swiss politics and political institutions: 2a) federalism and municipalities
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Swiss politics and political institutions: 2a) Federalism and Municipalities. Prof. Dr. Andreas Ladner iMPA 2013. What is federalism all about?. Federalism is about organizing a territory Federalism is about dealing with cultural differences - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Swiss politics and political institutions:
2a) Federalism and Municipalities
Prof. Dr. Andreas Ladner
iMPA 2013
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What is federalism all about?
Federalism is about organizing a territory
Federalism is about dealing with cultural differences
Federalism is about dealing with economic differences
Federalism is about organizing public services
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Inhabitants (7.8 Million)
ZH 1'211'647 BS 187'667BE 943'696 GR 186'744VD 620'294 NE 165'731AG 544'306 SZ 130'232
SG 449'399 ZG 99'388GE 408'820 SH 73'305LU 347'209 JU 68'794TI 310'215 AR 53'515VS 276'170 GL 38'546BL 260'036 NW 38'000SO 244'015 UR 35'246FR 236'339 OW 32'414TG 227'306 AI 15'021
Quelle: www.badac.ch
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Cultural differences?
The „Röschtigraben“ The „Spaghettigraben“
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(Economic) Differences
Alp Furna (GR)Zürich Paradeplatz (CS, UBS)
BaselBerner Seeland
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Program
Nation building without federalism would have been impossible in
Switzerland.
Since then, however, things have changed considerably. The nation
state has become much more powerful compared to the federal
units, and complex patterns of cooperation emerged.
From the point of view of a political scientist we shall briefly analyze
the functions and the functioning of Swiss federalism.
A special emphasis is put on the way Swiss federalism copes with
challenges such as the increasing entanglement of the different
layers of the state when it comes to the provision and funding of
services, the growing disparities among the federal units, and the
loss of sovereignty of the nation state due to globalization.
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Further readings
Ladner, Andreas (2010). "Intergovernmental relations in
Switzerland: towards a new concept for allocating tasks and
balancing differences", in: Michael J. Goldsmith and Edward C. Page
(eds.). Changing Government Relations in Europe: From Localism to
Intergovernmentalism. Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political
Science. pp. 210-227. ISBN13 978-0-415-54846-5.
Ladner, Andreas (2009). "Local government and metropolitan
regions in federal systems: Switzerland", in: Kincaid, John, Helen S.
Meyner and Nico Steytler (eds.) A Global Dialogue on Federalism,
Volume 6: Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal
Systems. McGill Queens University Press. p. 329-362. ISBN 978-0-
773-5356-33.
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Content Block 2: Part 1: Federalism
1. Preliminary remarks about Swiss Federalism
2. Comparative Federalism
3. Swiss Federalism: instruments and functioning
4. A successful reform of Swiss Federalism
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“We could get everything much cheaper”
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My conclusion
If there are no differences there is no need for
federalism.
Federalism means accepting diversity.
Do you agree?
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Confederations or unitarist states
Alliance Federalism Unitary state
Centrifugal state Centripetal state
Co-operation Objectives: autonomy and diversity
Objectives: integration and
equality of living conditions
Centralized organization in
all domains
Single purpose alliance (e.g. Nato)
Confederation (e.g. EU)
Confederal federal state (e.g. Canada, Switzerland, US)
Unitary federal state (e.g. Germany, Austria)
Decentralized unitary state (e.g. France)
Centralized unitary state with
centralized steering unit (communist republics)
Quelle: Stalder, Kurt (1999). Föderalismus und Finanzausgleich. Schriftenreihe der Fachgruppe für kantonale Finanzfragen. Solothurn: Verlag FkF.
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Federalism and devolved governments
In confederal systems, the central government is a legal creation of the constituent units (see the two oldest countries US and CH). Important here is the autonomous constitutional existence.
In unitary systems, any regional governments are legal creations of the central institutions (devolution). Some unitary countries are more decentralized that some federations.
Unitary countries such as Colombia, Italy and Japan have relatively strong regional governments. France and Peru are moving towards significant devolution to elected regional governments. In some countries such as the UK there are some regions asking for devolution.
