the czechoslovak struggle for national liberation in world war ii

The Czechoslovak Struggle for National Liberation in World War IIAuthor(s): H. Gordon SkillingSource: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 39, No. 92 (Dec., 1960), pp. 174-197Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4205225 .

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The Czechoslovak Struggle

for

National Liberation in

World War II*

H. GORDON SKILLING

I

The Munich settlement in 1938 represents a great divide in Czecho?

slovak history. For many Czechs this tragic event, a prelude to Ger?

man occupation and the outbreak of war the following year, repre? sented much more than a failure of a foreign policy based primarily on the west. It called into question the entire western orientation of

the republic, in ideas and institutions as well as in foreign policy, and

compelled a thorough reappraisal of Czechoslovak life and position in world affairs. The memory of 1938 was to remain a vivid and in?

fluential factor in the life of Czechs and Slovaks. The full impact of

Munich was to become apparent only later, after war and liberation.

It was already clear, however, that a new era of Czech history was

maturing and that the post-war course of events would depend on

deep forces, domestic and international, difficult then to calculate.

Wartime developments, to which this article is devoted, suggested, even though dimly, the general direction in which these forces were

moving. The eventual consequence of Munich and its aftermath, the occu?

pation of Prague, was a new struggle for liberation by Czechs and

Slovaks both at home and abroad, where two centres of resistance

developed, in London, and in Moscow. Both were avowedly working towards the goal of the national liberation of Czechoslovakia. Each

gradually came to be identified with a distinctive concept of the

strategy and tactics of that liberation.

The London concept, for which Eduard Benes, the former president, was the main spokesman, was primarily national in content. Its aim

was simple: the restoration of Czechoslovakia as an independent state, within its pre-1938 boundaries. Munich and its consequences were to be erased from history. The new Czechoslovakia, although

constitutionally and diplomatically a revival of the pre-Munich

republic, would, however, have to be fundamentally changed in

many aspects, political, economic and social, reflecting the revolu?

tionary process stimulated by the two world wars. Indeed pre-war

* The author wishes to acknowledge the support of a senior fellowship at the Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, in the writing of this article.



THE CZECHOSLOVAK STRUGGLE 175

bourgeois liberal democracy would, he felt, not survive the conflict, and would have to be reconstructed as a 'socialising' democracy.1

These aims could be attained, according to Benes, only by a diplo?

macy that won the friendship not of east or west alone, but of both

east and west.2 Munich had illustrated, in his opinion, the failure of a

balance of power that ignored Russia. A new Munich could only be

avoided by a policy of close alliance with Czechoslovakia's eastern

neighbour. At the same time Benes was not ready to rely solely on

Russia and sought safety in a system of collective security in which

the west and Russia were both involved. Such a diplomatic balance

would also foster a climate in which orderly domestic changes could

be effected, and extreme measures, on the bolshevik model, avoided.

The Moscow concept of liberation developed by the communist

leader, Klement Gottwald, showed striking similarities as well as sub?

stantial differences. After the involvement of Russia in the war, the

proclaimed goals of the communists were the liberation of the two

nations, Czechs and Slovaks, and the restoration of the pre-Munich state with its boundaries unchanged. A mere restoration of the politi? cal system existing prior to the Munich settlement was not enough, however; a 'national and democratic revolution' must create a radi?

cally changed regime and introduce sweeping economic and social

reforms.3 Munich was sufficient proof for the communists that only the working class, and not the former Czech and Slovak ruling classes, was capable of defending the interests of the nation. It was also proof, for them, that only the Soviet Union could be relied upon, diplo?

matically and politically, to protect and aid the future republic in its

revolutionary course.4

The war years were destined to show whether these two concepts, differing apparently more in emphasis than in essence, could be

reconciled, and whether the two centres of resistance in London and Moscow could find a common basis for post-war implementation of

their plans. 1 See Benes's speech in December 1940, Sest let exilu a druhi svetove vdlky (Six Years in

Exile and the Second World War), Prague, 1946, pp. 254-6, henceforth cited as Sest let exilu. For a full statement of Benes's views on the post-war world, see his Demokrack dnes a zitra (Democracy Today and Tomorrow), 3rd ed., Prague, 1946, especially Chapter VIII, written in 1941-2. 3 R. H. Bruce-Lockhart, 'The Second Exile of Eduard Benes' (Slavonic and East European Review, XXVIII, 70, London, 1949, pp. 39 ff.). 3 According to later communist sources, Gottwald, early in the war, revised the com? munist view of the revolution in 1918, and worked out a new thesis of a post-war 'national and democratic revolution'. See V. Kopecky, Gottwald v Moskve (Gottwald in Moscow), 2nd ed., Prague, 1948, pp. 16-19; KSC v boji za svobodu (The CPC in the Struggle for Free? dom), Prague, 1949, pp. 100-1. The first full formulation of the communist concept of the 'national and democratic revolution' was given by Gottwald in July 1945, Deset let, Sbornik stati a projevu, 1936-1946 (Ten Years, Collection of Articles and Speeches, 1936- 1946), Prague, 1947, henceforth cited as Deset let, pp. 275-89. 4 For a post-war communist view of the attitude of the Soviet Union to Czechoslovak independence, see G. Bare?, 'The Soviet Union and Czechoslovak State Independence' ( Tvorba, 6 November 1046).



176 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

The Munich agreement in September 1938 had immediate and

far-reaching repercussions in the internal political life of Czecho?

slovakia. Within a week Eduard Benes had resigned as president, and

had been replaced, by a formal vote of the national assembly, by Dr Emil Hacha, chairman of the supreme administrative court. A

government was formed under Rudolf Beran, former leader of the

republican agrarian party. Existing Czech parties merged together to

form the national unity party, headed by Beran, and the national

party of labour, headed by the socialist, Hampl. In Slovakia, an

autonomous government was created under Jozef Tiso, former

people's party leader, now head of the only remaining party, the

Slovak national unity party. Subcarpathian Ruthenia, renamed the

Carpathian Ukraine, also enjoyed autonomy under a government of

its own. The basis had been laid for a new form of political life of an

increasingly totalitarian nature.

Benes departed from his homeland for London on 22 October

1938. At that time he did not anticipate assuming the leadership of a

revolutionary liberation movement on the pattern of the first world

war. Indeed he hoped that the Czechs could enter the coming war

against Germany, an event of which he was confident, 'as a state with

a regular government', which would if necessary go abroad with part of its army, and thus avoid the 'calvary' of trying to secure recogni? tion as in 1914-18.5 Any action abroad, however, would supplement the official policy of the state in Prague and would have to be

'strictly co-ordinated with all the needs of the nation and state at

home'. German triumph in such a war was excluded from his mind.

