THE 1999 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND POST-ELECTIONDEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA

A Post-Election Assessment Report

November 28, 1999

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contact InformationAbbreviationsExecutive SummaryIntroduction The Composition of the DPR and Provincial and District AssembliesThe Allocation of Seats to Parties in the DPR: Retroactive Changes inthe RulesGeographical Patterns of Party Support The Allocation of Seats to Parties in Provincial and DistrictAssemblies: Problems in Some Locations The Hearing of Complaints and Grievances The Determination of Elected Candidates The Composition of the MPR Functional Group Delegates (Utusan Golongan) Provincial Delegates (Utusan Daerah) The MPR General Session - Issues of Democratic Process Openness and Transparency Decision-Making Procedures The MPR General Session - Substantive Issues Constitutional Amendments The Procedures to Elect the President and Vice President East Timor The Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis-Garis Besar HaluanNegara, or GBHN) The MPR General Session: Coalition Building and Power Sharing Votes on Structural and Procedural Issues The Election of the Speaker of the MPR The Election of the Speaker of the DPR President Habibie's Accountability Speech The Election of the President The Election of the Vice President The Role of the Military East Timor and the "Silent Coup" The Military Attempts to Wield Its Influence The Military's Low Profile during the MPR General Session General Wiranto's Vice Presidential Candidacy The Role of the Military in the New Cabinet Looking Ahead The Composition of the New Cabinet The New Government's Policy Platform Further Constitutional Reform

Appendix 1: The Political Effect of Abolishing Stembus Accords

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Appendix 2: The PPI's Official DPR Seat Allocation

Appendix 3: The Breakdown of DPR Seats by Bloc/Party and Region

Appendix 4: The Projected and Actual Composition of the PekanbaruMunicipality DPRD II, Riau Province

Appendix 5: DPR Seats Won by Full Quotas and LargestRemainders

Appendix 6: DPR Members Who Switched Districts

Appendix 7: The Demographic Makeup of the 1999-2004 DPR,Compared to Past DPRs

Appendix 8: The Demographic Makeup of the 1999-2004 DPR, byParty/Bloc

Appendix 9: The Composition of the MPR - 1999 General Session

Appendix 10: The Political Background of the National Unity Cabinet

For further information, please contact:

Eric Bjornlund Senior Associate and Director, Asia National Democratic Institute for International Affairs Jl. Teuku Cik Ditiro No. 42B Jakarta 10310 Indonesia

Phone: (021) 392-1617 Fax: (021) 392-7974 Email: eric@ndi.org

Glenn Cowan Senior Advisor, Asia National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036

Phone: (202) 328-3136 Fax: (202) 332-5576 Email: glennc@ndi.org

Funds for the publication of this report were provided by the UnitedStates Agency for International Development.

Copyright © National Democratic Institute for International Affairs(NDI), 1999. This work may be reproduced, excerpted and/ortranslated for noncommercial purposes provided that NDI isacknowledged as the source of the material and is sent a copy of anytranslation.

ABBREVIATIONS

DPR - Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's RepresentativeAssembly)

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DPRD I - Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I (Provincial People'sRepresentative Assembly)

DPRD II - Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah II (District People'sRepresentative Assembly)

FKKI - Fraksi Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia (Indonesian NationalUnity Bloc)

FPDU - Fraksi Perserikatan Daulat Ummat (Union of MuslimSovereignty Bloc)

GBHN - Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Outlines of StatePolicy)

Golkar - Partai Golongan Karya (Functional Groups Party)

KPU - Komisi Pemilihan Umum (Election Commission)

MPR - Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's ConsultativeAssembly)

NU - Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of the Muslim Scholars)

PAN - Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)

Panwas - Panitia Pengawas (Oversight Committee)

PBB - Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon and Star Party)

PBI - Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (Indonesian Unity inDiversity Party)

PDI-P - Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan (IndonesiaDemocratic Party - Struggle)

PDKB - Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (Love the Nation DemocracyParty)

PK - Partai Keadilan (Justice Party)

PKB - Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)

PKD - Partai Katolik Demokrat (Democratic Catholic Party)

PKP - Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (Unity and Justice Party)

PNI-FM - Partai Nasional Indonesia-Front Marhaen (IndonesianNational Party-Marhaen Front)

POLRI - Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Police)

PPD I - Panitia Pemilihan Daerah I (Provincial Election Committee)

PPD II - Panitia Pemilihan Daerah II (District Election Committee)

PPI - Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia (Indonesian Election Committee)

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PPP - Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development Unity Party)

TNI - Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military)

Wanhankamnas - Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional (NationalDefense and Security Council)

Executive Summary

On October 20 and 21, 1999, exactly 17 months after PresidentSoeharto resigned and Indonesia's transition to democracy began, thePeople's Consultative Assembly (MPR) elected Abdurrahman Wahidand Megawati Soekarnoputri to be Indonesia's new president and vicepresident, respectively. These elections represent the first largelydemocratic and relatively peaceful transfer of executive power inIndonesia's history. They also mark the end of an extended electoralprocess that began with the passage of the new legal framework forelections on January 28, 1999 and was highlighted by national,provincial and district legislative elections on June 7. Theestablishment of a legitimate government through these elections andthe announcement of the formation of the National Unity Cabinet onOctober 26 herald a new era of democratic transformation inIndonesia. Although much has been achieved in the democratictransition in Indonesia over the past 18 months, the hard work ofconsolidating these gains and overcoming the economic and socialcrisis has just begun.

This report examines developments in Indonesia's electoral processin September, October and early November 1999. It focuses on thecompletion of the process of forming the People's RepresentativeAssembly (DPR) and the MPR and on the 1999 MPR GeneralSession. As such it represents a continuation of the series of reportsand statements NDI has issued during the past year on this electoralprocess. The most recent of these reports, issued in August 1999,discussed developments up to that time in the formation of the DPRand the MPR. This report was prepared on the basis of directobservation of the General Session, discussions with MPR membersand political party leaders, and analysis of various written materialsproduced by the Election Commission (KPU) and the MPR.

The Composition of the DPR and Provincial and District AssembliesThe KPU completed the process of allocating seats to parties in theDPR only on September 1, nearly three months after the June 7elections. After weeks of rancorous debate, the KPU finally decidedon August 30 to retroactively change the rules and abolish votesharing agreements, known as stembus accords, at the national level.The consequence of this decision was to take DPR seats away fromsome parties and give them to others. These changes occurred onthe margins, and therefore did not significantly affect the overallmakeup of the DPR. Nevertheless, the KPU decision to alter the rulesthat determined whether parties won seats after the election resultswere known did not comply with basic legal norms.

For the provincial and district assemblies, the final vote count and theallocation of seats to parties was the responsibility of thecorresponding election committee: the PPD I at the provincial leveland the PPD II at the district level. Although the formula for allocatingseats to parties is a straightforward arithmetic calculation, there aresome districts in which it has not been followed. In addition, there aresome districts where arguments as to the validity of stembus accordsat the local level are still not resolved, with some seats left vacant.

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Attempts by the disadvantaged parties to address their complaintsabout this problem through the appropriate election committees havemet with no success, and there does not appear to be any effectivemechanism for redress through the courts.

As NDI has pointed out in earlier reports, the lack of a propercomplaint resolution mechanism has been a general area of concern.Where the relevant level of the election administration or electionoversight committee (Panwas) has failed for whatever reason toresolve a problem by discussion or consensus, no further action hasbeen taken.

The hybrid electoral system used in Indonesia in 1999, in whichproportional representation by province was combined withassignment of candidates to districts and some importance beinggiven to district-level results, required very complex rules for thedetermination of elected candidates. According to these rules, seatswon by "full quotas" were to be filled in a manner not subject to partydiscretion, whereas the KPU gave parties full discretion over seatswon by "largest remainders." In practice, parties were permittedsubstantial discretion in filling all of their seats, including full quotaseats, and 97 out of 462 elected DPR members (21 percent)"represent" districts other than those to which they were originallyassigned. It appears that the KPU in effect changed the rules after theelections. The consequence of these developments was to reduce thesignificance of the district element of Indonesia's hybrid electoralsystem.

The Composition of the MPRThe selection of functional group(1) delegates continued to be mired incontroversy during the months before the MPR General Session andeven after the MPR was sworn in on October 1. In some instances,controversy surrounded the KPU's choice of which organization hadthe right to be represented. In other cases, the controversysurrounded the KPU's rejection of certain individuals to representorganizations it had already selected. A third type of controversyconcerned the selection of delegates from particular organizations.These examples demonstrate that functional group representation, atleast in the current situation in Indonesia, is unworkable if notundemocratic. In any event, there appears to be an emergingconsensus that functional group representation in the MPR should beabolished before the 2004 elections.

The provincial assemblies seem to have chosen provincial delegatesfor the most part through the procedures suggested by the Minister ofHome Affairs. As NDI pointed out previously, these procedures hadmajoritarian tendencies, in which a majority coalition in a provincialassembly could sweep all five provincial delegate seats. This methodmeant that in some cases the political affiliation of the provincialdelegates differed significantly from the political makeup in theprovincial assemblies produced by the June 7 elections.

The MPR General SessionMost of the formal meetings of the MPR General Session were openand relatively transparent, especially in comparison to previous MPRsessions. Of course, political decision making was not limited to theformal meetings; the critical negotiations and political horse tradingtook place in private.

Fortunately for the consolidation of Indonesia's democratic transition,the results of the MPR session suggest that a broad consensus nowexists that the 1945 Constitution must be amended to addressweaknesses in the country's political structure. The 1999 MPR

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General Session produced a First Amendment to the Constitution thatmade changes to nine of the constitution's 37 articles. The mostimportant parts of this Amendment assert the DPR's dominant rolevis-a-vis the president in the legislative process. Although the FirstAmendment is not as sweeping as some had hoped, the MPR alsopassed a decree authorizing its Working Body to continue to meetand draft further amendments to be presented for approval by the fullbody at its first Annual Session in August 2000.

Under the rules the MPR adopted, the president and vice presidentwere chosen in separate elections that followed the same procedures.The rules provided for multiple rounds of voting if necessary to ensurethat the president and vice president would be elected with a majorityof those present as opposed to a mere plurality.

With respect to East Timor, the MPR considered various options thatwould have fallen short of complete acceptance of the results of theUN-supervised referendum on August 30, but in the end passed adecree entirely acceptable to the international community. This decreerecognized the results of the August referendum, rescinded the 1978MPR decree formalizing Indonesia's annexation of East Timor andordered the president to take steps to protect the rights of EastTimorese who wish to retain their Indonesian citizenship. Transitionaladministration of the territory now passes to the UN for several years.

The MPR also exercised its constitutionally mandated duty todetermine the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) for the comingfive years. President Abdurrahman Wahid is required by an MPRdecree to present a report to the MPR during each of its AnnualSessions from 2000 to 2003 and to be held accountable for hisgovernment's policies at the next MPR General Session in 2004. The1999-2004 GBHN lays out a largely reformist policy agenda acrossmany sectors, including the economy, politics, law, foreign affairs,defense and security, the civil service, religion, education, society andculture, regional development, natural resources and theenvironment.

The report also reviews the coalition building and power sharingarrangements that led first to the election of Amien Rais as Speakerof the MPR and Akbar Tandjung as Speaker of the DPR and later tothe election of Abdurrahman Wahid as President and MegawatiSoekarnoputri as Vice President.

The Role of the MilitarySince Indonesia's democratic transition began in mid-1998, themilitary has come under intense criticism for human rights abuses andcorruption during the New Order. In addition to these past abuses,fresh cases have occurred in many parts of the country over the past18 months.

In response to this criticism, the military developed the "NewParadigm," a blueprint for reducing its political profile. This blueprinthas created controversy within the military among officers unwilling togive up the political and economic power to which they have becomeaccustomed. It has also been criticized by civilians for not going farenough, because it is still based on the assumption that the militaryhas a rightful role to play in domestic politics. Restructuringcivil-military relations is one of the greatest challenges facingIndonesia's democratic transition.

The military's behavior in the months leading up to the GeneralSession demonstrated its ambivalence over its proper political role inthe emerging Indonesian democracy. The military was assertive in

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defending its positions regarding East Timor and tried to influencedomestic political developments as well. The military/police bloc,however, maintained a relatively low profile during the GeneralSession, and military commander General Wiranto abandoned his bidfor the vice presidency twice. Although the new cabinet still includesmilitary officers in important posts, there are other signs of incipientimprovement in civil-military relations in Indonesia.

