tax cases midterms

8/9/2019 Tax Cases Midterms

1/239

G.R. No. L-41919-24 May 30, 1980

QUIRICO P. UNGAB, petitioner,vs.HON. VICENTE N. CUI, !R., "# $"% &a'a&"(y a% !)*+ o ($ Co)( o /"%( I#%(a#&,Ba#&$ 1, 1TH !)*"&"a "%("&(, aao C"(y, THE COMMIIONER O/ INTERNALREVENUE, a#* !EU N. ACEBE, "# $"% &a'a&"(y a% (a( Po%&)(o, respondents.

CONCEPCION !R.,J:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order toannul and set aside the informations led in Criminal Case Nos. 19!, 191, 19", 19#,19$, and 19% of the Court of &irst 'nstance of (avao, all entitled) "People of thePhilippines, plainti, versus Quirico Ungab, accused*+ and to restrain the respondent udge

from further proceeding with the hearing and trial of the said cases.

't is not disputed that sometime in uly, 19-$, '/ 0aminer en 2arcia eamined theincome ta returns led by the herein petitioner, 3uirico P. 4ngab, for the calendar yearending (ecember #1, 19-#. 'n the course of his eamination, he discovered that thepetitioner failed to report his income derived from sales of banana saplings. 5s a result, the'/ (istrict /evenue 67cer at (avao City sent a +Notice of 8apayer+ to the petitionerinforming him that there is due from him petitioner: the amount of P1!$,9;!.;1,representing income, business ta and forest charges for the year 19-# and invitingpetitioner to an informal conference where the petitioner, duly assisted by counsel, maypresent his objections to the ndings of the '/ 0aminer. 14pon receipt of the notice, thepetitioner wrote the '/ (istrict /evenue 67cer protesting the assessment, claiming that

he was only a dealer or agent on commission basis in the banana sapling business and thathis income, as reported in his income ta returns for the said year, was accurately stated.'/ 0aminer en 2arcia, however, was fully convinced that the petitioner had led afraudulent income ta return so that he submitted a +&raud /eferral /eport,+ to the 8a&raud 4nit of the ureau of 'nternal /evenue. 5fter eamining the records of the case, the


2/239

depriving thereby the government of its due revenue in the amount ofP1%,;-".%9, inclusive of surcharge. 2

'n a second indorsement to the Chief of the Prosecution (ivision, dated (ecember 1",19-$, the Commissioner of 'nternal /evenue approved the prosecution of the petitioner. 3

8hereafter, ?iolation of ?iolation of ?iolation of


3/239


4/239

8he contention is without merit. Contrary to the petitionerIs claim, the rule thereinestablished had not been violated. 8he respondent


5/239


6/239

8he subject deciency ta assessments have already become nal, eecutory anddemandable forfailure of the petitioner to le a protest within the reglementaryperiod provided for by law. 8he +alleged protest+ allegedly led on une "%, "!!$ atthe Kegal (ivision, /evenue /egion No. ;, Baati City is nowhere to be found in the'/ /ecords nor reLected in the /ecord oo of the Kegal (ivision as normally done

by our receiving cler when she receiveMs any document. 8he respondent, therefore,has legal basis to collect the ta liability either by distraint and levy or civilaction.-0mphasis and underscoring supplied:

8he aforecited


7/239

'n a related move, petitioner submitted written interrogatories addressed to


8/239

with such prohibition has been rendered moot and academic by the voluntaryadmissions of the /espondent himself.

'?.

in holding that the constitutional right of an accused to eamine the witnessagainst him does not eist in this case. 8he PetitionerJs liability for ta deciencyassessment which is the main issue in the Petition for /eview is currently pending atthe Eonorable


9/239

records of the case because up to the date of this Petition the '/ records have notbeen submitted yet to the C85."-

2rave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical eercise ofjudgment as eAuivalent to lac of jurisdiction or, in other words, when the power is

eercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personalhostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positiveduty or a virtual refusal of duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. ";

8he Court nds that the issuance by the C85 of the Auestioned resolutions was nottainted by arbitrariness.

8he fact that


10/239

%. Fere these documents that you obtained from petitioner submitted to the ureauof 'nternal /evenue '/:Q Please describe said documents and under whatcircumstances the same were submitted.

. Fas the consent of the petitioner, its o7cers or employees obtained when the

documents that you obtained were submitted to the '/Q Please state when andfrom whom the consent was obtained.

-. (id you eecute an a7davit as an informer in the assessment which was issuedby the '/ against petitioner for the ta year 199% and other yearsQ#!4nderscoringsupplied:

while the Auestions for the revenue o7cers read)

1. Fhere did you obtain the documents, particularly the invoices and o7cialreceipts, which Mwere used by your o7ce as evidence and as basis of the

assessment for deciency income ta and value added ta for the ta year 199%issued against petitionerQ

". (o you now Br. Keonardo


11/239

joint accounts, associations, joint ventures or consortia and registered partnershipsand their members*

C: 8o summon the person liable for ta or reAuired to le a return, or any o7cer oremployee of such person, or a#y '%o# $a"#+ 'o%%%%"o#, &)%(o*y, o &a o

($ 6oo@% o a&&o)#(% a#* o($ a&&o)#("#+ &o*% &o#(a"#"#+ #("%a("#+ (o ($ 6)%"#%% o ($ '%o# "a6 o (a;, o a#y o($ '%o#, toappear before the Commissioner or his duly authoriDed representatives at a time andplace specied in the summons and to produce such boos, papers, records, or otherdata, and to give testimony*

(: 8o tae such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevantor material to such inAuiry* and

0: 8o cause revenue o7cers and employees to mae a canvass from time to time ofany revenue district or region and inAuire after and concerning all persons therein

who may be liable to pay any internal revenue ta, and all persons owning or havingthe care, management or possession of any object with respect to which a ta isimposed.

0mphasis and underscoring supplied:

8he law thus allows the '/ access to all relevant or material records and data in theperson of the tapayer,#"and the '/ can accept documents which cannot beadmitted in a judicial proceeding where the /ules of Court are strictly observed. ##8oreAuire the consent of the tapayer would defeat the intent of the law to help the '/assess and collect the correct amount of taes.

PetitionerJs invocation of the rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution to crosseamine the witness against him and to have compulsory process issued to securethe attendance of witnesses and the production of other evidence in his behalf doesnot lie. C85 Case No. -1! is not a criminal prosecution, and even granting that it isrelated to '.


12/239


13/239

consisting of 1,%%% cases of alcohol products. 0h. "", Bemorandum/eport of the 8eam dated une %, 19-1, pp. $91@$9", &older '', '/ rec.:.8he inventory lists of the seiDed alcohol products are contained in?olumes ', '', ''', '? and ? 0hibits 1$, 1%, 1, 1-, and 1;, respectively,'/ rec.:. 6n the basis of the teamIs report of investigation, the

respondent Commissioner of 'nternal /evenue assessed Br. Po ien


14/239


15/239

%1$@%1-, pp. %11@%1#, &older 11, '/ rec.:, it was ascertained that the


16/239

'nternal /evenue eaminer and approved by his superior o7cers will not bedisturbed. 85ll presumptions are in favor of the correctness of ta assessments. 9

6n the whole, we nd that the fraudulent acts detailed in the decision under reviewhad not been satisfactorily rebutted by the petitioner. 8here are indeed clear

indications on the part of the tapayer to deprive the 2overnment of the taes due.8he 5ssistant &actory


17/239

FE0/0&6/0, the Petition is (0N'0(. 8he (ecision of the respondent Court of 8a5ppeals is hereby 5&&'/B0(. Costs against the petitioner.

,petitioner,vs.ALBERTO . BENIPA7O,respondent.

#/ce of the $olicitor 0eneral for petitioner.+arlos 1. 2ntipor!a for respon!ent.

IDON,J.:

8his is an appeal taen by the Collector of 'nternal /evenue from the decision of theCourt of 8a 5ppeals dated anuary "#, 19$;, reversing the one rendered by theformer, thereby relieving respondent 5lberto (. enipayo from the payment of thedeciency amusement ta assessed against him in the total amount of P1",!9#.$%.

/espondent is the owner and operator of the Kucena 8heater located in themunicipality of Kucena, 3ueDon. 6n 6ctober #, 19%# 'nternal /evenue 5gent /omeode 2uia investigated respondentIs amusement ta liability in connection with theoperation of said theater during the period from 5ugust, 19%" to


18/239

conclusions, devoid of ndings of the fact of the alleged fraudulent practices of theherein tapayer+. 'n view thereof, and as recommended by the Conference


19/239

ratio eisted during the month of uly, 19%% does not provide a su7cientinference on the conditions in 19%" and 19%#. . .

'n order to stand the test of judicial scrutiny, the assessment must be basedon actual facts. 8he presumption of correctness of assessment being a mere

presumption cannot be made to rest on another presumption that thecircumstances in 19%" and 19%# are presumed to be the same as thoseeisting in 19$9 to 19%1 and uly 19%%. 'n the case under consideration thereare no substantial facts to support the assessment in Auestion. ...

