scale industrial investments.

When the threads are interwoven it meant that the Sri Lankan economywould predominantly be agrarian in character with a very weak industrialsector. In 1953, for example, almost fifty per cent of the GDP was derivedfrom agriculture whereas the share of the industrial sector was only about fiveper cent.20 Even though agriculture consisted of plantation and peasantsectors, peasant agriculture had largely been subsistence in nature andgenerated very little surplus. The state, therefore, had to depend almostentirely on the plantation sector for its revenue. Funds for sustaining the socialwelfare program had to be obtained from this source. Social welfareexpenditure, on the other hand, was relatively high. If public utilities andsocial welfare are put together they absorbed almost fifty per cent of theexpenditure while the productive sectors shared the other half.21 Meanwhile,the success of the plantation industries had very much been a function of theexternal trade of the country. If external trade statistics indicated a healthytrend, then, one could assume that the plantations were yielding sufficientincome to sustain government expenditure. But, unfortunately, except for abrief period between 1949 and 1951, Sri Lanka's terms of trade continued tobe in deficit.22 By about 1960, the annual average deficit was in the region ofRs 156 million and in the next year the country was compelled for the firsttime to borrow Rs 54 million from the IMF.23 While production activity in theother sectors was virtually frozen, dwindling income from the only availablesource could immediately put the government's social welfare programme intojeopardy. This was reflected in the widespread subsidy cut imposed by theUNP government in mid-1953. Although part of it was restored after strong

20 N. Balakrishnan and H.M. Gunasekara, 'Statistical Appendix', in K.M. de Silva (ed.)( SriLanka: A Survey (London, C. Hurst & Co., 1977), p. 258.

21 N. Balakrishnan, 'Industrial Policy and Development Since Independence', in ibid, p. 197.2 2 Even this short prosperity was not due to any underlying strength of the economy, but was an

outcome of certain external factors like the devaluation of the sterling, higher level ofeconomic activity in the developed economies, and the rearmament program of Westerncountries following the Korean War. See V. Nithiyanandam, The Political Economy of SriLanka...,pp. 141-3.

2 3 Satchi Ponnambalam, Dependent Capitalism in Crisis: The Sri Lankan Economy 1948-1980(London, Zed Press, 1981), pp. 45-7.

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protests from the public and the trade unions, welfare reduction had worked asan additional factor in the electoral defeat of the UNP in 1956.

The 1956 General Elections brought the SLFP led coalition into power.The new government, claiming itself to be the 'common man's government',had very little opportunity to think in terms of reducing the welfare budget. It,therefore, resolved to diversify the economy from its narrow plantationconfines. In a bid to improve the economy, the government drew up a TenYear Plan in 1959. The plan, contrary to policies of the earlier government,recognised the importance of the manufacturing sector and proposed an importsubstitution strategy to inaugurate industrial growth. But what happened fromthis point onwards was that Sri Lanka's economic policy and performance gotentangled with its communal politics. The communal element, combined withthe already existing welfare objective, made heavy inroads into the country'sgrowth achievement. In this connection, it is necessary to draw attention totwo salient points.

The first is the apparent contradiction between the policies of economicgrowth and the social welfare program. There are two sides to it. One, if asteady income from economic growth cannot be assured the social welfareprogram always faced the danger of running into some difficulty. And two, thedispensing of welfare benefits itself unless monitored carefully, could kill theincentive of the recipients and, in the long run, lead to a stagnation or evendecline of the economy. Sri Lanka suffered from both. On the one hand, therewas a continuous decline in the performance of the economy. On the otherhand, certain inherent features of the welfare measures had the ability to erodethe incentive to produce, especially in the peasant sector. One clear examplehad been the food subsidy made available to all the citizens. The subsidy priceof rice always prevented the peasants from receiving a competitive openmarket price for their output. Although a counter measure in the form of aGuaranteed Price Scheme was in operation, it had its own shortcomings andwas far from satisfactory in its achievements.24

Second, despite ominous signs that it would increasingly be difficult tomaintain the welfare program, no government until 1977, was prepared to takethe risk of reducing the welfare measures. The reason being what had,initially, been perceived as a device to attract the peasant vote had ultimatelyboomeranged on the politicians-cum-rulers. It was becoming more and moreevident that the popular support of a government and its chances of retainingpower in any electoral contest would very much depend on the sustenanceand, if possible, the increase of welfare measures. Even in 1977, when the newUNP government resolved to withdraw a good proportion of the welfare

2 4 N.D. Abdul Hameed, 'Factors Favouring the Rice Cultivation', in UN Research Institute forSocial Development (ed.), Rice Revolution in Sri Lanka (Geneva, United Nations, 1977), pp.24-7.

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facilities under its market oriented open economic policy program, it had tofirst indulge in some precautionary measures by way of constitutionalchanges. The overwhelming parliamentary majority the party had enabled it topromulgate a new constitution which extended the life of the parliament fromfive to six years, thus, delaying the need for an incumbent government to seekelectoral approval by a further year.25 The pressure that could accrue in thisrespect from ordinary members (backbenchers) the house had also beennegated by the introduction of an executive presidential system under whichthe president of the country had powers to override the decisions of theparliament.26 Yet, all these translated in real political terms, meant that the SriLankan rulers had neither the capacity nor the acumen to formulate alternativestrategies to sustain the massive rural vote. Consequently, when things goteconomically desperate for governments to continue with the welfareprogram, they were inclined to resort to other means of preserving peasantsupport. Two methods were chosen with this purpose in mind. But both endedup with disastrous consequences in terms of the ethnic issue.