Looking AheadThe Working Body of the MPR is required to draft morethoroughgoing constitutional reforms before August 2000. One of theprimary issues on the agenda is the direct election of the Presidentand Vice President; there appears to be emerging consensus fordirect elections which would occur for the first time in 2004. There isalso consensus on the need to abolish military representation in theDPR, which is called for in the new GBHN, and functional grouprepresentation in the MPR. The constitutional reform process willaddress the future of the MPR, including alternatives of abolishing italtogether or transforming the provincial representatives in the MPRinto an upper house of the national legislature. In addition, theWorking Body will consider whether Indonesia should transform itselffrom a unitary into a federal state. There will also need to be furtherreforms to increase the independence and the powers of thelegislative and judicial branches, as well as to establish strongerchecks and balances among the three branches of government.

IntroductionOn October 20 and 21, 1999, exactly 17 months after PresidentSoeharto resigned and Indonesia's transition to democracy began, thePeople's Consultative Assembly, or MPR, elected AbdurrahmanWahid as President and Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice President ofthe country. These elections represent the first largely democratic andrelatively peaceful transfer of executive power in Indonesia's history.They also mark the end of an extended electoral process that beganwith the passage of the new legal framework for elections on January28, 1999 and was highlighted by national, provincial and districtlegislative elections on June 7. The establishment of a legitimategovernment through these elections and the announcement of theformation of the National Unity Cabinet on October 26 herald a newera of democratic transformation in Indonesia. Although much hasbeen achieved in terms of democratic development in Indonesia overthe past 18 months, the hard work of consolidating these gains andmeeting the economic and social challenges has just begun.

This report examines developments in Indonesia's electoral processin September, October and early November 1999. It focuses on thecompletion of the formation of the People's Representative Assembly,or DPR, and the MPR and on the 1999 MPR General Session.(2) Assuch it represents a continuation of the series of reports andstatements NDI has issued during the past year on this electoralprocess.(3) The most recent of these reports, issued in August 1999,discussed developments up to that time in the formation of the DPRand the MPR. The present report was prepared on the basis of directobservation of the General Session, discussions with MPR membersand political party leaders, and analysis of various written materialsproduced by the Election Commission, or KPU, and the MPR.

The Composition of the DPR and Provincial and DistrictAssembliesThe People's Representative Assembly or DPR, Indonesia's nationallegislature, consists of 500 members, 462 elected on June 7 and 38appointed from the military and the police. Once election results were

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made official at the end of July, then seats could be allocated toparties and candidates assigned to those seats. These processeswere completed in August and September, concluding the election ofIndonesia's new legislative bodies.

The Allocation of Seats to Parties in the DPR: Retroactive Changes inthe RulesThe PPI (Indonesian Election Committee) finally completed theprocess of allocating DPR seats to parties on September 1, nearlythree months after the June 7 legislative elections. As NDI explainedin an earlier report, the most controversial issue surrounding thisprocess was the use of "stembus accords," or voluntary agreementsamong parties to combine their remaining votes with those of otherparties in order to improve their chances of winning more seats.(4)

After much uncertainty regarding the exact nature of theseagreements, in July the KPU determined that only two national-levelstembus accords were valid. When the eight Muslim parties to one ofthese accords discovered that their agreement did not actually work totheir benefit (in fact, collectively they lost three seats due to theaccord), they attempted to convince the KPU to change the rulesunder which these accords would be implemented.(5) After weeks ofrancorous debate, the KPU finally decided on August 30 to abolishretroactively both existing stembus accords at the national level,apparently as the path of least resistance in breaking the deadlock.

The eight parties made political, not legal, arguments for changing therules once election results were known. In abolishing the accords, theKPU reversed the rules it had made before the elections took place.The consequence of this decision was to take DPR seats away fromsome parties and give them to others. In particular, PKP and PBIeach lost two seats, and PDI-P, PPP and PAN each lost one seat.The beneficiaries were PDKB and PNU, which each gained two seats,and PK, PKD and PPIIM, which each gained one.(6) Under the rulesgoverning stembus accords established before the elections, 19parties would have won seats in the DPR; once stembus accordswere abolished, 21 parties won seats. Although these changesoccurred on the margins, and therefore did not significantly affect theoverall makeup of the DPR, it was neither appropriate nor in line withbasic legal norms for election officials to change the rules thatdetermined whether parties won seats after the election results wereknown.

Within days of the KPU's final decision, the PPI had completed andannounced the final allocation of DPR seats among parties.(7)

Twenty-one out of the 48 parties that contested the elections wonseats, although only six of those won the minimum of 10 seatsnecessary to pass the 2 percent electoral threshold for eligibility tocontest the 2004 elections: PDI-P, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN andPBB.(8) These six parties won a total of 429 of the 462 elected seats(93 percent). Therefore, unless the DPR revises this element of theelectoral law, 15 of the 21 parties currently holding representation inthat body are faced with the choice of either merging with otherparties or dissolving themselves before the 2004 elections.(9)

Once parties have representation in the DPR, they must form or joinblocs (fraksi). It is these blocs that have rights to nominate candidatesfor speaker, assign members to commissions, and make speecheson the floor.(10) There is no minimum number of members to form abloc, but blocs with less than 10 members lose certain rights. A smallbloc, for instance, cannot nominate one of its members to be speakerand does not have the right to place a member on all ninecommissions.

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The 21 parties represented in the DPR have formed nine blocs. Themilitary is a tenth, separate bloc.(11) Of these nine blocs, three wereformed jointly by two or more parties. The Reform Bloc is a coalitionof PAN and PK, two parties with substantial support from urbanMuslim voters. The Indonesian National Unity (KKI) Bloc unites therepresentatives of eight secular nationalist parties. The Union ofMuslim Sovereignty (PDU) Bloc is a coalition of five Muslim parties.

Geographical Patterns of Party SupportThe election results bear out the common analysis that the politicallandscape on the most densely populated islands of Java and Balidiffers from that on Sumatra and in Eastern Indonesia (Kalimantan,Sulawesi, Maluku, Irian Jaya, and East and West Nusa Tenggara).(12)

Although PDI-P and Golkar were the only two parties to win seats inevery province, much of their support came from different parts of thecountry. Java and Bali, the most developed parts of the country andthe birthplaces of Megawati Soekarnoputri's ancestors, weredominated by PDI-P, which won 92 of the 243 available seats (38percent) on those islands. Eastern Indonesia, the least developed partof the country and birthplace of then-President B.J. Habibie, wasdominated by Golkar. Golkar won 55 of the 119 seats apportioned tothese 13 provinces (46 percent), compared to its national result of 120of the total of 462 contested seats (26 percent). In the four provinceson the island of Sulawesi, Habibie's birthplace, Golkar won 26 of the41 seats (63 percent). Unlike the other two regions, the politicallandscape of Sumatra is fairly evenly balanced among the majorparties.

Similarly, PKB's regional pattern of support was skewed heavily infavor of Java and Bali, and 34 of its 51 seats come from the twoprovinces of Central and East Java alone. In fact, this regionalimbalance in PKB's support explains why, although it won a greatershare of the national popular vote than PPP, it garnered seven fewerDPR seats. PPP's support was more evenly spread throughout thecountry. Indeed, support for the three other major parties - PPP, PANand PBB - was largely balanced among the regions of Java and Bali,Sumatra and Eastern Indonesia.

The Allocation of Seats to Parties in Provincial and DistrictAssemblies: Problems in Some LocationsFor the provincial and district assemblies, the final vote count and theallocation of seats to parties was the responsibility of thecorresponding election committee: the PPD I at the provincial leveland the PPD II at the district level. These results were then to beratified by the KPU, although it does not appear that the KPU everformally took this step. The provincial and district results were ratifiedby the same presidential decree that made official the nationalresults.

Although the formula for allocating seats to parties is a straightforwardarithmetic calculation, there are some districts in which it has not beenfollowed. In Pekanbaru municipality (Riau province), for example,PDI-P and PAN both have received one more seat in the districtassembly than they are entitled to according to the election results;PBI and PP each have one fewer seat.(13) This is alleged to havebeen the result of local political intimidation. In addition, there aresome districts where arguments as to the validity of stembus accordsat the local level are still not resolved, with some seats left vacant.These include Gowa (South Sulawesi) and Musi Rawas (SouthSumatra).

Attempts by the disadvantaged parties to address their complaints

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about this problem through the appropriate election committees havemet with no success, and there does not appear to be any effectivemechanism for redress through the courts. It is thus a significantfailing of the electoral process that in certain specific instances partiesentitled to seats have been prevented from claiming them and thatthere appears to be no effective recourse. These specific instances,however, do not appear to have been widespread enough to call intoquestion the legitimacy of the electoral process itself.

The Hearing of Complaints and GrievancesThe lack of a proper complaint resolution mechanism has not onlyaffected the allocation of seats to parties; as NDI has pointed out inearlier reports, the complaint resolution process has been a generalarea of concern.(14) Where the relevant level of the electionadministration or election supervision committee (Panwas) has failedfor whatever reason to resolve a problem by discussion or consensus,no further action has been taken.

It is not clear whether the court system can or will entertain andexercise jurisdiction over grievances arising out of the electionprocess. There are no precedents, and the electoral legislation andregulations themselves are unclear. It is to be hoped that adisadvantaged party or individual will test this system, not only to gaina hearing for a grievance but also to establish a precedent for futureelections.

The police are responsible only for cases in which a criminal offenseis alleged to have been committed and for which a criminal penaltyexists. They have no role in purely civil questions or in cases whereonly a civil remedy is defined, such as, for example, breaches of theelection law relating to the size of campaign donations, for which thepenalty defined is the disqualification of a party from the election. Thepolice have not, however, succeeded in assembling enough evidenceto prosecute any of the alleged cases of "money politics" from theelection campaign period.(15)

The Determination of Elected CandidatesThe hybrid electoral system used in Indonesia in 1999, in whichproportional representation by province was combined withassignment of candidates to districts and some importance beinggiven to district-level results, required very complex rules for thedetermination of elected candidates. NDI has described these rules ingreater detail elsewhere.(16) According to these rules, seats won by"full quotas" were to be filled in a manner not subject to partydiscretion, whereas the KPU gave parties full discretion over seatswon by "largest remainders." In practice, as discussed below, partieswere permitted substantial discretion in filling all of their seats,including full quota seats.

The larger parties gained most of their seats through full quotas, andtherefore many more of their elected candidates were determined onthe basis of the parties' district-level results and should not have beendetermined after the election by party leaders.(17) Smaller parties, onthe other hand, gained all of their seats through largest remainders,and thus their central party leaders were able to select all of theirrepresentatives in the DPR.

Each party was required to assign candidates to specific districts.Elected candidates were to come from the districts within a provincewhere a given party fared best, and under the rules in place beforethe elections parties would not have been able to move candidates tonew districts once the election results were known. In practice, 97 out

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of 462 elected DPR members (21 percent) "represent" districts otherthan those to which they were originally assigned.(18) In other words,after the elections parties moved these candidates from the districtsto which they had been previously assigned. This is evident fromcomparing the districts listed in the presidential decree that makestheir membership in the DPR official to those in the final candidate listpublished by the PPI.

It appears that, in this instance, the KPU in effect changed the rulesafter the elections. Parties were in practice allowed essentiallycomplete discretion in determining their lists of elected candidates; atthe very least, there was a major lack of consistency and clarity. PAN,for example, moved 15 candidates from one district to another, eventhough it had only eight "largest remainder" seats for which the partyshould have had full discretion under the rules. PAN leadersexplained that the original assignment of candidates to districts hadbeen done hurriedly. Predictably, there were internal protests anddissatisfaction as a result.

There are a number of reasons that so many members were switchedfrom one district to another after the election. First, the KPU decidedthat the fixed number of seats per district (with a minimum of one) thatit established as part of the process of apportioning seats to provincesalso applied to the process of determining elected candidates. As NDIpointed out in a previous report, such a rule results in a high numberof anomalous outcomes.(19) Second, the central leaders of mostparties chafed at the district element of the electoral system, whicheffectively reduced their power. They did everything they could toundermine that element. Third, some parties had specific reasons fortaking advantage of the permitted flexibility in the process ofdetermining elected candidates. For example, PDI-P had beencriticized during the campaign for nominating a disproportionatenumber of non-Muslim (especially Christian) candidates. In response,after the elections PDI-P took advantage of the discretion allowed bythe KPU and the PPI to ensure that a larger share of its electedcandidates were Muslim.

In addition to the significant proportion of elected candidates whoswitched districts, in technical violation of the rules, there are also twomembers of the DPR who were elected from different provinces thanthe ones from which they were originally nominated. These areProbosutedjo from PNI-FM, who switched from North Sumatra toCentral Java, and Marcus Mali from PKD, who switched from WestKalimantan to Irian Jaya.(20) Each is the chairman of his party, andeach party won only a single seat in the DPR. Having guessed wrongabout which province would be most likely to provide their parties witha seat, Probosutedjo and Mali refused to allow any of their parties'original candidates from those provinces to be seated. Each tookadvantage of the KPU's lax enforcement of the rules. After all thecandidates nominated from the provinces in which these parties hadactually won a seat resigned their candidacies, each chairmanswitched his own nomination to that province and thereby claimed theseat. Probosutedjo and Mali were not sworn in as members of theDPR until after October 1, because of the time necessary to completethese processes and gain the approval of the KPU.

