Crawford Spence* and Francisco Javier Husillos Carqués**

The Hegemonic Contours of the

Social Accounting Literature

Abstract

This paper employs the lens of Hegemony in order to present the Social Accounting (SER) literature as a political field. It is argued that within this poltical field a certain hegemony in explanations of SER practice can be discerned. The dominant thoeretical paramaters are provided primarily by the reference points of Stakeholder, Legitimacy and Marxist Political Economy Theories. An analyis of these reference points reveals that there is much emptiness, inconsistency and contradiction within the SER field and that this is problematic sociologically. Combined with an analysis of the insights generated from the fieldwork of recent years, the paper argues that a rearticulation of the SER field is both inevitable and desirable.

*Corresponding Author: Crawford Spence School of Management University of St Andrews Scotland, KY16 9SS cs384@st-andrews.ac.uktel: +44 1334 462877

** Universidad Publica de Navarra Department of Gestion de Empresas Pamplona, Spain

The authors thank the participants at a University of Dundee, Department of Accounting and Business Finance Research Seminar on 15th February 2006, participants at the 2006 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference in Cardiff, 10th-12th July, David Collison and Rob Gray for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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1. Introduction

Whilst the Social Accounting (SER hereafter) remains disparate and without

commonly agreed theories (Mathews, 1997 and Parker, 2005) this is not to say that it

is completely without structure. On the contrary, there are discernible theoretical

contours and parameters within the SER field. Indeed, it is argued here that there has

been a hegemonic structuring of the SER field primarily, although not exclusively,

around the theoretical reference points of Stakeholder, Legitimacy and Marxist

Political Economy Theories (Gray et al, 1995a, 1996). The purpose of this paper is to

analyse both the way in which these reference points have become relatively fixed in

the SER field and, more specifically, to analyse how those reference points have been

interpreted and utilised once they have been set down. It emerges from this analysis

that the ways in which different theories are employed in the literature appear to

follow their own laws of development relatively independently of how they first

become entrenched. This has important sociological implications for a field such as

SER that is purportedly concerned with wider social change. For example, it is argued

below that there is much in the way of contradiction and inconsistency as regards to

the application of dominant theoretical reference points and that the SER field would

benefit from further clarification of the way in which dominant reference points might

be used to guide and explain empirical work. Moreover, going beyond the dominant

theories themselves, alternative explanations of SER practice have emerged from the

fieldwork of recent years. These explanations highlight much complexity in SER

practice, complexity which is not easily amenable to interpretation through dominant

empirical lenses. Thus, these qualitative explanations represent challenges to the

hegemonic structure of SER field and, combined with critique of the dominant

theories within their own terms of reference, call for a hegemonic rearticulation of the

field.

The paper proceeds as follows. The following section introduces the theoretical

framework of hegemony that is utilised throughout the paper. Using the lens of

hegemony the SER literature is presented as a political field in which various

antagonisms and affinities are structure around various points of reference that have

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achieved relative fixity. These reference points are Stakeholder, Legitimacy and

Marxist Political Economy Theories and their dominance appears to have been

largely, although not exclusively, a result of the merits that these theories have been

accorded by Gray et al (1995a, 1996). The subsequent three sections of the paper

analyse each of these reference points individually. Firstly, Stakeholder Theory is

treated as a reference point whose dominance appears to be largely ceremonial. The

paucity of Stakeholder Theory analyses suggests that this reference point serves a

function for the literature that is somewhat independent of its explanatory potential.

However, we present arguments which show that the explanatory potential of this

reference point could be fulfilled, should such an exercise be considered desirable.

Next, Legitimacy Theory is analysed. In contrast to Stakeholder Theory, there is a

vast array of Legitimacy Theory explanations of SER practice. However, these

explanations often remain vague and lacking in detail. Thus, whereas Stakeholder

Theory has much theoretical paritcularity that has not been used in the SER field,

Legitimacy Theory is relatively empty of theoretical particularity yet it has been

employed extensively. Thus, both of these thoeries have hegemonically structured the

SER field, at least in part, through the imposition of emptiness. Marxist Political

Economy Theory is then analysed. In contrast to the analyses of Stakeholder and

Legitimacy Theory, Marxist Political Economy Theory has structured the field of

SER not through emptiness, but through particularity. However, the particularity of

Marxist Political Economy interpretations has been inconsistent and contradictory,

implying that whilst it may be important for an intellectual field to have relatively

fixed theoretical reference points, the way in which those reference points structure

the SER field is highly contingent.

Following on from the analysis of these specific theoretical reference points, the

insights generated from fieldwork of recent years are presented and discussed. These

insights suggest a number of things. Firstly, that SER motivations are somewhat more

complex that dominant theorisations suggest. Secondly, that the internal struggles

over SER within organisations has been largely ignored by dominant theorisations.

Thirdly, that dominant theorisations have largely ignored how conflict mediation

comes about. Thus, these insights challenge the current hegemony of the SER field.

The subsequent section of the paper discusses the fragile and contingent nature of this

hegemony in more detail, arguing that a rearticulation of the field is inevitable and

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irrespective of the direction that SER researchers wish to take, such a rearticulation is

desirable from a sociological point of view in order to ascribe more internal coherence

to the arguments that we have amongst ourselves.

The Hegemonisation of the Social Accounting Literature Parker (2005), echoing Mathews (1997), recognises that the SER literature is

“voluminous, disparate, eclectic, and still without commonly agreed philosophies or

standpoints. In our post-modern world…this may become a comfortable state in

which we desist from seeking unitary positions and uniform assessments” (p.844). As

such, Parker (2005) argues for continued theoretical pluralism:

“pluralism in theoretical lenses and methodologies applied to common research problems can yield incremental and accumulating insights that are enriched by both commonality and difference. All are valuable. That holy grail, the all-encompassing unitary explanatory SER theory, is not only a mirage, but cannot deliver the richness of insights we need in this complex and changing field of research and action” (p.849).

One of the great insights offered by post-modernism is the simplification that is

enacted by any single discourse or theoretical position. From this it follows that no

one theory can fully capture the complexity of social reality. However, at the same

time certain theoretical positions, whilst always being subject to contestation, tend to

dominate others in any intellectual field. Indeed, the dominance of certain explanatory

theories over others in the field of SER is quite evident. In other words, whilst a

unitary theory for SER has not emerged one can discern from the SER literature a

certain hegemony in its theoretical parameters.

The traditional Gramscian conception of Hegemony is as a system of power relations

that emerges only in liberal democracies (see Gramsci, 1971) where the focus for the

dominant group is on obtaining widespread consent in civil society for its activities.

