tecson vs. comelec

6/30/2015 G.R.Nos.161434,161634&161824

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/mar2004/gr_161434_2004.html 1/27

TodayisTuesday,June30,2015

RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.161434March3,2004

MARIAJEANETTEC.TECSONandFELIXB.DESIDERIO,JR.,petitioners,vs.TheCOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,RONALDALLANKELLYPOE(a.k.a.FERNANDOPOE,JR.)andVICTORINOX.FORNIER,respondents.

xx

G.R.No.161634March3,2004

ZOILOANTONIOVELEZ,petitioner,vs.RONALDALLANKELLEYPOE,a.k.a.FERNANDOPOE,JR.,respondent.

xx

G.R.No.161824March3,2004

VICTORINOX.FORNIER,petitioner,vs.HON.COMMISSIONONELECTIONSandRONALDALLANKELLEYPOE,ALSOKNOWNASFERNANDOPOEJR.,respondents.

DECISION

VITUG,J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of theprivilege.Itisa"preciousheritage,aswellasaninestimableacquisition,"1thatcannotbetakenlightlybyanyoneeitherbythosewhoenjoyitorbythosewhodisputeit.

BeforetheCourtarethreeconsolidatedcases,allofwhichraiseasinglequestionofprofoundimportancetothenation.Theissueofcitizenshipisbroughtuptochallengethequalificationsofapresidentialcandidatetoholdthehighestofficeof the land.Ourpeoplearewaiting for the judgmentof theCourtwithbatedbreath. IsFernandoPoe,Jr.,theheroofsilverscreen,andnowoneofthemaincontendersforthepresidency,anaturalbornFilipinoorishenot?

Themomentof introspectiontakesusfacetofacewithSpanishandAmericancolonialrootsandremindsusoftherichheritageofcivillawandcommonlawtraditions,thefusionresultinginahybridoflawsandjurisprudencethatcouldbenolessthandistinctlyFilipino.

AntecedentCaseSettings

On31December2003,respondentRonaldAllanKellyPoe,alsoknownasFernandoPoe,Jr.(hereinafter"FPJ"),filedhiscertificateofcandidacyforthepositionofPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesundertheKoalisyonngNagkakaisangPilipino(KNP)Party, in theforthcomingnationalelections. Inhiscertificateofcandidacy,FPJ,representing himself to be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or"RonaldAllan"Poe,hisdateofbirthtobe20August1939andhisplaceofbirthtobeManila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.CommissiononElectionsandRonaldAllanKelleyPoe,alsoknownasFernandoPoe,Jr.,Respondents,"initiated,on09January2004,apetitiondocketedSPANo.04003beforetheCommissiononElections("COMELEC")todisqualifyFPJandtodenyduecourseortocancelhiscertificateofcandidacyuponthethesisthatFPJmadea

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materialmisrepresentationinhiscertificateofcandidacybyclaimingtobeanaturalbornFilipinocitizenwhenintruth,accordingtoFornier,hisparentswereforeignershismother,BessieKelleyPoe,wasanAmerican,andhisfather,AllanPoe,wasaSpanishnational,beingthesonofLorenzoPou,aSpanishsubject.Granting,petitionerasseverated,thatAllanF.PoewasaFilipinocitizen,hecouldnothavetransmittedhisFilipinocitizenshiptoFPJ,the latterbeingan illegitimatechildofanalienmother.Petitionerbasedtheallegationof the illegitimatebirthofrespondentontwoassertionsfirst,AllanF.PoecontractedapriormarriagetoacertainPaulitaGomezbeforehismarriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such priormarriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,marriedBessieKellyonlyayearafterthebirthofrespondent.

InthehearingbeforetheThirdDivisionoftheCOMELECon19January2004,petitioner,insupportofhisclaim,presentedseveraldocumentaryexhibits1)acopyofthecertificateofbirthofFPJ,2)acertifiedphotocopyofanaffidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy andconcubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship withBessieKelley,3)anEnglishtranslationoftheaffidavitaforesaid,4)acertifiedphotocopyofthecertificateofbirthofAllanF.Poe,5)acertificationissuedbytheDirectoroftheRecordsManagementandArchivesOffice,attestingto the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided orenteredthePhilippinesbefore1907,and6)acertificationfromtheOfficerInChargeoftheArchivesDivisionoftheNationalArchivestotheeffectthatnoavailableinformationcouldbefoundinthefilesoftheNationalArchivesregardingthebirthofAllanF.Poe.

Onhispart,respondent,presentedtwentytwodocumentarypiecesofevidence,themoresignificantonesbeinga) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that thereappearedtobenoavailableinformationregardingthebirthofAllanF.PoeintheregistryofbirthsforSanCarlos,Pangasinan,b)acertificationissuedbytheOfficerInChargeoftheArchivesDivisionoftheNationalArchivesthatnoavailableinformationaboutthemarriageofAllanF.PoeandPaulitaGomezcouldbefound,c)acertificateofbirthofRonaldAllanPoe,d)OriginalCertificateofTitleNo.P2247oftheRegistryofDeedsfortheProvinceofPangasinan,inthenameofLorenzoPou,e)copiesofTaxDeclarationNo.20844,No.20643,No.23477andNo.23478inthenameofLorenzoPou,f)acopyofthecertificateofdeathofLorenzoPou,g)acopyofthepurportedmarriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City CivilRegistrarofSanCarlosCity,Pangasinan,statingthat therecordsofbirth in thesaidofficeduringtheperiodoffrom1900untilMay1946weretotallydestroyedduringWorldWarII.

On 23 January 2004, theCOMELEC dismissed SPANo. 04003 for lack ofmerit. Three days later, or on 26January2004,Fornierfiledhismotionforreconsideration.Themotionwasdeniedon06February2004bytheCOMELECenbanc.On10February2004,petitionerassailed thedecisionof theCOMELECbefore thisCourtconformablywithRule64,inrelationtoRule65,oftheRevisedRulesofCivilProcedure.Thepetition,docketedG.R.No.161824,likewiseprayedforatemporaryrestrainingorder,awritofpreliminaryinjunctionoranyotherresolutionthatwouldstaythefinalityand/orexecutionoftheCOMELECresolutions.

Theotherpetitions, later consolidatedwithG.R.No.161824,would includeG.R.No.161434,entitled "MariaJeanetteC.Tecson,andFelixB.Desiderio,Jr.,vs.TheCommissiononElections,RonaldAllanKelleyPoe(a.k.a.FernandoPoe,Jr.),andVictorinoX.Fornier,"andtheother,docketedG.R.No.161634,entitled"ZoiloAntonioG. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of theCOMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only theSupremeCourthadoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontoresolvethebasicissueonthecase.

JurisdictionoftheCourt

InG.R.No.161824

InseekingthedisqualificationofthecandidacyofFPJandtohavetheCOMELECdenyduecoursetoorcancelFPJscertificateofcandidacy forallegedmisrepresentationofamaterial fact (i.e., thatFPJwasanaturalborncitizen)beforetheCOMELEC,petitionerFornierinvokedSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCode

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petitionseekingtodenyduecourseortocancelacertificateofcandidacymaybefiledbyanypersonexclusivelyon theground thatanymaterial representationcontained thereinas requiredunderSection74hereof isfalse"

inconsonancewiththegeneralpowersofCOMELECexpressedinSection52oftheOmnibusElectionCode

"Section52.PowersandfunctionsoftheCommissiononElections.InadditiontothepowersandfunctionsconferreduponitbytheConstitution,theCommissionshallhaveexclusivechargeoftheenforcementandadministrationofall lawsrelativetotheconductofelectionsfor thepurposeofensuringfree,orderlyandhonestelections"

andinrelationtoArticle69oftheOmnibusElectionCodewhichwouldauthorize"anyinterestedparty"to

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fileaverifiedpetitiontodenyorcancelthecertificateofcandidacyofanynuisancecandidate.

DecisionsoftheCOMELECondisqualificationcasesmaybereviewedbytheSupremeCourtperRule642 inanaction for certiorari underRule 653 of theRevisedRules ofCivil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987Constitutionalsoreads

"EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofall itsMembersanycaseormatterbroughtbeforeitwithin sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case ormatter is deemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,ormemorandum,requiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself.UnlessotherwiseprovidedbythisConstitutionorby law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court oncertioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromreceiptofacopythereof."

Additionally,Section1,ArticleVIII,ofthesameConstitutionprovidesthatjudicialpowerisvestedinoneSupremeCourt and in such lower courts asmay be established by lawwhich power "includes the duty of the courts ofjustice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and todeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment."

It issufficientlyclear that thepetitionbroughtup inG.R.No.161824wasaptlyelevated to,andcouldwellbetakencognizanceofby, thisCourt.Acontraryviewcouldbeagrossdenial toourpeopleof their fundamentalrighttobefullyinformed,andtomakeaproperchoice,onwhocouldorshouldbeelectedtooccupythehighestgovernmentpostintheland.

InG.R.No.161434andG.R.No.161634

PetitionersTecson,etal., inG.R.No.161434,andVelez, inG.R.No.161634, invoketheprovisionsofArticleVII,Section4,paragraph7,of the1987Constitution inassailing the jurisdictionof theCOMELECwhen it tookcognizance of SPANo. 04003 and in urging theSupremeCourt to instead take on the petitions they directlyinstitutedbeforeit.TheConstitutionalprovisioncitedreads:

"TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose."

Theprovision isan innovationof the1987Constitution.Theomission in the1935and the1973Constitution todesignate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vicepresidential contests, has constrained thisCourttodeclare,inLopezvs.Roxas,4as"not(being)justiciable"controversiesordisputesinvolvingcontestsonthe elections, returns and qualifications of the President or VicePresident. The constitutional lapse promptedCongress,on21June1957, toenactRepublicActNo.1793, "AnActConstitutingan IndependentPresidentialElectoralTribunal toTry,HearandDecideProtestsContestingtheElectionof thePresidentElectandtheVicePresidentElect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793designatedtheChiefJusticeandtheAssociateJusticesoftheSupremeCourttobethemembersofthetribunal.Although thesubsequentadoptionof theparliamentary formofgovernmentunder the1973ConstitutionmighthaveimplicitlyaffectedRepublicActNo.1793,thestatutorysetup,nonetheless,wouldnowbedeemedrevivedunderthepresentSection4,paragraph7,ofthe1987Constitution.