The consequence of these developments was to reduce thesignificance of the district element of Indonesia's hybrid electoralsystem. This served to undermine the original rationale for thatelement of the system, which was designed to establish theconnection between a DPR member and a certain geographicallydefined constituency, thereby increasing the member's accountabilityto that constituency and reducing the power of central party leaders.

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While the KPU ultimately permitted the parties to make such changes,this was inconsistent with the spirit of the election law.

The June 7 elections have dramatically altered the demographicmakeup of the DPR, as compared to the two previous nationallegislatures.(21) As would be expected, turnover has been muchhigher than in the past; only about 20 percent of current DPRmembers were also in the final New Order legislature of 1997-1999.As part of this turnover, there has been a radical shift in theoccupational background of DPR members, with the share of civilservants and retired military officers dropping significantly andmembers with a background in the private sector taking their place. Inaddition, the first democratically elected national legislature in fourdecades contains members who are slightly younger and morewell-educated than previous DPRs. The gender imbalance, however,has actually grown, with fewer female legislators than ever.

The Composition of the MPRThe 695-strong People's Consultative Assembly, or MPR, is made upof the 500 members of the DPR plus 65 functional group delegatesand 130 provincial delegates.(22) The MPR is charged by theConstitution with electing the president and vice president anddefining the Broad Outlines of State Policy.

Functional Group Delegates(23) (Utusan Golongan)The selection of functional group delegates continued to be mired incontroversy during the months before the General Session and evenafter the MPR was sworn in on October 1.

In some instances, controversy surrounded the KPU's choice of whichorganization had the right to be represented. For example, someelements of the Buddhist community protested the selection of Walubias their representative organization, because Walubi's chairwomanSiti Hartati Murdaya was considered to be close to both formerPresident Soeharto and then-President Habibie. These protests wereignored on the grounds that Walubi was the most broadlyrepresentative Buddhist organization, and Murdaya took her seat inthe MPR.

In other instances, the controversy surrounded the KPU's rejection ofcertain individuals to represent organizations it had already selected.For instance, Abdurrahman Wahid and Muchtar Pakpahan at firstwere barred from representing the largest religious organization in thecountry, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the independent labor unionSerikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (Indonesian Prosperous LaborUnion or SBSI), respectively, because they were considered to bepartisan figures with ties to PKB and Partai Buruh Nasional (NationalLabor Party or PBN). After intensive lobbying, Wahid was allowed totake NU's seat, but SBSI had to find another representative. Apartfrom sheer power politics, in which NU has much greater politicalclout than SBSI, it is unclear why the KPU applied what appears to bea double standard to these two individuals and organizations.

A third type of controversy concerned the selection of delegates fromparticular organizations. Problems occurred within at least threeorganizations selected by the KPU to represent their category: theIndonesian Film Actors' Guild (PERFI), the Chamber of Commerce(KADIN), and the Indonesian Christian Womens' Association (PWKI).

The Actors' Guild could not reach consensus on a candidate, andfinally chose Heroe Syswanto NS in a vote. Nonetheless, the defeatedcandidate, Eva Rosdiana Dewi, continued to protest publicly for sometime after the vote.

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The Chamber of Commerce first nominated Adiwarsita Adinegoro,who was approved by the KPU. After the fact, however, KADINattempted to change its choice to its chairman Aburizal Bakrie, knownto be close to then-President Habibie. When Adinegoro refused togive up his seat, he was expelled from KADIN, which continues torefuse to recognize him as its MPR delegate.

The national leadership of PWKI claims it never nominated Mary B.Harun to represent it. PWKI claims her approval by the KPU was dueto the efforts of KPU member Clara Sitompul, the nationalchairwoman of the Krisna Party. PWKI claims that Harun has neverbeen among its national or regional leaders, that she is instead thechairwoman of the Krisna Party's West Java provincial leadershipboard, and that she is Sitompul's daughter.

These examples demonstrate that functional group representation, atleast in the current situation in Indonesia, is unworkable, if notundemocratic. In principle, these groups are already representedthrough the political parties that won seats in the general elections.Their separate representation as functional groups gives them asecond, and much more powerful vote for the president and vicepresident and a disproportionate voice in national policymaking. Inpractice, it is difficult to justify why certain broad categories andspecific organizations and not others should be granted the right tohave such representation. Moreover, the specific individuals who fillthese seats are also chosen in a process that has no connection tothe voting public or sometimes even to the membership of theorganizations they purport to represent. Nor is functional grouprepresentation effective in practice at protecting minority interests. Inany event, there appears to be an emerging consensus that functionalgroup representation in the MPR should be abolished before the 2004elections.

Functional group representation has also allowed outgoing cabinetministers and other members of the political elite who did not run forthe national legislature to nevertheless claim important positions asmembers of the MPR. One member of Habibie's cabinet, Minister ofTourism, Culture and the Arts Marzuki Usman, for example, resignedhis post to become the delegate of the Indonesian Association ofEconomics' Graduates (ISEI).

The KPU's approval of two particular functional group delegatesperhaps marks the end of New Order-style ostracism for certainpolitical points of view. Sri Mulyono Herlambang and Arief Biki bothrepresent the category of veterans and independence heros, but theformer is a symbol of the "extreme left" (ekstrem kiri) and the latter isa symbol of the "extreme right" (ekstrem kanan). The New Ordercreated two sets of enemies of the state, and then posited the militaryas the only bulwark against them. The "extreme left" was communismand the "extreme right" was political Islam. Sri Mulyono Herlambang isthe son of one of the Air Force officers (with the same name) accusedof participation in the events of September 30-October 1, 1965. Underthe New Order, even descendants of people linked to these eventswere ostracized. Arief Biki's brother, Amir Biki, was one of those killedwhen the military cracked down on Muslim activists in Jakarta's portarea of Tanjung Priok in 1984.

On the theory that the 65 functional group delegates werenonpartisan, they were allowed to form their own bloc in the MPR.This represents a break from past practice, when they were rolled intoGolkar's bloc. Eight provincial delegates who did not want to joinparty-based or military blocs also joined the functional group delegate

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bloc. It was difficult to determine the political inclinations of this bloc;its members apparently did not vote in a unified manner.

Provincial Delegates (Utusan Daerah)Provincial delegates, chosen by provincial assemblies sworn in overseveral weeks in late August and early September, trickled intoJakarta in late September and early October. Only 65 of the 130delegates had been formally approved as members of the MPR by apresidential decree before the swearing-in ceremony on October 1.Nonetheless, approximately 85 provincial delegates participated andvoted in the first phase of plenary sessions, held from October 1 toOctober 4. It appears that the additional 20 of these 85 delegateswere sworn in on October 1 despite lacking the formal approval of thepresident. These 20 and the remaining 45 delegates were formallyapproved in three separate presidential decrees dated betweenOctober 5 and October 12, and a second swearing-in ceremony washeld on October 12.

The provincial assemblies seem to have chosen these delegates forthe most part through the procedures suggested by the Minister ofHome Affairs. As NDI pointed out in an earlier report, theseprocedures had majoritarian tendencies, in which a majority coalitionin a provincial assembly could sweep all five provincial delegateseats.(24) This method meant that in some cases the politicalaffiliation of the provincial delegates differed significantly from thepolitical makeup in the provincial assemblies produced by the June 7elections.

Nearly all of the individuals chosen by provincial assemblies asprovincial delegates had clear party affiliations; only eight of the 130delegates chose to join the more politically unaffiliated functionalgroup delegate bloc. Significantly, nearly half (62) chose to join theGolkar bloc, almost twice as many as the 32 who joined the PDI-Pbloc. This was in part due to Golkar's greater strength in the 20 OuterIsland provinces, which sent 100 of the 130 delegates. It was due alsoto the political inexperience of other parties' provincial leaderships.For example, in North Sulawesi, PPP split its vote between twocandidates, allowing Golkar to choose all five delegates. In NorthSumatra, PDI-P controlled 30 of the 85 seats in the provincialassembly, but ended up with none of the provincial delegates to theMPR. It was defeated by a coalition of Golkar (17 seats), PPP (eight),PAN (seven), TNI/POLRI (nine), and a joint bloc of PKB and otherparties. Each of these five blocs nominated one delegate, butapparently the TNI/POLRI delegate did not choose to join that bloc inthe MPR.

A proposal to allow the establishment of a separate bloc in the MPRfor the provincial delegates, as was the practice in New Order-eraMPRs, was defeated. Instead, each delegate was given theopportunity to choose which of the other 11 blocs he or she wouldjoin.(25) One consequence of the defeat of this proposal was thatMarzuki Darusman was able to be elected to the chairmanship of theGolkar bloc in the MPR. Darusman, now Attorney General, was aprovincial delegate from East Nusa Tenggara.(26) He was the vocalleader of the anti-Habibie faction within Golkar, and his election to thechairmanship of the Golkar bloc was another blow to then-PresidentHabibie's chances at re-election.

As with the example of Marzuki Usman among the functional groupdelegates, five members of Habibie's cabinet resigned their posts tobecome provincial delegates for Golkar: Minister of Home AffairsSyarwan Hamid, from Riau; Coordinating Minister of the Economy,Finance and Industry Ginanjar Kartasasmita, from West Java;

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Minister of Labor Fahmi Idris, from South Kalimantan; Minister ofHousing Theo Sambuaga, from North Sulawesi; and Minister of Youthand Sports Agung Laksono, from Southeast Sulawesi. In addition,former chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council A.A. Baramuli, oneof the leading figures in the Bank Bali scandal, gained a seat as aprovincial delegate for Golkar representing South Sulawesi.Furthermore, prominent figures from the New Order also becameprovincial delegates to the MPR. These included former deputyspeaker of the MPR Abdul Gafur representing Aceh (after failing to beelected as a provincial delegate from South Sumatra), who joinedGolkar's bloc; former development trouble-shooter (Sesdalopbang) Lt.Gen. (ret) Solichin Gautama Purwanegara representing West Java,who joined PDI-P's bloc; former Minister of Finance Fuad Bawazierrepresenting Yogyakarta, who joined the Reform bloc; and formerMinister of Cooperatives Subiakto Tjakrawerdaya representing EastJava, who joined PKB's bloc.

The MPR General Session - Issues of Democratic ProcessThe MPR was sworn in on October 1 and met as a full body for thenext four days. During that time, it chose its leaders, passed its rulesof procedure and established the membership of its Working Body(Badan Pekerja). The Working Body then met from October 6 to 14 todiscuss the MPR's various draft decrees. This subcommittee of theMPR consisted of 90 members chosen proportionally to the strengthof each bloc. The Working Body divided itself into three ad hoccommittees. Ad Hoc Committee I discussed the draft Broad Outlinesof State Policy, Ad Hoc Committee II discussed the MPR's other draftdecrees, and Ad Hoc Committee III debated proposed constitutionalreforms.

The full MPR reconvened on October 14 to hear the President'saccountability speech and the reports of these ad hoc committees. OnOctober 17, four commissions of approximately 175 members eachwere formed to discuss further these issues. Commissions A, B andC were tasked with the same issues as Ad Hoc Committees I, II andIII, respectively; Commission D discussed the President'saccountability speech. After commission meetings on October 18, theMPR met in plenary session on October 19 to pass its decrees andvote on the President's accountability speech. The presidentialelection was held October 20, with the vice presidential electionfollowing one day later.

Openness and TransparencyMost of the formal meetings of the MPR General Session wererelatively open and transparent, especially in comparison to previousMPR sessions. There were four basic types of formal meetings: (1)plenary sessions of the entire MPR membership; (2) meetings ofsmaller bodies within the MPR such as the ad hoc committees of theWorking Body and the commissions; (3) consultative meetingsbetween the MPR leadership and bloc leaders; and (4) internal blocmeetings. Updated schedules of these meetings were available in themedia center on a regular basis, which facilitated public attendanceand media coverage of them. In all of these meetings, members werefree to speak their minds and express strong differences of opinion,facilitated by the fact that for the first time ever each member had theuse of a microphone installed on the front of his or her desk. Ifanything, there was sometimes too little control over meetings, whichallowed them occasionally to descend into shouting matches and todrag on much longer than scheduled.