A victory for the west would be 'the only eventuality which would

make it possible for Europe once again to consolidate itself socially with the aid of England and America and ward off either complete chaos and social overthrow or even bolshevism itself, this time Ger?

man'.6

The establishment of a separate Slovak state, the German occu?

pation of Bohemia and Moravia, and the Hungarian seizure of Sub?

carpathian Ruthenia in March 1939, transformed the scene. Benes, then in the United States lecturing at the university of Chicago, at

once declared these events 'illegal' and in a telegram to President

Roosevelt, signed 'former president', called for the non-recognition of

the situation thus created. Within a month Benes had announced his

intention of forming a 'political directorium' of Czech leaders abroad,

5 E. Benes, Pameti, Od Mnichova k nove vdlce a k novemu vitezstvi (Memoirs, From Munich to a New War and a New Victory), Part II, vol. i, Prague, 1947, henceforth cited as Pameti, p. 87. An English translation was later published under the title Memoirs of Dr. Eduard BeneS, London, 1954. References are to the Czech original. 6 See Benes's message sent to the Prague government through its diplomatic represen? tative in London, 27 January 1939, ibid., pp. 81-6. Cf. Sest let exilu, pp. 14-24.




to represent and to direct a movement of liberation. Not only was the

occupation regarded as illegal, but also the Munich agreement. The

object of the struggle abroad was to be 'the winning back of our old

Czechoslovak republic'.7 At home a non-communist resistance in

sympathy, and in contact, with Benes, came into existence.8

Meanwhile the Czechoslovak communists could, with some justice, disclaim any responsibility for the decision of the former government to capitulate to German military, and British and French diplomatic, pressure. The blame was laid at the door of the government of the

republic and the bourgeois circles it was deemed to represent. In a statement to the permanent committee of the national assembly on 11 October, Gottwald urged the government to resist German de? mands which went beyond the Munich terms, called upon the parties to safeguard a democratic system, and urged the establishment of as

broad a national front as possible, with the working class playing a

significant role.9

Within a few days the leading members of the party left the

country, most of them flying to Moscow with Gottwald, others

headed by Vaclav Nosek, emigrating to England. During the same month the governments in Prague and Bratislava took steps to make the activities of the communist party illegal. It was formally dissolved in December and its parliamentary representation cancelled. One of its last legal actions was to cast its parliamentary vote against the election of Hacha. An underground leadership was formed at home,

including, in Bohemia and Moravia, Eduard Urx and other less- known figures, and in Slovakia, Julius Duris, Karol Bacilek and Koloman Mosko.10

The communists claimed that the events of 11 March 1939 con? firmed their criticism of the Munich 'dictate'. Legally, the occupation of the Czech lands and the separation of Slovakia were, in the words of the note which the Soviet Union had sent to Germany, regarded as

contrary to international law and to the Czechoslovak constitution, and therefore without validity. The political conclusion drawn was the necessity of 'resistance, defence and struggle' with the working class as 'the backbone of national resistance'. This was the message of the CPC in a proclamation distributed as an illegal leaflet shortly after 15 March.11 In similar vein Gottwald wrote, in an article for the

special number of World News and Views devoted to Czechoslovakia:

7 See his speech in Chicago, 8 June 1939, Sest let exilu, pp. 38-52. 8 See Karel Vesely-Stainer, Cestou ndrodniho odboje (The Path of National Resistance), Prague, 1947; Vladimir Krajina, 'Resistance at Home' (Svobodne slovo, 5 May 1946) and his fuller account, 'La Resistance tchecoslovaque' (Cahiers oVhistoire de la guerre, no. 3, Feb? ruary, Paris, 1950). 9 Deset let, pp. 124-9. See also World News and Views, XVIII, no. 50, London, p. 1149. 10 KSC v boji za svobodu, pp. 26-7, 34. 11 Ibid., pp. 63-4.




The history of the Czech and Slovak nation has not ended with March 15 and 16, 1939. It would be an error, if, from the fact that the Czech ruling class capitulated without a fight and the Slovak bourgeoisie, of its own accord even, slipped Hitler's horse-collar over its head, the world should conclude that the Czech and Slovak nation approves this shameful behaviour of the ruling class. In no way!

The Czech and Slovak people will conduct its underground resistance

against the regime of the occupants and the colonisers, against the alien

hegemony of fascist Germany. The struggle will be extraordinarily hard. But it is possible to say with certainty that occupied Czechoslovakia, and

especially the Czech lands, will never become a reliable hinterland for Hitler.12

The communists proceeded to establish an organisational basis for

their struggle. Gottwald was in familiar surroundings in Moscow and

could resume his former work with the Comintern. Bohumir Smeral, founder of the Czech communist party, was also there. Working

closely with Gottwald were such top leaders of the party as Sverma,

Slansk^, Kopecky, Svermova and Siroky. A separate party was

created in Slovakia under Duris and others; Bacilek was sent to Mos?

cow and Mosko to London. In the Czech lands the leadership re?

mained in the hands of those originally assigned to this task. Some?

what later a foreign bureau was set up in Paris to which Sverma,

Siroky and Kohler, and later Clementis, were sent.13

An important link between the two centres of resistance that were

now crystallising in east and west was Zdenek Fierlinger, a left-wing

socialist, who had served in various diplomatic posts between the

wars and had been sent as minister to Moscow in 1937. His immediate

reaction to 15 March had been to resign his post and to protest

against the occupation in a public statement. He was, however, per? suaded to accede to Benes's view of the desirability of maintaining the legation in Moscow as a 'legal basis' for the resistance, as Hurban, minister to Washington, had done, and to work with the organisation

already set up by Benes in the United States. At the same time he was

in close touch with Czech communists in Moscow, and reported statements by Smeral, Nejedly, and others expressing solidarity with

Benes's struggle for liberation.14 In England, the communist

deputies and senators in emigration offered Benes their collaboration

12 World News and Views, XIX, no. 27 (19 May 1939). Quotation from Deset let, pp. 133- J43- ... . . . ? 13 For an account of the activities of Czech communists in the Soviet Union, see KSC v boji za svobodu, pp. 68-78; V. Kopec&y, Gottwald v Moskve, pp. 6 ff.

14 Zdenek Fierlinger, Ve sluzbdch CSR (In the Service of the Czechoslovak Republic), 2 vols., Prague, vol. 1, 3rd ed., 1951; vol. 2, ist ed., 1948 (henceforth cited as Fierlinger), I, pp. 191-7, 200-5, 211-21, 228, 237-8. This work, published after Fierlinger's adhesion to the communist party, contains a wealth of documentary material concerning the war years. One cannot be certain of the completeness or authenticity of the documents, al? though no distortion or falsification has been detected.




on his return from the United States and held a series of conversations

with him.15 A communist policy directive, unpublished at the time, admitted the necessity of co-operating with Bene?; the party was not

willing to recognise his leadership officially and was anxious to have

Gottwald and other communists included in the wartime leadership and ultimately acknowledged as the leading force.16

With the outbreak of war in September 1939, the few slender links

between communists and non-communists were almost completely severed. In Moscow, the Czech legation had continued to function

even after the Soviet recognition of a separate Slovakia in September; it was closed, at the request of the Soviet government, at the end of

that year. In London, conflicts multiplied between the official Czech

movement and the substantial communist emigration. A CPC mani?

festo at the end of September described the war as an imperialist war. Freedom could be attained, it was said, not through Chamber?

lain and Daladier, but only by a common struggle of the peoples of

all belligerent states for the overthrow of their governments.17 Benes, from a secret conversation in Paris in October 1939 with the com?

munist Sverma, was able to discern the wide cleavage between their

viewpoints. Sverma, arguing that freedom could only be attained with the aid of the Soviet Union, urged Benes to act upon this

assumption and go to Russia. Benes refused, defending the necessity of the unity of east and west in a war that was world-wide and

revolutionary and into which the Soviet Union would sooner or later

be forced to enter.18

II

Meanwhile Benes had begun slowly to tread a path similar to that

followed by Masaryk and himself in the first world war. He set about

persuading the governments of the west to commit themselves to the

restoration of an independent Czechoslovakia and to recognise a

government representing it abroad. This effort was in some ways simpler than in 1914-18, in view of the existence of Czechoslovakia as an independent state for twenty years, and the original refusal of several governments, notably the Soviet and American, to recognise the situation created in March 1939. Unfortunately neither of these

governments showed any sign of entering the war. Both the French and British governments, still under the same leadership as in the Munich period, were at first unwilling to recognise even a provisional Czechoslovak government-in-exile.

