Effect of the CITES ban

Some people view the ban on internationalcommercial trade in ivory as an outstandingsuccess: poaching has declined dramatically;elephant numbers are increasing. In truth, thefacts are more complex or, in some cases, non-existent. The African Elephant SpecialistGroup of IUCN (AfESG) recognizes 37 Africancountries as range states, while two more holdsignificant stocks of ivory. The will and com-petence of the governments of these countriesto collect regular and reliable data on el-ephants and ivory varies enormously andthere are many information gaps.

Although much pioneering work was doneby those who produced the original AfricanElephant Database (see Douglas-Hamilton etal., 1992) in the late 1980s, the AfESG, whichhas since taken it over, has said ‘Most infor-mation on elephant numbers on the continenthas been guesswork and has not formed asuitable basis from which to determine popu-lation trends over time, or to discern the ef-fects of policy or management’ (Said et al.,1995). This means that the figure of 1.3 millionelephants, hitherto accepted as the continentalpopulation at the start of the 1980s, cannot besubstantiated and thus the extent of the

decline during the decade is not measurable.What can be said is that, before the ban, somecountries saw dramatic declines due to poach-ing – e.g. Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia –others experienced similar losses due to a com-bination of war and poaching – e.g. Angola,Mozambique, Sudan and Uganda – while otherssuffering neither disadvantage had stable orincreasing numbers – e.g. Botswana, SouthAfrica and Zimbabwe. For other countries –e.g. Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Zaire –there is no reliable information about pre-bantrends, although significant declines due topoaching are highly probable. Because no onecan go back to count elephant numbers in1990 in cases where the data are missing orunreliable, we shall have to accept that therecan never be a proper measure at a continentallevel of changes in population from the timewhen the trade ban came into effect. It followsthat there can be no continental assessment ofthe contribution the ban may have made to re-versing the overall decline, if indeed there hasbeen a reversal.

What is possible is to establish recent andcurrent numbers as the basis for measuringtrends in particular countries, or specificpopulations in these countries, in the future.In setting out the current position the AfESG

111© 1997 FFI, Oryx, 31 (2), 111–119

ORYX VOL 31 NO 2 APRIL 1997

The African elephant: conservation andCITES

Robin Sharp

Human beings have been making (and almost certainly trading in) ivory artefactsfor some 10,000 years. Yet it is only 8 years since the Parties to the Convention onInternational Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) placed a complete ban oninternational trade in elephant products by listing the African elephantLoxodonta africana on Appendix I at Lausanne in 1989. Nevertheless, at the10th Conference of the Parties to CITES in Harare this coming June, the listingwill be challenged again by three of the Southern African countries who originallyopposed it. This article describes what has happened on the ground since 1989, thepolitical developments, examines the downlisting proposals, and looks at possibleways forward in the short- and medium-term. The views expressed are personal tothe author.

has classified the data into four categories ofdescending reliability: ‘definite’, ‘probable’,‘possible’ and ‘speculative’ (Said et al., 1995).Using these categories the AfESG gives esti-mated continental totals from data available in1995, which range from 286,234 for ‘definite’to 579,532, which covers all four categories.The new AfESG information also permits a re-gional overview and some useful comparisonsof range states with the largest elephant popu-lations. Table 1 shows the stark contrast at re-gional level between West Africa, with its tinynumbers, and the three other regions. It alsohighlights the continuing importance of theCentral African range states, which, for a var-iety of reasons have been much less vocal inthe CITES debate than East and SouthernAfrican countries and less able to furnish reli-able data. It is perhaps even more striking tonote that five of the 37 range states may holdmore than two-thirds of the continental popu-lation of Loxodonta africana.

Once the ban on international ivory tradecame into force, there should in theory havebeen a regular accumulation of ivory in allrange states that did not set out to destroy it.TRAFFIC has made painstaking efforts to

elicit information on stocks from the relevantgovernmental authorities and its latest assess-ment was presented at a meeting of the ele-phant range states in Dakar, Senegal (Milliken,in press). The figures were revised during thecourse of the meeting using information fromgovernment officials present (Table 2).

