tari⁄ binding overhang: theory and evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 ·...
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Tari¤ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence
Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo Rho2
1University of New Hampshire
2Vanderbilt University
October 10, 2011George Washington University
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 1 / 24
![Page 2: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Introduction
Most market access commitments are in the form of Tari¤ Bindings.
Binding Overhang
Applied Tari¤s are substantially below the binding rates in manysectors/countries.
Binding Status # of sectors Share(%) Import Share (%)Applied Tari¤ below Binding 117,258 64.7 1.36e+12 23.8
Strong Binding 29,197 16.1 3.72e+12 65.0Unbound 34,810 19.2 6.40e+11 11.2Total 181,265 100 7.062+12 100
WTO members have retained substantial �exibility in choosing theirimport tari¤s.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 2 / 24
![Page 3: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Introduction
Most market access commitments are in the form of Tari¤ Bindings.Binding Overhang
Applied Tari¤s are substantially below the binding rates in manysectors/countries.
Binding Status # of sectors Share(%) Import Share (%)Applied Tari¤ below Binding 117,258 64.7 1.36e+12 23.8
Strong Binding 29,197 16.1 3.72e+12 65.0Unbound 34,810 19.2 6.40e+11 11.2Total 181,265 100 7.062+12 100
WTO members have retained substantial �exibility in choosing theirimport tari¤s.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 2 / 24
![Page 4: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Introduction
Most market access commitments are in the form of Tari¤ Bindings.Binding Overhang
Applied Tari¤s are substantially below the binding rates in manysectors/countries.
Binding Status # of sectors Share(%) Import Share (%)Applied Tari¤ below Binding 117,258 64.7 1.36e+12 23.8
Strong Binding 29,197 16.1 3.72e+12 65.0Unbound 34,810 19.2 6.40e+11 11.2Total 181,265 100 7.062+12 100
WTO members have retained substantial �exibility in choosing theirimport tari¤s.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 2 / 24
![Page 5: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
20 22 24 26 28 30 320
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180Log of GDP
Bin
d T
ariff
Log of GDP and Bind Tariff
China
Bangladesh
Zambia
US
Kenya
Jameica
Guyana
![Page 6: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
20 22 24 26 28 30 320
50
100
150
Log of GDP
Ove
rhan
g T
ariff
Log of GDP and Overhang Tariff
USEU
Bangladesh
Mongolia
KuwaitMauritus
Guyana
![Page 7: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Introduction
Most market access commitments are in the form of Tari¤ Bindings.Binding Overhang
Applied Tari¤s are substantially below the binding rates in manysectors/countries.
Binding Status # of sectors Share(%) Import Share (%)Applied Tari¤ below Binding 117,258 64.7 1.36e+12 23.8
Strong Binding 29,197 16.1 3.72e+12 65.0Unbound 34,810 19.2 6.40e+11 11.2Total 181,265 100 7.062+12 100
WTO members have retained substantial �exibility in choosing theirimport tari¤s.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 2 / 24
![Page 8: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
Flexibility and Protectionism Trade-O¤
Purpose of trade agreements
Terms-of-trade externality of trade policy
Need for �exibility
Uncertain political-economy conditions
Alternative �exibility mechanisms:
Weak Tari¤ BindingsContingent Protection (requires state veri�cation, e.g.:Safeguards andAntidumping)Liability System (break and compensate; e.g.: GATT escape clause)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 5 / 24
![Page 9: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Flexibility and Protectionism Trade-O¤
Purpose of trade agreements
Terms-of-trade externality of trade policy
Need for �exibility
Uncertain political-economy conditions
Alternative �exibility mechanisms:
Weak Tari¤ BindingsContingent Protection (requires state veri�cation, e.g.:Safeguards andAntidumping)Liability System (break and compensate; e.g.: GATT escape clause)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 5 / 24
![Page 10: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Flexibility and Protectionism Trade-O¤
Purpose of trade agreements
Terms-of-trade externality of trade policy
Need for �exibility
Uncertain political-economy conditions
Alternative �exibility mechanisms:
Weak Tari¤ BindingsContingent Protection (requires state veri�cation, e.g.:Safeguards andAntidumping)Liability System (break and compensate; e.g.: GATT escape clause)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 5 / 24
![Page 11: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Flexibility and Protectionism Trade-O¤
Purpose of trade agreements
Terms-of-trade externality of trade policy
Need for �exibility
Uncertain political-economy conditions
Alternative �exibility mechanisms:
