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The 2009 ThuringiaLandtagswahl: Exploring a NewCoalition FormulaWilly JouPublished online: 21 Jun 2010.

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ELECTION REPORT

The 2009 Thuringia Landtagswahl: Exploring aNew Coalition Formula

WILLY JOU

The state election in Thuringia on 30 August 2009 saw both a drastic decline in

support for the CDU, depriving it of a majority enjoyed since 1999, and the

return of the FDP and Greens to the Landtag after a 15-year absence, raising

the number of parliamentary parties from three to five. These changes suggest

that the new legislative term would be unlikely to resemble the previous one.

Perhaps the most notable outcome was post-election negotiations for a new gov-

ernment comprising the Left Party, the SPD, and the Greens, a ground-breaking

development in two respects: not only would this represent a novel governing

formula, but the Left Party would assume the unprecedented role of senior

coalition partner by virtue of its higher vote share. These talks did not

succeed, and the electoral arithmetic creating the possibility of a Left Party-

led government is not currently present in most other Lander. Nevertheless,

the discussion of a new coalition option served to break a taboo, perhaps render-

ing its realisation more likely in Thuringia and other eastern Lander in the

future.

BACKGROUND

The CDU has been the strongest party in Thuringia since unification, its number of

seats approaching or surpassing an absolute majority in every election until 2009.

After forming coalitions throughout most of the 1990s, first with the FDP (1990–

94), then the SPD (1994–99), the Christian Democrats became the sole governing

party in 1999. In contrast, the Social Democrat vote never exceeded 30 per cent,

and sank to an abysmal 15 per cent in 2004. That its 18.5 per cent vote share in

2009 is considered successful speaks volumes about expectations for the SPD in

the state.

The rise of the PDS mirrors the decline of the SPD. The PDS saw its vote share

increase in every election, tripling its support since 1990 and replacing the Social

Democrats as the leading opposition party in 1999. Bodo Ramelow, who became

leader of the state parliamentary party in 2001, is a well-known PDS leader on the

national stage, and served as a principal negotiator for the PDS in forging an alliance

with the west German WASG (Labor and Social Justice – Electoral Alternative),

which led to the establishment of the Left Party in 2005. After a stint in the first

German Politics, Vol.19, No.2, June 2010, pp.222–229ISSN 0964-4008 print/1743-8993 onlineDOI: 10.1080/09644001003774156 # 2010 Association for the Study of German Politics

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post-unification Landtag, both the FDP and Greens fell below the 5 per cent hurdle in

1994. Despite doubling their vote shares in 2004, neither succeeded in regaining a par-

liamentary foothold. Extreme right-wing parties that entered legislatures in several

neighbouring Lander did not have a serious presence in Thuringia.

In June 2003, Dieter Althaus succeeded the highly respected Bernhard Vogel to the

premiership upon the latter’s retirement. The new premier’s popularity, which earned

him positive evaluations even from supporters of opposition parties,1 coupled with an

unpopular SPD–Green federal government, helped the CDU retain a majority in 2004.

By the time of the 2009 election, the government could cite various statistics as

evidence of its competent administration, including favourable educational rankings,

a higher employment rate compared to the national average, low crime, investment

in infrastructure and hospitals, an end to net borrowing since the 2007 budget, and

structural reforms such as cutting the oversized bureaucracy in half.2

However, the same period also brought unexpected challenges to the government.

Examples include a plan for court system reorganisation abandoned in the face of

criticism from the judiciary, and a proposal to alter the status of the state’s part-time

teachers that the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) rejected.

Furthermore, reforms aimed at re-structuring the police system encountered fierce

resistance from police unions as well as opposition parties, resulting in interior minister

Karl Heinz Gasser’s resignation in April 2008.3 In the same month, Althaus proposed

Peter Krause for the post of culture minister, but the nomination fell through due to

controversy over Krause’s work for the radical right weekly Junge Freiheit.4 The

premier himself was involved in a fatal skiing accident in January 2009. He suffered

from cerebral haemorrhage, while the woman he collided with died, leading to a con-

viction of involuntary homicide.5 Althaus’ decision to talk about the accident with the

tabloid Bild-Zeitung incurred criticisms of insensitivity. The CDU retained a plurality

of votes in the June 2009 local election, but suffered heavy losses.

