tale of two teams

8/3/2019 Tale of Two Teams

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A Tale of Two Teams A Comparison of the Cubs and White Sox

in Chicago

Keith SheronyGlenn Knowles

NINE: A Journal of Baseball History and Culture, Volume 18, Number

1, Fall 2009, pp. 107-124 (Article)

Published by University of Nebraska Press

For additional information about this article

Access Provided by St. Norbert College at 09/07/11 5:11PM GMT

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nin/summary/v018/18.1.sherony.html
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A Tale of Two Teams

A Comparison of the Cubs and White Sox in Chicago

keith sherony and glenn knowles

The White Soxs appearance in the 2005 World Series reminded Chicago base-

ball enthusiasts about the other drought. The White Soxs previous World

Series championship was 1917, a level of futility eclipsed only by their cross-

town rival Cubs, who have not won a championship since 1908. While the

Cubs troubles have taken on mythical proportion during the century of inept-

ness, the White Sox suffered through their incompetence in virtual obscu-

rity. Unlike the Cubs, the White Sox had no Billy goats, August day games,

or Bartmans to blame, nor a conspicuous Wrigleyville fandom to promulgatetheir plight. Rather, the unassuming White Sox quietly slipped to a second-

class status within the Windy City.

Curses, sunshine, and booted balls aside, there is some mystery to the dis-

similar way the Cubs and White Sox are received in Chicago when one con-

siders that they share such similar history. Both teams are charter members of

their respective leagues. Unlike any other pair of teams in the same city, only

this pair has spent its entire history in that city, and Chicago is the only city

to always have more than one team.1 Both teams have been owned by baseball

luminaries and played in parks considered the grandest of their day. And both

teams on-field futility extends beyond the dearth of World Series champion-

ships. For example, out of the 150 chances for a first-place finish during the

past seventy-five years, the Cubs and White Sox have a combined total of9.2

As similar as their histories may be, the perception is that the Cubs and

White Sox are not similarly accepted in Chicago. The conventional wisdom

is that Chicago is a Cubs town, an idea so pervasive that even White Sox

players buy into it. For example, as the White Sox ramped up for the World

Series in 2005, first baseman Paul Konerko declared, As far as the Cubs, weknow mainly its a Cubs town.3 White Sox catcher A. J. Pierzynski surmised,

Theres a lot of teams that have gone a long time with out winning anything

. . . with the Cubs, its always fun when you have curses and stuff like that


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nine vol. 18.1108

to talk about. It makes it much more compelling.4 Even White Sox manager

Ozzie Guillen got into the act: This is a Cubs town. . . . You go to Niketown,

you only see Chicago Cubs stuff, and I dont blame them, because we havent

done anything yet to make that step.5 This impression was bolstered by the2005 attendance figures: the White Sox completed a wire-to-wire finish in first

place, but a Cubs team that was out of the playoff picture in August outdrew

them by800,000 fans.6

This study examines the strategies and exogenous actions that would explain

different outcomes for the Cubs and White Sox in Chicago. Since Chicago is

a duopoly rather than a monopoly, strategies that may yield an advantage are

considered.7 Although the Cubs and White Sox have rarely competed on the

field of play, they have nonetheless competed in an economic sense.8

This eco-nomic competition is investigated in this study. Specifically, the study answers

the questions:

What kind of baseball town is Chicago?

Is Chicago a Cubs town?

Has it always been that way?

What factors determine whether Chicago is a Cubs or White Sox town?

This study identifies factors that explain attendance trends for the Cubs

and White Sox over the 1901 to 2005 seasons. The factors under consideration

are categorized into two groups: baseball-related and economic-related. The

baseball-related factors include the impact on attendance of player quality,

team position in the standings, and post-season appearances. The economic-

related factors include the impact on attendance of ballpark construction and

renovation, and media utilization.9 The results indicate that Chicago is a Cubs

town today, but it has not always been that way.

what kind of baseball town is chicago?

There are caveats associated with using season attendance statistics for MLB

games played in Chicago to size up the kind of baseball town Chicago is.

Attendance would be expected to be high, given that there are two teams

in the city. Furthermore, other vagaries that would affect annual attendance

include variation in the number of games that make up a season, team reloca-

tions, and league expansions. The question about Chicago as a baseball town

then must be answered by considering relative to what. The variable RELA-TIVE ATTENDANCE was constructed to address this need.

RELATIVE ATTENDANCE compares Chicagos average attendance per

game to MLBs, and it is calculated as:


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Sherony and Knowles: A Tale of Two Teams 109

RELATIVE ATTENDANCE =Chicagos average attendance per game

MLBs average attendance per game

For the 2005 season, for example:

RELATIVE ATTENDANCE2005

= 3359830727 = 1.093

When interpreting the value of this variable, the point of reference is 1.