Weak Tari¤ BindingsContingent Protection (requires state veri�cation, e.g.:Safeguards andAntidumping)Liability System (break and compensate; e.g.: GATT escape clause)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 5 / 24
![Page 12: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Flexibility and Protectionism Trade-O¤
Purpose of trade agreements
Terms-of-trade externality of trade policy
Need for �exibility
Uncertain political-economy conditions
Alternative �exibility mechanisms:
Weak Tari¤ BindingsContingent Protection (requires state veri�cation, e.g.:Safeguards andAntidumping)Liability System (break and compensate; e.g.: GATT escape clause)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 5 / 24
![Page 13: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Flexibility and Protectionism Trade-O¤
Purpose of trade agreements
Terms-of-trade externality of trade policy
Need for �exibility
Uncertain political-economy conditions
Alternative �exibility mechanisms:
Weak Tari¤ Bindings
Contingent Protection (requires state veri�cation, e.g.:Safeguards andAntidumping)Liability System (break and compensate; e.g.: GATT escape clause)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 5 / 24
![Page 14: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Flexibility and Protectionism Trade-O¤
Purpose of trade agreements
Terms-of-trade externality of trade policy
Need for �exibility
Uncertain political-economy conditions
Alternative �exibility mechanisms:
Weak Tari¤ BindingsContingent Protection (requires state veri�cation, e.g.:Safeguards andAntidumping)
Liability System (break and compensate; e.g.: GATT escape clause)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 5 / 24
![Page 15: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Flexibility and Protectionism Trade-O¤
Purpose of trade agreements
Terms-of-trade externality of trade policy
Need for �exibility
Uncertain political-economy conditions
Alternative �exibility mechanisms:
Weak Tari¤ BindingsContingent Protection (requires state veri�cation, e.g.:Safeguards andAntidumping)Liability System (break and compensate; e.g.: GATT escape clause)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 5 / 24
![Page 16: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
The Role of Import Market Power
Larger countries: larger terms-of-trade externality
Unilateral trade policy in larger countries is more costly for the world.
Asymmetric Tari¤ Commitments:
Global e¢ ciency requires lower tari¤ bindings in countries with largerimport markets.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 6 / 24
![Page 17: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
The Role of Import Market Power
Larger countries: larger terms-of-trade externality
Unilateral trade policy in larger countries is more costly for the world.
Asymmetric Tari¤ Commitments:
Global e¢ ciency requires lower tari¤ bindings in countries with largerimport markets.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 6 / 24
![Page 18: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
The Role of Import Market Power
Larger countries: larger terms-of-trade externality
Unilateral trade policy in larger countries is more costly for the world.
Asymmetric Tari¤ Commitments:
Global e¢ ciency requires lower tari¤ bindings in countries with largerimport markets.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 6 / 24
![Page 19: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
The Role of Import Market Power
Larger countries: larger terms-of-trade externality
Unilateral trade policy in larger countries is more costly for the world.
Asymmetric Tari¤ Commitments:
Global e¢ ciency requires lower tari¤ bindings in countries with largerimport markets.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 6 / 24
![Page 20: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Literature on Flexible Trade Agreements
Tari¤ bindings:
Bagwell (2009)Amador and Bagwell (2010)
Contingent Protection:
Beshkar (2008, 2010 EER, 2010 JIE)Maggi and Staiger (2011 QJE)
Bindings and contingent protection:
Bagwell and Staiger (2005 JLS)
Transaction costs:
Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2010 AER)Beshkar and Bond (2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 7 / 24
![Page 21: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Market
Three goods: i = 0, 1, 2. Good 0 is numeraire.
Home (Foreign) country has a measure N (N�) of identicalhouseholds with a quadratic utility function.Home country has comparative disadvantage in good 1.We normalize country sizes such that
N = 1�N� = λ.
Supply of good 1:
Home : λp Foreign : (1� λ) βp�.
(β > 1).
Demand for good 1:
Home : λ (1� p) Foregin : (1� λ) (1� p�) .
Ad Valorem Import Tari¤s, t: p = p� (1+ t) .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 8 / 24
![Page 22: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Market
Three goods: i = 0, 1, 2. Good 0 is numeraire.Home (Foreign) country has a measure N (N�) of identicalhouseholds with a quadratic utility function.
