The Classical Problem of Evil Refuted

Luke Griffiss-Williams © 2009

Page 1 of 16

Introduction

Confronted with suffering people respond in a multitude of ways, for some

suffering strengthens faith in a God who walks alongside them in their pain, while

others conclude that a loving God would have prevented their suffering, ergo God

either does not exist or is unloving. Others while not seeing suffering as conclusive

proof of God’s non-existence see it as compelling evidence that Zie1 probably doesn’t

exist.2 Stackhouse’s introduction to the ‘Problem of Evil’ illustrates that suffering as

confronted by most people does not involve a reasoned analysis of a philosophical

problem, instead taking the form of a personal trauma leading to question “How could

God let this happen?”3

Rowan William writing after the Asian tsunami, suggested that if some

‘religious genius did come up with an explanation of exactly why all these deaths

made sense’4 this explanation would not provide confidence in God, but actually

make people feel worse.

The existence of suffering in the world is variously attributed by theists to

punishments sent by God,5 the result of a metaphysical battle between God and the

personification of evil, the devil,6 or the result of human action.7 In all three

approaches Christians agree that evil and suffering are only able to occur with the

permission of God. Confronted by a situation in which “we” claim that we would

relive suffering if able, it appears that God’s “refusal” to do so suggests that humans

are more loving than God.

Mackie charges theists with the belief in a loving God who allows evil as

being positively irrational.8 The theist is as such in a precarious position; providing an

explanation for why God allows suffering is unlikely to comfort the grieving, and

could result in a charge of philosophising pain, at the same time a failure to present a

‘solution’ to the problem , leaves theists’ open to Mackie’s charge.

1 Zie is a gender neutral pronoun used in preference to “he” or “her” it is capitalised throughout this paper when used in reference to God.2 The British Humanist Association has funded advertisements on London buses from January 2009 displaying the statement “There’s probably no God. Now Stop Worrying and enjoy your life”. McCandless (2008:n.p.) 3 Stackhouse (1998:1-2)4 Rowan Williams (2005:n.p)5 Bucay (2006) n.p6 Russell 1977:17,7 Strobel 2002:16.8 Mackie 1871:92

Page 2 of 16

Despite the dangers of philosophising suffering this paper will address

whether the ‘Classical Problem of Evil’ represents a real contradiction within theistic

belief. This approach is taken as personally if the problem was to be able to prove an

“unsolvable” paradox my own faith would be seriously damaged. This paper is not of

sufficient length to consider the ‘Evidential Problem of Evil” although it will be

briefly outlined in the conclusion.

This paper will provide a summary of assertions forming the problem,

addressing each assertion in turn and demonstrating areas requiring revision.

Conclusions will be drawn based on revision required.

Page 3 of 16

The Classical Problem of Evil Assertions

Implicit in the question “How could God let this happen?” is the belief that God knew

what was going to happen, could have prevented it, but choice not to; as such Hume

asks, ‘is God incapable of preventing evil, or unwilling to do so?’9

The problem as first described by Epicurus can be summarised by the following

set of assertions:10

(A1) Evil exists

(A2) God exists

(A3) God is perfectly good.

(A4) God is omnipotent

(A5) God is omniscient

(A6) A perfectly good being would eliminate evil as far as it could, and as soon

as it could.

These assertions create a conflict in which one or more assertion in the set is

necessarily untrue, and must be refuted by the theist.

9 Hume (2006/1779:64)10 adapted from Adams and Adams 1990:2

Page 4 of 16

(A1) Evil Exists

While most of us might agree with what in general terms we mean by the word

‘evil’ defining it philosophically is a little more difficult. We might refer to the act of

stabbing someone as ‘evil’ but we probably agree that doing so to protect a small

child was not evil. The circumstance in which an action is committed dramatically

effect whether we consider an act to be evil. Evil is not in itself a thing, we can not

put evil in a bottle, and so defining it is very difficult. The most common definition

used when referring to the Problem of Evil is any ‘ill’ or ‘subtraction’ from a perfect

state of affairs; hence, a burnt cake could be referred to as an ‘evil’ as in a perfect

world the cake would not be burnt. This use of the word does not carry a moral

judgment, but instead identifies that something is less than it could – or more

importantly, should be.

The type of ‘evil’ of greatest concern to humanity is suffering, which we will

define as a situation that subtracts from a perfect state and causes distress. If a burnt

cake does not distress us then we are unlikely to declare ‘its not fair’ and ask

questions about why this has been allowed to happen, it is then evil’s that result in

suffering that our the primary concern of the problem of evil, these can be seen as

falling primarily into two categories:

1. Moral Evil - wilful acts of free agents11 resulting in suffering.

2. Natural Evil - natural disasters, disease and illness resulting in suffering.

As already mentioned, there is a difficulty in defining evil as it is not an object we can

identify, but is instead a statement that something that has happened which takes

away from a perfect, or desire state of affairs. This difficulty has resulted in two

arguments being put forward to refute the existence of evil.

