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March 2012 page 1 HSP Reports from Geneva 35

Report from Geneva Review no 35

The Biological Weapons Convention Seventh Review Conference:A Modest Outcome

The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and ToxinWeapons Convention (BWC) was held in Geneva fromMonday 5 December to Thursday 22 December 2011 – theReview Conference had to finish by 6 pm on Thursday 22December 2011 as the United Nations in Geneva was closingthen for the Christmas break and this meant that there wasno flexibility at all in when the Conference might finish. Thisfollowed the Preparatory Committee meeting held in Genevaon Wednesday to Thursday 13 to 14 April 2011 (see Reportfrom Geneva Review no 34) which had agreed a provisionalagenda, draft rules of procedure, and a recommendeddistribution among the three regional groups of the posts ofChairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies (theCommittee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and theCredentials Committee).

On the opening day of the Review Conference,Ambassador Paul van den IJssel of The Netherlands waselected President of the Review Conference, AmbassadorDesra Percaya of Indonesia elected as Chairman of theCommittee of the Whole, Ms Judit Körömi of Hungary asChairman of the Drafting Committee and Mr Mário Duarteof Portugal as Chairman of the Credentials Committee. Theprovisional agenda was also adopted with its three substantiveitems:

10.Review of the operation of the Convention as providedfor in its Article XII(a) General debate(b) Articles I - XV(c)Preambular paragraphs and purposes of the

Convention

11.Consideration of issues identified in the review ofthe operation of the Convention as provided for inits Article XII and any possible consensus follow-upaction

12.Follow-up to the recommendations and decisions ofthe Sixth Review Conference and the question of futurereview of the Convention

The three week Review Conference was structured soas to commence with two days of general debate in whichstatements were made by representatives of fifty-four StatesParties and one Signatory State (Egypt), the European Union,seven specialized agencies and other internationalorganizations (the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC), the International Criminal Police Organization(INTERPOL), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE),

the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW), the United Nations Interregional Crime and JusticeResearch Institute (UNICRI) and the World HealthOrganization (WHO)). This was then followed by theCommittee of the Whole which met between Wednesday 7December and Friday 16 December and carried out an Articleby Article review of the Convention, producing a reportcontaining language proposed by individual States Parties orgroups of States Parties for the Final Declaration. It presentedthis report on Friday 16 December. Interposed with themeetings of the Committee of the Whole, the President heldinformal plenaries on cross-cutting issues from Wednesday7 December through to Tuesday 13 December 2011.Following the conclusion of the informal plenaries, thePresident conducted a series of informal consultations, inwhich he was aided by Facilitators, which focussed on findingconsensus language for the Article by Article FinalDeclaration and for Part III: Decisions andRecommendations of the Final Document.

104 States Parties participated in the Review Conferenceas follows: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia,Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium,Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, BruneiDarussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China,Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, CzechRepublic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark,Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France,Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See,Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq,Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait,Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho,Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia,Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands,New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic ofMoldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia,Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand,The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey,Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdomof Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States ofAmerica, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), andYemen. This was one more than the 103 States Parties whoparticipated at the Sixth Review Conference in 2006:Armenia, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Democratic Republicof Congo, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Fiji, Kazakhstan,Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liechtenstein,Madagascar, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Uganda, United ArabEmirates, and Uruguay all participated in 2011 whilst Bahrain,Benin, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan,

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Mali, Malta, Monaco, Oman, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, VietNam, and Zimbabwe, who had participated in 2006, did notdo so in 2011.

Five Signatory States participated: Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt,Haiti, Myanmar and the United Republic of Tanzania, whichwas five less than in 2006 (Burundi, Madagascar, Nepal, SyrianArab Republic and United Arab Emirates – of these Burundi,Madagascar and the United Arab Emirates have becomeStates Parties since 2006). Two States, neither party norsignatory, Cameroon and Israel, were granted Observer statusin 2011, one more than in 2006 when only Israel was accordedObserver status. The Convention now has 165 States Partiesand 12 Signatory States. 19 States have neither signed orratified (BWC/CONF.VI/INF.7/Add.1 dated 12 January2012).

The Secretariat prepared eight background documents in2011, instead of the previous six such documents. Consideringthe background papers in sequence the following observationscan be made:

BWC/CONF.VII/INF.1. History and operation of theConfidence Building Measures. This is an updated version ofthe background document provided at previous ReviewConferences. INF.1 contains 8 pages of background andintroduction, an Annex reproducing in 17 pages the Annex tothe Third Review Conference that sets out the agreed forms,and then 6 pages indicating which States Parties have submittedConfidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in each year sincethey were first agreed in 1987. This is similar to thebackground paper on CBMs in 2006 which presentedcomparable information. It should be noted that the annualreport of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) (BWC/CONF.VII/3 dated 23 November 2011) provides a reportindicating which States Parties had responded to each individualCBM in the year to date.

BWC/CONF.VII/INF.2 and Add.1 Compliance by StatesParties. This is closely similar to the background paperprepared prior to previous Review Conferences, in that it iscompiled from the information submitted by the States Partieswith no added material, comment or analysis. Informationwas provided by 36 States Parties: Argentina, Australia, Brazil,Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic,Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, India,Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan,Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland,Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation,South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom,and United States of America. This was sixteen more than in2006 as Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Georgia,Greece, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Kazakhstan,New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Republic ofMoldova, South Africa, Sweden and Ukraine all providedinformation in 2011 whilst Estonia, Hungary, Nigeria, Serbia,Switzerland and the Ukraine did not.

BWC/CONF.VII/INF.3 New scientific and technologicaldevelopments. This is a document which contains an overviewof developments prepared by the ISU based on submissionsfrom States Parties and other sources, and in Annex I anoverview of developments prepared by IAP: the GlobalNetwork of Science Academies. In a welcome change from

the corresponding document in 2006, in which the individualsubmissions from States Parties were not included, in 2011an annex comprising the individual submissions from StatesParties was issued separately as an addendum (BWC/CONF.VII/INF.3/Add.1, Add.2 and Add.3). Individualsubmissions were provided by ten individual States Parties:Australia, China, Czech Republic, Germany, Netherlands,Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, and UnitedStates of America. This was the same number as in 2006although in 2011 Germany, and South Africa madecontributions, whereas Argentina and the Russian Federationdid not. It is regretted that the third co-depositary did notmake a contribution as it has done hitherto.

BWC/CONF.VI/INF.4 Developments in other internationalorganizations relevant to the Convention. This documentreviews developments in regard to twelve UN and specializedagencies: 1540 Committee, Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), InternationalMaritime Organization (IMO), Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Secretary-General of theUnited Nations, United Nations Development Programme(UNDP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO), United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP), World Health Organization (WHO), andUnited Nations Interregional Crime and Justice ResearchInstitute (UNICRI). This is similar to 2006 although in 2011ICAO and UNICRI are included. The document thenconsiders six other international intergovernmentalorganizations: International Centre for Genetic Engineeringand Biotechnology (ICGEB), International Committee of theRed Cross (ICRC), INTERPOL, Organisation for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD), Organisation for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and WorldCustoms Organization (WCO). Finally it considers threeInternational commercial and scientific organizations: IAP –the Global Network of Science Academies, International AirTransport Association (IATA), and International Federationof Biosafety Associations (IFBA). Unlike in 2006, this 2011background paper has no summary table showing whichorganizations are active in which particular areas.Nevertheless, it is still a helpful document that helps to set theBWC in the wider international context.

BWC/CONF.VII/INF.5 Additional understandings. This is anupdated version of the background document provided atprevious Review Conferences that provides a summary ofthe additional understandings and agreements reached byprevious Review Conferences. The approach taken is first toprovide the language in the Convention and then secondlyprovide the additional understandings. This is done in turn forthe Preamble and then for each of the Articles. As in thedocument prepared for the Sixth Review Conference, thedocument prepared for the Seventh Review Conference doesnot, however, show how these extended understandings havedeveloped over the years, as successive Review Conferenceshave frequently amended the language and these amendmentsare not necessarily of equal merit nor are they always progressive.Although it would have been a longer document, the developmentof the language over the years is significant and important inconsidering language at the Seventh Review Conference.


BWC/CONF.VII/INF.6 Common understandings reached bythe Meetings of States Parties during the intersessionalprogramme held from 2007 to 2010. This is a new backgrounddocument that reproduces the substantive paragraphs fromthe respective reports adopted by the Meetings of StatesParties in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. This is a usefuldocument as it puts together the substantive outcome of theannual Meetings of States Parties, and it should have facilitatedthe preparation of States Parties’ proposals for language forthe Article by Article Final Declaration to be considered bythe Committee of the Whole. However, as reported later, theconsideration by the Committee of the Whole of proposalsfor the Final Declaration was less effective than at previousReview Conferences.

BWC/CONF.VII/INF.7 and Add.1 Status of universalizationof the Convention. This background document outlines theresults to date of the activities to promote universalization ofthe Convention undertaken by the President-designate of theReview Conference and the ISU in 2011. It also includesinformation from States Parties and other organizations, wherethat information has been provided to the President-designateor the ISU. The Convention currently has 165 States Parties(listed in the Annex to Add.1), with 12 signatories and 19states having neither signed nor ratified. A total of 31 statesare not party to the Convention.

BWC/CONF.VII/INF.8 and Add.1 Implementation of ArticleX of the Convention. This is a new background documentthat is compiled from the information submitted by the StatesParties with no added material, comment or analysis. It shouldbe noted that the Sixth Review Conference in paragraph 54of its Final Declaration in regard to Article X stated that:

54. The Conference encourages States Parties to provideappropriate information on how this Article is beingimplemented to the United Nations Department forDisarmament Affairs, and requests the Department to collatesuch information for the information of States Parties.

Information was provided by 27 States Parties: Australia,Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark,Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, India, Iran(Islamic Republic of), Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,Norway, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, RussianFederation, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdomand United States of America.

[Although not one of the background documents, it is notedthat BWC/CONF.VII/INF.10 dated 13 December 2011 isentitled Implementation of Article X of the BTWC – someillustrative contributions. This provides some specific butnot comprehensive examples of Article X cooperationactivities carried out by EU Member States and EUInstitutions. Indicative projects are listed for 14 EU MemberStates: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France,Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain,Sweden, and the United Kingdom. It is noted that three ofthese – Ireland, Italy and Spain – did not contribute to theofficial background document (BWC/CONF.VII/INF.8) onthe Implementation of Article X of the Convention even though

all States Parties had been encouraged to do so by paragraph54 of the Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference.]

Two of these background information documents werenew for the Seventh Review Conference: one on the commonunderstandings reached by the interesessional programmefrom 2007 to 2010 and the other on the implementation ofArticle X to be compiled from information submitted by theStates Parties.

Thirty Working Papers – nine fewer than at the SixthReview Conference in 2006 – were submitted by StatesParties or Groups of States Parties to the Review Conference:four by South Africa, three by United Kingdom, two each byBelgium, Germany and France and one each by Canada,China, Cuba (on behalf of the NAM), Finland, India, Iran,Iraq, Japan, Poland and the USA. In addition, members ofthe JACKSNNZ group submitted Working Papers eitheras the group or as part of the group: one by theJACKSNNZ group together with Kenya, Sweden, Ukraine,the United Kingdom and the USA, three by Australia,Japan and New Zealand, one by Norway, Switzerland andNew Zealand, and one by Germany, Norway andSwitzerland and one by Canada and Switzerland – this isa Working Paper by Canada and Switzerland entitledNational Implementation of the BTWC: ComplianceAssessment which was available as an advance documenton the unog.ch/bwc website but as of March 2012 it has yetto appear as a WP, although this is intended.

In contrast, in 2006 the thirty-six Working Papers weresubmitted as follows: eight by the EU, five by the LatinAmerican Group, four by NAM, three by Australia and byIran, two by Canada, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland andthe US and one each by Germany, New Zealand, Norway,Republic of Korea, Ukraine and the UK. The big differencein 2011 was in regard to Working Papers by the recognisedGroups – one by Cuba on behalf of the NAM and one by theJACKSNNZ group (together with other states) with noWorking Papers submitted by the EU, or by the LatinAmerican Group. A welcome step forward is the commitmentshown by the JACKSNNZ group of States Parties whosemembers submitted some nine Working Papers. It is notablethat the initiative shown by the JACKSNNZ group includeddeliberate variations in the configuration, sometimes formingtrios or duos within their group (Australia, New Zealand, Japan;Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand; Canada, Switzerland)and sometimes co-sponsoring working papers with membersof the Western Group outside the JACKSNNZ (Germany,Norway, Switzerland) or members of the Western and EastEuropean Groups and the NAM (Ukraine and Kenya, as wellas Sweden, UK and USA). It is noted that WP.20 when firstissued was submitted by Australia, Canada, Japan, NewZealand, Republic of Korea and Switzerland (on behalf ofthe JACKSNNZ), Kenya, Pakistan, Sweden, Ukraine, theUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland andthe United States of America – but when reissued as WP.20Rev.1, Pakistan was no longer a co-sponsor.

There was again the welcome provision of daily reportson the Review Conference written by Richard Guthrie forthe BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP). These reportswere distributed in hard copies to the delegates as well as bylistserv and on the BWPP website (at http://www.bwpp.org/reports.html).


Opening of the Review Conference

The Seventh Review Conference opened with Jarmo Sareva,Director of the Geneva Branch, Office for DisarmamentAffairs in the chair. In his opening remarks, he said that theConvention was the legal embodiment of the internationalcommunity’s determination to exclude forever the possibility ofdisease being used as a weapon. It was one of the three pillarsagainst weapons of mass destruction. He noted that there werethree short weeks in which to carry out the Review Conferenceto review all aspects of the operation of the Convention and todecide on what must be done to maintain and strengthen itseffectiveness, and thus reduce the risk of biological agents andtoxins being used as weapons. It was an important andchallenging task, and there was no time to waste.

Then following the provisional agenda (BWC/CONF.VII/1)he moved on to agenda item 2. Election of the President ofthe Review Conference and Ambassador Paul van den IJsselwas elected by acclamation. Ambassador van den IJssel thentook the chair and thanked the delegations for his election.He said that he had spent the last year preparing for theReview Conference both in Geneva and around the world.He very much saw this as a common enterprise. He said thecoming three weeks would be busy as a number of importanttopics were to be considered. He said that his aim was tolead the discussions in an open and transparent manner, andto ensure that all opinions were heard. He said he wasconfident that this would lead to an ambitious and realisticdocument that could be agreed by all at the end of this ReviewConference.

Ambassador van den IJssel then outlined the programmefor the rest of the opening morning. He said attention wouldfirst be given to the various procedural matters that requiredattention, starting with the adoption of the Agenda. Once thesehad been completed, there would be a message from theSecretary-General of the United Nations, and then briefaddresses from two special guest speakers, before movingon to the General Debate.

The President then went on to consider the items of theAgenda. Under agenda item 3, the provisional agenda as setout in BWC/CONF.VII/1 was adopted. Then under agendaitem 4, the report of the Preparatory Committee (BWC/CONF.VII/PC.2 dated 26 April 2011) was considered. ThePresident noted that the ISU had prepared eight backgrounddocuments. He said that these papers were meant only toprovide a variety of background information to help delegationsin their preparations, and that these background documentshad no official status as an input to the Review Conference.The report of the Preparatory Committee was adopted.

It is unfortunate that it was said that the backgroundinformation documents had no official status as inputs to theConference. This is because it is a fact that some of theinformation documents are immensely important in helpingthe States Parties to carry out their mandate as set out in theArticle XII section of the Final Declaration of the SixthReview Conference that states:

61.The Conference decides that the Seventh ReviewConference shall be held in Geneva not later than 2011and should review the operation of the Convention,taking into account, inter alia:(i) new scientific and technological developments relevant

to the Convention;(ii)the progress made by States Parties on the implement-

ation of the obligations under the Convention;(iii)progress of the implementation of the decisions

and recommendations agreed upon at the Sixth ReviewConference.

The information submitted by the States Parties oncompliance for BWC/CONF.VII/INF.2 (Compliance by StatesParties), on new scientific and technological developmentsfor INF.3 (New Scientific and Technological Developments)and on the implementation of Article X for INF.8(Implementation of Article X of the Convention) are centralto carrying out the mandated function of the ReviewConference to review the operation of the Convention andall States Parties are to be encouraged to submit informationfor these three documents. In addition, it can be argued thatthe information provided in INF.6 (Common understandingsreached by the Meetings of States Parties during theintersessional programme held from 2007 to 2010) is vital toassist the States Parties to judge the adequacy of the extendedunderstandings in the Article by Article Final Declarationsof previous Review Conferences and to develop ideas forPart III: Decisions and Recommendations. For futureReview Conferences, there is much to be said for recognisingthe importance of the information in these documents inenabling the States Parties to carry out their mandated functionto review the operation of the Convention at the ReviewConference.

The rules of procedure set out in Annex II to BWC/CONF.VII/PC.2 were then considered. The President notedthat the Preparatory Committee had recommended certainadjustments to Rule 5, Rule 8 and Rule 43 (2) respectively.Specifically, the Preparatory Committee recommended thatwith respect to Rule 5, the Conference should elect two (ratherthan one) Vice-chairmen for the Drafting Committee. Withrespect to Rule 8, the General Committee should be composedof the President, the 20 Vice-presidents, the Chairmen andVice-chairmen from the three Committees, the three regionalcoordinators, and the three Depositaries. And with respect toRule 43 (2), the Committees may decide to hold certainmeetings in public. The rules of procedure, as recommendedby the Preparatory Committee, were adopted under agendaitem 5.

Consideration was then given to the request of two Statesnot party – Cameroon and Israel – to be granted observerstatus. This was agreed. In addition, consideration was givento the requests of specialized agencies and regionalintergovernmental organizations – The African Union, theEuropean Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC), the International Criminal Police Organization(INTERPOL), the North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation(NATO), the Organisation for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons (OPCW), the World Health Organization (WHO),and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) – to begranted observer status. This was agreed.

Then under agenda item 6, the meeting went on to electthe Vice-Presidents of the Conference and the Chairmen andVice-Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, the DraftingCommittee and the Credentials Committee. For the Committeeof the Whole, Ambassador Desra Percaya of Indonesia waselected as Chairman of the Committee, Ms Judit Körömi,


Special Envoy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary,was elected as Chairman of the Drafting Committee, and MrMário Duarte of Portugal was elected as Chairman of theCredentials Committee. Under agenda item 8, the meetingwent on to formally confirm Richard Lennane as theSecretary-General of the Review Conference.

The indicative programme circulated as BWC/CONF.VII/2 was then considered under agenda item 9. The Presidentnoted that this included a suspension of the formal programmeat 4.30 pm on the afternoon of Tuesday 6 December 2011 toenable NGOs to make statements. Then on Thursday, therewould be an informal session for a discussion panel of industryrepresentatives in the morning, and the poster session in theafternoon. The indicative programme was agreed.

Before starting on the General Debate under agenda item 10(a), the Conference heard a video-statement from the UNSecretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, in which he said that TheBiological Weapons Convention is central to the globaldisarmament and non-proliferation framework. Over thepast five years, States parties have developed commonunderstandings aimed at better implementation of thiscritical instrument. The parties have also built a vibrantnetwork of concerned groups and individuals. He wenton: This Conference is a chance to build on theseadvances. You can address new developments in the fieldof life sciences and technology so that we can respond toemerging risks. You can also take a fresh look at how toensure that the Convention’s non-proliferation provisionsare carried out in full. You can continue our efforts tomake sure that all countries adhere to the Convention.Finally, you can boost cooperation on the peaceful usesof biological science and technology. This would directlysupport the Convention’s goal of preventing the nightmareof biological warfare.

The President then invited two special guests from the widerworld of science and technology to address the Conference.He said that he had invited them to speak about theresponsible conduct of science, and the role of scientists insupporting the implementation of the Convention.

The first was Professor Indira Nath, a specialist in theimmunology of infectious disease. She said that The BTWCis the legal embodiment of a powerful international normagainst the use of disease as a weapon. As a researcherwhose career has been devoted to seeking cures forinfectious disease, this has great meaning for me. I alsobelieve this norm provides a powerful connection beyondlegal requirements to the fundamental socialresponsibilities of science in ways that can strengthen theimplementation of the Convention in the future. She wenton to say In its efforts to engage the scientific communityin strengthening the BTWC, the States Parties can drawon an existing culture of responsibility in the scientificcommunity. Certainly that culture needs to be strengthenedand expanded and, as I will describe later, importantefforts are being made. But we are far from starting fromscratch. One important area I want to note but which Iwill not address is biosafety, the responsibility to protectthe health of workers as well as the broader communityand environment from harm. As other speakers will make

clear, important efforts are under way to improve biosafetyaround the globe and to use it as a foundation to enhancesecurity as well. It is an important part of the culture ofresponsibility and its capacity-building elements make itattractive for many countries.

She concluded by saying that she wished to bring a messagethat there is an opportunity to take advantage of thegrowing international recognition of the importance ofpromoting responsible conduct of science. For mostscientists, broad concerns about the social responsibilityof science and scientific ethics will be the best entry pointfor engagement in the specific concerns of the BTWC.Then more can be done to address particularresponsibilities vis-a-vis preventing the misuse of scienceto cause deliberate harm. The Review Conference is animportant opportunity for the States Parties to reinforceand support the essential role that education andawareness raising will play in enabling the scientificcommunity to meet its responsibilities under theConvention. It is also an opportunity to continue to buildthe relationships between the BTWC and the scientificcommunity that have developed in the last decade andthat will support our mutual goals of ensuring that scienceis used solely to support human progress.

The second special guest was Esther Ng, a student fromSingapore studying Genomic Medicine and Statistics at theUniversity of Oxford. She was invited to read an essay entitledBiosecurity: The role of young scientists with which she hadwon the offered in the Young Scientist Essay Contest. (Thecontest was run by the Implementation Support Unit incollaboration with the governments of the Netherlands,Switzerland and the United Kingdom, for graduate andundergraduate science students to write on the subject ofResponsible conduct in the life sciences, the importance ofsafety and security as well as the role for internationalcollaboration.)

In her essay, Esther Ng started by saying The exponentialgrowth of biomedical technology has brought aboutunimaginable advances in healthcare, accompanied byunprecedented threats to biosecurity. The maintenanceof a safe environment is the shared responsibility ofscientists, government officials and members of the public.This essay aims to outline ways in which young scientistscan contribute effectively to this cause. She then exploreda number of examples and concluded by saying that I believethat biological security is a shared responsibility withimportant roles even for who are not working within thefield of microbiology or genomics. As scientists, we shouldall be aware of the dual-use dilemma and help to generateideas on how security can be improved while minimisingthe hindrance on research. It is also important to bevigilant for irregular activity which may indicate potentialmisuse of biological agents. As junior researchers whospend a great deal of time in the laboratories, we areparticularly aptly positioned for this role. To conclude,rapid advances in the life sciences have brought aboutcountless benefits, but have also raised threats. Biologicalsecurity is a shared responsibility, with specific roles forjunior scientists. This essay has outlined a few of them,but it is up to each of us to consider how we can best useour knowledge or skills to further this cause.


General Debate

The meeting then moved on into the General Debate. It wasnotable that the screen in the hall displayed a quotation fromGoethe:

Ambitious Realism

Knowing is not enough, we must applyWilling is not enough, we must do.

Goethe

The President noted that there were currently 37 names onthe list of those wishing to make a statement.

Ambassador Rodilfo Benítez Versón of Cuba spoke on behalfof the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States, sayingthat at the XVI NAM Ministerial Conference held in Bali inMay 2011, the NAM Ministers had considered the BWC andhad reaffirmed that: The possibility of any use ofbacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weaponsshould be completely excluded, and … such use wouldbe repugnant to the conscience of humankind. Theyrecognized the particular importance of strengthening theConvention through multilateral negotiations for a legallybinding Protocol and universal adherence to theConvention. They reiterated their call to promoteinternational cooperation for peaceful purposes, includingscientific-technical exchange, and to adopt concrete actionsin this regard such as those contained in the Plan of Actionto implement the Article X submitted by the NAM StatesParties at the Sixth Review Conference, and the additionalNAM States Parties’ proposal on a mechanism for the fullimplementation of Article X of the Convention presentedmore recently. They … highlighted that the Conventionon Biological and Toxin Weapons forms a whole and that,although it is possible to consider certain aspectsseparately, it is critical to deal with all of the issuesinterrelated to this Convention in a balanced andcomprehensive manner.

He went on to say that the NAM feels that there is agreat necessity and urgency for the States Parties of theBWC to work towards strengthening and improving theeffectiveness and implementation of this Convention sothat together we can fully address this concern. He followedthis by saying that The Group stresses the particularimportance of all States Parties pursuing the objectivesthat were set forth by the Fourth Review Conference in1996, as we strongly believe that the only sustainablemethod of strengthening the Convention is throughmultilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement, dealing withall the Articles of the Convention in a balanced andcomprehensive manner. In this context, the Group recallsthat the Ad Hoc Group met between 1995 and 2001 to“consider appropriate measures, including possibleverification measures and draft proposals to strengthenthe Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legallybinding instrument”. However, in 2001 one delegationrejected the entire approach underlying the Protocol whichregrettably stalled the negotiation exercise that hadreached an advanced stage.

Ambassador Versón then said that the universality ofthe Convention is of high importance, and the foremostpriority should be towards the non-signatory States whohave yet to display the basic political will to adhere to theConvention. In regard to the NAM’s expectations for theSeventh Review Conference he said that the NAM’s view isthat the general thrust of the Review Conference shouldbe the review of the operation and implementation of allthe Articles of the Convention and its preamble, includingconsideration of the work of the meetings held duringthe inter-sessional period. He went on to stress theimportance of Article X and to say that the NAM has submitteda working paper on a mechanism to implement Article X andsaid that a mechanism under Article X should provide anopportunity for States Parties to BWC to submit offers ofassistance and requests for assistance in different areasunder the scope of Article X through the establishment ofa database to be administered by the ISU and detailedprocedures to deal with the settlement of disputes arisingfrom the lack of implementation of Article X. He went onto reiterate the importance of verification and compliancesaying that: Verification and Compliance: A central elementof the operation of any multilateral treaty is complianceby all State parties with their obligations. It is criticallyimportant for States parties to be collectively reassuredthat the provisions of the Convention are being realized.The BWC was established with the main objective of thetotal elimination of bacteriological and toxin weaponsbut it has yet to ascertain the achievement of this goal.This is an issue that we must revisit.

We understand that the BWC forms a composite whole.We believe we should deal with all the inter-linked elementsof the Convention – whether they relate to regulation,compliance or promotion. That is why … the NAM andOther States Parties advocate that only a multilaterallyagreed mechanism for verification of compliance canprovide the assurance of compliance with treatyobligations and deter against non-compliance. The FinalDeclaration of this Review Conference should, hence,underscore the importance of negotiations of a legallybinding mechanism to comprehensively strengthen theimplementation of the Convention, including verificationprovisions. This is essential to strengthen the Conventionand addressing compliance concerns.