Home country has comparative disadvantage in good 1.We normalize country sizes such that
N = 1�N� = λ.
Supply of good 1:
Home : λp Foreign : (1� λ) βp�.
(β > 1).
Demand for good 1:
Home : λ (1� p) Foregin : (1� λ) (1� p�) .
Ad Valorem Import Tari¤s, t: p = p� (1+ t) .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 8 / 24
![Page 23: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Market
Three goods: i = 0, 1, 2. Good 0 is numeraire.Home (Foreign) country has a measure N (N�) of identicalhouseholds with a quadratic utility function.Home country has comparative disadvantage in good 1.
We normalize country sizes such that
N = 1�N� = λ.
Supply of good 1:
Home : λp Foreign : (1� λ) βp�.
(β > 1).
Demand for good 1:
Home : λ (1� p) Foregin : (1� λ) (1� p�) .
Ad Valorem Import Tari¤s, t: p = p� (1+ t) .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 8 / 24
![Page 24: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Market
Three goods: i = 0, 1, 2. Good 0 is numeraire.Home (Foreign) country has a measure N (N�) of identicalhouseholds with a quadratic utility function.Home country has comparative disadvantage in good 1.We normalize country sizes such that
N = 1�N� = λ.
Supply of good 1:
Home : λp Foreign : (1� λ) βp�.
(β > 1).
Demand for good 1:
Home : λ (1� p) Foregin : (1� λ) (1� p�) .
Ad Valorem Import Tari¤s, t: p = p� (1+ t) .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 8 / 24
![Page 25: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Market
Three goods: i = 0, 1, 2. Good 0 is numeraire.Home (Foreign) country has a measure N (N�) of identicalhouseholds with a quadratic utility function.Home country has comparative disadvantage in good 1.We normalize country sizes such that
N = 1�N� = λ.
Supply of good 1:
Home : λp Foreign : (1� λ) βp�.
(β > 1).
Demand for good 1:
Home : λ (1� p) Foregin : (1� λ) (1� p�) .
Ad Valorem Import Tari¤s, t: p = p� (1+ t) .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 8 / 24
![Page 26: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Market
Three goods: i = 0, 1, 2. Good 0 is numeraire.Home (Foreign) country has a measure N (N�) of identicalhouseholds with a quadratic utility function.Home country has comparative disadvantage in good 1.We normalize country sizes such that
N = 1�N� = λ.
Supply of good 1:
Home : λp Foreign : (1� λ) βp�.
(β > 1).
Demand for good 1:
Home : λ (1� p) Foregin : (1� λ) (1� p�) .
Ad Valorem Import Tari¤s, t: p = p� (1+ t) .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 8 / 24
![Page 27: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
Market
Three goods: i = 0, 1, 2. Good 0 is numeraire.Home (Foreign) country has a measure N (N�) of identicalhouseholds with a quadratic utility function.Home country has comparative disadvantage in good 1.We normalize country sizes such that
N = 1�N� = λ.
Supply of good 1:
Home : λp Foreign : (1� λ) βp�.
(β > 1).
Demand for good 1:
Home : λ (1� p) Foregin : (1� λ) (1� p�) .
Ad Valorem Import Tari¤s, t: p = p� (1+ t) .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 8 / 24
![Page 28: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Political Objective Functions
Governments respond to political pressures.
A higher weight (θ > 1) is given to the welfare of the import-competingsector.
Importing country�s political welfare:
V (t; θ) = C (t,λ) + θπ(t,λ) + tp�m(t,λ),
where, C : consumers�surplus, π: producers�surplus, m: import demand.
The exporting country�s welfare:
V �(t) = C �(t,λ) + π�(t,λ).
θ is distributed according to pdf f (θ) with a compact support of [θ, θ̄]. Weassume uniform distribution.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 9 / 24
![Page 29: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Political Objective Functions
Governments respond to political pressures.
A higher weight (θ > 1) is given to the welfare of the import-competingsector.
Importing country�s political welfare:
V (t; θ) = C (t,λ) + θπ(t,λ) + tp�m(t,λ),
where, C : consumers�surplus, π: producers�surplus, m: import demand.
The exporting country�s welfare:
V �(t) = C �(t,λ) + π�(t,λ).
θ is distributed according to pdf f (θ) with a compact support of [θ, θ̄]. Weassume uniform distribution.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 9 / 24
![Page 30: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Political Objective Functions
Governments respond to political pressures.