Ordinaryusagewouldcharacterizea"contest"inreferencetoapostelectionscenario.Electioncontestsconsistofeitheranelectionprotestoraquowarrantowhich,althoughtwodistinctremedies,wouldhaveoneobjectiveinview, i.e., todislodge thewinningcandidate fromoffice.Aperusalof thephraseology inRule12,Rule13,andRule14of the"Rulesof thePresidentialElectoralTribunal,"promulgatedbytheSupremeCourtenbancon18April1992,wouldsupportthispremise

"Rule12.Jurisdiction.TheTribunalshallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVicePresidentofthePhilippines.

"Rule13.HowInitiated.AnelectioncontestisinitiatedbythefilingofanelectionprotestorapetitionforquowarrantoagainstthePresidentorVicePresident.Anelectionprotestshallnotincludeapetitionforquowarranto.Apetitionforquowarrantoshallnotincludeanelectionprotest.

"Rule 14. Election Protest. Only the registered candidate for President or for VicePresident of thePhilippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of thePresident or the VicePresident, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of thePresidentialElectoralTribunalwithinthirty(30)daysaftertheproclamationofthewinner."

Therulescategoricallyspeakofthejurisdictionofthetribunalovercontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsof the "President" or "VicePresident", of thePhilippines, andnot of "candidates" forPresident orVicePresident.Aquowarrantoproceedingisgenerallydefinedasbeinganactionagainstapersonwhousurps,

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intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.5 In such context, the election contest can onlycontemplateapostelectionscenario.InRule14,onlyaregisteredcandidatewhowouldhavereceivedeitherthesecondorthirdhighestnumberofvotescouldfileanelectionprotest.Thisruleagainpresupposesapostelectionscenario.

It is fair toconclude that the jurisdictionof theSupremeCourt,definedbySection4,paragraph7,of the1987Constitution,wouldnot includecasesdirectlybroughtbefore it,questioning thequalificationsofacandidate forthepresidencyorvicepresidencybeforetheelectionsareheld.

Accordingly,G.R.No.161434,entitled"MariaJeanetteC.Tecson,etal.,vs.CommissiononElectionsetal.,"andG.R.No.161634,entitled"ZoiloAntonioVelezvs.RonaldAllanKelleyPoea.k.a.FernandoPoe,Jr."wouldhavetobedismissedforwantofjurisdiction.

TheCitizenshipIssue

Now,tothebasicissueitshouldbehelpfultofirstgiveabriefhistoricalbackgroundontheconceptofcitizenship.

Perhaps,theearliestunderstandingofcitizenshipwasthatgivenbyAristotle,who,sometimein384to322B.C.,described the "citizen" to refer to aman who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of anoffice.6Aristotlesaw itssignificance ifonly todetermine theconstituencyof the "State,"whichhedescribedasbeingcomposedofsuchpersonswhowouldbeadequateinnumbertoachieveaselfsufficientexistence.7Theconcept grew to include onewhowould both govern and be governed, forwhich qualifications like autonomy,judgmentand loyaltycouldbeexpected.Citizenshipwasseen todealwith rightsandentitlements,on theonehand,andwithconcomitantobligations,on theother.8 In its idealsetting,acitizenwasactive inpublic lifeandfundamentallywillingtosubmithisprivateintereststothegeneralinterestofsociety.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept waslimited,byand large, tocivil citizenship,whichestablished the rightsnecessary for individual freedom,suchasrightstoproperty,personallibertyandjustice.9Itsmeaningexpandedduringthe19thcenturytoincludepoliticalcitizenship,whichencompassedtherighttoparticipateintheexerciseofpoliticalpower.10The20thcenturysawthenextstageofthedevelopmentofsocialcitizenship,whichlaidemphasisontherightofthecitizentoeconomicwellbeingandsocialsecurity.11TheideaofcitizenshiphasgainedexpressioninthemodernwelfarestateasitsodevelopedinWesternEurope.Anongoingandfinalstageofdevelopment,inkeepingwiththerapidlyshrinkingglobalvillage,mightwellbetheinternationalizationofcitizenship.12

TheLocalSettingfromSpanishTimestothePresent

Therewasnosuch termas "Philippinecitizens"during theSpanish regimebut "subjectsofSpain"or "Spanishsubjects."13 Inchurch records, thenativeswerecalled 'indios',denotinga low regard for the inhabitantsof thearchipelago.Spanishlawsoncitizenshipbecamehighlycodifiedduringthe19thcenturybuttheirsheernumbermadeitdifficulttopointtoonecomprehensivelaw.NotallofthesecitizenshiplawsofSpainhowever,weremadetoapplytothePhilippineIslandsexceptforthoseexplicitlyextendedbyRoyalDecrees.14

Spanish laws on citizenshipwere traced back to theNovisimaRecopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July1805 but as towhether the lawwas extended to thePhilippines remained to be the subject of differing viewsamong experts15 however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in thePhilippines theOrder de laRegencia of 14August 1841,16 theRoyalDecree of 23August 1868 specificallydefiningthepoliticalstatusofchildrenborninthePhilippineIslands,17andfinally,theLeyExtranjeradeUltramarof04July1870,whichwasexpresslymadeapplicabletothePhilippinesbytheRoyalDecreeof13July1870.18

TheSpanishConstitutionof1876wasneverextendedtothePhilippineIslandsbecauseoftheexpressmandateofitsArticle89,accordingtowhichtheprovisionsoftheUltramaramongwhichthiscountrywasincluded,wouldbegovernedbyspeciallaws.19

ItwasonlytheCivilCodeofSpain,madeeffectiveinthisjurisdictionon18December1889,whichcameoutwiththefirstcategoricalenumerationofwhowereSpanishcitizens.

"(a)PersonsborninSpanishterritory,

"(b)ChildrenofaSpanishfatherormother,eveniftheywerebornoutsideofSpain,

"(c)Foreignerswhohaveobtainednaturalizationpapers,

"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of theMonarchy."20

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Theyear1898wasanother turningpoint inPhilippinehistory.Already in thestateofdeclineasasuperpower,Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcomingworld power, the United States. Anacceptedprincipleofinternationallawdictatedthatachangeinsovereignty,whileresultinginanabrogationofallpoliticallawstheninforce,wouldhavenoeffectoncivillaws,whichwouldremainvirtuallyintact.

TheTreatyofPariswasenteredintoon10December1898betweenSpainandtheUnitedStates.21UnderArticleIXof thetreaty, thecivil rightsandpoliticalstatusof thenative inhabitantsof theterritoriescededto theUnitedStateswouldbedeterminedbyitsCongress

"Spanishsubjects,nativesofthePeninsula,residingintheterritoryoverwhichSpainbythepresenttreatyrelinquishesorcedeshersovereigntymayremain insuchterritoryormayremovetherefrom,retaining ineither event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of itsproceedsandtheyshallalsohavetheright tocarryontheir industry,commerce,andprofessions,beingsubjectinrespectthereoftosuchlawsasareapplicabletoforeigners.IncasetheyremainintheterritorytheymaypreservetheirallegiancetotheCrownofSpainbymaking,beforeacourtofrecord,withinayearfromthedateoftheexchangeofratificationsofthistreaty,adeclarationoftheirdecisiontopreservesuchallegianceindefaultofwhichdeclarationtheyshallbeheldtohaverenounceditandtohaveadoptedthenationalityoftheterritoryinwhichtheyreside.

Thus

"Thecivil rightsandpolitical statusof thenative inhabitantsof the territoriesherebyceded to theUnitedStatesshallbedeterminedbytheCongress."22

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, thenative inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become Americancitizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passportsdescribingthemtobecitizensofthePhilippinesentitledtotheprotectionoftheUnitedStates.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, alsocommonlyreferredtoasthePhilippineOrganicActof1902,thefirstcomprehensivelegislationoftheCongressoftheUnitedStatesonthePhilippines

"....thatallinhabitantsofthePhilippineIslandscontinuingtoresidetherein,whowereSpanishsubjectsonthe11thdayofApril,1891,andthenresided insaid Islands,andtheirchildrenbornsubsequent thereto,shallbedeemedandheldtobecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsandassuchentitledtotheprotectionoftheUnitedStates,exceptsuchasshallhaveelectedtopreservetheirallegiancetotheCrownofSpaininaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthetreatyofpeacebetweentheUnitedStatesandSpain,signedatParis,Decembertentheighteenhundredandninetyeight."23

Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one whowas an inhabitant of the Philippines, and aSpanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a nativeborninhabitant, 2) an inhabitantwhowasa native ofPeninsularSpain, and3) an inhabitantwhoobtainedSpanishpapersonorbefore11April1899.24

ControversyaroseontothestatusofchildrenborninthePhilippinesfrom11April1899to01July1902,duringwhich period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated injurisprudentialwritingatthetime,thatthecommonlawprincipleofjussoli,otherwisealsoknownastheprincipleof territoriality, operative in theUnited States andEngland, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelagowithinthatperiod.25Moreaboutthislater.

In23March1912,theCongressoftheUnitedStatesmadethefollowingamendmenttothePhilippineBillof1902

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition ofPhilippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoingprovisions,thenativesofotherinsularpossessionoftheUnitedStates,andsuchotherpersonsresidinginthePhilippineIslandswhowouldbecomecitizensoftheUnitedStates,underthelawsoftheUnitedStates,ifresidingtherein."26

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first timecrystallized.Theword "Filipino"wasusedbyWilliamH.Taft, the firstCivilGovernorGeneral in thePhilippineswhen he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the PhilippineAutonomyAct,alsoknownastheJonesLawrestatedvirtuallytheprovisionsofthePhilippineBillof1902,assoamendedbytheActofCongressin1912

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"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,eighteenhundredandninetynine,andthenresided insaid Islands,andtheirchildrenbornsubsequentlythereto,shallbedeemedandheldtobecitizensofthePhilippineIslands,exceptsuchasshallhaveelectedtopreservetheirallegiancetotheCrownofSpaininaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthetreatyofpeacebetweentheUnitedStatesandSpain,signedatParisDecembertenth,eighteenhundredandninetyeightandexceptsuchothersashavesincebecomecitizensofsomeothercountryProvided,ThatthePhilippineLegislature,hereinprovidedfor,isherebyauthorizedtoprovidefortheacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipbythosenativesof thePhilippineIslandswhodonotcomewithin theforegoingprovisions, thenativesoftheinsularpossessionsoftheUnitedStates,andsuchotherpersonsresidinginthePhilippineIslandswhoarecitizensoftheUnitedStates,orwhocouldbecomecitizensoftheUnitedStatesunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates,ifresidingtherein."

UndertheJonesLaw,anativeborninhabitantofthePhilippineswasdeemedtobeacitizenofthePhilippinesasof11April1899ifhewas1)asubjectofSpainon11April1899,2)residinginthePhilippinesonsaiddate,and,3)sincethatdate,notacitizenofsomeothercountry.