When the ratio is greater (less) than 1, Chicagos average attendance is greater

(less) than MLBs.

Figure 1 presents the time series for RELATIVE ATTENDANCE for 1901

2005. For comparison, RELATIVE ATTENDANCE was also calculated forNew York, the only other city in MLB that had multiple teams for most of

the previous century. By this measure, during the preWorld War II period

Chicago was a fabulous baseball town.

Attendance for most seasons was at least twenty percent higher than MLBs,

exceeded MLBs by forty percent in many years, and occasionally was sixty

percent or more higher than MLBs. There was a temporary drop in atten-

dance with the Black Sox scandal in the early 1920s. Simultaneously, atten-

dance increased significantly in New York when Babe Ruth was traded to theYankees.10 Attendance increased again in Chicago in the mid-1920s, but the

pattern begins to change more permanently in the early 1930s as attendance

ratchets down into a post-war era in which Chicago is a below average base-

Fig. 1. Chicago and New York avg. attendance per game / MLB avg. attendance per game


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ball town. An examination of the Cubs and White Sox post-season experi-

ences (table 1) provides one explanation for this trend.11

The high RELATIVE ATTENDANCE in the early part of the century coin-

cides with years in which both the Cubs and White Sox had good teams.Through 1919, the teams combined to win eight pennants and four World

Series. However, two other factors contributed to the high RELATIVE ATTEN-

DANCE in this early period: Comiskey Park and Sunday baseball. Larger sta-

dium capacity and the opportunity to attend games on non-working days

increased demand, augmenting the high attendance associated with fielding

good teams.12 Comiskey Park was constructed in 1910 and more than doubled

the capacity for attendance at White Sox games.13 However, the unique factor

for Chicago was Sunday baseball.Sunday baseball was important for the growth and success of Major League

Baseball, especially as owners built new ballparks with capacities exceeding

30,000. Of the major-league cities with multiple teams, only Chicago and

St. Louis had Sunday baseball early in the twentieth century.14 According to

Charlie Bevis, Chicago became the capital of Sunday baseball in the major

leagues,15 and the White Sox, with a new ballpark and large seating capacity

in 1910, were in the best position to take advantage of Sunday baseball. The

Cubs would not have the larger capacity to take advantage of Sunday baseballuntil Wrigley was expanded in 1927.16

After the Black Sox scandal, the White Sox fortunes changed, and they

disappeared from the post-season until the 1980s, save for their 1959 cameo.

table 1. Cubs and White Sox playoff appearances and results

Decade Cubs White Sox

190110 06(NL) 07(WS) 08(WS) 10(NL) 06(WS)

191120 18(NL) 17(WS) 19(AL)

192130 29(NL)

193140 32(NL) 35(NL) 38(NL)

194150 45(NL)

195160 59(AL)

196170

197180

198190 84(NLE) 89(NLE) 83(ALW)

19912000 98(WC) 93(ALW) 2000(ALC)

2000 03(NLDS) 05(WS)


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Nonetheless, Chicago was firmly established as a baseball town. By the end

of the 1920s, the Cubs continued to field good teams that won the National

League pennant five times in sixteen years beginning in 1929. Simultaneously,

the growth of the Negro Leagues and the Chicago American Giants fortifiedChicagos stature as an important baseball town. The American Giants were a

dominant team, winning the National Negro League championship in 1920

22, 1926, and 1927.17

Unfortunately for the Cubs, their period of five pennants in sixteen years

began in the first year of the Great Depression and ended in the last year of

World War II. They failed to win any of their five World Series appearances

and did not solidify fan loyalty. The downward ratchet of relative attendance

during the 1930s and 1940s coincides with this period. Each successful pen-nant gave Chicago baseball a boost, but each was followed by a downturn that

the next pennant was unable to overcome. As fans tired of losing the World

Series, Chicago slipped toward being a below average baseball town as mea-

sured by RELATIVE ATTENDANCE.

Many are familiar with the post-war period: the Cubs quit winning pen-

nants, the White Sox made their sole 59 World Series appearance, and Chicago

attendance per game regularly fell shy of the major-league average. There

were occasional good years in the 1980s as the White Sox and then the Cubs

returned to the post-season. Attendance responded to stadium improvements

with the addition of lights for both teams and a new stadium for the White

Sox. The variability in RELATIVE ATTENDANCE seems to level out in the

1990s, and the early twenty-first century shows signs of an upward trend in

attendance, attributable to the fact that the Cubs have been able to draw over 3

million fans regardless of the success of the team they put on the field.

is chicago a cubs town? has it always been that way?