All plenary sessions and some of the meetings of the smaller bodieswere open to the accredited public and were broadcast live onstate-run TV (TVRI) and radio (RRI), as well as on some private TVstations. All of the crucial votes took place during the plenary

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sessions, and thus the results of these votes were known immediatelyto the Indonesian public. The meetings of the smaller bodies debatedsuch crucial issues as the policy direction of the new government, thefuture of East Timor, constitutional reform, and procedures for theelection of the president and vice president. The early consultativemeetings among the interim MPR leaders and the unofficial blocleaders, before definitive leaders were chosen on October 3, werealso open to the public and were broadcast live through the electronicmedia. These meetings addressed the structural and proceduralissues mentioned above. Once definitive MPR and bloc leaders hadbeen chosen, these consultative meetings were no longer open to thepublic or the media. Internal bloc meetings, of course, were alsonever open to the public.

MPR members were distinctly aware that many of their sessions werebeing broadcast live across the country (and sometimes even acrossthe world, such as on CNN). Although some members tookadvantage of this fact to grandstand, others constantly reminded theircolleagues of their responsibility to the Indonesian public. In additionto the live broadcasts, both electronic and print media covered theGeneral Session extensively, setting aside daily air time andnewspaper space for special coverage of the MPR. This coveragewas facilitated by members' frequent availability to the media forinterviews. Political observers also contributed independent analysisthrough regular commentary and interviews. Of course, the generalpublic was much more attentive to this General Session because,unlike in the past, its outcome had not been scripted in advance.

Nevertheless, as is the nature of any political system, democratic orotherwise, political decision making is not limited to the formalmeetings. More often than not the critical negotiations and politicalhorse trading took place in the hotels where members stayed or at theprivate residences of certain key leaders. Although there had beenrampant public speculation about the role of "money politics" in theGeneral Session, in practice little concrete evidence came to light.

During the initial days of this MPR session, there was also a muchless obvious military presence in and around the Senayan area,where the MPR/DPR complex is located, and other strategic locationsin Jakarta, as compared to previous MPR sessions (especially Marchand November 1998) during which the city had taken on the feel of anarmed camp. For the first week of the General Session, theMPR/DPR complex and its environs were notably free ofdemonstrations, which may have been a sign of the greater publiclegitimacy accorded to this body as a result of the democratic natureof the June 7 elections.

As the presidential election neared, however, supporters of bothMegawati Soekarnoputri and B.J. Habibie were mobilized fromJakarta and other parts of the country, and people poured into thecapital by the thousands. Daily demonstrations by PDI-P supportersbegan taking place at the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in downtownJakarta, while Habibie supporters often rallied at major mosquesaround the city. Accordingly, the military presence was beefed up toprevent clashes between these groups and to prevent demonstratorsfrom entering the MPR complex. Nonetheless, on most days for thethree weeks of the General Session, the front gate of the complex onthe Gatot Subroto toll road was open for members, media and theaccredited public.

Decision-Making ProceduresFormer President Soeharto liked to claim that voting and majoritariandecision-making were Western liberal democratic practices alien to

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Indonesian (and East Asian) culture, which allegedly emphasizescollectivism and harmony - values that he claimed were betterachieved through deliberation (musyawarah) and consensus(mufakat). Among its other achievements, the 1999 MPR GeneralSession demonstrated that both consensual and majoritariandecision-making procedures have an important role in Indonesiandemocracy.

Whenever possible, the MPR and its smaller bodies seemed to givepriority to the achievement of consensus. This consensus, however,was not forced as in the past but the result of often extended andvigorous debate as well as intensive negotiations. Surprisingly,consensus was achieved even on such controversial issues as EastTimor and constitutional reform. Nonetheless, in a 695-member bodycomposed of members representing a wide range of political viewsand interests, consensus on some issues was just not possible. Thiswas especially true in the election of political leaders.

The MPR, however, never seemed uncomfortable turning to voting onissues about which consensus could not be achieved. The firstseveral votes on structural and procedural issues demonstrated thatboth members and the MPR secretariat staff lacked experience invoting procedures, but these wrinkles were soon ironed out andsubsequent votes proceeded more smoothly. Votes on issues wereconducted openly, by asking members to stand and be counted.Members sat in blocs, and thus it was rarely difficult to determine howblocs voted in these open votes.

In contrast, votes on individuals were conducted by secret ballot. Asfellow MPR members, the public sitting in the gallery and televisioncameras looked on, members were called up one by one. Each washanded a blank paper ballot, which she or he filled out in a votingbooth and dropped into a transparent ballot box before leaving theplenary hall. Immediately after all members had voted, the ballotswere shuffled together and counted to ensure the total numbermatched the number of members voting. Each ballot was thenopened in turn and its contents read out loud for all to hear, much likeat the polling stations on June 7. A running tabulation was kept on alarge whiteboard at the front of the hall. Interestingly, membersrefused to use the electronic voting devices installed by the MPRsecretariat just before the opening of the General Session, for fear ofmanipulation or recording of their votes.

The MPR General Session - Substantive Issues

Constitutional AmendmentsUnder the New Order, former President Soeharto and the military heldthe 1945 Constitution essentially sacred because it granted flexibilityand a wide range of powers to the executive branch. Any proposals toamend it were thus considered tantamount to treason. For thisreason, the simple fact that amending the Constitution is on thenational political agenda is already an important step in thedemocratic transition. In addition to providing a dominant position tothe executive branch, the 1945 Constitution lacks clarity. Many of itsclauses state that certain powers will be "delineated by law," a phrasethat in practice gave both Presidents Soekarno and Soeharto theability to implement and interpret the Constitution in any way theypleased. These weaknesses are not surprising given that thisConstitution was a temporary emergency document written just daysbefore the declaration of independence on August 17, 1945.

Fortunately for the consolidation of Indonesia's democratic transition,a broad consensus now exists among the political elite and perhaps

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the citizenry as well that the 1945 Constitution must be amended toaddress these weaknesses in the country's political structure.Interestingly, there is also broad consensus that whereas the mainbody and the explanations sections of the Constitution are fair gamefor amendment, the preamble should be left untouched. Thepreamble establishes Pancasila, the pan-religious state ideology; inthe 1950s, the Constituent Assembly (Konstituante) failed to enact apermanent Constitution in part because of conflict over whetherIndonesia should be a Pancasilaist, Islamic or socialist state. Thecontemporary consensus over leaving the preamble alone, evenamong Muslim parties, means that there is much less chance that thispolarizing debate will be reopened as Indonesia struggles tostrengthen its new democratic institutions.

The 1999 General Session of the MPR produced amendments to nineof the Constitution's 37 articles. The MPR decided to follow U.S.practice in amending the constitution, in which the full original text isaccompanied by the changes to these nine articles, which as a wholeare referred to as the First Amendment.

The First Amendment focuses on strengthening the position of thelegislative and judicial branches vis-a-vis the executive branch. Themost important parts of this Amendment assert the DPR's dominantrole vis-a-vis the president in the legislative process. In the originalConstitution, Articles 5 and 20 state that the president "holds thepower to establish laws with the approval of the DPR." Under the FirstAmendment, Article 20 now states that the DPR "holds the power toestablish laws." Article 5 now only grants the president the right "topresent bills to the DPR." Under the amended Article 20, a bill "isdebated by the DPR and the President to achieve common approval."Once approved, a bill is signed into law by the president. The MPRapparently decided not to adopt another clause stating that if anapproved bill sits on the president's desk for more than 30 days, itautomatically becomes law.

The nine amended articles in the First Amendment are many fewerthan the 20 articles originally identified as open to amendment by AdHoc Committee III of the MPR Working Body. Furthermore, theremaining parts of this amendment are largely cosmetic and do notaddress the root of the problems with the 1945 Constitution. Forinstance, the DPR now has a greater role in the formation of thecabinet, the assignment of Indonesian ambassadors to foreigncountries and the accreditation of foreign ambassadors to Indonesia.The DPR and the Supreme Court have also been given a role inadvising the president on the reduction of sentences. For thesedecisions, however, the president must only "consider the views of,"not gain the approval of, the DPR or Supreme Court. The power ofthe president to confer state honors is now to be restricted by law.Finally, the MPR reaffirmed the amendment passed at the MPRSpecial Session in November 1998 that limits the president and vicepresident to a maximum of two five-year terms.

Although the First Amendment is not as sweeping as some hadhoped, the MPR also passed a decree authorizing its Working Bodyto continue to meet and draft further amendments to be presented forapproval by the full body at its first Annual Session on August 18,2000. Changes adopted next August would therefore be referred to asthe Second Amendment.

The Procedures to Elect the President and Vice PresidentThe MPR's most important constitutionally defined duty is to elect thepresident and vice president. The 1945 Constitution, however, saysonly that these individuals are elected by a vote of a suara yang

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terbanyak, which has been variously interpreted as a special majority,a simple majority and a plurality. Thus the MPR itself had to determinemore detailed procedures for these elections.

Under the rules it adopted, the president and vice president werechosen in separate elections that followed the same procedures.(27)

The president was chosen first. A quorum for these elections wastwo-thirds of the MPR. Candidates must have been nominated eitherby a bloc or by a petition of 70 members (10 percent) of the MPR, andnominations closed 12 hours before the start of the plenary meeting inwhich the election took place. If only one candidate had beennominated, then that person would have been automatically approvedby the full body. Since there was more than one candidate, voting tookplace by secret ballot on a one-member, one-vote basis.(28)

Depending on the number of candidates, there could be multiplerounds of voting. In any round, a candidate who won the votes of amajority of members present was automatically declared thewinner.(29) If there was no majority winner in the first round, then thetop three vote-getters would advance to the second round. Failure toproduce a majority winner in the second round would result in a thirdround of balloting between the top two remaining candidates. In theunlikely event that there was still no majority winner in the third round,perhaps because of a high number of abstentions or invalid votes,balloting could be repeated up to twice within the following 24 hourswith the same two candidates. If these re-votes still did not produce amajority winner, then all nominees would be declared ineligible and anew round of nominations would have to take place, after which theabove voting procedures would be repeated. In the 1999 MPRGeneral Session, multiple rounds of voting were not necessarybecause in both elections only two candidates remained when votingcommenced, and a majority winner was achieved on the first ballot.

The MPR decree establishing these voting procedures also set out anumber of criteria for an individual to be eligible for nomination,including for the first time the filing of a declaration of assets. It wasthe responsibility of the MPR leadership to determine if an individualmet these criteria. One criterion that was proposed but eventuallydropped required all candidates to be in good physical health. Thiscriterion, had it remained in the decree, could have proved fatal to thecandidacy of the man who was eventually elected president,Abdurrahman Wahid.

The decree also requires that the president and vice president "mustbe able to work together," even though they are elected separately.Although President Wahid was intimately involved in the negotiationsregarding most of the vice presidential candidates, when MPRSpeaker Amien Rais announced the four official candidates on themorning of October 21, he said that there was no requirement that thepresident must be consulted about all of the nominees. Theseprocedures left open the possibility, at least on paper, that a vicepresident undesirable to the president could have been elected by theMPR. The decree did not specify what actions were to be taken if thissituation occurred.

East TimorAnother of the important items on the MPR's agenda was the future ofEast Timor. The result of the August 30 UN-administered referendum,timed to occur before the General Session, was an overwhelmingvictory for independence. The international community thus expectedthe MPR to ratify these results and grant East Timor itsindependence, especially in light of the atrocities committed by theIndonesian military and the militias it supported. Nonetheless, the

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MPR was also faced with both a general nationalist backlash and thespecific entreaties of pro-Indonesia East Timorese during the GeneralSession.

The MPR considered various options that would have fallen short ofcomplete acceptance of the referendum results, but in the end passeda decree entirely acceptable to the international community. Thisdecree recognized the results of the August referendum, rescindedthe 1978 MPR decree formalizing Indonesia's annexation of EastTimor and ordered the president to take steps to protect the rights ofEast Timorese who wish to retain their Indonesian citizenship.Transitional administration of the territory now passes to the UN forseveral years.

The Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis-Garis Besar HaluanNegara, or GBHN)Besides electing the president and vice president, another of theMPR's constitutionally defined duties is to determine the BroadOutlines of State Policy (GBHN) for the coming five years. Thisdecree is one of the most important yardsticks by which thepresident's performance, as summarized in his accountability speech,is measured at the end of his term. In the past, the GBHN was averbose and general document, and President Soeharto was neverheld truly accountable for his policies and other decisions. In contrast,the 1999-2004 GBHN is a more concise document, and the MPR maybe much more vigilant in holding President Wahid accountable. Therejection of President Habibie's accountability speech, in part becausehe was considered to have failed to carry out the directions of the1998 GBHN, is an important precedent in this regard.

President Abdurrahman Wahid is required by an MPR decree topresent a report to the MPR during each of its Annual Sessions from2000 to 2003 and to be held accountable for his government's policiesat the next MPR General Session in 2004.(30) Apparently, the MPRscrapped the proposal for an annual accountability speech. If therewere such a requirement, the MPR would have had an annualopportunity to reject the speech, thus rendering the president'spolitical position untenable.