5 review of the records has not disclosed anything su7cient to justify a reversal ofthe above nding made by the Court of 8a 5ppeals. 't should be borne in mind thatto sustain the deciency ta assessed against respondent would amount, in eGect, toa nding that he had, for a considerable period of time, cheated and defrauded thegovernment by selling to each adult patron two childrenIs ta@free ticets instead ofone ticet subject to the amusement ta provided for in


20/239

0.-. 3o. %456787

$an 1uan, 2frica, 0on9ales : $an 2gustin for petitioner.

-a'on 2. 0on9ales for respon!ents.

TEEHANEE,J.:

8hese are original actions for certiorari to set aside and annul the writ of mandamusissued by udge ?ictorino 5.


21/239

alleged deciency ta assessment on the Beralco


22/239

/espondent judge has no jurisdiction to tae cogniDance of the case because thesubject matter thereof clearly falls within the scope of cases now e;clusivelwithinthe jurisdiction of the Court of 8a 5ppeals.


23/239

&inance Corporation to accept bacpay certicates in payment of outstanding loans.5lthough there is no provision epressly authoriDing such acceptance, nor is thereone prohibiting it, yet the duty imposed by the acpay Kaw upon said corporationas to the acceptance or discount of bacpay certicates is neither clear norministerial, but discretionary merely, and such special civil action does not issue to

control the eercise of discretion of a public o7cer.+

10

Kiewise, we have held thatcourts have no power to order the Commissioner of Customs to conscate goodsimported in violation of the 'mport Control Kaw, /.5. $", as said forfeiture is subjectto the discretion of the said o7cial,11nor may courts control the determination ofwhether or not an applicant for a visa has a non@immigrant status or whether hisentry into this country would be contrary to public safety for it is not a simpleministerial function but an eercise of discretion.12

Boreover, since the o7ce of the Commissioner of 'nternal /evenue is charged withthe administration of revenue laws, which is the primary responsibility of theeecutive branch of the government, mandamus may not he against the

Commissioner to compel him to impose a ta assessment not found by him to bedue or proper for that would be tantamount to a usurpation of eecutive functions.5s we held in the case of +o''issioner of ''igration vs. 2rca13anent thisprinciple, +the administration of immigration laws is the primary responsibility of theeecutive branch of the government. 0tensions of stay of aliens are discretionary onthe part of immigration authorities, and neither a petition for mandamus nor one forcertiorari can compel the Commissioner of 'mmigration to etend the stay of an alienwhose period to stay has epired.


24/239

or informer would be allowed to usurp and control the o7cial functions of theCommissioner of 'nternal /evenue would create disorder and confusion, if not chaosand total disruption of the operations of the government.

Considering then that respondent judge may not order by mandamus the

Commissioner to issue the assessment against Beralco


25/239

letter%regarding the possible ling of criminal charges against petitioner. '/Commissioner Parayno began his letter with the following statement)

' have the honor to refer to you for preliminary investigation and ling of aninformation in court if evidence so warrants, the herein attached oint 57davit

of ROERIC C. ABA, TIMON P. CUREG, VILMA V. CARONAN,RHOORA L. ELO RE7E under 2roup


26/239

ConseAuently, Prosecution 5ttorney 8orrevillas, on behalf of respondent People,submitted on 1 (ecember "!!% a Compliance with ; ParteBotion to 5dmit5ttached 'nformation.1"Prosecution 5ttorney 8orrevillas moved that the documentssubmitted be admitted as part of the record of the case and the rst 'nformation besubstituted by the attached second 'nformation. 8he second 'nformation1#addressed

the discrepancies noted by the C85 in the rst 'nformation, by now reading thus)

8he undersigned Prosecution 5ttorney of the (epartment of ustice herebyaccuses!U7 ANNE ANTO y L):a+)"of the oGense of violation of


27/239

'n a /esolution1;dated "# &ebruary "!!, the C85 &irst (ivision denied petitionerJsBotion to 3uash and accordingly scheduled her arraignment on " Barch "!! at9)!! a.m. Petitioner led a Botion for /econsideration andHor/einvestigation,19which was again denied by the C85 &irst (ivision in a/esolution"!dated 11 Bay "!!.

Petitioner received a copy of the 11 Bay "!! /esolution of the C85 &irst (ivision on1- Bay "!!. 6n 1 une "!!, petitioner led with the C85 en banca Botion for0tension of 8ime to &ile Petition for /eview, doceted as C.8.5. 0. C/'B. No. !!1.


28/239


29/239


30/239

RULE 5

PROCEURE IN THE COURT O/ TA APPEAL


31/239

2iven the foregoing, the petition for review to be led with the C85 en bancas themode for appealing a decision, resolution, or order of the C85 (ivision, under


32/239

and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a naldecision of the whole controversy.+#$

'n other words, after a nal order or judgment, the court should have nothing moreto do in respect of the relative rights of the parties to the case. Conversely, +an order

that does not nally dispose of the case and does not end the CourtIs tas ofadjudicating the partiesI contentions in determining their rights and liabilities asregards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done bythe Court, is interlocutory.+#%

8he rationale for barring the appeal of an interlocutory order was etensivelydiscussed in ?atute v. +ourt of 2ppeals,#thus)

't is settled that an +interlocutory order or decree made in the progress of acase is always under the control of the court until the nal decision of the suit,and may be modied or rescinded upon su7cient grounds shown at any time

before nal judgment . . .+ 6f similar import is the ruling of this Court declaringthat +it is rudimentary that such interlocutory: orders are subject to change inthe discretion of the court.+ Boreover, one of the inherent powers of the courtis +8o amend and control its process and orders so as to mae themconformable to law and justice. 'n the language of Chief ustice Boran,paraphrasing the ruling in @elu9 vs. 1ustice of the Peace of $ariaa, +sincejudges are human, susceptible to mistaes, and are bound to administerjustice in accordance with law, they are given the inherent power of amendingtheir orders or judgments so as to mae them conformable to law and justice,and they can do so before they lose their jurisdiction of the case, that is beforethe time to appeal has epired and no appeal has been perfected.+ 5nd in theabovecited @elu9case, this Court held that +'f the trial court should discover orbe convinced that it had committed an error in its judgment, or had done aninjustice, before the same has become nal, it may, upon its own motion orupon a motion of the parties, correct such error in order to do justice betweenthe parties. . . . 't would seem to be the very height of absurdity to prohibit atrial judge from correcting an error, mistae, or injustice which is called to hisattention before he has lost control of his judgment.+ Corollarily, it has alsobeen held +that a judge of rst instance is not legally prevented from revoingthe interlocutory order of another judge in the very litigation subseAuentlyassigned to him for judicial action.+

5nother recogniDed reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a nal order orjudgment, and not from an interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity ofappeals in a single action, which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decisionon the merits of the case during the pendency of the appeal. 'f such appeal wereallowed, the trial on the merits of the case would necessarily be delayed for aconsiderable length of time, and compel the adverse party to incur unnecessaryepenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as incidental
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/gr_173176_2008.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/gr_173176_2008.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/gr_173176_2008.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/gr_173176_2008.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/gr_173176_2008.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/gr_173176_2008.html#fnt36


33/239

Auestions may be raised by him, and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by thelower court.#-

8here is no dispute that a court order denying a motion to Auash is interlocutory. 8hedenial of the motion to Auash means that the criminal information remains pending

with the court, which must proceed with the trial to determine whether the accusedis guilty of the crime charged therein. 0Aually settled is the rule that an orderdenying a motion to Auash, being interlocutory, is not immediately appealable,#;norcan it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.


34/239

Fhile the general rule proscribes the appeal of an interlocutory order, there are alsorecogniDed eceptions to the same. 8he general rule is not absolute. Fhere specialcircumstances clearly demonstrate the inadeAuacy of an appeal, then the specialcivil action of certiorarior prohibition may eceptionally be allowed.$18his CourtrecogniDes that under certain situations, recourse to etraordinary legal remedies,

such as a petition for certiorari, is considered proper to Auestion the denial of amotion to Auash or any other interlocutory order: in the interest of a +moreenlightened and substantial justice+*$"or to promote public welfare and publicpolicy*$#or when the cases +have attracted nationwide attention, maing it essentialto proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof+*$$or when the order wasrendered with grave abuse of discretion.$%+ertiorariis an appropriate remedy toassail an interlocutory order 1: when the tribunal issued such order without or inecess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion* and ": when the assailedinterlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not aGordadeAuate and epeditious relief.$

/ecourse to a petition forcertiorari

to assail an interlocutory order is now epresslyrecogniDed in the ultimate paragraph of


35/239

without or in ecess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that aninterlocutory order such as that involved in this case may be impugned. e that as itmay, it must be emphasiDed that this practice is applied only under certaineceptional circumstances to prevent unnecessary delay in the administration ofjustice and so as not to unduly burden the courts.$;

+ertiorariis not available to correct errors of procedure or mistaes in the judgeJsndings and conclusions of law and fact. 't is only in the presence of etraordinarycircumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice and fair play where resort to apetition for certiorariis proper. 5 party must not be allowed to delay litigation by thesheer epediency of ling a petition for certiorariunder /ule % of the /evised /ulesof Court based on scant allegations of grave abuse.$9

5 writ of certiorariis not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling)it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical eercise ofjudgment eAuivalent to lac of jurisdiction. 'ts function is limited to eeping an

inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts O actswhich courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. 't is notdesigned to correct erroneous ndings and conclusions made by the courts. %!