In the early decades of the twentieth century, Chicago established itself as

a key player in professional baseball with winning teams, innovative stadi-

ums, Sunday baseball, and leadership in the growth of the Negro National

League. Our second goal, however, was to describe the relative appeal of the

Cubs and White Sox in Chicago. Figure 2 shows each teams attendance over

the period 19012005. Both graphs suggest that the teams have enjoyed expo-

nential growth over time. Time series analysis found statistically significant

trend growth for the Cubs of1.8% per year and for the White Sox of1.5% peryear.18 This result implies that Chicago has tended to become a Cubs town.

However, each team has enjoyed persistent periods of higher attendance in

which Chicago might be described as their town.


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nine vol. 18.1112

To make the Cubs/White Sox comparisons, the variable ATTENDANCE

SHARE was constructed. ATTENDANCE SHARE measures a teams portion

of Chicagos total annual MLB game attendance and was calculated as:

ATTENDANCE SHARE = ln Cubs attendance ln White Sox attendance

The natural log form of the attendance series was used to account for dif-

ferences in the relative share that would arise from the aforementioned find-

ing that the Cubs growth rate was larger than the White Soxs growth rate.

Using the 2005 season as an example:

ATTENDANCE SHARE2005

= ln 3099992 ln 2342833 = .28

The result can be interpreted as a percentage.19 When the difference is posi-

tive (negative), the Cubs (White Sox) have the larger ATTENDANCE SHARE.

Therefore, .28 can be interpreted as the Cubs having a 28 percent larger atten-dance in 2005.

The advantages of using ATTENDANCE SHARE can be seen in figure 3.

We can observe persistent periods where one team has higher attendance and

the magnitude of the difference. From figure 3, we define periods of being

a teams town as having at least four consecutive years of larger ATTEN-

DANCE SHARE and at least one year with fifty percent more share. The

breakdown is shown in table 2.

The data offer support for the argument that Chicago is currently a Cubstown. Since the mid-1990s, the Cubs have had an appreciably larger ATTEN-

DANCE SHARE. This includes the years when the White Sox won the World

Series (2005) and made a playoff appearance (2000). Furthermore, if the years

Fig. 2. Cubs and White Sox attendance 19012005


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associated with the opening of U.S. Cellular Field are omitted, the Cubs dom-

inance in ATTENDANCE SHARE stretches back to 1985.

While Chicago may be a Cubs town today, by no means has it always been

their town. Rather, Chicago has cycled between the teams. Chicago was a

White Sox town at the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly after

the construction of Comiskey Park in 1910 and two World Series appearances

in 1917 and 1919.20 Notably, it became a Cubs town from the late 1920s throughthe 1940s when Cubs attendance frequently exceeded White Sox attendance

by more than fifty percent. Only in the early1940s, when the White Sox added

lights to Comiskey Park, were the White Sox attracting more fans. It cycled

back to a White Sox town through the 1950s and 1960s, changing back to a

Cubs town through the close of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-

first centuries with a brief interruption for the White Sox in the early 1980s.

The following section demonstrates that some of the fluctuations in relative

attendance can be accounted for by baseball- and business-related factors.

what factors determine whether chicago

is a cubs town or a white sox town?

Baseball-Related Factors

To identify the factors that explain ATTENDANCE SHARE for the Cubs and

White Sox, we examined variables that have been found to be statistically

significant in other economic studies of baseball attendance. Two baseball-related factors that measure team performance are the teams winning per-

centage (WL%) and the number of games back (GB) in the standings the team

finishes in a season. In addition, we wanted to capture aspects of team quality

Fig. 3. Attendance share (ln Cubs Attendance ln White Sox Attendance)


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nine vol. 18.1114

that might influence attendance but would not be evident from the teamsrecord. For example, a lineup may have featured a prodigious group of hitters

who were fan attractions although the team did not place high in the stand-

ings. Likewise, a team might have included a strong group of pitchers who

were popular with the fans yet did not receive run support so the team had a

low winning percentage. Team on-base percentage plus slugging percentage

(OPS) and earned run average (ERA) were used to account for the possibility

of such effects. We expect a higher winning percentage and OPS, and a lower

games back and ERA to favorably affect a teams attendance share.

Because the values for these variables are different for the two teams each year, their statistical treatment should be analogous to the ATTENDANCE

SHARE variable, in other words, relative winning percentage, or relative ERA.