PUBLIC EVALUATIONS OF PARTIES AND ISSUES

Against this background, it is not surprising that a survey taken immediately before the

2009 election found voters evaluating the overall performance of the government much

less favourably than they did prior to the previous election five years before (0.2 on a

–5 to 5 scale, compared with 1.0 in 2004). The decline in approval is even starker when

voters assessed the outgoing premier (falling from 2.1 in 2004 to 0.5 in 2009).

However, the government’s loss did not translate into accruing support for the main

opposition. In fact, appraisal of both the Left Party (–0.2) and its leader Ramelow

(0.2) lagged behind the CDU and Althaus, respectively. Instead, it was the Social

Democrats that benefited from the two large parties’ unpopularity, earning the

highest ratings for both the party (0.7) and its leader Christoph Matschie (0.9).6 Never-

theless, Althaus remained the preferred premier over both Matschie and Ramelow, by a

wider margin in the latter case. Voters gave him high marks on displaying both strong

leadership and a common touch, though not on trustworthiness. Asked who should

assume the premiership if a centre-left coalition was formed, voters favoured Matschie

over Ramelow, despite knowing that the SPD vote share would remain smaller than

that of the Left Party.7

THE 2009 THURINGIA LANDTAGSWAHL 223

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Among campaign issues, jobs topped the list of voters’ concerns by a large margin

(63 per cent). This still represents a sizeable decline from 2004, probably reflecting the

state’s improved employment conditions. Other prominent issues included education

(20 per cent), prices (17 per cent), and family and youth policy (10 per cent) (respon-

dents could name up to two issues). To the extent that voters believed any party could

manage unemployment and other economic issues, the CDU enjoyed greater confi-

dence than its two main rivals, while the three parties were virtually tied on education

and family policy. The only area where voters attributed greater competence to the Left

Party involves issues in the category ‘social justice’.8 These figures raise the question

of why the Christian Democrats did not win another massive victory. One explanation

may lie in responses to another survey question: when asked which issue respondents

deemed most crucial for determining vote choice, a plurality cited social justice.9

As all polls predicted that the CDU would lose its absolute majority, the question of

coalition composition became a major topic of discussion. While the Left Party had

always been in opposition heretofore, 43 per cent of voters viewed its participation

in government a positive development in principle (35 per cent disagreed). More

voters preferred a leftist coalition comprising of the Left Party, SPD, and Greens

(35 per cent) than a grand coalition between the CDU and SPD (22 per cent),10 but

both options elicited more disapproval than support. Opinion among CDU supporters

was divided among building a grand coalition, forming an alliance with the FDP, and

continuing to govern alone, but the latter two were generally deemed arithmetically

implausible.

ELECTION RESULTS

Results on election day proved such prognostication correct (see Table 1). Turnout

increased slightly from the previous election, benefiting all parties except the CDU.

High volatility characterised micro-level voting behaviour, as only 52 per cent of

TABLE 1

RESULTS OF THE 2009 THURINGIA STATE ELECTION

2009 2004

Votes % Vote Seats % Vote Seats

CDU 329302 31.2 30 43.0 45Left Party 288915 27.4 27 26.1 28SPD 195363 18.5 18 14.5 15FDP 80600 7.6 7 3.6Greens 64912 6.2 6 4.5NPD 45451 4.3 1.6Freie Wahler Thuringen 40811 3.9 2.6Others∗ 8943 0.8 4.1

Turnout 56.2 53.8

Note: ∗The ‘others’ category in 2009 includes Die Republikaner (REP; 0.4%) and Okologisch-DemokratischePartei (odp; 0.4%).Source: http://www.wahlen.thueringen.de/landtagswahlen/lw_wahlergebnisse.asp (accessed 12 October 2009).

