the centrality of the united nations in russian foreign policy

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The Centrality of the UnitedNations in Russian ForeignPolicyRitsa A. PanagiotouPublished online: 20 May 2011.

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The Centrality of the United Nations inRussian Foreign Policy

RITSA A. PANAGIOTOU

Russia’s relations with and attitude towards the United Nations (UN) cannot be viewedin isolation from its greater foreign policy goals. As these goals changed and evolvedthroughout various periods of Soviet and Russian history, relations with the UN havereflected these changes and have adapted accordingly. One of the key components ofRussia’s early post-Soviet foreign policy was the desire to re-establish great powerstatus and to reverse its post-Cold War irrelevance and decline in prestige. At thetime, this could be achieved only through its status as a permanent member ofan empowered Security Council. The shifting global equilibrium of the past fewyears – characterized by the re-emergence of a multipolar global configuration anda resurgent Russian foreign policy – suggests that Russia will no longer be relyingon membership of the Security Council to assert its great power status.

There has always been a link between Russia’s foreign policy objectives and

its attitude towards the United Nations (UN). In fact, throughout various

phases of Soviet and Russian history, relations with the UN have mirrored

important foreign policy priorities and were used as a means of pursuing

and achieving these goals. Although relations with the UN represent an impor-

tant dimension of Russian foreign policy, they have not been sufficiently

explored in the scholarly literature. Most of the seminal work analysing the

foreign policy priorities of the Soviet Union1 and the Russian Federation2

makes little or no reference to relations with the UN as a reflection of these

priorities. Moreover, the limited research that has focused particularly on

the Russian attitude and policy towards the UN concentrates on the Soviet

period;3 therefore, it does not address the significant changes that have

taken place in the post-Soviet period and how they have affected Russia’s

perceptions of, and relations with, the UN.

This article aims to contribute towards filling this gap in the literature, by

analysing the mechanisms through which Russia has used the UN in order to

Ritsa A. Panagiotou is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre of Planning and Economic Research,Athens, Greece.

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.27, No.2, June 2011, pp.195–216ISSN 1352-3279 print/1743-9116 onlineDOI: 10.1080/13523279.2011.564088 # 2011 Taylor & Francis

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pursue its foreign policy priorities and goals. The study is structured as

follows: the first part analyses Soviet perceptions of the UN during the

period of the Cold War, emphasizing the apprehensive approach of Soviet

policy-makers to international organizations in general, and the UN in particu-

lar. The next section discusses the gradual opening during the Gorbachev

period, focusing on how the thawing of relations between the Soviet Union

and the West was reflected in improved relations with the UN as well. This

phase was characterized by the realization that the Soviet Union had more

to gain from co-operation within the UN framework than confrontation and

that the Soviet Union could use its position on the UN Security Council to

compensate for its fading international power. The third part discusses the

post-Soviet period: in the light of the collapse of the Soviet ‘empire’ and

the unravelling of the Soviet sphere of influence, Russian foreign policy

priorities focused on finding the means to compensate for the loss of its

superpower status. In this context, permanent membership of the UN Security

Council was seen as one of the strongest foreign policy tools to allow Russia to

maintain its position in global affairs and to demonstrate its clout internation-

ally. The fourth section discusses the implications of the crisis in Iraq in 2003,

and the ramifications – from a Russian perspective – of the failure of the UN

Security Council to provide a solution to the crisis. Finally, the last section will

attempt to draw some conclusions regarding the future of Russia’s relations

with the UN in the light of a shifting global equilibrium, the main character-

istics of which are the erosion of US dominance, the re-emergence of a multi-

polar global configuration and a resurgent Russian foreign policy.

The Cold War: Soviet Attitude towards the UN

The Soviet Union played a leading role in the creation of the UN Charter and

the formation of the UN Security Council. The composition of both was the

product of negotiations and agreements made between the winners of the

Second World War – the Soviet Union, the USA and the UK – at successive

conferences held in Moscow in 1943, in Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and in Yalta

and San Francisco in 1945. The negotiations that took place at these meetings

were meant to reconcile the views of the ‘Big Three’ on the organization and

procedures of the UN, which, unlike the ill-fated League of Nations, was sup-

posed to secure world peace through law.

The Soviet stand during the negotiation process was aimed at countering

the country’s growing isolation, safeguarding Soviet independence and mini-

mizing the organization’s power and authority over its members. In fact, these

were to be the Soviet Union’s main objectives vis-a-vis the UN over the next

decades. Soviet concerns regarding the UN’s jurisdiction were evident before

the negotiations even began: the first time the concept of a UN organization

196 JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

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was raised by President Roosevelt in Tehran in 1943, Stalin’s immediate

question was whether this body ‘would have the right to make decisions

binding the nations of the world’.4 The very creation of the UN was acceptable

only once it had been established that it would be run by the Security Council,

an executive body of restricted membership in which the Soviet Union, like

the other permanent members, would have the right of veto. However, the

extent of the use of the veto became a source of contention and remained unre-

solved during the conference at Dumbarton Oaks.5 The unrestricted use of the

veto – under all circumstances and at every point in the process of handling

disputes, as well as on all decisions concerning procedural matters – was

perceived by the Soviet representatives as a necessary safeguard against an

emerging anti-Soviet coalition. On the other hand, the UK and part of the

US delegation at Dumbarton Oaks supported the view that the veto should

not be used when one of the permanent members was itself a party to the

discord under discussion, and that they should not have the right of veto

over procedural matters.

Another disputed issue was the Soviet demand that all 16 of the Soviet

republics be represented independently in the General Assembly. Many of

them, as Stalin had pointed out, were larger in size and population than

several other prospective members of the UN. Moreover, since the Supreme

Soviet had passed a constitutional amendment enabling the republics to

have their own foreign and defence ministries, they could – in theory –

pursue independent foreign policies, and therefore had the right to be

represented in the General Assembly. In order to pressure the USA and

Britain on these issues, the Soviet Union placed the UN Charter’s endorsement

on hold until agreement was reached with its two wartime allies on the subject.

However, after some brief bargaining, at Yalta Russia proved to be very

conciliatory on these two questions. First, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav

Molotov declared that the Soviet government accepted the USA and British

view on voting in the Security Council. Moreover, the Soviet Union no

longer insisted on all 16 republics being represented, but would compromise

with only three: Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania. The United States and

Britain agreed with Ukraine and Belorussia joining the UN, but Lithuania

was dropped.