The first method was to fall back on an earlier strategy used during theexternal dimension stage of communalism. That is to revive the'Ceylonisation' principle and adopt it to suit the new conditions. Old wine in anew bottle. 'Ceylonisation' became 'Sinhalisation' and, now, instead of theIndians it was directed against the indigenous Tamils. What was'Ceylonisation' to the external dimension, had, now, become 'Sinhalisation' tothe internal dimension of communalism. It is, of course, possible to trace theuse of the Sinhalisation concept as early as 1956, when Sinhala was made theofficial language, thus, devaluing the Tamils to the status of 'officialilliterates'.27 Yet, it was against a backdrop of economic hardship that theprinciple assumed character and significance. It embodied measures rangingfrom 'very open' to 'subtle' means of accomplishing certain objectives,'standardisation' used in determining university admissions had been the mostopen way in which the principle was applied. This reserved university placesto Sinhalese students at the expense of their Tamil counterparts.28 In theprocess, it had guaranteed benefits to the majority community right down theline. When industries were located in predominantly Sinhalese areas and jobswere given only to those who hailed from these areas, the regional dimension

2 5 The Constitution of the Second Republic of Sri Lanka, 1978 (Colombo, Government Press).2 6 There had been instances in the political history of Sri Lanka where ministerial decisions to

cut down welfare expenditure had to be reversed under pressure from backbenchers. It wason one such occasion that Felix Dias Bandaranaike, Minister of Finance under the 1960-1965SLFP Government, had to resign his portfolio.

2 7 M.R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerillas (Delhi, Konark Publishers,1994), p. 25.

2 8 See C.R. de Silva, 'The Politics of University Admissions: A Review of Some Aspects of theAdmissions Policy in Sri Lanka', Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 1, no. 2 (1978),pp. 85-123.

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of the principle was apparent. The Dry Zone Colonisation Schemes too servedthe same purpose.29 In addition to these, a host of devious channels, especiallyusing the (Sinhala) language requirement, were also adopted to transfereconomic benefits from the Tamils to the Sinhalese.30 The ultimate objectivewas, of course, to translate the benefits into votes. A perfect case study ofAnthony Downs' economic theory of democracy in which the primary aim ofa political party is to supply policies which will gain the most votes (emphasismine).31

The second method was to incite language and religious feelings to anextent that the attention of the rural electorate was kept focused on this areawithout tilting very much towards economic benefits - welfare or otherwise. Itis in this respect that the role of the Buddhist clergy proved vital. TheBuddhist vihara was at the centre of every Sinhalese village. Its crowdedcalendar of events, functions and ceremonies right round the year, providedample opportunity for the clergy to influence devotees. Is it, therefore, anysurprise that parties and politicians should rally round the Buddhist religionand government after government become the guardian angels of Buddhism?

This takes us to the direct dimension mentioned at the beginning of thissection. By now, it is clear that the minority communities of Sri Lanka, theTamils in particular, would have been at the receiving end, subjected to aseries of discriminatory measures. They had been affected not by a straightforward policy of promoting a Sinhala-Buddhist culture. More importantly, itwas the economic ramifications of the policy and the 'Sinhalisation' principleembodying it which afflicted more harm.

It is inevitable that the Tamils had to register their protest in some form.It is their manner of protest and the tempo inherent in it which ultimatelydiverted the attention of the international media towards Sri Lanka. At the

2 9 Chelvadurai Manogaran, 'Colonization as Politics: Political Use of Space in Sri Lanka'sEthnic Conflict', in Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger (ed.), The Sri LankanTamils: Ethnicity and Identity (Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford, Westview Press, 1994),pp. 84-125.

3 0 In this connection, it is pertinent to mention that the Tamils had the capacity to utilise any ofthe recognised economic strategies to their advantage. The way they benefited under animport substitution policy and, then, the manner in which they gained under open economicpolicies are good examples. For details, V. Nithiyanandam, 'Political Economy of Ethnicitywith Special Reference to Sri Lankan Tamils', pp. 8-10.

31 Anthony Downs, in his economic theory of democracy assumes that voters are utility-maximisers whereas political parties are vote-maximisers. Each citizen will vote for thepolitical party which s/he believes would provide her/him with a higher utility fromgovernment activity. Political parties behave like profit maximising firms in capitalisteconomies. Just as firms produce in response to consumer demands and expected profits, sowill political parties aim to supply policies which will gain the most votes. See AnthonyDowns, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, Harper Publishers, 1957), chs. 15-16.

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outset itself* it is* therefore, clear that media publicity has usually beendetermined more by external manifestations than by basic issues. However,this is not in any way exceptional. Media always live by the axiom 'if itbleeds, it leads' and unless something sensational happens a country hardlycomes into reckoning. In the case of Sri Lanka, for such an eventuality to arisethe media had to wait until Tamil reaction appeared on the horizon.

The mode of protest employed by the Tamils had, until the 1980s, beeneither parliamentary or peaceful means. These methods per se would not haveprovided much fodder for the international media. The opportunity, however,was created by the reaction from the Sinhalese for the peaceful responses ofthe Tamils. Tissa Balasuriya sums up what emerged in the following terms:

The response to the non-violence of the Tamil leaders was theviolence of the mob, the indifference of the police, and theridicule or the scorn of the responsible Sinhala politicalauthority.32

There were two notable instances of such a manifestation: one inColombo and the other in Jaffna. In 1956, after the 'Sinhala Only' legislationwas passed, the Tamil leaders performed satyagraha at the Galle Face Green.Physical violence was used on them by a mob, possibly with governmentacquiescence.33 Likewise, in 1961, the Federal Party of the Tamils againorganised a satyagraha campaign this time in front of the Jaffna Kachcheri inthe northern province. When the campaign gathered momentum withwidespread popular support, the Government got alarmed and, on thisoccasion, directly released force on the satyagrahis deploying the army.

But majority and/or government action against Tamils did not alwaysawait a provocation in the form of a counter measure. In an environmentwhere ethno-based feelings had politically been manipulated and runninghigh, violence itself became another device used to victimise Tamils. It wasreferred to as 'communal riots' (quite a misnomer) and was periodicallyunleashed: 1958, 1977, 1979, and 1983. Although no proper study of theseriots especially from a political economic perspective has so far beenundertaken, in every instance evidence had been produced to establish eitherthe overt or covert involvement of the government in power.34

3 2 Tissa Balasuriya, 'Ethnic Conflict Resolution: A Historical Perspective', Logos, Vol. 31, nos1& 2(1992), p. 5.

3 3 Loc. cit.3 4 There are, however, general works relating to the various riots. See Tarzie Vitachi,

Emergency '58: The Story of the Ceylon Race Riots (London, Andre Deutsch, 1958); Raceand Class (Special Issue), Vol. XXVI, no. 1 (1984); and S.J. Tambiah, Ethnic Fratricide andthe Dismantling of Democracy (London, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1986).