Whiletherewas,atonebrieftime,divergentviewsonwhetherornotjussoliwasamodeofacquiringcitizenship,the 1935Constitution brought to an end to any such linkwith common law, by adopting, once and for all, jussanguinisorbloodrelationshipasbeingthebasisofFilipinocitizenship

"Section1,ArticleIII,1935Constitution.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines

"(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution

"(2)ThoseborninthePhilippinesIslandsofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionofthisConstitution,hadbeenelectedtopublicofficeinthePhilippineIslands.

"(3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.

"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, electPhilippinecitizenship.

"(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw."

Subsection (4),Article III, of the1935Constitution, taken togetherwithexisting civil lawprovisionsat the time,which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreignhusbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting theirFilipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipinomothers to still electFilipinocitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority.Seekingtocorrectthisanomaly,aswellasfullycognizantofthe newly found status of Filipino women as equals tomen, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted theprovisionsofthenewConstitutiononcitizenshiptoreflectsuchconcerns

"Section1,ArticleIII,1973ConstitutionThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:

"(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.

"(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.

"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteenhundredandthirtyfive.


Forgoodmeasure,Section2ofthesamearticlealsofurtherprovidedthat

"AfemalecitizenofthePhilippineswhomarriesanalienretainsherPhilippinecitizenship,unlessbyheractoromissionsheisdeemed,underthelawtohaverenouncedhercitizenship."

The1987Constitutiongenerallyadoptedtheprovisionsofthe1973Constitution,exceptforsubsection(3)thereofthataimedtocorrecttheirregularsituationgeneratedbythequestionableprovisointhe1935Constitution.

SectionI,ArticleIV,1987Constitutionnowprovides:

"ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:

"(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.

"(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.

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"(3)ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajorityand


TheCaseOfFPJ

Section2,ArticleVII,ofthe1987Constitutionexpresses:

"No personmay be electedPresident unless he is a naturalborn citizen of thePhilippines, a registeredvoter,able to readandwrite,at least fortyyearsofageon thedayof theelection,andaresidentof thePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection."

Theterm"naturalborncitizens,"isdefinedtoinclude"thosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship."27

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935Constitution.Throughitshistory,fourmodesofacquiringcitizenshipnaturalization,jussoli,resjudicataandjussanguinis28 had been in vogue.Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a"naturalborn"citizenofthePhilippines.Jussoli,perRoavs.CollectorofCustoms29(1912),didnotlastlong.Withtheadoptionofthe1935ConstitutionandthereversalofRoainTanChongvs.SecretaryofLabor30(1947),jussanguinisorbloodrelationshipwouldnowbecometheprimarybasisofcitizenshipbybirth.

DocumentaryevidenceadducedbypetitionerwouldtendtoindicatethattheearliestestablisheddirectascendantofFPJwashispaternalgrandfatherLorenzoPou,marriedtoMartaReyes,thefatherofAllanF.Poe.WhiletherecordofbirthofLorenzoPouhadnotbeenpresentedinevidence,hisdeathcertificate,however,identifiedhimtobeaFilipino,aresidentofSanCarlos,Pangasinan,and84yearsoldatthetimeofhisdeathon11September1954.ThecertificateofbirthofthefatherofFPJ,AllanF.Poe,showedthathewasbornon17May1915toanEspaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an"uncertified"copyofasupposedcertificateoftheallegedmarriageofAllanF.PoeandPaulitaGomezon05July1936.ThemarriagecertificateofAllanF.PoeandBessieKelleyreflectedthedateoftheirmarriagetobeon16September1940. In thesamecertificate,AllanF.Poewasstatedtobetwentyfiveyearsold,unmarried,andaFilipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twentytwo years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birthcertificateofFPJ,woulddisclosethathewasbornon20August1939toAllanF.Poe,aFilipino,twentyfouryearsold,marriedtoBessieKelly,anAmericancitizen,twentyoneyearsoldandmarried.

Consideringthereservationsmadebythepartiesontheveracityofsomeoftheentriesonthebirthcertificateofrespondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with somedegreeofcertaintyfromthedocumentswouldbethat

1.TheparentsofFPJwereAllanF.PoeandBessieKelley

2.FPJwasborntothemon20August1939

3.AllanF.PoeandBessieKelleyweremarriedtoeachotheron16September,1940

4.ThefatherofAllanF.PoewasLorenzoPoeand

5.Atthetimeofhisdeathon11September1954,LorenzoPoewas84yearsold.

WouldtheabovefactsbesufficientorinsufficienttoestablishthefactthatFPJisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen?ThemarriagecertificateofAllanF.PoeandBessieKelley,thebirthcertificateofFPJ,andthedeathcertificateofLorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have beensubmittedinevidencebybothcontendingpartiesduringtheproceedingsbeforetheCOMELEC.

Thebirth certificate of FPJwasmarkedExhibit "A" for petitioner andExhibit "3" for respondent. ThemarriagecertificateofAllanF.PoetoBessieKelleywassubmittedasExhibit"21"forrespondent.ThedeathcertificateofLorenzoPouwas submittedby respondent ashisExhibit "5."While the last twodocumentswere submitted inevidence for respondent, theadmissibility thereof,particularly in reference to the factswhich theypurported toshow, i.e., themarriage certificate in relation to the date ofmarriageofAllanF.Poe toBessieKelley and thedeathcertificaterelativetothedeathofLorenzoPouon11September1954inSanCarlos,Pangasinan,werealladmitted by petitioner, who had utilized thosematerial statements in his argument. All three documents werecertifiedtruecopiesoftheoriginals.

Section3,Rule130,RulesofCourtstatesthat

"Original document must be produced exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a

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document,noevidenceshallbeadmissibleotherthantheoriginaldocument itself,except inthefollowingcases:

"xxxxxxxxx

"(d)Whentheoriginalisapublicrecordinthecustodyofapublicofficeorisrecordedinapublicoffice."

Beingpublicdocuments,thedeathcertificateofLorenzoPou,themarriagecertificateofAllanF.PoeandBessieKelly,andthebirthcertificateofFPJ,constituteprimafacieproofof theircontents.Section44,Rule130,of theRulesofCourtprovides:

"Entriesinofficialrecords.Entriesinofficialrecordsmadeintheperformanceofhisdutybyapublicofficerof thePhilippines,orbyaperson in theperformanceofadutyspeciallyenjoinedby law,areprima facieevidenceofthefactsthereinstated."

Thetrustworthinessofpublicdocumentsandthevaluegiventotheentriesmadethereincouldbegroundedon1)thesenseofofficialduty in thepreparationof thestatementmade,2) thepenaltywhich isusuallyaffixed toabreachofthatduty,3)theroutineanddisinterestedoriginofmostsuchstatements,and4)thepublicityofrecordwhichmakesmorelikelythepriorexposureofsucherrorsasmighthaveoccurred.31

ThedeathcertificateofLorenzoPouwouldindicatethathediedon11September1954,attheageof84years,inSanCarlos,Pangasinan.ItcouldthusbeassumedthatLorenzoPouwasbornsometimeintheyear1870whenthePhilippineswas still a colony ofSpain.Petitionerwould argue that LorenzoPouwas not in thePhilippinesduringthecrucialperiodoffrom1898to1902consideringthattherewasnoexistingrecordaboutsuchfactintheRecordsManagementandArchivesOffice.Petitioner,however, likewisefailedtoshowthatLorenzoPouwasatanyotherplaceduringthesameperiod.Inhisdeathcertificate,theresidenceofLorenzoPouwasstatedtobeSanCarlos,Pangasinan. In theabsenceofanyevidence to thecontrary, itshouldbesound toconclude,oratleasttopresume,thattheplaceofresidenceofapersonatthetimeofhisdeathwasalsohisresidencebeforedeath.ItwouldbeextremelydoubtfuliftheRecordsManagementandArchivesOfficewouldhavehadcompleterecordsofallresidentsofthePhilippinesfrom1898to1902.

ProofofPaternityandFiliation

UnderCivilLaw.

Petitionersubmits,inanycase,thatinestablishingfiliation(relationshiporcivilstatusofthechildtothefather[ormother])orpaternity (relationshipor civil statusof the father to thechild)ofan illegitimatechild,FPJevidentlybeinganillegitimatesonaccordingtopetitioner,themandatoryrulesundercivillawmustbeused.

UndertheCivilCodeofSpain,whichwasinforceinthePhilippinesfrom08December1889upuntilthedaypriorto30August1950whentheCivilCodeofthePhilippinestookeffect,acknowledgmentwasrequiredtoestablishfiliation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsoryacknowledgmentwaspossibleonly ifdoneduringthe lifetimeof theputativeparentvoluntaryacknowledgmentcouldonlybehadinarecordofbirth,awill,orapublicdocument.32ComplementarytothenewcodewasActNo.3753ortheCivilRegistryLawexpressinginSection5thereof,that

"Incaseofanillegitimatechild,thebirthcertificateshallbesignedandsworntojointlybytheparentsoftheinfantoronlyby themother if the father refuses. In the lattercase, itshallnotbepermissible tostateorrevealinthedocumentthenameofthefatherwhorefusestoacknowledgethechild,ortogivethereinanyinformationbywhichsuchfathercouldbeidentified."

Inorderthatthebirthcertificatecouldthenbeutilizedtoprovevoluntaryacknowledgmentoffiliationorpaternity,thecertificatewasrequiredtobesignedorsworntobythefather.Thefailureofsuchrequirementrenderedthesameuselessasbeinganauthoritativedocumentofrecognition.33InMendozavs.Mella,34theCourtruled

"SinceRodolfowasbornin1935,aftertheregistrylawwasenacted,thequestionherereallyiswhetherornothisbirthcertificate(Exhibit1),whichismerelyacertifiedcopyoftheregistryrecord,mayberelieduponas sufficient proof of his havingbeen voluntarily recognized.No such reliance, in our judgment,maybeplaced upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed theoriginal, letaloneswore to itscontentsas required inSection5ofActNo.3753.Forall thatmighthavehappened,itwasnoteventheyoreitherofthemwhofurnishedthedatatobeenteredinthecivilregister.Petitionerssaythatinanyeventthebirthcertificateisinthenatureofapublicdocumentwhereinvoluntaryrecognitionofanaturalchildmayalsobemade,according to thesameArticle131.Trueenough,but insuchacase,theremustbeaclearstatementinthedocumentthattheparentrecognizesthechildashisorherown."

