the american mood: a foreign policy of self-interest

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The American Mood: A Foreign Policy of Self-InterestAuthor(s): John E. RiellySource: Foreign Policy, No. 34 (Spring, 1979), pp. 74-86Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148519 .

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THE AMERICAN MOOD: A FOREIGN POLICY OF SELF-INTEREST

by John E. Rielly

Two years after Jimmy Carter took office, both the American public and the country's opinion leaders are preoccupied with what

they see as the diminishing position of the United States as the pre-eminent global power. They exhibit economic and military insecurity, worrying over the steep decline in the value of the dollar and a perceived increase in Soviet military power. Their support for defense spending is higher than at any other time since the early 1960s; yet they are wary of the kind of direct involvement in the affairs of other countries that characterized U.S. foreign policy in that decade.

These are the major findings of a new national survey of American public opinion on

foreign policy issues. The conclusion that

emerges most clearly from the data is that Americans have a heightened feeling of self- interest in their country's behalf. They are far more concerned today about securing an

adequate supply of energy and protecting American jobs and business interests than about such altruistic goals as combating world hunger, raising the standard of living in less developed countries, and bringing democracy to other nations. There is a reluc- tance to make commitments everywhere, but

JOHN E. RIELLY, who was foreign policy adviser to Senator and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey in 1963-1969, is president of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. This article is adapted from a report entitled American Public Opinion and U.S. For- eign Policy 1979, which is being published simulta- neously by the Chicago Council. Rielly was assisted in preparing the report by BERNARD COHEN, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin; ARTHUR CYR, program director of the Chicago Coun- cil; BENJAMIN PAGE, associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago; ROBERT PEAR- SON, assistant survey director at the National Opinion Research Center; and WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, associate professor of government at Harvard University.

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Rielly

at the same time a growing willingness to honor selective commitments somewhere. Above all, the missionary zeal that seemed to inspire Americans in the 1960s finds no resonance in popular or leadership opinion today.

The survey, which was sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR), was carried out by the Gallup Or- ganization. During the last two weeks of November 1978, a systematic, stratified national sample of 1,546 American men and women from all walks of life was interviewed in person. In addition, between late

Of a list of five friendly countries (Chile, France, Iran, Italy, and Mexico), the majority of the public would regard the coming to power of a Communist government through peaceful elections as a "great threat" only in the case of Mexico.

November and early January, a "leadership" sample was interviewed by telephone or in person. It included 366 people selected from the Carter administration, Congress, international business, labor, the media, academia, religious institutions, foreign policy organizations, and special interest groups.

This is the second CCFR study of the foreign policy attitudes of Americans. The first one, conducted in December 1974, followed on the heels of Richard Nixon's resignation, the election of the heavily Democratic 94th Congress, and the withdrawal of the last U.S. combat troops from Vietnam. On some issues, the recent results are compared with the earlier ones in order to discern trends.

In any assessment of the attitudes of the American people and their leaders toward foreign policy, one of the first issues to be addressed is what priority is given to foreign policy matters in relation to other public policy questions. If interest expressed in foreign news is a valid indication, attention to

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foreign affairs has declined in recent years. Almost twice as many people are "very inter- ested" in national or local news (48 and 57 per cent, respectively) as in news about other countries (26 per cent). The declining interest expressed in foreign policy news is consistent with a general decline in interest in public affairs news generally. Since 1974, interest in national news and state news has declined from 56 to 48 per cent and from 47 to 41 per cent, respectively. Meanwhile, interest in news about the local community stayed about the same.

When the respondents were asked to rank their priorities, domestic economic concerns came out on top. A total of 78 per cent of the public and 90 per cent of the leadership sample listed domestic economic issues as the most significant problems that could be addressed by governmental action. Not surprisingly, inflation emerged as the number one problem, with 67 per cent of the public and 85 per cent of the leaders listing it on top. Similarly, when government programs were ranked, those in the area of foreign policy re- ceived a lower priority than domestic ones. Comparatively high levels of support were registered by the public for increasing expen- ditures on education (55 per cent), farm subsidies (30 per cent), and highways (34 per cent). The only area of international endeavor enjoying substantially increased support was defense, with a total of 34 per cent favoring more spending in this area.

U.S. ROLE IN THE WORLD

"Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?"

Public Sample Better if we Better

take an if we active stay Not part out sure

1978 59% 29% 12%

1974 66 24 10

1956 71 25 4

1947 68 25 7

The data for 1947 and 1956 are from the National Opinion Research Center.