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voters cast their ballots for the same party as they did in 2004. CDU support fell

drastically, marking the party’s worst performance since unification by far. In contrast,

the Left Party achieved its best score ever in the state, and continued its enviable

record of an increased vote share at each election. It is also notable that the Left Party

gained 14 direct mandates, nearly tripling the number from five years before (the

CDU won 28 single member districts, and the SPD won two). Both the SPD and FDP

could boast a significant rise in vote share, and the latter returned to the legislature

along with the Greens for the first time in 15 years. Viewed from a longer-term perspec-

tive, however, the fact that the SPD celebrated its 18.5 per cent vote share is indicative of

its weakness rather than strength: the same vote share obtained in the 1999 election was

considered disastrous, and forced the resignation of then party leader Richard Dewes.

Table 2 shows vote distribution by age, gender, and occupational status. Similar to

patterns observed in national elections, the CDU (along with the FDP) performed well

among the self-employed, and both the CDU and SPD gained higher than average

support from the oldest cohort. The Left Party’s campaign themes found particular res-

onance among the unemployed, a phenomenon repeated in the Bundestag election four

weeks later. While the NPD did not cross the 5 per cent threshold, one may detect a

potentially worrying signal in the high vote share for the radical right among both

the unemployed and the two youngest cohorts.

FORMING A NEW GOVERNMENT

Electorally, the SPD’s performance presented a mixed picture: the party saw a notable

increase in vote share, but remained firmly stuck in third place, far behind both the

CDU and the Left Party. What the Social Democrats did secure, exclusively through

TABLE 2

PARTY CHOICE BY AGE, GENDER, OCCUPATIONAL STATUS

CDU Left Party SPD FDP Greens NPD

All 32 26 19 8 6 5

Age group18–24 26 21 17 9 9 1325–34 32 19 17 10 9 935–44 28 24 17 11 8 745–59 29 30 18 9 6 460 and above 38 28 21 5 4 2

GenderWomen 34 25 20 7 6 3Men 30 28 17 8 5 7

Occupational statusWorking class 32 29 16 7 3 8Middle class 30 24 18 11 9 4Self-employed 43 14 10 18 6 5Retired 35 30 23 4 3 2Unemployed 25 33 13 8 3 10

Source: Data from Infratest Dimap, available at http://wahlarchiv.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2009-08-30-LT-DE-TH/index.shtml

THE 2009 THURINGIA LANDTAGSWAHL 225

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gains from former CDU supporters and non-voters at the previous election (the SPD

actually lost a small number of voters to the Left Party), was a bargaining position

that guarantees seats in cabinet. The remarkable aspect of this situation lies not in

the SPD’s capacity to determine the composition of the new government, but rather

that it could do so from a position of relative weakness. By keeping its options open

prior to the election, the SPD could choose to negotiate with either, or both, the

CDU and Left Party, and extract maximum concessions from the larger parties. This

was exactly the strategy the Social Democrats followed.

While both the federal- and state-level CDU leadership backed Althaus to remain

premier and lead coalition talks with the SPD, the latter made his resignation a precon-

dition for opening any negotiation.11 In a move that surprised even his own parliamen-

tary caucus, Althaus announced four days after the election that he would step down as

both premier and party leader. Chancellor Angela Merkel, a close ally of Althaus,

declared that the Social Democrats now had no more excuses for delaying talks.12

Negotiators from the CDU and SPD formally met for the first time a week later, but

despite positive indications from both Matschie and CDU caretaker premier Birgit

Diezel,13 no agreement was reached.

In the meantime, the Left Party advocated a complete change of government by

forming a coalition with both the SPD and Greens, but both rejected the possibility

of a Left Party premier. It should be noted that while participation from the Greens

is not strictly necessary, a coalition between the Left Party and SPD would only

command a single seat majority in the Landtag, a margin seen as inadequate for a

stable government. Talks over a leftist government involving three rather than two

parties could only strengthen the SPD’s hand against the Left Party, not least

because the Greens’ origins in a former East German citizens’ movement prompted

them to insist on the Left Party facing its SED-tainted past.14

Just one day before the Green Party conference met to vote on whether to take part

in talks with the Left Party and SPD, Ramelow formally declared that he would not

seek the premiership, and that the three leftist parties should work together to seek a

suitable candidate for this position.15 This announcement placed Ramelow under a

barrage of criticism from within his own party, including a derisive statement from

federal party leader Gregor Gysi that if the Left Party as the largest component in a

prospective coalition relinquishes the premiership, the party might as well not nomi-

nate a leading candidate in the election at all.16 However, Ramelow insisted that the

decision lies with the state rather than the federal party.