InthebirthcertificateofrespondentFPJ,presentedbybothparties,nowhereinthedocumentwasthesignature

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ofAllan F. Poe found. There being nowill apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, bydecedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other publicdocument."InParejavs.Pareja,35thisCourtdefinedwhatcouldconstitutesuchadocumentasproofofvoluntaryacknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by privateindividuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials byreason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by whichrecognitionmaybemadebelongstothefirstclass."

Letusleaveitatthatforthemoment.

The1950CivilCodecategorizedtheacknowledgmentorrecognitionofillegitimatechildrenintovoluntary,legalorcompulsory.Voluntaryrecognitionwasrequiredtobeexpressedlymadeinarecordofbirth,awill,astatementbefore a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full bloodbrothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsoryacknowledgmentcouldbedemandedgenerally incaseswhen thechildhad inhis favoranyevidence toprovefiliation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might passexceptionallytotheheirsofthechild,anactiontoclaimacknowledgment,however,couldonlybebroughtduringthelifetimeofthepresumedparent.

AmicusCuriaeRubenF.Balanedefined,duringtheoralargument,"authenticwriting,"soastobeanauthenticwritingforpurposesofvoluntaryrecognition,simplyasbeingagenuineor indubitablewritingof thefather.Thetermwouldincludeapublicinstrument(onedulyacknowledgedbeforeanotarypublicorothercompetentofficial)oraprivatewritingadmittedbythefathertobehis.

TheFamilyCodehasfurtherliberalizedtherulesArticle172,Article173,andArticle175provide:

"Art.172.Thefiliationoflegitimatechildrenisestablishedbyanyofthefollowing:

"(1)Therecordofbirthappearinginthecivilregisterorafinaljudgmentor

"(2)Anadmissionoflegitimatefiliationinapublicdocumentoraprivatehandwritteninstrumentandsignedbytheparentconcerned.

"Intheabsenceoftheforegoingevidence,thelegitimatefiliationshallbeprovedby:

"(1)Theopenandcontinuouspossessionofthestatusofalegitimatechildor

"(2)AnyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourtandspeciallaws.

"Art.173.Theactiontoclaimlegitimacymaybebroughtbythechildduringhisorherlifetimeandshallbetransmittedtotheheirsshouldthechilddieduringminorityorinastateofinsanity.Inthesecases,theheirsshallhaveaperiodoffiveyearswithinwhichtoinstitutetheaction.

"Theactionalreadycommencedbythechildshallsurvivenotwithstandingthedeathofeitherorbothoftheparties.

"xxxxxxxxx.

"Art. 175. Illegitimate childrenmay establish their illegitimate filiation in the sameway and on the same,evidenceaslegitimatechildren.

"The actionmust be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action isbasedonthesecondparagraphofArticle172,inwhichcasetheactionmaybebroughtduringthelifetimeoftheallegedparent."

TheprovisionsoftheFamilyCodeareretroactivelyappliedArticle256ofthecodereads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested oracquiredrightsinaccordancewiththeCivilCodeorotherlaws."

Thus,inVda.deSyQuiavs.CourtofAppeals,36theCourthasruled:

"WeholdthatwhetherJosewasavoluntarilyrecognizednaturalchildshouldbedecidedunderArticle278of theCivilCodeof thePhilippines.Article2260of thatCodeprovidesthat 'thevoluntaryrecognitionofanaturalchildshalltakeplaceaccordingtothisCode,evenifthechildwasbornbeforetheeffectivityofthisbodyoflaws'orbeforeAugust30,1950.Hence,Article278maybegivenretroactiveeffect."

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It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimatechildrenisanattempttobreakawayfromthetraditionalideaofkeepingwellapartlegitimateandnonlegitimaterelationshipswithinthefamilyinfavorofthegreaterinterestandwelfareofthechild.Theprovisionsareintendedtomerelygoverntheprivateandpersonalaffairsofthefamily.Thereislittle,ifany,toindicatethatthelegitimateorillegitimatecivilstatusoftheindividualwouldalsoaffecthispoliticalrightsor,ingeneral,hisrelationshiptotheState.While,indeed,provisionson"citizenship"couldbefoundintheCivilCode,suchprovisionsmustbetakeninthecontextofprivaterelations,thedomainofcivillawparticularly

"Civil Law is that branch of lawwhich has for its double purpose the organization of the family and theregulationofproperty.Ithasthus[been]definedasthemassofpreceptswhichdetermineandregulatetherelationsofassistance,authorityandobedienceamongmembersofafamily,andthosewhichexistamongmembersofasocietyfortheprotectionofprivateinterests."37

InYaezdeBarnuevovs.Fuster,38theCourthasheld:

"InaccordancewithArticle9oftheCivilCodeofSpain,xxxthelawsrelatingtofamilyrightsandduties,orto thestatus,conditionand legalcapacityofpersons,governSpaniardsalthoughtheyreside ina foreigncountrythat,inconsequence,'allquestionsofacivilnature,suchasthosedealingwiththevalidityornullityof the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, theseparationoftheirproperties,therulesgoverningproperty,maritalauthority,divisionofconjugalproperty,theclassificationoftheirproperty,legalcausesfordivorce,theextentofthelatter,theauthoritytodecreeit,and,ingeneral,thecivileffectsofmarriageanddivorceuponthepersonsandpropertiesofthespouses,arequestionsthataregovernedexclusivelybythenationallawofthehusbandandwife."

Therelevanceof"citizenship"or"nationality"toCivilLawisbestexemplifiedinArticle15oftheCivilCode,statingthat

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons arebindinguponcitizensofthePhilippines,eventhoughlivingabroad"

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship.Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,39 such as onsuccessional rightsand family relations.40 In adoption, for instance, anadopted childwouldbe considered thechildofhisadoptiveparentsandaccordedthesamerightsastheirlegitimatechildbutsuchlegalfictionextendedonlytodefinehisrightsundercivillaw41andnothispoliticalstatus.

Civillawprovisionspointtoanobviousbiasagainstillegitimacy.ThisdiscriminatoryattitudemaybetracedtotheSpanish family andproperty laws,which,while definingproprietary and successional rights ofmembers of thefamily, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In themonarchial setup of oldSpain,thedistributionandinheritanceoftitlesandwealthwerestrictlyaccordingtobloodlinesandtheconcerntokeepthesebloodlinesuncontaminatedbyforeignbloodwasparamount.

ThesedistinctionsbetweenlegitimacyandillegitimacywerecodifiedintheSpanishCivilCode,andtheinvidiousdiscrimination survivedwhen the SpanishCivil Code became the primary source of our ownCivil Code. Suchdistinction,however,remainsandshouldremainonlyinthesphereofcivillawandnotundulyimpedeorimpingeonthedomainofpoliticallaw.

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemedindependentfromandnotinextricablytiedupwiththatprescribedforcivillawpurposes.TheCivilCodeorFamilyCodeprovisionsonproofof filiationorpaternity,althoughgood law,donothavepreclusiveeffectsonmattersalientopersonalandfamilyrelations.Theordinaryrulesonevidencecouldwellandshouldgovern.Forinstance,thematteraboutpedigree isnotnecessarilyprecluded frombeingapplicableby theCivilCodeorFamilyCodeprovisions.

Section39,Rule130,oftheRulesofCourtprovides

"ActorDeclarationaboutpedigree.Theactordeclarationofapersondeceased,orunable to testify, inrespecttothepedigreeofanotherpersonrelatedtohimbybirthormarriage,maybereceivedinevidencewhere it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown byevidenceother thansuchactordeclaration.Theword`pedigree includesrelationship, familygenealogy,birth,marriage,death, thedateswhenandtheplaceswhere thesefactsoccurred,andthenamesof therelatives.Itembracesalsofactsoffamilyhistoryintimatelyconnectedwithpedigree."

Fortheaboveruletoapply,itwouldbenecessarythat(a)thedeclarantisalreadydeadorunabletotestify,(b)thepedigreeofapersonmustbeatissue,(c)thedeclarantmustbearelativeofthepersonwhosepedigreeisinquestion,(d)declarationmustbemadebeforethecontroversyhasoccurred,and(e)therelationshipbetweenthe

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declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act ordeclaration.

Thus, thedulynotarizeddeclarationmadebyRubyKelleyMangahas,sisterofBessieKelleyPoesubmittedasExhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his ownpaternalrelationshipwithFPJ,i.e,livingtogetherwithBessieKelleyandhischildren(includingrespondentFPJ)inonehouse,andasonefamily

"I,RubyKelleyMangahas,oflegalageandsoundmind,presentlyresidinginStockton,California,U.S.A.,afterbeingsworninaccordancewithlawdoherebydeclarethat:

"1.IamthesisterofthelateBessieKelleyPoe.

"2.BessieKelleyPoewasthewifeofFernandoPoe,Sr.

"3.FernandoandBessiePoehadasonby thenameofRonaldAllanPoe,morepopularlyknown in thePhilippinesas`FernandoPoe,Jr.,or`FPJ.

"4.RonaldAllanPoe`FPJwasbornonAugust20,1939atSt.Luke'sHospital,MagdalenaStreet,Manila.

"xxxxxxxxx

"7. FernandoPoeSr., andmy sisterBessie,met andbecameengagedwhile theywere students at theUniversityof thePhilippines in1936. Iwasalso introduced toFernandoPoe,Sr.,bymysister thatsameyear.

"8.FernandoPoe,Sr.,andmysisterBessiehadtheirfirstchildin1938.

"9.FernandoPoe,Sr.,mysisterBessieandtheirfirstthreechildren,Elizabeth,Ronald,AllanandFernandoII,andmyself livedtogetherwithourmotheratourfamily'shouseonDakotaSt.(nowJorgeBocoboSt.),MalateuntiltheliberationofManilain1945,exceptforsomemonthsbetween19431944.

"10.FernandoPoe,Sr.,andmysister,Bessie,wereblessedwithfour(4)morechildrenafterRonaldAllanPoe.

"xxxxxxxxx

"18.IamexecutingthisDeclarationtoattesttothefactthatmynephew,RonaldAllanPoeisanaturalbornFilipino,andthatheisthelegitimatechildofFernandoPoe,Sr.

"DoneinCityofStockton,California,U.S.A.,this12thdayofJanuary2004.