The regional totals for ivory stocks (whichinclude public and registered private stocks)are interesting in their own right and particu-larly so when set alongside the population fig-ures in Table 1. While the small quantity ofivory in West Africa is consistent with thesmall elephant population in the 13 rangestates, there is a major problem with the find-ing that the seven Central African countrieshold 38 per cent of the estimated continentalelephant population but only 5 per cent of theacknowledged ivory stocks. The high stockfigures for the Southern region are no sur-prise, but it is noteworthy that Botswana andZimbabwe, with their large elephant popu-lations, should have ivory stocks that aremuch smaller than those of South Africa, with10,000 elephants, and Namibia, with 7800. Thestocks in Burundi and Sudan are essentiallywhat the two countries held when the ban

112 © 1997 FFI, Oryx, 31 (2), 111–119

Table 1. Selected African elephant population estimates

1. Regions Definite Probable Possible Speculative(no. range states) number number number number Total % total

Central (7) 7,320 81,657 128,648 7,594 225,219 37.77Eastern (8) 90,482 16,707 19,999 1,084 128,272 21.51Southern (9) 170,837 16,402 18,983 21,825 228,047 38.25West (13) 2,760 1,376 5,035 5,554 14,725 2.47Continental total* 286,234* 101,297* 155,944* 36,057* 579,532*

2. Countries† (Region)

Tanzania (Eastern) 73,459 12,419 12,301 0 98,179Zaire (Central) 4,470 13,174 65,974 0 83,618Gabon (Central) 0 61,794 20,218 0 82,012Zimbabwe (Southern) 56,297 11,674 13,884 0 81,855Botswana (Southern) 62,998 8,588 8,588 0 80,174Total 197,224 107,649 120,965 0 425,838

* These numbers are not the sums of the regional totals because some figures derive from statisticaluncertainty.† Those with largest estimated populations.Source: Said et al. (1995).

ROBIN SHARP

came into force. Only in certain East andSouthern African countries are ivory stocks re-ported to be growing annually in significantquantities, from which the only reasonableconclusion is that elsewhere new ivory fromelephants being killed legally or illegally, ordying naturally, is finding its way into privatehands and thence into the illegal internationaltrade or into storage. It seems unlikely that acommodity that has been valued for so manygenerations is simply being left in the bush.Where stocks are growing but cannot betraded, storage facilities need to be upgradedand expanded at considerable expense: thereis already evidence from Sudan and Djboutithat ivory held for too long in arid conditionsloses weight and quality (Milliken, in press).While the destruction of stockpiles by Kenyaand Zambia is a matter of public record, otherrange states with substantial numbers of ele-phants but static or non-existent stocks mightbe asked to address the question, ‘Where hasall the ivory gone?’

The one variable that might throw a directlight on the success or otherwise of the tradeban relates to ‘before’ and ‘after’ levels ofpoaching. Unfortunately, few range states

record this information comprehensively, al-though among countries that suffered heavilyfrom poaching in the 1980s, Kenya is nowrecording all illegal killings, distinguishing be-tween poaching and control incidents, whileTanzania has some precise data for certainprotected areas (Dublin et al., 1995). The pic-ture that emerges from these fragmentaryrecords is of a dramatic decline in poachingfollowing the ban but a gradual rise in the sec-ond biennium post-ban. Both the steep declineand the slight upward movement are consid-ered to be partly due to variations in enforce-ment effort, which was generally muchenhanced in 1989–90 and has fallen away sincebecause of budget cuts. There is also wide-spread testimony from questionnaire surveysand orally from directors of wildlife thatpoaching is widespread and continuing in themajority of range states with large elephantpopulations, even if it cannot be quantified.

The final statistic relevant to an assessmentof the effectiveness of the trade ban is the ex-tent of the continuing illegal trade. Inferencescan be made from seizures of illegal ivory butit is impossible to determine the total volumeof illegal trade from such information. Data onseizures, mostly from official sources, havebeen assembled by TRAFFIC for the years1989 onwards in the Bad Ivory DatabaseSystem (BIDS). Records come from around theworld, although, curiously, there is none fromWest Africa, where ivory markets are visibleand must in most cases be using importedtusks. They also come in rather slowly, so thatthere is still important material to be

THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT: CONSERVATION AND CITES

113© 1997 FFI, Oryx, 31 (2), 111–119

Table 2. African elephant ivory stocks in Africa 1996

1. Regions(no. countries) Tonnes % of total

Central (7) 23 5Eastern (8) 132 29Southern (9) 213 46West (13) 6 1Non-range (2) 88 19Total 462 100

2. Countries* (Region)

South Africa (Southern) 89 19Burundi (Non-range) 86 19Tanzania (East) 71 15Namibia (Southern) 51 11Sudan (East) 47 11Botswana (Southern) 30 6.5Zimbabwe (Southern) 29 6.5Total 403 87

* Those with largest recorded stocks.Source: Milliken (in press).

