the fundamental powers of the state

Glenn Rey AninoJuris Doctor 1

THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

A. Similarities, Distinctions and LimitationsSimilarities: Police power, taxation, eminent domain

1. They are inherent in the State and may be exercised by itwithout the need of express constitutional grant.

2. They are not only necessary but indispensable. The Statecannot continue or be effective unless it is able to exercisethem.

3. They are methods by which the State interferes with privaterights.

Differences1. The police power regulates both liberty and property. The

power of imminent domain and the power of taxation affectonly property rights.

2. The police power and the power of taxation may beexercised only by the government. The power of eminentdomain may be exercised by some private entities.

3. The property taken in the exercise of the police power isdestroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxiouspurpose. The property taken under the power of taxation andimminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose andis therefore wholesome.

4. The compensation for the person subjected to the policepower is the intangible altruistic feeling that he hascontributed to the general welfare. The compensationinvolved in the other powers is more concrete, to wit, a fulland fair equivalent of the property expropriated or protectionand public improvement for the taxes paid.

Police PowerDefinition: The power of the State to enact legislation which may

interfere the rights of liberty and property for thepromotion of the general welfare.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, isthe power vested by the Constitution in the legislature tomake, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesomeand reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either withpenalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution,as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of thecommonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.(MMDA v. Garin).

It is embraced in the public welfare which police powertries to promote are public morals, public safety, publichealth, general welfare, and economic security andprosperity.

Scope:This is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the mostdemanding of the three powers of the state. (Ynot v. IAC)

Characteristic:1. Police power cannot be bargained away through the

medium of a treaty or a contract. (Ichong v. Hernandez)2. Taxing power may be used as an implement of police

power. Stated otherwise, police power may use thetaxing power of the state to attain its purpose orobjective. (Tio v. VTRB).

3. Eminent domain may also be used as implement ofpolice power. (Association of Small Landowners vs.Secretary of Agrarian Reform)

CASES:

Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 1155 [Purpose: to promote theeconomic security of the people]Facts:


Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act toRegulate the Retail Business” was passed.The said law provides for a prospective prohibition againstforeigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners fromengaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by thepetitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates theinternational and treaty of the Philippines therefore it isunconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between thePhilippines and China was violated.

Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise ofpolice power.

Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of policepower. It was also then provided that the police power may not becurtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventionalagreement. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted toremedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by aliendominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty,the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by asubsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scopeof the police power of the state.

Syllabus:Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework

where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied toalmost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of policepower has become almost boundless, just as the fields of publicinterest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing andhave transcended human foresight.

Limitation of Police Power:1. Equal protection clause- The equal protection of the law

clause is against undue favor and individual or classprivilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppressionof inequality.

2. Due process clause: The due process clause has to do withthe reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of thepolice power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; ispublic welfare involved? The police power legislation mustbe firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and areasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.And if distinction and classification has been made, theremust be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

a. Requisites of Reasonablenessi. The classification rests on substantial

distinctionsii. It is germane to the purpose of the law.

iii. It is not limited to existing conditions only;and

iv. It applies equally to all members of the sameclass.

Ortigas and Co. v. CA, GR 126102, 12/4/00- Retroactivty of lawas exercise of police powerFacts:

On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold toEmilia Hermoso, a parcel of land, located in Greenhills SubdivisionIV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that the lot be usedexclusively for residential purposes only, and not more than onesingle-family residential building will be constructed thereon. TheBUYER shall not erect…any sign or billboard on the roof…foradvertising purpose. No single-family residential building shall beerected…until the building plans, specification…have been approvedby the SELLER. Restrictions shall run with the land and shall beconstrued as real covenants until December 31, 2025 when they shallcease and terminate.

In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission enactedMMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the ComprehensiveZoning Area for the National Capital Region reclassifying as a


commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison toRoosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located.

On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay IIIleased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp..The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease.Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story commercialbuilding for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.

On January 18, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint againstEmilia Hermoso with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and soughtfor demolition of the said commercial structure for having violatedthe terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale.

On June 16, 1995, the trial court issued the writ ofpreliminary injunction. On June 29, 1995, Mathay III moved to setaside the injunctive order, but the trial court denied the motion.