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International economic issues loom large in the survey, with inflation and the decline of the dollar seen as most important. There is an awareness of the interdependence between overseas events and the lives of indi- vidual Americans. U.S. foreign policy is considered to have a major impact on the value of the dollar by 82 per cent of the public and 77 per cent of the leaders. In the public sur-

vey, 85 per cent believe it has a major impact on U.S. gasoline prices, 72 per cent on the economy, 64 per cent on food prices, and 51 per cent on unemployment.

Forty per cent of the public favors the United States taking an active stance in opposing apartheid in South Africa.

Ninety-four per cent of the public interviewed is aware of the dollar's decline, and 67 per cent of the public and 66 per cent of the leaders feel "great concern over this decline." Among the public, 36 per cent consider the fall of the dollar to be the most important reason for declining U.S. influence in the world, more significant than the growing military power of the Soviet Union. To strengthen the dollar, 51 per cent of the public favors cutting government spending, even if that means curtailing government services. Thirty-one per cent also support raising tar- iffs. Of the leaders, 77 per cent back reduced government spending, and 51 per cent would raise the price of gasoline by 25 per cent, while 44 per cent would risk higher unemployment to strengthen the dollar. In con- trast, 50 per cent of the public is opposed to actions raising gasoline prices by 25 per cent.

In a period when only selective overseas involvement by the United States enjoys support, it is not surprising that the foreign aid programs, both economic and military, con- tinue to decline in public support. From 1974 to 1978, the popular sample support- ing economic aid in general dropped from 52 to 46 per cent. Foreign aid continues to be

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FOREIGN POLICY GOALS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Public Leaders

Very Somewhat Not Not Very Somewhat Not Not Important Important Important Sure Important Important Important Sure

1. Keeping up the value of the dollar 86% 8% 2% 4% 73% 25% 2% - 2. Securing adequate supplies of energy 78 15 2 5 88 12 1 3. Protecting jobs of American workers 78 15 3 4 34 57 7 2% 4. Worldwide arms control 64 23 5 8 81 16 3 5. Containing Communism 60 24 10 6 45 47 8 1 6. Combating world hunger 59 32 5 5 66 31 2 7. Defending our allies' security 50 35 7 8 77 21 1 1 8. Strengthening the U.N. 47 31 13 8 25 49 25 9. Protecting interests of American

business abroad 45 40 9 6 27 64 9 1 10. Promoting and defending human

rights in other countries 39 40 14 7 36 56 8 1 11. Helping to improve the standard of

living in less developed countries 35 47 12 6 64 33 3 12. Protecting weaker nations against

foreign aggression 34 47 10 9 30 63 5 2 13. Helping to bring democratic forms

of government to other nations 26 44 21 9 15 62 23 1

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Rielly

seen as an entering wedge for further involvement, with 25 per cent in the popular poll believing that economic aid gets the United States too involved with other countries. When the question is applied to a specific area such as Africa, 44 per cent of the public favor

giving economic aid to black African nations. But the majority (57 per cent) express concern that this aid will lead to U.S. military involvement in the area. Less than half (45 per cent) of the public believe that foreign economic aid helps U.S. national security, prevents the spread of communism (36 per cent), or is beneficial to the American economy (34 per cent).

Support for foreign aid has always been stronger among leadership groups, and 91 per cent of the leaders say they favor economic aid. They believe that economic aid helps U.S. national security (71 per cent), strengthens the national security of other countries (82 per cent), and helps the Ameri- can economy (63 per cent).

Seventy-two per cent of the public agree that "the Vietnam war was more than a mistake, it was funda- mentally wrong and immoral."

Military aid continues to be unpopular, though the actual level of public support has increased somewhat from 22 to 29 per cent between 1974 and 1978. The constituency for military aid is not the same as for economic aid. Among the leadership, 91 per cent favor economic aid and only 60 per cent favor military aid. Among the public, 39 per cent of those who favor economic aid are against military aid, with only 19 per cent of military aid supporters opposed to economic aid. People who describe themselves as liberals are, not surprisingly, more positive about economic assistance than are those who say they are conservatives, but both groups are strongly opposed to military aid.

The 1978 poll suggests that the principal reason for the increase in support for both de-

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fense spending and committing troops in selected areas is the perception of a growing Soviet military threat. Of those who favor greater spending, 69 per cent believe the United States is falling behind the Soviet Union. A clear majority of the public (56 per cent) shares this view, and 30 per cent regard this development with great concern. Although a smaller percentage of the leadership sample (39 per cent) agrees that the United States is falling behind the Soviet Union, 64 per cent are worried about the military balance. Yet while the leaders fear

growing Soviet military power, they still endorse greater cooperation with the USSR.