A higher weight (θ > 1) is given to the welfare of the import-competingsector.
Importing country�s political welfare:
V (t; θ) = C (t,λ) + θπ(t,λ) + tp�m(t,λ),
where, C : consumers�surplus, π: producers�surplus, m: import demand.
The exporting country�s welfare:
V �(t) = C �(t,λ) + π�(t,λ).
θ is distributed according to pdf f (θ) with a compact support of [θ, θ̄]. Weassume uniform distribution.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 9 / 24
![Page 31: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Political Objective Functions
Governments respond to political pressures.
A higher weight (θ > 1) is given to the welfare of the import-competingsector.
Importing country�s political welfare:
V (t; θ) = C (t,λ) + θπ(t,λ) + tp�m(t,λ),
where, C : consumers�surplus, π: producers�surplus, m: import demand.
The exporting country�s welfare:
V �(t) = C �(t,λ) + π�(t,λ).
θ is distributed according to pdf f (θ) with a compact support of [θ, θ̄]. Weassume uniform distribution.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 9 / 24
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Political Objective Functions
Governments respond to political pressures.
A higher weight (θ > 1) is given to the welfare of the import-competingsector.
Importing country�s political welfare:
V (t; θ) = C (t,λ) + θπ(t,λ) + tp�m(t,λ),
where, C : consumers�surplus, π: producers�surplus, m: import demand.
The exporting country�s welfare:
V �(t) = C �(t,λ) + π�(t,λ).
θ is distributed according to pdf f (θ) with a compact support of [θ, θ̄]. Weassume uniform distribution.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 9 / 24
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Cooperation vs. Non-Cooperation
Joint welfare:
W (t; θ) = V (t; θ) + V �(t)
= W (t; 1) + (θ � 1)π (t) .
Non-cooperative vs. Cooperative tari¤s:
tN (θ) = argmaxtV (t; θ),
tE (θ) = argmaxtW (t; θ) ,
tN (θ) > tE (θ) .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 10 / 24
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Cooperation vs. Non-Cooperation
Joint welfare:
W (t; θ) = V (t; θ) + V �(t)
= W (t; 1) + (θ � 1)π (t) .
Non-cooperative vs. Cooperative tari¤s:
tN (θ) = argmaxtV (t; θ),
tE (θ) = argmaxtW (t; θ) ,
tN (θ) > tE (θ) .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 10 / 24
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Non-cooperative vs. Cooperative tari¤s
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 11 / 24
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Binding vs. Applied Tari¤s
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 12 / 24
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Cap-and-Escape (Beshkar and Bond 2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 13 / 24
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Optimal Tari¤ Binding
Tari¤ binding: tB
Joint-welfare maximization problem:
maxtB
Z θB
θW (tN (θ); θ)f (θ)dθ +
Z θ̄
θBW (tB ; θ)f (θ)dθ
where θB is implicitly de�ned by
tN�
θB�= tB if tB � tN (θ) ,
θB = θ otherwise.
FOC:
E [θ � 1jθ � θB ]| {z }marginal expected political gain
= �Wt (tB , 1)πt (tB )
,| {z }marginal welfare cost
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 14 / 24
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Optimal Tari¤ Binding
Tari¤ binding: tB
Joint-welfare maximization problem:
maxtB
Z θB
θW (tN (θ); θ)f (θ)dθ +
Z θ̄
θBW (tB ; θ)f (θ)dθ
where θB is implicitly de�ned by
tN�
θB�= tB if tB � tN (θ) ,
θB = θ otherwise.
FOC:
E [θ � 1jθ � θB ]| {z }marginal expected political gain
= �Wt (tB , 1)πt (tB )
,| {z }marginal welfare cost
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 14 / 24
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Optimal Tari¤ Binding
Tari¤ binding: tB
Joint-welfare maximization problem:
maxtB
Z θB
θW (tN (θ); θ)f (θ)dθ +
Z θ̄
θBW (tB ; θ)f (θ)dθ
where θB is implicitly de�ned by
tN�
θB�= tB if tB � tN (θ) ,
θB = θ otherwise.
FOC:
E [θ � 1jθ � θB ]| {z }marginal expected political gain
= �Wt (tB , 1)πt (tB )
,| {z }marginal welfare cost
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 14 / 24
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Optimal Tari¤ Binding
R(θB ,λ) � �Wt (tB ,1)πt (tB )
= 11+λ θB+
�λθmax
1+λ � 1�
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 15 / 24
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Results
For su¢ ciently small countries:
Optimal tari¤ binding is decreasing in λ and 1β .