Although the principles of the UN Charter had been finalized and agreed, in

response to the USA’s refusal to recognize the Soviet-supported Polish commu-

nist government Stalin announced that Molotov would not be attending the

founding meeting of the UN, which was to take place in April 1945 in

San Francisco. The message was clear: if the USA remained unyielding to

the Soviet demands for the ‘buffer state’ of Poland, the Soviet Union might

stay out of the UN. However, using Molotov’s absence as leverage proved to

be a moot point, as Roosevelt’s death two weeks before the San Francisco

CENTRALITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 197

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Conference and the accession of Harry Truman to the presidency caused the

Soviet leadership sufficient concern to warrant a concession. Thus, even

though Poland was not represented at the UN, Molotov was present at the found-

ing Conference in San Francisco on 25 April, to take stock of the new president

of the United States and to evaluate the new state of affairs.6

While the notion of the UN was conceived during a brief but crucial period

of US–Soviet co-operation – the war against Nazi Germany – the implemen-

tation of this idea was to be enforced just as the two superpowers began

drifting apart and the Cold War began in earnest. In an effort to de-fuse the

growing tensions between the two countries, President Truman wrote a

personal letter to Stalin in which he referred to the need for the USA and

the Soviet Union to continue their collaboration both on a bilateral level

and through the organization of the UN, claiming that ‘the general interest

of our two countries in maintaining peace stands above any specific differ-

ences between us’.7 At the same time, however, US Secretary of State

James Byrnes presented a more sombre appraisal of the situation, contrasting

the USA’s ‘desire to build collective security’ with ‘the Soviet preference for

the simpler task of dividing the world into two spheres of interest’.8 Indeed,

from the very beginning, the Soviet Union’s relations with the UN were

characterized by the strain of trying to integrate a superpower with a deeply

engrained ‘two-camp’ view into a ‘one world’ organization. Inevitably, in

the absence of concurrence between the USA and the Soviet Union, the UN

was doomed from its very foundation to be used as an instrument of leverage

between the superpowers rather than as a vehicle for co-operation.

In January 1950, the Soviet Union boycotted all the UN agencies (includ-

ing the Security Council) in reaction to the defeat of the Soviet proposal to

expel the Nationalist Chinese representative and replace him with a represen-

tative of the communist People’s Republic of China, which the Soviet Union

considered the legitimate Chinese government. The absence of Soviet

delegates was to have fateful consequences when the Security Council

convened on 25 June 1950, following the invasion of South Korea by the

North Korean Army. The UN immediately drafted UNSC Resolution 82,

which was unanimously passed in the Security Council: with the Soviet

delegation absent and unable to veto the resolution, and with only Yugoslavia

abstaining, on 27 June the Council voted to invoke military action by the UN

for the first time in the organization’s history. The resolution led to direct

action by the United States, whose forces were joined by troops and supplies

from 15 other UN members.9 A Soviet resolution calling for an end to

hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign troops was rejected.

Following Nehru’s proposal that the Council should admit a representative

of Communist China and the Soviet Union should return to the talks, the

Soviet Union proclaimed its intention to end its boycott of the Security


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Council. Thus, on 1 August, Ambassador Yakov Malik took his seat –

coincidently, this was the month for the Soviet Union to assume the rotating

chairmanship of the Council. The return of the Soviet Union to the Security

Council implied recognition that its original decision to boycott the UN

until Communist China was accorded a seat had backfired, and that more

could be achieved by working within the organization than by abstaining

from its procedures. In June 1951, Malik’s initiatives laid the foundation for

the truce negotiations that were to last two years.

The Congo crisis was another opportunity to test the parameters of the

Soviet Union’s relations with the UN.10 The chaos and confusion that followed

Belgium’s granting of independence to the Congo in July 1960 – having done

little to prepare the nation for self-government – led to the intervention of a UN

force personally sponsored and supervised by Secretary-General Dag

Hammarskjold. As consensus on how to cope with the crisis collapsed, UN

members soon formed coalitions reflecting their increasingly divergent goals

and the larger Cold War era divide between Western and Soviet blocs. As far

as the Soviet Union was concerned, the Western powers’ handling of the

crisis in the Congo was proof that the UN was nothing more than another

arena in the struggle between the two world systems, and the stage for ‘a

struggle of the new and progressive against the old and the moribund’.11 This

view was evident in the commentary made by the Soviet Communist Party’s

official organ, Kommunist, on the 15th Assembly session, which stated that

‘the historic struggle taking place on the world stage in our days finds

expression within the walls of the Organization [the UN], where the world is

represented in all its manifold and of course contradictory complexity. Here a

polarization is taking place in the course of which the forces of peace,

freedom and social progress unite, while the advocates of aggression and

colonial slavery doom themselves to isolation’.12

The Congo crisis led Nikita Khrushchev to make an appearance at the UN

in order to make official recommendations concerning the restructuring of the

organization. Khrushchev’s proposal called for a ‘troika’ that would replace

the Secretary-General with a commission of three persons representing

capitalism, communism and non-alignment. This proposal failed to gain any

real support among the Afro-Asian group to which it was supposed to

appeal. Khrushchev’s other proposal – to transfer the UN headquarters to

Switzerland, Austria, or even the Soviet Union – was simply ignored.

Embittered by the failure of his proposals, Khrushchev did his best to

display disrespect and contempt towards the UN, shouting and laughing

during other delegates’ speeches, culminating during Harold Macmillan’s

speech when he removed his shoe and banged it on his desk.

Despite the failure of Khrushchev’s initiatives concerning organizational

issues, the evolution of events during the Congo crisis had given the Soviet


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Union the opportunity to play up its role as an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist

power, and to cultivate its credentials as the champion of the hitherto exploited

nations. As decolonization had created a rapid growth in UN membership – by

1965 membership in the UN stood at 118, twice as many as at its founding –

Soviet policy-makers understood the importance of cultivating strategic

relationships with these newly independent countries and the expanding

Afro-Asian bloc. This would not only help break Soviet isolation in the UN,

but would allow the Soviet Union to exert its influence on these countries.

Thus, the Congo crisis marked a turning point in Soviet perceptions of the

utility of the UN in its foreign policy, as it stimulated Soviet interest in

using the UN as a platform for propaganda, as well as an arena for exploiting

the underdeveloped nations’ grievances against the USA and its allies.

The Soviet Union’s scepticism regarding the UN and its tendency to play

down the importance of the organization, however, did not extend to the UN’s

executive organ, the Security Council, which was perceived as the real instru-

ment of power politics. The Soviet leadership was fully aware that permanent

membership of the UN Security Council offered a unique status in world poli-

tics: as the executive organ of the UN, the Security Council holds the real

power and authority over the most important UN activities. Only the Security

Council may authorize UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions,

and only Security Council resolutions – not General Assembly votes –

have the standing of international laws binding on all UN member states.

The Soviet presence on the Security Council and the attached veto power guar-

anteed that Soviet concurrence on all major policy decisions would be

required at all times. Characteristically, Andrei Gromyko, foreign minister

of the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1987, once declared that no international

question of any consequence could be addressed in the UN ‘without the

Soviet Union or in opposition to it’.13 Thus, one may conclude that, while

the Soviet Union exhibited a cynical indifference towards the UN General

Assembly, the purpose for which it was created and the principles on which

it was founded, it simultaneously used the power afforded by permanent

membership of the Security Council, which was perceived as the real

instrument of power politics.