More contemporary theorisations of hegemony develop the Gramscian conception

along logical lines in order to arrive at a position where hegemony is not merely a

heuristic for making sense of political affiliations but is actually seen as the terrain of

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politics itself (Laclau, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). That is,

hegemony is seen more as a social ontology: “it defines the very terrain in which a

political relation is actually constituted” (Laclau, 2000, p.44). Hegemony, therefore, is

politics.

Accepting this basic social ontology, it is within hegemonic frameworks that subjects

are constituted, that social networks and institutions are formed, that political

movements take shape. These political processes all take place in the absence of a

pre-determined power centre. The only universality or objectivity that exists here is

the logic of hegemony per se (Jones, 2006). That is to say that political processes and

affinities are constituted antagonistically1 in relation to each other in a complex

network of inherently unstable power constellations, as in a game of chess (Levy,

2005). However, as in a game of chess, certain pieces on the board come to take on a

more central a dominant position than others and the moves of the less important

pieces become constrained/enabled by their relation to those that have somehow

managed to achieve some level of dominance. Thus, whilst there is no pre-determined

centre, there are nodal points whose position is relatively fixed and around which sub-

discourses are defined.

Using this social ontology the SER literature can be seen as a political field that is

constructed through its own particular antagonisms and given shape by certain points

of fixity.2 The antagonisms between theories we will discuss in more detail below, but

the points of relative fixity within the theorisations of SER we argue come primarily

from the grand articulator of SER: Rob Gray. The consistent delineation and

development of a theory of accountability over the last twenty plus years has perhaps

become the nodal point in the SER literature (see, for example, Gray 1992, 2002,

1 Antagonism is seen by Laclau as fundamental to the construction of any political identity. Antagonism is at the heart of oppositional relations as well as at the heart of relations of unification, or chains of equivalence. 2 It should be noted that our use of a hegemonic framework here differs in two important respects from how theories of hegemony have previously been employed in the literature. Firstly, we are delineating what is a more poststructuralist conceptualization of hegemony than has hitherto been deployed. Previous authors have tended to align with a more traditional Gramscian political economy conceptualisation of hegemony. Secondly, whilst a hegemonic political economy framework runs through Arnold and Hammond (1994); Gallhofer and Haslam (2003, see chapter 4 in particular); Livesey (2002a, b) and Cooper (1995), these authors use hegemony to describe society and conceive the practice of SER as hegemonic. In contrast, we are using a hegemonic framework to describe, not

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2005; Gray et al, 1987, 1996). This theory, implicitly or explicitly, runs through the

vast majority of published research in SER. However, whilst this is obviously

important for any discussion of theoretical hegemony in SER, the theory of

accountability is not our primary concern here. Lehman (1999, 2001, 2005?) has

already illuminated the problematic liberal theoretical underpinnings of the

accountability project. Rather, we focus primarily on the hegemony of the theories

that are employed to explain SER in order to illuminate their underpinnings, the way

in which they are applied and expose their contingent emergence. Thus, whilst

Lehman (1999, 2001, 2005) presents in some respects an attempt to disrupt the

dominance of liberal accountability theorisations in SER, this paper represents an

attempt to disrupt the hegemony that has emerged to explain SER when it is not

accountability. Whilst Lehman’s political project is different from ours in other

respects, they are both similar in the sense that they seek to dislodge points of

reference that have become relatively entrenched and open up the taken-for-granted to

fresh critique.

For theories of SER that are not accountability the main point of reference in the

literature has also been the work of Gray et al (in particular 1995a and 1996). In these

studies, Gray et al classify the theories of SER into decision usefulness, economic and

socio-political theories. Whilst decision usefulness (see, Ingram, 1978; Belkaoui,

1980; Jaggi and Friedman, 1982; Freedman and Jaggi, 1986; Freedman and Stagliano,

1991; Lorraine et al, 2004) and economic theories (see, for example, Belkaoui and

Karpick, 1989; Ness and Mirza, 1992; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Toms, 2002 and

Hasseldine et al, 2005) have been employed in the literature, these have remained

somewhat peripheral to accepted explanations of SER practice.3 This may be due to it

having been suggested that “by far the more interesting and insightful theoretical

perspectives are those drawn from social and political theory – most particularly

stakeholder theory; legitimacy theory; and the perspectives that emerge from political

economy” (Gray et al, 1996, p.52). Common to each of these theories is the premise

that the economic domain cannot be studied in isolation from the political and social

society primarily, but the SER literature. The hegemonic practice for us in not SER in this context, but the different theorisations of what SER is. 3 Our review of the literature is inevitably partial and our view regarding what constitutes a dominant theory of SER is based on an intuitive understanding and our own personal and professional involvement within the field of SER.

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context within which it operates (see Gray et al, 1995a). These two works in

particular, in part reference to an emerging fixity in theorisation at the time, of course

also become self-fulfilling prophecies, articulating a potentiality in a manner that

provides structure and reifies reference points for future work. The anxious running

around for conceptual guidance may stop. We now have Stakeholder, Legitimacy and

Political Economy theories.

Gray et al (1995a) make the distinction between two broad variants of political

economy theory: Bourgeois and Classical. Gray et al (1995a) argue that Bourgeois

political economy theory may be associated with the liberalism of John Stuart Mill,

whereas Classical political economy theory is more closely associated with the

writings of Marx. The former adopts an essentially pluralistic view of society whereas

the latter “places sectional (class) interests, structural inequity, conflict and the role of

the State at the heart of its analysis” (Gray et al, 1995a, p.53). Gray et al (1995a) note

that this distinction is crucial as the Classical perspective views processes of

mediation and modification as determined by wider structural interests. In contrast,

the Bourgeois view of political economy views these processes of mediation and

modification as the whole story. The Marxist distinction between the base and the

superstructure may be useful here. A Marxist (we prefer the term Marxist to Classical,

see below) political economy perspective would hold that the economic base of

capitalism (being the dominance of capital over labour) determines the superstructures

of society (being the surface elements of ideology, culture, the legal system,

accounting and so on). In other words, the capitalist base has a deterministic influence

on the way in which conflict is mediated and modified at the level of the

superstructure. Importantly, from this perspective, the superstructure can have only a

very limited influence on the economic base, e.g. class relations cannot be altered. As

far as accounting is concerned, it has been argued from a Marxist political economy

perspective that accounting cannot change in and of itself, but can only change once

there has been change in the underlying structure of society (Cooper and Sherer,

1984). In contrast, a Bourgeois view of political economy largely ignores the

structural power of the economic base, focusing almost entirely on the superstructure.