8he Petition for /eview which petitioner intended to le before the C85 enbancrelied on two grounds) 1: the lac of authority of Prosecuting 5ttorney8orrevillas to le the 'nformation* and ": the ling of the said 'nformation in violationof petitionerJs constitutional rights to due process and eAual protection of the laws.

5nent the rst ground, petitioner argues that the 'nformation was led without theapproval of the '/ Commissioner in violation of


36/239

or criminal action against a ta law violator, but it does not describe in what formsuch approval must be given. 'n this case, '/ Commissioner ParaynoJs letter of 19Bay "!!% already states his epress approval of the ling of an information againstpetitioner and his signature need not appear on the /esolution of the


37/239

the commission of crimes, prosecute oGenders and administer the probation andcorrection system.%#4nder the (6 is the 67ce of the


38/239

&irst, a motion to Auash should be based on a defect in the information which isevident on its face.%8he same cannot be said herein. 8he 'nformation againstpetitioner appears valid on its face* and that it was led in violation of herconstitutional rights to due process and eAual protection of the laws is not evident onthe face thereof. 5s pointed out by the C85 &irst (ivision in its 11 Bay "!!

/esolution, the more appropriate recourse petitioner should have taen, given thedismissal of similar charges against ?elasAueD, was to appeal the /esolution dated"1 6ctober "!!% of the 67ce of the


39/239

classication, an erroneous or mistaen performance of the statutory duty,although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the eAualprotection of the laws. 8he unlawful administration by o7cers of a statute fairon its face, resulting in its uneAual application to those who are entitled to betreated alie, is not a denial of eAual protection unless there is shown to be

present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. 8his mayappear on the face of the action taen with respect to a particular class orperson, or it may only be shown by etrinsic evidence showing adiscriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the actionitself. B)( a *"%&":"#a(oy ')'o% "% #o( '%):*, ($ :)%( 6 a%$o


40/239

petitionerJs Botion to 3uash. 8he only basis for petitionerJs claim of denial of eAualprotection of the laws was the dismissal of the charges against ?elasAueD whilethose against her were not.

5nd lastly, the /esolutions of the C85 &irst (ivision dated "# &ebruary "!! and 11

Bay "!! directly addressed the arguments raised by petitioner in her Botion to3uash and Botion for /econsideration, respectively, and eplained the reasons forthe denial of both Botions. 8here is nothing to sustain a nding that these/esolutions were rendered capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily, as to constitutegrave abuse of discretion amounting to lac or ecess of jurisdiction.

'n sum, the C85 en bancdid not err in denying petitionerJs Botion for 0tension of8ime to &ile Petition for /eview. Petitioner cannot le a Petition for /eview with theC85 en bancto appeal the /esolution of the C85 &irst (ivision denying her Botion to3uash. 8he /esolution is interlocutory and, thus, unappealable. 0ven if her Petitionfor /eview is to be treated as a petition for certiorari, it is dismissible for lac of

merit.

HERE/ORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for /eview ishereby ENIE. Costs against petitioner.

O ORERE.

G.R. No. 130430. &:6 13, 1999J

REPUBLIC O/ THE PHILIPPINE, '%#(* 6y ($ Co::"%%"o# o ($

B)a) o I#(#a R#) =BIR>,petitioner v!. ALU V.

HIDON, re!pondent.

E C I I O N

MENODA,J.

8his is a petition for review of the decisionM1of the /egional 8rial Court, ranch$$,


41/239


42/239

8o implement this provision /evenue 5dministrative 6rder No. %@;# of the '/provides in pertinent portions)

8he following civil and criminal cases are to be handled by


43/239

d: 8he conditions to be observed by revenue o7cers, provincial scals and othero7cials respecting the institution and conduct of legal actions and proceedings.

/56 Nos. %@;# and 1!@9% are in harmony with this statutory mandate.

5s amended by /.5. No. ;$"$, the N'/C is now even more categorical.


44/239

granted by the Commissioner* when the tapayer cannot be located in theaddress given by him in the return led upon which the ta is being assessed orcollected*provi!e!, that, if the tapayer informs the Commissioner of anychange in address, the running of the statute of limitations will not besuspended* when the warrant of distraint or levy is duly served upon the

tapayer, his authoriDed representative or a member of his household withsu7cient discretion, and no property could be located* and when the tapayer isout of the Philippines.

Petitioner argues that, in accordance with this provision, respondentJs reAuest forreinvestigation of her ta deciency assessment on November #, 199" eGectivelysuspended the running of the period of prescription such that the government couldstill le a case for ta collection.M9

8he contention has no merit.


45/239

relied on the summary remedy of distraint and levy to collect the ta deciency. 8heimportance of this fact was not lost on the Court. 8hus, in2!vertising 2ssociates, itwas held)M1V't should be noted that the Commissioner did not institute any judicialproceeding to collect the ta. Ee relied on the warrants of distraint and levy tointerrupt the running of the statute of limitations.W

Boreover, if, as petitioner in eGect says, the prescriptive period was suspendedtwice, i.e., when the warrants of distraint and levy were served on respondent onanuary 1", 19;9 and then when respondent made her reAuest for reinvestigation ofthe ta deciency assessment on November #, 199", the three@year prescriptiveperiod must have commenced running again sometime after the service of thewarrants of distraint and levy. Petitioner, however, does not state when or why thistoo place and, indeed, there appears to be no reason for such. 't is noteworthy thatpetitioner raised this point before the lower court apparently as an alternativetheory, which, however, is untenable.

&or the foregoing reasons, we hold that petitionerJs contention that the action inthis case had not prescribed when led has no merit. 6ur holding, however, iswithout prejudice to the disposition of the properties covered by the warrants ofdistraint and levy which petitioner served on respondent, as such would be a merecontinuation of the summary remedy it had timely begun. 5lthough considerabletime has passed since then, as held in2!vertising 2ssociates nc. v. +ourt of

2ppealsM1-and Palanca v. +o''issioner of nternal -evenue,M1;the enforcement ofta collection through summary proceedings may be carried out beyond thestatutory period considering that such remedy was seasonably availed of.

HERE/ORE, the petition is (0N'0(.

G.R. No. 15394 /6)ay , 2008

ILAIR =INGAPORE> PTE, LT.,petitioner,vs.COMMIIONER O/ INTERNAL REVENUE,respondent.

E C I I O N

CARPIO MORALE,J.

Petitioner,


46/239

5s the '/ had not yet acted on the application as of (ecember ", "!!1,


47/239

(a; but becomes an a*** &o%( o# ($ +oo*% ')&$a%* whichconstitutes a part of the purchase price. 8he incidence of taation or theperson statutorily liable to pay the ta falls on Petron Corporation though theimpact of taation or the burden of taation falls on another person, which inthis case is petitioner


48/239

to &ile Petition for /eview1$before the C85 0n anc which gave it until November 1$,"!!% to le a petition for review.

6n November 11, "!!%,


49/239

1-, "!!% or Mafter thirty #!: days had lapsed from the nal date of 6ctober1;, "!!% to appeal.

8he argument that it reAuested Botions for 0tension of 8ime on 6ctober ";,"!!% or ten 1!: days from the appeal period and the second Botion for

0tension of 8ime to le its Petition for /eview on November 11, "!!% and itsallowance by the C85 n (ancnotwithstanding, the Auestioned (ecision is nolonger appealable for failure to timely le the necessary Petition for/eview.190mphasis in the original:

'n a


50/239

19-%. 8he trial court dismissed the appeal for having been led out of time, whichwas upheld by the Court of 5ppeals on the ground that the period within which toappeal should be counted from November "", 19-$, the date 5tty. ?iola received acopy of the November 19, 19-$ order. 8he appellate court held that 5tty. ?iola wasstill the counsel of record, he not having yet withdrawn his appearance as counsel

for the therein petitioners. 6n petition for certiorari,

"9

this Court held

M/espondent Court reconed the period of appeal from the timepetitionersJ original counsel, 5tty. 0scolastico /. ?iola, received the 6rdergranting the Botion for 5nnulment of documents and titles on November "",19-$. ut as petitioners stress, 5tty. ?icente Billora of the Billora, 8obias andCalimlim Kaw 67ce had led an +5ppearance and Banifestation+ on uly 1,19-$. Fhere there may have been no specic withdrawal by 5tty. 0scolastico/. ?iola, for which he should be admonished, by the appearance of a newcounsel, it can be said that 5tty. ?iola had ceased as counsel for petitioners. 'nfact, 6rders subseAuent to the aforesaid date were already sent by the trial

Court to the Billora, 8obias and Calimlim Kaw 67ce and not to 5tty. ?iola.

4nder the circumstances, (ecember 9, 19-$ is the controlling date of receiptby petitionersJ counsel and from which the period of appeal from the 6rder ofNovember 19, 19-$ should be reconed. 8hat being the case, petitionerJs appeal led on anuary $, 19-% was timely led.#!4nderscoring supplied:

8he facts of *olores *e ?esa 2ba!are not on all fours with those of the presentcase. 'n any event, more recent jurisprudence holds that in case of failure to complywith the procedure established by


51/239


52/239


53/239

Costs against petitioner.