Probability of strong binding is increasing in λ and 1β .
An optimal tari¤ binding agreement among asymmetric countries isasymmetric:
Countries with more market power should be given less �exibility to settheir trade policy.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 16 / 24
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Results
For su¢ ciently small countries:
Optimal tari¤ binding is decreasing in λ and 1β .
Probability of strong binding is increasing in λ and 1β .
An optimal tari¤ binding agreement among asymmetric countries isasymmetric:
Countries with more market power should be given less �exibility to settheir trade policy.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 16 / 24
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Results
For su¢ ciently small countries:
Optimal tari¤ binding is decreasing in λ and 1β .
Probability of strong binding is increasing in λ and 1β .
An optimal tari¤ binding agreement among asymmetric countries isasymmetric:
Countries with more market power should be given less �exibility to settheir trade policy.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 16 / 24
![Page 45: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
Results
For su¢ ciently small countries:
Optimal tari¤ binding is decreasing in λ and 1β .
Probability of strong binding is increasing in λ and 1β .
An optimal tari¤ binding agreement among asymmetric countries isasymmetric:
Countries with more market power should be given less �exibility to settheir trade policy.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 16 / 24
![Page 46: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
Results
For su¢ ciently small countries:
Optimal tari¤ binding is decreasing in λ and 1β .
Probability of strong binding is increasing in λ and 1β .
An optimal tari¤ binding agreement among asymmetric countries isasymmetric:
Countries with more market power should be given less �exibility to settheir trade policy.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 16 / 24
![Page 47: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
Explanatory Variable
Wij : country i�s share of world import in sector j .
Motivation
Importer�s market power may be measured by 1εWij, the inverse of the
elasticity of export faced by the importer.Relationship between export elasticity and import share (assumingconstant import demand elasticities across countries):
εWij =�
εXj + (1�Wij )εj
�/Wij ,
εXj : supply elasticity of the exporting country.
εWij only varies across countries within a given sector due to di¤erencesin import shares:
∂εWij∂Wij
< 0.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 17 / 24
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Explanatory Variable
Wij : country i�s share of world import in sector j .
Motivation
Importer�s market power may be measured by 1εWij, the inverse of the
elasticity of export faced by the importer.Relationship between export elasticity and import share (assumingconstant import demand elasticities across countries):
εWij =�
εXj + (1�Wij )εj
�/Wij ,
εXj : supply elasticity of the exporting country.
εWij only varies across countries within a given sector due to di¤erencesin import shares:
∂εWij∂Wij
< 0.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 17 / 24
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Explanatory Variable
Wij : country i�s share of world import in sector j .
Motivation
Importer�s market power may be measured by 1εWij, the inverse of the
elasticity of export faced by the importer.
Relationship between export elasticity and import share (assumingconstant import demand elasticities across countries):
εWij =�
εXj + (1�Wij )εj
�/Wij ,
εXj : supply elasticity of the exporting country.
εWij only varies across countries within a given sector due to di¤erencesin import shares:
∂εWij∂Wij
< 0.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 17 / 24
![Page 50: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/50.jpg)
Explanatory Variable
Wij : country i�s share of world import in sector j .
Motivation
Importer�s market power may be measured by 1εWij, the inverse of the
elasticity of export faced by the importer.Relationship between export elasticity and import share (assumingconstant import demand elasticities across countries):
εWij =�
εXj + (1�Wij )εj
�/Wij ,
εXj : supply elasticity of the exporting country.
εWij only varies across countries within a given sector due to di¤erencesin import shares:
∂εWij∂Wij
< 0.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 17 / 24
![Page 51: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
Instrumental Variable Approach
Import share is a¤ected by trade policy.
Instruments for Wij (motivated by factor-proportion theories of trade):
Productive resources of a country (physical capital, natural(agricultural) capital, mineral capital.GDP.
Fitted values of Wij found using
separate regressions for each of 97 sectors.OLS and Tobit.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 18 / 24
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Instrumental Variable Approach
Import share is a¤ected by trade policy.
Instruments for Wij (motivated by factor-proportion theories of trade):
Productive resources of a country (physical capital, natural(agricultural) capital, mineral capital.GDP.