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'Communal riots' served as an easy means of diverting global attentionto Sri Lanka. Since a majority of the Tamils outside the north and east of SriLanka lived in Colombo and its surroundings, every time riots broke out,Colombo became the nucleus. Violence apart, it became a hive of activity asrefugee camps cropped up in different parts of the city in order to house thoseTamils affected and displaced. Then, transport of refugees to the Tamil areashad to be arranged. All these had been ideal for international mediaconsumption, and, within easy access in the vicinity of the capital city itself.Sri Lanka quickly became a subject for 'hot news'.

One dimension of the 'hot news' syndrome had been the sympathy theTamils earned at an international level. This is due to the fact that in everysingle instance of political violence up to then the victims had been theTamils. There were also a few other factors which helped the sympathy drive.One of these had been the large scale migration of Sri Lankan Tamils tocountries abroad. Although migration to them had never been new, politicalsuppression, combined with economic difficulties, had pushed an increasingnumber outside Sri Lanka. This overseas community of Tamils was in aposition to impress upon host governments and various other fora and bodiesin their respective countries of settlement the plight of Tamils in Sri Lankaand enlist support for its cause. To cite one example, during the first half of1979 the Sri Lankan Tamil community in the USA was successful inpersuading the Governor of Massachusetts to submit a proclamation to theExecutive Chamber in Boston outlining the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka.Such events sometimes had the added advantage of inviting immediate mediaattention too. The Guardian (London), for example, commented on thisproclamation and described it as the first strategic victory for the Tamil UnitedLiberation Front (TULF) at an international level.35 Tamil Nadu in India toocontributed in its own way.

A simultaneous effect had been the interest of journalists and academicsalike in Sri Lankan affairs. Goonetileke lists in his bibliographical guide onthe 1983 riots and the national question in Sri Lanka a total of five hundredand seventy-two entries up to May 1984.36 According to him, while he was inthe process of collection, the list was growing further.37

While Tamil expatriate intelligentsia were engaged in presenting theircase to an international forum, the Tamil youth, the most affected segment ofthe community, had other ideas in mind. They had, by now, decided to

3 5 Quoted from Sutantiran, 8 July 1979. Sutantiran had been the official organ of first, theFederal Party and, then, the TULF. It ceased publication in the aftermath of the 1983 riots inSri Lanka.

3 6 H.A.I. Goonetileke, 'July 1983 and the National Question in Sri Lanka: A BibliographicalGuide', Race and Class, Vol. XXVI, no. 1 (1984), pp. 159-93.

3 7 Ibid., p. 162.

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confront the Sinhala governments by tactics of force and violence. The 'hotnews' syndrome, partly made possible by the Sinhala violence, had to makeway for Tamil violence which quickly took Sri Lanka into a 'hot...hot news'syndrome.

'Hot' to 'hot...hot' news

It could be mentioned that this syndrome extended roughly for about a decadecommencing in the aftermath of the 1983 riots and stretching up to the timewhen the Chandrika Government assumed power in 1994. Within this periodseveral traits picked up by the international media could be identified.

Militant movements occupy the centre stage during this period.38 Also, ithas become much easier to explain how the international media came to bepreoccupied with Sri Lanka. In short, the country had been bleeding and,hence, leading the news. It thus became the fertile ground for media reportersfrom all over the world. The only constraints on reporting had either been thecensorships imposed by governments in Colombo from time to time or whenthe ferocity of the war itself kept media personnel away from the theatres ofwar.

The most significant development had been the frequent confrontationsbetween the Sri Lankan security forces, the military in particular, and themilitants. It is possible to observe a certain trend in these confrontations. Themilitants initially took the police to task and completely paralysed it,compelling the government to close down one police station after another.Once this was accomplished they turned their attention towards the militaryand slowly but steadily gained ascendancy over it. First, the movement of theforces was restricted by blowing up their vehicles using land-mines. This wascarried to a point where it proved to be entirely successful. The army came tobe confined to the barracks almost permanently. It had to depend on the navyand the air force for its essential supplies. Having achieved this, the militantswere, in a position to take charge of areas where the military had beenimmobilised. This was further facilitated by the complete withdrawal of forcesfrom several areas. When the army found it increasingly difficult to keep thesupply lines through sea and air open to certain camps, it had no option but toclose them down. Yet, the security forces could not withdraw from all areas.In order to maintain at least a semblance of authority of the Sri Lankangovernment they had to entrench themselves in certain selected locations.

3 8 For an account of the rise of the various Tamil militant groups in Sri Lanka, see Dagmar-Hellmann Rajanayagam, 'The "Groups" and the Rise of Militant Secessionism', inChelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger (ed.), op. cit., pp. 169-207.

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The next stage saw the involvement of civilians, who, up to this point,were relatively unaffected. The only exception to this was when they wereunlucky enough to be in the vicinity of a spot where an incident had occurredand at the receiving end of the wrath of the soldiers. When the frustration ofthe forces gradually increased mainly due to their inability to deal directly andconfine the guerillas, they turned to make war on the civilians - the 'water'instead of the guerilla 'fish' that swims in it.39 This was carried out in twoforms. One was the frequent shelling from camps and naval ships, shootingfrom helicopters, and bombing from aeroplanes. Although the forces alwaysclaimed that their targets were suspected militant locations, it is an open secretthat civilians were badly affected resulting in widespread destruction ofphysical and human resources. The other method was the occasional'searches' carried out in towns and villages adjoining the camps. This wouldinvolve declaring a local curfew and engaging in mass arrests of any onecoming under suspicion of being a militant. This obviously exposed Tamilyouth in a very bad way and made them an eternally vulnerable lot. The aimand success of these exercises had always been questionable. The primaryobjective seems to be destabilising the society that nurtured the militantsrather than the actual elimination of them. Subsequent developments showedthat, leave alone eradication, even curtailment remained an illusive target.

The militants, on the other hand, had progressively become moreresourceful as well as powerful enough to destabilise the security forces.Periodically, they could engage in operations which took the forces bysurprise. Strategic planning, combined with some luck, resulted in themilitants running over entire camps. This had, by and large, been the processthrough which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) step by stepgained control of the entire northern province. It became, eventually, almostimpossible for the military to have camps in land-locked areas and it waspushed to the fringes where it could manage the supply lines via the sea.