Unlike ATTENDANCE SHARE, however, the relative comparisons need not

be corrected for expected trend growth. Consequently, the relative measures

of team performance are:21

RELATIVE WL% = Cubs WL% White Sox WL%

RELATIVE GB = Cubs GB White Sox GB

RELATIVE OPS = Cubs OPS White Sox OPS

RELATIVE ERA = Cubs ERA White Sox ERA

The interpretation of these variables centers on the value 1. A value for

RELATIVE WL% or RELATIVE OPS greater than 1 favors the Cubs, as they

had the higher WL% or OPS that season. A value for RELATIVE GB and REL-

ATIVE ERA greater than 1 favors the White Sox for a similar reason.

The results of the regression analysis found a relationship only between

RELATIVE WL% and ATTENDANCE SHARE.22 The result was statisticallysignificant and positive, confirming the expectation that a higher relative share

of wins tends to increase the relative share of attendance. Figure 4 shows the

similar pattern of the two series. Taken together, these results suggest that the

table 2. Cubs or White Sox town

Kind of town Years Duration Outliers

Sox 19101922 13 1918

Cubs 19261950 25 1940, 1941, 1943

Sox 19511967 17 1958

Cubs 19681976 9 1974

Sox 19811984 4

Cubs 1985present 21 1991, 1992


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cyclical nature of Chicago as a White Sox, then a Cubs, then a White Sox town

follows the teams fortunes on the field. The lack of statistical significance of

the other variables suggests that winning is the most important among the

team-quality variables.

The next set of variables considered the impact of post-season appearanceson ATTENDANCE SHARE. The analysis treated a post-season appearance

two ways, allowing for an expected contemporaneous effect as fans come out

to support their team during a championship season, and for the possibility

of a halo effect that would carry into the next season. Table 1 shows that the

Cubs made fourteen and the White Sox made eight post-season appearances

from 1901 through 2005.

The analysis found no evidence of a contemporaneous effect. However, the

contemporaneous effect was likely picked up by the high relative WL% forthe season for the team that qualified for post-season play. In contrast, there

is a marginally statistically significant halo effect in which the team appear-

ing in the post-season gains attendance in subsequent seasons.23 Furthermore,

Fig. 4. (A) Attendance share (ln Cubs Attendance ln White Sox Attendance) and (B) Win-

ning percentage share (Cub Win % / White Sox Win %)

A

B


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nine vol. 18.1116

the result for the White Sox is somewhat more significant, and a post-seasonappearance for the White Sox yields a larger gain in ATTENDANCE SHARE

than for the Cubs. These results predict that, ceteris paribus, in the 2006 sea-

son the White Sox should narrow the attendance gap, which totaled nearly

800,000 in 2005.24

Economic-Related Factors

Economic-related factors were the other group of variables used to explain

the relative share of season attendance for Chicagos two teams. One of these

factors is associated with the teams ballparks, both in terms of which facility

the team played in and changes that were made to the facility over time. Table

3 contains the chronology of the parks used by the Cubs and White Sox from

1901 through 2005. Both the Cubs and White Sox moved into new ballparks

in the early1900s and played in those park for at least eighty years. The White

Sox made the only other change, moving into U.S. Cellular Field in 1991. The

regression model was used to test for the impact on attendance share that was

associated with the moves into a new park. The predicted effect is that a moveinto a new park should increase the teams ATTENDANCE SHARE.

The statistical results supported this hypothesis when the Cubs and White

Sox moved from West Side Park and South Side Park respectively, but not

when the White Sox moved from Comiskey to U.S. Cellular. The White Sox

move to U.S. Cellular had the short-term impact indicated by figure 3, but the

statistical analysis suggested there was no lasting effect from U.S. Cellular in

determining ATTENDANCE SHARE.

Among the many renovations the Cubs and White Sox made to their ball-parks, two stand out: the addition of lights and periodic changes to the parks

total seating capacity. These renovations are summarized in table 3. The addi-

tion of lights was noteworthy because it permitted night baseball, lowering the

table 3. Cubs and White Sox parks

Years Cubs park Capacity Years White Sox park Capacity

19011915 West Side Park 16,000 19011910 South Side Park 15,000

19161926 Wrigley Field 18,000 (1916) 19111990 Comiskey Park 32,000 (1910)

20,000 (1923) 52,000 (1927)

19272005 Wrigley Field 38,396 (1927) 1940 Lights added to

Comiskey Park

1988 Lights added to 19912005 US Cellular Field 44,321(1991)

Wrigley Field 39,336 (2004)