Fitted values of Wij found using
separate regressions for each of 97 sectors.OLS and Tobit.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 18 / 24
![Page 53: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
Instrumental Variable Approach
Import share is a¤ected by trade policy.
Instruments for Wij (motivated by factor-proportion theories of trade):
Productive resources of a country (physical capital, natural(agricultural) capital, mineral capital.
GDP.
Fitted values of Wij found using
separate regressions for each of 97 sectors.OLS and Tobit.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 18 / 24
![Page 54: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
Instrumental Variable Approach
Import share is a¤ected by trade policy.
Instruments for Wij (motivated by factor-proportion theories of trade):
Productive resources of a country (physical capital, natural(agricultural) capital, mineral capital.GDP.
Fitted values of Wij found using
separate regressions for each of 97 sectors.OLS and Tobit.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 18 / 24
![Page 55: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
Instrumental Variable Approach
Import share is a¤ected by trade policy.
Instruments for Wij (motivated by factor-proportion theories of trade):
Productive resources of a country (physical capital, natural(agricultural) capital, mineral capital.GDP.
Fitted values of Wij found using
separate regressions for each of 97 sectors.OLS and Tobit.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 18 / 24
![Page 56: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
Instrumental Variable Approach
Import share is a¤ected by trade policy.
Instruments for Wij (motivated by factor-proportion theories of trade):
Productive resources of a country (physical capital, natural(agricultural) capital, mineral capital.GDP.
Fitted values of Wij found using
separate regressions for each of 97 sectors.
OLS and Tobit.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 18 / 24
![Page 57: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/57.jpg)
Instrumental Variable Approach
Import share is a¤ected by trade policy.
Instruments for Wij (motivated by factor-proportion theories of trade):
Productive resources of a country (physical capital, natural(agricultural) capital, mineral capital.GDP.
Fitted values of Wij found using
separate regressions for each of 97 sectors.OLS and Tobit.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 18 / 24
![Page 58: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/58.jpg)
Data
# of Countries 40# of Sectors 5224 (HS06)
Year 2007Tari¤ Data Bound and MFN Applied Tari¤
Economic Data Import, GDP, per capita GDPPolitical Data Democracy IndexData Source WTO, World Bank, UN, EIUTotal Obs. 249,282
Binding Status # of sectors Share(%) Import Share (%)Applied Tari¤ below Binding 117,258 64.7 1.36e+12 23.8
Strong Binding 29,197 16.1 3.72e+12 65.0Unbound 34,810 19.2 6.40e+11 11.2Total 181,265 100 7.062+12 100
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 19 / 24
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OLS Regression: Optimal Tari¤ Binding
Variable
Import ratio (OLS �tted values) �.28(0.07)
Import ratio (Tobit �tted values) �1.31(0.12)
Pseudo R-square 0.7325 0.7328Observations 141,716 141,716
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 20 / 24
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Probit Model: Likelihood of Strong Binding
Variable
Import ratio (OLS �tted values)0.31(0.002)
Import ratio (Tobit �tted values)0.51(0.004)
Pseudo R-square 0.4406 0.4477Observations 176,526 176,526
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 21 / 24
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Conclusion
Optimal tari¤ binding among asymmetric countries.
Theory. Under an optimal tari¤ binding agreement, the larger theimport market:
The lower the optimal bindingThe larger the country, the more likely that tari¤ binds
Evidence. WTO agreement is signi�cantly asymmetric:
A country�s tari¤ binding in a given sector is negatively correlated withits share of world imports in that sector.Strong binding is more likely in sectors with a higher import share.
In Progress.
Using import demand elasticities as an additional explanatory variable.
Complementary Work. Cap-and-Escape Arrangement (Beshkarand Bond 2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 22 / 24
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Conclusion
Optimal tari¤ binding among asymmetric countries.
Theory. Under an optimal tari¤ binding agreement, the larger theimport market:
The lower the optimal bindingThe larger the country, the more likely that tari¤ binds
Evidence. WTO agreement is signi�cantly asymmetric:
A country�s tari¤ binding in a given sector is negatively correlated withits share of world imports in that sector.Strong binding is more likely in sectors with a higher import share.
In Progress.
Using import demand elasticities as an additional explanatory variable.
Complementary Work. Cap-and-Escape Arrangement (Beshkarand Bond 2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 22 / 24
![Page 63: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/63.jpg)
Conclusion
Optimal tari¤ binding among asymmetric countries.