Given the importance placed on ideological dogma on all foreign policy

issues, and the ingrained Soviet scepticism regarding international organiz-

ations and their role, it is hardly remarkable that the Soviet Union considered

the potential for co-operation within the framework of the UN very limited.

Purely from an ideological perspective, Moscow believed that an international

body of such diverse and antagonistic sovereign states could not solve inter-

national problems, since ‘internal contradictions’ would make it impossible

for it to achieve any sustainable level of co-operation. However, beyond the

obvious ideological constraints, the Soviet attitude towards the UN was


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shaped by important pragmatic parameters as well: thus, in many cases, both

rhetoric and actions were fuelled by very real ‘power politics’ considerations:

for example, fearing Soviet isolation within the organization, evaluating how

best to use the UN to advance Soviet foreign policy priorities or promoting its

anti-imperialist credentials in order to influence many newly independent

countries in the UN.14 Thus, while the exact proportion between ideological

dogmatism and Realpolitik may be hard to quantify when one evaluates

Soviet policy and perceptions of the UN, one cannot deny that both were

present.

Finally, when viewed through the prism of the dynamics created during

the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s attitude and policy towards the UN during

this period are not surprising. As Adlai Stevenson, US ambassador to the

UN, declared, ‘The United Nations – as an idea and as an institution – is

an extension of western ideas . . . of Western ideology. It is based on a

Western parliamentary tradition. Its roots are in the Western idea of repre-

sentative government’.15 Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Soviet

Union viewed the UN with a mixture of trepidation, neglect and cynicism.

Some dramatic change would have to take place in Soviet domestic politics,

which would alter the way in which the Soviet Union viewed the role of

ideology, the world system, relations between the ‘camps’, and by extension

the UN.16

New Thinking: Gorbachev and the UN

The revolutionary nature of Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership had a direct

impact on the Soviet perception of the UN as well. In fact, one of the key

themes of the Gorbachev leadership’s ‘new thinking’ on international relations

was a greatly expanded and enhanced role for the UN in international poli-

tics.17 In the course of Gorbachev’s leadership the Soviet Union advanced a

greater number of proposals for strengthening the UN than any other

member state.18

The first signs of change in the Soviet attitude vis-a-vis the UN were the

subtle messages sent out by the Soviet leadership concerning the importance

of the organization, which were in direct contrast to its previous policy of

scaling down the UN’s authority and value. On 22 August 1985, in antici-

pation of a UN General Assembly special session on disarmament, the Polit-

buro underlined the ‘great significance’ it attached to the UN Organization as

an effective instrument of peace.19 At the same time, Vladimir Petrovskii,

deputy minister of foreign affairs, declared that ‘the UNO is an important

factor in the formation of the world political climate and public opinion’,

while he supported the establishment of an all-encompassing security

regime under the auspices of a revamped UN.20


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A major breakthrough was made when Gorbachev committed the Soviet

Union to meeting its outstanding financial obligations to the UN.21 Over the

course of the following year, the Soviet leadership took strong stands in

favour of extensive multilateral co-operation on environmental matters and

international verification of arms control agreements.22 The fact that

Moscow solicited UN involvement in planning a phased military withdrawal

from Afghanistan was a strong indication of the Soviet Union’s new commit-

ment to UN peacekeeping.23 Finally, in his speech to the UN General Assem-

bly on 7 December 1988, Gorbachev expressed regret that the UN had become

‘for many years a field for propaganda battles and for cultivating political

confrontation’.24

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait provided an opportunity to test this new era of

collective security and united action by the Security Council. The Soviet

Union’s full backing of Security Council Resolution 678 on the use of force

against Iraq was the most tangible indication of the new commitment to inter-

national co-operation within the framework of the UN Security Council.25

According to Petrovskii, the maintenance of stability and security in the

world is ‘pursued through multilateral co-operation within the UN and its

Security Council. . . . We see the beginnings of a new type of containment

of a potential aggressor by increasingly using multilateral political and legal

means’.26

Clearly, the trend towards international co-operation, the centrepiece of

Gorbachev’s foreign policy strategy, had found a natural expression in

improved Soviet relations with the UN as well. After decades of playing

down the importance of the UN and underrating its role as a global player,

the Soviet Union had committed itself to transforming the UN from an

arena for the Cold War to a field for really constructive co-operation.27

However, this new Soviet attitude towards the UN was more than just the

result of improved East–West relations and the waning of the Cold War. The

Soviet Union’s commitment to promoting an increased role for the UN in

international affairs marked the beginning of a trend that was to emerge

over the following years: as Soviet and Russian power on the global scene

progressively decreased, the importance of the UN in its foreign policy

increased, as did its desire to strengthen the UN. In the light of the Soviet

Union’s domestic turmoil – which culminated in the disintegration of the

Soviet state – and its declining international power, a permanent seat on the

Security Council of an empowered UN could be the sole remaining forum

where Moscow exercised a significant voice in world affairs.

This line of thinking seems to have influenced Soviet policy during the

Gulf War, and inspired its subsequent support for actions that enhanced the

power and prestige of the UN in general and the Security Council in particular.

This was expressed in an Izvestiya editorial: ‘The US–Soviet agreement on


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the Persian Gulf led to an increase in the capabilities of the Security Council,

where we continue to play a central role. Wouldn’t an increase in the effective-

ness of its activity increase our political possibilities and international pres-

tige?’28 After the termination of hostilities, both Foreign Minister Aleksandr

Bessmertnykh and Soviet Ambassador to the UN Yuli Vorontsov maintained

repeatedly that the Security Council ought to play the leading role in all post-

war security arrangements.29 Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze declared

that ‘the most important thing is to preserve the type of order in which all

decisions related to upholding international security are made by the UN

Security Council, in which we have a veto right’.30 The implications were

clear: the greater the power, scope and authority of the UN and the Security

Council, the greater Russia’s international voice would be.

After the Collapse: Post-Soviet Russia and the UN

Russia’s attitude and policy towards the UN during the post-Soviet period

were inextricably linked to the dramatic changes that Russia underwent

after 1991, and its search for a new role following the loss of its status as a

global superpower. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia – as

the largest of the Soviet republics and de jure successor state of the Soviet

Union – had to come to terms with a huge loss of population and territories,

a collapsing economy and a massive military withdrawal from neighbouring

countries. A historically unprecedented territorial contraction took place,

with Russia surrendering two centuries’ worth of imperial conquests and

returning the country to its early eighteenth-century borders. Following the

dissolution of the Soviet Union, 25 million Russians found themselves

living outside the borders of the new Russian Federation, in former Soviet

republics.31 In parallel to the collapse of the Soviet ‘empire’, important struc-

tures through which the Soviet Union played a significant role in global affairs

– such as the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Econ-

omic Assistance – also collapsed. Russia’s economic, military and political

weaknesses directly constrained its international role, and most Russians

experienced the loss of their country’s superpower status as a national humi-

liation. As Russia was no longer feared, it was no longer given the respect

accorded to major powers. Gorbachev himself said in his resignation speech

that one of his greatest concerns in departing was that ‘the people in this

country are no longer citizens of a great power’.32

These changes had a dramatic impact on Russia’s new foreign policy. To a

great extent, Russia’s foreign policy goals in the post-Soviet period were

informed by the desire to compensate for the loss of its superpower status,

as well as ‘the combination of a loss of national mission, a wounded national

pride, and a confused national identity’.33 Moreover, as Jeffrey Mankoff


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suggests, while Russia struggled to recover from the break-up of the Soviet