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opportunity cost for daytime workers to attend games. The model tested for

the impact of adding lights, with the predicted effect that adding lights should

increase a teams ATTENDANCE SHARE. The analysis found that the addi-

tion of lights to Comiskey Park had a statistically significant favorable impacton the White Soxs ATTENDANCE SHARE. This innovation by the White Sox

in 1940, coupled with inaction by the Cubs for forty-eight years, may partially

explain the Cubs lower ATTENDANCE SHARE in the 1940s compared to

the 1930s, and Chicagos transition to a White Sox town during the 1950s and

1960s. Statistically, there was no impact on ATTENDANCE SHARE from add-

ing lights to Wrigley Field. The number of night games played at Wrigley was

smallonly eighteenand, consequently, could not have moved attendance

significantly within an eighty-one-game schedule.To consider the impact of the parks total seating capacity, a new vari-

able was calculated, PARK CAPACITY SHARE, where:

PARK CAPACITY SHARE = Cubs Park CapacityWhite Sox Park Capacity

Figure 5 shows the PARK CAPACITY SHARE from 1901 through 2001.

While the timing of the expansion of the teams facilities was similar (both

ballparks were expanded in 1927), since 1930 Wrigley Fields capacity has hov-

ered between 36,000 and 40,000, whereas Comiskey Parks capacity hovered

between 47,000 and 50,000, leaving the Cubs with 80% capacity compared

to the White Sox. The capacities have converged recently, with the White Sox

decreasing capacity and the Cubs increasing. The predicted effect is that park

capacity should favor the team with the larger share because it has greater

ticket sales potential. The regression results found that indeed, a larger PARK

CAPACITY SHARE had a large and favorable impact on a teams ATTEN-

DANCE SHARE. Building a cavernous Comiskey Park initially enhanced

the White Soxs share of attendance, but over time as renovations downsized

the park the effect on attendance diminished as PARK CAPACITY SHAREapproached parity. Finally, larger capacity in Comiskey Park and later Wrigley

Field may explain ATTENDANCE SHARE more than a new ballpark effect

given the short-run impact of the new ballpark discussed above.

While team quality and ballpark renovations offer advantages that enhance

ATTENDANCE SHARE, these factors are neither unique nor permanent and

therefore do not provide an explanation for Chicago as a Cubs town in the

1990s and early twenty-first century.25 To understand how Chicago became a

Cubs town, one must consider factors that are sustainable in solidifying fanloyalty, thereby permitting the Cubs to maintain an advantage even when

relative team quality fell. The local neighborhoods that the ballparks occupy

may offer some explanation, but annual time series data are not available for


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nine vol. 18.1118

regression analysis.26 Furthermore, with the migration of population to the

suburbs after World War II and the development of the Interstate Highway

System beginning in the 1950s, the importance of the local neighborhood

diminishes somewhat.

The final group of economic variables considered addresses how Chicagos

teams have utilized the media. The Cubs and White Sox both began radiobroadcasts of their games in 1924, but the Cubs were especially aggressive in

using the medium to market their team. Bellamy and Walker describe this as

the Embracing Model:

[T]he goal of the Cubs . . . was expansion over the airwaves. The Wrigleys knew the

value of radio in marketing chewing gum and saw the mediums potential for Major

League Baseball. By the mid-1920s, when most owners thought that radio broadcasts

of Major League games decreased ballpark attendance, Wrigley . . . believed that radio

broadcasts did not give away the product but, instead, increased and diversified inter-est in the product. Indeed, he saw the value of radio not in the small rights fee (at the

time) that could be generated from exclusive licensing of the Cubs broadcasts to one

station. Rather, radios contribution came from the largely winning Cubs teams of the

1930s and early1940s and the wonders of the friendly confines of Wrigley Field. For

Wrigley, the more stations that carried the Cubs meant the more potential listeners

and the more potential Cubs fans.27

Wrigleys insight that radio broadcasts would generate brand loyalty and

increase attendance cannot be overstated. There was a significant increasein attendance for the Cubs in 1926 before their pennant win in 1929 and the

expansion of Wrigley Field in 1927. The Cubs ranked first in attendance in the

National League from 1926 through 1932. They were the first National League

Fig. 5. Park capacity share ( Cubs capacity / White Sox capacity)


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team to exceed one million in attendance in 1927, even though they finished

in fourth place.28 Although radio broadcasts began in Chicago in 1924, both

WGN and WMAQ began broadcasts of baseball in April 1925. Coverage

may have been limited in 1925 by signal strength and WGNs coverage of theScopes Monkey Trial in July and August of that year. However, interest in