O ORERE.

ILAIR =INGAPORE> PTE.

LT., Petitioner,

@ versus @

COMMIIONER O/ INTERNALREVENUE,

/espondent.

G.R. No%. 151383 K 152359

Present)C5/P'6,1., 5cting Chairperson,Z

54


54/239


55/239

5rticle $ of the 5ir 8ransport 5greement between the 2overnments of the /epublic of

the Philippines and the /epublic of


56/239

taes dependent solely on PetronJs action over which petitioner has no control. 'f

Petron fails to act or acts belatedly, petitionerJs claim will be barred, depriving

petitioner of its private property.M1#

Petitioner also maintains that to hold that only Petron can legally claim the

refund will negate the ta eemption epressly granted to petitioner under the N'/C

and the 5ir 5greement.M1$ Petitioner argues that a ta eemption is a personal

privilege of the grantee, which is petitioner in this case. Petitioner further argues

that a ta eemption granted to the buyer cannot be availed of by the seller* hence,

in the present case, Petron as seller cannot legally claim the refund. 6n the other

hand, if only the entity that paid the ta O Petron in this case O can claim the refund,

then petitioner as the grantee of the ta eemption cannot enjoy its ta eemption.

'n short, neither petitioner nor Petron can claim the refund, rendering the taeemption useless. Petitioner submits that this is contrary to the language and intent

of the N'/C and the 5ir 5greement.M1%

Petitioner also cites this CourtJs /esolution in ?ace!a v. ?acaraig, 1r.,M1Auoting the opinion of the


57/239

/espondent insists that in indirect taation, the manufacturer or seller has the

option to shift the burden of the ta to the purchaser. 'f and when shifted, the

amount added by the manufacturer or seller becomes part of the purchase price of

the goods. 8hus, the purchaser does not really pay the ta but only the price of the

commodity and the liability for the payment of the indirect ta remains with the

manufacturer or seller.M"1


58/239

transferred to petitioner was only the burden and not the liability to pay the ecise

ta on petroleum products.M#!

8he C85 also considered the 5viation &uel


59/239

8he C85 further cited Philippine 2cetlene +o., nc. v. +o''issioner of nternal

-evenueM#and +onte; +orporation v. Don. +o''issioner of nternal -evenue M#-and

concluded that the ta sought to be refunded is an ecise ta on petroleum products,

partaing of the nature of an indirect ta.M#;

8he C85 further ruled that while it is cogniDant of the eempt status of

petitioner under the N'/C and the 5ir 5greement, it is also aware that the right to

claim for refund of taes erroneously paid lies with the person statutorily liable to

pay the ta in accordance with


60/239


61/239

'n ?ace!a v. ?acaraig, 1r.,the Court specically mentioned ecise ta as an

eample of an indirect ta where the ta burden can be shifted to the buyer)

6n the other hand, Vindirect taes are taes primarily paid by personswho can shift the burden upon someone elseW. &or eample, the ecise and a!

valore'taes that the oil companies pay to the ureau of 'nternal /evenueupon removal of petroleum products from its renery can be shifted to itsbuyer, lie the NPC, by adding them to the cash andHor Vselling price.WM$;

Fhen Petron removes its petroleum products from its renery in Kimay,

ataan,M$9it pays the ecise ta due on the petroleum products thus

removed. Petron, as manufacturer or producer, is the person liable for the payment

of the ecise ta as shown in the 0cise 8a /eturns led with the '/.


62/239


63/239

on Petron as the manufacturer. Eence, Petron, as the statutory tapayer, is the

proper party that can claim the refund of the ecise taes paid to the '/.

8he0eneral =er's : +on!itions for 2viation Cuel $uppl


64/239

G.R. No. L-39910 '(:6 2, 1988

CECILIA TEOORO A7RIT, TORIBIA TEOORO CATANEA, PRUENCIO !.TEOORO, /RANCICO !. TEOORO, AN !OE/INA TEOOROTIONGON, petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE /ERNANO A. CRUD, P%"*"#+ !)*+, Ba#&$ II, Co)( o/"%( I#%(a#& o R"a, a#* MIAEL P. VERA, "# $"% &a'a&"(y a% ($Co::"%%"o# o I#(#a R#), respondents.

2tien9a, =abora, *el -osario : +astillo %aw #/ces an! =ana!a, $anche9, =ana!a :=ana!a %aw #/ces for petitioners.

GANCA7CO,J.:

8he application of ta amnesty to the estate of the 8eodoros is the issue in this case.

Petitioners are the legitimate children and heirs of the deceased spouses Barta .8eodoro who died intestate on uly 1, 19% and (on 8oribio 8eodoro who died testateon 5ugust #!, 19%. 8hereafter, the heirs of the deceased led separate estate andinheritance ta returns for the estates of the late spouses with the ureau of 'nternal/evenue.

'n the meantime, testate and intestate proceedings for the settlement of thedecedentsI estates were led 1by Cecilia 8eodoro@(ayrit, one of the petitionersherein, in the then Court of &irst 'nstance of Caloocan City, ranch '' doceted as


65/239

'nheritance 8a X interests 1,-$-,-9!.9$ 1,%1;,$%;.-"

8he aforementioned notice of deciency assessments was received by petitioner(ayrit on 5ugust 1$, 19-". 'n a letter dated 6ctober -, 19-", petitionersthrough counsel, ased for a reconsideration of the said assessments alleging thatthe same are contrary to law and not supported by su7cient evidence. 4'n the sameletter, petitioners reAuested a period of thirty #!: days within which to submit theirposition paper in support of their claim.

Beanwhile, on 6ctober 1, 19-", Presidential (ecree P.(: No. "#, entitled+Proclaiming 8a 5mnesty


66/239


67/239

6n uly 1!, 19-$, respondent udge issued an order approving the claim ofrespondent Commissioner and directing the payment of the estate and inheritancetaes.12(issastised with the decision, petitioners led a motion forreconsideration 13but it was denied 14in an order dated


68/239

19-$, before nally instituting the action for collection. 4nder the circumstances ofthe case, the act of the Commissioner in ling an action for allowance of the claimfor estate and inheritance taes, may be considered as an outright denial ofpetitionersI reAuest for reconsideration.

&rom the date of receipt of the copy of the CommissionerIs letter for collection ofestate and inheritance taes against the estates of the late 8eodoro spouses,petitioners must contest or dispute the same and, upon a denial thereof, thepetitioners have a period of thirty #!: days within which to appeal the case to theCourt of 8a 5ppeals.18his they failed to avail of .

8a assessments made by ta eaminers are presumed correct and made in goodfaith. 5 tapayer has to prove otherwise.15&ailure of the petitioners to appeal to theCourt of 8a 5ppeals in due time made the assessments in Auestion, nal, eecutoryand demandable.18

8he petitionersI allegation that the Court of &irst 'nstance C&': lacs jurisdiction over

the subject of the case is liewise untenable. 8he assessments having become naland eecutory, the C&' properly acAuired jurisdiction. 19Neither is there merit inpetitionersI claim that the eclusive jurisdiction of the Court of 8a 5ppeals C85:applies in the case. 8he aforesaid eclusive jurisdiction of the C85 arises only incases of disputed ta assessments. 205s noted earlier, petitionersI letter dated6ctober -, 19-" asing for reconsideration of the Auestioned assessments cannot beconsidered as one disputing the assessments because petitioners failed tosubstantiate their claim that the deciency assessments are contrary to law.Petitioners ased for a period of thirty #!: days within which to submit their positionpaper but they failed to submit the same nonetheless. Eence, petitionersI letter for areconsideration of the assessments is nothing but a mere scrap of paper.

PetitionersI contention that the absence of a decision on their reAuest forreconsideration of the assessments is a bar to granting the claim for collection isliewise without merit. 'n -epublic vs. %i' =ian =eng $on : +o., nc., 21this Court hadoccasion to rule that a decision on a reAuest for reinvestigation is not a conditionprecedent to the ling of an action for collection of taes already assessed. 8hisCourt ruled that +nowhere in the 8a Code is the Collector of 'nternal /evenuereAuired to rule rst on a tapayerIs reAuest for reconsideration before he can go tocourt for the purpose of collecting the ta assessed. 6n the contrary,


69/239

8he aforementioned cases are both not in point. 'n $an 1uan, the tapayerconcerned, through his accountant, disputed the assessments of income ta anddeciency income ta by adducing the reasons and eplanations why saidassessments of income ta were not due and owing from the tapayer. 8hus, it wastherein ruled that having disputed the assessments at the opportune time, theCommissioner of 'nternal /evenue cannot ignore the disputed assessments by

immediate immediately bringing an action to collect. y the same toenin +o''issioner of nternal -evenue vs. 0on9ales, the assessments of estate andinheritance taes were disputed by the tapayer by invoing prescription as adefense claiming that the assessments were made after the lapse of more than ve%: years.

Payment of taes being admittedly a burden, tapayers should not be left withoutany recourse when they feel aggrieved due to the erroneous and burdensomeassessments made by a ureau of 'nternal /evenue agent or by the Commissioner.