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Importance of Federalism
40 per cent of the world’s population
almost all democracies with large areas and/or populations are
federal
democratization brings along federalism (Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico)
with Belgium, Ethiopia and Spain formerly unitary countries
become federalist
Federalism has been adopted in post-conflict democracies
(Bosnia, Democratic republic of Congo, Iraq, Sudan, South Africa)
The EU has a number of federal characteristics
Anderson (2008:1ff)
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About 25 states
Belgien, 3 Regionen, 3 Gemeinschaften, Verfassung von 1994
Kanada, 10 Provinzen, 3 Territorien, Verfassung von 1867/1982
Äthiopien, 9 Bundesstaaten, 2 eigenständige Städte, Verfassung von 1995
Bosnien und Herzegowina, 2 Entitäten (innerhalb der bosniakisch-kroatischen Entität "Föderation Bosnien und Herzegowina" 10 Kantone)
Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, 50 Bundesstaaten, 1 Bundesdistrikt, Verfassung von 1787
Komoren, 3 Territorien, Verfassung von 2001
Deutschland, 16 Länder, Grundgesetz von 1949
Nigeria, 36 Bundesstaaten, 1 Territorium, Verfassung von 1979
Österreich, 9 Bundesländer, Verfassung von 1929.
Mexiko, 31 Bundesstaaten, 1 Territorium, Verfassung von 1917
Südafrika, 9 Provinzen, Verfassung von 1996
Schweiz, 26 Kantone (bis 2000: 20 Kantone und 6 Halbkantone), Verfassung von 1848 (Totalrevisionen von 1874 und 1999)
Spanien, 17 autonome Gemeinschaften, zwei Autonome Städte (Ceuta, Melilla)
Saint Kitts and Nevis Indien, 28 Staaten, 7 Territorien, Verfassung von 1950
Serbien Montenegro Venezuela, 23 Bundesstaaten, 1 Bundesdistrikt, Verfassung von 1999
Pakistan, 4 Provinzen, 2 Territorien, Verfassung von 1973
Russland, 21 Teilrepubliken, 6 Regionen, 49 Gebiete, 2 Städte föderaler Bedeutung, 1 autonomes Gebiet, 10 autonome Bezirke und 7 Föderationsbezirke, Verfassung von 1993
Argentinien, 23 Provinzen, 1 Bundesdistrikt, Verfassung von 1994
Brasilien, 26 Bundesstaaten, 1 Bundesdistrikt, Verfassung von 1988
Irak, 3 Bundesstaaten, Verfassung von 2005
Australien, 6 Bundesstaaten, 2 Territorien, 3 Außengebiete, Verfassung
Vereinigte Arabische Emirate, 7 Emirate,
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Common characteristics
At least two orders of government, one for the whole country and one for the regions with different elections
A written constitution with some parts which cannot be amended by the federal government alone
A constitution that formally allocates legislative and fiscal powers to the two orders of government ensuring some genuine autonomy for each order
Usually some special arrangements in the upper houses for the representation of the constituents units giving to smaller units greater weight than they would merit
An umpire procedure to rule on constitutional disputes between governments
A set of processes and institutions for facilitating or conducting relations between governments
Anderson, George (2008). Federalism: an Introduction. Forum of Federations, Ontario: Oxford University Press.
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Names of the constituent units
States: Australia, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Malaysia,
Mexico, Nigeria, US
Provices: Argentina, Canada, Pakistan, South Africa
Länder: Austria, Germany
Cantons: Switzerland
Regions, communities: Belgium
Autonomous communities: Spain
Regions, republics, autonomous areas, territories, cities:
Russia
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Distinctive characteristics
A. Territorial structure, disparities in terms of population and economy
B. Division of tasks and services between the different levels
C. Income and spending of the different levels
D. Tax autonomy, tax system, formal and material harmonisation
E. Role of the federal units in the decision making process of national
level
F. Financial disparities between the federal units and mechanism of
equalization
Stalder 1999: 3
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The Constituent Units
From 2 (St. Kitts and Nevis, Bosnia-Herzegowina) to 50 (USA) or 86
(Russia)
The largest unit may be bigger than many countries (Uttar Pradesh in
India: 160 million people, California: 34 million)
Some units may be very tiny: Nevis has only 12,000 people, AI has
15,000.
In some countries one or two units encompass the majority of the
population (St. Kitts 75 %, Flanders 58 %, Punjab in Pakistan 56 %)
In other countries the largest unit constitute a small part of the
population (California 12 %, Moscow 7 %, Zurich 17.3 %)
Anderson (2008:14ff.)
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Important distinction
Symmetric federalism
– All federal units have the same tasks, competences and
resources
Asymmetric federalism
– There are differences between the federal units, especially
as far as their autonomy is concerned
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Federations typically divide their territory into one
main class of unit
Some federations have special territorial units with
lesser constitutional status usually making them
subject to the central government (the national capital
district -> Washington DC; remote and thinly
populated territories -> Canada; special tribal areas,
overseas territories, Québec)
Anderson (2008:16)
Exemples
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Congruent versus incongruent federalism
Congruent: The federal units are ethnically
and culturally similar to the state as a whole.
Incongruent: The federal units differ from
each other. Each unit is more homogeneous
than the state as a whole.