All these proved sensational for the international media and any incidentconnected to these received widespread coverage. It came to a point ofextreme embarrassment to the Colombo government and it was driven to astage where it had to even solicit external help quite openly. J.R. Jeyawardane,President of the country during the period 1978 to 1988, once remarked in thisconnection that he would not hesitate to strike a deal even with the devil if itwas going to help in the defeat of the 'terrorists'.40

But, despite the increasing superiority of the militants, problems weredeveloping in their own camp. Internal rivalry between the various groups

3 9 Jeff Sluka, 'National Liberation Movements in Global Context', Conference Paper,Conference on Tamils in New Zealand, p. 14.

4 0 The remark was made when he came under criticism for soliciting military help from Israelwhich antagonised the Muslims of Sri Lanka.

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culminated in open hostilities and ultimately in the extinction of some or evenmost of them. Two reasons could be cited for this. One was the support thedifferent groups received from the Indian government, especially the TamilNadu State Government. The Indian influence could, in fact, be ascribed to bethe strength and weakness of the Tamil militant movement. While it is truethat without India no militant movement among Tamil youth would havesurvived, especially during the initial stages, it is equally correct to say thatthe Indian factor also contributed to a proliferation of groups and internalquarrelling. India, in its supportive role, devoid of any set plan, allowed a lotof indiscipline and contradictions to creep into the movement. Eventually,these erupted in open feuds. The second reason had been the rapidity withwhich the various movements gained control of areas, especially the Jaffnapeninsula. This invariably led to the question of controlling the managementof such areas. As Narayan Swamy describes,

....they went about establishing a new order in Jaffna peninsulawhen the Sri Lankan forces began progressively lose controlof the region....(The) major groups - LTTE, TELO, PLOT,EPRLF, and EROS - had a pie.41

This again led to indiscipline and confusion. All five groups, forexample, imposed taxes on a variety of goods and also used other means tocollect as much funds as possible.42 Very soon, the militants themselvesrealised that there was an urgent need to restore some order in their own campif they had to have any chance of pressing on. But, unfortunately, when theyfailed to accomplish this by consensus, they had to resort to force. Given thismilieu, it is not surprising that the LTTE, 'the largest, most powerful andwealthiest of the guerilla groups'43 emerged victors. In this process ofelimination, TELO met with the most violent end and caught the internationaleye. Narayan Swamy claims this to be 'a major turning point in Tamilmilitancy'.44 A similar attempt on the EPRLF, according to Rajanayagam, didnot succeed because political events intervened.45 In the meantime, PLOTE,through its own contradictions, 'ceased to exist for all intents and purposes'.46

The most important development during this period and the one whichreceived intense global scrutiny had been the introduction of the Indian PeaceKeeping Force (IPKF) into the crisis. India's involvement in the conflict hasalready been mentioned and is well known. But until this time it had been an

4 1 M.R. Narayan Swamy, op. cit., p. 186.4 2 Loc. cit.4 3 Dagmar-Hellman Rajanayagam, op. cit., p. 171.4 4 M.R. Narayan Swamy, op. cit., p. 199.4 5 Dagmar-Hellman Rajanayagam, op. cit., p. 171.4 6 M.R. Narayan Swamy, op. cit., p. 223.

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indirect intervention either attempting to influence decisions made by SriLankan governments or helping the militant movements in a covert manner.Now, there had been a direct thrust which needs to be explained. And, also,why at that juncture.

In the final analysis, both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE (bynow, the only viable group operating) had by their respective actions invitedthe Indian intervention. But, then, for the ultimate action India itself wassolely responsible. In May 1987, the Sri Lankan government put into effectthe meticulously prepared 'Operation Liberation' targeted initially towards thetaking over of the Vadamaratchy region in the northern province. It 'jolted theLTTE as never before'.47 When the government troops were taking the upperhand, the LTTE and the Tamil inhabitants were desperate and India appearedto be their only hope. India too responded with a set of dramatic moves whichkept the international media guessing what would be the next. In June, aflotilla of nineteen boats with thirty-eight tonnes of food stuff and otheressentials was sent to Jaffna by India. It is significant that on board werenearly a hundred journalists, making it obvious that India was after maximuminternational media attention.48 But the flotilla was turned away by the SriLankan navy. The very next day, five Indian AN-32 transporters, guarded byfour Mirage fighters, penetrated Sri Lankan air space and air dropped nearlytwenty-five tonnes of relief material over Jaffna. The zenith of these eventswas reached with the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Accord on 29 July 1987.49

But while the accord was being signed in Colombo, the first nail on its coffinwas being hammered by Prabaharan, the LTTE leader in New Delhi. In aninterview to the press, he disapproved the arrangements in the accord.50 ByOctober of that year, India, having sought peace, faced a situation of war. Ithad to pay the price for signing a government level agreement without firstseeking adequate acceptance from the LTTE. After almost two years offighting the IPKF had to leave Sri Lanka at the request of R. Premadasa, thenew president of Sri Lanka, with nothing to show by way of gains. If at all itachieved something, in terms of the ethnic conflict, it was the short-livedpeace that prevailed between the LTTE and the Premadasa government untilJune 1990. The only other accomplishment had been that the IPKF providedrelief for the Sri Lankan security forces at a time when the resources of thelatter were being stretched by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) activistsin the south of the country. The Indian saga in Sri Lanka came to an abrupt

4 7 M. R. Narayan Swamy, op. cit., p. 234.4 8 Ibid., p. 236.49 From a media point of view, the zenith, however, was the assault by a naval rating on Rajiv

Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, when he was given a naval guard of honour beforehis departure to India on 30 July 1987 after signing the accord.

5 0 Rajesh Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco: Peacekeepers at War (New Delhi, Vision Books,1990), p. 17.

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end with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 which shocked notonly India and Sri Lanka, but the entire world.

Apart from events pertaining to military or militant activities, two otherfeatures concerning the civilian population too began to attract a lot of mediaattention during this period. The first had been the rapidly deteriorating livingconditions in Tamil areas. Mention has already been made about the way inwhich the Sri Lankan security forces let out their frustration on the civilianpopulation. To this one must also add the wide ranging atrocities committedby the Indian forces during their reign.