RubyKelleyMangahasDeclarantDNATesting

Incaseproofoffiliationorpaternitywouldbeunlikelytosatisfactorilyestablishorwouldbedifficulttoobtain,DNAtesting,whichexaminesgeneticcodesobtainedfrombodycellsoftheillegitimatechildandanyphysicalresidueof the longdeadparentcouldbe resorted to.Apositivematchwouldclearup filiationorpaternity. InTijing vs.CourtofAppeals,42thisCourthasacknowledgedthestrongweightofDNAtesting

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific waysavailable.Fortunately,wehavenowthe facilityandexpertise inusingDNAtest for identificationandparentagetesting.TheUniversityofthePhilippinesNaturalScienceResearchInstitute(UPNSRI)DNAAnalysisLaboratoryhasnowthecapabilitytoconductDNAtypingusingshorttandemrepeat(STR)analysis.Theanalysisisbasedonthe fact that theDNAof a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from themother and the other from thefather.TheDNAfromthemother,theallegedfatherandthechildareanalyzedtoestablishparentage.Ofcourse,beinganovelscientific technique, theuseofDNAtestasevidence isstillopentochallenge.Eventually,as theappropriatecasecomes,courtsshouldnothesitatetoruleontheadmissibilityofDNAevidence.Foritwassaid,thatcourtsshouldapplytheresultsofsciencewhencompetentlyobtainedinaidofsituationspresented,sincetorejectsaidresultistodenyprogress."

PetitionersArgumentForJurisprudentialConclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted hiscitizenshiptorespondentFPJ,thelatterbeinganillegitimatechild.Accordingtopetitioner,priortohismarriagetoBessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making hissubsequentmarriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of thesupposedcertificateofmarriagebetweenAllanF.PoeandPaulitaGomezcouldbemostdoubtfulatbest.Butthedocumentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of

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respondentandamarriagecertificateofhisparentsshowedthatFPJwasbornon20August1939toaFilipinofatherandanAmericanmotherwhoweremarriedtoeachotherayearlater,oron16September1940.BirthtounmarriedparentswouldmakeFPJanillegitimatechild.Petitionercontendedthatasanillegitimatechild,FPJsofollowed thecitizenshipofhismother,BessieKelley,anAmericancitizen,basinghisstandon the rulingof thisCourtinMoranovs.Vivo,43citingChiongbianvs.deLeo44andSerravs.Republic.45

Ontheabovescore,thedisquisitionmadebyamicuscuriaeJoaquinG.Bernas,SJ,ismostconvincinghestates

"Wemustanalyzethesecasesandaskwhatthelismotawasineachofthem.IfthepronouncementoftheCourton jussanguiniswason the lismota, thepronouncementwouldbeadecisionconstitutingdoctrineundertheruleofstaredecisis.Butifthepronouncementwasirrelevanttothelismota,thepronouncementwould not be a decision but amere obiter dictumwhich did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite theCourttolookcloselyintothesecases.

"First,Morano vs. Vivo. The casewas not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about astepsonofaFilipino,astepsonwhowas thechildofaChinesemotherandaChinese father.The issuewaswhether thestepson followed thenaturalizationof thestepfather.Nothingabout jussanguinis there.Thestepsondidnothavethebloodofthenaturalizedstepfather.

"Second,Chiongbianvs.deLeon.Thiscasewasnotabout the illegitimatesonofaFilipinofather. Itwasabout a legitimate son of a fatherwho had becomeFilipino by election to public office before the 1935ConstitutionpursuanttoArticleIV,Section1(2)ofthe1935Constitution.Noonewasillegitimatehere.

"Third,Serravs.Republic.Thecasewasnotabout the illegitimatesonofaFilipino father.SerrawasanillegitimatechildofaChinesefatherandaFilipinomother.TheissuewaswhetheronewhowasalreadyaFilipinobecauseofhismotherwhostillneededtobenaturalized.Thereisnothingthereaboutinvidiousjussanguinis.

"Finally,Paavs.Chan.46This isamorecomplicatedcase.Thecasewasabout thecitizenshipofQuintinChanwhowasthesonofLeoncioChan.QuintinChanclaimedthathisfather,Leoncio,wastheillegitimateson of aChinese father and aFilipinomother.Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship fromLeoncio,hisfather.ButtheSupremeCourtsaidthattherewasnovalidproofthatLeonciowasinfactthesonofaFilipinamother.TheCourt thereforeconcludedthatLeonciowasnotFilipino. IfLeonciowasnotFilipino,neitherwashissonQuintin.QuintinthereforewasnotonlynotanaturalbornFilipinobutwasnotevenaFilipino.

"TheCourtshouldhavestoppedthere.Butinsteaditfollowedwithanobiterdictum.TheCourtsaidobiterthat even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin wasillegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutelyunnecessaryforthecase.xxxItwasobiterdictum,pureandsimple,simplyrepeatingtheobiterdictuminMoranovs.Vivo.

"xxxxxxxxx

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncementwould have no textual foundation in theConstitution, itwouldalsoviolatetheequalprotectionclauseoftheConstitutionnotoncebuttwice.First,itwouldmakeanillegitimate distinction betweena legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, itwouldmake anillegitimatedistinctionbetweentheillegitimatechildofaFilipinofatherandtheillegitimatechildofaFilipinomother.

"Thedoctrineonconstitutionallyallowabledistinctionswasestablished longagobyPeoplevs.Cayat.47 Iwould grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on realdifferences.xxxButrealdifferencesalonedonotjustifyinvidiousdistinction.Realdifferencesmayjustifydistinctionforonepurposebutnotforanotherpurpose.

"x x xWhat is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service?What possible stateinterestcantherebefordisqualifyinganillegitimatechildfrombecomingapublicofficer.Itwasnotthefaultof thechildthathisparentshadillicit liaison.Whydeprivethechildof thefullnessofpoliticalrightsfornofaultofhisown?Todisqualifyanillegitimatechildfromholdinganimportantpublicofficeistopunishhimfortheindiscretionofhisparents.Thereisneitherjusticenorrationalityinthat.Andifthereisneitherjusticenorrationality inthedistinction,thenthedistinctiontransgressestheequalprotectionclauseandmustbereprobated."

Theotheramicicuriae,Mr.JusticeVicenteMendoza(aformermemberofthisCourt),ProfessorRubenBalaneand Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunatelyhingingsolelyonpureobiterdicta,shouldindeedfail.

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Where jurisprudence regardedan illegitimatechildas takingafter thecitizenshipof itsmother, itdidso for thebenefit thechild. Itwas toensureaFilipinonationality for the illegitimatechildofanalien father in linewith theassumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support herillegitimatechild.Itwastohelpthechild,nottoprejudiceordiscriminateagainsthim.

The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, thefundamental lawprevailingon theday,monthandyearofbirthof respondentFPJ,canneverbemoreexplicitthan it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of thePhilippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification toprescribeconditionsordistinctionswherethereclearlyarenoneprovided.

InSum

(1)TheCourt,intheexerciseofitspowerofjudicialreview,possessesjurisdictionoverthepetitioninG.R.No.161824,filedunderRule64, inrelationtoRule65,oftheRevisedRulesofCivilProcedure.G.R.No.161824assailstheresolutionoftheCOMELECforallegedgraveabuseofdiscretionindismissing,forlackofmerit, thepetition inSPANo.04003whichhasprayedfor thedisqualificationof respondentFPJfromrunningforthepositionofPresidentinthe10thMay2004nationalelectionsonthecontentionthatFPJhascommittedmaterial representation inhis certificateof candidacyby representinghimself tobeanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.

(2)TheCourtmustdismiss,for lackof jurisdictionandprematurity,thepetitionsinG.R.No.161434andNo.161634bothhavingbeendirectlyelevatedto thisCourt in the latterscapacityas theonly tribunal toresolveapresidentialandvicepresidentialelectioncontestunder theConstitution.Evidently, theprimaryjurisdictionoftheCourtcandirectlybeinvokedonlyafter,notbefore,theelectionsareheld.

(3) In ascertaining, inG.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by theCOMELEC,itisnecessarytotakeonthematterofwhetherornotrespondentFPJisanaturalborncitizen,which,inturn,dependedonwhetherornotthefatherofrespondent,AllanF.Poe,wouldhavehimselfbeenaFilipinocitizenand,intheaffirmative,whetherornottheallegedillegitimacyofrespondentpreventshimfromtakingaftertheFilipinocitizenshipofhisputativefather.AnyconclusionontheFilipinocitizenshipofLorenzoPoucouldonlybedrawnfromthepresumptionthathavingdiedin1954at84yearsold,Lorenzowouldhavebeenbornsometimeintheyear1870,whenthePhilippineswasunderSpanishrule,andthatSan Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any otherevidence, couldhavewell beenhisplaceof residencebeforedeath, such thatLorenzoPouwouldhavebenefitedfromthe"enmasseFilipinization"thatthePhilippineBillhadeffectedin1902.Thatcitizenship(ofLorenzoPou), ifacquired,would therebyextend tohisson,AllanF.Poe, fatherof respondentFPJ.The1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to allpersons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate orillegitimate.

(4)Butwhile the totalityof theevidencemaynotestablishconclusively that respondentFPJ isanaturalborncitizenof thePhilippines, theevidenceonhandstillwouldpreponderate inhis favorenough toholdthathecannotbeheldguiltyofhavingmadeamaterialmisrepresentationinhiscertificateofcandidacyinviolationofSection78,inrelationtoSection74,oftheOmnibusElectionCode.Petitionerhasutterlyfailedto substantiate his case before theCourt, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties topresent their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been materialmisrepresentation,which,asso ruled inRomualdezMarcosvs.COMELEC,48mustnotonlybematerial,butalsodeliberateandwillful.

WHEREFORE,theCourtRESOLVEStoDISMISS

1.G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria JeanetteC. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versusCommission onElections,RonaldAllanKelleyPoe (a.k.a. "FernandoPoe, Jr.,) andVictorinoX. Fornier,Respondents,"andG.R.No.161634,entitled"ZoiloAntonioVelez,Petitioner,versusRonaldAllanKelleyPoe,a.k.a.FernandoPoe,Jr.,Respondent,"forwantofjurisdiction.

2.G.R.No.161824,entitled "VictorinoX.Fornier,Petitioner, versusHon.CommissiononElectionsandRonaldAllanKelleyPoe,alsoknownasFernandoPoe,Jr.,"forfailuretoshowgraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartofrespondentCommissiononElectionsindismissingthepetitioninSPANo.04003.

NoCosts.

SOORDERED.

Davide,Jr.,C.J.,seeseparateopinion,concurring.Puno,J.,onleavebutwasallowedtovoteseeseparateopinion.