Mathay III then filed with the Court of Appeals a specialcivil action for certiorari. The petition was granted and the order ofthe lower court is nullified.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:1. WON the MMC ordinance shall be given retroactive effect.2. WON the ordinance impairs a contract.

Held:In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having

only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equallysettled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contractare applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter arespecifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law whichenlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the partiesto the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot begiven retroactive effect without violating the constitutionalprohibition against impairment of contracts.

But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions.One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of policepower to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions

could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impairvested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicablenot only to future contracts, but equally to those already inexistence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauseswill have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by theState of police power to promote the health, morals, peace,education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people.Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be readinto every contract.

While our legal system upholds the sanctity of contract sothat a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties,nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene “law,morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” Otherwisesuch stipulations would be deemed null and void.

In the case at bar, when that stretch of Ortigas Avenue fromRoosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercialzone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, therestrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso,limiting all construction on the disputed lot to single-familyresidential buildings, were deemed extinguished by theretroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could nolonger be enforced.

PRC v. De Guzman, GR No. 144681, 6/21/04 [PolicePower/Public Health; The right to practice profession]Facts:

The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College ofMedicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed thePhysician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by theBoard of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional RegulationCommission (PRC) then released their names as successfulexaminees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter,the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successfulexaminees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in


the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) andObstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually andexceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% inBio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne.

The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding theregistration as physicians of all the examinees from Fatima Collegeof Medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools, theresults of those from Fatima were not only incredibly high butunusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation foundthat the “Fatima examinees gained early access to the testquestions.”

On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petitionfor mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC to givethem their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on July 21,1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging therespondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit andrecommended that the test results of the Fatima Examinees benullified.

On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated itsdecision ordering the PRC to allow the respondents to take thephysician’s oath and to register them as physicians. The same wasappealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which sustained theRTC decision.Hence, this petition.

Held:It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of everycitizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair,reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. Butlike all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, theirexercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of theState to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety,and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire toengage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technicalknowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite

to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particularpertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from thepotentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance amongthose who would practice medicine.

RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission tothe practice of medicine, the qualifications of the candidates for theboard examination, the scope and conduct of the examinations, thegrounds for the denying of the issuance of a physician’s license, orrevoking a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that theexaminee must prove that he has fully complied with all theconditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensingauthority to be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short, heshall have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Assuch, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine toissue licenses for the respondents to practice medicine. Thepetition is therefore granted.

Who May Exercise Police Power

General Rule: The legislature in general is the branch of thegovernment that is charged with its exercise.

Exception: Pursuant to a valid delegation, the following couldexercise police power:

1. The President2. Administrative bodies3. Lawmaking bodies of the LGU4. People at large through initiative


CASE:

MMDA v. Garin, GR No. 130230, 4/15/05 [Not Valid exercise ofPolice Power]Facts:The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O.Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) andhis driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along GandaraStreet, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The followingstatements were printed on the TVR:

“You are hereby directed to report to the MMDA TrafficOperations Center Port Area Manila after 48 hours from date ofapprehension for disposition/appropriate action thereon. Criminalcase shall be filed for failure to redeem license after 30 days.Valid as temporary DRIVER'S license for seven days from date ofapprehension.”

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, therespondent addressed a letter2 to then MMDA Chairman ProsperoOreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing hispreference for his case to be filed in court.

Issue: WON Rep. Act no. 7924 vest MMDA police power/

Held: No, Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with policepower, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions areadministrative in nature.

Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creatingthe MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not a local governmentunit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and,unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has nopower to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Thus, inthe absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order toopen the street was invalid.

Syllabus:A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state maywithhold in the exercise of its police power.

The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate amotor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by thestate, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exerciseof its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare,subject to the procedural due process requirements. This isconsistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal onthe license to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry andOposa v. Factoran on timber licensing agreements, and SurigaoElectric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao on a legislativefranchise to operate an electric plant.

The common thread running through the cited cases is that itis the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has thepower and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motorvehicles may be operated on the state highways.

The MMDA is not vested with police power.Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it

cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals notpossessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however,may delegate this power to the president and administrative boardsas well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or localgovernment units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exerciseonly such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the nationallawmaking body.