Table 3. Number and volume of reported ivoryseizures 1989–93

Year No. seizures Tonnes

1989 111 14.61990 809 10.31991 701 9.81992 843 10.21993 587 10.2Total 3051 55.1

Source: Adapted from Milliken and Sangalakula(1996).

assembled for 1994 and only very partial in-formation received for 1995 and 1996. Thedata available at November 1996 were pre-sented at the Senegal meeting (Milliken andSangalakula, 1996). From 1989 to date BIDShas recorded 3584 seizures contained an esti-mated 69 tonnes of ivory, of which 82 per centcomprised tusks or pieces of raw ivory, 7 percent semi-worked blocks and 11 per centworked pieces. Table 3 compares the sum-mary data for 1989–93, for which BIDS dataare most complete.

A fuller breakdown of these figures is givenin Milliken and Sangalakula (1996), whichshows that the most marked trend within thetypes of seizure is that in 1989 about twice thevolume of tusks and other raw ivory wasseized than in the following years, while thevolume of worked ivory in subsequent yearswas 10–20 times greater than in 1989. There isno discernible trend in the figures for seizuresof semi-worked blocks during these years, ex-cept that in 1989 and 1990 they exceeded thevolume of worked ivory pieces, whereas thereverse was the case for 1991–93.Nevertheless, TRAFFIC has evidence of a ‘cot-tage industry’ producing semi-worked blocksof ivory for the Far-East name-seal market inno fewer than 14 African countries, comparedwith only two identified by the Ivory TradeReview Group (Cobb, 1989).

It appears that Zimbabwe was added to thislist in the light of the leaked findings of theCITES Panel of Experts examining the country’sdraft elephant downlisting application for the10th Conference of the Parties (The Times,London, 29 November 1996). It is also likelythat when complete returns are available toBIDS the volume of seizures for 1994 will behigher than for the preceding 4 years, but thatin itself will not substantiate the belief thatthere is an upward trend. Only the full datafor 1995 and 1996 can establish or refute this.However, if the published Panel report con-firms the leaked claim that Zimbabwean deal-ers were issuing permits for ‘raw,semi-worked and finished ivory for commer-cial shipments to Japan, China, Thailand, HongKong, the Philippines, Indonesia, the UnitedStates and South Africa’, it will be difficult to

resist the contention that the illegal trade isgrowing in range and significance. The rela-tive ease with which ivory can be seen beingcarved and on display for sale in West Africancountries, irrespective of whether their lawspermit domestic trade, is another factor con-firming the illegal international trade, becausemost of this ivory will be imported raw andexported as tourist souvenirs. Finally, reportsfrom Tanzania, where over 6 tonnes of ivorywere seized in 1966, offer further evidence ofincreased illegal trading.

It will be clear from the previous para-graphs that there is a great deal of uncertaintyabout elephant population numbers andtrends since 1989, and even less informationabout poaching and the illegal ivory trade,while data on stockpiles indicate both prob-lems and unanswered questions. It is safe tosay that in some protected areas where poach-ing was heavy in the 1980s, the trade ban inconjunction with increased enforcement hasaided the recovery of severely reduced popu-lations, as has the ending of some ferociouscivil conflicts, but for the majority of rangestates there is no means of knowing what ef-fect the ban has had. It is incontrovertible thatpoaching and other illegal killing of elephantscontinues and represents a serious problemfor under-resourced wildlife authorities. Theillegal trade is widespread and serves both theFar Eastern market and the western touristmarket more generally, although whether itsvolume is growing can only be guessed at thisstage.

The politics of the CITES ban

Committed conservationists often deplore thefact that politics influences decisions of theCITES Parties on the listing of species, as ifthere were a purer way of dealing with prob-lems. However, CITES is an internationaltrade instrument created by governments asan act of policy for which they are accountableto their electorates or power base. Politics aretherefore unavoidable and we neglect them atour peril. The objective should be to ensurethat political decisions are rational, take

ROBIN SHARP

114 © 1997 FFI, Oryx, 31 (2), 111–119

account of sound science, and use public andprivate resources to the best effect.