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Panganiban,J.,onofficialleaveallowedtovotebutdidnotsendhisvoteonthematter.Quisumbing,J.,joinsthedissentofJusticesTingaandMoralescaseshouldhavebeenremanded.YnaresSantiago,J.,concursandalsowithJ.Punosseparateopinion.SandovalGutierrez,J.,concurs,pleaseseeseparateopinion.Carpio,J.,seedissentingopinion.AustriaMartinez,J.,concurs,pleaseseeseparateopinion.Corona,J.,joinsthedissentingopinionofJusticeMorales.CarpioMorales,J.,seedissentingopinion.Callejo,Sr.,J.,pleaseseeconcurringopinion.Azcuna,J.,concursinaseparateopinion.Tinga,J.,dissentsperseparateopinion.

SEPARATEOPINION

DAVIDE,JR.C.J.:

Theproceduralandfactualantecedentsoftheseconsolidatedcasesareasfollows:

On 9 January 2004, petitioner Victorino X. Fornier filed with public respondent Commission on Elections(COMELEC)a petition to disqualify private respondentFernandoPoe, Jr. (FPJ) and to denydue course to orcancel his certificate of candidacy for the position of President in the forthcoming 10 May 2004 presidentialelections. As a ground therefore, he averred that FPJ committed falsity in a material representation in hiscertificateofcandidacy indeclaring thathe isanaturalbornFilipinocitizenwhen in truthand in facthe isnot,sinceheistheillegitimatesonofBessieKelley,anAmericancitizen,andAllanPoe,aSpanishnational.ThecasewasdocketedasCOMELECCaseSPANo.04003andassignedtotheCOMELECsFirstDivision.

AtthehearingbeforetheFirstDivisionoftheCOMELEC,petitionerFornierofferedFPJsrecordofbirthtoprovethatFPJwasbornon20August1939toBessieKelley,anAmericancitizen,andAllanPoe,whowasthenmarriedtoPaulitaGomez.Upontheotherhand,FPJtriedtoestablishthathisfatherwasaFilipinocitizenwhoseparents,althoughSpanish nationals,wereFilipino citizens.He adduced in evidence a copy of themarriage contract ofAllanPoeandBessieKelley,showingthattheyweremarriedon16September1940inManila.

InitsResolutionof23January2004,theFirstDivisionoftheCOMELECdismissedCOMELECCaseSPANo.04003forlackofmerit.ItdeclaredthatCOMELECsjurisdictionislimitedtoallmattersrelatingtoelection,returnsand qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, but not those of national officials like thePresident.Ithas,however,jurisdictiontopassupontheissueofcitizenshipofnationalofficialsunderSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCodeonpetitionstodenyduecourseorcancelcertificatesofcandidacyonthegroundthat any material representation contained therein is false. It found that the evidence adduced by petitionerFornierisnotsubstantial,andthatFPJdidnotcommitanyfalsehoodinmaterialrepresentationwhenhestatedinhiscertificateofcandidacythatheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.

HismotionforreconsiderationfiledbeforetheCOMELECenbanchavingbeendenied,petitionerFornierfiledapetitionwiththisCourt,whichwasdocketedasG.R.No.161824.

Meanwhile,petitionersMariaJeanetteC.TecsonandFelixB.Desiderio,Jr.cametothisCourtviaaspecialcivilaction for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 161434, to challenge thejurisdiction of the COMELEC over the issue of the citizenship of FPJ. They assert that only this Court hasjurisdiction over the issue in light of the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, whichprovides:

TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbe thesole judgeofallcontests relating to theelection returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose.

On29January2004petitionerVelezfiledasimilarpetition,whichwasdocketedasG.R.No.161634.

Thecoreissuesintheseconsolidatedcases,asdefinedbytheCourtduringtheoralargument,areasfollows:

(1)Whether theCOMELEChas jurisdictionoverpetitions todenyduecourse toor cancel certificatesofcandidacyofPresidentialcandidates

(2)Whether theSupremeCourthas jurisdictionover thepetitionsof(a)Tecson,etal., (b)Velez,and(c)Fornierand

(3)WhetherrespondentFPJisaFilipinocitizen,andifso,whetherheisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.

Theseconsolidatedpetitionsmustbedismissed.

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BoththepetitionsofTecsonandVelezinvokethejurisdictionofthisCourtasprovidedforinthelastparagraphofSection4ofArticleVIIoftheConstitution,andraisetheissueoftheineligibilityofacandidateforPresidentonthegroundthatheisnotanaturalborncitizenof thePhilippines.TheactionscontemplatedinthesaidprovisionoftheConstitutionarepostelection remedies,namely, regularelectioncontestsandquowarranto.Thepetitionershould have, instead, resorted to preelection remedies, such as those prescribed in Section 68(Disqualifications), in relation toSection72Section69(Nuisancecandidates)andSection78(Petition todenycoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy),inrelationtoSection74,oftheOmnibusElectionCode,whichareimplemented in Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These preelection remedies oractionsdonot,however,fallwithintheoriginaljurisdictionofthisCourt.

Under the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC has the originaljurisdictiontodetermineinanappropriateproceedingwhetheracandidateforanelectiveofficeiseligiblefortheoffice for which he filed his certificate of candidacy or is disqualified to be a candidate or to continue suchcandidacybecauseofanyoftherecognizedgroundsfordisqualification.ItsjurisdictionoverCOMELECSPANo.04003is,therefore,beyondquestion.

Upon the other hand, this Court has jurisdiction over Forniers petition (G.R. No. 161824) under Section 7 ofArticleIXAoftheConstitution,whichprovides:

Section7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseormatterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.Acaseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingof thelastpleading,brief,ormemorandumrequiredbytherulesof theCommissionorbytheCommissionitself.UnlessotherwiseprovidedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought to theSupremeCourtoncertioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromreceiptofacopythereof.

ThisCourtcanalsotakecognizanceoftheissueofwhethertheCOMELECcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictioninissuingthechallengedresolutioninCOMELECSPANo.04003byvirtueofSection1ofArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,whichreadsasfollows:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may beestablishedbylaw.

Judicialpower includes thedutyof thecourtsof justice tosettleactual controversies involving rightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofnaybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.

On the issueofwhetherprivate respondentFPJ isanaturalbornFilipinocitizen, the following factshavebeenestablishedbyaweightypreponderanceofevidenceeitherinthepleadingsandthedocumentsattachedtheretoorfromtheadmissionsoftheparties,throughtheircounsels,duringtheoralarguments:

1.FPJwasbornon20August1939inManila,Philippines.

2.FPJwasborntoAllanPoeandBessieKelley.

3.BessieKelleyandAllanPoeweremarriedon16September1940.

4.AllanPoewasaFilipinobecausehis father,LorenzoPoe,albeitaSpanishsubject,wasnotshown tohavedeclaredhisallegiancetoSpainbyvirtueoftheTreatyofParisandthePhilippineBillof1902.

FromtheforegoingitisclearthatrespondentFPJwasbornbeforethemarriageofhisparents.Thus,pursuanttotheCivilCodetheninforce,hecouldeitherbe(a)anaturalchildifbothhisparentshadnolegalimpedimentstomarryeachotheror (b)an illegitimatechild if, indeed,AllanPoewasmarried toanotherwomanwhowasstillaliveatthetimeFPJwasborn.

Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around theillegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a nonissue. For purposes of thecitizenshipofan illegitimatechildwhose father isaFilipinoandwhosemother isanalien,proofofpaternityorfiliationisenoughforthechildtofollowthecitizenshipofhisputativefather,asadvancedbyFr.JoaquinBernas,one of the amici curiae. Since paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the COMELECcommittednograveabuseofdiscretioninholdingthatFPJisaFilipinocitizen,pursuanttoparagraph3ofSection1ofArticleIVofthe1935Constitution,whichreads:

Section1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:

(3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.

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IagreewiththeamicicuriaethatthisprovisionmakesnodistinctionbetweenlegitimateandillegitimatechildrenofFilipino fathers. It is enough that filiation is establishedor that the child is acknowledgedor recognizedby thefather.

DISSENTINGOPINION

CARPIO,J.:

Idissentfromthemajorityopinion.

TheAntecedentProceedings

Petitioner Fornier filed before the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") a "Petition for Disqualification ofPresidentialCandidateRonaldAllanKelleyPoea.k.a.FernandoPoe,Jr."onthegroundthatFernandoPoe,Jr.("FPJ") is not a naturalborn Philippine citizen. The Comelec First Division dismissed the petition, ruling thatpetitioner failed to present substantial evidence that FPJ committed "any material misrepresentation when hestated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a naturalborn citizen." On motion for reconsideration, theComelecEnBancaffirmed the rulingof theFirstDivision.PetitionerForniernowassails theComelecEnBancresolutionunderRule64inrelationtoRule65oftheRulesofCourt.

TheUndisputedFacts

The undisputed facts are based on two documents and the admission of FPJ. The first document is theBirthCertificateofFPJ,showinghewasbornon20August1939.TheBirthCertificate isanevidenceofFPJ.[1]TheseconddocumentistheMarriageCertificateofAllanF.PoeandBessieKelley,showingthattheirmarriagetookplaceon16September1940.TheMarriageCertificateisalsoanevidenceofFPJ.[2]Moreover,FPJadmitsthathismotherBessieKelleywasanAmericancitizen.[3]

Basedon these twodocumentsandadmission, theundisputed factsare: (1)FPJwasbornoutofwedlockandthereforeillegitimate,[4]and(2)themotherofFPJwasanAmericancitizen.

TheIssues

TheissuesraisedinFornierspetitionare:

(a)WhethertheCourthasjurisdictionoverthepetitiontodisqualifyFPJasacandidateforPresidentonthegroundthatFPJisnotanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen

(b)WhetherFPJisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.

Jurisdiction

TheComelechasjurisdictiontodetermineinitiallythequalificationsofallcandidates.UnderSection2(1),ArticleIXC of the Constitution, the Comelec has the power and function to "[E]nforce and administer all laws andregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection."TheinitialdeterminationofwhoarequalifiedtofilecertificatesofcandidacieswiththeComelecclearlyfallswithinthisallencompassingconstitutionalmandateoftheComelec.Theconductofanelectionnecessarilyincludestheinitialdeterminationofwhoarequalifiedunderexistinglawstorun for public office in an election. Otherwise, the Comelecs certified list of candidates will be cluttered withunqualifiedcandidatesmakingtheconductofelectionsunmanageable.Forthisreason,theComelecweedsoutevery presidential election dozens of candidates for president who are deemed nuisance candidates by theComelec.[5]

Section2(3),ArticleIXCoftheConstitutionalsoempowerstheComelecto"[D]ecide,exceptthoseinvolvingtheright to vote, all questions affecting elections x x x." The power to decide "all questions affecting elections"necessarily includes thepower to decidewhether a candidate possesses thequalifications requiredby law forelectiontopublicoffice.ThisbroadconstitutionalpowerandfunctionvestedintheComelecisdesignedpreciselytoavoidanysituationwhereadisputeaffectingelectionsisleftwithoutanylegalremedy.IfonewhoisobviouslynotanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen,likeArnoldSchwarzenneger,runsforPresident,theComeleciscertainlynotpowerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until after theelectionsbeforesuchcandidatemaybedisqualified.