But the real blow to living conditions revealed itself when thegovernment decided that in its battle against youth militancy ('terrorism' in itsown words) even economic means of the Tamil public could not be spared. Amajor step in this direction had been restraining the flow of various categoriesof goods into areas primarily controlled by the militants. By 1987, thegovernment had been allowing into Tamil areas, Jaffna in particular, onlycommodities which could be described as basic 'necessities' for humansurvival and that too in very minimum quantities. It denied access to any goodwhich it thought, even in a remote sense, could help the militants' fightingcapacity and strength. Goods so prohibited ranged from simple consumeritems like chocolates to intermediate and capital goods. Special mention mustbe made of petroleum products, fertilisers and a number of medical drugsessential for maintaining a satisfactory health service. Like other measures, theprohibition of goods too was interpreted as a 'war strategy'. But, in theimplementation of it, the dilemma for the government had always been todifferentiate between commodities helping the guerillas and the ones essentialfor the day to day lives of the civilians. Ultimately, when the net was castwide it could not but end up with almost a total economic embargo. Thiscreated immense hardship for all layers of the civilian population. Thesituation was made worse when certain economic activities like fishing toowere banned. All these resulted in widespread job losses and made the entirepopulation, especially those depending on independent means, a destitute lot.The ban on petroleum products and severing the supply of electricityamounted to crippling the whole economy of the region. In addition to theeconomic difficulties there was the problem of displacement of people due toboth military and economic factors. Those rendered homeless ended up asrefugees.

The human misery caused by all these attracted a number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) into problem areas. The NGOs operatingin Sri Lanka have formed themselves into a NGO Forum, which is describedas 'an international network of organisations concerned with the promotion of

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social justice and development in Sri Lanka'.51 Individual mention must bemade of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which largelysubstituted for the breakdown of medical services, particularly in the northernprovince. Relief measures apart, the NGOs had been useful in other respectstoo. They had served and are still serving as a means of disseminatingmessages abroad. While this had made them quite valuable to the internationalmedia, they had also been at the receiving end of the governments' wrath atvarious times, primarily during times of censorship. Another useful way inwhich they had served had been to act as intermediaries between (Sri Lanka)governments and the militants. During peace negotiations this had provedvaluable.

An aspect closely connected to the above has been the question of humanrights. Human rights violations are an inevitable outcome under conditions ofwar. In Sri Lanka, they comprised mainly of two types. One deals with thosewho were taken into custody on suspicion or otherwise by the security forces.There had been complaints of torture and ill treatment and also sexualharassment. There had also been several who went completely missing or laterrecovered dead. The other type is the excesses committed by security forcesduring times of military operations. Numerous instances had been recordedwhere the civilian population after being requested to seek sanctuary at certainplaces, those very sanctuaries being bombed. There had also been reports ofrape and sexual harassment on women. The use of human shields in combathad been another form of human rights violation reported.

Ironically enough, another side to this problem had been the human rightsrecord of the militants. It is alleged that they too adopted the same violationmethods used by the security forces. One of the earliest and most strikingexamples of a mass attack on civilians by the militants was in 1985 when onehundred and forty-six civilians were gunned down in Anuradhapura. Sincethen, civilian targets have not in any way been excepted by militantorganisations. The rivalry witnessed among the militant groups and thesuspicion on civilians that information was being passed on to the securityforces too had led to human rights violations on a large scale by the militants.There had also been instances in the early history of the militant movementsthat extortion of money and other forms of resources being the cause for illtreating civilians.

The human rights issue had made Sri Lanka the focus of attention forAmnesty International, a primary organisation campaigning for the safeguardof human rights at a global level. In the process, it had also served and, is still

5 1 Bryn Wolfe, "The Role of the International Community', in Peace with Justice (Canberra,Collection of Papers submitted at the International Conference on the Conflict in Sri Lanka,1996), p. 134.

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serving as the key source of information for the international media onatrocities committed by both the government and the militants. There had beenmany occasions in which the reports of Amnesty International came in forcriticism generally by both sides, but in particular, by the state. Yet, it is noexaggeration to say that the organisation has rendered a very useful service inthe on going conflict. It has served as an important check on the activities ofboth the state and the LTTE and has made them adopt a cautious approach intheir dealings with the civilian population.

'Hot...Hot' to 'Stale' News

This could be mentioned as an apt description of the way in which theinternational impressions about Sri Lanka have been undergoing a changesince the 1990s. Externally, the primary reason has been that events weredismally repetitive in character and dragged on without any signs of coming toan end. Pfaffenberger succinctly depicts the outcome in terms of internationalmedia reporting:

In the early years, it took only one or two deaths to tripwhatever sensor is deployed to allocate space in theWashington Post and New York Times of the world, but soon itwas a dozen, and then twenty-five, and then fifty, and nowmore than hundred. Surely the explanation can be found in thefact that Sri Lanka isn't news any more; the world has becomeaccustomed to people dying there.52

This, as he further points out, has given the various parties to the conflict'a certain latitude within which they can operate with impunity'.53 But, if onegoes a little deeper and analyses the relatively sudden lull in internationalmedia attention, it becomes possible to advance certain specific reasons.Moreover, one could also notice a subtle change in tenor in what is beingreported.

A major share of the responsibility could again be attributed to the Indianfactor. India's long involvement in the conflict had, in the final analysis, beenwithout proper directions or clear cut objectives. Even in the eleventh hourwhen the IPKF was introduced and ended up fighting a war against the LTTE,things had not become any clearer. This is very evident from the followingquestions Narayan Swamy poses, for which there were, obviously, no properanswers:

5 2 Bryan Pfaffenberger, 'Introduction: The Sri Lankan Tamils', in Chelvadurai Manogaran andBryan Pfaffenberger (ed.), op. cit., p. 2.

5 3 Loc. cit.