It is therefore salutary to recall the circum-stances of the ban and attempts to modify itsince 1989 in order to see whether an outcomeis possible that produces less ill-feeling andmisunderstanding between the Parties. Whilemost are aware that the debate at Lausannewas impassioned and a large majority (79 to11) favoured Appendix I listing, it is often for-gotten that inclusion of the ‘Somali amend-ment’ was crucial to the result. The latterallows a Party to apply for its elephant popu-lation to be downlisted to Appendix II if it canmeet a number of criteria relating to conser-vation status, management, law enforcementand rigour in operating any resumed trade.The Conference decision, 7.9, also providedfor an independent Panel of Experts ap-pointed by CITES to prepare a report on thesepoints to be considered along with each appli-cation. The Southern African countries withhealthy elephant populations left Lausannewith the reasonable expectation that theycould come to the next Conference with pro-posals that would satisfy the downlisting cri-teria and thus receive a fair, if not favourable,hearing. Nevertheless, ‘reservations’ againstthe listing among the range states were en-tered by Botswana, Malawi. South Africa,Zambia and Zimbabwe, while Namibia tookthe same position when it joined CITES in1991. A reservation on an Appendix I listingallows a Party to trade in the species con-cerned with a non-Party or another Partyholding a reservation, but there has been nolegal trade in elephant products under thisprovision.

Kyoto 1992

There was therefore no surprise when SouthAfrica, on its own, and the other fivecountries, jointly, submitted downlisting ap-plications for consideration at the 8thConference of the Parties, which took place inKyoto in March 1992. The five latter countrieshad by then formed an agreement with thetitle Southern African Centre for Ivory

Marketing (SACIM) and their proposal envis-aged a common registration and ivory mark-ing system with a focal point in Botswana.Following a change of government and achange of policy, Zambia withdrew from theproposal and from SACIM membership justbefore Kyoto.

Regrettably, the searching reports of the ap-pointed Panels on the downlisting applic-ations were not available to delegates beforethey arrived in Kyoto, thus frustrating thegood intention that they should influence thedecisions of the Parties on the basis of sciencerather than emotion. Most government del-egations have to prepare their positions in ad-vance, especially on topics that give rise todomestic concern and lobbying; for examplethe UK approach was to try to find some com-fort for the countries who had managed theirelephants successfully but not to supportdownlisting*. As the Conference progressedthe SACIM group offered to modify its pro-posal by holding back from trade until a se-cure system was in place, but it was too late.By then the European Community countrieshad heard a parade of African range state del-egations asserting in simple but moving termsthat they wanted the Appendix I listing to stayin place in order to discourage what they be-lieved would be a widespread resumption ofpoaching. Although it became clear that thevote could not be won, SACIM and SouthAfrica opted for a debate on the floor of theConference, which deepened wounds withoutpointing a way forward. By the time theywithdrew, considerable damage was done andthe SACIM ministers held a press conferenceindicating that they were considering with-drawal from CITES and the resumption of theivory trade. It was a bleak moment for theinternational conservation movement.

Because the elephant/ivory issue remainsformally exactly where it was in 1992, somereflection on how Kyoto might have been bet-ter managed is perhaps in order. The propo-nents of change were anxious to establish thatthose who opposed them were shifting the

THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT: CONSERVATION AND CITES

115© 1997 FFI, Oryx, 31 (2), 111–119

* The author was the official head of the UKdelegation but retired from government service in1995.

goal posts. Some of them gave the impressionthat their conservation track record was soself-evident that this alone would win the day.They did not make an effective effort to winsupport from other African range states, whocould be directly affected by the resumptionof a legal trade, or from interested non-Africancountries. Nor was there sufficient consul-tation with experts beforehand that mighthave helped to improve the proposals and toinfluence governments indirectly. The logis-tics of the work of the Panels also provedmore complicated than anticipated and hencethe penetrating analysis provided by their re-ports came too late to be useful. They gave thefairest wind to the Zimbabwean and SouthAfrican applications. Had these stood aloneand benefited from persuasive advocacy, theymight have made much more headway. Evenif the Conference had not approved them,there could have been a friendly message tocome back next time with improved pro-posals.