Union, the policy-making elite developed a deep-seated desire to prove to

the rest of the world that Russia was, in fact, a ‘Great Power’. In fact,

despite the obvious constraints to Russia’s global role, ‘most of Russia’s

ruling class continued to think of their country as destined by history and

geography to be one of the principal guardians of world order’.34 In this

context, the determination to salvage Russia’s prestige and global presence

was to be one of the pillars of Russian foreign policy over the next few

years, in an effort to reverse what Neil Robinson calls ‘the politics of faded

grandeur’.35 Relations with the UN were to play a crucial role in this

attempt to counterbalance Russia’s declining global power and subsequent

marginalization in the international system. The perception – which had

emerged during Gorbachev’s leadership – that a permanent seat on an

empowered Security Council could be the most important international

forum where Moscow exercised a significant voice in world affairs was

even more relevant and important after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Boris Yeltsin’s approach to foreign policy was very similar to that of

Gorbachev. However, whereas the Gorbachev leadership sought accommo-

dation with the West, Yeltsin wanted to submerge Russia into existing inter-

national institutions so as to share their benefits with Western states and

become a member of the ‘community of civilized states’.36 Under the leader-

ship of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev – who had worked for 16 years in

the directorate of international organizations in the Soviet ministry of

foreign affairs – Russia developed a foreign policy based on a heavy reliance

on Russian participation in international institutions.37

Russia’s first priority, as far as the UN was concerned, was to ensure the

smooth transition from a Soviet to a Russian permanent seat at the Security

Council.38 Russia was concerned about the implications of not automatically

being considered as the rightful successor to the Soviet Union, and being

obliged to go through the usual procedure of applying as an aspiring

member. Yeltsin put pressure on the heads of state of the newly created

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to support Russia’s continuance

of the membership of the USSR in the UN, including permanent membership

of the Security Council, and other international organizations.39 In a letter dated

24 December 1991, he informed the UN Secretary-General that the Soviet

Union’s membership of the Security Council and all other UN organs was

being continued by the Russian Federation, with the support of all CIS

countries. The letter was circulated among the UN membership and received

de facto acceptance, as no objection was registered. Thus, Russia ‘inherited’

the Soviet Union’s seat on the Security Council without debate or a vote.40

Russia’s position as the rightful successor of the Soviet Union was

confirmed during the Security Council summit on 31 January 1992, where


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President Yeltsin was invited to participate as the head of a state that enjoyed

de facto permanent membership status. In his speech, Yeltsin referred to the

Security Council as the ‘political Olympus of the contemporary world’, and

declared that Russia intended ‘to continue the partnership among the

permanent members’ towards settling regional conflicts – in areas such as

Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Cambodia and the Middle East – under the auspices

of the UN.41 Finally, he declared that ‘Russia regards the United States and the

West not as mere partners but rather as allies . . . I am confident that the world

community will find in Russia, as an equal participant in international relations

and a permanent member of the Security Council, a firm and steadfast

champion of freedom, democracy and humanism’.42

Russia’s determination to promote closer ties with the West was put

to the test during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Even though

Yugoslavia and the Balkans were a traditional area of Soviet and Russian

influence, the Russians adopted an impartial position with respect to

Bosnia and supported resolutions in the UN authorizing the use of force, if

necessary. Moreover, the Russian delegate to the Security Council made

no effort to use the veto in order to prevent the expulsion of Yugoslavia

from the UN. Despite strong domestic pressures from parliament and

public opinion – Pravda deplored Russia’s becoming ‘Washington’s yes-

man’43 – Yeltsin made sure not to drift too far from the mainstream of the

UN position on Yugoslavia.

The early 1990s have often been referred to as a ‘romantic phase’ of

Russian foreign policy, thanks to open compliance with Western policies

and an eagerness to co-operate with the West. However, this ‘romantic

phase’ was in essence a ‘pragmatic phase’, based on a realistic appraisal of

Russia’s political and economic weaknesses. Owing to the new balance of

power, a lack of co-operation on Russia’s part might encourage the USA

and the other Western powers to pursue their interests unencumbered by the

UN framework – something they would not have considered doing in the

heyday of Soviet power – leaving Russia with virtually no voice at all in

global politics. Co-operation was a way to keep the West engaged and

Russia involved.44

However, Kozyrev’s pro-Western stance came increasingly under intense

criticism.45 By early 1993, it had become clear that a distinct ‘Weimar

syndrome’46 was making itself felt: a sense that Russia had grown to resent

the role of ‘junior partner’ to the West, and was determined to pursue a

more independent foreign policy.47 An important indication of this new asser-

tiveness was Russia’s stronger defence of the Serbs in the summer of 1993: in

the face of Western pressure to assist the Muslim-controlled government of

Bosnia, Russia vetoed the UN proposal to have the arms embargo on

Bosnia lifted, and strenuously opposed military intervention by the West. 48


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The following years witnessed the slow adaptation of Russian foreign

policy, from high hopes for co-operation to a more assertive divergence from

Western priorities. Yevgenii Primakov, who replaced Kozyrev in January

1996, articulated Russia’s yearning for recognition as a great power: ‘Russia

was and remains a great power . . . its foreign policy should correspond to

that status’.49 He lamented that ‘instead of strategic relations, “leader and

led” relations have begun to take shape in which we have, of course, been

assigned the secondary role’.50 Primakov thus expressed Russia’s displeasure

at playing a second-class role in an American-dominated world.51 In parallel,

he understood that Russia could play a major role in international affairs only

in a more equally balanced, multi-polar world.52 Consequently, the policy pri-

ority was to promote multi-polarity – with an emphasis on international insti-

tutions – in order to balance the trend towards unipolarity.53 Considering these

new foreign policy priorities, Russian officials increasingly emphasized the

importance of the Security Council in international peacekeeping.54 As

Sergei Lavrov, permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the

UN, stated, ‘without an efficient and operative Security Council, the conflict-

settlement process itself would become an exclusive sphere, in the best case,

of regional efforts, and in the worst case, of unilateral actions without a

central coordinating role played by the United Nations Security Council’.55

Russia’s fear of being excluded from crucial decision-making in global

affairs grew as NATO was strengthened through enlargement and then

through its more aggressive military doctrine.56 Russia saw NATO expansion

as part of an American post-Cold War doctrine of neo-containment, whose

purpose was the encirclement and neutralization of Russia in its traditional

European sphere of influence.57 With the signing in May 1997 of the Founding

Act of co-operation between Russia and the West, Russia sought to obtain a

written commitment that NATO would limit the expansion of its military capa-

bilities even as its membership grew, would disavow any intention to use force

against any state except in self-defence or unless authorized by the Security

Council and would grant Russia a role in NATO’s political decision-making.