He then went on to make remarks about the CBMs, aboutthe Intersessional Programme (ISP), about scientific andtechnological (S & T) developments and about the ISU, onwhich he said The Group considers that any decision onthe future of the ISU as well as its structure, size andbudget, should be commensurate with the tasks assignedto it by this Review Conference.

[INF.1 shows that Cuba submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Cuba made a submissionin regard to compliance [INF.2] but not in regard to S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Although at previous Review Conferences and the annualMeetings of States Parties, a group statement – made by theEU country then in the Presidency – on behalf of theEuropean Union (and the Candidate Countries Turkey,Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,


Montenegro and Iceland, the Countries of the Stabilisationand Association Process and potential candidates Albania,Serbia as well as Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova) wouldhave been made as one of the opening group statements inthe General Debate, this did not happen at the Seventh ReviewConference. Instead of Poland (which was in the Presidencyof the EU in December 2011) making a statement at thispoint, the EU chose instead to make a statement as aninternational organization after all the States Parties and indeedSignatory States had spoken. This is a retrograde step as itsignificantly reduces the impact of the EU statement.

The next statement was made by Kairat Umarov, the DeputyForeign Minister of Kazakhstan. He stressed the importanceof universalization of the Convention. He then went on to saythat Kazakhstan recognizes the necessity to supplementBTWC regime with means of international control, toimplement effective measures of verification andtransparency, probably, within the framework of the UnitedNations. There remains another burning issue that of theinternational verification of the microbiological industriesof various countries of the world to make sure that theyhave not been retooled for military production. Settingup of an effective verification mechanism would helpstrengthen mutual trust and security. He went on to mentionthe importance of the right of every state to develop itsbiotechnologies for peaceful purposes. He noted theimportance of UN SCR 1540 in regard to export controls andsaid that Kazakhstan had applied to join the Australia Group.He concluded by outlining various national measures in regardto biological security and urging all States Parties to submittheir CBM declarations.

[Although Kazakhstan became a State Party in 2007, INF.1shows that it submitted its CBM in 2008 and 2011. In addition,Kazakhstan made a submission in regard to compliance[INF.2] but not in regard to S & T developments [INF.3] oron Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Mikhail Khvostov of Belarus then spoke onbehalf of the member States of the Collective SecurityTreaty Organization (CSTO) namely Armenia, Belarus,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan andUzbekistan. He said that the Foreign Ministers of the CSTOStates Parties had adopted a special statement for the SeventhReview Conference (which was circulated as BWC/CONF.VII/INF.9). In this they reaffirmed their commitmentto full compliance with all the obligations under the BTWC.The statement went on to say that We express hope that inthe course of the Seventh Review Conference … we canelaborate effective steps to increase the effectiveness ofthe Convention’s regime and agree on a set of concretemeasures to implement it. In addition, the statement said: Weare confident that it is necessary to analyze in objectiveand comprehensive manner accumulated problems in thearea of biosecurity. At the present time development ofbiological science and related threats and risks provideall increasing grounds for elaboration of workablemeasures aiming at verification of the Convention. Wetherefore come from understanding that elaboration ofthe legally binding mechanism for verification ofcompliance of the BTWC is the most effective way to

strengthen the regime of prohibition of biological andtoxin weapons and to raise confidence in the BTWCcompliance among all the states-parties. We deem itimportant to continue discussion of this issue in the courseof the next intersessional period of 2012-2015.

The statement also welcomed the convening of annualintersessional meetings with the participation of expertcommunity, constitutes solid basis for adoption ofbalanced and substantive final document of theConference. The universalization of the BWC is identifiedas a priority task. The importance of the submission of CBMs,of national implementation measures and the advances ofscience and technology are all noted, together with thedesirability of considering possible measures to improve themechanisms of Article V (consultations) and Article VI(investigations).

[INF.1 shows that Belarus submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. However, Belarus did not makesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], to S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

The next statement was made by Ambassador Pierre ClaverNdayiragije of Burundi which, in October 2011, had justbecome the newest State Party to the Convention. He saidthat from the international point of view, the ReviewConference was a crucial twenty-first century forum becauseit promoted international peace and security. He noted thatbiological weapons could be used to destroy livestock and theeconomic consequences of this could be terrible. Sincebiological weapons could be acquired by non-state actors, itwas essential that the international community work togetheron this issue. The Convention was critical and could protecthuman beings and agriculture, it was also very important forthe promotion of health. He said that Burundi would welcomea regional workshop which would contribute to raisingawareness regionally of all these issues. He closed by thankingthe States Parties that had supported Burundi in theirratification, in particular the United Kingdom.

[Not surprisingly, Burundi as the newest State Party had notcontributed to the CBMs [INF.1], to compliance [INF.2], toS & T developments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

The next statement was made by Elias Jaime Zimba ofMozambique which had acceded to the Convention in March2011. He recalled the statement of the President at thePreparatory Committee that he is committed to workingclosely with all States Parties in a transparent, inclusiveand constructive manner in order to secure a positiveoutcome to the Review Conference, and went on to saythat the task before us is enormous and complex. It requiresfrom all of us a spirit of openness, frankness and ofcompromise. He then outlined the importance of theConvention to Mozambique and what needed to be done tocounter the risks of the hostile use of biological science. Hesaid that we strongly believe success in the operation ofthe Convention rests to large extent on the effectivecompliance, and verification, and on comprehensive andeffective universalisation. The statement went on toacknowledge the value of the ISU and the importance of theimplementation of Article X.


[Not surprisingly, Mozambique as a new State Party had notcontributed to the CBMs [INF.1], to compliance [INF.2], toS & T developments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Eric Danon of France then spoke, saying thatFrance fully supported the declaration which will bemade on behalf of the EU tomorrow. He went on to saythat previous Review Conferences and intersessionalmeetings have helped to increase the awareness of theStates Parties to the issues of the Convention and toclarify its concepts and terms. It is now time to moveon to the next phase; to that of tangible and realisticdecisions. The fact that ten years ago we were unableto achieve a consensus on a verification protocol shouldnot stop us from working to preserve the authority andeffectiveness of the Convention. He then went on toemphasise the following priorities:1/ Firstly, learn lessons from successful experiences in

other areas or in certain countries to enhance theeffectiveness of national-level implementationmeasures.

2/ France’s second priority is to support initiatives to buildconfidence between States Parties.

3/ Third priority: between Review Conferences, we shouldintensify our work while showing flexibility.

4/ France’s fourth priority is to combine multilateral andbilateral actions to allow the BTWC to become fullyuniversal.He said that it is essential that the final document we

shall adopt at the end of this Conference be as tangibleas possible. In regard to the ISU he said that renewing theISU and widening the scope of its mandate are vital forthe effectiveness of our work. He concluded by referringto the 1925 Geneva Protocol saying that France encouragesall States to accede to this Protocol and withdraw theirreservations. He added that in regard to the Secretary-General’s mechanism in case of alleged use of biological orchemical weapons, France attaches great importance tomaintaining this mechanism.

[INF.1 shows that France submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, France made submissionsin regard to compliance [INF.2] and on Article X [INF.8] butnot on S & T developments [INF.3]].

Ambassador Rolf Nikel of Germany then spoke, saying thatGermany associated itself with the common position adoptedby the EU on 18 July 2011. He then went on to say We believethat the Seventh Review Conference will help to buildconsensus on the need for States Parties to engage in aneven broader range of activities if they are to prohibitand prevent illegitimate purposes for modern biology andthat This Conference will emphasize the need to furtherdevelop the BTWC into a more robust regime. He said thateffective national implementation of the Convention iscrucial for the global success of the BTWC. In regard toCBMs he said We strongly encourage all States Partieswho have not done so to participate in the annualexchange of CBMs. We support the idea of taking a freshlook, during this Conference, into ways to enhance theCBM process, above all to review the format of the CBMs.

He then went on to say We are aware that, currently, thereis no consensus on the issue of verification. However, weconsider this issue to be a central element of a completeand effective disarmament and non-proliferation regime.Nevertheless, we are ready to work toward options thatcould achieve common goals. He noted that one of the keyissues being addressed was the question of how confidencebuilding measures relate to compliance. … Providinginformation under the Confidence Building Measures onnational implementation will make a State Party’s activitiestransparent and contribute to building confidence.Confidence Building Measures, on the other hand, donot provide tools to address compliance concerns. Heconcluded with some remarks on Article X, saying that Ouractivities range from university projects of cooperationin the field of biotechnology through to establishing closerelations between the major German federal fundedresearch organizations and national Academies of Sciencein several countries. He added that Germany does notinterpret the requirements as set out in Article X in a narrowsense but understands cooperation and assistance in thewider perspective of Official Development Assistance(ODA), as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

[INF.1 shows that Germany submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Germany madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] and on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Sujata Mehta of India then spoke, saying thatIndia associated itself with the statement made by Cuba onbehalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. He said India iscommitted to improving the effectiveness of the BTWC andstrengthening its implementation. We also support effortsfor universalization. Since 1994, strengthening theConvention and its effective implementation has been theoverriding imperative for States Parties. He went on tosay that the Review Conference should underline that acentral element of the operation of the Convention iscompliance by all States Parties with their obligationsunder the Convention. … Verification of compliance iscritically important for States Parties to be collectivelyreassured that all the provisions of the Convention arebeing realized. In this context, India would like to reiterateits support for the objective of a multilaterally agreedmechanism for the verification of compliance that canprovide the assurance of observance of their legalobligations by States Parties and act as a deterrent againstnon-compliance.

He then addressed some issues that merit greaterattention of States Parties at this Review Conference. Hesaid that the full and effective implementation of Article Xof the Convention continues to be of great importancefor India. He added that Whilst legitimate peaceful usesshould not be hampered, India is not in favour ofunregulated transfers. We believe that strengthenedimplementation of Article III would ensure that thecooperation envisaged under Article X is not hampered.…. India is committed to maintaining effective exportcontrols matching the highest international standards. We


also support assistance for States Parties seeking suchsupport in strengthening their respective national systemsfor biosafety and biosecurity. He went on to address CBMs:CBMs are an important transparency measure to enhancetrust in the implementation of the Convention. India willsupport initiatives to that would encourage participationof States Parties in the CBMs. … CBMs are not analternative to an effective mechanism for the verificationof compliance. Then looking ahead, he said that A balancedand coherent treatment of issues under the responsibilityand clear oversight of the States Parties would be essentialfor the success of the future inter-sessional process. Webelieve that the Convention vests decision making powersin the Review Conference. He concluded by noting thatThere is considerable convergence of views among theStates Parties on the need for focused and continuousreview of S & T developments that have implications forthe Convention. Progress on this issue could representsignificant value addition at this Conference.

[INF.1 shows that India submitted its CBM each year between2006 and 2011 apart from 2008. In addition, India madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2] and on Article X[INF.8] but not on S & T developments [INF.3]].

Alistair Burt, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at theForeign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdomthen spoke, saying the United Kingdom wishes to align itselfwith the statement to be made by the European Unionand its three over-arching priorities for reviewing theBTWC. He went on to say As States Parties, we have muchto be proud of since we last came together in 2006. Theagreed intersessional work programme has served severalpurposes including promoting oversight, education, andawareness-raising among our national experts, includingscientists. … But now is a moment to move beyond whatwe have achieved already and see how we can do evenbetter. … We must act now to ensure that the Conventionremains up to the task, not only to confront effectivelythe threats but also to multiply the opportunities. We must,for example, ensure we can all reap the benefits of thepeaceful uses of micro-organisms, and ensure advancesin the life sciences are used but not abused. With regardto universality, he went on to call on all States that have notalready done so, to accede to or ratify the Conventionwithout further delay. He then said During this ReviewConference, the UK sees several opportunities to set theConvention on a much stronger footing. Our three keyaims are:- First, a new substantive programme of annual

intersessional meetings;- Second, an appropriate level of intersessional

decision-making;- Third, a regular review process for scientific and

technological developments .He then said A word about verification. The UK was a

leading player during the Protocol negotiations that tookplace in this building and worked hard with other StatesParties to secure a successful outcome. As we all know,that was not to be. We should of course discuss issueswhich many States Parties care about. But let us keep thisin proportion and focus on the achievable. He concluded

by urging all delegations to focus on the pragmatic andachievable and avoid fighting old battles. We believefirmly there is much common ground amongst thedelegations from all regions – the opportunity is there foran outcome that goes beyond what we achieved in 2002and 2006. Let us be bold and seize that opportunity.

[INF.1 shows that the UK submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, the UK madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] and on Article X [INF.8]].

Mr Olexandr Aleksandrovych of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the Ukraine then spoke. The circulated statementsaid that the Ukraine fully supported the statement deliveredby Poland on behalf of the European Union although the EUstatement was actually given later in the session of the GeneralDebate, when observers such as the EU could makestatements. He said that During the Review Conferencewe have an important task to sum up the past five-yearperiod of operation of the Convention, with a view toensure the steadfast implementation of all of its provisions.It is important to assess the latest scientific andtechnological developments related to the Convention, totake joint efforts aimed at raising awareness amongstscientists concerning the BTWC regime and possible risksthat may appear from lack of knowledge. He went on tosay that Ukraine shares the idea that the Seventh ReviewConference provides a unique opportunity for us to giveserious consideration and adopt vital decisions on thefollowing aspects:- improvement of the format of the existing Confidence-

Building measures (CBMs) in order to increase numberand quality of submissions by reducing their complexityand removing ambiguity from CBM forms;

- defining concrete steps on universalization of theConvention;

- establishing a well-balanced format for 2012-2016intersessional process;

- monitoring and analysis of the latest advances ofbiological sciences and technologies of commoninterest;

- establishing Action Plan on national implementationof BTWC under Article IV of the Convention;

- further development of international cooperation andtechnical assistance in the context of the implement-ation of Article X of the BTWC;

- strengthening the potential of the BTWC Implement-ation Support Unit.

[INF.1 shows that Ukraine submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011 apart from 2009. In addition, Ukrainemade submissions in regard to compliance [INF.2] and onArticle X [INF.8] but not on S & T developments [INF.3]].

Ambassador Datuk Othman Hashim of Malaysia then spoke,saying that Malaysia fully associated itself with the statementmade by Cuba on behalf of the NAM. He went on to say thatMalaysia supports the efforts by the international communityto press for universal adherence to the BWC and compliancewith its provisions. Nonetheless, regardless of the highpossibility for misuse of these beneficial sciences, the


establishment of verification mechanism for theConvention is idled. We believe much more could be doneto strengthen the effective implementation of theConvention, and Malaysia upholds the view that the onlyway to strengthen the Convention is through multilateralnegotiations for a legally binding Protocol and universaladherence to the Convention. Let’s put back together whatwe have stalled in 2001 and take concrete steps in thisregard. He went on to say that Malaysia is currently finalizingthe Biological Weapons Bill to ensure effectiveimplementation of the Convention in Malaysia. Furthermore,Malaysia undertakes to facilitate and will participate inthe fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials andscientific and technological information for the use ofbiological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes asprovided for under Article X of the Convention. On CBMs,Malaysia hopes that this Review Conference will be ableto come out with new ideas to increase submission ofCBMs by States Parties. We support proposals to amendCBMs in ensuring its practicality while at the same timeincrease its simplicity to ease the reporting burden onStates Parties. He then went on to say that the futureintersessional work should pay close attention to thedevelopment of science and technology and encompassof annual and systematic review on this issue for thebenefit of our community. He concluded by saying, in regardto the ISU, that Malaysia recognizes the important roleplayed by the ISU and supports its continued existenceto support to the work of the Convention. Nevertheless,in expanding the mandate of the ISU, Malaysia believesthat the ISU needs to be provided with the necessaryresources in proportion to its mandated workload.

[INF.1 shows that Malaysia submitted its CBM in 2010 and2011. However, Malaysia did not make submissions in regardto compliance [INF.2], on S & T developments [INF.3] or onArticle X [INF.8]].

Ambassador H E Yafei of China then spoke, saying that Theeffectiveness of the Convention needs to be improved andthe non-traditional security threats such as bio-terrorism,biosafety and security are increasingly prominent. Hewent on to say that at the Seventh Review Conference, Chinahopes that States Parties will, in a pragmatic and cooperativespirit, promote the Conference to adopt practical and feasiblemeasures to strengthen the effectiveness of the Conventionand achieve a work programme fully reflecting the viewsof all parties. In regard to promoting the purposes andobjectives of the Convention in a comprehensive manner,China considered that adopting national implementationmeasures constitutes basic obligations for States Partiesand also an important means to strengthen theeffectiveness of the Convention comprehensively. In recentyears … about 70 States Parties established nationalpoints of contact. China believes that States Parties shouldcontinue to improve national implementation measures,taking into account their domestic situation. In regard toCBMs, The low rate of submission is the most pressingchallenge to CBM mechanism. … China will engage indiscussions on how to improve CBMs in an open andconstructive manner. On science and technology, China

supports efforts to enhance the monitoring andassessment of the advances of biotechnology under theframework of the Convention, with a view to preventingthe hostile use of biotechnology and making it better servethe mankind. On international cooperation and assistance,China supports efforts to adopt practical measures andincrease input so as to enable States Parties, especiallydeveloping countries, to truly benefit from internationalcooperation. In regard to the ISU, China supports the ISUto continue to play an active role in promoting universalityof the Convention and international cooperation, as wellas enhancing communications and trust among StatesParties. He concluded by reaffirming China’s support toConvention and outlining the steps that China had taken toeffectively implement the Convention.

[INF.1 shows that China submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, China made submissionsin regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & T developments[INF.3] and on Article X [INF.8]].

The President then closed the morning session and the Secretary-General made an announcement that there would be a side eventat lunch-time hosted by Switzerland and the UK: an exhibitionof glass sculpture, at which a prize would be awarded to thewinner of the Young Scientist Essay Contest.

Resumption of the General Debate:Monday 5 December 2011 afternoon

The General Debate resumed at 3 pm.

Ambassador Oguz Demiralp of Turkey said we are lookingforward to positive outcomes in the Seventh ReviewConference, notably, in the areas of universalization,Intersessional process, the advances in Science andTechnology, Compliance and Verification, thecontinuation and strengthening of the ISU andcooperation and assistance. He then summarized the viewof Turkey on several items, saying that the Geographicalposition of Turkey makes the issue of universality animportant consideration. He went on to say that ThisConference should take into account any new scientificand technological development relevant to theConvention. Awareness of the innovations in the lifesciences as well as their implications for the BWC arenecessary to address the complex challenges in this area.In regard to Article X, he said that Enhanced implementationof this Article will not only contribute to the development ofcapacities to prevent and contain epidemics, but also buildconfidence. On CBMs, he said CBM reports are valuabletools for mutual understandings and transparency. In thisregard, Turkey has been submitting its reports regularly andthis year made the CBM data publicly available on thewebsite of the BWC Implementation Support Unit. Weencourage all the States Parties to do so. He went on tosay However, the Convention lacks a verification regime,which for Turkey, is a useful mechanism like the ChemicalWeapons Convention. We believe a similar mechanism inthe BWC will enable to strengthen the Convention’seffectiveness.


[INF.1 shows that Turkey submitted its CBM each year from2007 to 2011 but not in 2006. However, Turkey did not makesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Branka Latinovic of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of Serbia then spoke. The circulated statement saysthat Serbia has aligned itself with the Statement made byPoland on behalf of the European Union, although theEU statement was actually given later in the session of theGeneral Debate when observers such as the EU could makestatements. She then went on to speak about the RegionalWorkshop for South-East Europe for the Seventh ReviewConference held in Belgrade on 1-2 November 2011.Representatives from Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Montenegro, FormerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia and Serbiaparticipated. In the discussions, particular attention was givento the issues of strengthening of national implementationactivities of the Convention, future enhancing of CBMs,strengthening of national capacities for elaboration of lawsand regulations to implement BWC, supporting the BWCthrough UN Security Council 1540, role and assistanceof Implementation Support Unit/ISU. She then went on tooutline various steps that had been taken by Serbia includingthe adoption by the Parliament of Serbia of the law on thewithdrawal of the reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.She noted that Serbia continues to submit regularly theannual Declaration on CBM. We are aware that we shouldimprove our system and instruments on CBM Declaration.She went on to say that An adequate attention is beinggiven to raising the awareness of the BWC, particularlyto the issue of the threat of bioterrorism. Namely, thelectures on this issue are part of the education programof the Military Academy. The intention is to include thisissue in the educational programs of other academicinstitutions on different levels.

[INF.1 shows that Serbia submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011 apart from 2008. However, Serbiadid not make submissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], onS & T developments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador D. Javier Gil Catalina of Spain then said thattransparency and mutual confidence between States Partieswas essential for an effective Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention. The Convention was critical in building aneffective non-proliferation regime and for the application ofapplied sciences to improving health and education. Furtherexploration of ways to strengthen Confidence BuildingMeasures were necessary as these measures provided a basisfor transparency. An effective verification mechanism for theConvention was critical and Spain hoped there would besufficient political will to move this mechanism forward.International cooperation and synergies in terms of theprevention of diseases and bio-security were necessary toimprove safety at both the international and national levels.Spain commended the work of the Implementation SupportUnit, whose efforts had strengthened the capacity of StatesParties. He went on to say that universalization of theConvention should incorporate the ratification of States Parties

that had not yet done so. The main challenge of the Conventionwas to ensure the fulfillment of States Parties’ commitmentsand Spain noted the importance of a protocol for verificationin the long term, and the use of Confidence Building Measuresin the short term. It was important to develop new avenues toimprove the quality of provision while not burdening StatesParties further.

[INF.1 shows that Spain submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. However, Spain did not makesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8] although Spainmade a contribution to the EU paper on Article X [INF.10]].

Gennady Gatilov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of theRussian Federation then spoke, saying that Russia promotesinternational cooperation in the field of peaceful biology.We regularly – on the annual basis – provide informationfor building confidence in the biological sphere. For thisReview Conference, the Russian Federation submitted tworeports – on compliance with the Convention as a wholeand on implementation of its Article X. We are convinced ofthe need to further strengthen the regime of completeprohibition of biological and toxin weapons. He then wenton to say that efforts needed to be focused on three areas:

First, Universalization of the BTWC. … However, weare concerned that thirty countries still remain outsidethe BTWC. … This implies that on the territory of thirtyStates the production and development of biologicalweapons could go unpunished. We believe this situationis extremely dangerous. To make the Convention universalis our common priority. He went on to add that It is ofconcern that some States Parties to the BTWC stillmaintain reservations to the Geneva Protocol. … We urgeall countries maintaining reservations to the Protocol towithdraw them as soon as possible.

Second, Implementation of the BTWC. … We regret thatthere are still many States Parties where laws to implementthe Convention have not been put into effect or exist atall. We expect that the Review Conference will helpeliminate this serious backlog.

Third, Effective international control and verification.The possibility to verify compliance by all the States withtheir BTWC obligations is a guarantee that the provisionsof the Convention are not violated and the regime ofprohibition of biological and toxin weapons is functioningeffectively. It is impossible to ensure this confidencethrough transparency measures, no matter how importantand useful they are. That is why we strongly believe thata legally binding BTWC verification mechanism shouldbe developed. Although different approaches to this issuedo not allow us to find a solution today, it is important tomake maximum use of the intersessional work format toexplore every way to achieve this important goal.

He then went on to speak about scientific and technologicaldevelopments, saying that As part of the intersessionalprocess, it is necessary to examine and analyze what specificspheres at this moment need increased attention. Then inregard to the CBMs, he said We attach great importance toconfidence-building within the BTWC. Unfortunately, wehave to note once again that more than a half of the States


Parties to the Convention still fail to comply with theirobligation to annually submit information on theirbiological facilities and biological activities. The lack ofinformation concerning biological activities of anycountry inevitably makes us question whether theConvention is being implemented in good faith … In thecontext of confidence-building we urge each and everyState to provide information on its biological activities.On the intersessional process, he said The next intersessionalperiod could be focused on the discussion of such issuesas verification of compliance with the BTWC, improvementof confidence-building measures, and analysis ofscientific and technological advances in the field ofbiology. Finally, in regard to the ISU he said We highlyappreciate the five-year activity of the ISU … We areconvinced that its mandate should be extended for anotherfive years.

[INF.1 shows that the Russian Federation submitted its CBMseach year between 2006 and 2011. In addition, the RussianFederation made submissions in regard to compliance [INF.2]and on Article X [INF.8] but not on S & T developments [INF.3]].

Ambassador Gancho Ganev of Bulgaria then spoke, sayingBulgaria gives its full support to the objectives, prioritiesand concrete proposals contained in the EU commonposition for the Seventh Review Conference. He went onto say that Bulgaria was looking forward to productivedeliberations on the review of the BTWC operations andexploration of options to strengthen it further throughbuilding confidence in compliance, supporting nationalimplementation and supporting universalisation. He added:We believe confidence in compliance can be enhancedby means of information exchange and greatertransparency through declarations, consultations and on-site activities, including making better use of theintersessional process for exchanges and review and oftools as is the ISU. I join previous speakers, who havestated that there is currently no consensus on verification,which remains a central element of a complete andeffective disarmament regime, we could work towardspragmatic approaches, identifying options that couldachieve similar goals. In regard to the intersessional process,he said that this could be strengthened through setting updedicated working groups to address, in particular,national implementation; universalization; further workon CBMs; assistance and cooperation under Articles VIIand X; developments in science and technology. In regardto the ISU, he said We see practical value and support thestrengthening of the capacity of the ISU as a helpful toolto mitigate the deficit of an institutional structure.

[INF.1 shows that Bulgaria submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Bulgaria madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2] and on Article X[INF.8] but not on S & T developments [INF.3]].

Ambassador Elissa Golberg of Canada then spoke on behalfof the JACKSNNZ countries (Japan, Australia, Canada,Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Norway and New Zealand).[This statement would normally have been made at the start

of the General Debate with the other group statements butthis was not possible because the Ambassador of Canadawas not available in the morning.] She said that TheJACKSNNZ countries have identified seven topics thatwe believe require action in this conference. … :

First, Confidence-Building Measures remain anessential element of transparency under the BWC. Thatsaid, there are opportunities to strengthen the currentsystem. The JACKSNNZ believe that we must increaseparticipation, refine the content of CBM forms andimprove the CBM submission process. She added: We wouldalso like to note with appreciation … that a number ofJACKSNNZ members have been submitting their CBMson the ISU’s public website.

Second, International Cooperation under Article X.… the JACKSNNZ countries have undertaken a widerange of international cooperation activities over the pastfive years, including building capacity in diseasesurveillance, detection, diagnosis, containment, andtreatment, as well as biosafety, biosecurity, and CBRNEresponse training … It is essential that these efforts arecoordinated, so as to avoid duplication of work and tohelp identify potential partner countries. In this context,JACKSNNZ support the proposal that the ISU should beavailable to States Parties to help facilitate theirinternational cooperation …

Third, … biological sciences are advancing rapidly.... The JACKSNNZ believes that regular and moresystematic review should replace the clearly insufficientfive-yearly review. … Another use of concern is the dual-use nature of biotechnology. We note the proposal … onbehalf of JACKSNNZ … that dual-use education shouldbe an essential component of BWC implementation.Furthermore the JACKSNNZ support stronger ties betweenthe BWC and civil society, especially academic andindustry which both play an important role in BWCimplementation. … Accordingly, the JACKSNNZ wouldwelcome a collective assessment and discussion on therole of civil society … .