Theory. Under an optimal tari¤ binding agreement, the larger theimport market:
The lower the optimal binding
The larger the country, the more likely that tari¤ binds
Evidence. WTO agreement is signi�cantly asymmetric:
A country�s tari¤ binding in a given sector is negatively correlated withits share of world imports in that sector.Strong binding is more likely in sectors with a higher import share.
In Progress.
Using import demand elasticities as an additional explanatory variable.
Complementary Work. Cap-and-Escape Arrangement (Beshkarand Bond 2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 22 / 24
![Page 64: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/64.jpg)
Conclusion
Optimal tari¤ binding among asymmetric countries.
Theory. Under an optimal tari¤ binding agreement, the larger theimport market:
The lower the optimal bindingThe larger the country, the more likely that tari¤ binds
Evidence. WTO agreement is signi�cantly asymmetric:
A country�s tari¤ binding in a given sector is negatively correlated withits share of world imports in that sector.Strong binding is more likely in sectors with a higher import share.
In Progress.
Using import demand elasticities as an additional explanatory variable.
Complementary Work. Cap-and-Escape Arrangement (Beshkarand Bond 2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 22 / 24
![Page 65: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/65.jpg)
Conclusion
Optimal tari¤ binding among asymmetric countries.
Theory. Under an optimal tari¤ binding agreement, the larger theimport market:
The lower the optimal bindingThe larger the country, the more likely that tari¤ binds
Evidence. WTO agreement is signi�cantly asymmetric:
A country�s tari¤ binding in a given sector is negatively correlated withits share of world imports in that sector.Strong binding is more likely in sectors with a higher import share.
In Progress.
Using import demand elasticities as an additional explanatory variable.
Complementary Work. Cap-and-Escape Arrangement (Beshkarand Bond 2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 22 / 24
![Page 66: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/66.jpg)
Conclusion
Optimal tari¤ binding among asymmetric countries.
Theory. Under an optimal tari¤ binding agreement, the larger theimport market:
The lower the optimal bindingThe larger the country, the more likely that tari¤ binds
Evidence. WTO agreement is signi�cantly asymmetric:
A country�s tari¤ binding in a given sector is negatively correlated withits share of world imports in that sector.
Strong binding is more likely in sectors with a higher import share.
In Progress.
Using import demand elasticities as an additional explanatory variable.
Complementary Work. Cap-and-Escape Arrangement (Beshkarand Bond 2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 22 / 24
![Page 67: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/67.jpg)
Conclusion
Optimal tari¤ binding among asymmetric countries.
Theory. Under an optimal tari¤ binding agreement, the larger theimport market:
The lower the optimal bindingThe larger the country, the more likely that tari¤ binds
Evidence. WTO agreement is signi�cantly asymmetric:
A country�s tari¤ binding in a given sector is negatively correlated withits share of world imports in that sector.Strong binding is more likely in sectors with a higher import share.
In Progress.
Using import demand elasticities as an additional explanatory variable.
Complementary Work. Cap-and-Escape Arrangement (Beshkarand Bond 2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 22 / 24
![Page 68: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/68.jpg)
Conclusion
Optimal tari¤ binding among asymmetric countries.
Theory. Under an optimal tari¤ binding agreement, the larger theimport market:
The lower the optimal bindingThe larger the country, the more likely that tari¤ binds
Evidence. WTO agreement is signi�cantly asymmetric:
A country�s tari¤ binding in a given sector is negatively correlated withits share of world imports in that sector.Strong binding is more likely in sectors with a higher import share.
In Progress.
Using import demand elasticities as an additional explanatory variable.
Complementary Work. Cap-and-Escape Arrangement (Beshkarand Bond 2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 22 / 24
![Page 69: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/69.jpg)
Conclusion
Optimal tari¤ binding among asymmetric countries.
Theory. Under an optimal tari¤ binding agreement, the larger theimport market:
The lower the optimal bindingThe larger the country, the more likely that tari¤ binds
Evidence. WTO agreement is signi�cantly asymmetric:
A country�s tari¤ binding in a given sector is negatively correlated withits share of world imports in that sector.Strong binding is more likely in sectors with a higher import share.
In Progress.
Using import demand elasticities as an additional explanatory variable.
Complementary Work. Cap-and-Escape Arrangement (Beshkarand Bond 2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 22 / 24
![Page 70: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/70.jpg)
Conclusion
Optimal tari¤ binding among asymmetric countries.