[T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the followingacts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installationof a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No.7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislativepower. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated anylegislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the localgovernment units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 thatempowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve


resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of theinhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charteritself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for thepurpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the variousnational government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficientand expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitanarea. All its functions are administrative in nature and these areactually summed up in the charter itself.

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 isunderstood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant theMMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is anunauthorized exercise of police power.

Tests of Valid Exercise (Limitations) Lawful Subject: public interest

Police power could be exercised for the interests of the public ingeneral, as distinct from the interests of a particular class orindividual. This is based on the time-honored principle that thewelfare of the people is the supreme law.

CASES:

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. Board of Transportation,119 SCRA 597Facts:

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc.(TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators,who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operatetaxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzonaccessible to vehicular traffic.

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation(BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which declares thatno car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi.

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director ofthe Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued ImplementingCircular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the RegionalDirector, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all withinthe National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, andformulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed andaccepted for registration as public conveyances.

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with theBOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration andoperation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974,as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, providedthat, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit foroperation.

On December 29, 1981, petitioners instituted an action to theSupreme Court.

Issue: WON the implementation and enforcement of the assailedmemorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights toequal protection of the law, substantive due process, and protectionagainst arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.

Held: The administrative regulation is a valid police measure inconsideration of the safety and comfort of the riding public from thedangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in theexercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations topromote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety andgeneral welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful tocomfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulateproperty rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M.Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify theexercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certaingroups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".


Tio v. VRB, 151 SCRA 208 [to protect movie industry]Facts:

This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioneron his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogramoperators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality ofPresidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating theVideogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate andsupervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to asthe BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 andtook effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion ofits publication in the Official Gazette.

On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of theabovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended theNational Internal Revenue Code providing

“SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on eachprocessed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless oflength, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locallymanufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to salestax.”

“Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. —Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the provinceshall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price orrental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition ofa videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture oraudiovisual program.” “Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of thetax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent(50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be sharedequally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan ManilaCommission.”

Issue: WON the tax imposed by the Decree is a valid exercise ofpolice power.

Held:The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was

imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the videoindustry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrantviolation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation ofpornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of theDECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a validimposition.The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motivewhich impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor oneindustry over another.

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to selectthe subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that"inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class fortaxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation".Taxation has been made the implement of the state's policepower.

Dept of Education v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533Facts:

MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 issued that:“A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take theNMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not beallowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.”

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of theEast with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitionerclaims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as manytimes. When he applied to take it again, DECS rejected hisapplication on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to theRegional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel hisadmission to the test. He challenged the constitutionality of the ruleinvoking his constitutional rights to academic freedom and qualityeducation. The additional grounds raised were due process and equalprotection.


After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision onJuly 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting thepetition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner hadbeen deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through anarbitrary exercise of the police power.Hence, this action.

Issue: WON the three-failure rule is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: Yes. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainlywithin the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed theresponsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is notinfiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrusttheir lives and health. The method employed by the challengedregulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitraryor oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medicalschools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion ofthose not qualified to be doctors.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of theState. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) theinterests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of aparticular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) themeans employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment ofthe object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressiveupon individuals.

In other words, the proper exercise of the police powerrequires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

Rationale:While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he

does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of anyother calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closerthe link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has theresponsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that theyare not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources

must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common goodwhile also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

Sangalang v. IAC, 176 SCRA 719Facts:

As far back in 1977, Makati, Metro Manila has always beenplagued by traffic. For this reason, during that time, Mayor NemesioYabut of Makati ordered that studies be made on ways on how toalleviate the traffic problem, particularly in the areas along the publicstreets adjacent to Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed that thesubdivision plan of Bel-Air was approved by the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal on the condition, among others, that its majorthoroughfares connecting to public streets and highways shall beopened to public traffic. Accordingly, it was deemed necessary bythe Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public toopen to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbitand Pasco de Roxas streets. As a result, the gates owned by BAVA atJupiter and Orbit were ordered demolished.

Mayor Yabut justified the opening of the streets on thefollowing grounds:

1) Some time ago, Ayala Corporation donated Jupiter andOrbit Streets to Bel-Air on the condition that, under certainreasonable conditions and restrictions, the general public shallalways be open to the general public. These conditions wereevidenced by a deed of donation executed between Ayala and Bel-Air.