During the New Order, the military-dominated National Defense andSecurity Council (Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional, orWanhankamnas) drafted the GBHN and presented it to the MPR as afait accompli. This year the Wanhankamnas played a much lesssignificant role. In the months before the 1999 MPR General Session,political parties drafted their own versions of the Broad Outlines ofState Policy and then formed an inter-party team to compare andconsolidate these versions. The 1999-2004 GBHN itself requires thatordinary citizens should be much more actively involved in thedevelopment of the GBHN in the future, although it does not specifyhow this is to be done.

The 1999-2004 GBHN lays out a largely reformist policy agendaacross many sectors, including the economy, politics, law, foreignaffairs, defense and security, the civil service, religion, education,society and culture, regional development, natural resources and theenvironment.(31) The prescriptions for the economy include taking amarket-based approach that recognizes the inevitability ofglobalization while remaining socially and environmentally friendly.This will be achieved by playing to Indonesia's comparativeadvantages as an agrarian and maritime country, while emphasizingthe importance of small and medium-sized enterprises andcooperatives.

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The prescriptions for domestic politics emphasize the needs fornational reconciliation and further democratization. The policyguidelines note that constitutional and electoral reforms are necessaryto achieve checks and balances among the three branches ofgovernment. The 2004 elections will be conducted by a nationalelection commission that is to be independent and nonpartisan.Civil-military relations will also be restructured, including by endingmilitary representation in the DPR and restricting it to the MPR. TheGBHN also emphasizes the importance of a free press to democracyin Indonesia. At the intersection of economics and politics, the DPR isto be more heavily involved in decisions about the levels of foreigndebt Indonesia assumes, relations with international financialinstitutions such as the IMF and World Bank, and the privatization ofstate-owned assets.

Proposed legal reforms include restructuring and cleaning up thejudicial system and the police force and placing an emphasis onhuman rights. Corruption is also an issue for the civil service at alllevels, but especially in terms of increasing the transparency ofauditing the personal wealth of high government officials. As part ofthis effort, the GBHN requires the government to increase the salariesof civil servants, the police and the military. The political neutrality ofthe state bureaucracy is to be maintained.

Although the GBHN calls for civil-military relations to be restructured,it also continues to adhere to the theory of "total people's war" thatjustifies the military's territorial system. The police are to be fullyseparated from the military, and both institutions are to increase theirprofessionalism. In foreign affairs, Indonesia is to focus its diplomacyon ASEAN and the solidarity of the developing world, while continuingto integrate itself into the emerging global and Asian free traderegimes.

Religious policy is to focus on developing nondogmatic religiouseducational curricula and on fostering interfaith dialogue, as well asimproving government administration of the haj pilgrimage forMuslims. Education policy must emphasize decentralization andcurriculum reform, while improving teacher salaries. In the area ofsociety and culture, policy should emphasize improving health care,social security, family planning programs, and the lives of thehandicapped. Freedom of artistic expression is to be guaranteed, andtraditional culture is to be promoted, both for its own sake and as ameans of attracting eco-friendly tourists. Promoting gender equalityand developing youth programs to foster entrepreneurship and stemdrug abuse are also a priority.

Regional autonomy is to be implemented in the economic, political,legal, religious and cultural spheres. Autonomy granted to regionalgovernments, however, must be accompanied by the empowermentof elected regional assemblies (DPRDs) as watchdogs on thesegovernments. Integrated rural development is also to be emphasizedover the coming five years. In addition, Aceh, Irian Jaya and Malukuare to receive special attention. Decentralization of resource controland the promotion of sustainable development are the main prioritiesin the natural resource and environmental sector.

The MPR General Session: Coalition Building and Power SharingThe primary impact of the distribution of provincial delegates amongother blocs was to pull Golkar's strength nearly even to PDI-P's.(32)

The Central Axis (Poros Tengah), a loose coalition of Muslim partiesformed in July by PAN chairman Amien Rais, also controlled asignificant share of the MPR: 132 seats not counting PKB, or 189seats including PKB (which never actually joined the Central Axis but

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ultimately supported the same presidential candidate).

In negotiations, PDI-P acted as if it had an overall majority with whatwas widely perceived as a stiff and uncompromising negotiating style.But Indonesia's proportional representation electoral system did notproduce a majority party and instead spread significant numbers ofDPR seats among a number of larger parties. This outcome requiredall parties to negotiate and form coalitions. PDI-P's failure to do soevidently adversely effected its record in the MPR General Session.

Votes on Structural and Procedural IssuesOn October 2, the second day of the MPR General Session, thelongstanding coalition of PDI-P and PKB lost three votes in a row tothe Golkar/Central Axis coalition on structural and procedural issues.First, PDI-P's proposal to abolish separate blocs for both functionalgroup delegates and provincial delegates was defeated by a vote of379 to 250, in favor of allowing the functional group delegates to forma separate bloc while forcing the provincial delegates to join otherblocs. Second, PDI-P's efforts to limit the number of deputy speakersto five was defeated, 391 to 248, in favor of having seven deputyspeakers. This had the effect of providing the military and PBB,PDI-P's most ardent political opponent, the two additional leadershippositions. Third, PDI-P's proposal to prioritize consensualdecision-making over voting in the election of the MPR speaker wasalso defeated, 403 to 230. Although the substance of these votes wasnot particularly important, as a political matter these defeats exposedthe weakness of the PDI-P/PKB coalition and emboldened theGolkar/Central Axis coalition in its bid for the MPR and DPRspeakerships in subsequent days.

The Election of the Speaker of the MPROn October 3, the MPR elected its speaker. There were eightcandidates, representing the eight largest blocs, and the candidatewith the most votes was elected speaker, with the other sevencandidates automatically becoming deputy speakers. Leading up tothe general session, Abdurrahman Wahid had been considered theleading candidate for this post. Instead, Wahid threw his support toAmien Rais, who defeated PKB chairman Matori Abdul Djalil(supported by PDI-P as well) by a vote of 305 to 279.

Rais's victory was evidently based on a coalition of Golkar and theCentral Axis; Golkar supported him in an apparent deal to give Golkarchairman Akbar Tandjung the speakership of the DPR. The militarybloc evidently voted for its own candidate, Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, whocame in third place with 41 votes. This strategy could be seen aseither part of an effort to remain politically neutral on key votes - as afurther step toward reforming the military's role in politics - or as atactical move to avoid taking partisan stances before the mostimportant vote on the president. In any event, it was a cleardemonstration of the military bloc's power as a swing vote, becauseDjalil would have defeated Rais with those 41 additional votes.

The Election of the Speaker of the DPRTwo days later, on October 5, the DPR elected its speaker. Therewere five candidates, representing the five largest blocs, and thecandidate with the most votes was elected speaker, with the otherfour candidates automatically becoming deputy speakers. The CentralAxis held up its end of the bargain referred to above. When it becameclear that Tandjung would win, PDI-P and PKB tried to throw theirsupport to his candidacy through a consensus decision to avoidanother embarrassing defeat in a vote. Consensus was achieved atthe level of the inter-bloc leadership meeting. When the matter cameto the floor in a plenary session, however, members of the PBB bloc

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refused to accept the consensus decision and demanded a vote,which Tandjung won handily with 411 out of 491 votes. The militarybloc evidently supported Tandjung, as it was safe to do so for aconsensus candidate. Fifty-four members of PDI-P's 153-strong blocvoted for the party's own candidate, Soetardjo Soeryogoeritno.

President Habibie's Accountability SpeechAt the end of his term, the president is required to make a speechbefore the MPR outlining his achievements and failures vis-a-vis thepolicy platform set out for him by the MPR at the beginning of histerm. The MPR then decides to approve or disapprove of the speech.Although a rejection of the speech has no legal ramifications for thepresident, it is the functional equivalent of a parliamentary vote of noconfidence, and it is expected that he would no longer pursuere-election.

After President Habibie gave his accountability speech on October 14,each bloc was given an opportunity to respond over the next twodays, followed by a second speech by the President on October 17addressing their criticisms. During their speeches, only four blocs(PDI-P, PKB, KKI and PDKB) with 261 votes rejected Habibie'sspeech outright, whereas only two small blocs (PBB and PDU) with 22votes publicly accepted the speech. The remaining five blocs with themajority of votes (Golkar, PPP, Reform, military and functional groupdelegates) criticized the speech but did not make public an overallevaluation. MPR Commission D then further discussed the speechand the mechanisms for achieving an overall evaluation of it onOctober 18. Since Commission D could not achieve consensus, theissue was brought to a vote of the entire MPR on the evening ofOctober 19, approximately 12 hours before the scheduled presidentialvote. With President Habibie's political future hanging in the balance,the speech was narrowly rejected, 355 to 322, apparently by acoalition of PDI-P, PKB and some in Golkar and the Central Axis.Within hours, Habibie announced his withdrawal from the race.

The Election of the PresidentHabibie's withdrawal left Golkar and the Central Axis scrambling foranother candidate, and they finally settled on NU chairmanAbdurrahman Wahid after Akbar Tandjung and Amien Rais declinedto run. PBB nominated its chairman Yusril Ihza Mahendra, but hewithdrew his candidacy just before the voting started, leaving a racebetween Wahid and PDI-P's Megawati Soekarnoputri. Faced with thefirst opportunity in Indonesia's history for a president from NU, PKBmembers, drawn primarily from the ranks of NU, could not voteagainst Wahid, despite their party's long-standing coalition with PDI-Pand the close relations between Megawati and PKB's chairman MatoriAbdul Djalil. On Wednesday, October 20, 1999 at approximately2:30pm, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected Indonesia's fourthpresident, the first chosen through a democratic process, by 373votes to Megawati's 313. Because the balloting was secret, it remainsunclear how the military bloc voted in this election.

That afternoon and evening, riots erupted in Jakarta, Medan, Soloand Bali, as PDI-P supporters and others vented their frustrations.Several people were killed when two bombs exploded in Jakarta.Tensions eased only after Megawati was elected vice president thefollowing day.

The Election of the Vice PresidentGiven President Wahid's health problems of the last several years (heis diabetic, had two strokes in 1998 and is nearly blind), the post ofvice president suddenly gained increased significance. On Thursdaymorning, MPR Speaker Amien Rais announced the nomination of four

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candidates: Akbar Tandjung, PPP chairman Hamzah Haz, GeneralWiranto and Megawati (in a conciliatory gesture, nominated by PKBrather than PDI-P).

The voting, scheduled to begin at 11 am, was postponed until 2 pmfor furious inter-bloc negotiations. When the plenary sessionreconvened, Tandjung announced the withdrawal of his candidacy,and Rais read a letter from Wiranto doing the same. The session wasthen delayed for nearly another full hour while pressure was put uponHamzah Haz to withdraw as well so that Megawati could be declaredthe consensus candidate. This effort was unsuccessful, and a votewas held, which Megawati won in a convincing manner, 396 to 284,due to the apparent support of PDI-P, PKB, the military bloc, andsome from Golkar and the Central Axis.

Nonetheless, the result in the race for vice president was seen bymany observers as less a vote in support of Megawati than it was aneffort to assuage her supporters and avoid chaos. Within hours of theannouncement of the results, calm had returned to the streets of Bali,where rioting had continued on Thursday.

The Role of the MilitarySince Indonesia's democratic transition began in mid-1998, themilitary has come under intense criticism for human rights abuses andcorruption during the New Order. In addition to these past abuses,fresh cases have occurred in many parts of the country over the past18 months.

In response to this criticism, the military developed the "NewParadigm," a blueprint for reducing its political profile. This blueprinthas created controversy within the military among officers unwilling togive up the political and economic power to which they have becomeaccustomed. It has also been criticized by civilians for not going farenough, because it is still based on the assumption that the militaryhas a rightful role to play in domestic politics. Restructuringcivil-military relations is one of the greatest challenges facingIndonesia's democratic transition.

East Timor and the "Silent Coup"Since late 1998, the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia,TNI) had been quietly increasing its support for militias inside EastTimor. When the East Timorese people voted overwhelmingly forindependence on August 30, TNI and these militias began rampagingthroughout the territory. This led to calls for the insertion of aninternational military presence to restore order.

The military was reportedly unalterably opposed to the presence offoreign troops on "Indonesian soil." Thus, when President Habibiebegan hinting that he might accept such a presence, it was allegedthat on September 8 General Wiranto confronted him on the issueand asked him to step down.(33) When Habibie refused to resign,Wiranto reportedly agreed to allow him to keep his position on thecondition that Wiranto, and not Habibie, would make all strategicdecisions from then on.

The Indonesian and international media widely referred to thesealleged events as a "silent coup." Within days of this "silent coup,"Wiranto announced that Indonesia would accept the UN-sponsoredmilitary force.