Intersessional dialogue 1992–94

Following a call from the president of the ECEnvironment Council at the Kyoto meeting formore dialogue between Conferences on con-troversial topics, the UK took the lead on el-ephants during its presidency later in 1992and thereafter. This focused on an attempt tobring SACIM members into parley with rangestates in the other regions of Africa. A numberof small subregional meetings led to the firstrepresentative African meeting in September1994, organized by the UK for the EU, atKasane, Botswana. Eighteen African rangestates drawn from all regions plus Japan, theUS and three EU countries were represented.Preparatory papers by AfESG and CITES ex-perts, the availability of simultaneous transla-tion in French and English, and theinvolvement of co-chairs from each region inmanaging individual sessions all promoted agood discussion based on facts instead of theusual presentation of national positions,which characterizes so many formal intergov-ernmental meetings. It was a condition of get-

ting delegations to Kasane that no positionswould be taken up. As an exercise in bridge-building the meeting was a modest success.Field trips enabled West African officials toappreciate that Botswana has a very large el-ephant population, which is making life hardfor villagers and farmers; Southern Africansbegan to take their counterparts in other re-gions more seriously; and SACIM outlined thepossibility of co-operation on conservation,foreshadowing its change of name to theSouthern African Convention for WildlifeManagement. A French Government-financedmeeting of francophone range states heldsemi-secretly just before Kasane in CentralAfrican Republic was unhelpful and doubtlessintended to ensure that the countries concerneddid not relax their opposition to the ban.

Fort Lauderdale 1994

The Kasane meeting, held only 2 months be-fore the 9th Conference of the Parties to CITESat Fort Lauderdale, was too late to influencethe formulation of any elephant proposalsand, as it turned out, the outcome of those al-ready tabled. Believing that a meeting in theUSA would not be conducive to success,SACIM held its fire but South Africa submit-ted a downlisting application for trade in meatand hides, expressing its desire to trade inivory (with CITES approval) in the future.When the latter indication provoked a stormof criticism from protectionist non-govern-mental organizations, the South Africans hesi-tated, were slow to drop the reference to ivoryand failed to deliver the expected personal en-dorsement from President Mandela, eventhough the matter had been discussed in andendorsed by the South African Cabinet. Yetthey had expert support for the view that thelogistics of the international hide trade virtu-ally rule out poaching as a serious possibility,while almost all elephant meat consumption islocal. Moreover, having brought their eleph-ant population of under 1000 in 1900 to some10,000 in 1994, their conservation record inthis century has been outstanding.

Although, as at Kyoto, South Africa with-

ROBIN SHARP

116 © 1997 FFI, Oryx, 31 (2), 111–119

drew before a vote was taken, the debate wasfar more constructive than in 1992 and support was voiced by a number of non-African parties in addition to Japan andSwitzerland, which had spoken in support atKyoto. The Kasane meeting did not alter anyformal African positions but it did lead to anagreement that the African region of CITES,through its representatives on the StandingCommittee, would continue the dialogue be-fore the next Conference, which was to be inHarare. The Sudanese downlisting applicationto dispose of that country’s ivory stockpilefailed to meet the various criteria inResolution 7.9. The CITES Standing Committeewas given the task of examining the implica-tions of the ivory stock issue and revising theguidance to the Panel of Experts.

The African dialogue

As reported in Oryx (31, 9–10), another rangestate meeting took place in Dakar inNovember 1996. Organized and facilitated byIUCN with support from UNEP for CITES itwas attended by 31 of the 37 range states.Discussion within the four elephant regionshelped to confirm, clarify or present new dataon populations, stocks, poaching and the il-legal trade reviewed above. The plenary ad-dressed a series of policy issues, the mostproductive element of which was an expo-sition by Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabweof the downlisting applications, which werethen in draft but have since been formally sub-mitted for consideration by the HarareConference. As at Kasane, no positions weretaken on these proposals but there was morediscussion and explanation. Those making theproposals seemed satisfied with the measuredreaction and made it clear that they were verymuch in consultative mode, having taken thetrouble to consult experts and officials fromoutside Southern Africa in advance, and invit-ing further comment before the formal sub-mission date. All this was a welcome contrastto the suspicion and lack of openness that pre-ceded Kyoto and should avoid the bitternessthat characterized the debate at the 8th

Conference and contribute substantially to aninformed discussion.