It has been argued that the theories commonly employed in the SER literature

generally adhere to a Bourgeois political economy perspective that may be criticised

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for not dealing adequately with the fundamental conflicts that underlie advanced

capitalism (see, for example, Gray et al, 1995a). However, such a theoretical leaning

is rarely acknowledged by the authors themselves. It is unusual for authors to explain

their basic beliefs about the economic-social-political environment (the macro-level)

when they apply theories such as Stakeholder Theory (ST) or Legitimacy Theory

(LT). Indeed, these theories are often not applied as such, but more often than not

referred to in tangential fashion or are themselves used to add an air of (sic)

legitimacy to empirical results. There is not merely the issue of how things are

theorised, but whether they are theorised at all. We contend that it is impossible to

stand outside of theory and that, explicit or not, theorisation takes place in any

empirical study. In this regard, it can be inferred that these theoretical frameworks (as

applied) in the SER literature adopt a de facto Bourgeois perspective. These have

come to dominate our understanding of the SER phenomenon and show little signs of

abating. It is with the dominance of these theories, how they have been conceived and

how they have been applied in order to give shape to the field of SER that we are

concerned with in this paper.

Theories other than Stakeholder, Legitimacy and Marxist Political Economy have also

been employed to explain SER. There have been, for example, cultural and

institutional explanations (see Buhr and Freedman, 2001); Habermasian ideal speech

ethics (see, for example, Puxty, 1986, 1991 and Unerman and Bennett, 2004) and

Habermasian Legitimacy Theory (Rahaman et al, 2004); Organisational Change

Theory (Gray et al, 1995c; Larrinaga et al, 2001); Institutional Theory (Rahaman et

al, 2004); Structuration theory (Buhr, 2002); Ecological Modernisation theory

(Everett and Neu, 2000); Deep Ecology theory (Gray, 1992 and Maunders and Burritt,

1991); Eco-Feminist theory (Cooper, 1992); Ecological Responsiveness Theory

(Bansal and Roth, 2000); Media Agenda Setting Theory (Deegan et al, 2002). Many

of these will be considered throughout the course of the paper. All of these

‘alternative’ theories represent an attempt to integrate the economic with the socio-

political to some extent, although not all of them may be understood within a

Stakeholder, Legitimacy or Marxist Political Economy perspective. Indeed, we argue

that these ‘alternative’ theories, when combined with an analysis of the application of

the dominant theories, call into question the current theoretical hegemony in the field

and call for a re-articulation.

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Stakeholder Theory: An Empty Reference Point

Within Stakeholder Theory two broad strands can be discerned (see Gray et. al 1996

and Deegan, 2000). Firstly, there is the normative stakeholder approach which

resonates with equalising power relations and enhancing democracy. “This approach

is more compatible with a Rawlsian view of just distribution than with an egocentric

or firm-centric view of wants” (Wood, 1994, p.103). Secondly, there is a more

organisation-centric variant. In this case, the stakeholders are identified by the

organisation of concern in accordance with a perceived strategic need to ‘manage’

particular relationships in order to ensure both firm success and survival (Clarkson,

1995; Post et al 2002). This latter variant has been the more popular of the two in

every literature in which it has been applied. The managerial perspective of

Stakeholder Theory (see Freeman, 1984) deepens its roots in studies of Corporate

Planning (Ansoff, 1965), Corporate Social Responsibility (Sethi, 1971; Votaw y Sethi,

1974) and Systems Theory in its application to Organizational Theory (Ackoff, 1970;

1974).

The managerial variant of Stakeholder Theory has also been adopted as a popular

explanation of SER (Gray et al, 1996). However, even though Stakeholder Theory is

often cited in the opening literature review of papers, and in some cases towards the

end as an explanation for empirical results, the number of papers explicitly adopting a

Stakeholder Theory perspective has been few. A curious paradox can be found around

this issue. At the same time as authors describe Stakeholder Theory as one of the most

important theoretical frameworks in the field (see Gray et al 1995, 1996 and Deegan,

2000, 2002) they are only able to quote two references that make use of Stakeholder

Theory in a substantive fashion: Ullmann (1985) and Roberts (1992). Ullmann’s

(1985) seminal work is inconclusive, and Roberts’s (1992) study considered only a

narrow subset of organisational stakeholders. Notwithstanding the merits of these

works, the insights generated by them are, by virtue of their necessarily limited scope,

also limited.

There are, however, a number of works that, whilst not applying Stakeholder Theory

explicitly, do discuss issues of relevance from a Stakeholder Theory perspective. For

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example, the issue of which stakeholders engage with SER has been the subject of a

number of studies. Deegan and Rankin (1997) environmental information in the

Annual Report was material for shareholders, but not so relevant for analysts and

stockbrokers (see also Dierkes and Andal, 1985 and Mastrandonas and Strife, 1992).

O’Dwyer et al (2005) and Tilt (1994) have both shown how NGOs engage with SER,

but perceive it to be low in credibility. Azzone et al. (1997) analysed stakeholder

information needs in the context of environmental reporting.

A recurring topic, in this case from the perspective of management rather than

stakeholders, revolves around who are perceived as the most important stakeholders

in terms of SER. Hibbitt (2004) concludes that environmental disclosures are related

more to management’s perception of the importance of stakeholders as a whole rather

than to the perceived relevance perceived of any particular stakeholder group. Roberts

(1992) tested Ullmann’s (1985) Stakeholder Theory model, relating disclosure to

measures of stakeholder power, firm strategic posture and economic performance.

Roberts’s (1992) results support Stakeholder Theory, indicating that SER may be

particularly important for managing government and creditor stakeholders. Gray et al

(1995a) suggest that organisations will use emerging issues (such as the

‘environment’) in order to assess the power of stakeholders and prioritise their

information needs accordingly. Neu et al (1998) (through a Legitimacy Theory lens)

suggest that financial stakeholders are the most important to the organisation and that

disclosures will be primarily tailored towards them. Cormier et al’s (2004) survey of

managerial perceptions also suggests that SER is driven primarily by the market.

Going further, Owen et al (2000 and 2001) suggest that not only are the needs of the

more powerful stakeholder met primarily, but that other “secondary stakeholders”

may need to be manipulated in order to more effectively meet those needs.

These SER studies all talk about stakeholders but not in the context of stakeholder

theory, or generally any explicit theory at all. There has been virtually no attempt to

incorporate into SER the insights generated from Stakeholder Theory in other, related

literatures. For example, Stakeholder Theory has been used in the last 20 years to:

integrate economic and ethical literatures within corporate governance and

organizational theory (Jones, 1995); to understand the process of organizational

wealth creation (Post et al. 2002); to infer why firms pay attention to some social

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groups whilst systematically ignoring others (Mitchell et al. 1997; Agle et al. 1999);

to understand the environmental strategic behaviour of firms (Henriques and Sadorsky,

1999; Madsen and Ulhoi, 2001; Fernandez and Nieto, 2004; Fineman and Clarke,

1996; Céspedes-Lorente et al 2003); and to encapsulate the concepts of corporate

social responsibility and performance (Wood, 1991; Clarkson, 1995). Nevertheless, in

spite of this paucity of stakeholder analysis, Stakeholder Theory is continually

advanced tangentially as a popular explanation for SER. However, if we have so few

actual proofs of its capacity to explain the SER phenomenon, we must ask why

Stakeholder Theory is considered so important?