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Examples
Argentina, Austria, Australia, Brazil, Germany, Mexico,
the United States have a clearly dominant language
and relatively low levels of religious or ethnic diversity
In Switzerland, India, Canada, Ethiopia, Spain, Belgium
or Russia the diversity is reflected in the composition
of the constituent units.
Anderson (2008:17f.)
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Who Does What and How?
Basically two different approaches:
Dualist Models: Different jurisdictions are assigned to each order of
government, which then delivers and administers its own programs
(Canada, Brazil, US).
Integrated Models: Many shared competences and the constituent-
unit governments often administer centrally legislated programs or
laws (Germany, Austria, South Africa, Spain).
India and Switzerland have strong features of both. Australia is
dualist in administrative arrangements, but has many areas of
concurrency.
Anderson (2008:21 ff.)
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Integrated Models (-> co-operative federalism)
For most subjects central government sets framework
legislation that constituent units can complement with their
own legislation.
In these areas the government of the constituent units
delivers programs -> small civil service for central
government
Challenge: Restricting the detail of central government policy
making
Sometimes there is also joint decision making. Federal law
must be approved by all constituent units (Germany)
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Dualist Models
Each order of government delivers programs in the area of its
responsibility using its civil service and departments, the
federal government is thus present throughout the country.
In all dualist constitutions there are some shared or
concurrent powers (very few in Canada and Belgium, many in
Australia). Where powers are concurrent, federal power is
usually but not always paramount.
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Patterns of distribution of power in different policy area
Defence: always federal sometimes constituent units (CU)
Treaty ratification: almost always federal, sometimes CU
Major physical infrastructure: usually federal, sometimes concurrent, joint or
shared or CU
Primary and secondary school: usually CU, occasionally concurrent, rarely
federal
Post secondary education and research: no clear pattern
Pensions: either concurrent, joint, shared or federal
Health care: usually CU, sometimes concurrent, joint or shared
Police: usually shared, occasionally concurrent or joint, rarely federal or CU
joint = to orders make concurrent decisions; concurrent = both make laws in defined areas; shared =
different legal powers, decisions are made independently
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Residual Power
In bottom-up federations residual power is in
the hands of the constituent units
In federations that emerged from previously
unitary regimes, residual power is in the
hands of the federal state
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Relationship between the federal units
Competitive federalism
– There is competition between the different federal units to the benefit of the citizens (exit, voting by feet)
Solidary federalism
– Compensation of disadvantages among the federal units, equalization systems, co-operation.
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Competition
Many economist argue that a federation should minimize
the extent to which constituent units use tax competition
to influence companies and individuals to locate in a
particular area (limited control over mobile taxpayers).
Danger: downward spiral of tax rates, loss of revenues,
focus on other taxes.
Some economist favour fairly extensive tax competition
because they believe it can promote better services
(Anderson 2008: 31).
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Different revenue and spending arrangements
In some countries, the central government dominates
the levying and collection of revenues as well as the
delivery of programs.
In other countries, the constituent units play a more
important role in the collection of revenues and their
expenditures are larger.
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Central-government revenues relative to total government revenues
around 45 % Canada, Switzerland54 % United Statesbetween 60 and 75 % Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
India, Germany, Spainover 80 % Argentina, Malaysia, Mexico,
Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Venezuela
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Central-government direct spending relative to total government spending
30 to 40 % Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Germany
between 45 and 60 % Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Spain, South Africa, US
over 75 % Malysia, Venezuela
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Transfers to constituent units
In all countries central government raises more
revenue than it spends for its own needs.
Some transfers are unconditional, others are
conditional (and for example promote the
achievement of national purposes or
standards).
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Central transfer relative to constituent-unit spending
13 to 26 % Canada, Switzerland, US23 to 30 % Russia, Malysia44 % Germany46 % Australia, India68 % Belgium73 % Spainmore than 83 % South Africa, Nigeria, Mexico
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Tax system
Income tax and value added tax
Which shares go to the different tiers?
Who decides on the tax rate?
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Income tax
Schweiz Kanada USA Deutschland Österreich
Einkommenssteuer (Lohnsteuer)
Einziehende Stelle Bund, Kantone,
GemeindenBund, Provinzen Bund, Staaten Steuerverbund
(Gemein-schaftssteuer)
Bund
Anteil Bund 28.8 63.0 81.5 42.5 69.0Anteil Gliedstaaten ca. 43 37.0 18.5 42.5 16.5Anteil lokale Ebene ca. 28 15.0 14.5 Steuerföderalis-
musBund regelt Steuerbasis und Progression, über die Höhe entscheiden Provinzen
Steuerföderalis-mus
harmonisiert (Verteil-schlüssel)
harmonisiert (Verteil-schlüssel)
Nach Stalder 1999, eigene Ergänzungen
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VAT
Schweiz Kanada USA Deutschland Österreich
Wahrenumsatz-steuer
Anteil Bund 100.0 46.2 50.0 69.5
Anteil Gliedstaaten 53.8 100.0 48.0 18.7
Anteil lokale Ebene Spezialsteuern Weitere Umsatzsteuern
2.0 11.8
Verteilung Verteilschlüssel Verteilschlüssel
Nach Stalder 1999, eigene Ergänzungen
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Disparities between constituent units
The wealth of constituent units within federation differs
greatly, affecting their ability to raise own-source revenue.