15 Pameti, p. 144. 16 Issued in June 1939, in Paris. Text in Za svobodu ceskeho a slovenskiho naroda (For the Freedom of the Czech and Slovak Nations), Prague, 1956, a collection of documents from the years 1938-45, henceforth cited as Za svobodu, pp. 99-102. 17 World News and Views, XIX, no. 53, p. 1106. 18 Pameti, pp. 208-13.



l80 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

Benes made his own task more difficult by basing his campaign for

recognition on the concept of the legal continuity of Czechoslovakia

and its institutions. By denying legality to the Munich agreement as

well as the German occupation of Prague, the secession of Slovakia, and the absorption of Ruthenia by Hungary, Benes felt that he

might attain two goals. He would, first, secure recognition by the

great powers of the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia within its

original pre-Munich boundaries, including therefore the areas occu?

pied by Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ruthenians. He would,

secondly, win international recognition of himself as the legal presi? dent of the republic and of his government-in-exile as the legitimate

authority. This viewpoint created legal, as well as political, problems. Cer?

tain governments, notably the British, were unwilling to commit

themselves to the illegality of the Munich decisions, in which they had participated, or to any automatic restoration of the pre-Munich frontiers. Moreover, it was legally difficult to reconcile Benes's claim

to uninterrupted presidential continuity and constitutional per? manence with his own voluntary resignation in 1938, the selection of

a new president, the formation of a new government, and important constitutional changes. Politically, Benes's programme met with the

additional obstacle that important Czech elements abroad, notably the communists, and Slovaks such as Milan Hodza, former prime minister, and Stefan Osusky, minister to Paris, were at first reluctant

to accept his leadership.19 Nonetheless, by the end of 1939, Benes had secured French and

British recognition of a Czechoslovak national committee, made up of himself, General Sergej Ingr, Eduard Outrata, Hubert Ripka,

Juraj Slavik, Msgr Sramek, and General Rudolf Viest, to 'represent the Czechoslovak people5 and to establish an army in France. After

the fall of France, he was able to secure from the British government the recognition of a provisional Czechoslovak government with him?

self as president. Headed by the former cabinet minister and catholic

people's party politician, Sramek, the cabinet included members of

several of the main pre-war coalition parties, as well as independent

figures such as Jan Masaryk, Outrata and Ingr. In addition, a

'consultative, semi-parliamentary organ', or 'provisional parliament', known as the state council, was established, to give representation to

'every political factor of all earlier political trends and of all nationali?

ties'.20 Benes believed that he had thus gone a long way towards

vindicating his theory of the continuity of Czechoslovakia and its

19 See R. H. Bruce-Lockhart, 'The Second Exile of Eduard Bene?', op, cit., pp. 39-59, For Beness own description, see Pamiti, especially pp. 128 ff., 174 ff, 20 Pamtti, pp, 155-62; Sest let exilu, pp. 277-8, 295, 430-5.



THE CZECHOSLOVAK STRUGGLE l8l

constitutional system, although the British government was at pains to

make clear that its action did not represent acceptance of the 'legal

continuity of the Czechoslovak republic' or of any particular future

boundaries. Nonetheless it was politically a fact of great importance that a governmental system, complete with president, cabinet and

parliament, and armed forces, had now been brought into existence

on foreign soil.

The entry of Soviet Russia into the war in June 1941 enabled

Benes to register a twin triumph. On 18 July a treaty with the Soviet

Union concerning mutual aid in the war against Germany gave the

Czechoslovak government full recognition and led to the renewal of

diplomatic relations. On the same day the British government

expressed its willingness to give full recognition de jure to the Czech

regime abroad. Britain was still not ready to accept the doctrine of

legal continuity.21 Nevertheless Benes, addressing the people at home

by radio on 26 July 1941, drew the following conclusions from these

events:

Our diplomatic representation, our government, our entire sovereignty function again in the whole world as before Munich. Especially impor? tant politically, diplomatically and legally is the fact that your pre- Munich president, freely elected by the overwhelming majority of

Czechs, Slovaks, Germans and Subcarpathian Ruthenians, was recog? nised, with all his full rights under our pre-Munich constitution, as the head of the Czechoslovak state, both with reference to you at home and to all other allied states and to all those neutrals who have already recognised us to this or that degree.22

Within two weeks further support for the Czech position came from

the United States with the appointment of an ambassador to the

Czech government, a recognition which became 'complete and

definitive' in October 1942. Benes regarded his diplomatic work as incomplete as long as he had

not secured an explicit repudiation of the Munich settlement itself. In his negotiations with the British government the doctrine of legal continuity was still the rub. The turning-point came, as in the case of

recognition, as a result of Soviet action. In a conversation in London in June 1942, Molotov assured Benes that the U.S.S.R. did not

recognise anything that had happened to Czechoslovakia at Munich or afterwards, and recognised the pre-Munich boundaries of the

republic. As the British government was still unwilling to commit itself so categorically, the Czechs had to content themselves with a

statement in which the British government declared itself free from

any commitments arising out of Munich in determining its attitude

21 Pameti, pp. 182-8. 22 ?est iet exiiUj p< I20,




to the final delimitation of Czechoslovak boundaries.23 During his

visit to America in 1943, Benes was able to satisfy himself that the

United States did not recognise Munich or its consequences and con?

tinued to regard the republic as legally existing within its former

boundaries.24 During 1942-3 the major powers further agreed in

principle to the transfer of the Germans and other minorities from

the eventual post-war republic.25

By 1943 the second resistance movement abroad headed by Benes

had reached a climax. He had secured complete recognition for his

government-in-exile, and a repudiation of Munich. His assumption that the war would become world-wide, involving both the U.S.A.

and the U.S.S.R., had been fulfilled, and a growing degree of co?

operation between east and west was materialising. The time had

come for a visit to Russia.

III

In the first two years of the war the Czech communists at home and

abroad were openly hostile to the Benes movement. 'Neither Hacha

nor Benes but the communists' was their slogan. After the establish?

ment of the provisional government, the communists declared that

they had nothing in common with a 'comic-opera ministry in Lon?

don'. When the state council was established, the Czech communists

in London refused to participate in it and attacked it as an 'Ersatz-

Parliament'.26 Throughout 1940, the CPC was looking to a 'revolu?

tion of the working class and the subjected nations on the model of the

great socialist October revolution' as 'the only real escape from the

abyss of the present war'. Benes and his emigre movement were

condemned as 'supremely inimical to the interests of the Czech

national liberation movement and an extremely dangerous agency of

Anglo-American capital in the Czech ranks'.27 According to Benes's

own testimony, however, underground communist resistance did not

slacken during this period.28 The involvement of Russia in the war produced a complete change

of attitude. The day after the German invasion, the central committee

proclaimed 'the fateful association of our nation with the nations of the

U.S.S.R.' and called for 'the iron unity of the whole Czech nation, of all classes without distinction' . . . 'around the backbone of our

nation, the working class'.29 When Fierlinger returned to Moscow as

23 See Pameti, pp. 293-312; Sest let exilu, pp. 160-7, 465-7- 24 Sest let exilu, pp. 204-5. 25 Pameti, pp. 289, 306-8, 330-1, 361-2; Fierlinger, II, p. 193. 26 See World News and Views, XX, no. 19, p. 279; no. 26, p. 362; no. 31, p. 427; no. 46, p. 653; no. 51, p. 727. 27 A statement of the CPC of 15 December 1940, given in Pameti, pp. 213-17 n. Also given in Za svobodu, pp. 125-39. 28 Pameti, p. 217. 29 Ibid., pp. 218-22 n.




minister he resumed his cordial relations with the Czech communists.30

In London, too, the communists were ready to recognise the Benes

government as the legitimate representative of the republic and to

participate in the state council. In the autumn of 1941, Hodinova,

Kreibich, Nosek and Valo accepted an invitation to join the state

council31 and, although critical of its advisory character, they began to take an active part in its proceedings. Early in 1942, Dr Bohuslav

Vrbensky, a representative of the Czech communists in Russia, was

appointed to the council.32 Later in 1942, a Ruthenian communist, Ivan Petruscak, was added. In May 1943, a statement issued by the

London communists welcomed the dissolution of the Comintern and

proclaimed their loyalty to the sovereign interests of the nation.33 By the time Benes visited Moscow at the end of 1943, the communists

there were ready to welcome him as the head of the state and the

official representative of the Czech movement.