Russia achieved the first two objectives but failed in the third.58

The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 provoked intense

reactions in Russia. To the Russians, NATO’s intervention was an outrage, as it

flagrantly violated the Founding Act’s commitment that both NATO and Russia

would refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the UN

Charter.59 The fact that Russia had been sidelined during these crucial inter-

national developments intensified the realization that strengthening and pro-

moting the role of the Security Council had to become the cornerstone of

Russian foreign policy. This priority was increasingly reflected in Russian offi-

cial policy statements during this period.60 The Foreign Policy Concept of 2000

identified ‘a unipolar world structure dominated by the United States’ as one of


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the major dangers to Russian interests.61 The Concept emphasized the impor-

tant role of the UN Security Council in global affairs, and the influence that

Russia could have on ‘the formation of a New World Order’. The primary

concern expressed in the Concept was a fear that the UN Security Council

might be sidelined to the benefit of other organizations – such as NATO –

and that for principal questions of international security the stakes were

being placed on ‘Western institutions and forums of limited composition and

on weakening the role of the UN Security Council’. Finally, one of the basic

foreign policy goals listed in the Concept was to preserve the country’s interests

as a ‘great power’, as one of the influential centres of the contemporary world,

and to help bring about a ‘stable, fair and democratic world order’ based on prin-

ciples of international law and the UN Charter. In this context, President Vladi-

mir Putin openly criticized NATO for acting as the world’s policeman, claiming

that ‘this organization often ignores international opinion and agreements when

it takes its decisions’, and emphasized that NATO had ‘no right’ to usurp the

role of the UN Security Council.62

Russia’s concern over the undermining of the Security Council was also

expressed in the National Security Concept of 2000.63 The Security

Concept cautioned against the attempt ‘to create a structure of international

relations based on the domination of developed Western countries, led by

the USA, in the international community and providing for unilateral solution

of the key problems of global politics’. The Concept warned that ‘the tran-

sition of NATO to the use of force beyond the zone of its responsibility and

without the sanction of the UN Security Council . . . is fraught with the desta-

bilization of the strategic situation in the world’. It concluded that the foreign

policy of the Russian Federation should focus on ‘reinforcing the key mech-

anisms of multilateral guidance of global political and economic processes,

above all under the auspices of the UN Security Council’.

The importance that Russia placed on maintaining its global presence

through its status as a permanent member of the Security Council was also

evident during the intense debates on Security Council reform, which

started in earnest in the early 1990s.64 Russia was against any significant

reform of the Security Council, as it felt that this could dilute the country’s

power and have serious consequences for its international status and prestige.

Thus, throughout this period, Russia pursued a status quo policy, promoting

the concept of improvement of the Council’s working methods rather than

the expansion of membership or radical change.

The War on Iraq . . . and Beyond

Russia’s concern that the Security Council – and hence Russia itself – was

being sidelined during crucial international developments was confirmed


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during the course of events leading to the war in Iraq. However, in this case,

the threat to the Security Council’s role as the key actor in the international

security system was not NATO, as had been the case in the past, but the emer-

gence and consolidation of US unilateralism.

The two-month battle in the autumn of 2002 over a new Security Council

resolution, and the growing rift among the five permanent members was only

partly about the resolution of the Iraq crisis and the future of Sadam Hussein.65

In essence, it was a power struggle to determine the role of the UN Security

Council, the balance of power within the Council and the position of a

nearly omnipotent USA in the international system. Clearly, the stakes in

this power struggle were particularly high for Russia, who saw its hopes for

a greater global role through a strengthened Security Council directly

imperilled.

The events leading up to the invasion of Iraq are well known. During this

period, Russian policy-makers were trying to balance two seemingly irrecon-

cilable goals: condemning any potential unilateral military action by the USA

as illegitimate and unjustified, while simultaneously trying to keep the USA

engaged in dialogue within the Security Council and countering the USA’s

increasingly unilateralist instincts. As Dmitrii Rogozin, chairman of the

Duma’s international relations committee, declared, ‘we either co-operate

with America, a great military, economic and political power, and try to influ-

ence them through co-operation, or we quarrel and leave the USA alone with

its own ambitions and interests’.66

Despite the acknowledgement of the need to co-operate with the USA

and the call for unity within the Security Council, on 28 February, Russia

raised the stakes in the diplomatic game when Igor Ivanov declared that

‘Russia has veto power. If needed, and under the conditions of maintaining

international stability, Russia will use its veto . . . Russia will not support a

resolution which opens the way towards a power solution of the Iraqi

problem . . . The Russian position is that the UN Security Council must

be united, especially the permanent members’.67 Russia’s stance was sup-

ported by France and Germany, as the three countries adopted a joint

declaration urging strengthened UN inspections to disarm Iraq peacefully.68

Furthermore, France’s Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin echoed his

Soviet counterpart, stating that his country ‘will not allow a resolution to

pass authorizing the use of force. Russia and France, as permanent

members of the Security Council, will assume all their responsibilities on

this point’.69

Russia’s growing defiance of US war plans led to significant pressure from

the USA: Alexander Vershbow, US ambassador to Moscow, warned the

Russian leadership of the negative economic and geopolitical consequences

of a Russian veto against a resolution authorizing war. Specifically, he


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indicated that Russia could be jeopardizing its bid to join the World Trade

Organization and risked having to endure the perpetuation of Cold War-era

US trade restrictions, such as the Jackson–Vanik Amendment.70 He further

declared that Moscow could endanger planned co-operation between the

two countries in the energy sector, including massive US investment in the

Russian oil industry. Referring to the partnership forged between the USA

and Russia on many important issues, Ambassador Vershbow concluded

that ‘it would be a great pity if progress in these areas is halted, or actually

reversed because of serious disagreements over Iraq’.71

In the face of almost-certain defeat by a majority of members – including

the threat of vetoes by France and Russia – the USA, Britain and Spain

decided to pull their proposed resolution from consideration. Once the war

had begun, Russia continued to call for an immediate return to a diplomatic

solution within the UN framework. President Putin was particularly outspoken

in his criticism, denouncing the war as a ‘big political mistake’ that threatened

the disintegration of the existing international security system, was in viola-

tion of international law and the UN Charter, and could cause a humanitarian

catastrophe.72

An analysis of the events leading to the outbreak of the war indicates that

Russia’s stance during this period was consistent with its previous strategy of

fighting against the marginalization of the Security Council and trying to

upgrade its role in the international security system. The new challenge,

however, was to pursue this goal in the light of the irresistible emergence of

American unilateralism: the fact that Russia maintained its unwavering defi-

ance to US war plans, despite extreme pressure from the USA and potentially

significant political and economic cost, indicates the priority placed on the

geopolitical strategy of trying to manage the USA’s overwhelming global

power through international rules, institutions and procedures – in this case,

through the Security Council.

