gorman national academies cscans 30 october 2006
of 10
/10
Brian J. Gorman, M.Sc., J.D. Brian J. Gorman, M.Sc., J.D. Towson University, Maryland Towson University, Maryland Presentation for Presentation for The National Academies’ The National Academies’ Committee on Scientific Communication and Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security National Security October 30, 2006 October 30, 2006 Balancing Secrecy and Open Science Balancing Secrecy and Open Science The Dual Use Dilemma The Dual Use Dilemma
Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
Biosecurity, Open Science, Dual-Use Science, Due Process VettingTRANSCRIPT
- 1. Brian J. Gorman, M.Sc., J.D. Towson University, Maryland Presentation for The National Academies Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security October 30, 2006 Balancing Secrecy and Open Science The Dual Use Dilemma
- 2. The Dual Use Dilemma .
- Open publication of scientific methods
-
- Helps advance science
-
- Helps terrorists and rogue states pursue bioweapons
- 3. Unique Threat of Bioterrorism
-
- Lowest financial barrier at $1 per life
-
- Lowest access barrier to equipment
-
- Least effective detection modalities
-
- Longest lead time before awareness
-
- Largest population with technical know-how
-
- Weakest state controls
-
- Weakest international treaties
-
- Widest reach due to transmissibility
-
- Worst cooperation from professionals
-
- Widest access to sensitive information
-
- 4. Experiments of Concern*
- Renders a vaccine ineffective
- Alters resistance to antibiotics agents
- Increases virulence of a pathogen
- Increases transmissibility of a pathogen
- Alters the host range of a pathogen
- Enables evasion of detection
- Enables the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin
- 5. Due Process Vetting RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE
- #5. Would this paper lead to the increased transmissibility of a pathogen?
- 1. Unforeseeable 2.Remote 3. Possible 4. Likely 5. Imminent
- #7. Would this paper help enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities?
- 1. Unforeseeable 2.Remote 3. Possible 4. Likely 5. Imminent
- 6. Risk Assessment Scale Flow Chart Prevention New Article Author RAS Score IRB RAS Score Journal/Peer Review RAS Score BRC RAS Screening Publish BRC Vetting Request Article Author IRB Journal Gorman, 2005
- 7. Due Process Vetting Scale Flow Chart Prevention Publish Author Journal IRB Consent Consent Consent Demand Hearing Demand Hearing Demand Hearing Initial BRC Review and Finding Article recommended for classification Gorman, 2005
- 8. Notice Mechanism for Sensitive Science
- The national security community has no advance warning of publications on sensitive science.
- Export rules address national security by controlling the transfer of U.S. technology to countries of concern.
- Fundamental research is exempt from export license requirements.
- Removal of the fundamental research exemption for select agents would provide the national security community with notice of sensitive dual use science before publication to assure proper vetting.
- 9. Proposals on Scientific Communication and National Security
- Brian J. Gorman, Balancing National Security and Open Science: A Proposal for Due Process Vetting, Yale Journal of Law and Technology , Spring 2005.
- Brian J. Gorman, Biosecurity and Secrecy Policy: Problems, Theory and a Call for Executive Action, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society , Winter 2006.
- 10. Brian J. Gorman, M.Sc., J.D. Towson University, Maryland Presentation for The National Academies Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security October 30, 2006 Balancing Secrecy and Open Science The Dual Use Dilemma