The proposals to be considered atHarare

South Africa has not submitted any elephantproposals to the Harare conference despite thegenerally favourable assessment of the hidetrade given by TRAFFIC experts at Kasaneand Dakar. The proposals from Botswana,Namibia and Zimbabwe, which all havehealthy and well-managed elephant popu-lations that have not been subject to large-scale poaching, while separate and supportedby very different sets of material, are similarin form. Each envisages direct exports of regis-tered stocks of whole tusks originating in theexporting country to Japan only (not for anyre-export) in single shipments in each of thetwo years, 1997–98 and 1998–99. The quotasplanned for each of the 2 years are: Botswana,12.68 tonnes; Zimbabwe, 10 tonnes; andNamibia, 6.9 tonnes. The proposals fromNamibia and Zimbabwe also include non-commercial trade in live animals and huntingtrophies, while Zimbabwe also includes tradein hides and non-commercial trade in leatherarticles and ivory carvings. The proposals con-template a return to the following Conferencebefore any further ivory trade is undertaken,allow for inspection by CITES and others ofthe shipments, and outline a procedure for thedownlisting to be withdrawn before the nextConference if any abuses are identified. Thereare undertakings to use the revenue from salesexclusively for conservation and rural com-munity development. Namibia has produceda number of leaflets and information sheetsdesigned for the non-specialist audience andin one of these there is a welcome promise toco-operate with neighbouring countries in themonitoring of elephant population trends andthe illegal trade.

At the time of writing (January 1997) thePanel of Experts’ reports were not available,although the leak to The Times mentioned earlier indicated significant problems with in-ternal control of the ivory stockpile in

THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT: CONSERVATION AND CITES

117© 1997 FFI, Oryx, 31 (2), 111–119

Zimbabwe and an apparent laxity of approachto major abuses by legally registered domesticdealers.

Subject to this important limitation it is appropriate to offer some preliminary com-ment on these proposals in order to encourageconsidered and rational debate before del-egations arrive in Harare. There must be awelcome for the procedure that the threecountries have adopted, consulting rangestates and others well beforehand and goingout of their way to offer explanations. The bio-logical case for treating these populations asnon-endangered and therefore meritingAppendix II listing is overwhelming.Whatever views are held on a possible re-sumption of the ivory trade, Appendix I list-ing should not be retained just for symbolicpurposes. There is also no doubt that thearrangements proposed for shipments of single cargoes of ivory, open to independentinspection, to Japan only, and for two yearsonly, represent about as watertight anarrangement as it is possible to imagine, pro-vided that the Japanese authorities can giveassurances about the tracking of the ivoryonce it reaches Japan and before it isprocessed. Although Japan has introduced aninternal ivory control law, delegates in Dakarwho had a helpful exposition of it from aJapanese official did not seem to be convincedthat the system would withstand independentscrutiny. Nevertheless, Namibia, with an el-ephant population approaching the capacityof the available habitat and a very large stock-pile of ivory in relation to that population, ap-pears to have as good a case for downlistingunder the terms of Resolution 7.9 as can bemade. Nor can there be any doubt thatBotswana’s elephant numbers are very highindeed and causing a whole range of prob-lems for human communities as well as forplant diversity in parts of their range. Cullinghas long been put off for fear of internationalcensure but may soon be inevitable, with aconsequent escalation of the ivory stockpile. Inthe Experts’ report for Kyoto there was criti-cism of Botswana’s ivory managementarrangements and it is not clear how far theseproblems have been dealt with. If they have,

Botswana’s downlisting proposal also meritssympathetic consideration.

Zimbabwe’s application presents more diffi-culty. Biologically the case for downlisting isincontestable, especially if it is recalled that atthe turn of the century in this part of Africathe elephant population stood at 4000 and thehuman population was 5 per cent of its cur-rent level. In 1992 the Panel consideredZimbabwe’s marking and management of itsivory stock as exemplary. It has also been wellknown that the Zimbabwean authorities havesince 1989 been disposing of an average of 4–6tonnes of ivory a year to local carvers and ithas been assumed that some of this found itsway into the tourist trinket market. Againstthis background a decision to release 10tonnes in the first 9 months of 1996 is veryhard to understand and if, as appears, the‘local carvers’ have been found exportingsemi-worked blocks to a range of countriesunder the guise of personal-use-artefacts, agood deal of tightening up is needed. In thesecircumstances Zimbabwe might attract moresupport if on this occasion it proposed a zeroquota for ivory and sought only a trade inhides and live animals.