2) The opening of the streets was justified by publicnecessity and the exercise of the police power.

3) Bel-Air Village Association’s (BAVA) articles ofincorporation recognized Jupiter Street as a mere boundary to thesouthwest – thus it cannot be said to be for the exclusive benefit ofBel-Air residents.

4) BAVA cannot hide behind the non-impairment clause onthe ground that is constitutionally guaranteed. The reason is that it is


not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exerciseof police power.

BAVA, on the other hand, contended:1) Rufino Santos, president of BAVA, never agreed to the

opening of the said streets2) BAVA has always kept the streets voluntarily open

anywayMoreover, BAVA claims the demolition of the gates

abovementioned was a deprivation of property without process oflaw or expropriation without just compensation.

Issue: Who is correct: the Mayor or BAVA?

Held: The Mayor is correct, for the reasons mentioned above. Theopening of Jupiter St. was warranted by the demands of thecommon good, in terms of traffic decongestion and publicconvenience. There is no merit in BAVA’s claim that the demolitionif the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets amount to deprivation ofproperty without due process of law or expropriation without justcompensation. There is no taking of property involved here. The actof the mayor now challenged is, rather, in the concept of policepower. The concept of police power is the state authority to enactlegislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property inorder to promote the general welfare.

Police power, unlike the power of imminent domain, isexercised without provision for just compensation.Art. 436 of the Civil Code.

“When any property is condemned or seized by competentauthority in the interest of health, safety or security, the ownerthereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show thatsuch condemnation or seizure is unjustified.” It may not be donearbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden of showing that it isunjustified lies on the aggrieved party.

A nuisance could be legally abated by summary means.

Del Rosario v. Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521Facts:

On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 waspublished in two newspapers of general circulation in thePhilippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after itspublication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 ofAdministrative Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 theeffectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law,provided in Sections 6 and 12of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and7 of the Administrative Order.

Officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the nationalorganization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of theirprofessional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suitrequesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal)of the Generics Act of 1988 and the implementing AdministrativeOrder 62 issued pursuant thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null andvoid.

The petitioner's main argument against paragraphs (a) and(b), Section 6 of the law, is the alleged unequal treatment ofgovernment physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, on one hand, andthose in private practice on the other hand, in the manner ofprescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are allegedlyrequired to use only generic terminology in their prescriptions, thelatter may write the brand name of the drug in parenthesis below thegeneric name. The favored treatment of private doctors, dentists andveterinarians under the law is allegedly a specie of invalid classlegislation.

The petition was captioned as an action for declaratory relief,over which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, inview of the public interest involved, the Court decided to treat it as apetition for prohibition instead.

Issue: WON the Generic Act is constitutional.


Held: The Generic Act is not unconstitutional. It implements theconstitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote theright to health of the people" and "to make essential goods,health and other social services available to all the people ataffordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987Constitution).

The prohibition against the use by doctors of "nosubstitution" and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is avalid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures tothe patient the right to choose between the brand name and itsgeneric equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both thegeneric and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor isallowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with "no substitution," thepatient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, genericequivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit theimpoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a stilldeveloping country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthyminority.

The objective is "to promote and require the use of genericdrug products that are therapeutically equivalent to their brand-namecounter-parts" for "the therapeutic effect of a drug does notdepend on its 'brand' but on the 'active ingredients' which itcontains." The medicine that cures is the "active ingredient" ofthe drug, and not the brand name by which it has been baptizedby the manufacturer.

In any event, no private contract between doctor and patientmay be allowed to override the power of the State to enact laws thatare reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order,comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power canneither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual andproperty rights are held subject to its fair exercise.

Penal sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed.They are the "teeth" of the law. Without them, the law would betoothless, not worth the paper it is printed on, for physicians, dentistsand veterinarians may freely ignore its prescriptions andprohibitions. The penalty of suspension or cancellation of the

physician's license is neither cruel, inhuman, or degrading. It is nodifferent from the penalty of suspension or disbarment that this Courtinflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or violate the laws andthe Codes of Professional and Judicial Conduct.