The SPD had thus manoeuvred to exclude both the CDU and Left Party leaders

from the premiership without making a firm commitment to coalesce with either

party. In fact, the SPD continued to promote Matschie’s candidacy if a leftist govern-

ment were formed. Ramelow, Matschie, and the Green leading candidate Astrid Rothe-

Beinlich met formally for coalition negotiations, but once again no agreement was

reached, partly due (according the SPD) to the Left Party’s refusal to unequivocally

endorse a Social Democratic premier. Matschie continued to insist that the Left

Party should not claim the premiership so long as it was not accepted as a legitimate

prospective governing partner at the federal level.17 A full month after the state elec-

tion, the SPD leadership voted by a three-to-one margin to reopen talks with the CDU,

notwithstanding both Ramelow’s eventual concession that the Left Party would accept

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an SPD premier and internal criticisms from former leader Dewes and the party’s youth

wing.18 The timing of this decision, announced just a few days after the Bundestag

election, was unlikely to have been coincidental.

Coalition negotiations between the CDU and SPD began in early October, with

considerable attention focused on areas of disagreement such as the CDU’s proposals

for regional reorganisation and childcare benefits (the SPD wanted to scrap these

plans). The coalition agreement, reached after less than two weeks, was presented to

party conferences on 25 October. The belief that a deal with the outgoing governing

party betrayed the message of change promised during the campaign remained

strong within the SPD, evidenced for example by the mayor of Gera’s assertion that

a grand coalition may damage the SPD’s credibility to the extent that it may struggle

to surmount the 5 per cent hurdle in the next state election.19 However, Matschie

argued that the party had gone as far as it could in negotiations with the Greens and

Left Party before talks broke down, and secured 75 per cent approval for the grand

coalition agreement at the SPD conference (the CDU conference adopted the

agreement unanimously).20

The CDU nominated outgoing health and social affairs minister Christine Lieber-

knecht for premier, and she was elected the state’s first female chief executive at the

third round of voting in the Landtag (having missed the required absolute majority

by a single vote in both previous rounds).21 New faces in the Lieberknecht cabinet

include the Bavarian legal scholar Peter Huber as internal affairs minister, and the

33-year-old Christian Carius as minister for land development and transport, while

two close allies of ex-premier Althaus were not re-appointed. The SPD received

four portfolios to the CDU’s five: education, science, and culture (held by Matschie,

who also takes the deputy premiership), health and social affairs, economics, and

justice. The ministry of federal and European affairs went to an independent. The

new premier acknowledged that her choices caused some surprise even within her

own party.22

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Unlike state elections taking place on the same day in neighbouring Saxony, the 2009

Landtag election in Thuringia did not yield unambiguous winners or losers. The CDU

scored its worst result in the state’s short electoral history, losing more than a quarter

of its votes compared to 2004, but retained the premiership and a large share of

cabinet portfolios. The FDP and Greens both improved their performance sufficiently

to re-enter parliament, yet neither proved pivotal to coalition formation. The Left

Party not only achieved its highest vote share ever, but also came tantalisingly close

to attaining the role of senior governing partner for the first time in any German

state (even if at the cost of relinquishing the premier’s chair). The only clear winner

was the SPD, which achieved both vote- and office-seeking goals from its third-

place position.

It is worth noting that while Althaus’ resignation deprived Chancellor Merkel of a

loyal ally, the election outcome in Thuringia did not significantly influence either

national politics in general or the Bundestag campaign in particular, partly because

the three Landtag elections taking place on the same day (in Saarland and Saxony

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as well as in Thuringia) did not show uniform trends in terms of party fortunes. More-

over, nearly six out of ten Thuringian voters, including a majority of supporters from

every party, indicate that their vote choice was based on state rather than national

issues. Neither analysts nor practitioners saw discussions over various state coalition

options affecting post-election talks on the federal stage. For example, SPD chancellor

candidate Frank-Walter Steinmeier declared shortly after the election that the state

party’s decision on coalition formation would have no impact beyond Erfurt.23

The Thuringen election highlights both dilemmas and opportunities facing the SPD

in the eastern Lander, and also raises questions about the prospect of so-called red–red