Russia’s determination to fight against the sidelining of the Security

Council during this period was strengthened by the conviction that US

actions, policy and rhetoric concerning the UN were seriously undermining

the foundations of the international security system and consequently

Russia’s role in this system. Russian policy-makers were aware that this rise

in American unipolarity was gradually eroding the Security Council’s credi-

bility and had endangered its proper functioning. Just as bipolarity had under-

mined the Security Council during the Cold War by giving the Soviet Union

an incentive to deadlock decision-making, the unipolar power structure

encouraged the USA to bypass it. The USA’s disinclination to be bound by

the UN was evident even before Resolution 1441 was passed. In the course

of his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2002, President

George W. Bush declared that ‘we will work with the UN Security Council


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for the necessary resolutions’, but warned that the USA would act alone if the

UN failed to co-operate.73 One month later, when the USA formally proposed

a resolution to the Security Council, President Bush warned that he would not

be deterred if the Security Council rejected the measure: ‘If the UN doesn’t

have the will or the courage to disarm Saddam Hussein and if Saddam

Hussein doesn’t disarm, the United States will lead a coalition to disarm

him’.74 Characteristically, President Bush argued that the UN’s failure to con-

front Iraq would cause it to ‘fade into history as an ineffective, irrelevant

debating society’.75

Russia was also increasingly concerned that, with its power and domi-

nance at its peak, the USA seemed to take for granted an exemption from

legal accountability with respect to use of force that was irreconcilable with

the UN Charter system. The USA had clearly entered a period of unilateral

decision-making and self-confident assertion of its military might, disregard-

ing the views of its allies when they were opposed to its chosen course. The

USA’s lack of consideration for the UN and its evident impatience with the

‘artificial equality’ of the Security Council was amply illustrated through

the public statements of members of the Bush administration. One striking

example of this negative estimation of the UN was articulated by Richard

Perle, the chairman of the Pentagon’s advisory Defense Policy Board, who

wrote: ‘Saddam Hussein’s reign of terror is about to end . . . He will go

quickly, but not alone: in a parting irony he will take the United Nations

down with him’.76 The same message was reiterated in another article by

Perle, entitled ‘Thank God for the death of the UN: its abject failure gave

us only anarchy, the world needs order’.77 From a Russian perspective, the

decline of the UN and the dismissal of the Security Council were seen as a

decline of Russian importance in world affairs. Every time the Bush adminis-

tration derided the UN and denied that it needed a Security Council mandate to

go to war with Iraq, Russia felt that its prerogatives were impinged upon and

its national interests were threatened.78

Clearly, Russia’s objective of constraining the USA’s unilateralist, anti-

UN predisposition while promoting the Security Council as a credible

medium for conflict resolution, was not successful. With the benefit of hind-

sight, one might say that Russia was confronted by ‘a lose–lose situation’

considering its options and the subsequent implications for the future of the

Security Council and the international security system. On the one hand, by

threatening to veto the resolution, Russia unwittingly gave the US-led

coalition an excuse to bypass the Security Council and to act unilaterally. It

was clear from US policy statements that, although the USA would have

liked to have the legitimacy and endorsement of a Security Council resolution,

it would have proceeded without one anyway. Thus, Russia’s threat of veto

would not have been enough to thwart a war. On the other hand, if Russia


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had bowed to US pressure and voted in favour of the resolution authorizing a

war that it openly opposed, it would essentially be agreeing to make the Secur-

ity Council a vehicle for US policy. The negative legacy of a Security Council

that simply rubber stamped what it could not stop would further weaken the

foundations of a security system that was already feeling the strain of the

USA’s overwhelming power. Thus, whether Russia vetoed or not, the Security

Council and the structures of the existing international security system would

be seriously undermined. The inability of the Security Council to stop a war

that Russia had vehemently opposed had negative implications for both: it

underscored Russia’s weakness as much as it did the impotence of the Security

Council.

In the years that have passed since the face-off in the Security Council

and the launch of the war in Iraq, there have been important changes and

developments in the global equilibrium. The balance of power has shifted

away from unipolarity, giving way to a more multipolar, more interdepen-

dent world. Moreover, the past few years have witnessed the emergence of

a more confident, assertive and confrontational Russian foreign policy.

Examples of this new assertiveness include Moscow’s support for Iran’s

nuclear programme in the face of Western condemnation, its decision to

sell aircraft missiles to Tehran over Western and Israeli protests, its invita-

tion to Palestine’s new Hamas government to visit Moscow while the

USA and the European Union were cutting all ties with Hamas, and

joining Serbia in urging the Security Council to reject Kosovo’s unilateral

declaration of independence. The resurgence of Russian foreign policy

culminated in the conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008: the invasion of

Georgia – in response to Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia – was meant

to be a forceful exhibition of Russia’s resurgent role as a key player in

world affairs and a demonstration that it was once more a force to be

reckoned with. Russia’s show of strength and determination dispelled any

lingering doubts about the country’s plans for a stronger global presence.79

Russia’s decision a few weeks later to recognize the independence of South

Ossetia and Abkazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, further compli-

cated the Security Council’s efforts to reach common ground on a resolution

regarding the crisis in Georgia.80 The Russian leadership did not back down

even though its unilateral action drew international criticism and increased

the country’s isolation. Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetia and

Abkazia was a stark demonstration of its determination to hold sway in

lands where its clout has been jeopardized by NATO expansion and

growing Western influence. President Medvedev articulated Russia’s new

and challenging attitude: ‘we are not afraid of anything, including the

prospect of a new Cold War, but we don’t want it and in this situation

everything depends on the position of our partners in the West’.81


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Some Concluding Remarks

In closing this analysis of Russia’s relations, attitude and policies towards the

UN, one may conclude that these relations cannot be viewed in isolation from

Russia’s greater foreign policy goals. As these goals changed and evolved

throughout various periods of Russian history, relations with the UN reflected

these changes and adapted accordingly, going through cycles of distrust and

cynicism, rapprochement and co-operation, support and reinforcement. A

common thread linking the various phases was the tendency for Russia to

use its permanent membership of the Security Council as a strong foreign

policy tool and as a means of promoting its national interests.

When one analyses the complex network of stimuli informing Russia’s

post-Soviet foreign policy, it is clear that one of the most enduring and influ-

ential factors was the desire to re-establish great power status. As discussed

above, the underlying theme of Russian foreign policy was the restoration

of what its leaders considered to be Russia’s rightful place among the

world’s great powers, and the re-establishment of the country as one of the

influential power centres of the world today. Russian policy was thus

focused on trying to reverse post-Cold War irrelevance and decline, and to

prove to the rest of the world that Russia matters internationally. It has been

argued in this study that one of the main means through which Russian

policy-makers pursued this goal of ‘fighting against irrelevance’ was

through the UN. At the core of Russian foreign policy was the conviction

that the country could enhance and strengthen its global presence through

its status as a permanent member of the Security Council. The aspiration to

expand the role of the Security Council during this period was stimulated

by the realization that permanent membership on an empowered Security

Council was one of the few remaining vestiges of its former Great Power

status, and could be the only way for Russia to play a role in crucial inter-

national decision-making. At the same time, strengthening the Security

Council was seen as a means to counter the United States’ emerging unilater-

alism and overwhelming dominance in the global scene.