The insights generated by the studies which analyse the SER through the lens of the

relationship between the firms and their stakeholders, all lend weight to the argument

that SER is deployed in order to manage firm relationships with stakeholders. In

particular, the interests of the more powerful stakeholders are primarily appeased,

either directly or indirectly via the management of the interests of other stakeholder

groups. What we are trying to show here is that, in spite of a lack of formal theorising,

these studies could be encapsulated within a Stakeholder Theory framework.

Moreover, doing so would provide a more compelling and denser Stakeholder Theory

explanation of the SER phenomenon than has hitherto been advanced, and from

which further, more theoretically informed Stakeholder Theory explorations of SER

could be undertaken. As such there is potential for Stakeholder Theory to be theorised

in the SER literature to a similar extent as it has been in other literatures (see above).

We are not suggesting that Stakeholder Theory is necessarily the best theory for SER.

Rather, we are trying to show that it is possible to develop this theory and that if

Stakeholder Theory is to remain one of SER’s key theoretical guides then a more

robust and explicit theoretical analysis of the role that SER plays in managing firm-

stakeholder relationships is called for. Otherwise it appears as though Stakeholder

Theory is more important as a reference point that has not been filled with any

particular content, implying that it is important to have a hegemonic structure in the

SER field but that the particularity of the nodal points that make up that structure are

not important. If this is the case then the literature will remain disparate and only

notionally guided by a theory that few have substantively engaged with.

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Legitimacy Theory: A Historical Accident

Whereas Stakeholder Theory looks at relationships between firms and specific

stakeholders, Legitimacy Theory has been said to focus on relationships between

firms and society generally and, in doing so, permits a more explicit consideration of

conflict and dissension (Gray et al, 1995a, p.54 and see also Gray et al, 1996, p.46).

The basic premise of Legitimacy Theory is that threats to an organisation’s legitimacy

exist when its value system is perceived as being incongruent with the value system of

the larger social system of which it is part (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). “To the extent

that corporate performance does not reflect the expectations of the relevant publics a

legitimacy gap exists” (Lindblom, 1994, p.3).4 The existence of this legitimacy gap,

may have negative consequences for the firm in question such as “difficulty in

attracting human and financial resources, difficulty in attracting purchasers for the

corporation’s outputs, and legislative or regulatory action which the corporation may

wish to avoid” (Lindblom, 1994, p.4). It is therefore in the organisation’s interest to

have the condition of legitimacy and to satisfy the basic “social contract” that exists

between the firm and society (see Deegan, 2002; Shocker and Sheti, 1973 or

Mathews, 1993)

Legitimacy Theory has been employed in the literature in order to describe SER as a

strategic tool for closing legitimacy gaps. Gray et al (1996), for example, suggest that

many SER initiatives can be understood in terms of one of Lindblom’s (1994)

legitimation strategies. Indeed, Legitimacy Theory appears to be the single most

popular theoretical lens employed by studies seeking to explain corporate SER (see,

for example, Ahmad and Sulaiman, 2004; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Campbell et al,

2003; Deegan et. al, 2000, 2002; Gray et al, 1995a; Luft Mobus, 2005; Milne and

Patten, 2002; Moerman and Van Der Laan, 2005; O’Donovan, 1999, 2002; O’Dwyer,

2002; Patten, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2004; Tsang, 1998; Wilmhurst and Frost, 2000). An

4 Lewis and Unerman (1999) suggest that different perceptions of what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in society may be an important cause of differences in SER practices. Given that legitimacy theory is based on perceptions of a wider societal value base, managers may have different perceptions as to what society (in particular the relevant publics), may consider to be ‘good’ and ‘bad’. If this is the case, then perceived legitimacy gaps will vary and, accordingly, so will disclosure strategies aimed at legitimation.

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entire issue of The Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal was devoted to

Legitimacy Theory in 2002.

The literature shows how SER will be tailored to suit particular crises of legitimacy

that arise. Legitimacy Theory encourages a view of the organization as requiring

legitimacy from its “relevant publics” in order to continue and SER literature suggests

that SER is tailored to meet this purpose. Unlike Stakeholder Theory, Legitimacy

Theory studies have gone into more detail in describing how those disclosures will be

tailored in response to certain legitimacy crises. For example, studies have show how

legitimacy gaps can be closed by: increases in environmental disclosures (Patten,

1992; Campbell, 2003); disclosures that present the organisation in a positive light

(Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan et. al. 2002); reductions in disclosure (Patten,

1995). A variety of different disclosure strategies are undertaken, depending on the

particular legitimacy crisis that the organization is facing. These may include

additional positive disclosures, carefully managed negative disclosures or non-

disclosure. Going into more detail on the contingent nature of disclosure strategies,

O’Donovan (2002) suggests that managers will use different disclosure strategies for

different situations depending on whether managers perceive the need to repair,

maintain or gain legitimacy. O’Donovan (2002) implies that Legitimacy is a multi-

pronged strategy and involves complex managerial decisions.

In unpicking some of the detail of how firms use disclosure to achieve legitimacy,

Legitimacy Theory has provided generally more sophisticated explanations than

Stakeholder Theory. However, legitimacy explanations for SER have been found to

be unsatisfactory in certain cases (see, for example, Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Adams

et al, 1998; O’Dwyer, 2002 and Campbell et al 2003). The broad explanations that

Legitimacy Theory offers for SER practice are useful to analyze general trends in

firm’s reporting behavior but perhaps insufficient to understand the internal

management of this process. Most of the articles that embrace Legitimacy Theory

consider the firm-society relationship as fairly simplistic. The internal forces,

motivations and conflicts which drive the organizations from inside to implement

legitimacy strategies using SER have not been studied suitably yet (although see

O`Donovan, 2002; and O`Dwyer, 2002). There is thus much more to learn about how

legitimacy is managed at the firm level. Firm goes on being an authentic “black box”.