coalitions. So far two such coalitions have been established, in Berlin and Mecklen-

burg-West Pomerania, with contrasting results.24 In both cases the SPD won a larger

vote share than the Left Party in the preceding election, and entered the coalition as

the senior partner. Since the number of cases is as yet quite limited, few scholars

have attempted to theorise on conditions facilitating or hindering the formation and

duration of SPD–Left Party coalitions. One exception is a comparative study by

Hough and Verge, in which the authors conclude that an increase in support for

Social Democrats relative to the ex-communists, programmatic compatibility, and a

cordial relationship between party leaders are prerequisites for this governing

formula.25 While less than amicable relations between Matschie and Ramelow may

have contributed to the failure of talks aimed at creating a leftist government, the

major point of contention focused on the status of the Left Party as the senior

partner in a potential coalition, a scenario that the authors did not envisage. Neverthe-

less, to the extent that the possibility of a Left Party-led government came under

serious consideration, the aftermath of the Thuringia election may already have

broken a taboo, rendering the prospect of a red–red(–green) coalition more realistic

in the future.

NOTES

1. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, available at http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen_und_Publikationen/Wahlen/Wahlanalysen/Newsletter_Thueringen_2.pdf (accessed 12 October 2009).

2. ‘Der alte Schwung ist hin’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 Aug. 2009.3. ‘Innenminister Gasser tritt zuruck’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 April 2008.4. ‘Krause verzichtet auf Amt des Kultusministers’, 5 May 20085. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, ‘Althaus zu Geldstrafe verurteilt’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3

March 2009.6. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, available at http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen_und_

Publikationen/Wahlen/Wahlanalysen/Newsl_SaarThueSach09_2.pdf (accessed 12 October 2009).7. Infratest Dimap, available at http://wahlarchiv.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2009-08-30-LT-DE-TH/umfrage-

aktuellethemen.shtml (accessed 12 October 2009).8. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, available at http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen_und_

Publikationen/Wahlen/Wahlanalysen/Newsl_SaarThueSach09_2.pdf9. Infratest Dimap, available at http://wahlarchiv.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2009-08-30-LT-DE-TH/umfrage-

wahlentscheidend.shtml (accessed 12 October 2009).10. Infratest Dimap, available at http://wahlarchiv.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2009-08-30-LT-DE-TH/umfrage-

aktuellethemen.shtml (accessed 12 October 2009).11. ‘SPD fordert Althaus’ Ruckzug’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 Sept. 2009.12. ‘Merkel: ’SPD hat keine Ausreden mehr’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 Sept. 2009.13. ‘Matschie: Ernsthaftes Bemuhen zwischen CDU und SPD’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 Sept.

2009.14. ‘Grune nehmen Ramelows Einladung an’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 Sept. 2009.

228 GERMAN POLITICS

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15. ‘Ramelow verzichtet auf Ministerprasidentenamt’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 Sept. 2009.16. ‘Linke-Fuhrung kritisiert Ramelows Machtverzicht’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 Sept. 2009.17. ‘SPD-Chef Matschie kritisiert Linke als regierungsunfahig’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 Oct.

2009.18. ‘SPD-Vorstand entscheidet sich fur CDU’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 Oct. 2009.19. ‘SPD-Basis will Schwarz-Rot stoppen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 Oct. 2009.20. ‘SPD und CDU ebnen Weg fur Koalition’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 Oct. 2009.21. ‘Lieberknecht im dritten Anlauf zur Ministerprasidentin gewahlt’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30

Oct. 2009.22. ‘Lieberknecht beendet mit neuem Kabinett die Ara Althaus’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 Nov.

2009.23. ‘Merkel: “SPD hat keine Ausreden mehr”’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 Sept. 2009.24. See Dan Hough, Michael Koß and Jonathan Olsen, The Left Party in Contemporary German Politics

(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), chapters 5–6.25. Dan Hough and Tania Verge, ‘A Sheep inWolf’s Clothing or a Gift from Heaven? Left–Left Coalitions

in Comparative Perspective’, Regional and Federal Studies 19/1 (March 2009), pp.37–55.

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