70/239

6n the other hand with respect the petitionersI plea that the estate is at any rateentitled to ta amnesty, a reading of P.(. No. "# 30reveals that in order to avail ofta amnesty, it is reAuired, among others, that there should be a voluntarydisclosure of a previously untaed income. 8his was the pronouncement of this Courtin 3epo'uceno vs. ?ontecillo31with respect to P.(. #-! 32which was decreed as acomplement of P.(. Nos. "# and 1%-. 'n addition thereto, said income must have

been earned or realiDed prior to 19-" and the ta return must be led on or beforeBarch #1, 19-#. Considering that P.(. No. "# was issued on 6ctober 1, 19-", thecourt rules that the said decree embraces only those income declared in pursuancethereof within the taable year 19-". 8he time frame cannot be stretched to includedeclarations made prior to the issuance of the said decree or those made outside ofthe time frame as envisioned in the said decree. 8hus, the estates of the 8eodorospouses which have been declared separately sometime in the 19!Is are clearlyoutside the coverage of the ta amnesty provision.

Petitioners argue, however, that even if a notice of deciency assessment hadalready been issued, the estates may still avail of ta amnesty if the basis of suchdeciency assessment is either the failure to le a return or the omission of items oftaable income for a return already led or the under declaration of said return,citing P.(. No. - and


71/239

G.R. No. 120880. !)# , 1995J

/ERINAN R. MARCO II,petitioner v!.COURT O/ APPEAL, THE

COMMIIONER O/ THE BUREAU O/ INTERNAL REVENUE a#*

HERMINIA . E GUDMAN, re!pondent!.

E C I I O N

TORRE, !R. J.

'n this Petition for /eview on +ertiorari,2overnment action is once again assailedas precipitate and unfair, suGering the basic and oftly implored reAuisites of dueprocess of law.


72/239

'. 5nnul and set aside the Notices of Kevy on real property dated &ebruary "", 199#and Bay "!, 199#, issued by respondent Commissioner of 'nternal /evenue*

''. 5nnul and set aside the Notices of


73/239

": Ma 8he numerous pending court cases Auestioning the late PresidentIsownership or interests in several properties both personal and real: mae thetotal value of his estate, and the conseAuent estate ta due, incapable of eactpecuniary determination at this time. 8hus, respondentsJ assessment of theestate ta and their issuance of the Notices of Kevy and


74/239

the amount of P"#,"9#,!-,#;.!! Pesos:* ": (eciency income ta assessment no.&5C@1@;%@91@!!"$%" and (eciency income ta assessment no. &5C@1@;@91@!!"$%1against the


75/239

Notices of sale at public auction were posted on Bay ", 199#, at the lobby of theCity Eall of 8acloban City. 8he public auction for the sale of the eleven 11: parcelsof land too place on uly %, 199#. 8here being no bidder, the lots were declaredforfeited in favor of the government.

6n une "%, 199#, petitioner &erdinand IongbongI Barcos '' led the instant petitionfor certiorari and prohibition under /ule % of the /ules of Court, with prayer fortemporary restraining order andHor writ of preliminary injunction.+

't has been repeatedly observed, and not without merit, that the enforcement ofta laws and the collection of taes, is of paramount importance for the sustenanceof government. 8aes are the lifeblood of the government and should be collectedwithout unnecessary hindrance. Eowever, such collection should be made inaccordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for governmentitself. 't is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conLicting interests of theauthorities and the tapayers so that the real purpose of taation, which is the

promotion of the common good, may be achieved.+

M#

Fhether or not the proper avenues of assessment and collection of the said taobligations were taen by the respondent ureau is now the subject of the CourtIsinAuiry.

Petitioner posits that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subseAuent sale ofproperties of the late President Barcos eGected by the '/ are null and void fordisregarding the established procedure for the enforcement of taes due upon theestate of the deceased. 8he case of (omingo vs. 2arlitosM$is specically cited tobolster the argument that +the ordinary procedure by which to settle claims ofindebtedness against the estate of a deceased, person, as in an inheritance estate:ta, is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said courtmay order the administrator to pay the amount therefor.+ 8his remedy is allegedly,eclusive, and cannot be eGected through any other means.

Petitioner goes further, submitting that the probate court is not precluded fromdenying a reAuest by the government for the immediate payment of taes, andshould order the payment of the same only within the period ed by the probatecourt for the payment of all the debts of the decedent. 'n this regard, petitioner citesthe case of Collector of 'nternal /evenue vs. 8he 5dministratri of the 0state of0charri - Phil %!":, where it was held that)

+8he case of Pineda vs. Court of &irst 'nstance of 8ayabas and Collector of 'nternal/evenue %" Phil ;!#:, relied upon by the petitioner@appellant is good authority onthe proposition that the court having control over the administration proceedings hasjurisdiction to entertain the claim presented by the government for taes due and toorder the administrator to pay the ta should it nd that the assessment was proper,and that the ta was legal, due and collectible. 5nd the rule laid down in that casemust be understood in relation to the case of Collector of Customs vs. Eaygood,
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jun1997/120880.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jun1997/120880.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jun1997/120880.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jun1997/120880.htm#_edn4


76/239

supra., as to the procedure to be followed in a given case by the government toeGectuate the collection of the ta. Categorically stated, where during the pendencyof judicial administration over the estate of a deceased person a claim for taes ispresented by the government, the court has the authority to order payment by theadministrator* but, in the same way that it has authority to order payment or

satisfaction, it also has the negative authority to deny the same. Fhile there arecases where courts are reAuired to perform certain duties mandatory and ministerialin character, the function of the court in a case of the present character is not one ofthem* and here, the court cannot be an organism endowed with latitude ofjudgment in one direction, and converted into a mere mechanical contrivance inanother direction.+

6n the other hand, it is argued by the '/, that the stateIs authority to collectinternal revenue taes is paramount. 8hus, the pendency of probate proceedingsover the estate of the deceased does not preclude the assessment and collection,through summary remedies, of estate taes over the same. 5ccording to the

respondent, claims for payment of estate and income taes due and assessed afterthe death of the decedent need not be presented in the form of a claim against theestate. 8hese can and should be paid immediately. 8he probate court is not thegovernment agency to decide whether an estate is liable for payment of estate ofincome taes. Fell@settled is the rule that the probate court is a court with specialand limited jurisdiction.

Concededly, the authority of the /egional 8rial Court, sitting, albeitwith limitedjurisdiction, as a probate court over estate of deceased individual, is not a triLingthing. 8he courtIs jurisdiction, once invoed, and made eGective, cannot be treatedwith indiGerence nor should it be ignored with impunity by the very parties invoingits authority.

'n testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of theprobate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by hisprospective heirs before nal adjudication*M%to determine who are the heirs of thedecedent*Mthe recognition of a natural child*M-the status of a woman claiming to bethe legal wife of the decedent*M;the legality of disinheritance of an heir by thetestator*M9and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights. M1!

8he pivotal Auestion the court is tased to resolve refers to the authority of theureau of 'nternal /evenue to collect by the summary remedy of levying upon, andsale of real properties of the decedent, estate ta deciencies, without the cognitionand authority of the court sitting in probate over the supposed will of the deceased.

8he nature of the process of estate ta collection has been described as follows)

+


77/239

of the probate court to mae the amount of the inheritance ta a part of the naldecree of distribution of the estate. 't is not against the property of decedent, nor isit a claim against the estate as such, but it is against the interest or property rightwhich the heir, legatee, devisee, etc., has in the property formerly held bydecedent. &urther, under some statutes, it has been held that it is not a suit or

controversy between the parties, nor is it an adversary proceeding between thestate and the person who owes the ta on the inheritance. Eowever, under otherstatutes it has been held that the hearing and determination of the cash value of theassets and the determination of the ta are adversary proceedings. 8he proceedinghas been held to be necessarily a proceeding in rem. M11

'n the Philippine eperience, the enforcement and collection of estate ta, iseecutive in character, as the legislature has seen it t to ascribe this tas to theureau of 'nternal /evenue.


78/239

+8hus, the 2overnment has two ways of collecting the taes in Auestion. 6ne, bygoing after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the amount of the taproportionate to the inheritance received. 5nother remedy, pursuant to the liencreated by


79/239

'f the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association or corporationadversely aGected by the decision on the protest may appeal to the Court of 8a5ppeals within thirty #!: days from receipt of said decision* otherwise, the decisionshall become nal, eecutory and demandable. 5s inserted by P.(. 1--#:+

5part from failing to le the reAuired estate ta return within the time reAuiredfor the ling of the same, petitioner, and the other heirs never Auestioned theassessments served upon them, allowing the same to lapse into nality, andprompting the '/ to collect the said taes by levying upon the properties left byPresident Barcos.

Petitioner submits, however, that +while the assessment of taes may have beenvalidly undertaen by the 2overnment, collection thereof may have been done inviolation of the law. 8hus, the manner and method in which the latter is enforcedmay be Auestioned separately, and irrespective of the nality of the former, becausethe 2overnment does not have the unbridled discretion to enforce collection without

regard to the clear provision of law.+

M1$

Petitioner specically points out that applying Bemorandum Circular No. #;@;,implementing


80/239


81/239

ndings of the (epartment of usticeIs Panel of Prosecutors as per its resolution of "!