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On the other hand, the society variable in Legitimacy Theory studies remains a

blurred theoretical construct as well. Lindblom (1994) asserts that society is not

homogeneous, introducing the term “relevant public” to elucidate this. However, very

few articles have “unpacked” the organizational legitimacy process through the study

of the characteristics of those social actors (although see Neu et al 1998). The values,

interests, power and perceptions of different stakeholders differ. This is something

that Stakeholder Theory may embrace, yet it is curious as to why Legitimacy Theory

has not. Should Lindblom (1994) have used the term “stakeholder” rather than

“relevant public”, then these two theories might have been conflated and used to

successfully guide the SER literature towards a more sophisticated understanding of

firm-stakeholder relations than currently exists. The notion of the social contract

implicit in Legitimacy Theory reflects the same conceptualisation of the firm

balancing stakeholder demands and interests as runs through Stakeholder Theory. The

vague notion of society employed by Legitimacy Theory studies may be conceived as

a locus of stakeholder interests that are dominated by one particular sub-set of

stakeholders, i.e. the firm and its shareholders. Indeed, as far as this conflation is

implausible a criticism may be levelled at Legitimacy Theory for focusing attention

on a vague societal function of disclosure at the expense of analysing issues of power

and antagonisms between social groups. Thus, contra Gray (1996), Legitimacy

Theory may make conflict less explicit than Stakeholder Theory through its relatively

empty constructs of “society” and “relevant publics”. Legitimacy Theory provides a

broad sensitization towards the SER phenomenon but its lack of specification over

key theoretical constructs calls into question whether it can really be considered a

theory at all.

It appears to be something of a historical accident that Legitimacy Theory has

developed at all. Indeed, it is of interest that whilst Stakeholder Theory has been

widely applied and developed through various management literatures yet applied

only superficially to SER, Legitimacy Theory is the doyen of the SER literature yet

does not appear to have been applied in any literature other than SER.5 Thus, we have

5 Other organisational literatures have tended to deal with the notion of legitimacy through the lens of frameworks such as institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or resource dependence theory (see Oliver, 1991 for a joint application of both these theories in this context).

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a top-heavy Stakeholder Theory and a bottom-heavy Legitimacy Theory whose

respective deficiencies within their own terms of reference, we suggest, could be

remedied by reference to each other. In the case of Legitimacy Theory, for example,

the insufficient understanding of who the “relevant publics” are, which attributes

confer them this status or how those constituencies exert influence and power over the

organization (all of them important lacunas of the present Legitimacy Theory

literature) can clearly be remedied through drawing from Stakeholder Theory (with

level of develop that this theory has achieved in others field research). Reciprocally,

Stakeholder Theory’s underspecification of how SER is implicated in stakeholder

management processes can be resolved by reference to the insights relating to the

various disclosure-legitimation strategies. Such a conflation of Stakeholder Theory

and Legitimacy Theory is not merely an artificial exercise. Rather, as we have tried to

point out above, the way in which each of these theories have been applied to the SER

field has been to structure that field through the imposition of emptiness. Theories

without particular content, even if they serve the function of bringing authors together

around common issues, deprive a literature of the intellectual clarity which is a pre-

requisite for sociological and political direction.

Marxist Political Economy: A Contested Particularity

Whereas Stakeholder Theory and Legitimacy theory have been relatively empty

reference points for structuring the SER field, Political Economy Theory has a more

definable content, although quite different particularities have been taken from it.

Gray et al (1995a) describe Bourgeois Political Economy as concerned with

legitimacy of firms whereas Marxist Political Economy is described as concerned

with legitimacy of the system. Studies adopting the latter frame of reference often

come to the conclusion, or start from the premise, that accounting cannot change

society, and indeed cannot itself be significantly changed until there has been an

underlying change in the way in which society is structured (Cooper and Sherer,

1984). For example, Tinker et al (1991) suggest that SER mystifies and minimises the

structural inequalities of contemporary capitalism (p.36) and that SER will be

counter-productive as regards to its purported aim of increased democratisation. More

specifically, corporate socio-environmental disclosures have been construed as

15

“ideological instruments for promoting policies, beliefs, attitudes and practices that

perpetuate the inequality of women and other disadvantaged groups” (Tinker and

Neimark, 1987, p.73). Drawing from a similar Marxist political economy perspective,

Cooper (1992) introduces a feminist critique of Environmental Reporting concluding

that “(w)ithout a change to society, there is no way out of this. In the present symbolic

order accountants should not attempt to account for the environment” (Cooper, 1992,

p.37). Similarly, Puxty (1986, 1991) argues that SER “reject(s) the possibility of

progress of society through current pluralist institutions, and corporate social

information that might be generated through them” (1991, p.41). Such arguments

have been used to criticise the “social accounting project” for its failure to theorise

power. For example, in Lehman (1999), a communitarian critique that also draws

from Tinker et al (1991) and Puxty (1986, 1991), it is put forward that the neo-

pluralism inherent in Gray’s model of accountability does not recognise adequately

how corporations can overcome command and control models of state regulation.

All of these studies have been inspired by Marxist Political Economy, meaning that

they have taken as their frame of reference the macro level of the politico-economic

system rather than the more micro level of firm-stakeholder/society relations.

However, it should be noted that this characterisation of Marxist political economy

does not appear to have been universally embraced by social accounting theorists.

Woodward et al (2001) suggest that Gray et al’s (1995a) classification of political

economy into Bourgeois and Marxist variants is a “novel dichotomy”.6 Woodward et

al (2001) and Maltby (2004) both describe (what they imply is Marxist) Political

Economy in terms of a pro-active approach to CSR:

“companies use [SER] not merely to show their compliance with pre-existing norms, but to set out a particular array of values as significant, to make the case for those values and to demonstrate their adherence to them…companies take the initiative to promote their values to society rather than simply respond to social demands” (p.418, emphasis added).

6 The distinction is evident in Capital, however, where political economists with a Bourgeois consciousness such as Adam Smith and Ricardo are contrasted those who more starkly emphasise the capitalist system such as William Petty (p.486). However, Marx does tend to refer to those economists with a Bourgeois consciousness as “Classical” political economists. Thus, Gray et al’s (1995) terminology may be confusing (and this is why we instead adopt ‘Marxist Political Economy’), but Gray et al’s (1995) analytical distinction between both types remains valid.

16

Maltby’s (2004) concern is not with the level of resolution. Her concern is with a pro-

active strategy. Woodward et al (2001) also suggest, with no apparent consideration

of wider structures of domination, that pro-active disclosures constitute a political

economy approach. Buhr (1998) similarly makes a reactive/proactive distinction

between legitimacy and political economy theories. She suggests that the applicability

of whichever theory can be understood in terms of whether disclosure has been

motivated by a response to social and economic events (Legitimacy) or by a desire to

promulgate corporate ideology (Marxist Political Economy)7.