The Military Attempts to Wield its InfluencePerhaps believing that it now had the upper hand, the militaryattempted to wield further influence over political developments. TNI's

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Deputy Commander (now Commander) Widodo AS hinted onSeptember 13 that the MPR General Session might need to bepostponed because the national atmosphere was "not conducive" toholding such a politically charged event. This statement galvanizedcivilian politicians from across the political spectrum, and severalresponded publicly that perhaps the General Session should insteadbe expedited. (In the end, the election of the president and vicepresident did take place about three weeks earlier than originallyplanned.) The Team of Seven, an interparty consultative forumformed on September 11, began meeting to discuss issues leading upto the General Session. The early meetings of this forum did notinclude military representatives, who began joining later meetings justdays before the General Session began.

For several months, the military had been pushing a new bill on statesecurity and national emergencies through the holdover DPR electedduring the New Order. This bill had languished for 10 years in thestate secretariat before finally being presented to the DPR in 1999.The DPR substantially revised the bill, so that some commentatorsviewed it as an improvement on the draconian 1959 law it was meantto replace. Nonetheless, the bill became a flash point for studentprotests against military influence in politics. When the DPR passedthe bill anyway on September 23, one day before its term ended, thedemonstrations escalated into deadly riots (the so-called "Semanggi IIIncident"). On September 24, in an unusual move, the military (not thegovernment) announced that the president would not sign the bill untilit could be "socialized" - that is, better explained - to the public.

On September 28, just four days after the riots, Wiranto tookadvantage of the Team of Seven forum to again assert the military'snational leadership. He invited the leaders of the seven major partiesto a meeting at the Museum of the Drafting of the Declaration ofIndependence in Menteng, Central Jakarta. Abdurrahman Wahid,Megawati Soekarnoputri, Akbar Tandjung and Amien Rais wereamong those present. At this meeting, Wiranto emphasized the needto maintain order during the upcoming General Session and extracteda promise from all present that their parties would not mobilizesupporters during the MPR's deliberations.

The Military's Low Profile during the MPR General SessionIn contrast to this activist role played by military leaders, themilitary/police bloc in the MPR took a much lower profile during theGeneral Session itself. For instance, the military representatives rarelywore their uniforms, preferring suits and ties. In the consultative andplenary meetings that took place from October 1 to 4, they rarelyjoined the debates. The military/police bloc also refused to take sidesin the highly contested race for MPR speaker; instead the entire blocvoted for its own candidate, the political equivalent of abstention. Themilitary's representatives did abandon their neutral stance and vote inthe presidential and vice presidential elections, although it is notknown exactly who they voted for or even if they voted uniformly.Military representatives were active in pushing for a moreconfrontational stance on East Timor and for retaining their DPRrepresentation after 2004, but when these positions became politicallyuntenable they were abandoned.

General Wiranto's Vice Presidential CandidacyThe most visible sign that the military is divided over its political rolewas Wiranto's on-again, off-again vice presidential candidacy. He hadbeen careful to establish the military's neutral position in the June 7elections, which allowed him to maintain relations with all parties andpolitical leaders. This strategy appeared to be paying off, because atone point in August, he was being spoken of as a potential runningmate to both Habibie and Megawati. As September wore on, however,

25 of 33

it appeared that Megawati was not inclined to offer him the position.Thus, he reportedly became more aggressive in courting Golkar.

At Golkar's leadership meeting in May, when the party named Habibieits sole presidential candidate, Wiranto was tapped as one of its fourpossible vice presidential candidates, along with Akbar Tandjung,Ginanjar Kartasasmita and Sultan Hamengkubuwono X. Golkar againheld a leadership meeting on October 11 and 12, in the middle of theMPR General Session. In an unusual move, one week before themeeting, five provincial chapter chairmen who were retired militaryofficers quietly received promotions to brigadier or major general. Thismeeting reaffirmed Habibie as Golkar's presidential candidate, but italso gave the party leadership the flexibility to change candidates inlight of subsequent events. The party could not achieve consensus ona vice presidential candidate, despite support for Wiranto amongsome provincial chapters. The decision was left up to Habibie, and hechose Wiranto despite the potential for unrest generated by thisticket.

On October 18, one day before the vote on Habibie's accountabilityspeech and two days before the presidential election, Wirantoannounced that he "would not participate in the competition over thepresidency and vice presidency." This decision was apparently due tointense pressure from other active and retired officers, and it was agrave blow to Habibie's candidacy. Some analysts believe that thiswas a calculated move and that Wiranto expected to be consideredagain once the president had been elected. (He did subsequentlyagain become a candidate.) In any case, the announcement sent asignal to MPR members, especially those from the military/police bloc,that it was acceptable to reject Habibie's accountability speech,because Wiranto was no longer explicitly tied to Habibie.

President Abdurrahman Wahid owed his election more to a coalitionof civilian parties than to military support. Thus, he did not need toturn to Wiranto to pay some of these debts with the vice presidency.For his part, Akbar Tandjung cleverly took Wiranto's announcement atface value, and he himself became Golkar's candidate for vicepresident. When the official candidates were announced, Wiranto hadnot even been nominated by the military/police bloc, but rather by thePDU bloc and a petition of 74 members that included none of themilitary representatives. Wiranto reportedly came under intensepressure to resign his candidacy from regional military commanderswho had already been facing demonstrations and riots due to theMPR's failure to elect Megawati as president. Thus, rather than lose athree- or four-way vote, Wiranto was forced to withdraw his candidacyfor the second time in four days.

The Role of the Military in the New CabinetThe new "National Unity" cabinet contains some important firsts forcivil-military relations. President Abdurrahman Wahid changed thename of the Ministry of Defense and Security to the Ministry ofDefense, implying a sole focus on external threats. The new Ministerof Defense, Prof. Juwono Sudarsono, is the first civilian to occupy thatpost in 40 years. He is highly respected within TNI and was the deputygovernor of the National Resilience Institute (Lembaga KetahananNasional or Lemhannas), the military's think tank, for a number ofyears. He is also a professor of international relations at theprestigious University of Indonesia and has an M.A. from theUniversity of California at Berkeley and a Ph.D. from the LondonSchool of Economics. Another first is that the new TNI commander,Admiral Widodo AS, is from the Navy; this is the first time ever thatTNI has been led by an officer from other than the Army. Thisunderscores President Wahid's new emphasis on Indonesia as amaritime nation and may signal a reduced political role for the Army.

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The cabinet also contains five active and retired officers, four from thearmy and one from the navy. Although this suggests the military willcontinue to exert significant political influence, it is also the fewestofficers in any cabinet in decades. These officers are General Wirantoas Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Lt. Gen. (ret) SurjadiSoedirdja as Minister of Home Affairs, Lt. Gen. Susilo BambangYudhoyono as Minister of Mining and Energy, Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelaras Minister of Transportation and Communications, and Rear AdmiralUpper Half Freddy Numberi as Minister of Utilization of the CivilService.

Looking Ahead

The Composition of the New CabinetThe National Unity Cabinet is largely a result of the political bargainsstruck during the elections for the president and vice president. Itcontains at least one representative from each of the seven majorparties: PDI-P, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN, PBB and PK.(34) The newcabinet contains many new faces; only four ministers have served inprevious cabinets. Although most ministers thus lack experience inthe executive branch, many share a broad commitment to reform.

Indonesians quickly began to raise a number of concerns about thecabinet. Some have criticized the continued placement of militaryofficers in ministerial positions. Others have questioned the suitabilityof certain ministers for their new posts. Another concern has beenwhether a cabinet consisting of such diverse political interests will beable to work together to formulate and implement a coherent policyagenda. Finally, many have lamented the lack of a formal(party-based) opposition and have expressed doubts about the abilityof the DPR to provide oversight of a government consisting of allmajor parties. Procedures for accountability in the DPR are weak andneed to be reviewed. A coalition of NGOs has already declared itsintentions to act as a "Cabinet Watch" in the absence of a formalopposition in the DPR.

Soon after its formation, the cabinet was shaken by President Wahid'sannouncement that three ministers were under investigation foralleged corruption. Weeks later, the government has still notannounced the names of these three ministers. On November 18,however, Coordinating Minister for Public Welfare and PovertyAlleviation Hamzah Haz announced his resignation. Although hisname had been widely speculated to be among the three, Hazclaimed that his resignation was due to dissatisfaction over Wahid'sdecision to open trade ties with Israel.

President Wahid has also come under criticism, primarily fromemployees of the affected bureaucracies, for his decision to not namea new Minister of Information, Minister of Social Services and Ministerof Agrarian Affairs. The Ministry of Information will be abolished inanother step toward ensuring the freedoms of expression and of thepress. The services provided by the Ministries of Social Services andAgrarian Affairs will be among the first services to be devolved tolower levels of government.

The New Government's Policy PlatformAs discussed above, the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) setthe overall policy direction for the new government. The followingdescribes some of the early moves made by the new government,which admittedly is only about one month old at the time of the

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publication of this report.

The maintenance of Indonesia's national integrity appears to be ofsingular importance to President Wahid. Regional sentiment isrunning high in Indonesia at this time. Although the cabinet containsthe first Irianese minister ever, Freddy Numberi, representatives of theethnic communities of West Sumatra and North Sulawesi publiclyexpressed disappointment at the lack of Minangkabau andManadonese representation in the cabinet. Wahid has assigned VicePresident Megawati Soekarnoputri to address the specific problemsfacing the provinces of Riau, Maluku and Irian Jaya.

In the first weeks of his term, Wahid has made conciliatory gesturesto address longstanding grievances in the province of Aceh. He hasalready met with some of the leaders of the Free Aceh Movement(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM), and has declared that a separateregional military command will not be established in Aceh as long ashe is president. President Wahid established a fact-findingcommission and promised that trials of military officers accused ofhuman rights abuses would begin immediately. The new presidentappointed prominent human rights activist Marzuki Darusman to thepost of Attorney General; Darusman has called publicly for these trialsto be conducted by the civilian rather than the military judicial system.

Furthermore, President Wahid created a new cabinet position, theState Minister of Human Rights, and filled it with a prominentAcehnese politician from PAN, Hasballah Saad. Wahid also appointeda Navy admiral and an Acehnese general as commander and deputycommander of the military. In one of his first public statements, thenew commander declared that the military would no longer pursue a"security approach" to the problems in Aceh and would insteadsupport a political solution. Nonetheless, violent clashes between themilitary and both unarmed civilians and armed rebels have continuedto occur and public support in Aceh for a referendum onindependence appears to have increased substantially. PresidentWahid himself agreed in November that a referendum, though notnecessarily a referendum on independence, should be held withinseven months, but this idea has drawn vocal opposition from theDPR, the MPR, the military and others. Resolving the political futureof Aceh, including addressing demands for a referendum, is perhapsthe most critical question facing Indonesia at this time.

Restoring international confidence in the Indonesian economy,cleaning up official corruption, especially at the highest levels, andrecapitalizing the banking system appear to be the key points in thenew government's economic strategy. Wahid has said he will pardonformer President Soeharto if convicted, in part because of the latter'spoor health, but that the same will not be true for Soeharto's familyand cronies. Marzuki Darusman is likely to be an activist AttorneyGeneral, and a Commission on Civil Service Corruption is expected tobe formed soon. The government has made public the long version ofthe PricewaterhouseCoopers report on the Bank Bali scandal, animportant prerequisite for reestablishing relations with the IMF and theWorld Bank.

Further Constitutional ReformThe Working Body of the MPR is required to draft broaderconstitutional reforms before August 2000. One of the primary issueson the agenda is the direct election of the president and vicepresident; there appears to be emerging consensus that this isnecessary and will occur for the first time in 2004. There is alsoconsensus on the need to abolish military representation in the DPR,which is called for in the new GBHN, and functional group

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representation in the MPR. The constitutional reform process willaddress the future of the MPR, including alternatives of abolishing italtogether or transforming the provincial representatives in the MPRinto an upper house of the national legislature. In addition, theWorking Body will consider whether Indonesia should transform itselffrom a unitary into a federal state. Indonesians also see the need toincrease the independence and the powers of the legislative andjudicial branches, as well as to establish stronger checks andbalances among the three branches of government.

1. The 1945 Constitution stipulates that the membership of the MPRincludes functional group representatives who are intended torepresent certain under-represented sectors of society. The decisionas to which organizations are included as functional groups is madeby the Election Commission.

2. The 1945 Constitution provides that the MPR should meet at leastonce every five years. These regularly scheduled meetings arereferred to as General Sessions. In 1999 the MPR also decided tohold Annual Sessions, beginning in the year 2000. The MPR can alsomeet in Special Sessions.