The visit to Moscow and the signature of the Czechoslovak-Soviet

pact of mutual aid against Germany marked a new high point in

Benes's diplomatic achievements.34 The Soviet Union was already committed to the restoration of the pre-war Czechoslovak republic. The new treaty and the conversations which Benes held with Stalin

and other Soviet leaders seemed to underline their acceptance of

the principles of mutual recognition of national independence and

non-intervention in internal affairs. The agreement also seemed to

offer permanent safeguards against a repetition of Munich or of the German Drang nach Osten. Moreover the pact had met with the

approval of the western powers at the Moscow conference in 1943, so that Benes's formula of 'east and west' had received their

endorsement.35 Benes came away from Moscow completely satisfied. In his report to the state council on 3 February 1944, he declared

that 'in all questions which we discussed and which were related to

our state and national interests, we came to absolute agreement and

full mutual accord'.36

Of hardly less significance than his diplomatic activity were the

political discussions with the Czech communists in Moscow, lasting

30 Fierlinger, II, pp. 26-7. 31 Pame'ti, pp. 457-8. 32 Fierlinger, II, pp. 35-6. 33 Central European Observer, London, 11 June 1943. 34 For the Moscow visit, see Pameti, pp. 379-400; Sest let exilu, pp. 215-22, 354-69; Fierlinger, II, pp. 191-5; Eduard Taborsky, 'Benes and Stalin?Moscow, 1943 and 1945' (Journal of Central European Affairs, XIII, no. 2, Boulder, Colorado, July 1953, pp. 154-81). 35 There had been a lorfg delay in arranging the trip to Moscow, largely owing to various British objections. Only after Eden's approval of the pact, and the Moscow con? ference's favourable consideration of the matter, did Benes proceed with his trip. See Pame'ti, pp. 362-5, 379-80; Fierlinger, II, pp. 62-73, 114-21, 128-74. 86 Sest let exilu, p. 363. See also E. Taborsky, 'Benes" and the Soviets' (Foreign Affairs, 27, no. 2, New York, January 1949, pp. 302-14).




an entire week.37 Benes conducted these talks on his own, meeting a

communist delegation consisting of Gottwald, Sverma, Slansky and

Kopecky. The results were regarded as satisfactory on both sides. The

chief differences related to the policy adopted by Benes at the time of

Munich, his attitude towards the Hacha regime, and his views on the

Slovak question. General agreement was reported on the need for a

revolutionary course of action and radical economic and social

measures following liberation, and on the importance of the national

committees as organs of liberation. Gottwald was said to have ex?

pressed his readiness to co-operate loyally so that the transition to the

new regime might take place peacefully and harmoniously. Benes was

satisfied that agreement on fundamental matters would be attainable

and that civil war at home might be avoided.

It was understood that a new government, based on a united

national front and an agreed programme, would have to be formed, either before the return to Czechoslovakia, as the communists

suggested, or after, as favoured by Benes. Whether an agreement on

the actual composition of such a government was reached seems

highly doubtful. Benes had already expressed his view that a simpli? fication of the pre-war party system would be desirable, leaving three

main parties, representing the left, centre and right.38 This would

have involved a fusion of the left-wing parties, including the com?

munists. The communists preferred a system of four political parties, none of which would be conservative. The three socialist parties, by which they meant the social democratic, the national socialist, and

the communist, would form the core of the national front govern?

ment, with the people's party or populists in association as a non-

socialist party.39 Whether Benes, in Moscow, accepted the idea of the

primarily 'socialist' character of the first post-war government is not

clear from the available evidence.40

The idea of a bloc of socialist parties, as the decisive force within

the national front, soon came to be the foundation of the political

platform of the communists. In a statement in February 1944 con?

cerning questions of 'political leadership', Gottwald advanced the

thesis that war was a 'test of classes and social groups, as well as of

political parties', and that the experience of Munich and its after-

37 There is no full account of these talks. Brief summaries are given by Benes, Pamiti, pp. 405-14; Fierlinger, II, pp. 196-208; Kopeck^, Gottwaldv Moskve, pp. 32-7. Fierlinger's participation, suggested by the communists, was rejected by Bene?, but he was kept in? formed by both sides. A full report in a letter of 21 December 1943 from Gottwald to the communists in London was recently published in K. Gottwald, Spisy (Works), Prague, 1955, XI, pp. 259-72. 38 Bene?, Demokracie dnes a zitra, pp. 314-16. See also Sest let exilu, pp. 389-90. 39 Kopeck^, op. cit., pp. 25-9, 38-41. 40 Nothing is given in Benes's memoirs to suggest his acceptance. Fierlinger, however, reports his agreement with the communist conception. See Fierlinger, II, pp. 199-200. So does Gottwald, in Spisy, XI, pp. 266-7.




math had demonstrated the bankruptcy of the former ruling classes

and parties. A new leadership must be found in an alliance of workers,

peasants, tradesmen and intellectuals and, in political terms, in a bloc

of three parties, communist, social democratic and national socialist.41

The basis for such a bloc had already been laid in a common May

Day statement of spokesmen of the three parties in 1943.42 Now,

following the Moscow talks with Benes, negotiations began in London

between representatives of these three groups.43 An important element in these discussions was the attempt to unify the social

democrats who were split into several factions. Bohumil Lausman, who had visited Russia in 1942 and had talked with Fierlinger and

Gottwald, was the most vigorous advocate, among the Czech social?

ists in London, of the co-operation of all 'socialist' parties in a 'national

bloc of the working people'.44 These negotiations laid the foundation

for such an alliance immediately after the return to Prague. One object Benes had failed to achieve during his Moscow visit?

the representation of the communists in the London government. As

conceived by Benes, that government was not constructed according to a 'party key' following the tradition of pre-war coalition cabinets, but was 'all-national', composed of leading figures in exile irrespec? tive of party affiliation. In its original composition the government,

according to Benes, represented left, right, and centre in almost equal

proportions.45 In the absence of any communist or left-wing socialist

representation, it was regarded in these circles as conservative.46 At the Moscow talks Benes had invited the communists to send two

delegates as members of the government, but had been rebuffed. The communists were willing to take part only in a wholly reconstructed

cabinet, and it was agreed that this reconstruction should take place at the time of liberation.47 Nor were the left-wing socialists willing to

accept membership, as suggested by Benes to Fierlinger in Moscow.48

Apart from the addition of the social democrat, Vaclav Maj er, in

August 1944, the government remained unchanged until the end of the war. The idea of a delegation of the state council to Russia was

broached during the Moscow talks, but was never realised.49 The

suggestion from London that Gottwald or another communist should 41 An article 'On Some Questions of the Political Leadership of Our National Resis?

tance', published in Geskoslovenski listy, on I February 1944. See Deset let, pp. 228-33. 42 Fierlinger, II, pp. 126-7. Among those who signed the statement were Bohumil Lau?- man, Vaclav Maj er and Frantisek Nemec for the social democrats.