The first is that evil is illusionary – an argument proposed by Mary Baker

Eddy in the 19th Century.12 The argument has had little impact on theodicy as it is

counter-intuitive, requiring the dismissal of evidence of suffering in preference to

(arguably) the more limited evidence of God’s existence. For the Christian this view

is in conflict with the premises that “Christ suffered and died on the cross”13 and so

cannot be adopted as a response to the Problem.

11 Within this definition it is noted that the wilful acts of “spiritual” beings other than humans might be included. 12 McCullough 1975:12.13 McGrath 207:211.

Page 5 of 16

The second, and more important argument is one put forward by Aquinas in

response to the question of whether God created evil. Aquinas argued that evil is not a

created thing with an existence in and of itself. Rather evil is a privation of good in

something that would be expected to have that good by its nature,14 evil and suffering

representing a dysfunction not a function.15

Applying the privation argument to natural phenomenon an earthquake can be

viewed as ‘good’ in performing as an earthquake should; despite a consequence of

this good being a privation of human life. Likewise those actions of humans in accord

with their natures (as created/intended) are not of themselves negative even when

they cause a privation in some other thing/being.

Applied to moral evil the privation argument suggests that some acts of free

beings result in privations of their own nature or the nature of other beings/things as a

consequence of a choice made to act against their nature as created or intended.

As yet a philosophical sound response to this argument has not been

forthcoming; as such a revision is required of the first assertion, from “Evil exists” to

“The privation of good exists”.

There is a danger in this revision that suffering might be seen as marginalised,

it is noted that the lack of mention of suffering is not intend to marginalise it but to

place it into a wider context of privation.

14 Aquinas 1948/ 13 Century Summa Theologica 1.49.1.15 Vardy 1992:22-34.

Page 6 of 16

(A2) God exists

Evidence is not requested or required within the set to substantiate this claim

Instead the ‘Classical Problem of Evil’ as discussed in the introduction, attempts to

show that one item of the set must be false – ie, if ever other part of the set is correct

then the fault must lay in the belief in God.

It is worth mentioning here that a response that can be offered against ‘The

Problem’ is that there is some compelling evidence for the existence of God, and that

this evidence is equal or greater than the evidence against the existence of God. If you

where, for example, to provide an apparently flawless argument to show that I do not

have any hands, I might reasonable rely on my use of them, my experience of having

hands, that I can see them, feel them etc. This raises questions other whether I am

correct to dismiss your argument as being convincing but wrong, or whether I am in

fact delusional.

Page 7 of 16

(A3) God is perfectly good

Aquinas states that “God alone is good essentially.”16 however, Aquinas

description of good refers not to any moral status but rather to ‘perfection in

according to the constitutions of its own being’, ‘in respect of any accidents being

added as necessary for its perfection,’ and ‘attaining to something else as the end.’

The first of these definitions while useful for defining humans as good in as much as

they conform to their “design” is of little assistance in showing that a good being

must by necessity oppose privations of good. The inclusion of the statement that God

is perfectly good is intend to suggest an opposition to the privation of good, as such a

better rendering of this assertion might be “God is perfectly good, and perfectly

loving”. This definition embraces Johnson’s description of ‘perfectly loving’ as the

‘willing of good’ in another (Johnson 2005/1992:266).

16 Aquinas 1948/ 13 Century Summa Theologica 1.6.3

Page 8 of 16

A4) God is omnipotent

Omnipotent was defined by Descartes (1596–1650) as referring to an ability

to do anything whether logically impossible or not (Vardy 1992:27 and McGrath

2007:216). Cheung (2003/2001:102) arguing that God can do only things which are

logically possible suggests that to view God as being capable of doing the logically

impossible is nonsensical, and moves into categorical fallacy where by we suggest the

ability to make a square circle.

William of Ockham (c.1288 - c.1348), argued that God has potentia absoluta,

being able to commit to a course of action which then becomes irreversible, having

made such choices God has potential oridnata, being able to act only in accordance

with the limitations that Zie has ordained, and irrevocably imposed (McGrath

2007:218). This argument suggests that to limit God’s ability by denying Zie’s ability

to self restrict future actions (such as God will not lie) creates a conflict with the

statement that God can do anything logically possible. While attempting to solve one

problem, this creates another in that it requires God to be capable of change,

something traditionally denied by theists. Potentially God would have reduced

“power” with each irrevocable choice made, and as such God while once being

omnipotent now has relatively less power.