82/239

0ven if we are to rule out the notices of assessments personally given to thecaretaer of Brs. Barcos at the latterIs last nown address, on 5ugust ", 1991 and


83/239

mailed to or served upon the /egister of (eeds of the province or city where theproperty is located and upon the delinAuent tapayer, or if he be absent from thePhilippines, to his agent or the manager of the business in respect to which theliability arose, or if there be none, to the occupant of the property in Auestion.

+

8he foregoing notwithstanding, the record shows that notices of warrants ofdistraint and levy of sale were furnished the counsel of petitioner on 5pril -, 199#,and une 1!, 199#, and the petitioner himself on 5pril 1", 199# at his o7ce at theatasang Pambansa.M"1Fe cannot therefore, countenance petitionerIs insistencethat he was denied due process. Fhere there was an opportunity to raise objectionsto government action, and such opportunity was disregarded, for no justiablereason, the party claiming oppression then becomes the oppressor of the orderlyfunctions of government. Ee who comes to court must come with cleanhands. 6therwise, he not only taints his name, but ridicules the very structure of

established authority.

IN VIE HEREO/, the Court /0


84/239

6n uly #1, 19%-, 5gent anDuela submitted his report wherein it was stated amongothers that >

't can be stated in this connection that sometime in the early part of19$9, the personnel of the local o7ce of the ureau of &orestry in (aet,Camarines Norte, manifested under the name of the subject tapayer",!%".$; cubic meters of timber, with the corresponding forest chargesin the total amount of P1%,$$#.% including surcharges. 8he ureau of&orestry then demanded for the payment of said forest charges onanuary 1%, 19$9. Eowever, the subject tapayer, for one reason or the

other, contested this assessment until this case reached the hands ofthe


85/239

&orest charges and surcharges for the year 19$9 appealed to the

FE0/0&6/0, judgment is rendered >

a: 6rdering both defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiG theamount of P1,"19.9% plus legal interest thereon from 5ugust "%, 191,


86/239

the date of the ling of the original complaint until fully paid, or in caseof failure to Pay the said amount, ordering the forfeiture of 2'

c: Fhere the assessment of any internal revenue ta has been madewithin the period of limitation above prescribed such ta may becollected by distraint or levy or by a proceeding in court, but only ifbegun 1: within ve years after the assessment of the ta, or ": priorto the epiration of any period for collection agreed upon in writing bythe Collector of 'nternal /evenue and the tapayer before the epirationof such ve@year period. 8he period so agreed upon may be etendedby subseAuent agreements in writing made before the epiration of theperiod previously agreed upon.

petitioner argues that counting from anuary 1%, 19$9 when the ureau of &orestry in(aet, Camarines Norte made an assessment and demand for payment of theamount of P1%,$$#.%% as forest charges and surcharges for the year 19$9, up to theling of the complaint for collection before the lower court on 5ugust "%, 19 1,more than ve %: years had already elapsed, hence, the action had clearlyprescribed.


87/239

PetitionerIs aforesaid argument lacs merit. 5s correctly observed by the trial courtand the Court of 5ppeals in the appealed decision, the letter of demand of the 5ctingCommissioner of 'nternal /evenue dated 5ugust "9, 19%; was the basis ofrespondentIs complaint led in this case and not the demand letter of the ureau of&orestry dated anuary 1%, 19$9. 8his must be so because forest charges are internal

revenue taes

and the sole power and duty to collect the same is lodged with theureau of 'nternal /evenue 5and not with the ureau of &orestry. 8he computationandHor assessment of forest charges made by the ureau of &orestry may or may notbe adopted by the Commissioner of 'nternal /evenue and such computation madeby the ureau of &orestry is not appealable to the Court of 8a 5ppeals. 88herefore,for the purpose of computing the ve@year period within which to le a complaint forcollection, the demand or even the assessment made by the ureau of &orestry isimmaterial.

'n the case at bar, the commencement of the ve@year period should be countedfrom 5ugust "9, 19%;, the date of the letter of demand of the 5cting Commissioner

of 'nternal /evenue

9

to petitioner Bambulao Kumber Company. 't is this demand orassessment that is appealable to the Court of 8a 5ppeals. 8he complaint forcollection was led in the Court of &irst 'nstance of Banila on 5ugust "%, 191, verymuch within the ve@year period prescribed by


88/239

jurisdiction, of collusion between the parties, or of fraud in the partyoGering the record with respect to the proceedings. 5s held by thisCourt in 'nsular 2overnment vs. Nico the tapayer may raise only theAuestions whether or not the Collector of 'nternal /evenue hadjurisdiction to do the particular act, and whether any fraud was

committed in the doing of the act. 'n that case, (oroteo Nico was nedby the Collector of 'nternal /evenue for violation of sub@paragraphs d:,e: and g: of


89/239

Kim 8ian 8eng


90/239


91/239

collecting the ta assessed. 6n the contrary,


92/239

later than 6ctober ;, 19%- for on said date it acnowledged receipt thereof. 't hadthirty days from 6ctober ;, 19%- within which to appeal to the Court of 8a 5ppealspursuant to


93/239

evidence of want of jurisdiction, of collusion between the parties, or of fraud in theparty oGering the record with respect to the proceedings. 115s held by this +ourt innsular 0overn'ent vs.3ico 1"the tapayer may raise only the Auestions whether or not the Collector of'nternal /evenue had jurisdiction to do the particular act, and whether any fraud was

committed in the doing of the act. 'n that case, (oroteo Nico was ned by theCollector of 'nternal /evenue for violation of subparagraphs d:, e: and g: of


94/239

Fe now come to the appeal of the 2overnment. 't maintains that the lower courterred in not imposing on defendantIs ta liability a surcharge of %= for late payment.


95/239

G.R. No. L-4255 A)+)%( , 198

AUGUTO BAA, petitioner,vs.REPUBLIC O/ THE PHILIPPINE, '%#(* 6y ($ o"&"(o G#a, a#*

!)*+ GUILLERMO /. VILLAOR, Ba#&$ V, Co)( o /"%( I#%(a#& oMa#"a, respondent.

2ngel -. 0on9ales for petitioner.

=he $olicitor 0eneral for respon!ents.

AQUINO,J.:

8he issue in this case is whether the decision of the Court of &irst 'nstance of Banilanot the 8a Court: in an income ta case is reviewable by the 5ppellate Court or bythis Court.

'n a demand letter dated 5ugust #1, 19-, the Commissioner of 'nternal /evenueassessed against 5ugusto asa deciency income taes for 19%- to 19! totallingP1,#%#.1".Z

5s may be noted, the deciencies were based on the tapayerIs failure to report infull his capital gains on the sales of land. 8his omission or underdeclaration ofincome justied the imposition of %!= surcharge.

8he tapayer did not contest the assessments in the 8a Court. 8he CommissionerIsletter@decision on the case was dated *ece'ber 6, 7GHK. 6n the assumption that theassessments had become nal and incontestable, the Commissioner on


96/239

Fe hold that the petition is devoid of merit. 8he trial court acted within itsjurisdiction in rendering its decision and dismissing asaIs appeal. Ee should haveappealed to this Court. Eis failure to do so rendered the decision nal andeecutory.De has no cause of action for certiorari.

8he decision is correct. 'f he wanted to contest the assessments, he should haveappealed to the 8a Court. Not having done so, he could not contest the same in theCourt of &irst 'nstance.

8he issue of prescription raised by him is baseless. 8he assessments were predicatedon the fact that his income ta returns, if not fraudulent, were false because heunderdeclared his income. 'n such a case, the deciency assessments may be madewithin ten years after the discovery of the falsity or omission. 8he court actionshould be instituted within ve years after the assessment but this period issuspended during the time that the Commission is prohibited from instituting a courtaction.ZZ

5s eplained in the


97/239

'n the complaint led by the /epublic of the Philippines, through the


98/239

on a charge of non@payment of income taes is fatal to any civil action tocollect the payment of said taes.7LwphM7.Nt

PlaintiG@appellant assails the ruling as erroneous. (efendant@appellee on his parturges that it should be maintained.

'n applying the principle underlying the civil liability of an oGender under the PenalCode to a case involving the collection of taes, the court a quo fell into error. 8hetwo cases are circumscribed by factual premises which are diametrically opposed toeach either, and are founded on entirely diGerent philosophies. 4nder the Penal Codethe civil liability is incurred by reason of the oGenderIs criminal act.


99/239


100/239

VFE0/0&6/0, nding Mthe herein petitionerJs [Botion to (ismissJ as4NB0/'86/'64


101/239

[/espondent Court of 8a 5ppeals acted with grave abuse of discretion and withoutjurisdiction in considering the a7davitHreport of the revenue o7cer and theindorsement of said report to the secretary of justice as assessment which may beappealed to the Court of 8a 5ppeals*

/espondent Court of 8a 5ppeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in consideringthe denial by petitioner of private respondentsJ Botion for /econsideration as Manal decision which may be appealed to the Court of 8a 5ppeals.J

V'n denying the motion to dismiss led by the C'/, the Court of 8a 5ppeals stated)

[Fe agree with petitionersJ contentions, that the criminal complaint for ta evasion isthe assessment issued, and that the letter denial of Bay 1-, 199% is the decisionproperly appealable to Mus. /espondentJs ground of denial, therefore, that therewas no formal assessment issued, is untenable.