Cubs baseball had increased. In 1926, radio stations in Elgin were added, and

WGN moved operations to a new high-power transmitter in Elgin late in the

year. By the end of the decade, the Cubs strategy evolved into a successful

trifecta wager: fielding a good team, renovating their stadium, and effectively

using the new medium of radio.29 When considering baseball- and economic-

related factors in a market that is nota monopoly, where teams face compe-

tition from one another, the best strategy to sustain fan loyalty is successfulutilization of the media.30

The Wrigleys embracementof the media carried over to television when

broadcasts of Cubs games began in 1947. As Bellamy and Walker described it,

For the Cubs, television became a means of promoting the team and expanding its

audience. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Phil Wrigley sold the Cubs TV rights for

minimal fees, reasoning that he was creating fans. As late as 1963, Cubs rights for both

radio and television cost only $500,000 . . . $350,000 less than the fees earned by the

cross-town White Sox.31

In contrast, the White Sox, who began television broadcasts in 1948, had a

decidedly different approach to and experience with the media. Bellamy and

Walker note that

Despite the teams higher on-field success than the Cubs, the White Sox television

strategy limited coverage to a small number of day games during televisions forma-

tive period. The White Sox also suffered with a more limited radio network and a

financially strapped ownership.32

The Cubs and White Sox also had starkly different experiences when they

ventured into cable television broadcasts. After being purchased by the media

giant Tribune Company, the Cubs built a national market with games tele-

cast over super-station WGN. In contrast, the White Soxs experiment with

pay-per-view cable telecasts in 1982 cost them both audience and Harry Caray,

their popular announcer who defected to WGN.

The regression analysis found high statistical significance associated with

the advent of radio and super-station broadcasts, both of which increasedthe Cubs attendance share. These findings are consistent with the Embracing

Modelin that the Cubs used radio and then super-station broadcasts to expand

their market outside the immediate Chicago area. In doing so, the Cubs nur-


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nine vol. 18.1120

tured a non-local fan base and became a regional and then a national team.

A trip to Wrigley Field became a reason to visit Chicago. Thus, the contrast-

ing use of the media by the Cubs and White Sox, and especially the super-

station broadcasts, are a major part of the explanation for why today Chicagois thought of as a Cubs town. Finally, local non-cable television broadcasts

of games affected neither the Cubs nor the White Sox attendance share. This

finding does not support but is not inconsistent with the Embracing Model,

possibly because the local fan base was already amply aware of the teams via

radio and newspaper coverage.

conclusion

Regression analysis found that the growth rate in attendance for the Cubs

exceeded the growth rate in attendance for the White Sox by .3% per year

over the last century. The Cubs may have had a bad century for World Series

appearances, but they have done well in attendance and fan loyalty. The dif-

ference in growth rates of the two teams was marginally statistically signifi-

cant, meaning that there has been a slight trend for Chicago to become a Cubs

town over time. Baseball-related factors that explain attendance, such as team

and player quality, can explain short-term fluctuations in attendance, but not

long-term trends that make Chicago a Cubs town today. Similar reasoning

applies to economic factors, such as ballpark construction and renovation.

To generate the difference in long-term growth, the Cubs needed to build a

base of loyal fans who extended beyond the confines of the north-side neigh-

borhood of Wrigley Field. This was accomplished through innovative utiliza-

tion of the media, first with radio beginning in the 1920s and then with local

television coverage beginning in the late 1940s and finally a national market

on cable television. This strategy was contrary to the conventional wisdom

of many owners who felt media coverage of home games would cannibalizeattendance. But without a monopoly in its local market, it was a successful

strategy for the Cubs to use to develop a loyal fan base that would increase

attendance in the long run. The first hint that this would be a successful

strategy came in 1926 when WGN and WMAQ were both broadcasting Cubs

games. The Cubs finished in fourth place, playing in their old Federal League

ballpark, yet they led the National League in attendance for the first time since

moving to Wrigley Field in 1916. From 1926 to 1938, the Cubs were first or sec-

ond in attendance in the National League and outdrew the White Sox everyyear. The Cubs had first mover advantages in adopting radio and later televi-

sion. This appears to be the primary explanation for why Chicago is a Cubs

town today. Finally, although occasional surges in White Sox attendance rep-


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resented temporary gains, attributable to team quality, the addition of lights,

or a new stadium, they were nonetheless important; the White Sox have not

suffered the fate of all other second teams in multiple-team citiesthey have

survived.

notes

1. With the beginning of the American League war in 1901, Chicago, Boston, Phila-

delphia, and New York/Brooklyn had multiple teams. By 1902, St. Louis acquired a

second team, and in 1903 Baltimore relocated its American League franchise to New

York, giving New York a third team. Of all these cities with multiple teams early in

the twentieth century, only Chicago and New York continue to have two teams at thebeginning of the twenty-first century. However, New York had only one team between

1958, when the Dodgers and Giants relocated to California, and 1962, when the New

York Mets and Houston Astros entered the National League.