The relevance of this to the Problem of Evil is that the argument that God is

omnipotent could be used to suggest that God is able to prevent the privation of good

in two cases simultaneously where a conflict exists. E.g. if a fire is good, and a tree is

good, but a forest fire destroys the tree, an omnipotent being can allow the fire to

consume the tree and preserve the tree simultaneously. The argument that God cannot

do what is logically impossible enables an argument that says for a fire to be a fire,

and a tree to be a tree where the two are in conflict the privation of one must occur –

as such an intervention can not defend both events/objects/people.

The problems inherent in Ockhams argument with the gradual limiting of

God’s power require further exploration, however for the purposes of this paper his

argument will be rejected in preference to Cheung’s description of God as omnipotent

in that God is capable of doing anything that is logically possible.

Page 9 of 16

(A5) God is omniscient

Significant debate exists as to whether omniscience is a logical concept. The

arguments surrounding this are somewhat complex, a full consideration of the topic

being beyond the scope of this paper. Cantor’s proof indicates that omniscience is a

logical impossibility17 in addition to which Holt (2004:n.p) raises three objections

suggesting that God can not have experiential knowledge or middle knowledge, and

that God’s freewill and foreknowledge present a logical contradiction.18 A

satisfactory answer to these difficulties has yet to be forthcoming resulting in this

premise being accepted on faith alone (Sobel 2004:369-397)

Despite these difficulties, the inclusion of A5 in the Problem of Evil set serves

primarily to show that God knows of the existence of evil/privation of good. While

A5 as worded shows God as having knowledge of every privation of good, even if

only one case existed in which God was aware of a privation of good and had not

intervened would allow the argument of the problem of evil to maintain that a conflict

exists if it can be shown that God could have (as Omnipotent) and should have acted

to end it. As such no worthwhile gain can be made from a Christian perspective by

challenge the assertion that God is omniscient and it remains a tenant of Christian

faith.

17 Everitt 2004:28818 see also Dawkins 2006:77-78

Page 10 of 16

(A6) A perfectly good being would always eliminate evil expediently as far as it

could.

A1-A5 does not provide a necessary contradiction, as such A6 must introduce a

contradiction for a ‘problem’ to be shown. The revised form of A1 (Privation of good

exists) requires a revision of A6 to maintain its membership of the set:

A perfectly good and loving being would always prevent the privation of

good expediently as far as it could.

Plantinga (1977:19-21) proposes this assertion19 requires revision to recognise that a

loving being should not prevent a privation of good where doing so would generate a

greater privation of good,20 and that where only one of two equal privations can be

resolved it is not incumbent on a loving being to resolve both.21 As was shown when

assessing omnipotence, Christians do not claim that God can do the logically

impossible in this way.

This necessitates a further revision to A6:

A perfectly good and loving being would always prevent the privation of

good expediently as far as it could, when doing so would not:

a) Generate a greater privation of good than it eradicated.

b) Prevent the removal of a privation of good that is greater in

significance than that which is addressed.

Plantinga’s revision removes the apparent conflict in the set, and as such requires

the questioner to return to A3 (Privation of evil exists) and propose a revision

suggesting that “Privation of evil exists, which could be removed by an

omnipotent being without generating a greater or equal privation of good, or

preventing the removal of a privation of an equal or greater significance.’

19 Plantinga’s arguments have not been directly quoted as they address Evil not the privation of Good, instead the principles of his argument have been applied.20 e.g. in the case of someone with a bruised leg, a surgeon could cure the pain by removing the leg – but doing so would result in a greater evil.21 i.e. two people in a burning building with only time to save one of them.

Page 11 of 16

For this to be sustained an example must be provided in which this situation is

shown to exist. While emotive examples such as a fawn dying painfully over 5 days

in a forest fire, or a young girl being beaten and raped may make it difficult to

imagine that an intervention is not possible without creating a greater or equal

privation, proving that such a privation does not exist is impossible; not least as it

requires the production of a scale on which the various relative privations arising

from an incident might be judged.

Until evidence can be found to show a convincing case in which this situation

occurs this statement can be rejected, and as such the set A1-6 do not present a

necessary contradiction as applied to Christian belief.

Page 12 of 16

Conclusion

This paper has shown that the apparent paradox created by the Classic Problem of

Evil is unsustainable as it relates to a philosophical problem.