Fourth, … compliance and verification, includingenhancement of States Parties’ compliance with the BWC.She mentioned the Australian-Japanese-New Zealandproposal for the establishment of a working group … todiscuss and develop common understandings on BWCcompliance, and also the joint Canadian-Switzerlandproposal on compliance assessment, which suggests asystem of showing compliance through transparentdemonstration of a States Party’s implementation program.

Fifth, … the Intersessional Process …. The JACKSNNZconsider that the arrangement can be improved and wouldbe more adaptable to our changing world with WorkingGroups, which would meet annually and workintersessionally. …. The JACKSNNZ also consider thatthe current arrangement could be strengthened byproviding the Meeting of States Parties decision-makingpowers on specific issues in a clearly-defined manner.

Sixth, … the Implementation Support Unit …. TheJACKSNNZ believe the ISU mandate must be renewed,given the valuable support role it plays in helping StatesParties implement all articles of the Convention. We wouldsee merit in a measured enhancement of the ISU so that it


can undertake the activities mandated to it by States Partiesat this Review Conference in a full and effective manner.

Seventh and lastly, … BWC universality …. Furtherand more systematic work is needed to increasemembership in the Convention.

[INF.1 shows that Canada submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Canada madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2] and on Article X[INF.8] but not on S & T developments [INF.3]].

Ambassador Alexandre Fasel of Switzerland then spoke,saying that Switzerland aligned itself with the JACKSNNZstatement. He went on to say that Switzerland is pleasedto note that the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)is in rather good shape. Over the course of the lastfour years, States Parties have worked together in acollegial and constructive manner and have reachedmuch common ground. This conference can now buildon what has been achieved. We should seize this opportunityand take various decisions to further strengthen theBWC’s norms, their implementation and the institutionalframework in which we continue our work. He saidthere are a number of issues where we consider progressto be crucial.

Achieving universal adherence to the Convention mustremain a key priority. … At a minimum we should aim tobring into the Convention all those states that still remainoutside of the BWC but are parties to the ChemicalWeapons Convention. Switzerland hopes that the ReviewConference can decide to strengthen and recalibrateuniversalization efforts, including the adoption of anaction plan on universality.

Switzerland welcomes the achievements made by thepast two Intersessional Processes. … Having said that,we consider that the existing set up was not ideal to ensure“effective action” could in fact be taken. … We believethat this process could be significantly improved in a wayto make the BWC more action-oriented. In this sense, wesupport the creation of open-ended working groups andthe restructuring of the annual Meeting of States Parties,in order to make it more flexible while ensuring topicalcontinuity. We further suggest that the issue of providingthe Meeting of States Parties with the authority to takedecisions on specific, clearly-defined issues should alsobe addressed.

As to international cooperation, …. we fully endorseproposals that aim at creating concrete mechanisms thatcould foster international cooperation in an efficient way.

Switzerland attaches great importance to the ConfidenceBuilding Measures (CBMs). … We believe that pragmaticchanges … could contribute to higher participation in andgreater relevance of this instrument. …. a working group inthe intersessional process could be dedicated to theconsideration of issues regarding CBMs.

He then went on to say that Switzerland stronglysupports the renewal and strengthening of the BWCImplementation Support Unit’s (ISU) mandate. …. Webelieve that a measured enhancement of the ISU’s rangeof activities is a desirable and realistic goal.

[INF.1 shows that Switzerland submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Switzerland madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2] and on Article X[INF.8] but not on S & T developments [INF.3]].

Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty of South Africa then spoke,saying that South Africa associated itself with the statementmade on behalf of the NAM and other States Parties. Hewent on to say that South Africa shares the view that alegally binding instrument is necessary to strengthen theConvention and improve its implementation, and that suchan instrument should remain a goal. However, SouthAfrica does not believe that the only route to obtain sucha goal is through full time negotiations. South Africa isalso open to other means of strengthening the Convention,and believes that these mechanisms should not be ignoredwhen such negotiations are not practically possible. Inthis regard, South Africa will make a number of proposalsaimed at achieving our shared objective of strengtheningthe Convention and its implementation. He went on to say,in regard to the intersessional process, that South Africa isof the view that the utilisation of the intersessional periodis crucial for the future strengthening of the Convention;therefore, this Review Conference will have to take somebold, but realistic steps. … my delegation believes thatthe time is ripe for the improvement of the process in orderto further strengthen the Convention and itsimplementation. He added that South Africa believes thatthe time has come for this Review Conference to establisha structured system of meetings with different levels ofdecision making. In regard to international cooperation andassistance he said that South Africa believes that as wecontinue our endeavours to strengthen the BTWC regime,it is vital that we should also focus on the developmentaland co-operation features of the Convention. He notedthat South Africa has submitted a working paper setting out aproposed mechanism.

[INF.1 shows that South Africa submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, South Africa madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2] and on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] but not on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Steffen Kongstad of Norway then spoke sayingthat Norway has aligned itself with the JACKSNNZstatement presented by Canada. After highlighting someissues of particular importance to Norway, he went on tosay We need to agree on a new intersessionalprogramme that allows States Parties to address bothexisting and emerging challenges in the coming years.In that regard, we should also look at how theintersessional format could possibly be improved andstrengthened. We must clearly make greater efforts touniversalise the BTWC, and we hope that the forth-coming Conference in Finland on establishing a zonefree of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle Eastwill encourage more countries in the region to jointhe Convention. We also need to look at how theconfidence-building measures can be refined and utilizedto better reflect current needs.


He went on to say In addition, there is a need to take acloser look at how we can ensure that the Conventionkeeps pace with the rapid developments in science andtechnology by strengthening the practical collaborationbetween the scientific and disarmament communities. Hethen added that Health remains a key priority …. Norwaytherefore underlines the importance of the fullimplementation of Article X of the BTWC. At the same timewe must recognise that efforts in promoting internationalcooperation and assistance in human, animal and planthealth are carried out by other institutions, such as theWorld Health Organization, the World Organization forAnimal Health and the FAO. He concluded by saying thatThe ISU and its mandate need to be confirmed and, ifpossible, strengthened at the forthcoming ReviewConference.

[INF.1 shows that Norway submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Norway madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2] and on Article X[INF.8] but not on S & T developments [INF.3]].

Ambassador Juan José Gómez Camacho of Mexico thenspoke, saying that he reiterated Mexico’s commitment to theimplementation of the Biological Weapons Convention.Universalization of the Convention would strengthen theregime. Progress of science and technology in our time hadincreased access to products that until recently were only inthe hands of a few. Thus the Convention had to bestrengthened and new approaches had to be explored. It wasa multidimensional issue and Mexico regretted the lack ofbinding legal provisions in the Convention and verificationmechanisms. The intersessional period had been very fruitfuland expert meetings were very useful as well; these meetingsshould continue. Mexico was very open to looking at proposalsto strengthen the Implementation Support Unit working on theimplementation of the Convention. Detection, preparation andresponse were areas that needed to be better known and dealtwith. Notification and Response were tasks that the World HealthOrganization was working on; and there had been a workshopon the issue. Training was provided on early detection. TheInternational Health Regulations were crucial and Mexico hadrealized this during the H1N1 epidemics in 2009. Thus, regionaland multilateral cooperation was crucial in the preparation andprevention of crises and exchange of information as well astransparency were key instruments of this.

[INF.1 shows that Mexico submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011 apart from 2006. However, Mexicohad not made submissions in regard to compliance [INF.2],on S & T developments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Mari Amano of Japan then spoke, saying thatJapan associates itself with the statement made by Canadaon behalf of the JACKSNNZ group. He went on to say Iwould like to highlight a number of points that are ofinterest to my country. He said that In order to strengthenthe BWC, Japan has been especially active in the followingthree areas.

The first is enhancing national implementation of theBWC. For national legislation it is important for each

country to introduce domestic legislation and establishsystem in order to safely and appropriately control high-risk pathogens. …. As part of our efforts in this area,Japan has submitted a working paper … on awareness-raising among life scientists. …

The second area is the strengthening ofintersessional activities. Japan recognizes that in lightof progress in life sciences it has become necessary toreview annually the developments relevant to the BWC.… We consider it desirable to establish three open-endedworking groups by reorganizing the existing Meeting ofExperts. We believe that the creation of three open-endedworking groups … will allow for the continual discussionof important issues such as confidence building,international cooperation and assistance, and the reviewof science and technology. …

The third is confidence building measures (CBMs).Japan regards CBMs as important for transparency… we are considering to further enhance transparencyby … also making it available to the public. Takinginto account that the CBM format has not beenmodified since 1991, we believe that it is now hightime to revise it.

[INF.1 shows that Japan submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Japan made submissionsin regard to compliance [INF.2] and on Article X [INF.8] butnot on S & T developments [INF.3]].

Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia then spoke, sayingthat During the last intersessional period, States Partieshave continued to collaborate on advancing effectivenational implementation on a practical level, with strongsupport from the Implementation Support Unit. There hasalso been much valuable direct collaboration on health-security capacity-building. As an example, Australia hasbeen working with partners in our region to help buildcapacity in disease surveillance systems. …. The healthand security benefits of such collaborations are clear.He went on to say our Convention continues to facesignificant challenges. Ten States have joined the BWCsince the last Review Conference – and we welcome themto our community of BWC States Parties – but thirty-oneStates still remain outside. Rapid advances in life sciencesand the increasing globalisation of biotechnology, whichpromise many benefits to humankind and to the BWC’simplementation, are also changing the nature of thepossible threats the BWC is required to address. Are weas States Parties keeping up with these advances in ournational implementation of the Convention? In regard tothis Review Conference, Australia believed that thisConference should:• refine the intersessional process so that it provides for

greater flexibility and continuity in the way in whichStates Parties address important implementation-related issues;

• mandate a conceptual discussion among States Partiesto develop common understandings on compliancethrough the establishment of an open-endedintersessional working group on confidence buildingand compliance issues;


• mandate more frequent reviews by States Parties ofrelevant advances in science and technology throughthe establishment of an open-ended intersessionalworking group on science and technology and oneducation and awareness-raising within the scientificcommunity; and

• assist in focusing States Parties’ internationalcooperation and assistance efforts through theestablishment of an open-ended intersessional workinggroup on cooperation and assistance.

Beyond these proposals, Australia recognises a range ofother decisions this Conference should take, includingon:• greater coordination in promoting BWC universalisation

and national implementation as means to raise barriersto biological weapons proliferation (includingbioterrorism) and to promote the peaceful uses ofbiology;

• strengthening the CBM process so that it encouragesgreater participation, offers greater transparency andis more effective in building confidence in compliancewith the Convention; and

• renewing the Implementation Support Unit in a mannerwhich preserves and consolidates its efficient, effectiveand professional operations in support of StatesParties.

[INF.1 shows that Australia submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Australia madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] and on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Dell Higgie of New Zealand then spoke, sayingthat she associated her delegation with the statement deliveredby Canada on behalf of the JACKSNNZ group. She went on tosay In the absence of a formal compliance regime, theconfidence building measures mechanism has become animportant tool to promote implementation of the Conventionand to share experiences and best practice in this regard.We support all efforts to increase participation in theconfidence building measures process, includingimprovements to the reporting forms to make them more user-friendly and relevant. In regard to the intersessional process,she said The good work that has been undertaken in thepast intersessional process has demonstrated the value ofregular, targeted meetings to ensure the good health of theConvention and its implementation. There is potential forthe intersessional process to better serve implementation ofthe Convention and we would see merit in a targetedintersessional approach – perhaps adopting a workinggroup or standing committee mechanism – to take forwardthe Convention’s objectives and to ensure that it remains upto date with current developments. In regard to the ISU shesaid that New Zealand supports a measured enhancement ofthe ISU to ensure that it can undertake the activitiesmandated by States Parties in a full and effective manner.

[INF.1 shows that New Zealand submitted its CBM eachyear between 2006 and 2011. In addition, New Zealand madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], and on ArticleX [INF.8] but not on S & T developments [INF.3]].

Ambassador Maria Ciobanu of Romania then spoke sayingthat Romania associates itself with the statement whichwill be delivered by the European Union later in theconference. She went on to say There is no alternative tothis regime, but it is the one most in need of beingstrengthened, in order to prevent the misuse of sciencefor purposes prohibited by the Convention. [Emphasis inoriginal]. She said that The 7th Review Conference is animportant and timely opportunity to revisit the Convention,after the last complete review in 2006. and added thatRomania continues to attach high priority to thestrengthening of the Convention as the basis of ourcommon efforts to prevent the proliferation of biologicaland toxin weapons. I would like to underline that we stronglysupport further strengthening the universality of the BWCmembership. But BWC universalization is not sufficientwithout an improvement of the process of its implementationon regional and national levels. … Romania considers thatthe BWC next intersessional period should provide StatesParties with a new opportunity to continue the dialogue asan essential point for the success of the BWC. She then saidthat Romania remains convinced that confidence buildingmeasures have an important role to play in enhancingtransparency with respect to States Parties’ compliance withthe Convention. … We are committed to working with otherStates Parties on measures of strengthening the CBMsmechanism. She added that We must continue to developpreventive measures such as codes of conduct for thoseinvolved with the life sciences. She then concluded by sayingthat we do support the prolongation of the ISU’s mandatefor five year duration. In this context, we are open to anysuggestions to improve the mandate and format of the ISUin the next inter-sessional period. [Emphasis in original].

[INF.1 shows that Romania submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. However, Romania did not makesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Dian Triansyah Djani of Indonesia then spoke,saying that Indonesia would like to associate itself with thestatement delivered by … Cuba on behalf of the Group ofthe Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Other StatesParties. He went on to say It is our strong belief that allStates Parties to the Convention should work together inachieving general and complete disarmament under strictand effective international control. He then said weunderscore the paramount importance of internationalcooperation, assistance and partnership. We perceive themerit of establishing a framework for cooperation in orderto narrow the gap between States Parties pertaining theirresources, development and national capacity. Suchframework may consist of an integrated approach tocooperation through, inter alia, the establishment of anoffer/request for assistance mechanism, a venue tosustainably and transparently discuss cooperation toenhance common understanding and avoid suspicions,as well as a database to keep track the ongoing and pastcooperation to provide a lesson learned and best practicesfor States Parties. He continued: We also believe in theneed for a compliance and verification mechanism, which


constitutes a challenge to the Convention, to ensure andverify States Parties adherence to the Convention. Weunderstand the difficulty in arriving at an agreement toestablish the mechanism. Therefore we are of the viewthat continuous discussions on the topic in theintersessional process are pertinent in order to forgecommon understanding. He also said However, suchmechanism should not be confused with ConfidenceBuilding Measures (CBMs) which serve as a tool toprovide transparency and build trust among States Partiesin the implementation of the Convention. We share theview on the need to increase States’ participation in CBMssubmission and to review the CBMs form in order toprovide clarity and useful information needed to enhancetransparency and eliminate suspicions.

[INF.1 shows that Indonesia submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011 apart from 2006 and 2007. However,Indonesia did not make submissions in regard to compliance[INF.2], on S & T developments [INF.3] or on Article X[INF.8]].

Norman Antonio Lizano Ortiz of Costa Rica then spoke,saying that Costa Rica highlighted the topic of universalityand welcomed the new members. In addition, Costa Ricawas glad to see that most countries in its region, Latin Americaand the Caribbean, had understood the necessity to adhere tothe Biological Weapons Convention. Despite the limitedresources, there had been positive results in the past fewyears thanks to the Implementation Support Unit. Costa Ricawould like to see this Unit strengthened and hoped that thisConference would manage to reach that result. About scienceand technology, Articles VII and X really needed to berespected and implemented; exchanging experience wascrucial along with the transfer of technology and educationabout the issue. Costa Rica had had contacts with countriesin its region and a workshop had been organized at Lima,Peru on these issues.

[INF.1 shows that Costa Rica had not submitted a CBMbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Costa Rica had not madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Jesus S Domingo of the Philippines then spoke, saying thatthe Philippines associates itself with the statement of theNon-Aligned Movement (NAM). He went on to say thatThe Philippines wishes to express its appreciation for theprogress we have made since the 6th RevCon, including,inter alia, the useful and constructive intersessional process,the activation of the ISU, advances in biological scienceand technology, developments in unversalization andnational implementation, and regional and bilateralcooperation. He went on to mention the East Asia-PacificConference Week held in Manila earlier in 2011: The Ministersof the ASEAN Regional Forum, in their 2011 Meeting,reaffirmed their commitment to the BWC and called on StatesParties to work constructively towards strengthening theregime at the RevCon. He then said that the Philippines is ofthe view that regional and sub-regional cooperation is avital element and dynamic for the advancement of the goals

and objectives of the BWC, and should be accorded dueattention in our deliberations during our RevCon. Heconcluded by saying We would also like to take this opportunityto call for sustained and enhanced support to our nationalimplementation efforts, and to encourage further South-South and Triangular cooperation.

[INF.1 shows that the Philippines had submitted a CBM in2010. However, the Philippines had not made submissions inregard to compliance [INF.2], on S & T developments [INF.3]or on Article X [INF.8]].

Adam Ravnkilde of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofDenmark then spoke, saying that I would like to alignmyself with the statement to be delivered by the EuropeanUnion. He went on to say that Denmark considers buildingconfidence in compliance, supporting nationalimplementation and promoting universalization of theBTWC as overall priorities for this Review Conference.Denmark calls upon all States not party to the BTWC toadhere to it without further delay. He then said we shoulduse this Review Conference as a momentum to reaffirmthe BTWC as one of the fundamental pillars of theinternational community’s efforts to counter weapons ofmass destruction and further strengthen it in this regard.He went on to say that An essential focus of this Conferenceshould be ensuring that the BTWC is continuously up todate with new technological developments, so that it caneffectively contribute to the challenge of reducing the threatfrom biological weapons. In regard to Article X, he said thatDenmark is fully committed to the implementation of ArticleX, and shares the view that States Parties should worktowards the exchange of equipment, material, andscientific and technological information for the use ofbiological materials for peaceful purposes.

…. However, taking into account the dual-use problemof certain biological materials and know-how, Denmarkis also of the opinion that biosecurity is an essentialelement that should be considered whenever biologicalmaterial, know-how and technology is transferred amongStates. He added that The Confidence Building Measuresunder the BTWC and the mandatory data to be reportedto the UN under Security Council Resolution 1540 are inmany ways closely related. Denmark considers that it isnecessary to coordinate information reported to the 1540Committee and the CBMs under BTWC.

[INF.1 shows that Denmark submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Denmark madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2] and on Article X[INF.8] but not on S & T developments [INF.3]].

Neil Giovanni Paíva Benevides of Brazil then spoke, sayingBrazil believes that the effective contribution of theConvention to international and regional peace andsecurity would be enhanced through universal adherenceto the Convention. He went on to say The present Conferenceconstitutes a crucial opportunity for States Parties to senda clear signal to international community that it is possibleto strengthen international security regimes throughmultilateral negotiations. With regard to CBMs, he said Brazil


also supports reviewing and enhancing confidence-buildingmeasures (CBMs) in the BWC. By updating and simplifyingCBMs, countries may find it easier to submit them annually.We believe that they should increasingly become amechanism for transparency and trust. However, CBMsshould not be used as a proxy-verification mechanism, norshould they become compulsory. In regard to Article X hesaid Brazil firmly believes that the full, effective and nondiscriminatory implementation of Article X is essential forthe realization of the objectives and purpose of thisConvention. He went on to say Brazil endorses the workcarried out by the Implementation Support Unit duringthe intersessional period. …. This expertise ought not tobe wasted. …my country supports the renewal of itsmandate until the VIII Review Conference in 2016. Wealso support the idea that has been put forward by somedelegations of granting the ISU a coordinating role inmatters of international cooperation, making it similar toa ‘clearing house’. Brazil believes an ‘enhanced ISU’ canonly be considered after we decide on the structure andfuture activities for the next intersessional period.Furthermore, we would need to better understand theimplications in terms of costs for an expanded ISU. Inregard to the intersessional process, he said that Brazil wouldfavor proposals for creating ‘open-ended groups’ with asubstantive mandate and for a fixed time-frame. Thesegroups could discuss the improvement of practices andmechanism for implementing the BWC. We believe theirrecommendations could be taken for perusal at the annualMeeting of States Parties, for a final decision at the five-yearly Review Conference. He concluded by saying A keyelement of the operation of any multilateral treaty iscompliance by all State Parties with their obligations. It iscritically important for States parties to be collectivelyreassured that the provisions of the Convention are beingrealized. Brazil and other like-minded countries are willingto pursue the debate and negotiations towards the adoptionof a verification protocol, but we understand that this mustbe a consensual decision taken by the States Parties tothe BWC.

[INF.1 shows that Brazil submitted its CBM each year between2006 and 2011 apart from 2008 and 2009. In addition, Brazilmade a submission in regard to compliance [INF.2] but not on S& T developments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Giancarlo Leon Collazos of Peru then spoke, saying that thiswas the time to highlight the commitment of Peru to thecomplete disarmament of weapons of mass destruction,including of biological weapons. In the light of the importancePeru attached to this Convention, Peru had organized aworkshop on the Convention for its region. Most countries aswell as civil society representatives had contributed to thedebate. It had allowed the participants to deal with the keyfeatures of the Convention from a regional perspective. YetPeru was interested in developing its biological industry andthus Peru found it very important to see a more activecooperation and technology exchange. Strict compliance withthe Convention was necessary and the intersessional processwas very helpful to reach this better compliance. Peru had afew proposals such as on Article X. Peru supported all

initiatives that would strengthen that article throughtechnological and scientific exchanges for peaceful purposes.

[INF.1 shows that Peru did not submit any CBMs between2006 and 2011. In addition, Peru did not make submissions inregard to compliance [INF.2], on S & T developments [INF.3]or on Article X [INF.8]].

The President then closed the afternoon session and theSecretary-General made an announcement that there wouldbe a side event on Tuesday morning at 9.00 am entitled GermGambits: Lessons for BWC Compliance Drawn from theUNSCOM Inspections in Iraq. He also reminded allparticipants that there would be a Poster session on Thursdayafternoon on the mezzanine floor.

Resumption of the General Debate:Tuesday 6 December 2011 morning

The General Debate resumed at 10 am on Tuesday 6December 2011.

Ambassador Idriss Jazaïry of Algeria spoke, saying Algeriaassociated itself with the statement made by Cuba on behalfof the Non-Aligned Movement. He went on to say that theBiological Weapons Convention constituted a fundamentalelement for international peace and security. Although it wasnot perfect, it still provided a multilateral normative frameworkthat could prevent the proliferation of biological weapons andeliminate them. Algeria had adhered to the Convention in 2001.It was a party to all instruments of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It had a nationalsystem that corresponded to international norms of biologicalsafety and security. Algeria had never produced, transferredor used such weapons. Biology, microbiology and theirapplications in various activities developed rapidly. Thedual use of the material and equipment produced by thisprogress gave way to more possibilities of proliferation. Alack of a verification regime meant that there could bemisuse of these materials. A global review was necessary.Algeria like many countries belonging to the Non-AlignedMovement believed that a multilateral, binding instrumentwould be the most efficient tool to make this regimeefficient. In the meantime, an agreement must be reachedon a minimal package. Algeria recommended a dualapproach: first of all universal adherence – all Statesneeded to be convinced, and Burundi and Mozambiquewere congratulated for acceding to the Convention. Thecreation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction inthe Middle East was crucial. To be credible and pertinent,this instrument needed to achieve total and transparentimplementation. However, the national implementationmeasures should not serve as a pretext to introduce newforms of discrimination reducing the extent of internationalcooperation planned by Article X of the Convention. TheConvention should not only be seen as a disarmament tool.It was also a tool for cooperation for socio-economicdevelopment. The Convention should work on securityaspects, whether they were related to the military, nutritionor sanitation. The discussions held during the intersessionalperiod had shown the inequalities between States Parties in


matters of implementation. The Conference had to takemeasures in order to reinforce the provisions of Article X.Algeria supported the initiative to continue discussions duringthe intersessional period.

[INF.1 shows that Algeria did not submit any CBMs between2006 and 2011. In addition, Algeria did not make submissionsin regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & T developments[INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Jüri Seilenthal of Estonia then spoke, sayingEstonia fully associates itself with the statement whichwill be delivered by the European Union later during theConference. He went on to say that The Seventh ReviewConference provides us with an opportunity to modernizeand further strengthen the Convention in order to betteraddress the changing nature of biological weapons. Inthis respect, Estonia is dedicated to achieve progressespecially in the following areas. First, we expect theSeventh Review Conference to renew and further enhancethe intersessional process. … Estonia believes the nextintersessional work programme should be more actionoriented and responsive to our changing world. We aretherefore ready to support the creation of more flexiblemeeting formats and thematic working groups… He saidThe prolongation of the mandate of the ImplementationSupport Unit is another priority. … We pledge our fullsupport to renewing the ISU’s mandate for a further fiveyears and a modest expanding of the ISU, if the ReviewConference will decide to extend its activities. In regard toCBMs he said We believe that it is high time to modernizethis format. We therefore fully support the idea to discussthe improvement and further development of theConfidence-Building Measures’ format. He went on tosay that National implementation of the Convention is apivotal point for the success of the BTWC. In this regard,I would like to reaffirm that Estonia has fully implementedall obligations resulting from the BTWC into Estoniannational law.

[INF.1 shows that Estonia submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. However, Estonia did not makesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Héctor Raúl Peláez of Argentina then spoke, saying thatArgentina saw the universalization of adherence to theConvention and the implementation of the Convention at thenational level as key aspects. The discussions during theintersessional period had been very useful. The Conferenceshould identify ways to develop the Confidence BuildingMeasures. Argentina believed that the different themesidentified during the preparatory meetings would be helpfulto guide the Conference’s work. Argentina hoped that theStates that were not parties would see the importance ofadhering to the Convention. Argentina welcomed the last twocountries that had joined the Convention. Argentina was readyto discuss possible ways to improve transparency. Adheringto the Convention also meant that there were some obligations,such as those in Article X. Argentina supported the idea ofcreating a database in which there were requests and

responses in the field of cooperation. Argentina would supportany means to strengthen cooperation; it was crucial to thisConvention. The possibility of use of biological weaponsrequired a rapid and efficient response of States. This wasonly possible if States were ready for such a use, and thismeant that States had to cooperate fully. Argentina hoped tosee this Review Conference focus on the following fields forthe next few weeks: compliance, cooperation and assistance,science and technology. Many changes had occurred sincethe Sixth Review Conference, and the Seventh ReviewConference constituted a new opportunity in order toconsolidate the basis of the future agreements that wouldstrengthen the cornerstone of the international regime for thenon-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

[INF.1 shows that Argentina submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Argentina made asubmission in regard to compliance [INF.2] but not on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Zeljko Jerkic of Bosnia and Herzegovina thenspoke, saying that The number of issues to be discussedwill certainly contribute to a better understanding of thescope and implications of the full implementation of theConvention … Each element connected with thecompliance with the BTWC, cooperation and assistanceas stipulated in the Convention, further enhancement ofthe confidence building measures and intensification ofthe so called intersessional process deserves our fullattention. He went on to say we need to reaffirm the valueof the Convention on Biological Weapons as aninstrument for multilateral and also regional cooperation;let me reiterate this concept which is key in a multilateralsystem; cooperation. He added We therefore firmly believethat the VII RC by bringing together representatives ofgovernment, individual experts, academia, as well asNGOs presents an exceptional opportunity to furtherstreamline our activities which certainly goes beyond thecommunity on disarmament. He then outlined a number ofactions being taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina. He went onto say that Smaller countries, with limited resources, skillsand expertise, are even more compelled to rely on eachother and to establish the closest possible cooperationand coordination mechanisms. He concluded by sayingAllow me to express our confidence that the VII RC willresult in very practical follow-up steps aimed at increasingoverall security and making our planet safe place for usbut also for future generations.