Both the public and leadership samples are in favor of limiting nuclear weapons, undertaking joint U.S.-Soviet projects to solve energy problems, and even banning all nuclear weapons. Only a minority of the

public and a smaller minority of the leaders endorse restricting trade, and an even smaller

group wants to prohibit the exchange of scientists with the Soviet Union. Public eu-

phoria about detente has evaporated, but there remains solid support for specific aspects of that policy.

Consistent with greater concern about Soviet power, support for the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) has grown. Since 19 74 there has been a 5 per cent increase

(from 4 to 9 per cent) in public support for

intensifying the U.S. commitment to NATO, an 8 per cent increase (from 50 to 58 per cent) in those who want to keep the commitment as it is, and a 4 per cent drop (from 13 to 9 per cent) in those wanting to decrease the commitment. Among leaders, the shift has been even sharper. Those who believe that the United States should increase its commitment to NATO has grown from 5 per cent

SENTIMENTS ON DEFENSE SPENDING 1960 1969 1974 1978

1. Too much 18% 52% 32% 16%

2. About right 45 31 47 45

3. Too little 21 8 13 32

The data for 1960 and 1969 are taken from Gallup polls.

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00

U.S. RESPONSE TO CRISIS SITUATIONS

"There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if: ... [or] how far [do] you feel the U.S. should be willing to go?"

Public

Send Do Try to Refuse Send Military Don't Troops Nothing Negotiate to Trade Supplies Know

1. Panama closes Canal to U.S. 58% 3% 22% 4% 2% 11% 2. Soviets invade W. Europe 54 9 16 2 6 13 3. Soviets take West Berlin 48 10 19 3 6 48 4. Soviets invade Japan 42 13 20 3 9 13 5. Arabs cut off oil to U.S. 36 5 34 12 1 12 6. Rhodesia invaded by Cuban

troops supplied by Soviets 25 18 26 5 10 16 7. Arabs invade Israel 22 14 38 3 8 15 8. N. Korea invades S. Korea 21 24 28 3 9 15 9. China invades Taiwan 20 25 27 5 7 16

10. Soviets invade Yugoslavia 18 26 30 5 6 17 11. Israel invades Arab states 11 19 42 5 5 18

Leaders

Send Do Try to Refuse Send Military Don't Troops Nothing Negotiate to Trade Supplies Know

49% 2% 32% 13% 1% 3%

92 - 3 - 4 1

77 1 11 4 4 2

81 1 6 1 10 2

30 1 37 27 18 5

10 16 43 7 20 4

31 2 27 2 35 4 45 6 13 2 30 4

18 12 44 5 17 4

15 13 35 10 22 6 .

10 5 63 10 7 4 "



in 1974 to 21 per cent in 1978, those who would keep the commitment as it is have increased slightly from 62 to 65 per cent, and those who would decrease the commitment have dropped from 29 per cent in 1974 to 12 per cent in 1978. This suggests that, despite the desire in the United States to avoid commitments in certain parts of the world, the American people are prepared to support greater efforts to defend U.S. interests in certain high-priority areas. This includes defending Western Europe against the USSR. Here Carter has accurately read the mood of the American people by concentrating the proposed increase in defense spending on strengthening U.S. forces in NATO.

In the survey of opinion leaders, an over- whelming majority (92 per cent) favor a commitment of American troops if the Sov- iets invade Western Europe, and a large majority if the Soviets invade West Berlin (77 per cent) or Japan (81 per cent). The public is less enthusiastic, with 54 per cent support- ing a response to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, 48 per cent in the case of West Berlin, and 42 per cent in the case of Japan.

While the gap between popular and leadership opinions on this question remains large, it should be noted that public support for the use of U.S. troops in such situations has increased. In the case of a hypothetical Soviet attack on Western Europe, for ex- ample, public support for a U.S. response rose from 39 per cent in 1974 to 54 per cent in 1978. A similar increase in support for troop commitments has occurred among opinion leaders. Their support for sending

ROLE OF THE CIA "In general, do you feel that the CIA should not work inside other countries to try to strengthen those elements that serve the interests of the U.S. and to weaken those forces that work against the interests of the U.S.?" Should the CIA Public Leaders work inside other countries? 1974 1978 1974 1978

Should 43% 59% 35% 59% Should not 26 21 59 35 Don't know 31 20 6 6

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PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. VITAL INTERESTS "[From this] list of countries, [indicate] whether you feel the United States does or does not have a vital interest [there]."