Under Rule 25 on "Disqualification of Candidates" of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a voter may questionbeforetheComelecthequalificationsofanycandidateforpublicoffice.Thus,Rule25provides:

Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of acandidateasprovided forby theConstitutionorbyexisting laworwhocommitsanyactdeclaredby law tobegroundsfordisqualificationmaybedisqualifiedfromcontinuingasacandidate.

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Section2.WhoMayFilePetitionforDisqualification.Anycitizenofvotingage,ordulyregisteredpoliticalparty,organization or coalition of political partiesmay file with the Law Department of the Commission a petition todisqualifyacandidateongroundsprovidedbylaw.(Emphasissupplied)

TheComelecadopteditsRulesofProcedurepursuantto itsconstitutionalpowertopromulgate itsownrulesofprocedure[6]toexpeditethedispositionofcasesorcontroversiesfallingwithinitsjurisdiction.

TheComelechasruledupon thequalificationsofcandidates,even if theConstitutionprovides thatsomeotherbody shall be the "sole judge" of thequalificationsof theholders of thepublic offices involved.TheCourt hasupheldthejurisdictionofComelectoissuesuchrulings,[7]evenwhentheissueisthecitizenshipofacandidate.[8] Thus, theComelec has jurisdiction to determine initially if FPJmeets the citizenship qualification to run forPresident.

However,theComelecEnBanc,initsscantyresolution,failedtostatethefactualbasesofitsruling.TheComelecEnBancalsofailedtoruleconclusivelyontheissuepresentedwhetherFPJisanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen.The Comelec En Banc affirmed the First Division ruling that "[W]e feel we are not at liberty to finally declarewhetherornottherespondentisanaturalborncitizen."Inshort, theComelecEnBancallowedacandidateforPresident to run in thecomingelectionswithoutbeingconvinced that thecandidate isanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen.Clearly,theComelecEnBancactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.UnderSection1,ArticleVIII,aswellasSection5,ArticleVIII,oftheConstitution,theCourthasjurisdictiontohearanddecidetheissueinapetitionforcertiorariunderRule64inrelationtoRule65.

Tohold that theCourtacquires jurisdiction todetermine thequalificationofacandidate forPresidentonlyaftertheelectionswouldleadtoanabsurdsituation.TheCourtwouldhavetowaitforanalientobeelectedonelectiondaybeforehecouldbedisqualifiedtorunforPresident.Ifthecaseisnotdecidedimmediatelyaftertheelection,analienwhowinstheelectionmayevenassumeofficeasPresidentbeforeheisfinallydisqualified.Certainly,thisis not what theConstitution sayswhen it provides that "[N]o personmay be elected President unless he is anaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines."[9]TheclearandspecificlanguageoftheConstitutionprohibitstheelectionofonewho isnotanaturalborncitizen.Thus, the issueofwhetheracandidate forPresident isanaturalbornPhilippinecitizenmustbedecidedbeforetheelection.

GoverningLaws

SinceFPJwasbornon20August1939,hiscitizenshipatthetimeofhisbirthdependsontheConstitutionandstatutesinforceatthetimeofhisbirth.[10]FPJscitizenshipatthetimeofhisbirthin1939,applyingthelawsinforcein1939,determineswhetherheisanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen.

NaturalbornPhilippinecitizensare"thosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship."[11]Ifapersonhastoperformanact,suchasprovinginan administrative or judicial proceeding, that an event subsequent to his birth transpired thus entitling him toPhilippinecitizenship,suchpersonisnotanaturalborncitizen.[12]

The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force in 1939, are the governing laws thatdeterminewhetherapersonbornin1939isaPhilippinecitizenatthetimeofhisbirthin1939.Anysubsequentlegislationcannotchangethecitizenshipatbirthofapersonbornin1939becausesuchlegislationwouldviolatetheconstitutionaldefinitionofanaturalborncitizenasonewhoisaPhilippinecitizenfrombirth.Inshort,onewhoisnotaPhilippinecitizenatbirthin1939cannotbedeclaredbysubsequentlegislationanaturalborncitizen.

GeneralPrinciples

AlegitimatechildofaFilipinofatherfollowsthecitizenshipofthefather.Achildbornwithinwedlockispresumedtobe thesonof the father[13]and thuscarries thebloodof the father.Under thedoctrineof jussanguinis,asprovided for in Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, by the fact of legitimacy,automaticallyfollowsthecitizenshipoftheFilipinofather.

An illegitimate child, however, enjoys no presumption at birth of blood relation to any father unless the fatheracknowledges thechildatbirth.[14]The lawhasalways required that "inall casesof illegitimatechildren, theirfiliationmustbedulyproved."[15]Theonlylegallyknownparentofanillegitimatechild,bythefactofillegitimacy,isthemotherofthechildwhoconclusivelycarriesthebloodofthemother.Thus,unlessthefatheracknowledgestheillegitimatechildatbirth,theillegitimatechildcanonlyacquirethecitizenshipoftheonlylegallyknownparentthemother.

However,iftheFilipinofatherislegallyknownbecausethefiliation(bloodrelationofillegitimatechildtothefather)of the child to the Filipino father is established in accordancewith law, the child follows the citizenship of theFilipino father. This gives effect, without discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children, to theprovisionof the1935Constitution that "[T]hosewhose fathersarecitizensof thePhilippines"[16]arePhilippinecitizens.

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NatureofCitizenship

If the Filipino father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the child is a naturalborn Philippine citizenbecausenootheractafterhisbirthisrequiredtoacquireorperfecthisPhilippinecitizenship.ThechildpossessesallthequalificationstobeaPhilippinecitizenatbirth.

If the Filipino father acknowledges the child after birth, the child is a Philippine citizen as of the time of theacknowledgment.In thiscase, thechilddoesnotpossessall thequalifications tobeaPhilippinecitizenatbirthbecauseanact theacknowledgementof theFilipino father is required for thechild toacquireorperfecthisPhilippine citizenship. Statutory provisions on retroactivity of acknowledgment cannot be given effect becausetheywouldbecontrarytotheconstitutionaldefinitionofnaturalborncitizensasthosewhoarePhilippinecitizensatbirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship.

Iftheillegitimacyofachildisestablished,thereisnopresumptionthatthechildhasthebloodofanymanwhoissupposedtobethefather.Thereisonlyaconclusivepresumptionthatthechildhasthebloodofthemother.Ifanillegitimatechildclaimstohavethebloodofamanwhoissupposedtobethechildsfather,suchbloodrelationmustbeestablishedinaccordancewithproofoffiliationasrequiredbylaw.

Wheretheillegitimatechildofanalienmotherclaimstofollowthecitizenshipoftheputativefather,theburdenisonthe illegitimatechild toestablishabloodrelationto theputativeFilipinofathersincethere isnopresumptionthatanillegitimatechildhasthebloodoftheputativefather.Eveniftheputativefatheradmitspaternityafterthebirthof the illegitimatechild, theremustbeanadministrativeor judicialapproval thatsuchblood relationexistsuponproofofpaternityasrequiredbylaw.

Citizenship,beingamatterofpublicandState interest,cannotbeconferredonan illegitimatechildofanalienmotheron themeresaysoof theputativeFilipino father.TheStatehasa right toexamine theveracityof theclaimofpaternity.Otherwise,thegrantofPhilippinecitizenshiptoanillegitimatechildofanalienmotherislefttothesolediscretionoftheputativeFilipinofather.Forexample,aPhilippinecitizenofChinesedescentcansimplyclaimthathehasseveralillegitimatechildreninChina.TheStatecannotberequiredtograntPhilippinepassportstothesesupposedillegitimatechildrenborninChinaofChinesemothersjustbecausetheputativeFilipinofatheracknowledges paternity of these illegitimate children. There must be either an administrative or judicialdeterminationthattheclaimoftheputativeFilipinofatheristrue.

ThecaseoftheillegitimateVietnamesechildren,borninVietnamofVietnamesemothersandallegedlyofFilipinofathers, is illustrative.ThesechildrengrewupinVietnam,manyof themstudyingthereuntilhighschool.Thesechildren grew up knowing they were Vietnamese citizens. In 1975, a Philippine Navy vessel brought them,togetherwiththeirVietnamesemothers,tothePhilippinesasSaigonfelltothecommunists.Themothersofthesechildren became statelesswhen theRepublic of (South)Vietnam ceased to exist in 1975. The Department ofJustice rendered Opinion No. 49 dated 3 May 1995 that being children of Filipino fathers, these Vietnamesechildren, even if illegitimate, are Philippine citizens under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935Constitution andSection1(2),Article III of the1973Constitution.ThisOpinion is citedbyFPJasbasis for his claimof beinganaturalborn Philippine citizen.[17] However, this Opinion categorically stated that before the illegitimateVietnamese children may be considered Filipino citizens "it is necessary in every case referred to that suchpaternitybeestablishedbysufficientandconvincingdocumentaryevidence."[18]

In short, the illegitimate child must prove to the proper administrative or judicial authority the paternity of theallegedFilipinofatherby"sufficientandconvincingdocumentaryevidence."Clearly,anadministrativeor judicialact isnecessary to conferon the illegitimateVietnamesechildrenPhilippinecitizenship.Themereclaimof theillegitimatechildoffiliationtoaFilipinofather,orthemereacknowledgmentoftheallegedFilipinofather,doesnotautomaticallyconferPhilippinecitizenshiponthechild.TheStatemustbeconvincedoftheveracityofsuchclaimandapprovethesame.Since the illegitimateVietnamesechildrenneed toperformanact toacquireorperfectPhilippinecitizenship,theyarenotnaturalbornPhilippinecitizens.TheybecomePhilippinecitizensonlyfromthemomenttheproperadministrativeorjudicialauthorityapproveandrecognizetheirfiliationtotheirallegedFilipinofathers.