[INF.1 shows that Bosnia and Herzegovina did not submitany CBMs between 2006 and 2011. In addition, Bosnia andHerzegovina did not make submissions in regard to compliance[INF.2], on S & T developments [INF.3] or on Article X[INF.8]].

Ambassador Md. Abdul Hannan of Bangladesh then spoke,saying that Bangladesh associated itself with the statementmade by Cuba on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Hesaid that The additional understandings reached in severalreview conferences have further strengthened theeffectiveness of the Convention. In regard to universality, he


said Bangladesh supports a concerted campaign, over thenext couple of years, towards making the Conventionuniversal. …. We call upon all the states that are yet tosign or ratify the Convention to consider being a party toit. He went on to say that the Implementation Support Unit(ISU) has been doing a commendable job by providingadministrative support to the States Parties forimplementation of the provisions of the Convention. … Ibelieve that the States Parties will continue their fundingfor the ISU during the next intersessional period. He thensaid The success of the Convention depends on complianceby all States Parties to it with their obligations. In orderto ensure this, we must develop an effective verificationmechanism capable of responding to the challenges posedby new scientific and technological developments inproduction, use and stockpiling of biological weapons.Our ultimate goal is to ensure full and effectiveimplementation of the Convention. Pending this goal,Bangladesh considers the Confidence Building Measures(CBMs) as important tools for ensuring transparency, andbuilding trust and confidence among the States Parties.… CBMs reporting format should be updated during theintersessional period. In regard to Article X, he saidBangladesh particularly underscores the importance ofeffective implementation of Article X of the BTWC. … Wecall for enhanced international cooperation in this area,particularly in technology transfer. He added thatBangladesh stresses on the need for capacity building inthe fields of disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis,and containment of infectious diseases.

[INF.1 shows that Bangladesh submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011 apart from 2006, 2008 and 2011.However, Bangladesh did not make submissions in regard tocompliance [INF.2], on S & T developments [INF.3] or onArticle X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Haeryong Kwon of the Republic of Koreathen spoke, saying my delegation attaches particularimportance to this Review Conference. Following thesuccess of the 6th Review Conference in 2006, this year’sReview Conference provides us with a unique andexcellent opportunity not only to assess how theConvention in its entirety has been operating for the lastfive years, but also to generate the political will necessaryto strengthen the Convention. Through a comprehensiveArticle by Article review of the Convention, we shouldreaffirm and further elaborate upon our current under-standing of the provisions of the Convention in light ofnew scientific and technological developments. He wenton to say my delegation associates with the JACKSNNZ’sstatement presented by the Canadian delegation. He saidFirst, the Republic of Korea places high priority on nationalimplementation of the Convention. … Penal legislation,tightened national export controls and regulations on bio-safety and bio-security are essential elements for enhancingnational implementation mechanisms. He then said thatbiological science and technology is advancing rapidly. …the five-yearly review seems to be insufficient to meet thechallenge. He went on to say Third, the intersessional processhas created a positive momentum that can and should be

carried forward. … Indeed, it would be even more construc-tive for the intersessional work to be conducted on a moreregular, formal and systematic basis. Proceeding in this waywould ensure greater continuity and coherence between theReview Conferences. He concluded by saying that the Koreandelegation shares the opinion that the establishment of theISU (Implementation Support Unit) is one of the successstories of the 6th Review Conference. … In this context, wefavour a measured enhancement of its mandate.

[INF.1 shows that the Republic of Korea submitted its CBMeach year between 2006 and 2011. However, the Republic ofKorea did not make submissions in regard to compliance[INF.2], on S & T developments [INF.3] or on Article X[INF.8]].

Ambassador Pedro Oyarce of Chile then spoke, saying thatChile associated itself with the statement made by Cuba onbehalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. He went on to saythat this Review Conference was the conclusion of five yearsof work undertaken during the intersessional programme.Efforts should focus on universal adherence to the Conventionwhich was a key priority. Global biological security could onlybe reached through this universal adherence. It was a jointpriority and a global responsibility. Implementation was also akey priority. National implementation efforts had to beeffective. Chile had specialized staff for the implementationof the Convention and for research and scientific projects.Also, transparency could not be emphasized enough.Confidence Building Measures had to be increased andimproved as well. Cooperation and assistance were anadditional avenue for the successful implementation of theConvention. The intersessional work should be optimized.Chile was interested in the Japanese proposal to create threegroups in order to analyze the ways to increase mutualconfidence and improve cooperation and assistance. The workof the Implementation Support Unit had proved itself to beessential in order to articulate the intersessional dialogue. Thestrengthening of its mandate was essential and Chile wantedto emphasize that the Implementation Support Unit should bea focal point in matters of cooperation.

[INF.1 shows that Chile submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. However, Chile did not makesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Zamir Akram of Pakistan then spoke, sayingthat Pakistan aligns itself with the statement delivered byCuba, on behalf of the NAM and Other States Parties tothe BTWC. He went on to outline the national regulatoryframework in Pakistan and said that we have drafted BTWClegislation which will shortly be tabled in our parliament.He said that The Seventh Review Conference provides anopportunity to further strengthen all aspects of theConvention. In our view, this can be done in two ways.Firstly, by expanding the membership of the Convention,thereby, ensuring universalization of obligations providedby the BTWC; and Secondly, by enhancing implementationof all articles of the BTWC, in an inclusive, balanced,non-discriminatory and comprehensive manner. He then


said he would like to highlight key aspects of our nationalapproach towards various issues under consideration ofthis Review Conference:• We believe in renewing and intensifying our efforts

towards Universalization of the BWC as only 9additional states have joined the Convention in thepast five years.

• As a member of NAM and being a developing country,we accord special importance to full and effectiveimplementation of Article X of the Convention.

• Pakistan believes that only a multilaterally agreedverification mechanism can provide the assurance ofcompliance with treaty obligations. The finaldeclaration of this Review Conference shouldunderscore this element.

• The BWC inter-sessional process has proven its utility.We should look at ways of improving it further in amanner that ensures balanced consideration of allimportant issues and that its scope and authority donot transgress into the domain of the ReviewConference itself.

• CBMs enhance transparency and trust among StatesParties. However, they cannot be a substitute forcompliance measures. Proposed amendments to theCBM forms should encourage submissions by reducingthe reporting burden on States Parties.

• Pakistan believes in the importance and benefits ofregularly reviewing developments in science andtechnology related to the Convention.

• … the BWC ISU … should continue assisting StatesParties, according to the mandate given by the ReviewConference. The mandate given to the ISU should alsodetermine its future composition, which, if expanded,should be rooted in principles of equitablegeographical distribution.

[INF.1 shows that Pakistan did not submit any CBMs between2006 and 2011. However, Pakistan did make a submission inregard to compliance [INF.2] but not on S & T developments[INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Omar Hilale of Morocco then spoke, sayingthat his delegation aligned itself with the statement made byCuba on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. He then saidthat that the Biological Weapons Convention was one of thethree pillars of the international regime for the non-proliferationof weapons of mass destruction. The Seventh ReviewConference was being held in an international context of majorpolitical changes and a deep financial and economic crisis,two ingredients that favoured the exacerbation of terrorism.Also, biological and scientific advances were multiplying therisks of double use. Thus the work of this Review Conferencehad to be considered with particular attention. Theimplementation of Article X remained the best way to promoteaccession to the Convention. At the moment, theimplementation of Article X suffered from a lack oftransparency, selectivity and the mismatch between the offersand requests of cooperation means. A system of publicationof offers and requests for cooperation on the website of theImplementation Support Unit, in addition to a working groupon article X, would be able to fill the gaps. The introduction of

this system and the establishment of a specific group onspecific questions such as science and technology and publichealth would be very useful. This would be an additional chargeof work for the Implementation Support Unit. Thus it wouldrequire additional funds. However, being part of aninternational instrument gave rights but also entailed obligations,such as providing additional funds when needed. Also, therewas an urgent need for all States Parties to report regularlyon their activities. Morocco had put in place in 2005 a NationalCommittee of Bio-security in charge of implementing theCartagena Protocol on biodiversity and the control ofgenetically modified organisms at the national level.

[INF.1 shows that Morocco submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. However, Morocco did not makeany submissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Jafar Huseynzade of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofAzerbaijan then spoke, saying that CBMs … plays thecrucial role in the success of the BTWC itself. In thisregard, we stand ready to join the discussions on theimprovement of the methods of submission of CBMs withthe view of facilitation on time submission, taking intoaccount current technical capabilities. He went on to saythat Secondly in our view, ensuring the full implementationof BTWC can not be achieved in light of existing protractedconflicts which have created grey zones in uncontrolled andoccupied territories. He concluded by saying Let me expressour hope that this Review Conference will not only revisitthe measures have been taken in implementing the provisionof the Convention, but also will discuss measures tostrengthen and improve its implementation.

[INF.1 shows that Azerbaijan submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011 apart from 2006 and 2007. However,Azerbaijan had not made any submissions in regard tocompliance [INF.2], on S & T developments [INF.3] or onArticle X [INF.8]].

Col. Hasan Al-Nesf of the National Committee for theProhibition of Weapons of Qatar then spoke, saying therewere still many countries outside of the Biological WeaponsConvention and this constituted an international risk.Universalization of the Convention was crucial for internationalsecurity. A permanent commission had been created in Qatarin order to better implement the Convention. Qatar respectedits obligations under the Convention and it did not research,produce or develop such weapons. Qatar did not store anybiological or toxin agents either. The national commission forthe prohibition of weapons held workshops and targeted issuesconcerning the armed forces as well as other sectors. Thenational commission was also setting up a database and traininghuman resources on the topic. The national commission hadcompleted a draft law to issue permits for controlled biologicalagents that were on the list of the Australia Group. The draftlaw was one of the measures taken in compliance withSecurity Council Resolution 1540. Qatar also implementedhealth regulations and had a system of notification from doctorsas soon as there were signs of epidemics. Qatar was readyto fully participate in this Review Conference. Qatar also


welcomed the holding of a Conference in 2012 in Finland onthe topic of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction inthe Middle East.

[INF.1 shows that Qatar submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011 apart from 2006 and 2007. However,Qatar had not made any submissions in regard to compliance[INF.2], on S & T developments [INF.3] or on Article X[INF.8]].

Harifera Elisa Rabemananjara of Madagascar then spoke,saying the Implementation Support Unit had done excellentwork since 2006 to promote the universalization of theBiological Weapons Convention. She said that Madagascarhad adhered to the Convention in 2008 and was in the processof ensuring that its national legislation was in line with that ofthe Convention. Madagascar was committed to theConfidence Building Mechanisms as provided for in ArticleV. During this month a technical capacity mission from theEuropean Union would assist the country to provide its firstConfidence Building Measures submission. The Governmentof Madagascar was concerned about the risks of pandemicsbecause the country lacked sufficient capacity and facilitiesfor surveillance of pathological micro-organisms and had notbeen able to follow the recommendations as stipulated in theConvention regarding biological weapons. Madagascar wouldstrive to develop these capacities and strengthen its biologicalsecurity despite its lack of resources. Madagascar supportedthe proposal by the Non-Aligned Movement for internationalassistance as provided for in Articles VII and X in the Convention.

[Although Madagascar became a State Party in 2008, INF.1shows that Madagascar had not submitted a CBM between2009 and 2011. In addition, Madagascar had not made anysubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Mohamed Al Sharaa of the Ministry of Sciences andTechnology of Iraq then spoke, saying the Biological WeaponsConvention was crucial to international peace and security.New measures for the future should be taken during thisReview Conference. However great the challenges may be,progress could be made as well. This Conference reaffirmedthe joint commitment of the States parties to make theConvention as efficient as possible. Disarmament was apriority for Iraq. Thus Iraq was working on this in the MiddleEast as it had a stabilizing role. The national constitutionstipulated that Iraq shall respect its commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and biologicalweapons. Iraq welcomed Security Council Resolution 1540;it was a useful tool in the international realm. Since the SixthReview Conference, Iraq had created a body that made surethat all decisions taken by the Conference were beingimplemented. This body also created a national system tohonour the international obligations of the Convention. It alsogoverned all transfers to the Implementation Support Unit.Iraq reaffirmed the importance of the Support Unit and howcrucial its role was. Iraq had received financial help fromseveral donors for the implementation of the Convention andwas very grateful for this. Article X had extreme importancefor all Member States and especially for developing nations.

Strengthening capacities of developing nations would bebeneficial to the international community as a whole. Earlywarning and identification of risks were important foreveryone. Iraq called for increased multilateral cooperationin the name of international peace and security.

[INF.1 shows that Iraq submitted its CBM each year between2006 and 2011 apart from 2006 and 2007. However, Iraq hadnot made any submissions in regard to compliance [INF.2],on S & T developments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Luis Gallego of Ecuador then spoke, saying ithad been difficult to fill the important gap of a verificationmechanism in the Convention. Some States had championeda binding verification mechanism but to date no solution hadbeen found. New discoveries in biotechnology had led togreater risks for the world and this required a strengtheningof the Convention and its mechanisms. It was important torealize that Confidence Building Measures could not be turnedinto a verification mechanism because they were not bindingand depended on the goodwill of each State Party. Ecuadorsupported the proposals made for annual meetings during theintersessional process. It was vital to strengthen theImplementation Support Unit by increasing both its capacityand budget. The fundamental mission of the ImplementationSupport Unit should be to provide technical capacity as manyStates Parties had not been able to fully implement theConvention due to their own lack of technical capacity.Ecuador also noted that a transnational working group fortraining and cooperation would benefit all States parties inthe implementation process.

[INF.1 shows that Ecuador had submitted its CBMs in 2007and 2008 but not in the other years between 2006 and 2011.However, Ecuador had not made any submissions in regardto compliance [INF.2], on S & T developments [INF.3] or onArticle X [INF.8]].

The General Debate then moved on to hear a statement by aSignatory State, Egypt:

Mohamed Hatem El-Atawy of Egypt spoke, saying that Egyptwould also like to associate itself with the statement deliveredby Cuba on behalf of the Non Aligned Movement and Othersparties to the BWC. He said Egypt looked forward to theconference to be held in Finland in 2012 and hoped that it wouldlead to the establishment of the desired Middle East zonefree of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction.He continued: Egypt welcomes efforts to promote theuniversalization of the Biological Weapons Conventionprovided that such efforts would be directed towards thenon-signatory states … He went on to say that Egypt supportsthe calls to promote international cooperation, assistanceand exchange in the field of biological sciences andtechnology for peaceful purposes in accordance with ArticleX of the Convention. We encourage the consideration ofspecific mechanisms or other approaches that would enablegreater international cooperation and assistance and in theimplementation of Article X. [Emphasis in the original]. In regardto the rapid advances in science and technology, he said it willbe pertinent for the Review Conference to consider measures


that could further strengthen the effectiveness of the imple-mentation of the Convention. He then said that We believethat the role played by the ISU … should continue and addedWe believe that the next intersessional period should alsoinclude the consideration of further topics of relevance tothe Convention in order to exchange experiences andencourage information sharing that would be beneficial toall states.

[As Egypt is a Signatory State, it is not invited to submit CBMsor to contribute to INF.2, INF.3 or INF.8]

The General Debate then moved on to hear statements frominternational organizations:

The first such statement was made by Ambassador MariangelaZappia on behalf of the European Union and the CandidateCountries Turkey, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia, Montenegro and Iceland, the Countries of theStabilisation and Association Process and potential candidatesAlbania, Serbia as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.She said that The EU has arrived at this Conference with astrong common position. … The EU’s objectives are realisticand ambitious at the same time: together with all State Parties,we want to review the operations of the BTWC and to exploreconcrete options to strengthen it further. The EU has identifiedthree priorities for reviewing the BTWC: building confidencein compliance, supporting national implementation, andpromoting universalisation. [Emphasis in the original]. Inregard to compliance she said that State Parties should beable to demonstrate compliance by means of informationexchange and enhanced transparency about theirimplementation activities and intentions towards compliance.This can be achieved by means of declarations, consultationsand on-site activities, representing increasing levels oftransparency and scrutiny, but also by information exchangeand review during the intersessional process. Whilerecognising that there is currently no consensus on the issueof verification, which remains a central element of a completeand effective disarmament and non proliferation regime, weare willing to work towards identifying options that couldachieve similar goals. Then in regard to CBMs, she said thatConfidence Building Measures are crucial tools with regardto creating confidence in compliance. The CBMs are thepolitically agreed regular national declaration tool onimplementation and compliance. They should be modifiedin order to try to increase participation in CBMssubmissions.

She added … with regard to compliance the EU is alsoin favour of strengthening the UN Secretary-General’smechanism for investigation of alleged use of biologicaland toxin weapons. Further action could be consideredand decisions taken on the provision of assistance andcoordination in the context of Article VII of the BTWCwith relevant organisations upon request by any StateParty in the case of alleged use of biological and toxinweapons, including improving national capabilities fordisease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and publichealth systems. In regard to national implementation she saidour common aim should be supporting and strengthen-ing, where necessary, national enforcement measures,

including criminal legislation, biosafety and biosecuritymeasures in life science institutions, control over patho-genic micro-organisms and toxins, export control for dual-use agents and technologies, the appointment of a na-tional contact point for the BTWC, and regional and in-ternational cooperation, … She said We need to strive foruniversal adherence of all States to the BTWC, … the EU… therefore recommends the adoption of an action planon universalisation evaluated during dedicated sessionsduring the intersessional process, and, if necessary, modi-fied at each State Parties’ Meeting.

Concerning Article X, she said The European Union willcontinue to support the concrete implementation of Arti-cle X of the BTWC … In this regard, we would favourintegrating information related to assistance in the CBMsby revising Form D or creating a new form, and mandat-ing the ISU to compile Article X of the BTWC related in-formation into an online database. She concluded by say-ing The European Union is also convinced that a processof more frequent assessments of relevant scientific andtechnological developments, which may have implicationsfor the BTWC, such as in the rapidly developing fields ofsynthetic biology and nanotechnology and the increas-ing convergence of chemistry and biology is of the ut-most importance. The ISU’s mandate, whose prolonga-tion for another five years should be guaranteed, shouldalso include the establishment of a communication and in-formation platform on policy, scientific and other activitiesrelevant to the BTWC. A working group could be estab-lished for S and T assessments during the intersessionalprocess. Furthermore, science and technology items couldbe included on the agenda of Meetings of State Parties.

This was followed by a statement made by Grace Asirwatham,Deputy Director General of the Organisation for the Prohi-bition of Chemical Weapons. She said that the BWC andthe CWC have mutually reinforcing complementarities. Shewent on to note four areas of common interest:

The first of these is full and effective nationalimplementation, which is a clear prerequisite for the goodfunctioning of both treaties. … A robust domestic regimeconveys a strong message to those who may harbourmalicious intent. … However, more than 50 percent of StatesParties of the CWC still need to take action to ensure thattheir legislation covers all key areas of the Convention. …Over the next year we will launch new initiatives beginningwith e-learning modules for National Authorities and acooperation and assistance activities database to facilitateinformation sharing between States Parties.

The second area of common interest is the impact ofadvances in science and technology. Both the BWC andCWC are disarmament treaties tied closely to science, andthe dynamic nature of science has a direct impact on ourown work. … A topic of direct relevance to both the BWCand CWC is the growing convergence between chemistryand biology … the Director-General recently requestedthe Scientific Advisory Board to study this issue and reportback to him. The SAB therefore established a temporaryworking group on this subject …

The third area of common interest relates to assistanceand protection in the case of use of chemical or biological


weapons. … the expectations of our States Parties emergedclearly in favour of a more pro-active OPCW role in mattersof both assistance and protection as well as safety andsecurity against chemical weapons and toxic chemicals.

The fourth and final area of common interest betweenour two treaties is international cooperation in the peacefuluses of science. … Further, just last week, the Conferenceof States Parties adopted an agreed framework for the fullimplementation of Article XI [of the CWC], which will providea new impetus to our international cooperation activitiesand the necessary guidance to make them more effective.

She then went on to say Among a number of emergingissues on the OPCW’s agenda, there are two which I believeare of relevance to both the BWC and CWC and, withregard to which, I think the OPCW can benefit from theexperience of BWC States Parties. She said The firstconcerns issues of chemical safety and security. A broaderapproach to security underlines the need to focus on suchissues. A related area concerns the exchange ofinformation and sharing of best practices regarding safetyand security management, and the potential role ofindustry standards. The second area concerns educationand outreach. … More concretely, future generations mustbe made fully aware of their responsibilities as scientistsand engineers when dealing with materials that couldpresent a danger to humankind.

The President then closed the morning session of the GeneralDebate, noting that the afternoon session would include theinformal session in which NGOs would make statements. Healso said that the session on the morning of Wednesday 7December 2011 would start promptly as there would bestatements in the General Debate by the Foreign Minister ofthe Netherlands and by the Secretary of State for the UnitedStates. Later on Wednesday morning, the Committee of theWhole would start its work on the Article by Article FinalDeclaration and then on the Wednesday afternoon, thePresident proposed to hold informal plenaries to consider cross-cutting issues – he envisaged starting by considering scienceand technology and then the intersessional process.

The Secretary-General then announced side events atlunchtime with a joint event by the Global Network of ScienceAcademies - Report of the Workshop on Trends in Scienceand Technology Relevant to the BWC and the University ofBradford - Key Points for the Review Conference. A secondside event would be by the Netherlands Institute of InternationalRelations Clingendael - The Future of Biological WeaponsRevisited.

Resumption of the General Debate:Tuesday 6 December 2011 afternoon

The General Debate resumed on the afternoon of Tuesday 6December 2011:

Zeyad Almasha’n of Kuwait spoke, saying that the ReviewConference was taking place at a time of considerablechanges in the Middle East. The Biological WeaponsConvention was key to international peace and security andhopefully the Review Conference would be successful in its

efforts. The promotion of Confidence Building Measures wasone of the crucial issues of the Review Conference duringthe next three weeks and Kuwait supported this. Kuwait alsosupported continuing the intersessional meetings anddiscussions. Kuwait would like to call upon all States that hadnot yet joined the Convention to do so soon. Kuwait had nevertried to acquire biological weapons and never would.

[INF.1 shows that Kuwait had not submitted any CBMsbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Kuwait had not madeany submissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Gerard Corr of Ireland then spoke, sayingIreland fully associates itself with the Common Positionadopted by the European Union on 18 July …. Irelandalso fully associates itself with the statement to be deliveredon behalf of the EU. He then said We are committed toworking to identify and strengthen existing mechanismsso as to build confidence in compliance with the BTWC.We believe there is great merit in more frequent assessmentsof ongoing scientific and technological developments andto working to ensure that the Convention can keep pacewith these rapid developments. … We are also committedto the implementation of Article X … we will continue tosupport initiatives and projects aimed at capacity buildingin the areas of disease detection, surveillance, diagnosisand infectious disease containment. On universality, he saidIreland is also committed to promoting the universality ofthe Convention… He then said Ireland is also committedto supporting effective international implementation andwent on to outline the new legislation – the Biological WeaponsAct 2011 – which Ireland had adopted earlier in 2011.

[INF.1 shows that Ireland submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Ireland had made asubmission in regard to compliance [INF.2] but not on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]. However,Ireland had contributed to the EU paper on Article X[INF.10]].

The General Debate then continued with two statements frominternational organizations before hearing a further statementby a State Party, Colombia:

Keith Hamilton of the World Organisation for AnimalHealth (OIE) spoke: saying Animal diseases includingzoonoses continue to have a significant impact on publichealth, animal health, food safety, food security, theenvironment and economies…. Biotechnological advancesmean that these agents can be readily engineered to be moredangerous than they are in their natural state. OIE believesthat day to day preparedness against ordinary diseaseoutbreaks offers the best protection against unusual,deliberate and accidental releases … He went on to note thatin 2011 the world had been declared free from rinderpest andthe OIE and FAO were moving forward in implementing post-rinderpest eradication activities. He then added that 2011 alsosaw the development of OIE’s strategy on global bio-threatreduction; strengthening global biosecurity. The OIE’sstrategy focuses on strengthening, enhancing, and


developing cross-links in existing health systems. It focuseson close collaboration with OIE’s international partners,including the WHO, the BWC and the Global Partnership.

Peter Herby of the International Committee of the RedCross then spoke, saying the ICRC has for nearly a decadepromoted a broad-based approach to preventing the hostileuses of biology, an approach we have often referred to as a“web of prevention”. He went on to say that There are threeareas the ICRC would like to highlight where decisions ofthis Review Conference can strengthen the Convention andcontribute to building an effective “web of prevention”against the hostile use of biological agents and toxins.

Firstly, the Convention needs an improved means toreview scientific and technological developments. …. TheConvention needs to establish a mechanism to ensureregular and structured review and to assess developmentsin science and technology so that the benefits to theConvention can be maximized and the risks minimized.This Review Conference provides an opportunity that mustbe seized to agree on such a mechanism.

Secondly, there is a need for States Parties to increasetheir efforts to educate life scientists. …. There is, therefore,a clear need to ensure that all universities offeringcurricula in the life sciences include at least onemandatory session that covers the risks, the rules ofnational and international law and the responsibilities ofscientists. This Review Conference could call for theestablishment of such a requirement by all States Partiesat national level.

Thirdly, this Review Conference presents anopportunity to re-focus attention on the core issue ofmonitoring and assessing compliance with the Convention,which has not been discussed as part of the annualmeetings. …. This Review Conference should agree onan agenda for a future process of annual meetingsthrough which the States Parties will address monitoringand compliance challenges and strengthen the scope andimplementation of the Convention’s confidence buildingmeasures.

In conclusion, he said, it is important to recall theultimate objective of the Convention stated in its preamble,namely to “exclude completely the possibility of biologicalagents and toxins being used in weapons.” A centerpieceof this Review Conference should therefore be anunambiguous reaffirmation in the final declaration of theobligation of States Parties to respect, and ensure respectfor, the absolute prohibition of biological weapons.[Emphasis in original].