43 Ibid., II, pp. 197-208, 220-8; Kopeckf, op. cit., pp. 37-9. 44 See Lausman's article in Ceskoslovenski listy, published in Za nov^ Geskoslovensko (For a New Czechoslovakia), Moscow, 1944; Prague, 1945, pp. 142-5. See also Bohumil Lau?- man, Kdo byl vinen? (Who Was Guilty?), Vienna, 1953, pp. 28-9. 45 Pameti, pp. 179-80; 165-6. 46 Sec: Fierlinger, II, pp. 36-41, 223, 297. 47 Pameti, pp. 406-7, 411; Fierlinger, II, pp. 201; Gottwald, Spisy, XI, p. 269. 48 Fierlinger, II, pp. 201-4. 49 Ibid., II, pp. 205, 218-19, 226, 295-6.




visit England met with a cool reception. In the end liaison between

the two centres had to depend, apart from the representation of the

communists in the state council, on the Czechoslovak legation in

Moscow, supplemented in the closing months by the arrival there of

a government delegate to the liberated territories.

IV

By 1944 the advance of the Red Army had brought nearer the

moment of liberation. An agreement between the Czech and Soviet

governments was signed in May 1944, by which the Czechs were

assured that the Red Army would transfer zones that ceased to be

areas of military operations to the full authority of the Czech govern? ment. Even in military zones, where the authority would remain

with the Soviet commander, a Czechoslovak 'government delegate' was to assist the Soviet commander, 'organise and direct, according to Czechoslovak laws, the administration of territory cleared of the

enemy' and form Czechoslovak armed forces.50 Frantisek Nemec, a

social democrat and member of the London government, was

appointed to this post, with General Viest as his deputy. The com?

munists would have preferred a collective organ, representing the

national front, rather than an individual delegate, but contented

themselves with the appointment of political advisers: Lausman, for

the social democrats, Valo for the communists, Hala for the people's

party, Uhlif, for the national socialists, and F. Hodza, for the Slovak

agrarians (later democrats). Later a Ruthenian communist, Turya- nitsa, was added.51 The government delegate arrived in Moscow on

25 August 1944, and later proceeded to the liberated parts of the

republic. Another problem was the role to be performed by the people at

home and the relationship of their organs of resistance to the govern? ment abroad. Benes had devoted his attention almost exclusively to

the diplomacy of national liberation. Moreover he had been inclined, in his broadcasts from London, to discourage active resistance at a

time when it would have involved useless sacrifices. However, a non-

communist resistance had existed from the beginning of the German

occupation, and after almost complete destruction in 1941, was

reorganised in 1943 and 1944.52 By February 1944, Benes was calling for revolutionary resistance by the people at home.53 The communists

had from the beginning advocated active resistance, and had been

critical of Benes's waiting attitude. They greeted his appeal in 1944

50 Text in Sest let exilu, pp. 475-7. See also Fierlinger, II, pp. 246-54. 51 Fierlinger, II, pp. 292-5, 317, 463; Gottwald, Spisy, XI, pp. 341, 345-6. 52 See references cited in n. 8. 53 Sest let exilu, pp. 378-84.




with enthusiasm.54 The party had been able to maintain an illegal

organisation in existence, with interruptions, throughout the entire

war, replacing one illegal central committee after another.55 From

1943 the CPC had embarked on a campaign to activate the struggle at home and to organise partisan warfare. Emissaries were sent from

Moscow, Vetiska to the Czech lands, and Smidke and Bacilek to

Slovakia, bearing instructions to this effect. Rudolf Slansky had been

assigned to the headquarters of the Ukrainian partisan staff to assist

in the sending of Soviet and Slovak partisans to the occupied areas

behind the front lines. London, too, was in touch with the resistance

at home, although unable to give it any significant military support. Mutual suspicion of the political designs of these para-military

operations was rife.56

It was hoped that through the so-called 'national committees'

unity would be achieved in the popular resistance accompanying liberation and an orderly transition effected to a stable post-war administration. From 1942 on the communists had appealed in their

Moscow broadcasts to the people at home to form these national

committees.57 At the Moscow talks there seems to have been agree? ment on the necessity of such organisations.58 In April 1944, a

proclamation was broadcast by the London government, calling on

the people to form local, district, and provincial national committees.

Considerable difference of opinion existed as to their role and com?

petence, especially in the post-liberation phase.59 There was, how?

ever, general agreement that the local and district committees

would be the main organs of administration during the transition

emergency, would be regularly elected as soon as conditions per? mitted, and would serve as the basis for the election indirectly of

provincial national committees in Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and

Ruthenia, and a provisional national assembly.60 Apparently on the basis of a draft agreed upon in Moscow in conversations between Gottwald and Nemec,61 a constitutional decree was issued in London

on 4 December 1944, providing for the election of such local, district, and provincial committees, and a provisional national assembly. In this way, as the preamble to the decree read, in accordance with the

principle of the 1920 constitution that all state power was derived

54 See Gottwald's speech in May 1942, Deset let, pp. 174-6, and in February 1944, ibid., pp.234-5. 65 For a full account of the party's underground work, see KSC v boji za svobodu.

66 Fierlinger, II, pp. 304-6, 307 ff., 318, 324-34, 350-1; see also Taborsky, 'BeneS and Stalin', pp. 169-70. 67 See Deset let, pp. 176, 192, 195, 209, 214, 235, 244, 250-6. 58 PamHi, pp. 408-9; Fierlinger, II, pp. 199-200; Gottwald, Spisy, XI, pp. 262-6.

69 Fierlinger, II, pp. 200, 287-90, 334-7; Gottwald v Moskve, pp. 39-40. See also Deset let, pp. 249-56; Za novi Geskoslovensko, pp. 108-15, 122-32. 60 Deset let, pp. 235, 251; Sest let exilu, pp. 387-8. 61 Fierlinger, II, pp. 336-7.




from the people, 'the sovereign people' would be able to 'exercise

this power during the transitional period'.62

V

All plans for an orderly transition were disrupted by the action of

the Slovak people, who carried through their own liberation before

the arrival of the Red Army and, for approximately two months,

governed themselves through the Slovak national council. This

uprising was to have profound effects on the transition to post-war

government and on the later constitutional relationship of Czechs

and Slovaks.63

The basis for the revolt was laid as early as September 1943, when

the Slovak national council was formed illegally in Bratislava, in con?

sequence of an agreement for common action between communists and non-communists. It included Karol Smidke, Gustav Husak, and

Ladislav Novomesky for the communists, and Jozef Lettrich, Jan

Ursiny, and Matej Josko for the non-communists. It represented therefore a broad national front pledged, in its proclamation of

December 1943, to lead the struggle for the overthrow of the Ger?

mans and their Slovak supporters, and to seize power in Slovakia,

exercising it until the people were free to elect their own representa? tives. Of great political significance were the desire expressed to work

in agreement with the Czechoslovak government abroad and the

approval of its work in the international and military spheres. At

the same time the Slovak national council proclaimed the Slovak wish to live together with the Czechs in a common state, based on the

principle of equality. In 1944 plans were laid for an uprising, and

with the approval of Benes, Lieutenant-Colonel Golian was appointed military commander.64 Smidke was sent to the Soviet Union to co?