Therationalebehindrequiringthatonlynaturalborncitizensmayholdcertainhighpublicoffices[19]istoinsurethattheholdersofthesehighpublicofficesgrewupknowingtheywereatbirthcitizensofthePhilippines.Intheirformative years they knew they owed from birth their allegiance to the Philippines. In case any other countryclaimstheirallegiance, theywouldbefaithfuland loyal to thePhilippinesofwhichtheywerecitizensfrombirth.ThisisparticularlytruetothePresidentwhoisthecommanderinchiefofthearmedforces.[20]ThePresidentofthePhilippinesmustowe,frombirth,allegiancetothePhilippinesandmusthavegrownupknowingthathewasacitizenof thePhilippinesat birth.The constitutional definition of a naturalbornPhilippine citizenwould lose itsmeaningandefficacyifonewhowasatbirthrecognizedbylawasanalienweredeclaredfortyyearslater[21]anaturalbornPhilippinecitizenjustbecausehisallegedFilipinofathersubsequentlyadmittedhispaternity.

ProofofFiliation

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Article131[22]oftheSpanishCivilCode,thelawinforcein1939,recognizedonlythefollowingasproofoffiliationofanaturalchild:

a.acknowledgmentinarecordofbirth

b.acknowledgmentinawill

c.acknowledgmentinsomeotherpublicdocument.

ToestablishhisPhilippinecitizenshipatbirth,FPJmustpresenteitheranacknowledgementinarecordofbirth,or an acknowledgment in some other public document executed at the time of his birth. An acknowledgmentexecutedafterbirthdoesnotmakeoneacitizenatbirthbutacitizenfromthetimeofsuchacknowledgmentsincetheacknowledgmentisanactdoneafterbirthtoacquireorperfectPhilippinecitizenship.

After the birth of onewho is not a naturalbornPhilippine citizen, a subsequent legislation liberalizing proof offiliation cannot apply to such person to make him a naturalborn citizen. A naturalborn Philippine citizen isexpressly defined in the Constitution as one who is a citizen at birth. If a person is not a citizen at birth, nosubsequent legislation can retroactively declare him a citizen at birth since it would violate the constitutionaldefinitionofanaturalborncitizen.

BurdenofProof

AnypersonwhoclaimstobeacitizenofthePhilippineshastheburdenofprovinghisPhilippinecitizenship.Anypersonwho claims to bequalified to run forPresident becausehe is, amongothers, a naturalbornPhilippinecitizen,hastheburdenofprovingheisanaturalborncitizen.Anydoubtwhetherornotheisnaturalborncitizenisresolvedagainsthim.Theconstitutionalrequirementofanaturalborncitizen,beinganexpressqualificationforelectionasPresident,mustbecompliedwithstrictlyasdefined in theConstitution.As theCourt ruled inPaav.Chan:[23]

ItisincumbentuponapersonwhoclaimsPhilippinecitizenshiptoprovetothesatisfactionoftheCourtthatheisreallyaFilipino.NopresumptioncanbeindulgedinfavoroftheclaimantofPhilippinecitizenship,andanydoubtregardingcitizenshipmustberesolvedinfavoroftheState.

SincetheundisputedfactsshowthatFPJisanillegitimatechild,havingbeenbornoutofwedlock,theburdenisonFPJ to prove his blood relation to his allegedFilipino father. An illegitimate child enjoys no presumption ofblood relation to any father. Such blood relationship must be established in the appropriate proceedings inaccordancewithlaw.

PrivatepartylitigantscannotstipulateonthePhilippinecitizenshipofapersonbecausecitizenshipisnotaprivaterightorproperty,butamatterofpublicandState interest.Even if petitionerFornieradmits thatFPJ,althoughillegitimate,isthesonofAllanF.Poe,suchadmissioncannotbindtheStateforthepurposeofconferringonFPJthe status of a naturalborn Philippine citizen or even of a naturalized citizen. Certainly, the Court will notrecognizeapersonasanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen justbecause theprivateparty litigantshaveadmittedorstipulatedonsuchastatus. In thepresentcase, theSolicitorGeneral,as representativeof theGovernment, isstronglydisputingthestatusofFPJasanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen.

Legitimation

UnderArticle123[24]oftheSpanishCivilCode,legitimationtookeffectasofthedateofmarriage.Therewasnoretroactivityoftheeffectsof legitimationontherightsofthelegitimatedchild.Thus,a legitimatedchildacquiredthe rightsof a legitimate childonlyasof thedateofmarriageof thenatural parents.Allan F. Poe andBessieKelleyweremarriedon16September1940whileFPJwasbornmorethanoneyearearlieron20August1939.AssumingthatAllanF.PoewasFPJsnaturalfather,theeffectsoflegitimationdidnotretroacttothebirthofFPJon20August1939.

Besides,legitimationvestsonlycivil,notpoliticalrights,tothelegitimatedchild.AstheCourtheldinChingLeng:[25]

The framersof theCivilCodehadno intentionwhatsoever to regulate thereinpoliticalquestions.Hence, apartfromreproducingtheprovisionsoftheConstitutiononcitizenship,theCodecontainsnopreceptthereonexceptthat which refers all matters of "naturalization", as well as those related to the "loss and reacquisition ofcitizenship" to "special laws." Consistently with this policy, our Civil Code does not include therein any ruleanalogoustoArticles18to28oftheCivilCodeofSpain,regulatingcitizenship.(Underscoringintheoriginal)

Clearly,evenassumingthatthemarriageofAllanF.PoeandBessieKelleylegitimatedFPJ,suchlegitimationdidnotvestretroactivelyanycivilorpoliticalrightstoFPJ.

TreatyofParisof1898andPhilippineBillof1902

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FPJadmitsthathisgrandfather,LorenzoPou,wasaSpanishcitizenwhocametothePhilippinesfromSpain.[26]Tobenefit from themassnaturalizationunder theTreatyofParis of 1898and thePhilippineBill of 1902,FPJmust prove that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899. Once it isestablished that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899, then he ispresumedtohaveacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipundertheTreatyofParisof1898andthePhilippineBillof1902.[27]BeinganinhabitantandresidentofthePhilippineson11April1899isthedeterminativefacttofallunderthecoverageoftheTreatyofParisof1898andthePhilippineBillof1902.[28]

Thereis,however,noevidenceonrecordthatLorenzoPouwasaPhilippineinhabitantandresidenton11April1899.ThedateofarrivalofLorenzoPouinthePhilippinesisnotknown.IfhearrivedinthePhilippinesafter11April 1899, then he could not benefit from themass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and thePhilippineBillof1902.ThereisalsonoevidencethatLorenzoPouwasnaturalizedasaPhilippinecitizenafter11April1899.Thus,therecanbenopresumptionthatLorenzoPouwasaPhilippinecitizen.

ThereisalsonoevidenceonrecordthatAllanF.Poe,thesonofLorenzoPouandtheallegedfatherofFPJ,wasnaturalizedasaPhilippinecitizen.Thus,basedontheevidenceadducedthereisnolegalbasisforclaimingthatAllanF.PoeisaPhilippinecitizen.Nevertheless,thereisnoneedtodelvefurtherintothisissuesincetheCourtcandecidethiscasewithoutdeterminingthecitizenshipofLorenzoPouandAllanF.Poe.WhetherornotLorenzoPouandAllanF.PoewerePhilippinecitizensisnotmaterialinresolvingwhetherFPJisanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen.

ConventionontheRightsoftheChild

ThePhilippinessignedtheConventionontheRightsoftheChildon26January1990andratifiedthesameon21August 1990. The Convention defines a child to mean "every human being below the age of eighteen yearsunless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier." Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke theConvention since he is not a child as defined in the Convention, and he was born half a century before theConvention came into existence. FPJs citizenship at birth in 1939 could not in any way be affected by theConventionwhichenteredintoforceonlyon2September1990.

The Convention has the status of a municipal law[29] and its ratification by the Philippines could not haveamendedtheexpressrequirementintheConstitutionthatonlynaturalborncitizensofPhilippinesarequalifiedtobePresident.While theConstitutionapparently favorsnaturalborncitizensover thosewhoarenot, that is theexplicitrequirementoftheConstitutionwhichneithertheExecutiveDepartmentnortheLegislature,inratifyingatreaty, couldamend. In short, theConventioncannotamend thedefinition in theConstitution thatnaturalborncitizensare"thosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship."

Inanyevent,theConventionguaranteesachild"therighttoacquireanationality,"[30]andrequiresStatesPartiesto"ensuretheimplementation"ofthisright,"inparticularwherethechildwouldotherwisebestateless."[31]Thus,as far as nationality or citizenship is concerned, theConvention guarantees the right of the child to acquire anationalitysothathemaynotbestateless.TheConventiondoesnotguaranteeachildacitizenshipatbirth,butmerely"therighttoacquireanationality"inaccordancewithmunicipallaw.WhenFPJwasbornin1939,hewasapparently under United States law an American citizen at birth.[32] After his birth FPJ also had the right toacquirePhilippinecitizenshipbyprovinghisfiliationtohisallegedFilipinofatherinaccordancewithPhilippinelaw.AtnopointintimewasFPJindangerofbeingstateless.Clearly,FPJcannotinvoketheConventiontoclaimheisanaturalbornPhilippinecitizen.

TheDoctrineinChingLengv.Galang

The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother follows thecitizenshipofthealienmotherastheonlylegallyknownparent.Theillegitimatechild,evenifacknowledgedandlegallyadoptedbytheFilipinofather,cannotacquirethecitizenshipofthefather.TheCourtmadethisdefinitivedoctrinalrulinginChingLengv.Galang,[33]whichinvolvedtheillegitimateminorchildrenofanaturalizedFilipinoofChinesedescentwithaChinesewoman,SyAn.The illegitimatechildrenwere lateron jointlyadoptedbythenaturalizedFilipinoandhislegalwife,SoBuanTy.

ThefactsinChingLengasquotedbytheCourtfromthetrialcourtsdecisionareasfollows:

AfterthepetitionerChingLengAliasChingBanLeeobtainedjudgmentinthisCourtdatedMay2,1950grantinghis petition for naturalization, he together with his wife So Buan Ty filed another petition also in this Court inSpecial Proc. No. 1216 for the adoption of Ching Tiong Seng, Ching Liong Ding, Victoria Ching Liong Yam,SydneyChingandChingTiongAn,allminorsandadmittedlytheillegitimatechildrenofpetitionerChingLengwithoneSyAn,aChinesecitizen.Findingthepetitionforadoptionproper,thisCourtgrantedthesameinadecisiondated September 12, 1950, declaring the said minors free from all legal obligations of obedience andmaintenancewithrespecttotheirmotherSyAnandtoalllegalintentsandpurposesthechildrenoftheadopterChingLengaliasChingBanLeeandSoBuanTywithallthelegalrightsandobligationsprovidedbylaw.

6/30/2015 G.R.Nos.161434,161634&161824

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