Lennin Hernandez Alarcon of the Ministry of Foreign Affairsof Colombia then spoke, saying that Colombia was committedto disarmament and the elimination of weapons of massdestruction. This Review Conference was an excellentopportunity of improving the Biological Weapons Convention.Colombia signalled the importance of the universalization ofthe Convention and of the implementation of the Conventionat the national level. International cooperation was also keyand Colombia wanted to reiterate its strong interest incontributing to this Conference.

[INF.1 shows that Colombia had not submitted any CBMsbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Colombia had not madeany submissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Jacek Bylica of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisationthen spoke, saying that The 29 Nations of the NATO-RussiaCouncil confirm the high value of the Biological and ToxinWeapons Convention (BTWC) and the work of the BTWCSeventh Review Conference, and their intention to workto strengthen the implementation of the Convention andits universalization.

The President then suspended the formal session of theGeneral Debate and immediately resumed in informal session,inviting the representatives of 19 NGOs to make theirstatements.

Informal Session of the General Debate,Tuesday 6 December 2011 afternoon

Graham Pearson of the Division of Peace Studies of theUniversity of Bradford in the UK then spoke saying Thereis justifiably a great sense of optimism that under yourleadership realistic ambitions will be achieved that willeffectively strengthen the regime totally prohibitingbiological and toxin weapons so addressing theinternational concern, anxiety and awareness of thedangers of the use of deliberate disease as a weapon ofwar or for terrorist purposes. Certainly no ReviewConference has been as well prepared as this one withthe series of workshops around the world at Wilton Park,Beijing, Montreux, Berlin, Manila and Clingendael, withthe material available in the Think Zone, and the advancecopies of documents for this Review Conference. He saidthat There are five realistic outcomes – which are entirelyattainable – that we would urge the Seventh ReviewConference to achieve.

First, … we urge that a standing working group beestablished to consider the application and implicationsof scientific and technological developments in specificareas for all the Articles of the Convention.

Second … This Review Conference should set a targettowards universality of 190 States Parties by the time ofthe Eighth Review Conference.

Third, the effectiveness of the Convention depends onthe steps taken to achieve national implementation by theStates Parties. This Review Conference should demonstrateits commitment to an effective Convention by agreeing anAction Plan to ensure that all States Parties have adoptednational legislation, including penal legislation.

Fourth, the States Parties should agree a furtherintersessional programme between 2011 and 2016 ofannual Meetings of States Parties prepared by standingworking groups addressing the following three separateand distinct topics:• The advances in science and technology in specific

areas relevant to the Convention• An improved Confidence-Building Measures regime• Confidence in compliance


Fifth … For the further effective strengthening of theConvention it is essential that the ISU is enlarged so thatit can indeed carry out its mandate agreed by this ReviewConference. [Emphasis in original]

Nicholas Sims of the London School of Economics andPolitical Science in the UK then spoke saying In this statementwe have chosen five areas in which to encourage you toreach agreement.

1.Implementation Support Unit … States Parties needto be realistic about the tasks you allocate and the resourcesrequired for the effective fulfilment of those tasks. … werecommend a considerably larger ISU, one whose resourceswill match the expanded role of implementation support whichwe hope this Conference will approve.

2. Intersessional work programme: reshaping theintersessional process …. We hope the Conference willdecide on an annual Meeting of States Parties supportedby meetings of working groups or standing expert groups,to push ahead work on several topics in parallel. Somegroups may need more time than others. Allocation of timeamong groups is one of the types of decision that theConference should specifically authorise the Meeting ofStates Parties to take by consensus, each year, in theinterests of flexibility.

3. Confidence-building measures … To develop aclearer, collective vision of their purpose and longer-termevolution, a CBM working group should be establishedby this Conference. It should enquire whether the existingCBMs provide the transparency needed for reassurance,or whether additional categories of information ordifferent questions would be more useful.

4. Science and technology We share the view thatscientific and technological developments of relevanceto the Convention need ongoing collective assessment,and new structures designed to provide this. We hope theConference will ensure that such assessment takes placein a working group or other forum comprising scientificadvisers from academia, industry and government, withinput from a wide range of sources including nationalacademies of science and NGOs …

5. Compliance and the future We encourage you toraise your sights, in the spirit of ambitious realism: lookahead to the Eighth Review Conference and identify thesteps that will need to be taken before 2016 if theConvention is to emerge strengthened in operation andrecognised as the cornerstone of biological disarmament.These steps will include States Parties demonstrating theircompliance to one another, as treaty partners should, inan acceptable framework of accountability, and usingagreed procedures to clarify and resolve any complianceconcerns that may arise. [Emphasis in original]

Kathryn Nixdorff, of the International Network ofEngineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility(INES) said that As scientists and engineers, we mustcontinue to express our concerns about the need to dealmore effectively with advances in science and technologyin order to minimize the potential risks that they pose tothe BWC. She went on to say that INES strongly supportsthese calls for a new annual S&T assessment mechanism

within a continuing, improved yearly intersessionalprocess. She said that In addition, INES recognises thatall life scientists have an obligation to act responsibly intheir work to help minimize the associated risks. … It isour view that States Parties need to take steps nationallyto ensure the education and awareness of all thoseengaged in the life sciences. Furthermore, States Partiesshould provide annual reports on the steps they havetaken nationally to improve education and outreach as apart of their submissions under CBM E. She then concludedby saying that INES proposes that the States Parties to theSeventh Review Conference of the BWC agree to theestablishment of a Working Group composed ofgovernment experts, scientists from civil society institutionsand representatives of industry to carry out a structured,analytical and systematic review of S&T developments ofrelevance to the Convention within the framework of anew intersessional process 2012-2015.

Andrzej Gorski of the Bio-security Working Group of theInter-Academy Panel on International Issues: theGlobal Network of Science Academies then spoke, sayingthat he wished to highlight two activities of IAP that areparticularly relevant to the deliberations of the 7th ReviewConference: first, advances in science and technology(S & T), and second, education and awareness-raising.He noted that a workshop Trends in Science and Technologyrelevant to the BTWC had been held in Beijing, China inNovember 2010 and that the executive summary of the reportof this meeting had been included as Annex I to the ISUbackground paper INF.3. He said that three major themeshad emerged from the workshop:• The rapid pace of change in the life sciences and

related fields;• The increasing diffusion of life sciences research

capacity and its applications, both internationally andbeyond traditional research institutions;

• The extent to which additional scientific and technicaldisciplines beyond biology are increasingly involvedin life sciences research.The report also underscores the relevance of S & T to

every major Article of the Convention and the challengesand opportunities that the advances present forimplementation. He also spoke about a workshop onPromoting Education on Dual-Use Issues in the LifeSciences held in Warsaw in November 2009 to developrecommendations for the most effective approaches toeducating life scientists internationally on dual use issues.

Masamichi Minehata of the National Defense MedicalCollege of Japan in a joint statement with the Universityof Bradford said It is now widely recognised that very fewof those engaged in the life sciences have any knowledgeof the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or oftheir responsibilities and obligations under theConvention. He added that It is recommended that theStates Parties in their consideration of Article IV at thisReview Conference address how best to ensure that thoseengaged in the life sciences within all States Parties areaware of their obligations and responsibilities under theConvention. Consideration needs to be given to what


actions might be taken by the States Parties nationallyand collectively to ensure that all those engaged in thelife sciences whether in government, industry or academiaare aware of the Convention. After outlining a number ofinitiatives, he concluded by saying that We believe that thereis much that civil society and the life science communitycan do to help raise the level of awareness and educationof all those engaged in the life sciences, and thereby tostrengthen the implementation of the Convention throughthe establishment of a culture of responsibility in all thoseengaged in the life sciences, whether in government,industry or academia. We urge that States Parties addressthis issue during the Review Conference and showleadership in taking effective action to ensure that theimplementation of Article IV is urgently advanced amongstall those engaged in the life sciences.

Scott Spence of Verification Research, Training andInformation Centre (VERTIC) then spoke, saying thatVERTIC has been highly engaged in the work of the BWCfor many years, and we have accelerated our contributionto the most recent intersessional process through ourNational Implementation Measures Programme. In regardto national implementation, he said that VERTIC calls on theReview Conference to take a strong decision on nationalimplementation, to encourage all BWC member states toenact comprehensive legislative frameworks during theperiod leading up to the Eighth Review Conference in 2016and to regularly discuss state practice, assistance needsand progress made during the next intersessional process.In regard to universality he said VERTIC calls on the ReviewConference to take a strong decision on universality ofthe Convention, with clear steps towards substantialexpansion of its membership in time for the Eighth ReviewConference in 2016 and regular reviews of progressduring the next intersessional process. On internationalcooperation and assistance, he said VERTIC advocatesinternational co-operation and assistance under theauspices of the BWC, as an independent, internationalco-operation and assistance entity. Then on complianceand verification, he added that VERTIC calls on the ReviewConference to take a strong decision to enhancetransparency and confidence-building concerningnational implementation through the next intersessionalprocess and urges states parties to continue discussionson any other necessary mechanisms for ascertainingcompliance. He concluded by saying that VERTIC calls onthe Review Conference to take a strong decision in supportof the Article I general purpose criterion and its role inpreventing any misuse of biological agents developedusing the latest advances in the life sciences and to engagein regular reviews of developments in science andtechnology during the next intersessional process.

Kai Ilchmann of the Harvard Sussex Program onChemical and Biological Weapons said that he wouldconcentrate on one area we feel that States Parties shouldagree: to increase their efforts to stay informed abouttrends in the life sciences and related areas of technology.He said that understanding the implications of newdevelopments in the life sciences and related areas of technology

was an essential task for States Parties. The prevention ofthe development, acquisition and use of biological and toxinweapons required a thorough understanding of the nature ofdisease and of the properties of the biological agents and toxinsthat caused it. The consideration of science and technologypotentially relevant for the Convention should be exploredusing a holistic framework. He went on to note, in particular,the continued convergence between the life sciences andchemistry and the implications that this is having for boththe Chemical Weapons Convention and the BiologicalWeapons Convention. We are fully supportive of thesuggestions made by the Advisory Panel on Future OPCWPriorities that “exchanges of experience and jointtechnical reviews could be helpful to understand how[convergence] affects the implementation of [the ChemicalWeapons Convention and Biological WeaponsConvention] at the interface between chemistry andbiology” and that the “Technical Secretariat shouldestablish a liaison (i.e. point of contact) with the BWCimplementation process.” We hope that the States Partiesto the BWC will give these suggestions due considerationduring their discussions at the Seventh ReviewConference and, as the Organisation for the Prohibitionof Chemical Weapons is doing, examine what theconvergence of chemistry and biology means in practicalterms for their work. He concluded by saying We supportthe idea of more frequent examination of the newdevelopments in science and technology.

Tim Trevan of the International Council for the LifeSciences said that The mission of the ICLS was to helppromote and advance global public health, safety andsecurity. To this end, we seek to safeguard opportunitiesto conduct research and apply advances in the lifesciences for the practical benefit of society by promotingbest practices, standards and codes of conduct, soensuring the responsible pursuit of science. He went onto say that Networks can be effective in mitigatingbiological risks where there was a convergence of interestsbecause they can:• provide access to expertise and reference data that

would otherwise not be available• be very cost efficient by being virtual and thereby

removing overhead costs• respond directly to local challenges

He noted There are particular areas where civicnetworks may be able to act more effectively thangovernments, such as for multidisciplinary issues, internationalcoordination and cooperation, and for issues where normalstructures had reached their limits, such as when governmentalinfrastructure had failed due to civil war.

Iris Hunger, speaking on behalf of the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute, said in regard toadvances in science and technology that It is neverthelessvital to review the main relevant trends and methods orapproaches that may be employed in order to understandthe implications of such activity for biological armscontrol. She continued: With respect to CBMs, thisconference may wish to consider the desirability ofrevising the information-exchange format agreed by the


Second and Third Review Conferences, including whetherand how they could to be modified to serve as a basis forachieving capacity-building objectives on a practical andtechnical level, such as for the improvement of theoperation of life sciences laboratories. She then said Withrespect to Article X, the parties may wish to considerfurther the desirability and modalities for (a) exchangingoperationally focused, time-limited proposals, and (b)requests or offers that support and strengthen relevanteconomic development and cooperation. Then in regardto compliance and verification she said The capacity of theBTWC regime to strengthen compliance and verificationcan be improved partly through consultation on S&Tassessments and the sharing of best practices on S&Tevaluation methodologies.

Gunnar Jeremias of the Research Group for BiologicalArms Control at the University of Hamburg said that Wehave come here with great expectations. We would like tosee the BWC coming out of this important conference astronger, more reliable treaty, having been set on a steadypath towards comprehensiveness and modernization. Hewent on to say that we believe that the BWC most urgentlyneeds a mechanism to assess compliance. And again,almost everyone in this room agrees. Verification ofcompliance with the BWC is, however, more complicatedthan for other arms control and disarmament treaties. Headded that three elements are essential in a complianceassessment mechanism for the BWC. First, the mostimportant element of such a mechanism would be thecontinuous reaffirmation through information monitoringthat existing capabilities and capacities are not being usedto develop biological weapons. … Second, the BWC is inneed of a reliable challenge investigation mechanism toaddress serious allegations of biological weapons useand development. It would be highly desirable to betterconnect the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism for theinvestigation of CBW use with the BWC. A thirdindispensable component of a verification mechanism forthe BWC is a ‘mid-level element’, something between thepolitically charged challenge investigations and day-to-day information monitoring activities. He concluded bysaying that We are in the fortunate position that the initialcomponents of all three verification elements are alreadyin existence. If they are further developed and usedjudiciously in a modular approach, the BWC wouldbecome much more robust in the years to come.

Mark Johnson of MJ Lawrence Consulting then spoke,saying that Many States Parties lack medicalcountermeasures (MCMs) for responding to a bioterroristattack. It is now widely recognized that terrorists couldresort to using biological weapons. However, whilst thelevel of probability that such an attack will actuallyhappen remains low, the MCMs required to respond tosuch an incident are expensive to develop and involve alengthy process till they can be ready for use. If StatesParties are to be prepared, they need to engage in adialogue with industry on how to ensure that preparednessis improved and how this work can be financed. He wenton to say that It is recommended that the States Parties

should encourage the establishment of an open dialoguewithin States Parties between governments and industryso that bioterrorism preparedness can be improved. Thereis a real danger that in the absence of such dialogue,governments will rely solely on past experience gainedfrom pandemic influenza vaccine and antibioticpreparedness. While there are some similarities tobioterrorist preparedness which can be relevant, there arealso significant differences. He concluded by saying that Whenyou consider Article VII at this Review Conference, Irecommend that you include in your Final Declarationlanguage that recognizes the importance of States Partiesengaging in dialogue with industry so as to ensure that theappropriate medical countermeasures (MCMs) are indeedavailable when they are required to counter an outbreak ofdisease, whether natural, accidental or deliberate.

Christine Rohde of the Global Biological Resource CentreNetwork (GBRCN) spoke, saying We especially endorsethe outcome of the Meeting of States Parties in 2008 whenyou recognized that “biosafety and biosecurity measurescontribute to preventing the development, acquisition oruse of biological and toxin weapons and are anappropriate means of implementing the Convention.” Inorder to take such measures, it is necessary to enhanceawareness and create a biosecurity-conscious culture. Shewent on to say that As we recognize the present and futurevalue of the effective national implementation of the BTWCwith its high global relevance, and recognizing the rapidscientific and biotechnological developments, we wouldlike to express to the States Parties that the Code ofConduct (CoC) presented here will add value to theobjectives of the BTWC. The aim of the CoC is to preventmicrobial resource centres from directly or indirectlycontributing to malicious misuse of biological agents andtoxins, including the development or production ofbiological weapons and shall promote a basic ethicalunderstanding of science compliant with the BTWC. Wealso consider that such a generally applicable type of aCode can substantially help all States Parties becauseawareness raising is absolutely crucial in the scientificworld. In conclusion she said our message andrecommendation to the Seventh Review Conference is thatStates Parties should, as part of their consideration ofimproving the national implementation of the Convention,agree to adopt a comparable Code of Conduct for theirnational microbial resource collections and otherinstitutions in the life sciences because of the awarenessraising focus on biosecurity that it provides.

Kathryn McLaughlin, speaking on behalf of the Institutefor Security Studies in South Africa, said Africa, perhapsmore than any other continent, experiences the impact ofnaturally occurring diseases almost daily, particularly onvulnerable populations in states where health carefacilities are seldom equipped to deal effectively andefficiently with disease outbreaks. Africa is also the regionwhere more could, and should, be done with regard toimproving scientific research and diagnostic facilities andwhere biosafety measures remain insufficient and under-resourced. She went on to say that As of November 2011,


37 African countries are States Parties. African Statesthat have signed the BTWC but have not yet ratified are:Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Liberia,Malawi, Somalia and United Republic of Tanzania. … .We believe that universalisation in Africa is essential tostrengthening the convention … . It is, however, evident thata more sustained and concentrated effort is needed by StatesParties with respect to Africa. It is also important torecognise that any discussion about universalisation needsto address issues of assistance to states that may require it.She concluded by saying that This 7th ReviewConference provides an important opportunity tos t r e n g t h e n t h e C o n v e n t i o n . B y g a r n e r i n ggreater political support to place the BTWC into adevelopmental context and highlighting the socio-economic benefits of universalisation and fullimplementation, it is an opportunity that should not be missed.

Janet Phelan of ITHACA, a human rights agency, then spoke,saying she wished to submit concerns to this Conventionthat the United States of America is engaged in anoffensive biological weapons program. … these weaponsmay be stockpiled at Sierra Army Depot, which is amilitary base in Northern California, as well as possiblyat other locations. She went on to say that In 2001… theUnited States passed a piece of legislation which in itselfconstitutes a violation of Articles I, II and IV of the BWC.This piece of legislation, Section 817 of the US PATRIOTAct, The Expansion of the Biological Weapons Statute,gives the United States a “blank check” to stockpilebiological weapons and toxins and de facto removes theU.S. from the stipulations contained in the BWC. This isaccomplished by the addition of a final caveat to 817,stating that “the prohibition contained in this section shallnot apply to any duly authorized United Statesgovernmental activity.” She concluded by saying that all ofthese signals … point to a future attack within the bordersof the U.S. facilitated by the United States government.

Brad Goble of the International Federation of Bio-safetyAssociations (IFBA) then spoke, saying that The IFBA’smission statement (“safe, secure and responsible workwith biological materials”) highlights the need to protectand promote global health and security, and lays thefoundation for the implementation of strategies to minimizethe serious dangers that can arise from the failure toimplement sound biosafety and biosecurity practices. Hewent on to add that Looking to the future, the IFBA andmore than 50 of its members recognize the uniqueopportunity we have in strengthening our engagementand collaboration with BWC stakeholders as an importantpartner in achieving our complementary goals across theworld. Our task is to help ensure that all states have thebiosafety, biosecurity and biological non-proliferationknowledge and tools they require. Collaboration withinternational, regional and national biosafetyassociations provides a direct channel with those whoactually run the facilities that conduct biological research.He concluded by saying that The biosafety communityshould work with states parties to build biosafety and

biosecurity capacity in developing countries—with aparticular focus on raising awareness among biosafetyprofessionals about the convention and dual-use issues.The biosafety community can also act as a useful bridgebetween governments and the private sector, and becomean influential partner in generating greater buy-in andencouraging closer engagement within the framework ofthe convention.

Graham Pearson of the Steering Committee of thePugwash CBW Study Group then spoke, saying that Thepoints that we outline … represent our view of what arerealistically achievable at the Seventh Review Conference.1. Universalization of the Convention. …. We recommend

that the States Parties at the Seventh Review Conferenceshould take steps to provide high level leadership anda sustained committed attention to universalizationthroughout the period to the Eighth ReviewConference. ….

2. The Intersessional Process. … We recommend that theStates Parties at the Seventh Review Conference shouldagree that there should be annual Meetings of StatesParties during the intersessional period that areprepared for by standing working groups and meetingsof experts. These annual meetings should takedecisions where appropriate on the basis of consensus.

3. National Implementation together with Education andOutreach. We recommend that the States Parties at theSeventh Review Conference should adopt an ActionPlan with an interim target that two thirds of the StatesParties to the Convention shall have adopted effectivenational implementation legislation by the time of theEighth Review Conference.

4. Confidence-Building Measures Regime … We recommendthat the States Parties at the Seventh Review Conferenceshould agree some modifications to the existing CBMregime at the Seventh Review Conference. And equallyimportantly, a standing working group should be set upto consider in the intersessional period after the SeventhReview Conference how the effectiveness of, and theparticipation in, the CBM regime might be furtherenhanced as well as to review its concept and purposewithin the overall efforts to strengthen the Convention.

5. Advances in Science and Technology. … we recommendthat the States Parties at the Seventh Review Conferenceshould agree to set up a standing working group ofscientific and technical ... and to report on theimplications for all Articles of the Convention, with aview to the strengthening of the Convention …

6. International Cooperation and Assistance. We …recommend that the States Parties … should agree thatthe Implementation Support Unit should … operate aclearing house mechanism on internationalcooperation and assistance …

7. Compliance and demonstration of compliance. …. Werecommend that the States Parties … should agree to setup a standing working group to consider a con-ceptualdiscussion of what measures would demonstratecompliance, and how clarification might be obtained inrespect of any queries regarding compliance ….


8. The Implementation Support Unit…. We recommend thatthe States Parties … should agree to the continuationof the ISU and give it an appropriate mandate andresources ….

Ali Akbar Mohammadi of the Ferdous InternationalFoundation (FIF) and Global Health and SecurityConsultants (GHSC) then spoke, saying that dangerouspathogens may cause risk to public health through:• Natural outbreaks;• Poor laboratory and clinical conditions;• Careless handling of infectious materials containing

dangerous pathogens and conditions;• Deliberate misuse of such materials.

He went on to say that FIF and GHSC have given theirfirst and foremost priority in assisting these countries tostrengthen their national capacity to adequately preventand respond to the threats caused by biological risksthrough implementation of a National Biological RiskManagement Programme (NBM) which he then outlined.He went on to say that implementation of such programmein particular in the absence of a universally agreedinstrument, will to a large extend facilitate the imple-mentation of the BTWC. Moreover, we know that 194member states of WHO are committed to implement theInternational Health Regulations (IHR) by 2016 the latest.Therefore implementation of such programme will alsobe in the line with several articles of IHR in strengtheningnational capacity to prevent and respond to public healthevent of international concern (PHEIC). He concluded bysaying that We strongly believe it is the responsibility ofall member states in particular those with financialresources as well as funding agencies to help the lowresource and developing countries in implementation ofsuch programme towards establishment of nationalcapacity to prevent and respond adequately andeffectively to biological risks.

Amy Smithson of the James Martin Center forNonproliferation Studies then spoke, saying thatConventional wisdom that predates the Biological andToxin Weapons Convention (BWC) holds that verifyingcompliance with this treaty’s prohibitions is not possible.She then went on to outline what the UNSCOM inspectionsin Iraq had achieved. She pointed out that On closerexamination, the inspection activities that enabledUNSCOM inspectors to detect Iraq’s bioweapons programbear quite some resemblance to the routine inspectionprocedures of well-known accords such as the ChemicalWeapons Convention and the Nuclear NonproliferationTreaty. She went on to say that Therefore, a strong collectiveinterest in strengthening the compliance provisions of theBWC should resonate at this Review Conference. Thepublic worldwide is depending on the States Parties ofthe BWC to spare no effort in making sure that the normagainst biological weapons is policed and upheld. Onbehalf of the inspectors who did what many think isimpossible, we sincerely hope that you act on thatresponsibility. She added that A way must be found,however, for BWC States Parties to restart a dialogue

about verification, to learn from applicable historicalexperience, and to explore options feasible in the 21stcentury to strengthen the compliance provisions of theBWC. A reasonable start would be the establishment aworking group to consider these matters, …

Trevor Griffiths of Pax Christi International then spoke,saying that Pax Christi would like to remind theinternational community gathered here today that it hasthe “responsibility to protect” (R2P) the security of allpeople. He then went on to urge the States Parties to takeinto account the following recommendations: Universality.All States should sign and ratify the BTWC, prohibitingthe possession or development of biological and toxinweapons. … The Intersessional Process … Pax ChristiInternational supports continuation of annual meetingsof experts and of States Parties. Proposals to installstanding thematic expert groups should also beimplemented. … Annual Meetings of States Parties shouldbe authorised to make decisions on the basis of consensusand as appropriate. Confidence-Building Measures PaxChristi International urges all States Parties who havenot done so to submit CBMs for 2011 and all States Partiesto continue submitting CBMs in the future. Pax ChristiInternational also recommends that States Parties agreeto amend the CBMs at the Seventh Review Conference …Science and technology Pax Christi supports the movesto establish a body of scientists and policy makersentrusted with continuous monitoring of relevant scientificand technological progress. The Implementation SupportUnit The mandate of the Implementation Support Unit(ISU) … should be renewed and extended .... Its strengthshould be increased appropriately. Internationalcooperation and assistance Pax Christi Internationalwelcomes initiatives for international cooperation andassistance that contribute to saving lives and minimisingsuffering. … Compliance and verification The StatesParties to this Convention should agree on a mechanismto provide increased confidence in compliance. … Duringthe Seventh Review Conference, a reasonable ambitionis to make progress towards an effective complianceregime. The international community will lose credibilityif it fails to do so, as it needs to be seen to be addressingits responsibility for ensuring that global life sciences arenot misused. [Emphasis in original].

The President then closed the informal session and resumedthe formal General Debate. He said that the General Debatewould continue on Wednesday morning at 10.00 am withstatements from the Netherlands and the USA. The ReviewConference would then move on to a meeting of theCommittee of the Whole with an Informal Plenary meeting inthe afternoon.

The Secretary-General then reminded participants that theGeneral Debate would start promptly at 10.00am and thatthere would be a side event at 09.00 am when the Harvard-Sussex Program would make a presentation on Results fromexamining the role of Science and Technology reviews inthe Biological Weapons Convention.


Resumption of the General Debate:Wednesday 7 December 2011 morning

The General Debate resumed at 10.00 on Wednesday 7December 2011.

Uri Rosenthal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of theNetherlands spoke, saying that In line with the priorities ofthe EU member states for this Review Conference, theNetherlands will provide its support towards supportingnational implemention; enhancing compliance of theConvention and promoting universality. He then said a lot ofwork remains to be done and said let me stress three points:•· Firstly, national implementation. The level of national

implementation, although generally improving remainspatchy and inconsistent. …. all States Parties to theConvention should focus on supporting andstrengthening national enforcement measures, likecreating criminal legislation and appropriate biosafetyand biosecurity measures.

• Secondly, improve the Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention in order to enhance compliance. We donot have a binding verification protocol. …. I urge allStates Parties to play their part in shaping the futureof the BTWC and taking specific effective steps toreduce the risks posed to international security bybiological weapons.