ordinate action with the Red Army. The opportunity for translating these plans into action came in

late August with the invasion of Slovakia by the German armed

forces. Open revolt spread throughout the area, partisan groups and Slovak army units taking part under the leadership of the Slovak

national council. In its first public session in the capital of the

liberated area, Banska Bystrice, on 1 September, the council issued 62 Text in Zdenek Pe?ka, Dokumenty k ustavnim dejindm teskoslovenskpm 1938-1946 (Docu?

ments on the Constitutional History of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1946), 2 vols., Prague, 1947, II, pp. 40-1. 63 Communist sources on the Slovak uprising are Slovenskd Ndrodnd Rada, 1943-9 (Slovak National Council, 1943-9), Bratislava, 1949; KSC v boji za svobodu, pp. 181 fl*.; Kopeck^, Gottwald v Moskve, pp. 41-5. See also Jozef Lettrich, 0 Slovenskej ndrodnej rade (On the Slovak National Council), Bratislava, n.d. 1945?; Jozef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia, New York, 1955, pp. 198 ff. Informative, too, is Fierlinger, II, pp. 327 ff. 64 According to Bene?, the plans for an uprising were drawn up in close co-operation with the London government. See Sest let exilu, p. 230.



THE CZECHOSLOVAK STRUGGLE l8g

its 'Declaration of the Slovak Nation'. Proclaiming itself as alone

entitled to speak in the name of the Slovak nation, the council

assumed 'legislative and executive power' in the whole of Slovakia, and stated its intention to continue co-operation with the Czecho?

slovak resistance abroad. It indicated once again the desire of the

Slovaks for fraternal life with the Czech nation in a new Czechoslovak

republic.

Although the free Slovak government for a time had possession of a

substantial part of Slovakia, it soon went down to defeat. Appeals for

aid were made to the Soviet government by the Czech communists and the Slovak delegation in Moscow, and by the London govern? ment. Some assistance was forthcoming from the east and west,

although it is not clear in either case what amount of aid was in fact

given.65 At the end of the existence of free Slovakia, Generals Viest and Golian were captured by the enemy. Slansky, Sverma, and Laus? man retreated into the mountains and took part in more partisan fighting in which Sverma lost his life. The Slovak communist party resumed its illegal activity under a new central committee headed by Bast'ovansky.

The political importance of this short-lived Slovak regime can

hardly be exaggerated. The Slovaks, by this decisive act, proclaimed their hostility to the separate Slovak state and its authorities, and their solidarity with their Czech kinsmen and the Czechoslovak

government abroad. The restoration of a united Czech and Slovak state?one of the basic objectives of Benes's struggle for legal con?

tinuity?had thus been given striking revolutionary endorsement. At the same time a harmony of viewpoint between communists and non- communists had been revealed. In a reorganisation of the council in

September 1944, the equality of representation of the two main par? ties, the communist party of Slovakia, and the newly-formed democratic party, was maintained, with twenty members allotted to

each, and an additional seat to Colonel Golian. A six-member

presidium was headed by two chairmen, Karol Smidke and Vavro Srobar. When the size of the council increased to fifty in October, Golian was replaced by General Viest, a member of the government in London, who had assumed the military command. The socialists and communists carried through a unification of the two parties under the name of the communist party of Slovakia. This party,

65 Fierlinger (ibid.) expresses the view that the Soviet armed forces made an important modification in their original plans for a summer offensive so as to aid the Slovak uprising. Bene? hints at difficulties in securing western aid for the rebels due to an agreement reached at Teheran on military zones of influence, placing Czechoslovakia in the Soviet sphere (Pameti, pp. 375 n., 376-7). Although such a delimitation has often been referred to by other writers, no evidence for it has been found. Lettrich (op. cit., pp. 210-13) minimises the extent of Soviet aid, and blames the U.S.S.R. for forbidding extensive western assis? tance.

G



I90 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

although organisationally separate, was in close touch with the com?

munist party of Czechoslovakia and its leadership in Moscow,66 as

was shown by the dispatch to Banska Bystrice of two of the top leaders of the CPC, Sverma and Slansky.

The existence of this Slovak regime for two months had injected a

new and important factor into the post-war picture. A political

system had been established, in revolutionary fashion, exercising, as

its first decree proclaimed, 'all legislative, governing and executive

power in Slovakia'.67 It was obvious that after the war the Slovak

right to an autonomous status within the new Czechoslovakia would

have to be accepted. In order to make this clear, a delegation of the

Slovak national council consisting of Novomesky, Ursiny, and Lieu?

tenant-Colonel Vesel, proceeded to London in October 1944 for

political discussions concerning the future relationships of Czechs and

Slovaks.68

A more immediate result of the uprising was a modification of the

plans for the transition to post-war government. It had originally been assumed that the government delegate for the liberated terri?

tories would, until the arrival of the government itself, administer

these areas. London was now willing to accept the Slovak national

council as a provincial national committee, but was anxious to pre? serve the full authority of the government and its delegate in liberated

Slovakia and to require prior approval for Slovak measures by the

president and the government, 'in the spirit of the valid Czechoslovak

constitution'.69 The delegate, Nemec, on his arrival in liberated

Slovak territory, had been confronted with an existing system of

government claiming to exercise all legislative and executive power. This made it impossible for him to carry out his mission as originally conceived. Nonetheless the Slovak national council was ready to

recognise the delegate as a liaison between it and the London

government and to admit his participation in meetings of the national

council. An agreement to this effect was reached with Nemec. The

Slovak viewpoint was forcefully presented to Benes and the London

government by the Slovak delegation during their discussions in

October and November. The delegation was ready to recognise the

authority of the president and government; the latter, in turn, were

ready to accept the Slovak national council as the organ of struggle, but insisted on an unconditional recognition of the president, the

government, and the constitutional validity of the 1920 basic law.

66 See Milo Gosiorovsky, Ilegdlny boj KSS a SlovenskS ndrodne povstanie (Illegal Struggle of the CPS and the Slovak National Uprising), Bratislava, 1949, p. 12.

67 Pe?ka, op. cit., II, p. 135. 68 See detailed report of these discussions in Fierlinger, II, pp. 410-19. 69 See government decree concerning the administration of liberated territory, Peska, op. cit., II, pp. 19-20. See also Lettrich, 0 slovenskej ndrodnej rode, pp. 31-40.



THE CZECHOSLOVAK STRUGGLE igi

Although the defeat of the Slovak uprising rendered these considera?

tions applicable only to the future, the Slovak delegation to London

proceeded to Moscow, so as to be in readiness for taking part in the

eventual process of the transfer of power.

VI

In the meantime continued Red Army advances made it possible for Nemec, the government delegate, to return again to liberated

territory, this time to Chust, in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, on 27 Octo?

ber 1944. Almost at once a series of incidents occurred which greatly disturbed both him and the London government.70 The authority of

the delegate was limited to a relatively small part of the liberated

territory; as he later discovered, even this was regarded by the Soviet

commander as part of the military zone under Soviet authority. A

much larger zone in which military operations continued was under

exclusively Soviet authority. In this latter area the Soviet high com?

mand began to enrol volunteers from the population in the Red

Army, an action which seemed to threaten the right of the Czechs, under the treaty with the Soviet Union, to form an army of their own.