These theorisations can be forensically traced back to Guthrie and Parker’s (1989,

1990) characterisations. Guthrie and Parker (1989) describe a Political Economy of

accounting’s view of SER:

“corporate disclosure is a proactive process of information provided from management’s perspective, designed to set and shape the agenda of debate and to mediate, suppress, mystify and transform social conflict” (p.351, emphasis added)

Earlier in their study, Guthrie and Parker (1989) define Legitimacy Theory as

primarily reactive to social norms. Thus, the distinction, prevalent in many recent

studies, between Legitimacy Theory and Marxist Political Economy Theory, was

born. This constitutes yet another historical accident that can be identified as having

shaped the SER literature in particular directions. Guthrie and Parker (1989) may

hardly be blamed for this (although see Arnold, 1990). Their discussion of political

economy theory amounts to just one paragraph, is clearly open to interpretation and

was written at a time when theorisation of SER was in its infancy. Guthrie and Parker

(1989) also clearly reference the political economy theorisations of Tinker (1980);

Tinker and Neimark (1987); Cooper (1980); and Cooper and Sherer (1984). Those

Political Economy theorisations are clearly concerned with the level of analysis, viz.

looking at accounting in its politico-economic context and with the effects of

accounting on the distribution of income, wealth and power rather than whether

disclosure responses are proactive or reactive. Indeed, whether Legitimacy Theory

7 Buhr (1998, p.186) also seems to employ a dichotomy on the basis of level of resolution. She suggests that LT is concerned mostly with corporate-level activities and responses whereas political economy theory is concerned with the influence of social norms or the distribution of wealth and power. Thus, Buhr’s (1998) conception is consistent with our own in this sense, but also simultaneously employs a reactive/proactive dichotomy.

17

may be considered a theory of reactions is itself highly debatable. Lindblom’s (1994)

seminal work on legitimacy theory is explicit about legitimation incorporating both

reactive and proactive strategies. Congruence between corporate and societal values

can be achieved by organisations reacting to societal expectations or by proactively

attempting to change societal norms.

Furthermore, political economy explanations have not been limited to pro-active

strategies either. Tinker and Neimark’s (1987) study viewed disclosures as responses

to particular crises of capitalism. Even where the distinction between reactive and

proactive strategies has not been used, the level of resolution continues to be ignored.

For example, drawing on Guthrie and Parker (1990), Kuasirkun and Sherer (2004)

suggest that political economy theory (rather than Legitimacy or Stakeholder Theory)

constitutes responding to social pressures. This may well be true, but only if this is

extended to recognise that responding to those social pressures is linked to the wider

politico-economic system in some way. Such underspecification of theories leads to

confusion in the literature. For example, Kuasirkun and Sherer (2004) conclude that

non-disclosure in the face of social pressures cannot be explained by political

economy theory. This can be contrasted with Adams et al (1995) who, again without

any reference to systemic conditions, suggest simply that non-disclosure constitutes a

(seemingly Marxist) Political Economy strategy.

It has been suggested that “the whole problem of determining quite what a political

economy of accounting is does warrant further study” (Woodward et al, 2001, p.389,

emphasis original). We seek to clarify this issue in the literature by suggesting that

different theories be characterised according to their level of resolution (Gray et al,

1995a). Pro-active or reactive and disclosure or non-disclosure aside, the concern of

Marxist Political Economy is with the system-level conflicts and mediations that

inform Tinker (1984); Tinker and Neimark (1987); Tinker et al (1991); Lehman

(1999, 2001); Cooper and Sherer (1984); and Puxty (1986, 1991). According to this

criterion, many political economy interpretations of SER practice may be thought of

as Bourgeois as they look at the level of firm-stakeholder relations, effacing the wider

political issues and failing to engage substantively with the notion of power (Everett,

2007). However, the micro/macro distinction is one that many studies have not

recognized, thus implying that whilst the hegemonic reference points may often

18

emerge or be imposed, how those reference points shape the construction of

knowledge in an intellectual field can follow its own laws of development. It is

inevitable that different meanings will be read into different signs but those processes

of theoretical development will benefit the SER field if they have an internal

consistency and thoroughness that, in the case of Marxist Political Economy, is

currently lacking.

SER Fieldwork: Creating Fissures in the Hegemonic Field Other perspectives that do not easily fit within Stakeholder, Legitimacy or Marxist

Political Economy perspectives have also been brought to bear on SER. We do not

aim to review all of those perspectives here but instead focus on those insights that

have been derived by engaging SER actors directly. The SER interpretations from the

fieldwork of recent years have offered in-depth explanations of both why and how

SER takes place within organisations (Gray, 2005). In doing so, we suggest that they

have exposed current (dominant) theorisations as underspecified and are dislodging

the SER field’s points of fixity.

We have identified three broad ways in which the fieldwork of recent years disrupts

the current theoretical hegemony. Firstly, a number of studies have shown SER

motivations to be complex and multifarious. Rather than being driven purely by

legitimacy or stakeholder management concerns (at whichever level of analysis),

firms appear to be reporting on socio-environmental issues for a variety of reasons

and in ways that are not necessarily consistent across firms. For example, Adams

(2002) suggests that the way in which organisations structure their reporting process

(i.e. things as seemingly banal as which departments are involved and the timing and

resources committed) has an important impact on how the report will turn out. Buhr

(2002) found that changing environmental disclosure practices is a long and

complicated process, and that it varied across the two firms studied. In one case the

strong domination structures of capitalism were used by a proactive institutional

investor to influence the reporting practices. In the other case, agency played a bigger

role in that someone inside the company was championing the process. Gray et al

(1995b) also found the role of individual champions to be significant in initiating

Environmental Reporting. Motivations were also found to differ across firms in Miles

19

et al’s (2002) exploration of UK SER motivations, noting a number of factors that

shape organizational reporting processes: peer pressure and benchmarking activities;

stakeholder pressure; government pressure; and pressure from the City; enhanced

external reputation; external recognition via awards/ranking exercises; increased staff

morale; and “business drivers, such as cost or risk reduction” (Miles et al, 2002,

p.85). Spence and Gray (2007) similarly describe how organisations will report for a

number of reasons, although they argue that whilst these reasons differ across firms,

the particular configuration of motivations in firms are all conducive to the

construction of a “business case”. Thus, it is implied by Spence and Gray (2007) that

there is an overall homogeneity to the apparent complexity of SER motivations that

other fieldwork studies have unpicked.

Secondly, the studies looking at managerial perceptions and implementation of the

SER process imply that there is some sort of internal struggle for meaning over

sustainability, CSR and SER. For example, a number of studies have employed

organisational change theory, and imply that conflict mediation does not in itself fully

explain why organisations are reporting (Gray et al, 1995b; Larrinaga and

Bebbington, 2001; Larrinaga et al, 2001). Whilst Gray et al (1995b) show that

Environmental Reporting is employed largely as part of a change resistance strategy,

Larrinaga et al (2001) note that transparency, although not actually achieved through

the Environmental Report, emerges as a key phrase in the discourse of organisational

actors. This shows the incoherence that actually exists within organisations. Larrinaga

et al (2001) argue that the complexity of this incoherence could make the debate

around which of the extant theories (Stakeholder, Legitimacy and Marxist Political

Economy) is most applicable, sterile. Larrinaga et al (2001) imply that these theories

do not capture all of the complexity of SER practice. Larrinaga and Bebbington

(2001) build upon these themes and suggest that organisations simultaneously change

substantively when they respond to the environmental agenda and change the

environmental agenda itself in order to perpetuate the status quo. Thus, Larrinaga and

Bebbington (2001) offer a rejoinder to each of the socio-political theories that focus

unfailingly on corporate strategic self-interest.