• Thirdly, universality of the BTWC. We need to aim atthe universal adherence to the Convention. …. With165 treaty parties, we are still lagging behind mostother multilateral disarmament treaties. [Emphasis inoriginal].

[INF.1 shows that the Netherlands submitted its CBM eachyear between 2006 and 2011. In addition, the Netherlandsmade submissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] as well as on Article X [INF.8]].

Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State of the United Statesof America then spoke, saying that Two years ago, theObama Administration released our national strategy forcountering biological threats, which is a whole-of-government approach designed to protect the Americanpeople and improve our global capacity. We support ourpartners’ efforts to meet new international standards indisease preparedness, detection, and response. She wenton to say But there is still more to do, and I want to brieflymention three areas. First, we need to bolster internationalconfidence that all countries are living up to ourobligations under the Convention. It is not possible, inour opinion, to create a verification regime that willachieve this goal. But we must take other steps. To beginwith, we should revise the Convention’s annual reportingsystems to ensure that each party is answering the rightquestions, such as what we are each all doing to guardagainst the misuse of biological materials. Countriesshould also take their own measures to demonstratetransparency. Under our new Bio-Transparency andOpenness Initiative, we will host an international forumon health and security to exchange views on biologicalthreats and discuss the evolution of U.S. bioresearch

programs. … In short, we are intending and are meetingour obligations to the full letter and spirit of the treaty,and we wish to work with other nations to do so as well.She then said that Second, we must strengthen eachcountry’s ability to detect and respond to outbreaks andimprove international coordination. As President Obamasaid earlier this year at the UN, “We must come togetherto prevent and detect and fight every kind of biologicaldanger, whether it’s a pandemic like H1N1, or a terroristthreat, or a terrible disease.” She continued: Finally, weneed thoughtful international dialogue about the waysto maximize the benefits of scientific research and minimizethe risks. …. So how do we balance the need for scientificfreedom and innovation with the necessity of guardingagainst such risks? There is no easy answer, but it beginswith open conversations among governments, thescientific community, and other stakeholders, in this forumand elsewhere. …. Ambassador Kennedy and the U.S.team look forward to working with all of you for a strongset of recommendations. She concluded by saying that weknow the biological threats we face today are new, butour commitment to face threats together is not. …. So inthat same spirit, let us move forward to address thechallenges we face together in the 21st century.

[INF.1 shows that the USA submitted its CBM each yearbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, the USA madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] as well as on Article X [INF.8]].

The President then suspended the General Debate for a fewminutes before resuming with a statement made by Nigeria.

Syndoph Paebi Endoni of Nigeria said that Nigeria wishedto be associated with the statement made by Cuba on behalfof the Non-Aligned Movement. He then went on to say thatNigeria hoped that at this Review Conference, we are ableto review the operations of the Convention, review relevantscientific and technological developments and their impacton society and consider the very pertinent issue ofinternational cooperation in the field of peaceful use ofbiological agents and toxins, in addition to the reviewfor another term the mandate of the ISU. In regard to ArticleX, he said that Nigeria would urge this Review Conferenceto give this issue some bite so as to encourage its full andeffective implementation. He then went on to outline someactions that had been taken by Nigeria including a nationalsensitization workshop on the BWC to be held in 2012.

[INF.1 shows that Nigeria submitted its CBM between 2006and 2011 in 2007 and 2008. However, Nigeria did not makesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Ambassador Seyed Mohammed Reza Sajjadi of the IslamicRepublic of Iran then spoke, saying that Iran associateditself with the statement made by Cuba on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties. He then saidWe believe that the only sustainable way for regimebuilding in the BWC is through the legally bindinginstrument to comprehensively strengthen the Convention


therefore the multilateral negotiations should be resumedon a legally binding instrument to comprehensivelystrengthen the Convention including in the area ofinternational cooperation for peaceful purposes.Piecemeal solutions or fragmented proposals are not anappropriate option. He went on to say The Universality ofthe Convention is of high importance to Islamic Republicof Iran. … We support the adoption of an action planwith targeted timelines for ensuring the universality ofthe Convention. He then said The full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X, as one of themain pillars of the Convention, is essential to achieve theobject and purpose of the Convention. … We believe thatthere is an urgent need for the establishment of amechanism on Article X. The Islamic Republic of Iransupports NAM and other states’ proposal on theestablishment of a solid mechanism for the implementationof Article X. In this vein, we also request 7th ReviewConference to adopt specific measures for submission ofcases of transfer denials by States Parties to ISU. In regardto the Intersessional Process, he said We believe that weshould keep continuity in the next intersessional processand not alter it radically. …. Furthermore, the decisionmaking is the prerogative of the Review Conference andshould not be delegated to the Intersessional Process.The Intersessional Process shall be directed towards thestrengthening of the Convention in its entirety…. Webelieve that the overlooked Articles of the Conventionlike Articles X and Article VII shall be the core issues onthis process. Then in regard to CBMs, he said The CBMs asa voluntary measure would lead to enhance the confidenceamong States Parties. …. However, we do share the viewthat CBMs shall not constitute a mechanism forverification of compliance. … Consideration of a newCBM form on the implementation of Article X needs to beaddressed by this Conference. He concluded by saying Anydecision with regard to the continuation of the ISU andits possible mandate should be commensurate with thespecific decisions that we take in this Conference forstrengthening the Convention.

[INF.1 shows that the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted itsCBM each year between 2006 and 2011 apart from 2011. Inaddition, the Islamic Republic of Iran made submissions inregard to compliance [INF.2] and on Article X [INF.8] butnot on S & T developments [INF.3]].

The President then suspended the General Debate, sayingthat the Committee of the Whole would commence in a fewminutes with Ambassador Desra Percaya in the Chair.

The General Debate was subsequently resumed later duringthe Review Conference to enable statements to be made byone more State Party, Afghanistan, and by three internationalorganizations: INTERPOL, UNICRI and the WHO. On themorning of Friday 9 December 2011 contributions were madeby INTERPOL and UNICRI.

Ali Rached of the International Criminal PoliceOrganization (INTERPOL) spoke saying that recentbiological scientific advancements, especially within the

field of synthetic biology, provide a new spectrum of dual-use technology that could be misused to serve terrorist orcriminal intentions. He went on to talk about a newcomprehensive approach addressing not only thebioterrorism threat, but also the Chemical, Radiological,Nuclear terrorism and the explosives (e) threat (referredto as CBRNe). He then described the Bioterrorismprevention unit which has started to develop a substantialintelligence analysis capability, with the aim of gatheringcomprehensive data on biological incidents, analyzingthe threat and providing all INTERPOL member countriesa robust analytical support helping them to prevent andaddress all types of Biothreat. He concluded by sayingthat Bioterrorism is a multidimensional global threatthat requires coordinated and harmonized internationaldedicated efforts. …. The development of partnershipsinvolving other relevant disciplines, such as publichealth and the scientific community, (on the local,national, regional, and international scale) is in ourview, essential for a more efficient prevention andresponse effort.

Kristina Kangaspunta of UNICRI (United NationsInterregional Crime and Justice Research Institute) then spoke,saying that This conference is also a welcomed occasionto update ourselves with the roles of differentorganizations, engage with one another, create synergiesto avoid the duplication of efforts and orient ourselvesso as to head in the most appropriate direction foraddressing the bio-threat. She went on to outline UNICRI’scontribution to the common endeavour of the internationalcommunity to address the threat posed by hazardousbiological material and bio-weapons. …. One of the majorroles that UNICRI has been playing is to enhance thecapabilities of Member States to fulfil their obligationsunder various Conventions including the BiologicalWeapons Convention through the “CBRN Centres ofExcellence” initiative. She added that The initiative foresees,from the beginning of 2012, the implementation of projectson:first,‘Knowledge development and transfer of best

practice on biosafety/biosecurity and bio-riskmanagement’;

second,‘Knowledge development and transfer of bestpractice on biological waste management’;

third, ‘Guidelines, procedures and standardization on bio-safety/bio-security’;

fourth,‘Sharing experience between EU and South EastAsian countries on the reinforcement of legislationsand regulations in the field of bio-safety and bio-security’;

fifth,‘Strengthening laboratory bio-safety and bio-security’;

and sixth, the establishment of an ‘International Networkof Universities and Institutes for raising awarenesson dual-use concerns in bio-technology’.She went on to say that in our enthusiasm to seek

enhanced implementation of the Convention we must becautious and well coordinated so as not to lose themomentum we have gained. This can be ensured only bypreventing overlaps and through enhanced cooperation.


The final contributions to the General Debate – by Afghanistanand the WHO – were made on the morning of Tuesday 13December 2011.

First, Mohammed Qasim Hashemzai, Deputy Minister of theMinistry of Justice of Afghanistan spoke, saying thatAfghanistan associatted itself with the statement made byCuba on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. He went onto review what Afghanistan had done in regard to severalinternational treaties. He then said that the LegislativeDepartment of the Ministry of Justice is currentlyfinalizing draft legislations aimed at helping the countrymeet its obligations under the BWC. He continued: We,therefore, attach great importance to the full, effective,and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X whichsignificantly contributes to the economic andtechnological development of States Parties to theConvention. …. as we encourage that the needs andcapabilities of the States Parties from developing countriesbe heeded, we also highlight that particular considerationbe accorded to the peculiarities and special needs of theLDCs [Least Developed Countries] as the most marginalizedand disadvantaged segment of the human family, forexample in the areas of building infrastructure,development of human resources and national capacitybuilding. He then said that Universalization of the Conventionis very dear to Afghanistan. …. We encourage all those statesthat have not yet done so to accede to the Convention….Nonetheless, for those countries who are States Parties tothe Convention, we strongly favor the establishment of amultilateral verification mechanism. He concluded by sayingin regard to the ISU We welcome the continuation of the ISUand its mandate renewed. However, we share the views …that structural changes/expansion of the ISU, if any, shouldbe guided by striking a balance between equitablegeographic representation and maintaining the technicaland profession capacity to carry out the functions asmandated to it by the Conference.

[INF.1 shows that Afghanistan has not submitted a CBMbetween 2006 and 2011. In addition, Afghanistan has not madesubmissions in regard to compliance [INF.2], on S & Tdevelopments [INF.3] or on Article X [INF.8]].

Isabelle Nutall, Director Global Capacities, Alert andResponse, of the World Health Organization (WHO) thenspoke, saying that The WHO has been working to strengthenglobal and national capacities to counter these risks. TheSeventh Review Conference provides an opportunity toinform you of some of our activities of the past five years,and also to let you know about our perspective on thechallenges on the horizon and how we intend to preparefor them. She went on to say that WHO has a commitmentthrough its resolutions WHA 54.14 and WHA 55.16 tohelp Member States strengthen their preparedness againstbiological risks focusing on national and global publichealth systems. … WHO’s primary role in responding tothe natural, accidental or intentional release of abiological agent would be to support affected MemberStates in detecting the occurrence of disease, to managepublic health consequences, and to communicate to other

Member States real-time public health risk assessmentsand recommendations. She then went on to outline manydevelopments … that may be pertinent to your discussions.She noted that The centerpiece of Health Security is theInternational Health Regulations (IHR). …. The IHR(2005) are legally binding and designed to support theattainment of this goal through the development of corecapacities at the national level. She went on to say that In2011, a Memorandum of Understanding was signedbetween the WHO and the UN Office for DisarmamentAffairs to formalize WHO’s operational and technicalsupport to the UN Secretary General duringinvestigations of alleged use of biological weapons. TheMemorandum of Understanding outlines targets forharmonizing procedures as well as joint training activitiesas well as the provision of equipment and expertise.

This completed the General Debate.

Committee of the Whole

The Committee of the Whole commenced on the morning ofWednesday 7 December 2011, following the General Debate,with Ambassador Desra Percaya of Indonesia as theChairman and Piers Millett as the Secretary. AmbassadorPercaya started by saying that he had received requests fromNGO colleagues to observe the work of the Committee ofthe Whole. He went on to note that according to theunderstandings agreed in connection with the Rules ofProcedure adopted on Monday, in line with discussions at thePreparatory Committee, Committees may decide to holdcertain meetings in public. Ambassador Percaya proposedthat the work of the Committee of the Whole would open in apublic session which could be reverted into a private sessionas it became appropriate. It was agreed that the Committeeof the Whole would hold its first session in public.

Ambassador Desra Percaya then made some openingremarks, saying that he intended to work in a transparentmanner and that he saw himself as the facilitator of theCommittee. The aim was to produce a text for the FinalDeclaration and he sought a robust consensus text similar tothat which had been agreed at the Sixth Review Conferencein 2006. He noted that the President would be holding InformalPlenaries that would address cross-cutting issues that wouldlead to Part III: Decisions and Recommendations. TheCommittee of the Whole would be carrying out the Article byArticle review. The two processes would work in tandem asthere would be issues that arose in both processes – such asCBMs – which would be a cross-cutting issue and wouldalso be considered under Article V.

He proposed to look at each Article in turn and then toconsider the Preamble. His aim would be to carry out a firstreading of all the Articles and then to carry out a secondreading of each and every Article. Some Articles would requiremore time than others. He also noted that for each Articlethere were a number of sources to be drawn upon: the text ofthe Convention, the Final Declarations of past ReviewConferences (set out in the background Information DocumentBWC/CONF.VII/INF.5) and the common understandingsagreed at the Meetings of States Parties during theIntersessional Process (and set out in background Information


Document BWC/CONF.VII/INF.6). He also noted that othermaterial was contained in the Working Papers as well as inthe statements made in the General Debate.

Before moving on to look at Article I, Ambassador Percayaraised the question of how the outcome of the intersessionalmeetings should be reflected in the Final Declaration. Henoted that the Sixth Review Conference decided that theSeventh Review Conference would consider the work andoutcome of these meetings and decide on any further action.It was necessary to now take action on this point. He notedthat the work undertaken during the intersessional processcould be comfortably related to one, or multiple articles of theConvention and he proposed that as much of it as possibleshould be covered during the work of the Committee of theWhole. He also recognized that there would be overlap withthe work of the informal plenaries and that there might wellbe opportunities to decide upon further action based upon thework of the 2007 – 2010 meetings.

He said that there were three broad ways in which thework of the intersessional process might be reflected:• All the common understandings reached at Meetings of

States Parties could be reflected wholesale in the FinalDeclaration.

• Some of the common understandings, perhaps where theyexpanded upon text from previous Review Conferences,could be identified and just these reflected in the FinalDeclaration.

• A reference could be included that simply endorsed theoutputs of the annual Meetings of States Parties (perhapssimilar in format to the approach used at the Sixth ReviewConference).

Ambassador Percaya then invited views from the Committeeof the Whole as to how this issue should be approached.

In the subsequent discussion, a number of States Parties– Algeria, Norway, United States and France – spoke sayingthat it was up to delegations to submit paragraphs for inclusionin the Final Declaration. The view was expressed that thethird option was the simplest and the others would be verytime-consuming. Ambassador Percaya said that the thirdoption would be followed to adopt a similar approach to thatat the Sixth Review Conference with delegations being freeto submit proposals for the individual Articles that could containparagraphs from the common understandings.

[It is evident from BWC/CONF.VII/5 Annex I that Algeriaand Norway both submitted proposals for two Articles, theUnited States for eight Articles and France submitted noproposals.]

The Committee of the Whole then considered each Articleof the Convention in turn. The session on Wednesday morning,7 December 2011, saw consideration of Articles I, II and III.The Committee of the Whole continued on the Wednesdayafternoon with some further consideration of Article III andthen moved to on to consider Article IV. It then concluded inorder to enable an Informal Plenary to be held, and noted thatthe Committee of the Whole would resume on Thursdaymorning by considering Article V.

The Committee of the Whole resumed on the morning ofThursday 8 December 2011 following an informal session inwhich the President chaired a panel of representatives of

industry, made up of Gary Burns (AstraZeneca), PatrickScannon (XOMA LLC) and Huanming Yang (BGI). TheCommittee of the Whole then followed when considerationwas given to Articles V and VI, together with a furtherconsideration of some Article IV issues.

The Committee of the Whole then continued on the morningof Friday 9 December 2011 with consideration being given toArticles VII to X. Later the same day, the Chairman of theCommittee of the Whole circulated BWC/CONF.VII/COW/INF.1 dated 9 December 2011, which was entitled Proposalsmade to the Committee of the Whole (as at 15.00, 9December 2011). This collated the proposals for the text ofthe Final Declaration of the Seventh Review Conferencesubmitted during the first week of the Committee of the Whole.It had two parts:(a)Part I contains text from the Final Declaration of the

Sixth Review Conference corresponding to the articlesconsidered by the 2011 Committee of the Whole until13.00 on 9 December. A number of paragraphs in thistext have been highlighted in bold to indicate thatproposals have been made to alter this paragraph.The individual proposed amendments are not detailedin this document.

(b)Part II contains all the textual proposals submitted tothe Secretariat by 15.00 on 9 December.Addenda were subsequently issued to BWC/CONF.VII/

COW/INF.1 as follows: Add. 1 Proposals made to theCommittee of the Whole (as at 15.00, 12 December 2011);Add. 2 Proposals made to the Committee of the Whole (as at13.00, 14 December 2011); and Add. 3 Proposals made tothe Committee of the Whole (as at 13.00, 16 December 2011).

The Committee of the Whole then resumed on the morningof Monday 12 December 2011 with consideration of theremaining Articles of the Convention: Articles XI to XV.

On the morning of Tuesday 13 December 2011, theCommittee of the Whole gave consideration to the ‘SolemnDeclaration’ which covers the preambular paragraphs of theConvention and which immediately precedes the Article byArticle language in the Final Declaration.

The following day, Wednesday 14 December 2011, theCommittee of the Whole started on its second considerationof all the Articles of the Convention. A further compilation ofthe proposals submitted to the Chairman was circulated asBWC/CONF.VII/COW/INF.2 dated 14 December 2011which was entitled Combined proposals made to theCommittee of the Whole (as at 00.00, 14 December 2011).This stated that:

This document combines the proposals made duringthe Committee of the Whole prior to 15.00 on Monday 13December 2011. These proposals were drawn frominterventions made during meetings of the Committee as wellas written proposals received by the Secretariat as containedin BWC/CONF.VII/COW/INF.1 and its addenda.

Text highlighted in bold corresponds to proposals fornew text, amendments to text found in the FinalDeclaration of the Sixth Review Conference, or text fromthe Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference forwhich there are proposals pending. Normal text is drawn


directly from the Final Declaration of the Sixth ReviewConference as contained in BWC/CONF.VI/6.

In his opening remarks, Ambassador Desra Percaya, theChairman, said that he hoped that sufficient progress wouldbe made to enable him to produce a draft report overnight,based on the Chair’s best judgement of where consensus lay,in order to be able to transmit back to the Review Conferencea formal report of the Committee, including the draft Articleby Article Final Declaration. As it became evident that therewere differing views on some of the paragraphs, the Chairrequested the assistance of Syndoph Endoni of Nigeria andof Reto Wollenmann of Switzerland to act in an informalcapacity to consult with the delegations that had expresseddivergent views on particular paragraphs in order to try toreach consensus on those paragraphs. At the end of the day,a first draft of the procedural section of the report of theCommittee of the Whole was circulated as BWC/CONF.VII/COW/CRP. 1 dated 14 December 2011.

On Thursday 15 December 2011, the Committee of the Wholecontinued its consideration of BWC/CONF.VII/COW/INF.2by taking each Article in turn rather than each paragraph inturn, enabling better progress to be made. Even with thisaccelerated procedure, it was evident that the Committee ofthe Whole was falling behind schedule and would not reachthe handover point until after the date envisaged in theindicative programme (BWC/CONF.VII/2) which showed theCommittee of the Whole considering its report on theafternoon of Wednesday 14 December 2011.

The following day, Friday 16 December 2011, AmbassadorPercaya presented the Committee of the Whole with a draftof the Article by Article Final Declaration in BWC/CONF.VII/COW/CRP. 2 dated 16 December 2011 entitledOutline of the Draft Final Declaration of the SeventhReview Conference. In presenting this document, AmbassadorPercaya said that this was his best estimate of what wouldconstitute a consensus text for the Final Declaration. Whereit had been hard to identify where the consensus lay, the textfrom the Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conferencehad been inserted, as this was language which had been agreedby consensus. The Committee of the Whole then went on toadopt its report, which subsequently was issued as BWC/CONF.VII/5 dated 21 December 2011 entitled Report of theCommittee of the Whole. This records that:

5. Based on these discussions, the Chairman of theCommittee produced, under his own responsibility, anoutline of the draft final declaration of the Conference,which is attached to this report as Annex II. TheCommittee noted that the language in this outcome wasnot agreed, had not been fully discussed, and had beenincluded without prejudice to the position of anydelegation. The Committee decided to transmit the outlineto the plenary of the Conference for further discussionand negotiation, as appropriate, with a view to reachingconsensus on a final document as soon as possible.

The report included two Annexes – Annex I comprisingProposed language submitted to the Committee of theWhole and Annex II comprising Outline of the Draft Final

Declaration of the Seventh Review Conference Preparedby the Chair of the Committee of the Whole. Annex II didnot include any language for the Solemn Declaration and afacilitator was appointed later that day to help finalize theSolemn Declaration. Immediately after the Committee of theWhole had adopted its report on Friday, 16 December 2011,the President of the Review Conference resumed a plenarysession in order to take note of the report of the Committeeof the Whole.

Informal Plenaries

In parallel with the meetings of the Committee of the Wholethere were Informal Plenaries chaired by the President ofthe Review Conference, Ambassador Paul van den IJssel.The first Informal Plenary took place on the afternoon ofWednesday 7 December 2011. As this was an informal session,NGOs were present as observers throughout. The Presidentsaid that the topic for the first Informal Plenary was to be afirst discussion on Science and Technology. This had beenchosen because the Committee of the Whole had been havinga discussion on Article I of the Convention – an Article inwhich developments in science and technology were ofparticular importance. In addition, the President noted thatthe Sixth Review Conference in its Final Declaration onArticle XII had decided that the Seventh Review Conferenceshould review the operation of the Convention, takinginto account, inter alia: (i) new scientific and technologicaldevelopments relevant to the Convention.

The President recalled that in consultations in the previousmonth there was general agreement that there was a need tokeep a better track of developments in science and technologyand the implications for the Convention. He also noted thatthere had been several Working Papers – WP.3 from India,WP.13 from Australia, Japan and New Zealand as well asseveral Working Papers on the Intersessional Process whichalso touched on science and technology. He invited delegationsto present their proposals, and then any additional thoughts,so that consideration could be given to how to bring the ideastogether into a consolidated proposal.

The second Informal Plenary on the afternoon of Thursday 8December 2011 considered the topic of the IntersessionalProcess, and whether its structure and organization should bedifferent from that between the Sixth and Seventh ReviewConferences. Several working papers were of direct relevanceto this: those by the UK (WP.1, WP.2, WP.10), Australia, Japanand New Zealand (WP.11), Australia and Japan (WP.12), SouthAfrica (WP.18) and the USA (WP.23). As with the InformalPlenary on Wednesday, there was a lively discussion.

The third Informal Plenary on the afternoon of Friday 9December 2011 considered the topics of the Confidence-Building Measures regime, and of Cooperation and Assistance.In regard to the CBM regime consideration was given bothto whether amendments should be agreed at the SeventhReview Conference to the existing CBMs and also to whetherthere should be discussion of the CBM regime during theIntersessional Process. Several working papers were of directrelevance to this: those by Belgium (WP.6), Germany, Norwayand Switzerland (WP.9), Germany (WP.14), South Africa(WP.19), Norway, Switzerland and New Zealand (WP.21)


and Canada (WP.25). A start was also made on the discussionof Cooperation and Assistance which continued on theMonday afternoon. Working papers of relevance toCooperation and Assistance were those by Cuba for the NAM(WP.26) and South Africa (WP.16). Reference was also madeto the EU information paper (BWC/CONF.VII/INF.10) whichcontained examples of cooperation and assistance from theEU and its Member States.

The fourth Informal Plenary on the afternoon of Monday 12December 2011 continued the discussion of Cooperation andAssistance, and then went on to consider Compliance, andsubsequently Universality. The working papers of directrelevance to Compliance were the working papers byAustralia, Japan and New Zealand (WP.11) and Germany(WP.14). Reference was also made to a joint working paperby Canada and Switzerland (an advance copy available onunog.ch/bwc), and the US paper on the intersessional process(WP.23). In addition, the working paper by France (WP.28)was clearly intended to assist the consideration of compliance.There were no Working Papers on Universality.

The fifth Informal Plenary was on the afternoon of Tuesday13 December 2011 when the topics were the ImplementationSupport Unit and ‘Any Other Issues.’ The working papers ofdirect relevance to the ISU were those by Germany (WP.15),South Africa (WP.17) and Japan (WP.22). Under ‘Any OtherIssues’ one topic was raised by Switzerland on dual–useeducation and awareness: a non-paper dated 8 December 2011was circulated providing Suggested language on educationand awareness-raising which was based on the JACKSNNZand Kenya, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates of America Working Paper 20/Rev.1.

Following the completion of the Committee of the Whole onFriday 16 December 2011, the President conducted a seriesof informal consultations, and was assisted in his work byFacilitators in the following areas:• Solemn Declaration: Ambassador Alexandre Fasel

(Switzerland)• Articles I-XV: Ms Judit Körömi (Hungary) and Mr. Daniel

Simanjuntak (Indonesia)• Science and technology: Mr Zahid Rastam (Malaysia)• Assistance and cooperation: Mr Jesus Domingo

(Philippines)• Confidence-building measures (CBMs): Mr Paul Wilson

(Australia)• Intersessional programme: Ambassador Jo Adamson

(United Kingdom) and Mr Ben Steyn (South Africa)

In addition, on Friday 16 December 2011, the Presidentcirculated BWC/CONF.VII/CRP.1 entitled Elements for thedraft final document. This provided language for the following:

A. Outcome of the 2007–2010 intersessional programmeB. Intersessional programme 2012–2015

1. Meetings2. Sponsorship and fellowship programmes

C. Science and technologyD. Mechanism to promote cooperation and assistance

1. Database system to facilitate assistance requests andoffers

2. Open-ended working group on cooperation andassistance

E. Strengthening national implementationF. Confidence-building measuresG. Promotion of universalizationH. Implementation Support UnitI. Finances

The Final Stages

The following week commencing on Monday 19 December2011 saw the Review Conference entering its final phase. Asat the Sixth Review Conference in 2006, the DraftingCommittee did not meet, and instead, as recorded in the FinalDocument, The Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of theCommittee met, and decided to assist the President withhis informal consultations. The President had earlier madeit clear to the States Parties that the deadline of 6pm onThursday 22 December 2011 could not be extended as theUnited Nations in Geneva were shutting down then for theChristmas break. A proposal was tabled on the first day ofthe final week on Monday 19 December 2011 by China, India,Iran, Pakistan and Russia entitled Draft Proposal onStructure of ISP. This put forward two standing items –developments in science and technology and implementationof Article X – and four annual topics of which one was c).Consideration of multilateral verification measures thatwould ensure compliance with the Convention (to beconsidered in 2014). It also proposed a one week durationfor the Meeting of States Parties that would be preceded bya one week Meeting of Experts.