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys v. Comelec, 289SCRA 337 – The law was a proper regulation by the State of theuse of airwaives.Facts:

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys ofthe Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers ofradio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to bewithout legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, itwas not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatenedinjury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on theother hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutionalchallenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stationsin the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P.No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No.881 which provides:

“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio andtelevision time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall beallocated equally and impartially among the candidates within thearea of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose,the franchise of all radio broad casting and television stations arehereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free ofcharge, during the period of campaign.”

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same lawrequires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers andmagazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shallbe procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends thatSection 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free airtime.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to severalmillion pesos in providing COMELEC


Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it berequired to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primarysource of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of airtime to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free airtime is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According topetitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air timefor one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lostP58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provideat least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issue:Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and

television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.

Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes takingof property without due process of law and without justcompensation.

Held:Petitioners’ argument is without merit. All broadcasting,

whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by thegovernment. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there aremore individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies toassign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among otherthings, to amendment by Congress in accordance with theconstitutional provision that “any such franchise or rightgranted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repealby the Congress when the common good so requires.”

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies,which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequenciesthrough which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They aremerely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since afranchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege mayreasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of someform of public service.

In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditionsmay validly be imposed on the grantees or licensees. The reason forthis is that, as already noted, the government spends public funds forthe allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it doesnot do in the case of the print media. To require the radio andtelevision broadcast industry to provide free air time for theCOMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

Ople v. Torres, supra (293 SCRA 141)President Fidel V. Ramos issued A.O. No. 308 entitled

Adoption of a National Computerized Identification ReferenceSystem on December 12, 1996. It was published in four newspapersof general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997.

On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petitionagainst respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and theheads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with theimplementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, the court issueda temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

The petition is based on two important constitutionalgrounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress tolegislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry'sprotected zone of privacy. The implementation of AO No. 308insidiously lays the groundwork for a system which will violate theBill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution.

Held: WON the A.O No. 308 has a lawful subject in the exercise ofpolice power.

Held: No.The President is vested by the constitution the duty of

supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of generalpeace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative powerover bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to dischargehis duties effectively.


Administrative power is concerned with the work ofapplying policies and enforcing orders as determined by propergovernmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniformstandard of administrative efficiency and check the official conductof his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rulesand regulations.

Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by anadministrative order.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by thePresident which relates to specific aspects in the administrativeoperation of government. It must be in harmony with the law andshould be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carryingout the legislative policy.

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merelyimplements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for thefirst time a National Computerized Identification Reference System.Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contendingstate policies-- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacyinterest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice ofpolicies, etc.

Many regulations however, bear directly on the public.It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in itsscope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be asubstitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts inthe form of a public law. Although administrative regulationsare entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules andregulations is not an independent source of power to make laws.

Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be thesubject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as anadministrative legislation because facially it violates the rightto privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone.”

Lawful Means

The means employed are reasonably necessary for theaccomplishment of the purpose, and not duly oppressive onindividuals.

Additional Limitations when police power is exercised by virtue ofvalid delegation:o Express grant by lawo Within the territorial limits of the enacting bodyo Must not be contrary to law.

CASES:Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 [Not a valid exercise of policepower: as he “may see fit”]Facts:

President Marcos issued EO No. 626-A which amended EO. No.626. It provides that:

“SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such thathenceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition orpurpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province toanother. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of thisExecutive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation andforfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitableinstitutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of theNational Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case ofcarabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Directorof Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.”

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boatfrom Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they wereconfiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued forrecovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ ofreplevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. Afterconsidering the merits of the case, the court sustained the


confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer beproduced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court alsodeclined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, asraise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumedvalidity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the IntermediateAppellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has nowcome before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON EO 626-A is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:No. EO 627-A as it amended EO 626 has the same lawful

subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equalcertainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that therebe a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "nocarabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic)and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another."The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connectionbetween the means employed and the purpose sought to be achievedby the questioned measure is missing. There is no connection on howthe prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos canprevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can bekilled anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than inanother.

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the policepower because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is notreasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is undulyoppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of theproperty confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense andis immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on theadministrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of thesupposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions andmilitates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,

finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officersmentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in thedistribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, wehereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272Facts:On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772,which reads in part:Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free printspace of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaperof general circulation in every province or city for use as "ComelecSpace" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator andfrom March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of saidnewspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazineor periodical of said province or city.