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...Why did New Delhi arm and train the militants? to carve outa separate state in Sri Lanka? Or to teach Colombo a lesson forwhatever it was worth?... Was the LITE to be crushed withoutreprieve? If so, how long was the Indian army going to carryon fighting? What would happen when LTTE was a spentforce? Why was the IPKF waging a war at all?54

Ultimately, when India was forced to leave after burning its fingers avacuum had been created. One has to admit here that a fair amount of globalinterest in Sri Lankan affairs had actually been due to India. Whatever India'sreal objectives had been, the world at large had been conscious of India'sposition in the Indian Ocean and the key role it could play in the geo-politicsof the region. In short, the global focus on the Sri Lankan conflict had beenthrough the Indian eyes. This could, in fact, be mentioned as one of the keyreasons as to why, despite relatively active lobbying by Tamil expatriates,other countries, including the major powers of the world, avoided interventionin the Sri Lankan conflict. When India decided to wash its hands worldinterest too invariably waned, affecting media attention.

Sinhalese expatriate action in recent times had been another causativefactor. This not only curtailed international media attention, but alsosomewhat twisted the hitherto existing image of the conflict. From the timewhen communal politics began simmering in Sri Lanka, outward migrationhad operated as an outlet valve for the Tamils. In the post-1983 period, ascommunal politics turned into an ethnic conflict the trend exacerbated andTamils from Sri Lanka comprised a sizeable proportion of the expatriatecommunity in many countries. Their influence had a great deal to do withinternational impressions created about Sri Lanka and the sympathy the Tamilcause received. The meagre number of Sinhalese in these countries had nochoice but to keep a low profile. But as the conflict dragged on, even themajority community at home could not escape its consequences for long. Themain impact came from the deteriorating economic conditions, an upshot ofspiralling defence expenditures. During the period 1991-1995, for example, aview of the functional classification of expenditures in Sri Lanka reveals thatunder the three major headings: Economic, Social, and General PublicServices, defence as an individual category (under General Public Services)attracted the second highest in current expenditure to be surpassed only byhousing under social services.55 In percentage terms, defence expendituresincreased from about twelve per cent of the budget in 1991 to 18.6 per cent in1995.56 It is, however, pertinent to point out that the Central Bank of SriLanka which analyses the economic performance of the country, especially in

5 4 M.R. Narayan Swamy, op. cit., p. 323.5 5 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 1995 (Colombo, 1995), p. 89.5 6 Loc. cit.

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its annual reports, has largely ignored the economic implications of risingdefence expenditures. The 1995 annual report, for instance, in very simpleterms mentioned that 'rising defence expenditures made heavy claims onbudgetary resources'.57 The major impact on the economy is, however, feltthrough foregone opportunities. It could lead to lower investment levels inproductive sectors of the economy, higher budget deficits, higher taxes, andincreased government borrowing or a combination of any of these. Apart fromeconomic difficulties, it is equally true that there had, generally, been anescalation of security risk in areas so far immune to the conflict, Colombo notexcepted. The JVP campaign too, in this respect, made its contribution. Whenall these combined to operate as 'push' factors, a good number of Sinhalesetoo jumped the migration bandwagon.

Once they settled down in their new overseas locations, if not all, at leasta fair number among them came forward to organise themselves andconcentrated on counter propaganda to the Tamil cause. While a number ofassociations were formed and fora floated the ones which were alreadyexisting began functioning with renewed vigour and enthusiasm.58 Within ashort time a lot of water had flown under the bridge and there has been aconscious attempt, either successfully or unsuccessfully to meet some of thetraditional arguments from the Tamil side. To cite one example, in one of thepublications of the Australia Centre for Sri Lanka Unity (ACSLU), theallegation that for long the Tamils of Sri Lanka had been discriminated ischallenged.59 The Sri Lankan government has, wittingly or unwittingly, beenaiding these efforts. Its diplomatic missions abroad, for example, have playeda supportive role and have offered encouragement to this campaign.

Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan government, in its own way too, has diverteda substantial amount of resources towards counter-propaganda measures. Amajor reason for this has been the thinking that it is a necessary supplement tomilitary measures at home. In this respect, the government's endeavour hasbeen geared in two directions. First, in a bid to slow down or, if possible,even to completely prevent the flow of funds to the LTTE, emphasise theviolent nature of the organisation's activities. Efforts have been taken toreiterate the terrorist character and internationally tarnish its image as anational liberation force. Requests have simultaneously been made to foreigngovernments either to ban the organisation or to restrict its activities.60

5 7 Ibid., p. 1.5 8 Mention could be made of the Australia Centre for Sri Lanka Unity (ACSLU) in Australia

and the United Sri Lanka Association (USLA) in New Zealand.5 9 ACSLU, 'The Myth of Discrimination Against Tamils in Sri Lanka', ACSLU Publication No.

10 (Queensland, 1996). Also, see Neville Ladduwahetty, 'A Fresh Perspective of TamilGrievances', SL Net Forum, Vol. 25, 1996.

6 0 A concrete example of this is the efforts of the Sri Lankan government in the USA. Therecently passed anti-terrorism law in the US calls for the Department of State, in consultation

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Second, to try to promote its own image as one that is reasonable, interested inprotecting human rights, and making a sincere effort to resolve the issue. Inorder to ensure success in this manoeuvre, it is rumoured that even privateadvertising firms have been engaged at great costs. These two actions puttogether can be termed as two sides of the same coin. The domestic censorshipimposed and the prohibition of independent travel to troubled areas byforeigners greatly facilitated the government in both. They denied independentassessment of the situation to foreign media personnel and helped to preservethe good image of the government and the bad image of the LTTE.61

Judging by international media response in recent times it could, perhaps,be concluded that the government has achieved a measure of success in itsefforts. One could, for example, refer to the editorial of the reputed The Timesof London on 10 August 1995 under the caption 'Tiger Terror'. An addedfactor in the government's success seems to be the continued reliance onmarket-oriented economic growth. This is juxtaposed with the ethnic problemand the government had been given credit for its achievement on both thepolitical/military and economic fronts. The Washington Post of 11 October1996, for example, wrote as follows:

The particular achievement of Sri Lanka...is to have preservedand extended market reform and the welfare state even whileengaged in protracted cruel battle against minority Tamilseparatists.