Public Does Does Not Don't Know

Saudi Arabia 80% 8% 12% Japan 78 11 11 Israel 78 8 14 Panama 77 11 12 Egypt 75 10 15 Soviet Union 74 15 11 People's Republic of China 70 16 14 Canada 69 19 12 West Germany 69 15 16 Iran 67 13 20 Cuba 66 23 11 Great Britain 66 20 14 South Africa 63 22 15 South Korea 61 24 15 Mexico 60 22 18 France 54 30 16 Taiwan 53 26 21 Rhodesia 49 26 25 Nigeria 42 29 29 Turkey 39 31 30 Brazil 38 32 30 India 37 33 30 Italy 36 41 23 Poland 28 45 27

Leaders Does Does Not Don't Know 95% 5% 99 1 91 8 1% 66 33 1 91 9 95 4 1 93 6 1 95 4 1 98 1 1 92 7 1 69 30 1 94 5 1 62 37 1 70 28 2 90 10 90 10 55 43 2 49 48 3 59 38 3 75 24 1 73 25 2 55 43 2 ) 80 20 - 42 55 3



U.S. troops if Western Europe were invaded increased from 77 per cent in 1974 to 92 per cent in 1978.

Thus, although there are only a limited number of places where the American public and its leaders are prepared to support the commitment of U.S. troops, the willingness to take action in those select high-priority areas is greater among both the leadership and the public than it was four years ago.

Only 4 per cent of the American public lists U.S. relations with Africa as an important foreign policy focus.

As the largest trading area in the world, the European Community continues to grow in significance in an era when international economic considerations increase in impor- tance for the American people in relation to security and political issues. The Council's survey reveals a substantial increase in awareness of the European Community by the American public from 45 per cent in 1973 (when the Gallup Organization last put the question to the public) to 63 per cent in 1978. A total of 31 per cent believe that ties between the United States and Western Europe are closer today than in 1968.

A series of more specialized questions was put only to leaders. Among them, 60 per cent responded that the European Community has been helpful to the United States, with only 5 per cent seeing it as harmful; the European Parliament was viewed favorably by 69 per cent and unfavorably by 16 per cent. Leaders also strongly favored the new European Monetary System by 69 per cent to 19 per cent, and split evenly at 36 per cent on the question of whether ties between the United States and Europe are closer today than they were a decade ago.

Consistent with the reduced interest in foreign news and the lower priority given to government programs in the international area, a smaller percentage of both the public

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ROLE OF DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONS IN THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY, 1978

"How important a role do you think the following cur- rently play in determining the foreign policy of the United States-a very important role, a somewhat important role, or hardly an important role at all?"

Per cent "very important"

Public Public Leaders 1974 1978 1978

Institutions: President 49% 72% 94% Secretary of State 73 61 63 State Department 38 45 34 Congress 39 45 45 American business 41 41 22 Military 36 40 29 United Nations 28 31 3 CIA 28 29 17 Public opinion 19 26 20 Labor unions 24 25 7 Private foreign

policy organizations n.a. 12 6

"Do you feel the role of the following should be more important than they are now, less important than they are now, or should be about as important as they are now?"

Per cent "more important"

Public Public Leaders 1974 1978 1978

45% 44% 21% 30 35 28 39 35 31 48 43 31 21 27 22 19 29 10 41 39 35 15 18 13 59 62 44 17 17 13

n.a. 11 25 Z



and the leadership favor an active U.S. role in world affairs-59 per cent, compared with 66 per cent in 1974. This is the lowest figure recorded by the Gallup Organization on this question since 1947.

Both the public and the leaders feel a con- tinued anxiety about the esteem in which the United States is held; 56 per cent of the public and 47 per cent of the leaders believe there has been a decline of regard for the United States in the last 10 years. Yet 47 per cent of the leaders believe the United States should play a more important and powerful role ten years from now. Despite the malaise of the Vietnam years, 66 per cent of the public and 87 per cent of the leaders believe that the United States has been a "force for good" rather than a "force for evil" since World War II. (Among the public, 9 per cent said the country had been a "force for evil." Among the leadership, 4 per cent agreed.)

Despite the emphasis placed on the subject by the Carter administration, promoting human rights overseas does not emerge in this poll as a top-ranking foreign policy goal of the American people. When the question was posed in the abstract, 67 per cent of the public and 29 per cent of the leaders expressed support for "pressuring countries which violate human rights." But in specific cases, a much smaller percentage supported action. For ex- ample, 50 per cent agreed with the statement that "how the Soviet Union handles the treatment of the Jews or other minority groups is a matter of internal Soviet politics and none of our business," and 42 per cent disagreed.

Finally, the public survey indicates that Americans still rely heavily on the president and the media, particularly television news, for their information on foreign policy. The president is considered to be a very reliable source by 32 per cent of the public, television news by 30 per cent, and newspapers by 26 per cent. Although the public wants Congress to play a significant role in the formulation of foreign policy, only 11 per cent consider it a very reliable source.

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the american mood: a foreign policy of self-interest

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