Theory. Under an optimal tari¤ binding agreement, the larger theimport market:
The lower the optimal bindingThe larger the country, the more likely that tari¤ binds
Evidence. WTO agreement is signi�cantly asymmetric:
A country�s tari¤ binding in a given sector is negatively correlated withits share of world imports in that sector.Strong binding is more likely in sectors with a higher import share.
In Progress.
Using import demand elasticities as an additional explanatory variable.
Complementary Work. Cap-and-Escape Arrangement (Beshkarand Bond 2010)
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 22 / 24
![Page 71: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/71.jpg)
Optimal Cap and Escape ArrangementCostly State Veri�cation
θ may be revealed publicly through a state-veri�cation process.
Costly State Veri�cation:
Cost of producing evidence by the importing country.Cost of going through the dispute settlement process incurred by allparties.Independent of the country/industry size.
If the process is not invoked, t cannot be greater than tB .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 23 / 24
![Page 72: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/72.jpg)
Optimal Cap and Escape ArrangementCostly State Veri�cation
θ may be revealed publicly through a state-veri�cation process.
Costly State Veri�cation:
Cost of producing evidence by the importing country.Cost of going through the dispute settlement process incurred by allparties.Independent of the country/industry size.
If the process is not invoked, t cannot be greater than tB .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 23 / 24
![Page 73: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/73.jpg)
Optimal Cap and Escape ArrangementCostly State Veri�cation
θ may be revealed publicly through a state-veri�cation process.
Costly State Veri�cation:
Cost of producing evidence by the importing country.
Cost of going through the dispute settlement process incurred by allparties.Independent of the country/industry size.
If the process is not invoked, t cannot be greater than tB .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 23 / 24
![Page 74: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/74.jpg)
Optimal Cap and Escape ArrangementCostly State Veri�cation
θ may be revealed publicly through a state-veri�cation process.
Costly State Veri�cation:
Cost of producing evidence by the importing country.Cost of going through the dispute settlement process incurred by allparties.
Independent of the country/industry size.
If the process is not invoked, t cannot be greater than tB .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 23 / 24
![Page 75: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/75.jpg)
Optimal Cap and Escape ArrangementCostly State Veri�cation
θ may be revealed publicly through a state-veri�cation process.
Costly State Veri�cation:
Cost of producing evidence by the importing country.Cost of going through the dispute settlement process incurred by allparties.Independent of the country/industry size.
If the process is not invoked, t cannot be greater than tB .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 23 / 24
![Page 76: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/76.jpg)
Optimal Cap and Escape ArrangementCostly State Veri�cation
θ may be revealed publicly through a state-veri�cation process.
Costly State Veri�cation:
Cost of producing evidence by the importing country.Cost of going through the dispute settlement process incurred by allparties.Independent of the country/industry size.
If the process is not invoked, t cannot be greater than tB .
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 23 / 24
![Page 77: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/77.jpg)
General demand and supply functions
The marginal deadweight loss for a general supply and demandfunctions:
R(θB ) � �Wt (tN (θB ), 1)
πt (tN (θB ))
= (θB � 1)(1+ 1
(1+ εW ) tE�
θB� ),
where,tE (θ)
1+ tE (θ)=
�(θ � 1)s(p(t))m(p(t))ε
�,
εW : export supply function faced by the importing country.ε : import demand elasticity.
tB is increasing in εW and sm , and decreasing in ε.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 24 / 24
![Page 78: Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidenceiiep/assets/docs/beshkar_tariff... · 2011-12-09 · Tari⁄ Binding Overhang: Theory and Evidence Mostafa Beshkar1 Eric Bond2 Youngwoo](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022042923/5f73350f9db49e6ba84e5262/html5/thumbnails/78.jpg)
General demand and supply functions
The marginal deadweight loss for a general supply and demandfunctions:
R(θB ) � �Wt (tN (θB ), 1)
πt (tN (θB ))
= (θB � 1)(1+ 1
(1+ εW ) tE�
θB� ),
where,tE (θ)
1+ tE (θ)=
�(θ � 1)s(p(t))m(p(t))ε
�,
εW : export supply function faced by the importing country.ε : import demand elasticity.tB is increasing in εW and s
m , and decreasing in ε.
Beshkar, Bond, Rho (UNH and Vanderbilt) Flexible Trade Agreements 10/2011 24 / 24