2. Of150, 9 is 6%. Assuming an equal probability of winning a pennant, the prob-

ability of a pennant win in a given year with eight teams in the league would be 12.5%.

With the expansion and restructuring into divisions, the probability of a first-place

win in a six-team division would be 16.7% and in a five-team division would be 20%.

3. Mike Dodd, White Sox Look to End the Other Drought, USA Today, October

10, 2005.

4. Dodd, White Sox Look.

5. Carol Slezak, World Series Could Be Just the First Step for Sox, Chicago Sun-

Times, October 25, 2005.

6. The Cubs ended the season four games under .500, ten games behind in the

wild-card race, and 21 games behind division-leading St. Louis. The White Sox, on the

other hand, were first in their division, winning 99 games, the most in the American

League.

7. For example, a new stadium would be a differentiation strategy that may yield a

competitive advantage. For a general discussion of strategies for competitive advan-

tage, see Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and

Competitors (New York: Free Press, 1980).

8. The Cubs and White Sox competed in the 1906 World Series and in modern

interleague play.

9. Economic studies that have investigated attendance with all teams have consid-

ered other economic variables, such as ticket prices, unemployment rates, income, and

the cost of living. However, this study considers two teams in the same city in whichthere is limited data by regions within a city. Census data by Zip Code Tabulation Area

(ZCTA) is only available for the 2000 Census.

10. When the Yankees acquired Ruth in 1920, he hit fifty-four home runs, exceeding


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the total home runs for all major-league teams except the last-place Philadelphia Phil-

lies, who led the National League with sixty-four. The Yankees attendance numbers for

1920 more than doubled the 1919 numbers, reaching over one million, despite the fact

that the Yankees leased the Polo Grounds from the Giants and finished the season inthird place. The attendance in 1920 was the highest for any New York team up to 1946.

11. The three early peaks in the Chicago attendance per game statistics are from the

years 1906, 1917, and 1929, corresponding to post-season appearances.

12. When the Cubs were in the World Series in 1918, they played their home games

at Comiskey Park because the seating capacity was much higher than Wrigley Field.

13. The capacity of Comiskey Park in 1910 was 32,000. South Side Park, which the

White Sox had used since 1901, only had a capacity of 15,000. Wrigley Field would

not become a factor in attendance until capacity was expanded to 38,396 in 1927.BallparksSite Map, Ballparks by Munsey and Suppes. http://www.ballparks.com/

baseball.

14. Sunday baseball was not played on a regular basis in New York until 1919, in

Boston until 1932, and in Philadelphia until 1934. Charlie Bevis, Sunday Baseball: The

Major Leagues Struggle to Play Baseball on the Lords Day, 18761934 (Jefferson, NC:

McFarland, 2003).

15. Bevis, Sunday Baseball, 135.

16. The Cubs played at West Side Grounds (with a capacity of 16,000) from 1893

through the 1915 season. Wrigley Field (a.k.a. North Side Ball Park [1914]; Weeghman

Park [191415]; and Cubs Park [191626]) was originally built in 1914 for the Federal

League team, the Chicago Federals. The capacity was 14,000 in 1914, and then increased

to 18,000 in 1915. The Federal League folded after two years, and the Cubs moved from

the West Side Grounds in 1916. The grandstand was double-decked in 1927, increas-

ing capacity to over 38,000. BallparksSite Map, Ballparks by Munsey and Suppes.

http://www.ballparks.com/baseball.

17. Rob Ruck, American Giants, Encyclopedia of Chicago (Chicago: Chicago His-

torical Society and the Newberry Library, 2005), http://www.encyclopedia.chicago

history.org/pages/42.html.

18. The natural log of attendance was the dependent variable with year as the inde-

pendent variable. The standard error on the year coefficient that is interpreted as the

growth rate was .001.

19. Calculating the percentage in the traditional way leaves some ambiguity in the

result. If the lower White Sox attendance is used as the base, the percentage difference

is .32. However, if the larger Cubs attendance is used as the base the percentage differ-

ence is .24. The difference in the natural logs will approximately yield the average ofthese two percentages.

20. In 1914 and 1915, with the competing Federal League team on the north side of

Chicago, Cubs attendance fell dramatically, much more so than White Sox attendance.