3. NDI, The New Legal Framework for Elections in Indonesia,February 23, 1999; NDI, The Prospects for Democratic Elections inIndonesia, May 28, 1999; Statement of NDI and The Carter CenterInternational Election Observation Delegation to Indonesia's June 7,1999, Legislative Elections, June 9, 1999; NDI and The Carter CenterInternational Election Observation Mission, Indonesia's June 7, 1999,Legislative Elections: Counting and Tabulation of Votes, June 20,1999; Post-Election Statement No. 3 of NDI and The Carter CenterInternational Election Observation Mission, Indonesia's June 7, 1999,Legislative Elections: Vote Tabulation and the Electoral Process, July15, 1999; and NDI and The Carter Center, Post-ElectionDevelopments in Indonesia: The Formation of the DPR and the MPR,August 26, 1999.

4. NDI and The Carter Center, Post-Election Developments inIndonesia, pp. 2-3.

5. The eight Muslim parties were Partai Umat Islam (Islamic People'sParty or PUI), Partai Kebangkitan Umat (Islamic People's AwakeningParty or PKU), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development UnityParty or PPP), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1905 (1905 IndonesiaMuslim Association Party or PSII 1905), Partai Politik Islam IndonesiaMasyumi (Masyumi Indonesian Muslim Political Party or PPIIM),Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon and Star Party or PBB), PartaiKeadilan (Justice Party or PK) and Partai Nahdlatul Umat (NahdlatulUmat Party or PNU).

6. See Appendix 1.

7. Appendix 2 contains a copy of the PPI's official allocation of DPRseats by party and province.

8. It does not appear that any other parties besides these six havepassed the alternative threshold: 3 percent of the seats in theprovincial and district assemblies distributed across half of theprovinces and half of the districts in Indonesia.

9. See also NDI, The New Legal Framework, p. 7.

10. DPR commissions are the equivalent of American legislative

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committees.

11. The table in Appendix 3 provides the party composition of eachbloc.

12. The table in Appendix 3 provides a breakdown of DPR seats byparty and region.

13. See Appendix 4.

14. NDI and The Carter Center, Indonesia's June 7, 1999, LegislativeElections: Vote Tabulation and the Electoral Process, p. 4.

15. Ibid.

16. NDI, The New Legal Framework, pp. 2-6; NDI, The Prospects forDemocratic Elections, pp. 17-19; NDI, Indonesia's Unique ElectoralSystem, June 1, 1999.

17. See the table in Appendix 5.

18. For a full list of these 97 members, see Appendix 6.

19. NDI, The New Legal Framework, pp. 13-23.

20. Probosutedjo is former President Soeharto's half-brother.

21. See the tables in Appendix 7. Appendix 8 contains a demographicbreakdown of the current DPR by party.

22. The number of MPR members had been set at 700, including 135provincial delegates, but the five provincial delegates from East Timorcould not be chosen in September given the conditions there followingthe August 30 referendum. Thus the actual number of provincialdelegates was 130, and the total membership of the MPR was 695.

23. The 1945 Constitution stipulates that the membership of the MPRincludes functional group representatives who are intended torepresent certain under-represented sectors of society. The decisionas to which organizations are included as functional groups is madeby the Election Commission.

24. NDI and The Carter Center, Post-Election Developments inIndonesia, p. 6.

25. The distribution of the provincial delegates across the 11 blocs isgiven in the table in Appendix 9.

26. Darusman was born in Solo, Central Java, and has lived inJakarta for many years. There were no residency requirements forprovincial delegates, which significantly undermined their statedpurpose of providing a mechanism for regional representation. It wasa common practice for parties to ensure that their national leaders notelected to the DPR in June were accommodated in the MPR asprovincial delegates.

27. MPR Decree No. VI/MPR/1999.

28. The Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO), a Jakarta-basednongovernmental organization, conducted a short but intense

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campaign for an open presidential election, including the use of openballoting, to increase transparency and accountability. Although thiscampaign was successful in raising public awareness about the issue,and some of its recommendations were adopted by the MPR, thecampaign failed to convince MPR members to use an open ballot inthese elections.

29. Since the basis for the overall vote count was members present(as opposed to present and voting), abstentions and invalid ballotscounted in determining the number of votes necessary to achieve amajority. This rule was designed to ensure broader support andlegitimacy for the elected president.

30. MPR Decree No. VII/MPR/1999.

31. MPR Decree No. IV/MPR/1999.

32. See the table in Appendix 9.

33. Kompas, September 9, 1999, pp. 1, 11; Kompas, September 13,1999, pp. 1, 11.

34. The table in Appendix 10 provides more details on the ministersand their political affiliations.

Copyright © 2000 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). All rightsreserved. Portions of this work may be reproduced and/or translated fornon-commercial purposes provided that NDI is acknowledged as the source of thematerial and is sent copies of any translation.

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APPENDIX 1

THE POLITICAL EFFECT OF ABOLISHING STEMBUS ACCORDS

(LOSS)NET GAIN

(no accords)DPR SEATS

(with 2 accords)DPR SEATS

PARTY(1)153154PDI-P

120120Golkar(1)5859PPP

5151PKB(1)3435PAN

1313PBB176PK253PDKB253PNU

(2)46PKP22PDI

(2)13PBI110PKD

11PDR11IPKI11PP11PSII11PNI-MM11PNI-FM

110PPIIM11PKU

Two National Stembus Accords:

38582Parties8 Muslim

066Parties3 Secular

Sources:Two Accords: NDI's calculations, based on official election results.No Accords: PPI official seat allocation, September 1, 1999.

Unfortunately, NDI is unable to provide the following appendix to this document: Appendix 2: The PPI's Official DPR Seat Allocation

APPENDIX 3

THE BREAKDOWN OF DPR SEATS BY BLOC/PARTY AND REGION

Eastern IndonesiaSumatraJava & BaliTotalPercent*SeatsPercent*SeatsPercent*SeatsSeatsBloc/Party

19%2921%3260%921531) PDI-P

46%5520%2434%411202) Golkar

22%1329%1748%28583) PPP

6%310%584%43514) PKB

12%534%1454%22415) Reform15%535%1250%1734 PAN0%029%271%57 PK

23%331%446%6136) PBB

42%58%150%6127) KKI**0%025%175%34 PKP

100%20%00%02 PDI0%00%0100%11 PP0%00%0100%11 PNI-FM0%00%0100%11 PNI-MM

100%10%00%01 PBI100%10%00%01 IPKI100%10%00%01 PKD

22%222%256%598) PDU***20%140%240%25 PNU0%00%0100%11 PKU

100%10%00%01 PDR0%00%0100%11 PSII0%00%0100%11 PPIIM (Masyumi)

80%420%10%059) PDKB

3810) TNI/POLRI

119100243500Total

* Percent of bloc's/party's total seats** KKI = Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia (Indonesian National Unity)*** PDU = Perserikatan Daulat Ummat (Union of Muslim Sovereignty)

APPENDIX 4

THE PROJECTED AND ACTUAL COMPOSITIONOF THE PEKANBARU MUNICIPALITY DPRD II,

RIAU PROVINCE

(LOSS)GAIN

SEATSACTUAL

SEATSPROJECTED

TOTAL

SEATSREMAINDER

LARGEST

REMAINDERSVOTE

SEATSQUOTA

VOTESVALID

PARTY101012,127957,765Golkar

1109153955,791PDI-P1981,701851,157PAN

66188637,280PPP22655213,019PBB1115,18605,186PK1114,18804,188PKP1112,66902,669PKB

(1)0112,16902,169PBI(1)0111,96801,968PP

55TNI/POLRI4545634Totals

Sources:Total Projected Seats: NDI's calculations based on official election results. No stembus accords were valid.

(Total Valid Votes = 247,295; Quota = 6,182)Actual Seats: Speaker's Office, Pekanbaru Municipality DPRD II.

APPENDIX 5

DPR SEATS WON BY FULL QUOTAS AND LARGEST REMAINDERS

ProvincesSwitch

Members

DistrictsSwitch

MembersRemainder Seats

LargestFull Quota Seats

SeatsTotal

%#%#Party

1912%1888%135153PDI-P1018%2183%99120Golkar1733%1967%3958PPP1022%1178%4051PKB1524%876%2634PAN885%1115%213PBB486%614%17PK3100%50%05PDKB3100%50%05PNU2100%40%04PKP1100%20%02PDI

100%10%01PBI1100%10%01PKD

100%10%01PDR1100%10%01IPKI1100%10%01PP1100%10%01PSII

100%10%01PNI-MM1100%10%01PNI-FM

1100%10%01PPIIM1100%10%01PKU

29726%12074%342462Totals

APPENDIX 6

DPR MEMBERS WHO SWITCHED DISTRICTS

Representing District*:ProvinceNamePartyPresidential DecreeFinal Candidate List

Kodya SabangKab. Aceh BesarAcehKarimun UsmanPDI-PKab. Aceh TimurKab. Aceh BaratAcehT. Zulfikar Taib Aly, S.H.Kab. Mandailing NatalKab. Tapanuli SelatanN. SumatraIrmadi LubisKodya Padang PanjangKodya PadangW. SumatraMarah Simon Mhd. Syah, S.H.Kodya PayakumbuhKab. PasamanW. SumatraYohanes LukmanKodya JambiKab. BatanghariJambiAgnita Singedikane IrsalKab. TulungagungKab. ProbolinggoE. JavaPramono AnungKab. BerauKab. PasirE. KalimantanI. Emir MoeisKab. NgadaKab. Sumba BaratE. Nusa TenggaraJulius BoboKab. ManggaraiKab. NgadaE. Nusa TenggaraJacob Nuwa WeaKodya KupangKab. KupangE. Nusa TenggaraMatheos PormesKodya ParepareKodya Ujung PandangS. SulawesiSophan SophiaanKodya PaluKab. DonggalaC. SulawesiFauziah AbdullahKodya BitungKab. Sangihe & TalaudN. SulawesiEngelina Andaris PattiasinaKodya KendariKab. ButonS.E. SulawesiTheo SyafeiKab. Maluku TenggaraKab. Maluku TengahMoluccasJ.E. SahetapyKab. FakfakKab. JayapuraIrian JayaDaniel YokuKab. Biak NumforKab. ManokwariIrian JayaLukas SabarofakKab. TimikaKodya JayapuraIrian JayaLukas Karl DegeyKodya Pematang SiantarKab. SimalungunN. SumatraEdi Ramli SitanggangGolkarKodya Tanjung BalaiKab. Labuhan BatuN. SumatraRambe Kamarul ZamanKab. LebakKab. PandeglangW. JavaEki SyachrudinKab. BrebesKab. GroboganC. JavaDaryatmo MardiyantoKodya MagelangKab. KaranganyarC. JavaHajriyanto Y. ThohariKab. TubanKab. JombangE. JavaAisyah Hamid BaidlowiKodya ProbolinggoKab. KediriE. JavaIrsyad SudiroKodya MalangKab. TulungagungE. JavaIris Indira MurtiKab. LamonganKab. BojonegoroE. JavaSarwoko SoerjohoedojoKab. JembranaKab. BulelengBaliSylvia RatnawatiKodya SibolgaKab. LangkatN. SumatraH.M. Danial TandjungPPPKab. Pesisir SelatanKab. PasamanW. SumatraH.A. Syahrudji TanjungKab. Lima Puluh KotaKab. AgamW. SumatraAisyah AminyKab. Sarulangon BangkoKab. Bungo TeboJambiAbdul Kadir IsmailKab. LahatKab. Ogan Komering UluS. SumatraDW. Javauddin A.R.Kodya BengkuluKab. Rejang LebongBengkuluAchmad Ferial HuseinKodya TangerangKodya BandungW. JavaA.M. SaefuddinKodya CilegonKodya BekasiW. JavaAli Hardi KiaidemakKab. KudusKab. SemarangC. JavaAkhmad MuqowamKodya TegalKab. DemakC. JavaLukman Hakim SaifuddinKab. BantulKab. SlemanYogyakartaHusnie ThamrinKab. BangkalanKab. JemberE. JavaNadhier MuhammadKodya PalangkarayaKab. Kotawaringin TimurC. KalimantanRusnain YahyaKab. MarosKab. SinjaiS. SulawesiArsyad PanaKab. MajeneKodya Ujung PandangS. SulawesiNoer Namry NoorKab. Buol TolitoliKab. DonggalaC. SulawesiMuhammad NawirKodya GorontaloKab. GorontaloN. SulawesiSukardi HarunKodya BinjaiKab. LangkatN. SumatraAris Azharai SiagianPKBKodya Pangkal PinangKab. Ogan Komering UluS. SumatraAwaluddin BurhananKab. Way KananKab. Lampung TengahLampungImam Mawardi Sanjaya