Thus, as far as SER is driven by the need to mediate conflicts with external groups,

there would appear to be some sort of internal mediation prior to this (see, Gray and

20

Bebbington, 2000; O’Dwyer and, in particular, Norris and O’Dwyer, 2004 and

O’Dwyer, 2005). The implementation of SER by firms cannot be presumed

unproblematic, as is often suggested by theoretical explanations that focus largely on

the interface between the firm and its external stakeholders. These organisational

change studies reveal something of the internal processes that are at work to try and

negotiate the concept of the environment and trivialise the resultant SER.8 A number

of qualitative explorations have reflected this internal struggle in yet more detail. For

example, O’Dwyer’s (2005) case study elucidates how the numerous, conflicting

motivations for SER in an Irish aid agency were eventually made to cohere in line

with top management concerns. Again reflecting the internal struggles that take place

over SER, a number of studies have explored qualitatively managerial perceptions of

Sustainability, Corporate Social Responsibility or SER. Work on managerial

perceptions of Sustainability has been undertaken by Bebbington and Thomson

(1996) and Gray and Bebbington (2000) who both found that business had yet to

grapple with the more fundamental issues that Sustainable Development raises and

that a ‘business as usual’ attitude persists. O’Dwyer (2003) interviewed organisational

members in Ireland in order to examine, in detail, their conceptions of Corporate

Social Responsibility (CSR), finding that there were conflicts between individual the

conceptions of managers and those demanded by the organisation. As was also found

in Gray and Bebbington (2000), this is indicative of organisational members holding

personal views that conflict with the ‘corporate line’. In both cases the individuals felt

powerless in doing anything but following that line. Nevertheless, it is implied that

prior to the dominance of strategic concerns, an internal struggle (however futile and

small) takes place. Norris and O’Dwyer (2004) go some way towards explaining how

this alignment between personal and organisational values comes about within

organisations, outlining the socialisation processes that overcome resistance to the

corporate line.

Thirdly, explanations for how SER specifically mediates conflicts have been offered

by Thomson and Bebbington (2005) and Rahaman et al (2004). These studies do not

necessarily contradict political economy theories so much as they show how our

current conceptualisations of these theories remain underspecified as regards to what

8 Ball (2005) also explores organisational change in relation to Environmental Accounting, although her emphasis is less on the implications for SER so much as the role that SER played in other

21

they themselves seek to describe. For example, Thomson and Bebbington (2005) note

that SER tends to show an (implausibly) ‘objective’ coherence. This linguistic denial

of conflict sheds light on exactly how Western Capitalism comes to be justified

through SER. In a rare piece of fieldwork investigating SER in developing countries

(although see PhD theses of Rasha and Momin), Rahaman et al (2004) found that one

of the major motivations for SER in a Ghanaian ‘public sector’ organization was

coercive pressure to report from the World Bank (being one of the funders of the

organisation). Rahaman et al (2004) suggest that the resultant report served to obscure

the poverty and inequalities that are reproduced by the organisation’s activities and

was ultimately hegemonic in sustaining acceptance of the global, free market ideology

pushed by the World Bank. This study complements previous Habermasian

interpretations of SER (Puxty, 1986, 1991) by showing empirically how

communication comes to be distorted. More specifically, Thomson and Bebbington

(2005) and Rahaman et al (2004) focus on the way in which issues are presented in

reports, pointing us toward the importance of language and ideology. This work

complements the emerging literature dealing in-depth with the use of language in

corporate reports (see Milne et al, 2005, Tregidga et al, 2006; Laine, 2005; Livesey,

2002a, b; Livesey and Kearins, 2002). These studies focus on the linguistic forms that

are characteristic of conflict mediation and, in doing so, allow us to expand and reflect

upon conflict mediation explanations of SER.

Discussion In characterising the SER as a political field that inevitably takes on a hegemonic

form we can draw attention to the key points of reference that become relatively fixed

in the construction of that hegemony. In analysing how these points of reference come

to be fixed and, separately, how those points of reference are somewhat independently

infused with meaning and used to shape empirical work, we have attempted to

highlight the problematic nature of the current hegemony in the field. The primary

object of this exercise was to draw attention the sociological underpinnings and

structure of the SER field, i.e. to highlight the theoretical parameters and how these

have been applied by researchers. In doing so, we have largely kept to analysing the

SER field within its own terms of reference. In other words we have taken the

organisational processes.

22

hegemony as we see it and analysed it from within the literature rather from some

purportedly objective stand-point. Of course we do not claim to have remained neutral

in the process of doing this. Whilst we have consciously avoided any attempt to

propose a unifying theory for SER that is ‘better’ than what is already out there, at the

same time we have not limited ourselves to merely analysing the internal coherence or

validity of extant SER theorisations. We have at times critiqued their political content

also. Thus, this exercise, although primarily sociological, is also unavoidably political

in nature.

We have argued above, in the first place, that there is a discernible theoretical

hegemony in the SER literature. Gray et al´s (1995a, 1996) description of various

political economy theories has been reified within SER. Stakeholder, Legitimacy and

Marxist Political Economy Theories have become key reference points within the

field and continue to influence and be used to justify emerging work. Whilst the

emergence of a theoretical hegemony is, from our perspective, quite natural and

unavoidable, the way in which that emerges is worthy of analysis. The imposition of a

theoretical landscape has gone largely without critique (although see Everett, 2007).

Indeed, the acceptance of this landscape appears more problematic when we look in

more depth at how its key reference points have been developed by SER researchers.

Whilst the existence of a theoretical hegemony per se might be beyond criticism, the

actual form that such a hegemony takes is highly contingent. In order to show this, we

have looked in some detail at the reference points themselves.

Stakeholder Theory perhaps provides the best example of a reference point which has

been accepted as such without it having had any significant development on SER

theorisations. This reference point has remained largely empty in spite of the wealth

of particularity that it could be infused with from other organisational literatures, or

by fusing with Legitimacy Theory. Until such a process of particularisation (or filling)

takes place it seems sociologically questionable why we should keep talking about

Stakeholder Theory. Legitimacy Theory too has been applied in a manner that

imposes emptiness onto the SER field, although in a different sense. Whereas

Stakeholder Theory appears to be absent of any particular content by virtue of the

paucity of stakeholder theorisations, Legitimacy Theory has been theorised beyond

any other theory in SER. However, the emptiness of its key concepts ascribes to

23

Legitimacy Theory a status of a broad heuristic rather than an in-depth theory that can

be used to understand complexity and conflict. Its particular content is problematic

and its emergence as an entity separate to Stakeholder Theory appears to be

something of a historical accident. Imagine we got rid of the label Legitimacy Theory

completely and talked about notions of legitimacy within the context of firm-

stakeholder relations under the banner of Stakeholder Theory? As absurd as this might

sound it is perhaps less absurd than partial theorisations and the re-invention of

wheels. Indeed, by remaining tendentially empty of particularity these theories are

subject to bolt-on jobs at the end of academic papers that appear to serve the function

of legitimating (sic) the (relatively separate) empirical analyses that precede them.