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While White Sox attendance fell after 1922, it is not clear how White Sox attendance

was impacted by the National Negro League team whose ballpark was next to Comis-

key Park. Given the segregation in housing and baseball, the impact was in all likeli-

hood small.21. The data to calculate these variables is available at Sports Reference LLC, 2002

National League Team Statistics and Standings, http://www.baseball-reference.com/

leagues/NL_2002.shtml.

22. The dependent variable in all of the regressions was ATTENDANCE SHARE

equal to ln(Cubs attendance) ln(White Sox attendance). Both year (time) and rela-

tive WL% were significant at the 1% level. Relative GB had a negative sign as expected

but the significant level was only .193.

23. The independent variables in the regression were relative WL% and a dummyor indicator variable for post season appearance, including this variable lagged one

period. The lagged dummy variables for both the Cubs and White Sox were significant

at the 10% level. The contemporaneous variables were not.

24. The attendance gap narrowed from 757,100 in 2005 to 165,801 in 2006. However,

the relative WL% also fell from .80 to .73 with a last-place finish for the Cubs in 2006.

25. Many studies have demonstrated the so-called honeymoon effect of a new

baseball stadium on attendance, with the duration of the effect lasting from as little

as three years to as much as ten years. For a recent study, see Zenon X. Zygmont and

John C. Leadley, When Is the Honeymoon Over? Major League Baseball Attendance

19702000,Journal of Sport Management19 (2005): 27899.

26. From 2000 census data by Zip Code Tabulation Areas, the area around Wrigley

has approximately twice the per capita income and twice the population density of the

area around U.S. Cellular. U.S. Census Bureau, 6063-Digit ZCTA5-digit ZIP Code

Tabulation Area, http://www.census.gov/. Earlier census data has some demographic

data by Community Area with Wrigley in Lake View community and Comiskey in

Armour Square. In 1930, community areas around Wrigley were nearly 100% white.

By1990, the neighborhood became more diverse with an influx of Hispanics, blacks,

and Asians. On the other hand, throughout the twentieth century the South Side of

Chicago has been highly diverse, but with segregated housing. Armour Square goes

from primarily white in 1930 to primarily Asian by1990. Douglas to the east is primar-

ily Black. Bridgeport to the west is primarily white up to 1960, but with 26% Hispanic

and 17% Asian by 1990. Adrian Capehart, Douglas, Encyclopedia of Chicago (Chi-

cago: Chicago Historical Society and the Newberry Library, 2005), http://www.ency

clopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/388.html; Dominic A. Pacyga, Bridgeport, Ency-

clopedia of Chicago (Chicago: Chicago Historical Society and the Newberry Library,2005), http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/165.html; Amanda Selig-

man, Lake View, Encyclopedia of Chicago (Chicago: Chicago Historical Society and

the Newberry Library, 2005), http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/


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nine vol. 18.1124

715.html; David M. Solzman, Armour Square, Encyclopedia of Chicago (Chicago:

Chicago Historical Society and the Newberry Library, 2005), http://www.encyclope

dia.chicagohistory.org/pages/71.html.

27. Robert V. Bellamy Jr. and James R. Walker, Baseball and Television Origins: TheCase of the Cubs,NINE: A Journal of Baseball History and Culture10, no. 1 (2001): 37.

28. The Yankees are the first to do so in the American League in 1920.

29. Up to 1925, the New York Giants were for many years the number-one team in

attendance in the National League. The Cubs became number one in attendance in

1926 with a fourth-place finish in the National League (up from last place in 1925).

Wrigley Field expanded capacity by adding a double deck over the grandstand, but

not until the 1927 season. The only explanation for the increase in attendance in 1926

is radio. For a history of radios influence see WGN Radio, The History of ChicagosWGN Radio 720, http://wgngold.com; and Scott Childers, A look back at the Q.670

WMAQ, http://www.scottchilders.com/timecapsule/TCWMAQ.htm.

30. St. Louis may be another case study in the importance of the media. Bellamy

and Walker, Baseball and Television Origins, 3637, discuss how the Cardinals also

successfully used radio and television. 1926 was a transition year for the Cardinals, as it

was for the Cubs. St. Louis was considered a Browns town until the Cardinals upset

the Yankees in the 1926 World Series. KMOX first broadcast Cardinal games in this

series and regularly broadcast home games in 1927 along with KFVE. The Browns sub-

sequently left St. Louis to become the Baltimore Orioles after the 1953 season, leaving

the Cardinals with a monopoly in the St. Louis market. See STL Radio Hall of Fame,

St. Louis Cardinals Radio History, http://www.stlradio.com/articles-stlcards.htm.

31. Bellamy and Walker, Baseball and Television Origins, 3839.

32. Bellamy and Walker, Baseball and Television Origins, 40.

tale of two teams

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