Following this line of argument, it will be interesting to see how the recent

shifts that have taken place in the global environment will affect Russia’s

relations with the UN. Specifically, it is clear that recent years have witnessed

a new resurgence in Russia’s foreign policy and Russia is re-defining its

foreign policy priorities. At the same time, a more balanced, multilateral

global environment has replaced absolute unipolarity, and a more conciliatory

and co-operative US foreign policy has replaced the USA’s overwhelming and

often confrontational approach to foreign relations. As far as Russia’s relations

with the UN are concerned, the implications of these important changes are

twofold: first, one may assume that Russia no longer looks to the UN for


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confirmation of its superpower status, and no longer considers the Security

Council its ‘only voice’ on the international stage, or its ‘last vestige of

power’, as it did in the early post-Soviet period. Second, the erosion of US uni-

polarity and the prospect of more constructive relations between the two

countries imply that Russia no longer needs to pursue its strategy of ‘promot-

ing’ the Security Council in order to counter-balance the irresistible force of

US unilateralism, as it did during the Iraq crisis. The combination of these

two crucial factors will undoubtedly affect the role and importance of the

UN in Russian foreign policy, and may stimulate a new ‘cycle’ in Russia’s

relations with the UN, in which the organization plays a less strategic and

essential role.

NOTES

1. For a comprehensive analysis of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War, see: JosephL. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, 4th edn(New York: Macmillan, 1992); Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron Jr. (eds.), TheConduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1980); AdamUlam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973(New York: Praeger, 1974); Albert Weeks, The Other Side of Coexistence: An Analysis ofRussian Foreign Policy (New York: Pitman, 1970).

2. There is a plethora of literature covering foreign policy in post-Soviet Russia: see, forexample, Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009); Eugene B. Rumer, Russian Foreign PolicyBeyond Putin (London: Routledge, 2007); Robert Legvold, Russian Foreign Policy in theTwenty-first Century and the Shadow of the Past (New York: Columbia University Press,2007); Ronald H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: ChangingSystems, Enduring Interests (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998); Ted Hopf (ed.), Understand-ings of Russian Foreign Policy (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,1999); Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Councilon Foreign Relations, 1998); Roger E. Kanet and Alexander V. Kozhemiakin (eds.), TheForeign Policy of the Russian Federation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997); Celeste Wallander(ed.), The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview,1996); Peter Shearman (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview,1995); Leon Aron and Kenneth Jensen (eds.), The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994).

3. Alexander Dallin, ‘The Soviet View of the United Nations’, International Organization,Vol.16, No.1 (1962), pp.20–36; Rupert Emerson and Inis Claude, ‘The Soviet Union andthe United Nations: An Essay in Interpretation’, International Organization, Vol.6, No.1(1952), pp.8–10.

4. Dallin, ‘The Soviet View of the United Nations’, p.22.5. For an excellent summary of the Soviet Union’s stance during the negotiations at Dumbarton

Oaks, see Robert Hilderbrand, The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for PostwarSecurity (Chapel Hill, NC and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990),pp.183–212; Charles Prince, ‘Current Views of the Soviet Union on the International Organ-ization of Security’, American Journal of International Law, Vol.39, No.3 (1945), pp.450–85.

6. Emerson and Claude, ‘The Soviet Union and the United Nations’, pp.8–10.7. Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the

Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain at the time of theGreat Patriotic War, 1941–45 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), p.276.

8. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p.105.


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9. Although the Soviet Union challenged the resolution, claiming that the decision of the Secur-ity Council was illegal owing to the absence of the Soviet and legitimate Chinese representa-tives, the view prevailed that a permanent member of the Security Council had to veto aresolution explicitly in order to defeat it.

10. C.J.L. Collins, ‘The Cold War Comes to Africa: Cordier and the 1960 Congo Crisis’, Journalof International Affairs, Vol.47, No.1 (1993), pp.243–69; M.G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: TheCold War in Africa – From Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan, 1982).

11. Editorial, ‘Za mir, za razoruzhenie, za svobodu narodov’ [For peace, for disarmament, forfreedom of peoples], Kommunist, 1960, No.14, pp.4–5 (p.5).

12. Ibid., p.5.13. Seweryn Bialer, Stalin’s Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.237.14. See Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1996).15. Speech to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 18 Jan. 1961, quoted in Dallin, ‘The

Soviet View of the United Nations’, p.36.16. See Sylvia Woodby, Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy

(Boulder, CO: Westview 1989), pp.57–60; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: RethinkingCold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp.1–25.

17. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlya nashei strany i dlya vsego mira[Perestroika and new thinking for our country and the whole world] (Moscow: Politizdat,1988).

18. Ted Daley, Russia’s Continuation of the Soviet Security Council Membership and ProspectiveRussian Policies Toward the United Nations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publications, 1992),p.9. See also Peter Shearman, ‘New Political Thinking Reassessed’, Review of InternationalStudies, Vol.19, No.2 (1993), pp.139–58 (p.157); Maurice Strong, ‘The United Nations in anInterdependent World’, International Affairs (Moscow), 1989, No.1, pp.11–22 (p.18).

19. Pravda, 23 Aug. 1985.20. Vladimir Petrovsky, ‘OON – instrument sovmestnykh deistvii gosudarstv v interesakh mira’

[The UNO: an instrument of joint actions by states in the interest of peace], Mezhdunarodnayazhizn’, Vol.9, No.21 (1985), pp.4–10 (p.9).

21. Jonathan Haslam, ‘The UN and the Soviet Union: New Thinking?’, International Affairs,Vol.65, No.4 (1989), pp.677–84 (p.681).

22. Daley, Russia’s Continuation of the Soviet Security Council Membership, p.9.23. Vladimir Petrovsky, ‘A Dialogue on Comprehensive Security’, International Affairs

(Moscow), Vol.35, No.11 (1989), pp.3–13 (p.3).24. ITAR-TASS, 8 Dec. 1988.25. Andrei Kolosovsky, ‘UN Mirrors the Whole World’, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.37,

No.2 (1991), pp.21–9 (p.24).26. Vladimir Petrovsky, ‘Priorities in a Disarming World’, International Affairs (Moscow),

Vol.37, No.3 (1991), pp.3–8 (p.6).27. See Sylvie Woodby and Alfred B. Evans (eds.), Restructuring Soviet Ideology: Gorbachev’s

New Thinking (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990).28. Alexei Pushkov, ‘Plechom k plechu s Amerikoi’ [Shoulder to shoulder with America], Izves-

tiya, 13 Oct. 1990.29. ITAR-TASS, 6 March 1991.30. Eduard Shevardnadze, ‘Introduction to a Survey of the Foreign and Diplomatic Activities of

the USSR: November 1989–December 1990’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR(Moscow), 22 Jan. 1991.