A further proposal was then tabled on the afternoon ofTuesday 20 December 2011 by the JACKSNNZ group(Japan, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland,Norway, New Zealand) entitled Draft proposal on theintersessional programme 2012-2015. This put forwardthree standing topics: national implementation, internationalcooperation and assistance, and developments in science andtechnology. Later that afternoon, the President circulated apaper entitled Possible topics for standing agenda items.This put forward three standing agenda items – science andtechnology developments, international cooperation andassistance, and national implementation.

The afternoon of Tuesday 20 December 2011 also sawconsideration being given to the President’s text in BWC/CONF.VII/CRP.1 regarding the Implementation Support Unit.Richard Lennane, the head of the ISU, introduced the annualreport of the ISU (BWC/CONF.VII/3 dated 23 November2011) and noted how much had been achieved with limitedhuman and financial resources. The report stated that Themain cause of restrictions on the ISU’s activities has beenlack of human and financial resources: the servicesoffered by the ISU are oversubscribed, and approximatelyone in three invitations to the ISU to participate in anevent or activity has had to be turned down eitherbecause of lack of available staff, or insufficient travelfunds. There was universal support for the activities ofthe ISU although there was discussion as to its size andbudget. Consideration was also given to the fact thathitherto the ISU had been funded through the budget for


the annual meetings of the BWC intersessional process.Although this was a convenient arrangement, it did meanthat only those States Parties which participated in themeetings in a given year paid a share of the cost of theISU for that year.

Financial issues were considered further in an InformalPlenary on the morning of the penultimate day, Wednesday21 December 2011. A paper (BWC/CONF.VII/4 dated 21December 2011) entitled Estimated costs of theintersessional programme of the Convention to be heldfrom 2012–2015 was circulated which included a slightlyenlarged ISU of 5 staff instead of 3. The estimated costs ofthe intersessional programme, including conference servicingand non-conference-servicing elements, amounted to US$1,943,400 in each of the years 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015.In addition, the Secretariat circulated a paper entitled Budgetcomparison dated 21 December 2011, which included as anAnnex the assessed contribution for 2012 for each State Partyto the BWC. This showed that the contribution for some StatesParties such as Bhutan or Burundi would be US $ 19 in 2012whilst that for Portugal would be US $ 9,989 and that forSpain US $ 62,110 and those for the Russian Federation wouldbe US $ 31,308, for the United Kingdom US $ 129,100 andfor the United States US $ 430,074.

It became evident that the estimated costs for theIntersessional Programme 2012 – 2015 in BWC/CONF.VII/4 could not be agreed and a revised estimate with no increasein the staff or the budget of the ISU was circulated as BWC/CONF.VII/4/Rev. 1 dated 22 December 2011 in which theestimated costs of this intersessional programme, includingconference servicing and non-conference-servicing elements,amounted to US$1,387,200 in each of the years 2012, 2013,2014 and 2015.

On the afternoon of the final day, Thursday 22 December2011, the President circulated a draft of the Final Document(BWC/CONF.VII/CRP. 2 dated 22 December 2011) entitledDraft Final Document of the Seventh Review Conference.This comprised a six-page report of the work of theConference to which was attached an eleven-page Articleby Article Final Declaration and a seven page Part III:Decisions and Recommendations. A 15-page Annex Ientitled Revised forms for the submission of the ConfidenceBuilding Measures was attached. This Final Document waseventually agreed after an amendment was made to thelanguage in section I. Finances of Part III: Decisions andRecommendations to add the words noting that theseestimated costs were prepared on exactly the same basisas the estimated costs for the 2007–2010 intersessionalprogramme, and therefore represent zero real growth, withany nominal increase due solely to currency and inflationfactors. This amendment was necessary to meet the concernsof Portugal and Spain who could not accept any increase inthe costs of the BWC. The Review Conference successfullyadopted the Final Document (BWC/CONF.VII/7) shortlyafter 5 pm in the afternoon, within an hour of the UN closingfor the Christmas break. There were then brief remarks bythe President, Ambassador Paul van den IJssel, and byAmbassador Idriss Jazaïry of Algeria, who had been chosen

to chair the intersessional meetings in 2012, and then by Cuba(for the NAM and other states group), Nigeria, Australia (forthe Western group), Romania (for the Eastern Europe group),Greece, United States of America, Japan, China, Mexico,Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of Korea, RussianFederation, France, United Kingdom, India, United ArabEmirates and Pakistan.

Analysis and Reflections

The Seventh Review Conference successfully reachedagreement on its Final Document (BWC/CONF.VII/7) lateon the afternoon of its final day, Thursday 22 December 2011.This achievement in itself was cause for relief as it came tenyears after the Fifth Review Conference had failed to reachagreement. Whilst the Sixth Review Conference in 2006had successfully demonstrated the will of the States Partiesto work together to nurture and strengthen the Convention,there had been indications of potential difficulties at theMeeting of States Parties in 2010 when some States Partieswere reluctant to accept language that had been accepted atthe Meeting of States Parties the previous year in 2009, thatsaid The States Parties agreed on the value of ....Nevertheless, the outcome of the Seventh Review Conferencehas been met with considerable disappointment because itssubstantive content fell so far below realistic expectations.Indeed, at the beginning of the Seventh Review Conferencemany States Parties appeared to have and to cherish realisticambitions for the outcome of the Conference, which seemedto be coming to fruition in December 2011. Certainly in theopening week the optimistic tone of many contributions to theGeneral Debate appeared to hold out the prospect ofconsensus on a reasonably wide range of BWC topics, evenif not all. The contrast in atmosphere just two weeks laterwas noted with dismay. Some of this was because of politicaldifficulties – very late in the Review Conference on the finalMonday proposals were tabled by China, India, Iran, Pakistanand Russia for the Intersessional Programme which sharplycurtailed expectations. By then, failure was a distinctpossibility. It is much to the credit of those who persevered toget the best outcome they could, and steered the Conferencethrough its truncated third week, that a Final Document wasachieved at all.

The Final Document is the outcome on which an overallappraisal of the Conference rests. In preparing thisappraisal, the process by which the Final Document wasdeveloped is examined, starting with the General Debateand the Committee of the Whole, as well as the mainelements which constitute the text in both the Article byArticle Final Declaration and Part III: Decisions andRecommendations. Comparisons are drawn between howthe Sixth and the Seventh Review Conferences proceeded.Throughout, a conscious emphasis is laid on the processrather than the politics of the Conference, partly becausethe process issues are more openly documented, and partlybecause non-governmental commentators are betterplaced to contribute to improving the structures andprocedures of Review Conferences than to influencingthe politics of the BWC. The Seventh Review Conferencerevealed weaknesses in the process: weaknesses for whichremedies can be prescribed that are detailed in a set of


recommendations at the end of this article.Nevertheless, the part played by the politics of States

Parties to the BWC should not be underestimated. Politicaldifferences among States Parties undoubtedly constrained theoptions for the Conference and reduced the chances of amore positive outcome. It is also evident that the chances ofachieving a more positive outcome can be increased by moreGroups of States Parties and States Parties making theircontributions both as proposals for the Committee of the Wholeand as Working Papers. Leaving it to other States Parties tomake the running is really not an option.

The overall verdict is a modest outcome. Contributingto that overall modest outcome were distinct successesand failures in particular areas, which are addressed below.

General Debate

The General Debate sets the scene and the tone for theReview Conference at its outset. The group statements havealways been presented first and have been significant in settingthe tone for all that follows. Based on previous ReviewConferences, the General Debate was expected to commencewith statements on behalf of the European Union ‘plus’ StatesParties and on behalf of the NAM and Other States Partiesfollowed by statements on behalf of the JACKSNNZ group,the Latin American Group and any other groups.

Group statements. At the Seventh Review Conference, twoopening group statements were made – one by Cuba on behalfof the NAM, and the other by Belarus on behalf of themember-states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.The group statement by Canada, on behalf of JACKSNNZ(Japan, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland,Norway, New Zealand) was made late – in the middle of theMonday afternoon and consequently had a reduced impact.There was no group statement by the Latin American states(unlike at the Sixth Review Conference in 2006) and, as willbe addressed below, the EU ‘plus’ chose, instead of havingthe State Party in the EU Presidency in December 2011,Poland, make its statement as on previous occasions, to speakas an international organisation after the States Parties and aSignatory State had spoken, thus greatly minimizing its impactand influence.

National and other statements. 10 national statements weremade by States Parties on the Monday morning. A further 5national statements were made by States Parties on Mondayafternoon before the group statement by Canada on behalfof JACKSNNZ, which was then followed by a further 14statements by States Parties. Tuesday morning saw a further14 national statements by States Parties, then a statement bya Signatory State. These were then followed by two statementson behalf of international organisations. The first was thestatement by the EU as an international organisation and thesecond by the OPCW. On Tuesday afternoon, statementswere made by two States Parties, then by two internationalorganisations (OIE and ICRC), a further State Party andthen a further international organisation (NATO). Theformal session was then suspended for an informal session

in which 19 NGOs made statements. The Wednesdaymorning saw statements from a further 4 States Partiesand at a later session when the General Debate wasresumed, one State Party and three internationalorganisations made statements.

European Union. Presumably as a consequence of GeneralAssembly resolution A/RES/65/276 dated 10 May 2011, the‘EU plus’ statement was delivered by the EU as an internationalorganization after the national statements by States Partiesand a Signatory State, and this timing significantly diminishedits impact. It was a good strong statement that should havebeen delivered first or second in the General Debate on behalfof the ‘EU plus’ as a group of 36 States Parties. It was alsonoted that two of the States Parties in their written statementsreferred to the EU statement delivered by Poland (which wasin the Presidency in December 2011 and would have prior toA/RES/65/276 made the ‘EU plus’ statement). It does seemthat, in negotiating A/RES/65/276, the EU was blind to theconsequent significant reduction in impact of subsequent EUstatements. Indeed, the benefits, if any, from A/RES/65/276to the ‘EU plus’ States are not apparent.

Committee of the Whole

The Committee of the Whole under the chairmanship ofAmbassador Desra Percaya of Indonesia commenced itswork on the Article by Article Final Declaration on themorning of Wednesday 7 December and continued untilFriday 16 December when it adopted its Report (BWC/CONF.VIII/5). The aim of the Committee of the Wholeis essentially to start from the Article by Article FinalDeclaration of the Sixth Review Conference and considerArticle by Article how the language should be developedso as to take into account any developments between theSixth and Seventh Review Conferences, thus creating theextended understandings that are central to the health anddirection of the Convention, as well as setting out theshared perspective of the States Parties as to where theConvention should be heading over the coming five yearsleading to the Eighth Review Conference.

Comparative analysis. The proposals made to theCommittee of the Whole in 2011 are compared with thosemade to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006, andsummarised in the table below. In considering the numbers ofproposals made by a group of States Parties or by a singleState Party, it needs to be recalled that at the Sixth ReviewConference proposals were made for all 15 Articles and forthe Solemn Declaration – so that in 2006 the number ofproposals made out of 16 is indicative of the attention beinggiven by a group of States Parties or by a single State Partyto the overall strengthening of the Convention Article byArticle. In contrast, in 2011 at the Seventh ReviewConference, no proposals were made for Articles XI, XIIIand XV – so the number made out of 13 is indicative of howextensive was the attention being given by a group of StatesParties or by a single State Party to the overall strengtheningof the Convention Article by Article.


State Party/Group 7th Rev Con Proposals

7th Rev Con Paragraphs

6th Rev Con Proposals

6th Rev Con Paragraphs

India 9 21 14 78 United States 8 23 14 70 Islamic Republic of Iran 7 15 15 64 Cuba (NAM) 6 23 2 12 Cuba 5 6 – – UK 5 11 – – Australia 3 4 – – Russian Federation 3 11 – – Algeria 2 5 – – Belgium 2 2 – – Mexico 2 8 – – N igeria 2 2 – – Norway 2 2 – – Argentina 1 1 – – Canada 1 1 2 3 Germany 1 2 – – Pakistan 1 1 14 28 South Africa 1 3 – – Switzerland 1 5 – – European Union – – 12 44 China – – 6 10 Japan – – 6 25 Ukraine – – 3 6 Latin American Group – – 2 4 Brazil – – 1 1 Croatia – – 1 2 New Zealand – – 1 1 Co-depositaries – – 1 1

19 entit ies (15 entities in 2006)

62 proposals 146 paragraphs

94 proposals 349 paragraphs

Report of COW 98 paragraphs 57 paragraphs

Final Declaration 74 paragraphs 66 paragraphs

The reduction in the number of proposals in 2011 by abouta third from the number of proposals in 2006, together withthe reduction by almost two-thirds in the number ofparagraphs submitted in these proposals suggests that therewas sadly a failure by the States Parties to recognise thecentral importance and significance of the Article by ArticleFinal Declarations and their extended understandings. Thequestion can be asked whether the absence and paucity ofproposals was indicative of ‘Didn’t care’ or of ‘Didn’t realise’?

There are also some marked and significant differencesbetween the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 and theSeventh Review Conference in 2011. The first is thecomplete absence in 2011 of any proposals submitted bythe European Union – or by Poland on behalf of the EuropeanUnion – whereas proposals were submitted by Finland onbehalf of the EU in 2006 for 12 Articles of the Convention.The significant value of proposed language already agreedby 27 States Parties (the member states of the EU) needs to


be appreciated. The second is that whilst the State Party(Pakistan) of the President of the Sixth Review Conferencesubmitted proposals for almost every Article (14) of theConvention in 2006, no proposals were submitted by the StateParty (The Netherlands) of the President of the SeventhReview Conference. It is also noted that whilst China andJapan each made six proposals in 2006, neither submittedany in 2011.

It is also to be noted that at the Sixth Review Conferencein 2006 the report of the Committee of the Whole showedthat contributions had also been received for:

• Action Plan on Universality Latin-American,Australia,Finland (EU)

• Action Plan on National ImplementationFinland (EU)

• Action Plan on Article X Cuba (NAM)

• ISU Latin-American,Finland (EU),Norway

• ISP Latin-American,Finland (EU),Cuba (NAM),New Zealand,South Africa

• CBMs Latin-American,Finland (EU)

These proposals eventually led to the language in PartIII: Decisions and Recommendations of the Final Document.It is recognised that before the Seventh Review Conference,the President-Designate had indicated that he envisaged asimilar division between the Article by Article FinalDeclaration and the Part III: Decisions andRecommendations. However, text was not explicitly soughtin 2011 for Part III: Decisions and Recommendations,although some States Parties in their Working Papers madeproposals that could – and should – have been used toformulate draft language for Part III: Decisions andRecommendations. This perceived disconnect betweenWorking Papers and draft language is examined further in thesection below on Part III: Decisions and Recommendations.

The Committee of the Whole process and the commonunderstandings from the Intersessional Process. It isalso evident that, in 2011, the Committee of the Whole consideredat its outset how best to incorporate the outcome of theIntersessional Process, with the Chairman of the Committee ofthe Whole saying that there were three broad ways in which thework of the intersessional process might be reflected:• All the common understandings reached at Meetings of

States Parties could be reflected wholesale in the FinalDeclaration.

• Some of the common understandings, perhaps where theyexpanded upon text from previous Review Conferences,

could be identified and just these reflected in the FinalDeclaration.

• A reference could be included in the Final Declarationthat simply endorsed the outputs of the annual Meetingsof States Parties (perhaps similar in format to the approachused at the Sixth Review Conference)

In the subsequent short discussion of these proposals, anumber of States Parties – Algeria, Norway, United Statesand France – spoke saying that it was up to delegations tosubmit paragraphs for inclusion in the Final Declaration.The view was expressed that the third option was the simplestand the others would be very time consuming. The Chairmansaid that the third option would be followed to adopt a similarapproach to that at the Sixth Review Conference withdelegations being free to submit proposals for the individualArticles that could contain paragraphs from the commonunderstandings.

[It is evident from BWC/CONF.VII.5 Annex I that Algeriaand Norway both submitted proposals for two Articles, theUnited States for eight Articles and France submitted noproposals.]

With the benefit of hindsight it is evident that the processadopted at the Seventh Review Conference failed to giveappropriate weight to the fact that the common understandingsagreed in the four years of the Intersessional Process werethe product of some eight weeks of work and thus thesecommon understandings merited a more systematicconsideration by the Committee of the Whole. Furtherrelated recommendations as to how this might be remediedat future Review Conferences are made below.

Article by Article Final Declaration

It is evident to those considering the evolution of the Biologicaland Toxin Weapons Convention that the extendedunderstandings that have been developed – which build fromReview Conference to Review Conference on the languagein the previous Article by Article Final Declarations – arecentral to the life of the Convention and are, above all,forward looking. The many positive functions of the FinalDeclaration, notably through the cumulative expression ofextended understandings drawing out the latent potential ofthe Convention, Article by Article, and the progressivedevelopment of procedures and definitions, need to be fullyrecognised.

A major error at the Seventh Review Conference was itsapparent failure to appreciate the value and the centralimportance of the Article by Article Final Declaration inthe evolution of the Convention. This failure wasdisappointingly typified by the incautious and incorrectdescription of the Article by Article Final Declaration asthe backward-looking part of the Final Document. Thisoccurred, for example, in the President-Designate’s letter toall States Parties on 17 November 2011 when, perhapsreflecting an earlier misapprehension, he said:

The programme envisages that the Committee of theWhole will conduct the article-by-article review of theConvention, developing the text of the finaldeclaration, while informal plenaries will work on the


cross-cutting issues for which specific decisions willbe recorded in the forward-looking section of the finaldocument (for example, an intersessional process, anyrevisions to the CBMs, the future of the ISU, etc). Therewill undoubtedly be some overlap between theCommittee of the Whole and the informal plenaries,but this is natural and welcome: it is entirelyappropriate that reflections from the backward-lookingarticle-by-article review should inform the decisionstaken in the forward-looking agenda. [Emphasis added]

This was further reflected in the President-Designate’sspeaking notes to the Regional Group meetings on 29November 2011 which stated that the substantive work ofthe Review Conference will be carried out in two main forums:the Committee of the Whole, and informal plenaries:

- The Committee of the Whole: will deal with thearticle-by-article review of the Convention (agendaitems 10 (b) and (c)), looking at each article in turn,and developing text for the Final Declaration partof the final document.

- Informal plenaries: will deal with “cross-cutting”issues that do not fit under a single article of theConvention, and with specific issues needingdecisions, e.g. because they were explicitlymandated by the Sixth Review Conference (agendaitems 11-13). The informal plenaries will developtext for the “decisions and recommendations” or“forward-looking agenda” part of the finaldocument.

- I would characterise this division of labour asfollows: the Committee of the Whole produces textthat records what has happened, what the situationis, and what the States Parties think about it. Theinformal plenaries produce text that specifies whatthe States Parties are going to do about it. [Emphasisin original]

This description unfortunately has the effect ofdowngrading the status of the Article by Article FinalDeclaration by taking too narrow a view of the functions itperforms. It also inadvertently and incorrectly sends themessage to the States Parties that the Article by Article FinalDeclaration is less important than Part III.

The Article by Article Final Declaration consequentlyfailed to build as might have been expected on that of theSixth Review Conference and its extended understandings.Worse, there were backward steps in that there were seriousomissions in the Final Declaration in 2011 of material thathad been agreed and appeared in 2006. A significant exampleis the loss from the Article IV language of the paragraphrelating to education. The Final Declaration in 2006 stated:

14.The Conference urges the inclusion in medical,scientific and military educational materials andprogrammes of information on the Convention andthe 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Conference urgesStates Parties to promote the development of

training and education programmes for thosegranted access to biological agents and toxinsrelevant to the Convention and for those with theknowledge or capacity to modify such agents andtoxins, in order to raise awareness of the risks, aswell as of the obligations of States Parties underthe Convention.

This language was present in 2011 in the report of theCommittee of the Whole (BWC/CONF.VII/5) in a slightlymodified form as language for the Article IV section:

23.The Conference urges the inclusion in medical,scientific and military educational materials andprogrammes of information on the Convention andthe 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Conference urgesStates Parties to promote the development oftraining and education programmes for thosegranted access to biological agents and toxinsrelevant to the Convention and for those with theknowledge or capacity to modify such agents andtoxins, taking into account the commonunderstandings reached during the 2008 Meetingof States Parties.

However, this was lost in the final few days and does notappear in the Final Declaration.

There was also a failure to take the commonunderstandings agreed at the annual Meetings of States Partiesbetween 2006 and 2011 and incorporate these systematicallyinto the Article by Article Final Declaration. It appears froma comparison of texts that this was done for Article VII, butless so, or not at all, for other Articles. As a consequencesome valuable common understandings were lost. An exampleof this was the common understanding regarding oversight ofscience that had been agreed at MSP/2008 as:

25.Having considered the oversight of science, StatesParties recognised the value of developing nationalframeworks to prohibit and prevent the possibility ofbiological agents or toxins being used as weapons,including measures to oversee relevant people,materials, knowledge and information, in the privateand public sectors and throughout the scientific lifecycle. Recognising the need to ensure that suchmeasures are proportional to risk, do not causeunnecessary burdens, are practical and usable anddo not unduly restrict permitted biological activities,States Parties agreed on the importance of involvingnational stakeholders in all stages of the design andimplementation of oversight frameworks. StatesParties also noted the value of harmonizing, wherepossible and appropriate, national, regional andinternational oversight efforts.

This was carried forward to the Committee of the Wholein 2011 and appeared in the report of the Committee of theWhole (BWC/CONF.VII/5) as:

21.The Conference recognises the value of adoptingand further strengthen[ing] national measures, as


appropriate, to oversee relevant people, materials,knowledge and information, in the private andpublic sectors and throughout relevant scientificand administrative activities. Recognising the needto ensure that such measures are proportional torisk, take into account national and localcircumstances, do not cause unnecessary burdens,are practical and usable and do not unduly restrictpermitted biological activities, the Conferenceaffirm the importance of involving nationalstakeholders in all stages of the design andimplementation of oversight frameworks. TheConference also notes the value of harmonizing,where possible and appropriate, national, regionaland international oversight efforts.

It was then lost in the final week and did not appear in theFinal Declaration – another retrograde step.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is evident that at futureReview Conferences an attractive solution would be for theChairman of the Committee of the Whole, on his own authority,to formulate a preparatory document for the Committee ofthe Whole to consider that introduces the substantiveparagraphs with the common understandings from annualMeetings of the States Parties as draft language for whicheverArticle of the Convention is judged appropriate by theChairman. These common understandings would then appearArticle by Article in the Annex to the Final Report of theCommittee of the Whole entitled Proposed languagesubmitted to the Committee of the Whole. It is recommendedthat the common understandings language should appear asthe first submission under the relevant Article and thus reflectthat this is language already agreed by all the States Partiesat the annual MSP.

As it is noted that in 2011 the Chairman of the Committeeof the Whole issued a document (BWC/CONF.VII/COW/INF.1) that included a Part I which contains text from theFinal Declaration of the Sixth Review Conferencecorresponding to the articles considered by the 2011Committee of the Whole until 13.00 on 9 December, it isrecommended that at a future Review Conference theChairman of the Committee of the Whole who is nominatedat the Preparatory Committee should – as part of the Bureaubetween the Preparatory Committee and the ReviewConference – formulate a preparatory document for theCommittee of the Whole that contains Article by Article thelanguage agreed at the previous Review Conference in theArticle by Article Final Declaration and add to this for eachArticle the common understandings in the consensus outcomedocuments of the annual Meetings of States Parties. Adoptingsuch an approach would help to prepare the ground for theCommittee of the Whole to consider how to develop thelanguage appropriately.

The unsatisfactory handling, noted above, of text from thecommon understandings generated in the IntersessionalProcess of 2007-2010 was carried over into the failure of theReview Conference in 2011 to endorse the consensusoutcome documents in which they were contained. Instead,in the element of Part III: Decisions and Recommendationsthat addressed A. Outcome of the 2007-10 IntersessionalProcess, the final paragraph:

4. The Conference reiterates that common under-standings were identified in the consensus outcomedocuments of the meetings of States Parties (BWC/MSP/2007/5, BWC/MSP/2008/5, BWC/MSP/2009/5and BWC/MSP/2010/6), within their mandates.[Emphasis added].

is significantly weaker than the corresponding paragraph inPart III: Decisions and Recommendations of the SixthReview Conference which stated:

4. The Conference endorses the consensus outcomedocuments from the Meetings of States Parties(BWC/MSP/2003/4, BWC/MSP/2004/3 and BWC/MSP/2005/3). [Emphasis added].

The failure at the Seventh Review Conference, unlike atthe Sixth Review Conference in 2006, to endorse theconsensus outcome documents is regrettable, as the FinalDeclaration in 2011 did not – as it might have done – integratethe relevant paragraphs systematically into its Article by ArticleFinal Declaration either. They are only reflected patchilyand intermittently in the Final Declaration. Merely toreiterate that common understandings were identified issignificantly weaker than endorsement of the consensusoutcome documents would have been. Two improvementsfor future Review Conferences are outlined above which maycontribute to a solution.

Part III: Decisions and Recommendations

In 2011, there was no explicit request for language for PartIII: Decisions and Recommendations to be submitted byStates Parties or by groups of States Parties. However, someStates Parties made proposals in their Working Papers thatcould have been used to create draft language for Part III:Decisions and Recommendations. What appeared to belacking was any process to take the proposals in the WorkingPapers and translate them into a first draft for Part III:Decisions and Recommendations. There was an apparentdisconnect in the months immediately prior to the ReviewConference which could have been remedied if there hadbeen a much earlier appointment of Friends of the Chair orFacilitators to conduct open-ended consultations on each ofthe major elements and identify widely acceptable text forthe start of the Review Conference. After all, it was evidentby the time of the Preparatory Committee meeting in April2011 what the major topics for the Review Conference weregoing to be. In the event, the language relating to elements ofwhat became Part III: Decisions and Recommendationsin 2011 seems to have first appeared in Elements for thedraft final document Forward-looking agenda (BWC/CONF.VII/CRP. 1 dated 16 December 2011) rather than beingsubmitted by States Parties.

As this language only became available late – within justa week of the termination on 22 December 2011 – during theReview Conference, this necessarily meant that alternativeproposals were made even later. In particular the proposaltabled by China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia on the firstof the last four days – on Monday 19 December 2011 – entitledDraft Proposal on Structure of ISP came very late, and


was at variance with the President’s appointment on theprevious Friday 16 December of Ambassador Jo Adamson(United Kingdom) and Ben Steyn (South Africa) asFacilitators to develop language for the IntersessionalProgramme. The subsequent proposal made on the afternoonof Tuesday 20 December 2011 by the JACKSNNZ group(Japan, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland,Norway, New Zealand) entitled Draft proposal on theintersessional programme 2012-2015 just 48 hours beforethe inflexible termination deadline of 6 pm on Thursday 22December 2011 was thus even later. Late proposals withlittle time for consideration are not helpful for achieving asuccessful outcome.