Then, more serious still, came the demands of meetings held in

various localities in the same zone for the incorporation of these areas

in the Soviet Union. A leading part was played by Ivan Turyanitsa, an adviser of the government delegate, who was permitted to enter

the Soviet military operations zone and to aid in the organisation of

these meetings. Meanwhile a communist party of the Transcarpa- thian Ukraine was organised under his leadership. This chain of

events culminated in a provincial congress of national committees at

the end of November, which proclaimed the decision to leave the

Czechoslovak republic and to establish a national council of the

Carpathian Ukraine as the supreme organ of government. This

council, headed by Turyanitsa, thereupon requested Nemec to leave

the territory within three days. His position had become untenable, and on 11 December he returned to Moscow.

This trend of events threatened not only the authority of the

government delegate but the whole conception of restoring Czecho?

slovakia within its pre-Munich boundaries. It even raised the ques? tion as to whether a similar movement might later occur in Slovakia.

Although deeply disturbed, Benes was inclined to think that these

events were happening without the knowledge of the Soviet govern-

70 The main source for the following is Fierlinger, II, pp. 387 ff., especially pp. 408-10, 421-7, 446-55, 462-504, 516-17, 555-60; F. Nemec and V. Moudry, The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, Toronto, 1955. See also Taborsk^'s articles cited above, and Ivo Ducha?ek, The Strategy of Communist Infiltration: The Case of Czechoslovakia (Memorandum, Yale Institute of International Affairs, New Haven, 1949), pp. 9-15.



ig2 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

ment, perhaps as a result of initiative taken by the Ukrainian com?

munist party or the Ukrainian government. Through Fierlinger and

Nemec in Moscow, the London government let it be known to the

Soviet Union that it stood firm on the idea that the pre-Munich frontiers must be preserved until the peace conference, and that the

provisions of the 1944 treaty concerning liberated territories must be

observed. However, it was also made evident that the London Czechs

were ready to come to an agreement on Ruthenia with the Soviet

Union at a later date.

After considerable delay conversations were held with Vyshinsky and Molotov at the end of December by a group of Czechs, including

Fierlinger, Nemec and Valo, as well as the Ruthenian, Petruscak, and the Slovak national council delegates, Novomesky, Ursiny and

Vesel. These talks revealed the Soviet attitude. The course of events

in Ruthenia, or Carpathian Ukraine, was regarded as a spontaneous movement of the Ukrainian population which the Soviet Union was

unwilling to suppress. But the Czechs were assured that this did not

mark a change of policy towards them or threaten the alliance of the

two governments. Meanwhile the Czech and Slovak communists, who had earlier

supported the government and the delegate in their attitude towards

the Ruthenian movement and had claimed to have no prior know?

ledge of Turyanitsa's actions, swung over to the view that the Czecho?

slovak government should take immediate action to facilitate the

transfer of Ruthenia to the U.S.S.R. Non-communist Slovaks, in?

cluding Srobar and Ursiny, were of the same opinion, fearing that

otherwise the future of Slovakia itself might be jeopardised. As a

result of the conversations with Vyshinsky and Molotov, and later

with the communists, Nemec came to the conclusion that immediate

action to satisfy the Ukrainian demands was desirable. A meeting of

those who had been present at the talks with Vyshinsky and Molotov,

together with Gottwald and Kopecky, reached a unanimous decision

to this effect. Nemec, in reporting this decision to the president in

London, stated that in his opinion the movement in Ruthenia was in fact 'popular and elemental (zivelne)' and that the Czech govern? ment could administer this territory only by the use of violence,

against the will of the people. Such a concession was rejected by Benes, who felt that it would do

great harm to the prestige of Czechoslovakia abroad and call into

question its entire policy of alliance with the Soviet Union and restoration of Czechoslovakia within its pre-Munich frontiers. He

concluded moreover, from the report of the conversations with

Vyshinsky and Molotov, that such a concession was unnecessary. He

insisted that the entire matter be postponed and settled eventually in



THE CZECHOSLOVAK STRUGGLE I93

a friendly fashion between the two governments after the war. Bene?

was evidently long since convinced that Ruthenia would have to be transferred to the U.S.S.R. in the interest of friendship with Russia, and may have already indicated his attitude to the Russians and

others on earlier occasions. Indeed the expression of such a view to

Slovaks in 1943, of which Nemec was informed in Moscow, had

helped to persuade the latter of the desirability of the action he had

proposed.71 The matter was dealt with in a decisive manner by Stalin himself.

On 23 January 1945, Gottwald was summoned to the Kremlin.

Having heard from Gottwald of the 'embarrassment' felt by the

Czech government over the events in Ruthenia, Stalin, in Gottwald's

presence, dictated a letter to Benes assuring him that the Soviet

government had not decided to break its treaty with Czechoslovakia or settle the question of the Carpathian Ukraine unilaterally. The

Soviets were not ready, it was true, to forbid the expression of national

will by the Carpathian population. Stalin reminded Benes that he

(Benes) had expressed his willingness in Moscow in 1943 to give up this territory to the Soviet Union, and that he, Stalin, had not agreed to this. The whole matter, now that it had been raised by the popula? tion of the Carpathian Ukraine, could be settled by an agreement between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia either before or after the

end of the war. In his reply to Stalin, Benes concurred that the matter

should be settled by agreement, if possible after the war and before a

peace conference.72

Although the Ruthenian communist, Petruscak, was left in Ruthenia in January 1945, as the representative of the government

delegate, it seemed evident that any control which the Czech govern? ment would exercise would be purely nominal and temporary.

During his visit to Moscow in March Benes made clear that he was

willing to cede the area, and the Russians indicated that they were

ready to defer a final settlement until after his return to Prague.73 The final transfer of Ruthenia or Carpathian Ukraine to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was accomplished by a treaty between the Czech and Soviet governments injune 1945.

71 Concerning Benes's earlier willingness to cede Ruthenia, little is known. BeneS, in his memoirs, makes some ambiguous references to Ruthenia which may have referred to such proposals. See Pameti, pp. 207, 403, 405 n. In his address to the state council in February 1944, he asserted that Ruthenia belonged to Czechoslovakia legally (Sest let exilu, pp. 392- 393). According to Taborsk^, Bene? had sought to retain Ruthenia but had been prepared to sacrifice it if necessary in the interest of friendship with Russia. While not making any promise to the Russians, he had made his attitude clear to them on several occasions (Taborsk^, *Bene? and Stalin'). Nemec and Moudry (op. cit., pp. 79-82, 128-9, 173-6) confirm the willingness of Bene? to cede Ruthenia.

72 For this and the text of Stalin's letter to Benes, see Fierlinger, II, pp. 555, 557-60. English text of Stalin's letter and Benet's reply are given by Taborsk^, 'Bene? and Stalin'. See also Nemec and Moudrf, op. cit., pp. 165, 355-7. 73 Fierlinger, II, pp. 595-6, 599-601.




VII

During the discussions on Ruthenia one of the main concerns of the

London government had been to ward off the possibility of a

repetition of the Ruthenian affair in Slovakia. Czechs and Slovaks, communists and non-communists, had presented a united front in the

Moscow discussions as to the necessity of Slovakia remaining a part of

Czechoslovakia. The Soviet government had moreover given assurances that nothing untoward, such as the acceptance of volun?

teers in the Red Army, would occur in liberated Slovak territories.