31. Dimitri K. Simes, After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power (New York:Simon & Schuster, 1999), p.208.

32. Los Angeles Times, 26 Dec. 1991.33. Donaldson and Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia, p.112.34. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, p.13.


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35. Neil Robinson, Russia: A State of Uncertainty (London and New York: Routledge, 2002),pp.133–4.

36. Heinz Timmerman, ‘Russian Foreign Policy under Yeltsin: Priority for Integration into the“Community of Civilized States”’, Journal of Communist Studies, Vol.8, No.4 (1992),pp.163–85 (p.165).

37. See Jeff Checkel, ‘Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the Future?’, RFE/RL Research Report,Vol.1, No.41 (1992), p.18; Coit Blacker, ‘Russia and the West’, in Michael Mandelbaum(ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy, pp.167–94 (pp.172–3).

38. Yehuda Blum, ‘Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union’s Seat at the United Nations’, EuropeanJournal of International Law, Vol.3, No.2 (1992), pp.354–62.

39. United Nations, ‘Decision by the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Indepen-dent States’, UN Doc.A/47/60-S/23329, Annex V (30 Dec. 1991).

40. Dimitris Bourantonis and Ritsa Panagiotou, ‘Russia’s Attitude Towards the Reform of theUnited Nations Security Council, 1990–2000’, Journal of Communist Studies and TransitionPolitics, Vol.20, No.4 (2004), pp.79–102 (pp.89–91).

41. United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3046 Meeting, UN Doc.S/PV.3046, 31 Jan. 1992, p.25.

42. Ibid., p.27.43. Pravda, 27 Jan.1993.44. Andrei Kozyrev, ‘Nash partner vostochnaya Yevropa’ [Our partner eastern Europe], Rossiskie

vesti, 11 Nov. 1993.45. A. Migranyan, ‘Vneshnyaya politika Rossii: Katastroficheskie itogi trekh let’ [Russia’s

foreign policy: the catastrophic results of three years], Nezavisimiya gazeta, 10 Dec. 1994.46. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, p.2.47. Suzanne Crow, ‘Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?’, RFE/RL Research Report,

1994, No.3, p.6; see also Margot Light, ‘Foreign Policy Thinking’, in Neil Malcolm, AlexPravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light (eds.), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.33–100 (p.40); Leon Aron, ‘The ForeignPolicy Doctrine of Post-Communist Russia’, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The NewRussian Foreign Policy, pp.23–63 (pp.25–7).

48. For a detailed analysis of Russia’s policy towards Bosnia, see Donaldson and Nogee, TheForeign Policy of Russia, pp.206–12; see also James Sherr, ‘Doomed to Remain a GreatPower’, The World Today, Vol.52, No.1 (1996), pp.8–12 (p.8); J. Headley, ‘Sarajevo, Feb-ruary 1994: The First Russia–NATO Crisis of the Post-Cold War Era’, Review of Inter-national Studies, Vol.29, No.2 (2003), pp.209–27 (p.209).

49. Kremlin International News Broadcast, 12 Jan. 1996.50. FBIS Daily Report, 24 Dec. 1997.51. Ye. Kozhokin, ‘Osnovnye prioritety vneshnei politiki Rossii (1992–1999)’ [Basic priorities

of Russia’s foreign policy, 1992–1999], Vneshnyaya politika Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1992–1999 [Foreign policy of the Russian Federation, 1992–1999] (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000),pp.33–50.

52. Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed.), Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on theThreshold of the Twenty-first Century (London: Cass, 2003), pp.3–11.

53. Yu.G. Kobaladze, ‘Predislovie’ [Foreword], in Z. Bzhezinski (ed.), Velikaya shakmatnayadoska [The great chessboard] (Moscow: Mezdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1998), pp.9–10.

54. Paula Dobriansky, ‘Russian Foreign Policy: Promise or Peril?’, The Washington Quarterly,Vol.23, No.1 (2000), pp.135–44 (p.140).

55. United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-third session, 63rd Plenarymeeting, A/53/PV.63, 19 Nov. 1998.

56. Alexei Pushkov, ‘Russia and NATO: On the Watershed’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.7,No.2 (1996), pp.13–31 (pp.26–8).

57. Johanna Granville, ‘After Kosovo: The Impact of NATO Expansion on Russian PoliticalParties’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol.8, No.1 (2000), pp.24–45 (p.26); see also ChristopherL. Ball, ‘Nattering NATO Negativism? Reasons Why Expansion May Be a Good Thing’,Review of International Studies, Vol.24, No.1 (1998), pp.43–67.


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58. Robinson, Russia, pp.143–5.59. Ibid., p.145.60. Paul Kubicek, ‘Russian Foreign Policy and the West’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.114,

No.4 (1999), pp.547–68 (pp.554–6).61. ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’ (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of the Russian Federation, 28 June 2000).62. Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Blackwell,

2003), pp.72–97; Valeri Ivanovich Mikhailenko, ‘Russia in the New World Order: Powerand Tolerance in Contemporary International Relations’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol.11, No.2(2003), pp.198–211 (p.205).

63. ‘The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 18 Jan. 2000.64. Bourantonis and Panagiotou, ‘Russia’s Attitude Towards the Reform of the United Nations

Security Council’, pp.87–99.65. On 8 November 2002, after almost eight weeks of negotiation and tremendous pressure by the

United States, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, which set anew timetable and a new regime of inspections for Iraq. Resolution 1441 – which did notauthorize the use of force by the USA – represented a compromise between the Frenchand Russian view and the USA and British perspective.

66. Ekho Moskvy radio station, 20 Feb. 2003.67. The Moscow Times, 28 Feb. 2003.68. France is also a permanent member of the UN Security Council, with veto power, while

Germany had just joined the body in January 2003 as a non-permanent member and wasthe acting chair.

69. Le Monde, 3 March 2003.70. The Jackson–Vanik amendment to the US Trade Act of 1974 tied trade with the Soviet Union

to permission for citizens, notably Soviet Jews, to emigrate.71. Izvestiya, 12 March 2003.72. ITAR-TASS, 20 March 2003.73. The New York Times, 13 Sep. 2002.74. M.J. Glennon, ‘Why the Security Council Failed’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.82 (2003), pp.16–35

(p.17).75. Ibid., p.18.76. The Spectator, 22 March 2003.77. The Guardian, 20 March 2003.78. V. Brovkin, ‘Who is With Whom: The United States, the European Union, and Russia on the

Eve of the War on Iraq’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol.11, No.2 (2003), pp.212–22 (p.216).79. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, pp.241–93.80. Ibid., pp.1–11.81. Associated Press, 27 Aug. 2008.


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the centrality of the united nations in russian foreign policy

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