The Sri Lankan government and the Sinhala expatriates operating intandem, supplementing each other and receiving considerable support atinternational media levels, have, to a certain extent, back-pedalled theactivities of the Tamil expatriates. To this one must also add the 'weariness'which has crept into expatriate Tamil ranks. This is synonymous with the 'aidweariness' found in the development economics literature. The aid wearinessrefers to the attitude of developed economies towards foreign assistance to theless developed ones.62 When continuous help and support have not brought inthe desired outcome a weariness has crept in the further disbursement of aid.Such 'weariness' or 'fatigue syndrome' could be described as a naturalphenomenon in instances of prolonged assistance without tangible results.

with the Department of Justice, to draw up a blacklist of terrorist organisations. The bankaccounts of these organisations will be frozen, members cannot enter the USA, and fund-raising (even for charitable purposes) for these organisations will be illegal. Sri Lanka hadbeen lobbying for the inclusion of the LTTE in this blacklist. But, up to now, the list has notbeen released.

61 Depending on ground realities, guided tours to the war fronts were arranged intermittently bythe government.

62 Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development (6th ed., London and New York, Longman,1997), p. 557.

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But, in the ease of the Tamils, coming at a wrong time, it has helped to projectthe activities of the opposite side.

Yet, it should not in any way be assumed that the Tamil diaspora hasentirely lost hope and has altogether abandoned its struggle at the internationallevel. Tamil associations spread in different parts of the globe and theirfederated bodies have been very active in the sustenance of interest andkeeping the struggle alive. They have organised seminars and conferenceswhere their viewpoints could be deliberated, put across to an internationalaudience and receive feedback. These bodies have put out their ownpublications too. In this respect the Tamil Monitor published by theAustralasian Federation of Tamil Associations is worthy of note. But moreimportant than all these is how the modern technology has come to theirrescue. What they lost by way of media space has, perhaps, been made up withthe web pages. It must, however, be noted that internet facilities have equallybeen used by both sides. Trawick, in this connection, mentions that 'just as theVietnam War was the first television war, the War in Sri Lanka may be thefirst internet war' .63 War it may be, but there is no denial that it had led tosome very open discussion on certain contentious issues. From aninternational media perspective, it has added a further dimension with an everincreasing role.

Certain implications of this syndrome also cannot be ignored. Activitiesof the Tamil and Sinhalese expatriates, irrespective of their scale ofoperations, have brought the war, hitherto confined to Sri Lanka, tointernational levels. This has taken the form of a cold war. Cyberspace warmentioned above could, arguably, be a healthy development. But there havebeen several other instances where the two groups had come into openconflict. This has made things difficult for host governments of countries inwhich they are active. Sometimes these governments have come in forcriticism from both sides. It happened, for example, in Canberra, Australia inJune 1996 and, then soon after, in Wellington, New Zealand in July 1996. Onboth occasions, government personnel from host countries, initially, agreed tobe present at the conferences organised by Tamil organisations, later withdrewunder pressure from Sinhalese organisations.64 In New Zealand, for example,a government spokeswoman advised members of parliament who had agreedto attend the conference, 'not to go because of the level of dissension in theNew Zealand Sri Lankan community over issues in Sri Lanka'.65 Tamils

6 3 Margaret Trawick, 'Cyberspace War and Sri Lanka', Massey University Campus News, Issue32 (1996), p. 4.

6 4 The Canberra conference was jointly sponsored by the Australian Human Rights Foundationand Australasian Federation of Tamil Associations on the theme Peace with Justice, whereasthe Wellington Conference was organised by the New Zealand Tamils on the theme Tamils inNew Zealand.

6 5 Evening Post (New Zealand), 12 July 1996.

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alleged that Sri Lanka's embassy in Canberra had been backing the Sinhaleseorganisations.66

Apart from Tamil organisations, even foreign individuals, especiallyacademics, who are suspected to be sympathetic to Tamils have been pickedup for criticism by Sinhalese organisations. This is clearly evident whenMargaret Trawick, a senior academic of Massey University in New Zealandbecame the target of a barrage of criticism over a short article she wrote aboutthe Sri Lankan Tamil militants in one of the student publications.67 They wentto the extent of lodging a complaint with the Vice Chancellor of the universityover the issue. Likewise, academics who agreed to read papers at theWellington conference referred to earlier were strongly urged not to associatewith the conference. There is an imminent threat that the trend wouldcontinue.

It must, however, be observed that this does not augur well for anycontribution that could come towards resolving the conflict from an overseasdimension: either from the expatriate Sri Lankan community or from foreigngovernments. The cordial relationship between the communities, a vitalingredient for success, is being thwarted. At the same time, confusion iscreated in the minds of governments abroad and the general media audience.This can sometimes lead to totally wrong and alarming conclusions.68 One ofthem is, after an erroneous impression is formed about the LTTE, this isextended to embrace the entire Tamil population. The international media,influenced by such impressions, wittingly or unwittingly tended to equateevery Tamil with the LTTE. A news caption in one of the leading NewZealand dailies, for example, read 'Tamils Kill 27 \ 6 9 It is amazing that noteven Tamils from Tamil Nadu, India are spared! Another accompanyingfeature could, perhaps, be that the international media personnel may run tohasty conclusions. For example, Gwynne Dyer, writing in the 'World View'column of the New Zealand Herald, concludes that the war in Sri Lankashows 'clear signs of approaching an end'.70 But he has failed to elaborate

6 6 Loc. cit.6 7 For a cross-section of the criticisms, see EXMSS Off Campus, Oct. 1996, pp. 9-11.6 8 During the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting of November 1995, held in

Auckland, the author experienced a classic instance of how confused the public overseas canbe when the two communities openly confront each other. While the Tamils were registeringtheir protest against the presence at the meeting of the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister in oneentrance to the venue of the meeting, the Sinhalese too organised a march to express theirsupport to the Sri Lankan contingent. Few members of the public, quite unaware that the twogroups were out for opposing reasons, queried as to why, instead of merging into one, the twowere protesting separately.

6 9 New Zealand Herald, 30 Aug. 1996.7 0 New Zealand Herald, 12 Oct. 1996.

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what these 'clear signs' are. The reality, however, looks far from it. All signalspoint towards an escalation of, if not the conventional war, a guerilla war.

'Stale' news to 'good' news...?

From what has been portrayed in the previous section, it is clear that theoutlook is not only 'stale', but is rather gloomy too. Could this be translatedinto one of lasting peace -real good news to everyone?