Soviet spokesmen had also urged the return of Benes and his govern? ment to the homeland as soon as possible so as to avoid such mis?

understandings. In the meantime the government delegate, Nemec, was allowed to return to Slovak territory and reached Kosice on

i February 1945. In accordance with earlier agreements, he turned

over the administration of liberated territory to the Slovak national council and continued to act as a liaison with the government and the

Red Army command. National committees were formed throughout Slovakia, but the authority of the Czechoslovak government was

recognised. Armed forces were formed as Slovak units within the

Czechoslovak army.74 All that remained was for the Czech government itself to return

home. Benes's intention was that the London cabinet should resign; it would then be reappointed as a provisional government and a new

government would be formed on the second or third day after his

return to Kosice.75 He had already begun negotiations with Nosek, Sramek and others with this in mind. Gottwald suggested that dis? cussions could take place better in Moscow: the government, having been agreed upon there, would then take over at once when it returned to Slovakia. Benes accepted this suggestion and arrived in Moscow in March for talks which were to wind up the two resistance movements in exile.

The Moscow meeting marked the climax of the work abroad of

both Benes and Gottwald. For two weeks Benes was engaged in con?

sultations with Stalin and the Soviet government and with the Czech

leaders in Moscow. Gottwald, Slansky, Nosek, Kopecky, and Lasto-

vicka participated in the talks for the CPC; Fierlinger, Lausman,

Majer and Pacak for the social democrats; David, Stransky, Drtina and Uhlif for the national socialists; Sramek and Hala for the

people's party. According to Kopecky all these formed a national front and then negotiated with a special delegation sent to Moscow by

74 Ibid., pp. 487-8, 490, 496, 499, 504-8, 516, 578-80. 75 Ibid., pp. 568-74, 580-2. See Gottwald's dispatches to Bene? and Nosek in February 1945, in K. Gottwald, Spisy, XI, pp. 358-62.




the Slovak national council, consisting of Husak, Novomesky, Srobar, Ursiny, Soltes, Styk, and Col. Ferjencik. According to the same source, Gottwald submitted the main proposals which were

accepted by the Czech and Slovak national fronts, and were then

submitted to Benes for his approval. Apart from this, almost nothing is known of these discussions other than the results: the new govern? ment and its programme.76

The return of the government to Kosice in April and its welcome there by the Slovak national council was symbolic. There the com?

position of the cabinet was announced, and the text of the pro? gramme, henceforth to be called the Kosice programme, was

published. The new government, headed by Fierlinger, was a coali? tion of six major parties, with a non-communist majority, but in?

cluding a substantial representation of both Czech and Slovak communists. Although the government was not dominated by the

communists, their position afforded them great influence on govern? ment policy and a base for establishing eventual domination.77 Unity of the London and Moscow centres had nonetheless been achieved. The organ of Slovak revolution, the Slovak national council, and the

embodiment of Czechoslovak unity and legal continuity, the Czechoslovak government under President Benes, gave each other mutual recognition. The important elements of the Slovak resistance at home and abroad had thus been merged in a single authority, at once constitutional and revolutionary.

The liberation of the Czech lands soon made possible the return of this new authority to Prague. The revolutionary aspect of this event was underlined by the fact that the capital had been liberated only a few days earlier partly by its own efforts in the revolt of early May.78 An uprising lasting four days, in which 2,000 lives were lost, demon? strated that the Czechs were not willing passively to await their liberation. The Czech national council which had prepared and directed the revolt included representatives of the CPC, the national

socialists, the people's party, the social democrats, and revolutionary trade union and agricultural movements. It was headed by a notable Czech historian, Professor Albert Prazak, and its political leader was the communist, J. Smrkovsky. It was symbolic that support for the

76 Gottwald v Moskve, pp. 47-53. Bene? omits his Moscow trip from his memoirs; Fierlinger gives only a brief account, as does Taborsk^ in his article, 'Benes and Stalin'. 77 The author deals more fully with this and post-war events in 'Revolution and Con? tinuity in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1946' to be published in the Journal of Central European Affairs; 'The Breakup of the Czechoslovak Coalition, 1947-8' (The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Scknce, vol. 26, no. 3, Toronto, August i960, pp. 396-412); and 'The Prague Overturn in 1948' (Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol. IV, Toronto, i960, pp. 88-114). 78 For the Prague revolt, see Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved, London, 1950, Chapter IV; the communist sources, KSC v boji za svobodu, pp. 232-60; V. Kouck^, Illegdlni KSC a prazskSpovstdni (The Illegal CPC and the Prague Uprising), Prague, 1946; Prazskd kvHnovd revoluce (The May Revolution in Prague), Prague, 1946.



I96 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

hard-pressed rebels and final liberation came from the Red Army, to

whom fell the honour of liberating the capital on 9 May.79 The

Czech national council had taken over power at the outset of the

rebellion in the name of the Czechoslovak government and now duly transferred power to that government on its return to Prague on

11 May. Unlike its Slovak counterpart, the Czech national council was not represented in the government. The arrival of Benes a few

days later marked the formal end of the wartime resistance.

The return of President Benes to Prague was the apogee in the

gradual fusing of the two centres of Czech resistance abroad. Avoid?

ing the tragic conflicts of other eastern European exiled leaders, the

Czechs in London and Moscow had been able to achieve a substantial

degree of unity. Moreover the people at home, as can be seen from

the Slovak and the Prague uprisings, had also preserved political

unity and were willing to accept the leadership of the liberation

movement abroad.

Benes had thus reached his primary goal: the restoration of an

independent Czechoslovakia, largely within the pre-war frontiers. This represented a diplomatic triumph, marred only by the necessity of yielding Ruthenia to the Soviet Union. It had been accomplished, as anticipated, by means of a diplomacy based not on east or west

alone but on both. As the cession of Ruthenia indicated, however, the

pendulum of Czech foreign policy had swung further to the east than

expected. As an added consequence, the participation of communists in Czech politics was to be more influential than originally conceived.

All this Benes was ready to accept as a necessary consequence of the

changed balance of world power and of internal political forces. In return he was able to re-establish his own position as the leading figure in the new republic, and assure a smooth transition largely on the basis of his doctrine of continuity.

The communists, in spite of their initial hostility towards Benes and

continuing differences, were ready to recognise his leadership and

give their blessing to his diplomatic activities. The alliance with the Soviet Union seemed to bear out their view that Russia was the main

79 The failure of the allied forces to aid the uprising from the west has been attributed by the communists to the unwillingness of the western governments to aid the Czechs. According to the U.S. state department, the failure of the forces under General Patton to advance beyond the Karlsbad-Pilsen-Budweis line in western Bohemia was the result of a prior agreement on a military demarcation line, and the unwillingness of the Soviet com? mand to allow this line to be crossed at the time of the Prague uprising. See New Tork Times, io May 1949. See also Forrest C. Pogue, 'Why Eisenhower's Forces Stopped at the Elbe' (World Politics, IV, no. 3, Princeton, N.J., October 1952). A brief and somewhat uncertain role was played during the uprising by the forces of General Vlasov, Russian collaborator with Nazi Germany, one of whose divisions fought against the Germans in Prague on 7 May. This episode remains clouded in obscurity. Cf. George Fischer, Soviet Opposition to Stalin. A Case Study in World War II, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 98-102; S. Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European History, 2nd ed., Princeton, 1953, pp. 43I-3*




guarantor against another Munich and strengthened their hands in

domestic political relations with Bene?. In spite of the turn of events

in 1944-5, which made eastern Europe an area of Soviet military and

diplomatic predominance, they were willing to commit themselves to

the orderly restoration of Czechoslovakia, avoiding for the time being

independent revolutionary actions.

The role of the communists nonetheless, in sharp contrast to their

pre-war impotence, was to be a decisive one, and was to pave the

way for their final triumph. In the meantime there were to be three

years during which co-operation gave way to open conflict before the

issue was resolved in their favour.



the czechoslovak struggle for national liberation in world war ii

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