The failure of the classical problem to prove an internal contradiction within

theism has resulted in the argument being for the most part abandoned (Inwagen

1991:135) in favour of the Evidential Problem of Evil as presented by Draper who

argues that:

our knowledge about pain and pleasure represents significant negative evidence in relation to theism.22

Such a claim proposes a hypothesis of indifference whereby the weight of evidence

regarding the human condition and nature is seen to point to existence on earth as

being unrelated to the actions of either benevolent or malevolent non-human being

persons (Draper:1989:332). This proposition has been vigorously debated between

atheist and theist, with theist such as Inwagen (1991) refuting it.

While it has been shown that it is not irrational to believe in God in the light

of suffering an answer has not been provided to “Why did God let this happen?” all

that has been demonstrated is that it is possible to believe that God had/has a reason

for allowing suffering/the privation of good – the two most commonly proposed

reasons for allowing suffering to exist being “soul-making” and the maintaining of

“freewill”.

Approaching this question singly from a philosophical and logical position is

not intended to marginalise the real pain experienced by individuals, it is however

considered necessary by this author for the theist to be able to demonstrate that belief

in God can not be proven as irrational.

Accepting that the privation of good may serve a purpose or be necessary

need not, as Williams fears, lead us to philosophise pain. The Christian response to

evil and suffering reaches its pinnacle at the Cross, with the declaration that while we

will not be spared suffering, we are not required to endure it alone.

Questions remain regarding the level of intervention exercised by God on the

created universe. While most Christians would agree God is capable of, and does

intervene to minimise privations in some situations, many reject a concept of God

being actively involved in sending or preventing storms and famines as they occur

22 Draper (1989:331)

Page 13 of 16

daily throughout the world. A fully integrated theology of intervention has yet to be

proposed but remains necessary if a fuller understanding of why the privation of good

is allowed by God – currently such an integrated theology of intervention remains

illusive.

Page 14 of 16

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Marilyn McCord and Adams, Robert Merrihew (Editors) (1990) Oxford

Readings in Philosophy: The Problem of Evil, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Aquinas, Thomas (1948/13th Cent) Summa Theolgica,(tr. The Fathers of the English

Dominican Provonce), New York: Benzinger Bros.

Bucay, Saleh Ampaso (2006) AIDS, A Severe Punishment from God! [Online]

http://www.maranao.com/articles/AIDS%20A%20Severe%20Punishment

%20from%20God.htm Accessed 10 Dec 08

Cheung, Vincent (2003/2001) Systematic Theology, Boston, MA: Reformation

Ministries International

Dawkins, Richard (2006) The God Delusion. Bouston: Houghton Miffin Co.

Draper, Paul. “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” Noûs No.23.

331-350

Everitt, Nicholas (2004) The Non-existence of God, London: Routledge

Inwagen, Peter Van (1991) “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the

Problem of Silence” 135-165 in Tamberlin, James E. (ed.), Philosophical

Perspectives, 5, Philosophy of Religion 1991, Astacaderg,CA: Ridgview

Holt, Tim (2004) “Problems with Divine Ominiscience” Arguments for Atheism

[Online]http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/arguments-for-atheism/problems-

with-divine-omniscience/ Accessed 08 December 2008

Hume, David (2006/1779/) Dialogues concerning natural religion. Mineola, N.Y.:

Dover Publications; repr., (1779) London: Robinson

Johnsone, Elizabet A. (205/1992) She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist

Theologial Discours . New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company

Mackie, John (1971) “Evil and Omnipotence” in Mitchell, Basil ed. The Philosophy

of Religion, London: Oxford University Press

McCandless, Kevin. (2008) “Atheists Run Ads Saying God ‘Probably’ Doesn’t Exit”

CNSNEWS [Online] http://www.cnsnews.com/Public/Content/article.aspx?

RsrcID=38019

McCullough H.B. 1975 “Theodicy and Mary Baker Eddy” Sophia Vol.14, Num. 1,

March 1975. 12-18

McGrath, Alister (2007), Christian Theology: An Introduction, (4th ed.,) Oxford:

Blackwell

Page 15 of 16

Plantinga, Alvin (1977/1974) God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, Michigan:

Wm. B. Eerdmans

Russell, Jeffery Burton (1977) The Devil, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

Sobel, Jordan Howard (2004) Logic and Theism : Arguments For and Against Beliefs

in God, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Strobel, Lee (2002 ) The Case for Faith, Grand Rapids, MI:Zondervan

Williams, Rowan (2005) Article on the Asian tsunamin for the Sunday Telegraph –

printed 2 January 2005. [Online]

http://www.portsmouth.anglican.org/faq/questions_about_faith/god_suffering_a

nd_the_tsunami_by_rowan_williams/

Vardy, Peter (1992) The Puzzle of Evil. London: Fount

Page 16 of 16