['t is the CourtJs honest belief, that the criminal case for ta evasion is already anassessment. 8he complaint, more particularly, the oint 57davit of /evenue0aminers Kagmay and


102/239

evasion complaint, more than su7ce to Aualify as an assessment. 8herefore, thisassessment having been disputed by petitioners, and there being a denial of theirletter disputing such assessment, this Court unAuestionably acAuired jurisdictionover the instant petition for review.JWM

5s earlier observed, the Court of 5ppeals sustained the C85 and dismissed thepetition.

Eence, this recourse to this Court.M-

R)"#+ o ($ Co)( o A''a%

8he Court of 5ppeals held that the ta court committed no grave abuse ofdiscretion in ruling that the Criminal Complaint for ta evasion led by theCommissioner of 'nternal /evenue with the (epartment of ustice constituted anVassessmentW of the ta due, and that the said assessment could be the subject of a

protest. y denition, an assessment is simply the statement of the details and theamount of ta due from a tapayer. ased on this denition, the details of the tacontained in the '/ eaminersJ oint 57davit,M;which was attached to the criminalComplaint, constituted an assessment.


103/239

Petitioner argues that the ling of the criminal complaint with the (epartment ofustice cannot in any way be construed as a formal assessment of privaterespondentsJ ta liabilities. 8his position is based on


104/239

within which to mae an assessment or to protest the same, or whether interest andpenalty may accrue thereon.

't should also be stressed that the said document is a notice duly sent to thetapayer. 'ndeed, an assessment is deemed made only when the collector of

internal revenue releases, mails or sends such notice to the tapayer.

M1

'n the present case, the revenue o7cersJ 57davit merely contained acomputation of respondentsJ ta liability. 't did not state a demand or a period forpayment. Forse, it was addressed to the justice secretary, not to the tapayers.

/espondents maintain that an assessment, in relation to taation, is simplyunderstood to mean)

V5 notice to the eGect that the amount therein stated is due as ta and a demand forpayment thereof.WM1-

V&ies the liability of the tapayer and ascertains the facts and furnishes the data forthe proper presentation of ta rolls.WM1;

0ven these denitions fail to advance private respondentsJ case. 8hat the '/eaminersJ oint 57davit attached to the Criminal Complaint contained some detailsof the ta liabilities of private respondents does not ipso factomae it anassessment. 8he purpose of the oint 57davit was merely to support andsubstantiate the Criminal Complaint for ta evasion. Clearly, it was not meant to bea notice of the ta due and a demand to the private respondents for paymentthereof.

8he fact that the Complaint itself was specically directed and sent to the(epartment of ustice and not to private respondents shows that the intent of thecommissioner was to le a criminal complaint for ta evasion, not to issue anassessment. 5lthough the revenue o7cers recommended the issuance of anassessment, the commissioner opted instead to le a criminal case for taevasion. Fhat private respondents received was a notice from the (6 that acriminal case for ta evasion had been led against them, not a notice that theureau of 'nternal /evenue had made an assessment.

'n addition, what private respondents sent to the commissioner was a motion fora reconsideration of the ta evasion charges led, not of an assessment, as shownthus)

V8his is to reAuest for reconsideration of the ta evasion charges against my client,P5


105/239

A**"("o#a I%%)%A!!e!!ment Not Nece!!ar" efore (ilin$ of #riminal

#omplaint

Private respondents maintain that the ling of a criminal complaint must bepreceded by an assessment. 8his is incorrect, because


106/239

a% P%"*#(, Ta%) a#* &(ay

o A*a:%o# Ma#a+:#( Co'oa("o#,

Petitioners,

@ versus @

COURT O/ APPEAL a#*

LIA7A7 VINDON-CHATO,

"# $ &a'a&"(y a% Co::"%%"o#

o ($ B)a) o I#(#a R#),/espondents.

@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @

COMMIIONER O/ G.R. No. 1245

INTERNAL REVENUE,

Petitioner,Present)

@versus@ P4N6, +.1., Chairperson,

C5/P'6,C6/6N5,

COURT O/ APPEAL, COURT K06N5/(6@(0 C5


107/239

K6< /0R0< private respondents:, in their respective capacities as president,

treasurer and secretary of 5damson Banagement Corporation 5BC: against then

Commissioner of 'nternal /evenue Kiwayway ?inDons@Chato C6BB'


108/239


109/239

6n 6ctober 1!, 199$, the Commissioner led a Petition for /eview with the

Court of 5ppeals assailing the trial courtJs dismissal of the criminal cases.


110/239

$. FE08E0/ 6/ N68 8E0 &'K'N2 6& 5 C/'B'N5K C6BPK5'N8


111/239

8he Commissioner repaired to the Court of 5ppeals on the ground that

the C85 acted with grave abuse of discretion.


112/239

3. HETHER THE COURT O/ TA APPEAL HA !URIICTION

TO TAE COGNIDANCE O/ BOTH THE CIVIL AN THE CRIMINAL

APECT O/ THE TA LIABILIT7 O/ AMC, LUCA G. AAMON,

THEREE !UNE . AAMON AN ARA . E LO RE7E.

8he case of CIR . Pa%&o Ra(y, ( a.M11 is relevant. 'n this case, then '/

Commissioner ose 4. 6ng authoriDed revenue o7cers to eamine the boos of

accounts and other accounting records of Pascor /ealty and (evelopment

Corporation P/(C: for 19;, 19;- and 19;;. 8his resulted in a recommendation for

the issuance of an assessment in the amounts of P-,$9;,$#$.% and P#,!1%,"#.#%

for the years 19; and 19;-, respectively.

6n Barch 1, 199%, the Commissioner led a criminal complaint before the (6

against P/(C, its President /ogelio 5. (io, and its 8reasurer ?irginia


113/239

the C85 order. Eowever, this Court reversed the Court of 5ppeals decision and the

C85 order, and ordered the dismissal of the petition. Fe held)

5n assessment contains not only a computation of ta liabilities, but also ademand for payment within a prescribed period. 't also signals the time when

penalties and interests begin to accrue against the tapayer. 8o enable thetapayer to determine his remedies thereon, due process reAuires that it mustbe served on and received by the tapayer. 5ccordingly, an a7davit, whichwas eecuted by revenue o7cers stating the ta liabilities of a tapayer andattached to a criminal complaint for ta evasion, cannot be deemed anassessment that can be Auestioned before the Court of 8a 5ppeals.

Neither the N'/C nor the revenue regulations governing the protest ofassessmentsM1"provide a specic denition or form of anassessment. Eowever, the N'/C denes the specic functions and eGects ofan assessment. 8o consider the a7davit attached to the Complaint as a

proper assessment is to subvert the nature of an assessment and to set a badprecedent that will prejudice innocent tapayers.

8rue, as pointed out by the private respondents, an assessment informsthe tapayer that he or she has ta liabilities. ut not all documents comingfrom the '/ containing a computation of the ta liability can be deemedassessments.

8o start with, an assessment must be sent to and received by a tapayer,and must demand payment of the taes described therein within a specicperiod. 8hus, the N'/C imposes a "% percent penalty, in addition to the ta

due, in case the tapayer fails to pay the deciency ta within the timeprescribed for its payment in the notice of assessment. Kiewise, an interestof "! percent per annum, or such higher rate as may be prescribed by rulesand regulations, is to be collected from the date prescribed for its paymentuntil the full payment.M1#

8he issuance of an assessment is vital in determining the period oflimitation regarding its proper issuance and the period within which to protestit.


114/239

't should also be stressed that the said document is a notice duly sent tothe tapayer. 'ndeed, an assessment is deemed made only when the collectorof internal revenue releases, mails or sends such notice to the tapayer. M1-

'n the present case, the revenue o7cersJ 57davit merely contained acomputation of respondentsJ ta liability. 't did not state a demand or a periodfor payment. Forse, it was addressed to the justice secretary, not to thetapayers.

/espondents maintain that an assessment, in relation to taation, issimply understood to mean)

V5 notice to the eGect that the amount therein stated is due asta and a demand for payment thereof.WM1;

V&ies the liability of the tapayer and ascertains the facts andfurnishes the data for the proper presentation of ta rolls.W M19

0ven these denitions fail to advance private respondentsJ case. 8hat the'/ eaminersJ oint 57davit attached to the Criminal Complaint containedsome details of the ta liabilities of private respondents does not ipsofactomae it an assessment. 8he purpose of the oint 57davit was merely tosupport and substantiate the Criminal Complaint for ta evasion. Clearly, itwas not meant to be a notice of the ta due and a demand to the privaterespondents for payment thereof.

8he fact that the Complaint itself was specically directed and sent to the(epartment of ustice and not to private respondents shows that the intent ofthe commissioner was to le a criminal complaint for ta evasion, not to issuean assessment. 5lthough the revenue o7cers recommended the issuance ofan assessment, the commissioner opted instead to le a criminal casefor ta evasion. Fhat private respondents received was a notice from the (6that a criminal case for ta evasion had been led against them, not a noticethat the ureau of 'nternal /evenue had made an assessment.