Representing District*:ProvinceNamePartyPresidential DecreeFinal Candidate List

Kab. SumedangKab. BandungW. JavaAgus Suflihat MahmudPKBKodya TangerangKab. IndramayuW. JavaAbdul Khaliq Ahmad(cont.)Kab. GroboganKab. PurwodadiC. JavaAbdul Wahid KarimKab. Barito UtaraKab. Kotawaringin TimurC. KalimantanSyaifullah AdnawiKab. Tanah LautKab. BanjarS. KalimantanKhalilurrahman Kab. BangliKodya DenpasarBaliMachrus UsmanKab. EnrekangKodya Ujung PandangS. SulawesiMochtar Noer JayaKab. AsahanKab. Deli SerdangN. SumatraAhmad Sanoesi TambunanPANKodya SolokKab. Padang PariamanW. SumatraAmbia H. RoestamKodya BatamKodya PekanbaruRiauRadja RoesliKab. KerinciKab. Tanjung JabungJambiZulkifli NurdinKab. BangkaKab. Ogan Komering IlirS. SumatraTibrani BasriKodya MetroKodya Bandar LampungLampungSuminto MartonoKab. MajalengkaKab. BandungW. JavaMochtar AdamKab. TegalKab. BanyumasC. JavaMunawar SholehKab. JeparaKab. BoyolaliC. JavaDjoko SusiloKab. SlemanKodya YogyakartaYogyakartaAkhmad Risaf IskandarKodya MojokertoKab. SidoarjoE. JavaWahyudi IndrajayaKab. TabalongKodya BanjarmasinS. KalimantanNoor Adenan RazakKab. BulunganKodya BalikpapanE. KalimantanNurdiati AkmaKab. MamujuKodya Ujung PandangS. SulawesiMoh. AskinKab. Yapen WaropenKodya JayapuraIrian JayaRahman SulaimanKodya Tebing TinggiKab. Deli SerdangN. SumatraNur BalqisPBBKodya SolokKodya BukittinggiW. SumatraMS KabanKab. BekasiKab. CianjurW. JavaYusril Ihza MahendraKab. CirebonKab. BandungW. JavaHartono MardjonoKodya CirebonKodya BandungW. JavaYusuf Amir FeisalKab. TapinKab. Barito KualaS. KalimantanM. QasthalaniKab. Lombok BaratKab. BimaW. Nusa TenggaraHamdan ZoelvaKab. SelayarKodya Ujung PandangS. SulawesiZubair BakryKab. Tanah DatarKodya PadangW. SumatraIrwan PrayitnoPKKab. Lampung UtaraKab. Lampung TengahLampungRokib Abdul KadirKab. KarawangKodya Depok W. JavaZirlyrosa JamilKab. BanjarnegaraKab. CilacapC. JavaMutammimul 'UlaKab. SambasKab. BangkayangW. KalimantanSeto HariantoPDKBKodya TernateKodya AmbonMoluccasArnold N. RadjawaneKab. NabireKab. TimikaIrian JayaAstrid SusantoKab. SimeuleuKab. Aceh BaratAcehTgk. Muhibbuddin WalyPNUKab. SukabumiKab. BogorW. JavaAbdullah Al WahdiKab. Hulu Sungai TengahKab. BanjarS. KalimantanYunani HasharKab. DairiKodya MedanN. SumatraSutradara GintingsPKPKodya BogorKab. BandungW. JavaTjetje Hidayat PadmadinataKab. SintangKab. SanggauW. KalimantanMassardy KaphatPDIKab. JenepontoKodya ParepareS. SulawesiHamid MappaIPKIKab. TangerangKab. BogorW. JavaHussein NaroPPKab. TasikmalayaKab. GarutW. JavaAmaruddin DjajasubitaPSIIKab. KuninganKab. BandungW. JavaSayuti RahawarinPPIIMKab. PasuruanKab. BanyuwangiE. JavaAsnawi LatiefPKU

*Note:Kab. = Kabupaten = RegencyKodya = Kotamadya = Municipality

APPENDIX 7

THE DEMOGRAPHIC MAKEUP OF THE 1999-2004 DPR,COMPARED TO PAST DPRs

TABLE 1: FORMER OCCUPATION

TABLE 2: HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

TABLE 3: AGE GROUP

1999-20041997-991992-97OCCUPATION20%24%40%Previous DPR71%40%42%Private Sector

10%37%19%Military*Civil Service/

*Active and retired civil servants and military officers.

1999-20041997-991992-97EDUCATION LEVEL17%15%27%Secondary School64%70%66%College19%15%7%Postgraduate

1999-20041997-991992-97AGE GROUP4%3%3%< 35

39%36%34%35-4957%61%63%> 50

Source: Kompas, October 1, 1999, p. 15.

APPENDIX 8

THE DEMOGRAPHIC MAKEUP OF THE 1999-2004 DPR, BY PARTY/BLOC

TABLE 1: FORMER OCCUPATION

PARTY/BLOC

TABLE 2: HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

GRADUATEPOST-

OTHERMILITARY*SERVICE/

CIVIL

SECTORPRIVATE

1997-99 DPRD1997-99 DPR25%14%61%0%0%PDI-P6%6%22%8%59%Golkar

14%5%24%19%38%PPP55%10%31%4%0%PKB39%10%51%0%0%Reform54%8%38%0%0%PBB17%0%75%8%0%KKI33%0%67%0%0%PDU80%0%20%0%0%PDKB0%37%0%0%63%TNI/POLRI

23%11%39%5%23%Totals

*Active and retired civil servants and military officers.

COLLEGESCHOOLSECONDARY

PARTY/BLOC17%54%29%PDI-P23%73%5%Golkar9%70%21%PPP18%61%22%PKB22%76%2%Reform31%69%0%PBB8%58%33%KKI11%67%22%PDU

100%0%0%PDKB24%71%5%TNI/POLRI19%65%16%Totals

TABLE 3: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

PARTY/BLOC

TABLE 4: AGE GROUP

TABLE 5: SEX

OTHERHINDUCATHOLICPROTESTANTMUSLIM1%5%7%25%63%PDI-P0%1%4%9%86%Golkar0%0%0%0%100%PPP0%0%0%0%100%PKB0%0%0%0%100%Reform0%0%0%0%100%PBB0%0%50%8%42%KKI0%0%0%0%100%PDU0%0%40%60%0%PDKB0%8%8%8%76%TNI/POLRI1%2%5%11%81%Totals

>6556-6446-5536-45<35PARTY/BLOC5%35%33%23%4%PDI-P2%19%39%36%4%Golkar

12%40%28%17%3%PPP4%31%16%37%12%PKB7%20%29%44%0%Reform0%46%15%38%0%PBB

17%33%42%8%0%KKI0%33%22%44%0%PDU0%80%20%0%0%PDKB0%13%82%5%0%TNI/POLRI5%29%35%27%4%Totals

FEMALEMALEPARTY/BLOC9%91%PDI-P

12%88%Golkar7%93%PPP6%94%PKB0%100%Reform0%100%PBB0%100%KKI0%100%PDU

20%80%PDKB0%100%TNI/POLRI7%93%Totals

APPENDIX 9

THE COMPOSITION OF THE MPR - 1999 GENERAL SESSION

SeatsTotal MPR

UD SeatsAdditional

DPR SeatsBloc/Party

185321531) PDI-P182621202) Golkar7012583) PPP576514) PKB498415) Reform

34 PAN7 PK

380386) TNI/POLRI130137) PBB

14212Unity (KKI)8) Indonesian National

4 PKP2 PDI1 PP1 PNI-FM1 PNI-MM1 PBI1 IPKI1 PKD

909Sovereignty (PDU)9) Union of Muslim

5 PNU1 PKU1 PDR1 PSII1 PPIIM

50510) PDKB

7380Delegates (65)11) Functional Group

695130500Total

APPENDIX 10

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NATIONAL UNITY CABINET

Party/Organizational Affiliation(s)*Previous Position(s)MinisterTNI-AD (General)

CommanderM, Defense and Security; TNI

Wiranto1) CM, Politics & Security:

PDI-P (DPP, DPR)

PDI-PResearch & Development,Deputy Speaker, MPR; Head,

Industry: Kwik Kian Gie2) CM, Economy, Finance &

Hasanuddin University, [Golkar](1989-1997)Rector, Hasanuddin University

Alleviation: Basri Hasanuddin3) CM, Public Welfare & Poverty

PKB (DPP, DPR)Head, External Relations, PKB4) M, Foreign Affairs: Alwi Shihab

Resilience InstituteUniversity of Indonesia, National

EnvironmentM, Education and Culture; SM,

Sudarsono5) M, Defense: Juwono

TNI-AD (Lt Gen, ret)Governor, JakartaSoedirdja6) M, Home Affairs: Surjadi

PBB (DPP, DPR)National Chair, PBBIhza Mahendra7) M, Laws & Regulations: Yusril

Gadjah Mada University, [PAN]Dean, MBA Program, UGM8) M, Finance: Bambang Sudibyo

TNI-AD (Lt Gen)AffairsTNI Chief of Staff for Territorial

Bambang Yudhoyono9) M, Mining & Energy: Susilo

Golkar (MPR)BusinessmanProvincial Delegate, MPR;

Kalla10) M, Industry & Trade: Jusuf

Bengkulu University, [PDI-P]Representative in IndonesiaProfessor, Agriculture; FAO

Prakosa11) M, Agriculture: Muhamad S

PK (DPP, DPR)President, PKNur Mahmudi Ismail12) M, Forestry & Plantations:

TNI-AD (Lt Gen)InstituteGovernor, National Resilience

Communications: Agum Gumelar13) M, Transportation &

[Golkar]

GolkarService (1988-93); Sec'y Gen,SM, Utilization of the CivilSM, Environment (1993-98);

Sarwono Kusumaatmadja14) M, Maritime Exploration:

[Golkar]Trade Union (F-SPSI)Chair, Federation - All-Indonesia15) M, Labor: Bomer Pasaribu

Career Civil ServantDiseases, Ministry of HealthDirector General, Contagious16) M, Health: Ahmad Sujudi

Gadjah Mada University, [PAN]

Washington, DCIndonesian Embassy,Education & Culture Attache,

Muhaimin17) M, National Education: Yahya

[PKB]

NUFoundation; Head, Rois Syuriah,Chair, Malang Islamic University

Tolchah Hasan18) M, Religion: Mohammad

Foundation (YLKI)Indonesian Consumer Institute

MPR; NGO ActivistFunctional Group Delegate,

Development: Erna Witoelar19) M, Housing & Regional

[PKB]of Sciences (LIPI)Researcher, Indonesian Institute

Muhammad AS Hikam20) SM, Research & Technology:

PPP (DPP, DPR)Chair, PPP

Zarkasih NurMedium-sized Enterprises:21) SM, Cooperatives & Small &

Party/Organizational Affiliation(s)*Previous Position(s)MinisterAtmajaya University, [PDI-P]

Atmajaya UniversityLecturer, Philosophy and Ethics,

Keraf22) SM, Environment: Sonny

(IIP)Institute of Government Science

Ministry of Home AffairsAutonomy & General Gov't,Director General, Regional

Ryaas Rasyid23) SM, Regional Autonomy:

[PKB]Commissioner, Postal ServiceHidayat Djailani24) SM, Tourism & the Arts:

PDI-P (DPP, DPR)Treasurer, PDI-PEnterprises: Laksamana Sukardi25) SM, Investment & State

Golkar (DPP, MPR)Member, GolkarProvincial Delegate, MPR; KPU

Sinambela26) SM, Youth & Sports: Mahadi

Career Civil ServantMinistry of Mining and EnergyDirector General, Mining,

Boediro Soetjipto27) SM, Public Works: Rafik

PKB (DPP, DPR)PKBDeputy Speaker, DPR; Chair,

Khofifah Indar Parawansa28) SM, Women's Empowerment:

PAN (DPP, DPR)Chair, PAN; KPU Member, PANHasballah M. Saad29) SM, Human Rights:

PAN (DPP, DPR)Deputy Secretary General, PANPopulation: Al-Hilal Hamdi30) SM, Transmigration &

TNI-AL (Rear Admiral, Upper Half)Governor, Irian JayaService: Freddy Numberi31) SM, Utilization of the Civil

[PDI-P]MPR; BusinessmanFunctional Group Delegate,

Anak Agung Gde Agung32) SM, Community Problems:

Golkar (DPP, MPR)

CommissionNational Human RightsChair, Golkar Bloc, MPR; Chair,

Darusman33) Attorney General: Marzuki

TNI-AL (Admiral)TNI Deputy Commander34) TNI Commander: Widodo AS

[PKB]

Agency (Bappenas)National Development PlanningHead, Education and Training,35) State Secretary: Ali Rahman

Key:1) CM = Coordinating Minister2) M = Minister3) SM = State Minister (without portfolio)4) TNI = Indonesian National Military5) TNI-AD = Army6) TNI-AL = Navy7) DPP = Central Leadership Board

* When the party's name is listed in brackets, this individual has only an indirect affiliation.