If more sympathy can be expected for theSouthern African countries this time around inview of the trouble they have taken and themore limited nature of their proposals, therewill still be concern about the possible knock-on effects of any renewed legal trade.Enhanced monitoring of elephant populationsand the illegal trade will be crucial if an as-sessment of the consequences of the proposeddownlisting is to be made. Moreover, rangestates who are still anxious about the safety oftheir elephants may feel that they are beingasked to take a risk without any compensatingbenefit. It would greatly assist the reception ofthese proposals, and not only in Africa, if asmall but specific percentage of the net rev-enue from any ivory sales could be pledged tothe international monitoring effort, which inthis case must mean the work of TRAFFIC andAfESG, although much more than money isneeded for effective monitoring. At the sametime international donors should be urged toenhance their support, not least the Global

ROBIN SHARP

118 © 1997 FFI, Oryx, 31 (2), 111–119

Environment Facility. If Loxodonta africana isnot a flagship species for conservation ofglobal biodiversity it is hard to know what is.

Beyond Harare

If the proposals are accepted in whole or part,it will be vital for a parallel track of action tobe developed alongside the monitoring ofpopulations, poaching and the illegal trade.This should consist of serious study and de-bate on a range of policy issues. It must be rec-ognized that the package under considerationis short-term and unlikely to deal with manyof the issues affecting stockpiles or the pos-ition of other range states. One surprisingpiece of information to emerge at Dakar was astatement by the Japanese Government thattheir manufacturers hold 90 tonnes of tusksand 90 tonnes of semi-worked ivory, whichwas being processed in final form at the rateof 10 tonnes per year, only partly out of cau-tion about the future of supplies. This rate ofconsumption can be compared with the totalof 30 tonnes for each of 2 years, which thethree downlisting countries propose to ship toJapan. This suggests that the proposals to beconsidered at Harare should be seen as strictlylimited and not necessarily as the precursor ofa post-1999 trade.

There needs to be an investigation of thenon-Japanese markets for ivory to establishwhether they are in principle open to control.It seems unlikely that satisfactory systemscould be put in place by 1999, even if the rel-evant authorities were ready to co-operate. Ifthese markets were to become legal, anothermatter alluded to in Dakar is the possibility ofadding value to raw ivory in Africa, by devel-oping carving and marketing skills. The op-tions for dealing with ivory stockpiles requiremuch more examination; little progress wasmade on this aspect at Dakar. More work isneeded on sustainable uses of elephants apartfrom ivory, because there is little experience orunderstanding of this in many range states.Finally, thought should be given to the

development of an international mechanism,primarily African, to control any reopenedmarket in African elephant ivory so thatstocks in range states such as Sudan, who can-not meet the biological criteria for downlist-ing, could gradually be brought into thesystem and any benefits from a legal tradewidely shared. This would, of course, requirechanges in the CITES arrangements and at themoment this seems to be a remote prospect.Nevertheless, some imaginitive thinking, aswell as good will and commitment, will beneeded quite soon if a viable way is to befound for people and elephants to co-exist inthe endlessly challenging continent of Africa.

References

Cobb, S. (ed.) 1989. The Ivory Trade and the Future ofthe African Elephant. Ivory Trade Review Group,Oxford.

Douglas-Hamilton, I., Michelmore, F. and Inamdar,A. 1992. African Elephant Database. United NationsEnvironment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya.

Dublin, H.T., Milliken, T. and Barnes, R.F.W. 1995.Four Years after the CITES Ban: Illegal Killing ofElephants, Ivory Trade and Stockpiles. A report ofthe IUCN/SSC African Elephant SpecialistGroup, Nairobi.

IUCN/SSC. 1996. African Elephant SpecialistGroup. Conservation of the African Elephant: Issuesand Actions. A report to the IUCN/CITES MeetingPromoting Dialogue between African Countrieson the Conservation of the African Elephant.11–16 November, 1996, Dakar, Senegal.

Milliken, T. 1997 (in press). The status of ivorystocks in Africa 1990–1996. TRAFFIC Bulletin, 16(3).

Milliken, T. and Sangalakula, L. 1996. TRAFFICEast/Southern Africa. The Illegal Ivory Trade sincethe CITES Ban: Using Law Enforcement Data toAssess Trends. A report to the IUCN/CITESMeeting Promoting Dialogue between AfricanCountries on the Conservation of the AfricanElephant. 11–16 November 1996, Dakar, Senegal.

Said, M.Y., Chunge, R.N. Craig, G.C., Thouless, C.R.Barnes, R.F.W. and Dublin, H.T. 1995. AfricanElephant Database. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland.

Robin Sharp, 30 Windermere Avenue, London NW66LN, UK.

THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT: CONSERVATION AND CITES

119© 1997 FFI, Oryx, 31 (2), 111–119