Private respondents maintain that the ling of a criminal complaint mustbe preceded by an assessment. 8his is incorrect, because


115/239

whether to issue an assessment or to le a criminal case against the tapayeror to do both.

Private respondents insist that


116/239

Fe rule that the recommendation letter of the Commissioner cannot be

considered a formal assessment. 0ven a cursory perusal of the said letter would

reveal three ey points)

1. 't was not addressed to the tapayers.

". 8here was no demand made on the tapayers to pay the ta liability, nor

a period for payment set therein.

#. 8he letter was never mailed or sent to the tapayers by the

Commissioner.

'n ne, the said recommendation letter served merely as thepri'a

faciebasis for ling criminal informations that the tapayers had violated


117/239

the capital gains ta return and the ?58 returns, and paid the taes they have

declared due therefrom. 4pon investigation of the eaminers of the '/, there

was a preliminary nding of gross discrepancy in the computation of the capital

gains taes due from the sale of two lots of 55' shares, rst to 5P5C and then to

5P5C Philippines, Kimited. 8he eaminers also found that the ?58 had not been

paid for ?58@liable sale of services for the third and fourth Auarters of

199!. 5rguably, the gross disparity in the taes due and the amounts actually

declared by the private respondents constitutes badges of fraud.

8hus, the applicability of U#+a6 . C)%"M"%is evident to the cases at

bar. 'n this seminal case, this Court ruled that there was no need for precise

computation and formal assessment in order for criminal complaints to be ledagainst him. 't Auoted BertenJs Kaw of &ederal 'ncome 8aation, ?ol. 1!,


118/239

arising under the National 'nternal /evenue Code or other laws or partof law administered by the ureau of 'nternal /evenue*

/epublic 5ct No. ;$"$, titled V5n 5ct 5mending the National 'nternal /evenue

Code, 5s 5mended, 5nd &or 6ther Purposes,W later epanded the jurisdiction of the

Commissioner and, correspondingly, that of the C85, thus)


119/239

the ureau of 'nternal /evenue, where the National 'nternal /evenueCode provides a specic period of action, in which case the inaction shallbe deemed a denial*

#: (ecisions, orders or resolutions of the /egional 8rial Courts inlocal ta cases originally decided or resolved by them in the eercise of

their original or appellate jurisdiction*

b: urisdiction over cases involving criminal oGenses as herein provided)

1: 0clusive original jurisdiction over all criminal oGenses arisingfrom violations of the National 'nternal /evenue Code or 8ariG andCustoms Code and other laws administered by the ureau of 'nternal/evenue or the ureau of Customs) Provi!e!, however, 8hat oGenses orfelonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount of taesand fees, eclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than 6nemillion pesos P1,!!!,!!!.!!: or where there is no specied amount

claimed shall be tried by the regular courts and the jurisdiction of theC85 shall be appellate. 5ny provision of law or the /ules of Court to thecontrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civilaction for the recovery of civil liability for taes and penalties shall at alltimes be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in thesame proceeding by the C85, the ling of the criminal action beingdeemed to necessarily carry with it the ling of the civil action, and noright to reserve the lling of such civil action separately from the criminalaction will be recogniDed.

": 0clusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal oGenses)

a: 6ver appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders ofthe /egional 8rial Courts in ta cases originally decided by them,in their respected territorial jurisdiction.

b: 6ver petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions ororders of the /egional 8rial Courts in the eercise of theirappellate jurisdiction over ta cases originally decided by theBetropolitan 8rial Courts, Bunicipal 8rial Courts and BunicipalCircuit 8rial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.

c: urisdiction over ta collection cases as herein provided)

1: 0clusive original jurisdiction in ta collection cases

involving nal and eecutory assessments for taes, fees,charges and penalties) Provided, however, 8hat collectioncases where the principal amount of taes and fees, eclusiveof charges and penalties, claimed is less than 6ne millionpesos P1,!!!,!!!.!!: shall be tried by the proper Bunicipal8rial Court, Betropolitan 8rial Court and /egional 8rial Court.

": 0clusive appellate jurisdiction in ta collection cases)


120/239

a: 6ver appeals from the judgments, resolutions ororders of the /egional 8rial Courts in ta collection casesoriginally decided by them, in their respective territorialjurisdiction.

b: 6ver petitions for review of the judgments,

resolutions or orders of the /egional 8rial Courts in theeercise of their appellate jurisdiction over ta collectioncases originally decided by the Betropolitan 8rial Courts,Bunicipal 8rial Courts and Bunicipal Circuit 8rial Courts, intheir respective jurisdiction.

8hese laws have epanded the jurisdiction of the C85. Eowever, they did

not change the jurisdiction of the C85 to entertain an appeal only from a nal

decision or assessment of the Commissioner, or in cases where the Commissioner

has not acted within the period prescribed by the N'/C. 'n the cases at bar, the

Commissioner has not issued an assessment of the ta liability of private

respondents.

&inally, we hold that contrary to private respondentsJ stance, the doctrines

laid down in CIR . U#"o# $"''"#+ Co.and7a6% . /o?oare not applicable

to the cases at bar. 'n these earlier cases, the Commissioner already rendered an

assessment of the ta liabilities of the delinAuent tapayers, for which reason the

Court ruled that the ling of the civil suit for collection of the taes due was a

nal denial of the tapayersJ reAuest for reconsideration of the ta assessment.

IN VIE HEREO/, premises considered, judgment is rendered)

1. 'n 2./. No. 1"!9#%, 5&&'/B'N2 the C5 decision dated Barch "1,199%, which set aside the /egional 8rial CourtJs 6rder dated 5ugust ;,199$, and /0'N


121/239

O ORERE.

G.R. No. 104151. /6)ay 24, 1999J

COMMIIONER O/ INTERNAL REVENUE,petitioner v!. B./. GOORICH

PHIL., INC. =#o< IME ARB7 INTERNATIONAL TIRE CO., INC.> a#*THE COURT O/ APPEAL, re!pondent!.

E C I I O N

PANGANIBAN,J.

Notwithstanding the epiration of the ve@year prescriptive period, may theureau of 'nternal /evenue '/: still assess a tapayer even after the latter hasalready paid the ta due, on the ground that the previous assessment wasinsu7cient or based on a VfalseW returnQ

T$ Ca%

8his is the main Auestion raised before us in this Petition for /eviewon +ertiorariassailing the (ecisionM1dated &ebruary 1$, 199", promulgated by theCourt of 5ppealsM"in C5@2/


122/239

ased on the '/Js Ketter of 5uthority No. 1!11% dated 5pril 1$, 19-%, the boosand accounts of private respondent were eamined for the purpose of determiningits ta liability for taable year 19-$. 8he eamination resulted in the 5pril "#, 19-%assessment of private respondent for deciency income ta in the amountof P,!!%.#%, which it duly paid.


123/239

ve@year period, then, it may be validly justied only by [fraud, irregularity andmistaeJ on the part of the tapayer.WM

Eence, this Petition for /eview under /ule $% of the /ules of Court. M-

T$ I%%)%

efore us, petitioner raises the following issues)

V'

Fhether or not petitionerJs right to assess herein deciency donorJs ta has indeedprescribed as ruled by public respondent Court of 5ppeals

''

Fhether or not the herein deciency donorJs ta assessment for 19-$ is valid and inaccordance with lawW

Prescription is the crucial issue in the resolution of this case.

T$ Co)(% R)"#+

8he petition has no merit.

Ma"# I%%) 6re!cription

8he petitioner contends that the Court of 5ppeals erred in reversing the C85 onthe issue of prescription, because its ruling was based on factual ndings that shouldhave been left undisturbed on appeal, in the absence of any showing that it hadbeen tainted with gross error or grave abuse of discretion.M;8he Court is notpersuaded.

8rue, the factual ndings of the C85 are generally not disturbed on appeal whensupported by substantial evidence and in the absence of gross error or grave abuseof discretion. Eowever, the C85Js application of the law to the facts of thiscontroversy is an altogether diGerent matter, for it involves a legal Auestion. 8hereis a Auestion of law when the issue is the application of the law to a given set of

facts. 6n the other hand, a Auestion of fact involves the truth or falsehood ofalleged facts.M9'n the present case, the Court of 5ppeals ruled not on the truth orfalsity of the facts found by the C85, but on the latterJs application of the law onprescription.


124/239

V


125/239

collection of taes. 8hus, the law on prescription, being a remedial measure, shouldbe liberally construed in order to aGord such protection.M1"5s a corollary, theeceptions to the law on prescription should perforce be strictly construed.


126/239

fraudulently. 0Aually. signicant was its failure to prove respondentIs intent to evadethe payment of the correct amount of ta.

'neludibly, the '/ failed to show that private respondentIs 19-$ return was ledfraudulently with intent to evade the payment of the correct amount of ta.M1%

Boreover, even though a donorIs ta, which is dened as +a ta on the privilegeof transmitting oneIs property or property rights to another or others withoutadeAuate and full valuable consideration,+M1is diGerent from capital gains ta, a taon the gain from the sale of the tapayerIs property forming part of capital assets,M1- the ta return led by private respondent to report its income for the year 19-$was su7cient compliance with the leg

tax cases midterms

Documents