Major Elements of Part III: Decisions and Recom-mendations

The President-Designate, when he addressed substantiveissues in the speaking notes for his meetings with the RegionalGroups on 23 to 28 September 2011 – just over two monthsbefore the start of the Seventh Review Conference – saidthat Over the past months I have participated in severalinformal seminars and workshops in various countries,and have held a considerable number of bilateralconsultations, including in capitals and added that In thecourse of these consultations, a relatively coherent picturehas emerged of the areas in which a result will benecessary if the Review Conference is to be considered asuccess. [Emphasis added] These are, very briefly:

- the future of the intersessional process, the confidence-building measures, and the Implementation SupportUnit;

- the need for a means to monitor and assess develop-ments in science and technology;

- strengthening international cooperation and assistanceactivities and the implementation of Article X;

- possibilities for compliance and verification; and- universalization.

Evaluation of outcomes in each of these areas in whicha result will be necessary

The future of the intersessional process. The continuationof the ISP is welcomed. The inclusion of three StandingAgenda items is a good step forward in addition to the topicHow to enable fuller participation in the CBMs for 2012– 2013 and the topic How to strengthen implementation ofArticle VII, including consideration of detailed proceduresand mechanisms for the provision of assistance andcooperation by States Parties for 2014 – 2015. The threeStanding Agenda items are first: Cooperation andassistance, with a particular focus on strengtheningcoooperation and assistance under Article X; second:Review of developments in the field of science andtechnology related to the Convention; and third:Strengthening national implementation. In addition, reportson universalization efforts, and on the ISU, are recurrent itemson the agenda of annual Meetings of States Parties continuedfrom the last Intersessional Process.

The overall agenda is thus significantly fuller than between2002 and 2006 and between 2006 and 2011. The addition oftwo Vice-Chairmen, to secure a regional group balance eachyear and share political leadership, is also a step forward.But the absence of any explicit continuity in regard to theStanding Agenda items – such as would be helped by either atask leader or working group secretary – is regretted. It is tobe hoped that in future years the Vice-Chairmen will beChairmen and will be able thereby to bring much neededcontinuity. Only by organising the work programme early, andallocating agenda items among these office-holders, assistedas needed by Facilitators or Friends of the Chair on particulartopics, can the necessary political leadership be exercised inthe regrettable absence of working groups from the newIntersessional Process. The failure to recognise the value oftaking decisions during the Intersessional Process byconsensus as appropriate is regretted, but the existing rulesdo allow for any conclusions or results to be reached andthis wording is likely to become more important as the newIntersessional Process develops. Much now depends on thepurposefulness with which States Parties make use of theIntersessional Process and its fuller agenda.

The confidence-building measures. Some amendmentswere agreed at the Seventh Review Conference – but thefailure to agree all the amendments emerging from the threeyears of discussion and subsequent e-panel is unfortunate.However, the agreement that in 2012 and 2013 as part of theintersessional programme States Parties will consider howto enable fuller participation in the CBMs provides anopportunity for the States Parties who are keen to improvethe benefits from the CBM regime to submit substantiveWorking Papers well in advance of the meetings in 2012.Such papers can explore what it is that inhibits fullerparticipation and what might facilitate fuller participation whilstenhancing the benefits from the CBM regime. It is, after all,some two decades since the CBMs were last given seriousconsideration and the further and comprehensive attention[emphasis added] which the Sixth Review Conferencedecided they would merit at the Seventh Review Conferenceneeds to be addressed through constructive and forwardlooking consideration in 2012 and 2013.

The Implementation Support Unit. The continuation iswelcomed but the failure to allocate any additional staff andresources is regretted. The failure to allocate additionalresources to the ISU – which had already demonstrated thatits present resources were inadequate for its 2006 mandate –is another missed opportunity. The explicit acceptance ofvoluntary funds for the ISU as recorded in

33.The Conference notes that States Parties in aposition to do so may consider making voluntarycontributions to the Unit to enhance its ability tocarry out its mandated tasks.

is welcomed. It will be important in future annual reports by theISU that they show each year whether their resources wereadequate – and if not, to detail the shortfall so that appropriateresources can be approved at subsequent Review Conferences.


The need for a means to monitor and assessdevelopments in science and technology. It is encouragingthat it was agreed that this should be a Standing Agenda itemfor the intersessional period. However, in practice it will bechallenging to ensure that the seven topics specified inparagraph 22 of Part III: Decisions and Recommendations:

(a) new science and technology developments that havepotential for uses contrary to the provisions of theConvention;

(b) new science and technology developments that havepotential benefits for the Convention, includingthose of special relevance to disease surveillance,diagnosis and mitigation;

(c)possible measures for strengthening nationalbiological risk management, as appropriate, inresearch and development involving new scienceand technology developments of relevance to theConvention;

(d)voluntary codes of conduct and other measures toencourage responsible conduct by scientists,academia and industry;

(e) education and awareness-raising about risks andbenefits of life sciences and biotechnology;

(f)science- and technology-related developmentsrelevant to the activities of multilateral organizat-ions such as the WHO, OIE, FAO, IPPC and OPCW;

(g)any other science and technology developments ofrelevance to the Convention.

are indeed being addressed – “will be addressed” – eachyear for the topical scientific subject for each year as detailedin paragraph 23 of Part III: Decisions and Recommendations:

(a)advances in enabling technologies, including high-throughput systems for sequencing, synthesizingand analyzing DNA; bioinformatics andcomputational tools; and systems biology (to beconsidered in 2012);

(b)advances in technologies for surveillance,detection, diagnosis and mitigation of infectiousdiseases, and similar occurrences caused bytoxins in humans, animals and plants (to beconsidered in 2013);

(c)advances in the understanding of pathogenicity,virulence, toxicology,immunology and relatedissues (to be considered in 2014);

(d)advances in production, dispersal and deliverytechnologies of biological agents and toxins (to beconsidered in 2015); [Emphasis added].

There is only one week each year for the Meeting ofExperts and the Meeting of States Parties. This makes itunlikely that the Standing Agenda item on advances in scienceand technology will have more than one day at each meeting.Furthermore, no provision has been made to ensureconsistency and continuity in preparing and planning toaddress science and technology developments. There is noexplicit continuity in either political leadership, scientificfacilitation or even the secretariat function. Once again, itwill be up to States Parties who are keen to see the enhance-

ment of the assessment of advances in science and technologyand their implications for the Convention to submit substantiveWorking Papers on matters within the agenda, selected fortheir significance for the BWC, well in advance of themeetings in 2012.

Strengthening international cooperation and assis-tanceactivities and the implementation of Article X. This had asuccessful outcome in that it was not only agreed that thisshould be a Standing Agenda item but it was also agreed toestablish a database system that is effectively a clearing houseto facilitate requests for and offers of exchange of assistanceand cooperation among States Parties. In addition, a sponsorshipprogramme was agreed. This is the only topic on which theoutcome at the Seventh Review Conference essentially metexpectations prior to the Review Conference.

Universalization. This had a successful outcome in that itwas addressed at the Seventh Review Conference. However,it is evident that the States Parties were content to continueas in the previous intersessional period even though thenumber of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention has continued to lag behind those of otherinternational conventions during the same period. It isregrettable that the States Parties were unable to adopt astronger and more systematic approach than that of dependingon the variable enthusiasms of the successive annualChairmen. The States Parties appeared not to recognize thatthere are lessons to be learned for the BWC in the successof the sustained efforts made to achieve universalisation ofthe CWC.

Possibilities for compliance and verification. This is notaddressed in the outcome of the Seventh Review Conference.It represents a complete failure to move forward even afterthe broad feeling from the preparatory workshops thatconceptual discussions on compliance and the demonstrationof compliance attracted wide support.

Weaknesses in the process leading to the SeventhReview Conference

Although it was evident that there was widespreadenthusiasm for a successful outcome during the 15 monthsprior to the Review Conference, which consequently –and justifiably – raised expectations for a realisticallyambitious outcome, in the event the Review Conferencefailed to achieve this, and there is consequently a sense ofgreat disappointment. While it is recognised that politicaldifferences accounted in large part for the failure of theReview Conference to match earlier expectations,nevertheless this failure was also caused in part byweaknesses in the process. A number of elements relatingto the process of the Review Conference can be identifiedas having contributed to its disappointing outcome:

• Failure to recognise the huge importance of the Article byArticle Final Declaration in building extendedunderstandings Review Conference upon ReviewConference which is essential to ensure that theConvention is a thriving and valuable entity.


• Failure by the Member States of the ‘EU plus’ to recognisethat the change from participating as a group of States Partiesrepresented by its Presidency and making one of the groupstatements at the outset of the General Debate, to becomingan “international organization” speaking after the StatesParties and the Signatory States, meant that the impact ofthe ‘EU plus’ statement was significantly reduced.

• Failure by the Member States of the EU to recognise thatthe failure to submit proposals agreed by 27 States Partiesfor language for the Article by Article Final Declarationhad the consequence that much greater efforts wererequired by all individual Member States of the EU to submitlanguage.

• In contrast to the situation at the 2006 Review Conference,when proposals were submitted by Pakistan, the StateParty of the President, for language for 14 of the 15 Articlesof the Convention in the Article by Article FinalDeclaration, in 2011 no proposals were submitted by theNetherlands for the Article by Article Final Declarationat the Seventh Review Conference.

• There was failure to create a specific channel enablingproposals for text for items in Part III: Decisions andRecommendation to be submitted by States Parties (by aseparate route parallel to that in which States Parties submitproposals for text for the Article by Article FinalDeclaration).

• Unfortunate usage of incorrect language described theArticle by Article Final Declaration as ‘backward looking’and the Part III: Decisions and Recommendations as‘forward looking’, whereas it is evident that theextended understandings in the Final Declaration thathave been developed – and which build from ReviewConference to Review Conference on the language inthe previous Article by Article Final Declarations –are central to the life of the Convention and are, aboveall, forward looking.

• An opportunity was missed that would have helped toprepare for the topics to be considered for inclusion in PartIII: Decisions and Recommendations: the appointment atthe Preparatory Committee meeting – in informal session ifnecessary – of Facilitators or Friends of the Chair for eachof these topics charged with developing draft text throughopen-ended consultations to be submitted at the start of, orprior to, the Review Conference.

In addition, it is unfortunate that undue emphasis appearedto be placed on the lack of official status of the informationdocuments (see Annex) when it is evident that the reportsprovided by the States Parties – on compliance, on scientificand technological developments, and on Article X – are anintegral part of the Review Conference. Ways should bedevised whereby the Review Conference considers thesubmitted information, and records it appropriately in its FinalDocument. Such a process would encourage more StatesParties to put the effort needed into submitting reports forthese documents.

Dates

The agreement in the Article by Article Final Declarationfor Article XII that:

65. …. The Conference therefore decides that ReviewConferences be held at least every five years.[Emphasis added]

is a welcome step forward over the previous language in 2006which agreed that:

60. …. The Conference therefore recommends thatReview Conferences should continue to be held atleast every five years. [Emphasis added]

As it is noted that the States Parties to the CWC at theirConference of States Parties (Report C-16/5 dated 2December 2011) held from 28 November to 2 December2011 approved the dates and duration for their ThirdReview Conference and for their subsequent Conferencesof States Parties:

21.2 The Conference at its Twelfth Session decided tohold its Seventeenth Session from 26 to 30 November2012 (paragraph 22.2 of C-12/7). The Conferenceapproved the following dates for the Third ReviewConference and for the next regular sessions of theConference:

Third Review Conference: from 8 to 19 April 2013;

Eighteenth Session: from 2 to 6 December 2013;

Nineteenth Session: from 1 to 5 December 2014;

Twentieth Session: from 30 November to 4 December2015;

Twenty-First Session: from 28 November to 2 December2016; and

Twenty-Second Session: from 27 November to 1December 2017.

it is recognized that the Depositaries could benefit the StatesParties to the BWC, by taking steps now to agree the datesfor the next five years – for both the annual MSPs and for afull three weeks conference of 15 working days from 7 to 25November 2016 for the Eighth Review Conference. Ideally,the BWC annual Meeting of States Parties would take placein the week preceding the CWC Conference of States Parties,as this could facilitate cross-fertilization between the twoConventions.

The welcome step forward taken under Article XII hasboth practical and deeper significance. In practical terms itenables dates to be chosen for the Eighth Review Conference,and space booked with the United Nations, without delaybecause the decision taken already constitutes the necessaryauthority. Its deeper significance is that it finally places theBWC Review Conference process on a regular basis and


thereby reinforces the permanence of this treaty regime. Thismove from recommendation to decision had, accordingly, longbeen advocated as a way of strengthening the Convention,and it is one outcome of the Seventh Review Conferencethat can be wholeheartedly welcomed.

Further Issues

Two issues became prominent in the Conference which had,however, not been included in the President-Designate’s listof areas in which a result will be necessary. One wasfinancial constraints, which had not been expected to loom aslarge as they did: in this respect the Conference wasunfortunate in its timing. The other was nationalimplementation, which had been a surprising omission fromthe list, because among both governments and non-governmental supporters of the BWC it has long been seenas vital to the strengthening of the Convention. Many proposalswere put forward for States Parties to consider at the SeventhReview Conference, including support for an Action Plan orsimilar programme, much activity from legislative assistance-providers such as VERTIC (for whose work several StatesParties expressed appreciation in the General Debate) andnew approaches to improving national implementationdeveloped since the Sixth Review Conference.

Financial constraints were particularly emphasised by StatesParties from southern Europe, but the climate of austeritythey reflected was more widely felt. It is evident from thepaper circulated by the Secretariat on 21 December 2011that the annual additional resources sought from Portugaland Spain for the measured and modest augmentation of theISU in BWC/CONF.VII/4 were $2,869 for Portugal and$17,775 for Spain. Given that the major participants hadaccepted the measured and modest augmentation of the ISU,and that the EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC[Council Joint Action 2008/858/CFSP of 10 November 2008]with its budget of 1.4 M Euro ($ 1 M) was about to terminateat the end of December 2011 with some $270,000 unspent,it appears that this was yet another example of the EU’sfragmentation and its failure to think and plan ahead in acoordinated way. These constraints resulted in the Conferenceadopting, in its final hours, a budget embodying zero real growthincrease subject only to variations for inflation and for currencyfluctuations against the Swiss franc. This strict budgetarydiscipline impinged on the costs permitted to the IntersessionalProcess and, notably, prevented any increase of staff orresources for the Implementation Support Unit. The BWC is,in comparison with many, a very inexpensive treaty toadminister, but this fact counted for nothing: its diminutivescale of assessments on States Parties was still subjected tothe full force of public expenditure cash limits.

National implementation was, apart from the budget, thelast issue to be resolved, with tough negotiation continuingvery late in the Review Conference over the content of thethird Standing Agenda item entitled Strengthening nationalimplementation. The decision of the Review Conference atparagraph 24 of Part III: Decisions and Recommendationswas that the following topics will be addressed under the

Standing Agenda Item on strengthening nationalimplementation:(a)a range of specific measures for the full and compre-

hensive implementation of the Convention, especiallyArticles III and IV;

(b)ways and means to enhance national implementation,sharing best practices and experiences, including thevoluntary exchange of information among StatesParties on their national implementation, enforcementof national legislation, strengthening of nationalinstitutions and coordination among national lawenforcement institutions;

(c)regional and sub-regional cooperation that can assistnational implementation of the Convention;

(d)national, regional and international measures toimprove laboratory biosafety and security ofpathogens and toxins;

(e)any potential further measures, as appropriate, relevantfor implementation of the Convention.

The detailed content of this agenda item does offer thepotential for States Parties to pursue conceptual discussionsextending to the nature of BWC compliance and thedemonstration of such compliance. It offers this in paragraph24(b), which includes under ways and means to enhancenational implementation: sharing best practices andexperiences, including the voluntary exchange ofinformation among States Parties on their national im-plementation, enforcement of national legislation,strengthening of national institutions and coordinationamong national law enforcement institutions; and inparagraph 24(e) especially: any potential further measures,as appropriate, relevant for implementation of theConvention. One of the earliest tests of the resolve of StatesParties to build up the BWC treaty regime through the newIntersessional Process will be the ingenuity and determinationwith which they make use of the possibilities that thenegotiation of the Standing Agenda item Strengtheningnational implementation now offers. Once again, it will beup to States Parties to prepare and submit substantive WorkingPapers well in advance of the meetings to be considered underthis Standing Agenda item.

Looking ahead

Given that the Seventh Review Conference achieved a modestoutcome, it is now important to examine carefully what wasachieved and what this outcome now makes possible in orderto achieve the maximum benefits from this in the comingIntersessional Period, as well as looking ahead to the EighthReview Conference itself.

The Intersessional Period

The Intersessional Programme has agreed three StandingAgenda items – on cooperation and assistance, ondevelopments in the field of science and technology relatedto the Convention, and on strengthening nationalimplementation. The agenda each year will also have to includetwo recurrent items carried forward from the last


Intersessional Period: a report on progress towardsuniversality, and the annual report of the ImplementationSupport Unit (ISU). In addition, the IntersessionalProgramme has to consider two topics: one in 2012 and2013 on how to enable fuller participation in the CBMsand one in 2014 and 2015 on how to strengthenimplementation of Article VII, including considerationof detailed procedures and mechanisms for theprovision of assistance and cooperation by StatesParties. As both the annual Meeting of Experts and theannual Meeting of States Parties will last for a week –five working days, it is evident that States Parties will needto prepare appropriate substantive Working Papers andsubmit these well in advance of the annual Meetings.

It will be up to States Parties to address the key elementsin these Working Papers – this is especially the case in regardto the Standing Agenda item on developments in science andtechnology as the mandate for this requires seven topics tobe addressed for the topical subject to be considered eachyear. Thus in 2012 there are three topical subjects to beaddressed: advances in enabling technologies, includinghigh-throughput systems for sequencing, synthesizing andanalyzing DNA; bioinformatics and computational tools;and systems biology. As there is unlikely to be longer thanone day to consider all of this at the Meeting of Experts andagain at the Meeting of States Parties, the importance of wellconstructed and focused Working Papers is evident. Theyneed to be on matters within the agenda selected for theirsignificance for the BWC.

There are also opportunities arising from the appointmentof two Vice-chairs for the Intersessional Process which shouldfacilitate progress. This is a distinct advance towards sharedpolitical responsibility on behalf of the States Parties as awhole. It will also enable the very concentrated workload tobe shared – an especially important point given the allocationof only one week to the Meeting of Experts and one weekto the Meeting of States Parties. It also represents a movetowards a balanced political leadership, although it seemsunlikely that the same individuals will be carrying out thesame task throughout the Intersessional Period. Much ofthe value of this addition will depend on how efficientlyand effectively the Chair and the two Vice-chairs divideup the work load – i.e. the agenda items – each year bothamong themselves and any Facilitators or Friends of theChair they may appoint, for example on CBMs, to carryforward tasks ongoing from the Seventh ReviewConference. There will be an opportunity to achievevaluable continuity – both through Vice-chairs becomingChair in successive years, and in taking up responsibilityfor items such as the promotion of universality and seeingthis through into successive years.

Although there was no agreement to increase the resourcesand the staffing of the Implementation Support Unit, therewas a welcome extension enabling States Parties in a positionto do to consider making voluntary contributions to the Unit inorder to enhance its ability to carry out its mandated tasks.This will be especially important as the mandate of the ISUwas extended by the decision that it shall, in addition to thetasks mandated by the Sixth Review Conference, performthe following tasks:

(a) implement the decision to establish and administer thedatabase for assistance requests and offers, andfacilitating the associated exchange of informationamong States Parties;

(b) support, as appropriate, the implementation by theStates Parties of the decisions and recommendationsof this Review Conference.

Given the situation about resources at the Seventh ReviewConference, it is expected that the annual reports of the ISUwill include in future a section regarding its resources andtheir adequacy for carrying out the mandate.

Looking ahead to the Eighth Review Conference

While it is recognised that the success of the Eighth ReviewConference will depend upon many political differencesbeing overcome, and therefore upon the resolutedetermination of the States Parties as a whole to take theConvention forward, certain identified weaknesses in theReview Conference process nevertheless deserve earlyattention. Accordingly, in preparing for the ReviewConference long before 2016, States Parties arerecommended to consider addressing specific weaknessesin the process with the following remedies:

Use of time

1. The Conference should be of three full weeks’ duration,with 15 working days. In practice this means from 7 to 25November 2016 in order to avoid overlap with the alreadyscheduled CWC Conference of States Parties at theHague. After the CWC Conference of States Parties only14 working days remain before (as in 2011) the UN shutsdown for the Christmas break on 22 December 2016. Inorder to secure the period from 7 to 25 November 2016for the Eighth Review Conference in Geneva, coordinationwith the First Committee in New York is required, to ensurein 2016 that the work of that Committee – insofar as itrelates to biological and toxin weapons – will have beencompleted in time.

2. The Preparatory Committee meeting should be of threedays’ duration, including a third day with substantiveexchanges of views on the issues that have beenidentified as meriting decisions at the Review Con-ference. This would be a valuable complement to twodays devoted to procedure.

Advance documentation

3. For the vast majority of participants in the Eighth ReviewConference, this will be their first BWC ReviewConference. Consequently there is a real need forbackground papers that explain the process and the stepstherein. Given that the Biological Weapons ConventionMeetings Secretariat in the United Nations Departmentfor Disarmament Affairs, the precursor to theImplementation Support Unit, produced a BWC SixthReview Conference Backgrounder. The Implementation


Support Unit should do likewise for the Eighth ReviewConference and issue this no later than 12 months prior tothe Eighth Review Conference.

4. The compilations of national reports from States Partieson compliance, on developments in science and technologyrelevant to the BWC, and on Article X should berecognized as having a different status from otherinformation papers and should be regarded as foregroundpreparatory documents of the Conference to be studied inadvance and to form the basis of review at the Conferenceitself, in accordance with Article XII.

5. The report of the Implementation Support Unit for theReview Conference should show clearly where resourceshave proved inadequate to the tasks set by States Partiesin fulfilment of the ISU mandate and should quantify theshortfall year by year.

6. The information paper on Developments since the lastReview Conference in other international organizationswhich may be relevant to the Convention should includelonger sections on (a) The 1540 Committee, (b) TheSecretary-General of the United Nations and (c) TheOrganisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW) as developments in all three are especiallypertinent to the BWC and are key elements in preparingfor the Eighth Review Conference.

7. Working Papers should be submitted well in advance byStates Parties and groups of States Parties and madeavailable by posting on the unog.ch/bwc website.

8. The Think Zone should again be created on the unog.ch/bwc website with similar groupings of items by subjectmatter as in 2011.

General Debate

9. The particular value of group statements being made atthe outset of the General Debate should be recognisedand all groups of States Parties should be encouraged tomake their statements at the outset as such group statementsthen have maximum impact and set the tone and the scenefor the ensuing statements by the individual States Parties.In this respect, the European Union ‘plus’ statement shouldbe made by the EU country in the Presidency at the time ofthe Eighth Review Conference on behalf of the EU ‘plus’ asa group of States Parties, instead of much later as aninternational organisation.

Article by Article Final Declaration

10. The importance of the extended understandings that havebeen developed which build from Review Conference toReview Conference on the language in the previous Articleby Article Final Declarations needs to be recognised inpreparing for the Eighth Review Conference, as theseunderstandings are central to the life of the Conventionand are, above all, forward-looking.

11.Common understandings reached during the four years ofthe Intersessional Process are the product of some eightweeks of work and these common understandings merit amore systematic consideration by the Committee of theWhole.

12. Common understandings reached during the IntersessionalProcess should be integrated Article by Article with theFinal Declaration of the Seventh Review Conferenceinto a preparatory document for the Committee of theWhole. This could readily be done by the Chairman-designate of the Committee of the Whole or by the ISU.

13. Common understandings reached during the IntersessionalProcess should in any case be placed first under eachArticle in the Annex of text submitted to the Committeeof the Whole.

14. The particular value of proposals for text submitted bygroups of States Parties, as well as by individual StatesParties, to be submitted to the Committee of the Wholefor incorporation into the Article by Article FinalDeclaration needs to be recognized and consequentlymore proposals submitted.

15. The greater recognition to the forward-looking functionsof the Article by Article Final Declaration should beachieved through the submitted proposals seeking to buildupon the extended understandings from previous ReviewConference and focussing in particular on what the StatesParties should do to strengthen the Convention over thenext decade.

16. The European Union should agree that its proposals forlanguage to be considered by the Committee of the Wholefor the Article by Article Final Declaration should beagreed within the EU prior to the Review Conferenceand submitted through the EU country in the Presidencyat the time of the Eighth Review Conference on behalf ofthe EU member states. A parallel approach should beadopted for language to be submitted for consideration inthe Informal Plenaries for Part III: Decisions andRecommendations. [see point 18. below]

Part III: Decisions and Recommendations

17. The forward-looking functions of Part III: Decisions andRecommendations should be recognised as being of equalweight with those of the Article by Article Final Declaration.

18. The particular value of proposals for text for inclusionin Part III: Decisions and Recommendationssubmitted by groups of States Parties, as well as byindividual States Parties, needs to be recognized andconsequently proposals for such text needs to bespecifically requested for submission prior to the startof the Review Conference.

19. Friends of the Chair or Facilitators should be appointedat the Preparatory Committee stage, if necessary ininformal session, to conduct open-ended consultations oneach major element likely to be considered for inclusion inPart III: Decisions and Recommendations, with a viewto developing widely acceptable draft text prior to or atthe beginning of the Conference for consideration in theInformal Plenaries.

20.Proposals for text in Part III: Decisions andRecommendations should in any case be submitted earlierin the Conference than in 2011 in order to encourage timelyconsideration and enable Facilitators or Friends of the Chairto complete their allocated tasks in full knowledge of therange of proposals put to the Conference.


All in all, it is evident that all the States Parties engaged inthe Eighth Review Conference need to recognize during thetwelve months leading up to the Review Conference itselfthe importance of preparing and submitting proposals – eitherto the Committee of the Whole for the Article by Article FinalDeclaration or for channeling through to the InformalPlenaries for the Part III: Decisions and Recommendations– are vital to achieve a further strengthening of the Biologicaland Toxin Weapons Convention to ensure that biological agentsand toxins are not misused to cause harm. All the StatesParties need to be involved and to ensure that their ideas andproposals are submitted prior to the Review Conference itself.

Further information

Commentaries on the Article by Article Final Declaration,on the contributions to the Committee of the Whole, on thePart III: Decisions and Recommendations of the FinalDocument and an analysis of the amendments agreed to theCBMs in Annex I to the Final Document of the SeventhReview Conference are available in the University ofBradford Review Conference Paper No. 31 The BTWCSeventh Review Conference: A Modest Outcome byGraham S Pearson and Nicholas A Sims, available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/RCPapers.htm

This review was written by Graham S Pearson, HSP Advisory Board in conjunction with Nicholas A Sims, London School ofEconomics.

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