History of peace attempts is as old as the conflict itself. The fact that theyall have ended in failure indicates that right along the line certain fundamentalissues relating to the conflict have either been neglected or given less thansufficient priority. It is not the intention of this essay to identify these issues orto impress upon the international community its obligation in this regard. Bothhave, to a considerable extent, been accomplished in a contribution byMarcus Einfield.71 This essay, by way of an addendum, picks on two areas,one political and the other economic, where the international media, in theopinion of the author, are better placed to make an impression.

Ever since a militant dimension entered the conflict, there has been aconsistent attempt at the Sri Lanka government level, supplemented bySinhala/Buddhist organisations home and abroad to brand the militants asterrorists and to dub their guerilla warfare as terrorist activities. Theinternational media, one feels, have not taken a firm attitude in their approachto this question. The general tendency has, however, been to tilt largelytowards the government side. Even globally reputed newspapers like TheTimes use such captions as 'Tiger Terror'.72 Here the media abdicateresponsibility by not going into the underlying causes of the conflict. But theyhave, by virtue of their global links, the capacity to dig into the root of thematter. The international media have the obligation to tell their audience that'the Tamils' call for 'self-determination' is at the heart of the war in SriLanka',73 and also that the guerilla warfare 'is a form of political warfareguided by political rather than military considerations'.74 While condemningviolence, such an approach would contribute towards a better understanding ofthe problem.

The economic argument pertains to recent developments in the field ofinternational political economy. The developments per se lead to theevolvement of a new international economic order. There is an urgent need forcountries, especially those belonging to the Third World, to be conscious of

71 Marcus Einfield, 'The Development of Human Rights', in Peace with Justice, pp. 137-47.7 2 The Times (London), 10 August 1995.7 3 Marcus Einfield, op. cit., p. 141.7 4 Jeff Sluka, op. cit., p. 13.

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the emerging order and adjust accordingly. Otherwise, they face the danger ofbeing left by the wayside and pushed deeper into a state of underdevelopment.Media serve as an ideal source for the dissemination of knowledge andinformation on this ongoing process of globalisation.

Two rather contrasting changes dominate the process. On the one hand,there is a gradual but steady subordination of the political to the economic.This is manifested in the convergence of states accompanied by thephenomenon of macro-regionalism. Cox refers to this as a 'globalrestructuring' and, then, goes on to identify the macro-regions:

Three macro-regions redefining themselves are a Europecentred on the EC, an East Asia sphere centred on Japan, and aNorth American sphere centred on the United States andlooking to embrace Latin America.75

The underlying principle behind this trend has been the interdependencywhich tends to subordinate the principle of territoriality. Even the threeregions mentioned cannot be autarchic. While they have entered into an interregional competition for investment and shares of the world market, theycannot get away from the fact that they 'have too much involvement in theeconomies of other regions...'.76 The need has, therefore, arisen for states tocompromise on the 'territoriality' principle based on military and politicalpower with the growing interdependency. The state, in the process, has totransform itself into a 'trading state'.77

On the other hand, there is a concurrent process of disintegration toowhereby autonomous states are born. Scores of other struggles are going onseeking either national or more regional freedom. One has to only turn toEastern Europe to look for examples.78 Ironically, however, most of theEastern European states, once independent, have expressed a strong desire tobecome part of the European Union.79

It is clear, then, that in the international political economy of today, thereis a simultaneous process of economic integration and political disintegration.Yet, the phenomenon is not contradictory but rather complementary in nature.Economic integration, the key to success, is only possible in a climate of

7 5 Robert Cox, 'Global restructuring: Making Sense of the Changing International Politicaleconomy', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (ed.), Political economy of theChanging Global Order (London, Macmillan, 1994), p. 52.

7 6 Loc. cit.7 7 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York, Basic Books, 1986).7 8 Ian Kearns, 'Eastern and Central Europe in the World Political economy', in Stubbs and

Underhill (eds), op. cit., pp. 378-89.7 9 Pier Carlo Padoan, "The Changing European Political Economy', in ibid., pp. 336-51.

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peace and political harmony within the region. The concept cannot be anydifferent to situations within countries. Since 'there is little material gain to befound in the control of more territory', in the event of a clamour for morenational or regional freedom, the best strategy for any government in terms ofoverall economic success would be to allow for an element of politicaldisintegration and, then, seek economic integration.80

Turning to Sri Lanka, it cannot in any way be claimed that the country isunaware of these developments. It is already a member of the South AsianAssociation for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). Almost a decade ago, itmade approaches to be a member of the Association of South East AsianNations (ASEAN). Now, it is also vying to be a member of the Asia PacificEconomic Co-operation (APEC). But the drawback in the Sri Lankan policy isthat it is engaged in a valiant attempt to apply double standards. While it hasmade efforts to become a part of the region to enhance its economic gains ininternational terms, it is refusing to recognise the benefits at its doorstep thatcould accrue through more regional autonomy within the country. If one needsfurther proof one has to only look at the existence of Free Trade Zones. On theone hand, the government is prepared in certain selected locations to surrenderat least a part of its economic sovereignty to foreign multinational companiesin order to derive some economic gain. But, on the other, it is again turning ablind eye to economic advantages within easy reach at regional levels withinits domestic bounds. What is required here is a meaningful decentralisation ofpower to particular regions recognising their right for self-determination.Instead, the government has been wasting a colossal amount of physical andhuman resources in these regions in order to retain political power, thesignificance of which, in an international context, is clearly on the wane. SriLanka, no doubt, has its priorities wrong. In a fast changing global order thereis an urgent need for the country to rethink its strategy in terms of competitiveadvantage both internally and externally and not to get bogged down in ideasof comparative advantage. Dispensing political power in an internal regionmay, perhaps, be a minor sacrifice towards achieving an enormous economicgain.

8 0 Susan Strange, 'Rethinking Structural Change in the International Political Economy: States,Firms and Diplomacy', in ibid., p. 108.

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Ethnic communities and religionsSinhalese1 I low country

jaWria H I ] Kandyan

:. ' .°C\ Tamil• . [ | Ceylon

_._•"' | j Indian

C Ceylon Moor^iiln!<:,

Mannar

t Aniindlianiin — ' i ^

Gal District boundary(district names are thesame as their capitals)

0 District capital

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