Therefore, both Stakeholder and Legitimacy Theory are problematic from within their

own frame of reference. We have tried to show in this paper that these problems are

resolvable. However, whilst important intellectually and sociologically, such a clean-

up job would not resolve the limitations of these theories which emanate from their

limited scope, i.e. that they adopt a largely bourgeois perspective of society (Gray et

al, 1995a). Terms such as legitimation and stakeholder management arguably

understate the extent to which SER is caught up in a wider process of ideologising

and consent construction, perhaps even casting business in the misleading role of

supplicant (Collison, 2003). What may be of more interest is in exploring the

institutional arrangements and structural factors that give rise to stakeholder

management and legitimacy pressures. Gray (2002) calls for more meta-theorisation

of accounting to allow for more sophisticated conversations between ourselves and to

counter the implicit tendency towards managerialism that is inherent in un-theorised

accounting. We suggest that partially and incoherently theorised accounting can lead

to similar fallacies. As such, we see the dominance of the Bourgeois perspective in

SER as problematic. For theories that purport to incorporate political dimensions,

Stakeholder Theory and Legitimacy Theory do not theorise the role of the state or the

structural influence of large corporations. As Gray (2002) notes, the principle

justification for SER must lie in its “emancipatory and radical possibilities” (p.689).

To assess this, it seems essential that we have an appreciation of how SER operates in

and emerges from a wider context. Gray (2005) argues that this is

24

“especially important because, as far as I can see, it is not possible to consider the future, the urgent potential for the pursuit of sustainability and more immediately the possibilities of responsibility and ecological stewardship, without a serious appreciation of global financial capitalism, the role of the state and the roles played by power in its various guises” (p.22).

To some extent, such a theorisation may take place through institutional theory.

Larrinaga (2007) outlines the clearest application to date of institutional theory in the

context of SER, highlighting, unlike the firm-level pluralism of Legitimacy Theory,

that organisational reporting responses may be the result of a combined rearguard

action fortified by institutional norms, shared meanings and relatively homogenised

discourse. However, Larrinaga (2007) also tends to interpret institutional pressures as

existing on a country specific level, arguably placing too much emphasis on country

differences at the expense of the higher-level unification within which those

differences exist. Nevertheless, institutional theory can be interpreted at different

levels of resolution. Deegan and Unerman (2006) note that institutional theory is not

necessarily limited to a bourgeois level of analysis, implying that its theoretical tools

may be applied more effectively to deal with issues of conflict and dissent (see also

Rahaman et al, 2004).

In looking at Marxist Political Economy theorisations of SER we have also tried to

show the contradictory nature of the development of theoretical reference points and

how these reference points can often follow their own laws of development

independently of how they become relatively fixed in the first place. Marxist Political

Economy has been interpreted inconsistently in the literature. Whilst differences in

interpretation of signs and reference points should be welcomed in order to be

reflective of the theoretical hegemony under which we work, those interpretations

should be theoretically justified. With Marxist Political Economy we see a number of

interpretations that have not been thoroughly developed or integrated with other

Marxist Political Economy interpretations in the literature. Rather, we have seen a

rather superficial and heuristical version gain currency at the expense of denser

theorising and with no attempt at justification. We are not suggesting that a Marxist

Political Economy framework be adopted more generally but do argue, again in the

interests of sociological rigour, that if authors seek to use certain theoretical lenses to

explain SER that they situate them within the appropriate level of resolution and be

25

clear when and how they diverge from different interpretations that have purported to

use the same lens.

The insights offered by the exploratory works of recent years show how motivations

are complex and multifarious, that there are internal struggles that are worthy of

further exploration and that the way in which processes of conflict mediation come

about is only beginning to be unpicked. Whilst these issues may be explored partly

through beyond Stakeholder, Legitimacy and Marxist Political Economy Theory, the

limits of (the SER field’s current conceptualisations of) these theories is all too

obvious. The insights generated from fieldwork thus go further and call into question

the current hegemonisation of the SER field. By virtue of the fact that many of the

arguments in these studies remain disparate they have not been amenable to

encapsulation within dominant theoretical frameworks. They thus represent a series of

disruptive challenges from below. As more of these studies progress, the less

entrenched current points of fixity will become and the prospect for a hegemonic re-

articulation of the field will present itself. Contra Parker (2005), we argue that a set of

disparate theoretical interpretations is unlikely to persist. New points of fixity will

inevitably emerge and a new hegemony will be discernible. How this will happen

cannot easily be predicted but the more conscious we are of how we develop theory

and exchange ideas amongst ourselves, the more likely that the unities that we

develop will be sociologically rigorous and politically powerful. If SER has potential

for constructing a better world, then solidifying its sociological underpinnings can

only help. The use of empty theoretical reference points will only serve to allow us to

continue producing work that rhetorically precludes antagonistic discussion.

Finally, we want to finish with a positive message, one that is not stoically focused on

orderly contemplation but that engages the emotions (Everett, 2007). As researchers

in this field we have an attachment to it and we want it to fly with Dionysus, we want

it to be somehow part of transcending the careering juggernaut that is advanced

capitalism, helping us to leave a lighter footprint on the earth and construct a better

world for our children. The critique we offer is in the hope that we get our house in

order so that we can be better equipped to do achieve those ends. We don’t pretend to

have all the answers and would be the first to admit that the theoretical lens here

perhaps is better at explaining ‘what is’ than ‘what should be’. Laclau’s theorising is

26

based upon Hegelian dialectics and so affirms contingency and ascribes as

ineradicable antagonism to social life. A theory of antagonism might just create more

problems (Jones, 2006). Perhaps we need to transcend Hegel, modernity and the vast

majority of western philosophical thought and affirm something that is beyond

dialectics, that is, a purely positive ontology of Being (Deleuze ref.). This would

require a detachment from the social world, an elevation of the spirit over the intellect

and reconciliation with Being. Social theory tends to keep us attached to particular

positions and identities. This can only affirm contingency and antagonism as such,

leaving us with (by definition) impossible projects. This asks us to do nothing less

than transcend the world and enter into a realm of deep joy. This need not be viewed

as an abdication of responsibility, on the contrary. It is only those who have

transcended the world that will ever be in a position to make the world better (Tolle,

ref).

Tolle

Deleuze

Jones, C. (2006)

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