The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission,free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make knowntheir qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms ofgovernment. The Comelec space shall also be used by theCommission for dissemination of vital election information.

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer forthe issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI asks us todeclare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void onthe ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by theConstitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, againstthe taking of private property for public use without justcompensation.

Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letterdirectives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "ComelecSpace" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to theprovisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 isviolative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of thepress and of expression.


On 20 April 1995, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Orderenjoining Comelec from enforcing and implementing Section 2 ofResolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec directives addressed tovarious print media enterprises all dated 22 March 1995. The Courtalso required the respondent to file a Comment on the Petition.On behalf of the respondent Comelec, he Solicitor General arguesthat even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letterdirectives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless bevalid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The SolicitorGeneral also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is apermissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of theComelec over the communication and information operations ofprint media enterprises during the election period to safeguard andensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:1. WON Section 2 of the said Resolution compels publishers todonate Comelec Space.2. WON Comelec Resolution is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:1. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" ofthe dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (notless than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personalproperty for public use or purposes. The taking of private propertyfor public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but notwithout payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9).

2. As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended thatSection 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compellingpublishers to "donate" "Comelec space, " may be sustained as a validexercise of the police power of the state. This argument was,however, made too casually to require prolonged consideration onour part. Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination onthe part of Comelec) to show that the police power — essentially apower of legislation — has been constitutionally delegated to

respondent Commission. Secondly, while private property mayindeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police powerof the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instantcase with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power.

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavyinstrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a nationalemergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately andwithout regard to the individual business condition of particularnewspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, totake private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. Noattempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgentnecessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec andthat Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonableand calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec.Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power ofthe State.

B. Eminent Domain [Also Read Rule 67 (reExpropriation) of the Rules of Court] Definition and Scope Distinguished from destruction from necessity

CASE: American Print Works v. Lawrence,23 N.J.L. 590

Who May Exercise Elements Necessity of the Exercise

CASES: Republic v. La Orden de PP.Benedictinos de Filipinas, 1 SCRA 646

City of Manila v. ChineseCommunity, 40 Phil 349

Private PropertyCASES: Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620

PLDT v. NTC, 190 SCRA 717 Taking Requisites


CASE: Republic v. Castellvi, 58 SCRA336

ExamplesCASES: U.S. v. Lynch, 188 U.S.

445U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S.

256NPC v. Aguirre-

Paderanga, 464 SCRA 481 Taking under Police Power

CASE: Richards v. Washington Terminal233 U.S. 546o invalid taking under the police power

CASES: City of Quezon v. Ericta,122 SCRA 759

Phil. Press Institute v.COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272

Public UseCASE: Province of Camarines Sur v. CA,222 SCRA 173

Just Compensation Definition

CASE: Eslaban v. De Onorio, GR No.146062, June 28, 2001

Who is the “owner” who shall receive thepayment?CASE: Knecht v. CA, 297 SCRA 754

Determination of JC: Judicial FunctionCASES: NHA v. Reyes, 123 SCRA245

EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA305 (1987) (reversing NHA v. Reyes)

form of JCCASES: Ass’n of Small

Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian, 175 SCRA343

Land Bank v. CA, 249SCRA 149 (M.R. Resolution, 258SCRA 404)

time of assessing JCCASE: Eslaban v. De Onorio, supra

Hda.Luisita v. PARC, Resolution,G.R. No. 171101. 11/ 22/2011 (seealso the discussion on justcompensation in the dissent of J.Sereno)

entitlement of owner to interestCASE: Urtula v. Republic, 22 SCRA 477

right of landowner in case of non-paymentof JCCASE: Republic v. CA, GR No. 146587,

7/2/2002

C. Taxation Definition, Nature and Scope Who exercises vested with the legislature constitutionally given to LGUs

Related Concepts (requirements in the exercise) Due Process Equal Protection

Double Taxation Public Purpose Tax Exemptions

the fundamental powers of the state

Documents

print media enterprises

family residential building

television broadcasting companies

local government units

regional trial court

due process clause

metropolitan manila commission

police power legislation