Most federations have provisions for dealing with these
differences through transfers.
There is a great variety in the design and the underlying
principles for these transfers.
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Different redistribution systems
Usually there are transfers from central government to the
constituent units. In Switzerland and Germany there also
transfers from richer to poorer constituent units.
What is the aim of the equalization: minimal standards, same
level, within a range, super-equalization?
The importance of unconditional transfers in equalization
programs varies.
Conditional transfers can also include equalization considerations.
Central government spending (investments) in specific areas can
also have a equalizing effect.
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Vertical Relations
In federations the two houses the parliament
are constituted on different representative principles,
with one chamber (usually the upper house) using a
formula based on constituent units whereas the system
for the lower house is closer to the representation by
population
are elected or namend in different ways
can have quite similar or distinct powers
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Bundesrat (Germany)
Probably the most distinct Upper House
Länder delegates are not elected but named by their
governments and officially led by their minister-
presidents
Legislation that affects the Länder must be approved
by the Bundesrat
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Representation in the Upper House
Equal number of members from each full constituent
units: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Nigeria, Mexico,
Russia, South Africa, Switzerland
Unequal number with weight given to population:
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India
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Power of the Upper House
US: Senate has all power of the House of Representatives, but it
alone approves key appointments, declarations of war and treaties.
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Switzerland: absolute veto power
Germany: Veto over matters affecting Länder and suspensive veto
over other matters
India, Nigeria: veto of the Upper House can be overridden in a joint
sitting of the two Houses
Austria, Malaysia, Spain: Suspensive veto only
Canada: extensive legal powers but only uses them to revise and
delay
Belgium: Veto on all matters that can affect the federal system.
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The basic characteristics of Swiss Federalism
The existence of the cantons is guaranteed
The cantons are free to organize themselves internally
The cantons elect their own authorities
The cantons dispose of far reaching competences
The cantons dispose of their own financial resources
There is no political control ruling over the cantons
The cantons participate equally in the decision making
process on federal level
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The institutions of Swiss Federalism
Vertically: Participation of the cantons in the
decision making on national level
Horizontally: Co-operation between the cantons
Neidhart, Leonard: Föderalismus in der Schweiz. Zürich: Benzinger, 1975
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Horizontal institutions
Treaties between cantons (Konkordate)
Conference of high civil servants and directors
The conference of the cantonal governments
Regional governmental conferences
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Vertical institutions:
The second chamber in the Parliament („Ständerat“) The majority of the cantons which is needed to change
the Constitution („Ständemehr“) The right of the cantons to launch an initiative The possibility of eight cantons can launch a
referendum The possibility to call for a joint assembly of the two
chambers of Parliament The role played by the cantons in the pre-
parliamentary decision making process The execution of federal policies by the cantons
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Party composition of the Council of States 1975-2011
1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007
FDP 15 11 14 14 18 17 18 14 12CVP 17 18 18 19 16 16 15 15 15SP 5 9 6 5 3 5 6 9 9SVP 5 5 5 4 4 5 7 8 7LPS 1 3 3 3 3 2 - - -
LdU 1 - - 1 1 1 - - -
Lega - - - - 1 - - - -
Grüne 2Grünliberale 1
Total 44 * 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
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Party composition of the National Council 1975-2011
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
701
91
9
19
22
19
28
19
35
19
39
19
43
19
47
19
51
19
55
19
59
19
63
19
67
19
71
19
75
19
79
19
83
19
87
19
91
19
95
19
99
20
03
20
07
FDP CVP SP SVP Grüne Andere
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The majority of the people versus the majority of the cantons
Datum Vorlage Ja-% Volk Kantone gescheitert am
14.1.1866 Mass und Gewicht 50.5 9,5:12,5 Ständemehr23.10.1910 Volksinitiative für Proporzwahl Nationalrat 47.5 12,0:10,0 Volksmehr13.03.1955 Volksinitiative zum Schutz der Mieter und Konsumenten 50.2 7,0:15,0 Ständemehr03.03.1957 Zivilschutzartikel 48.1 14,0:8,0 Volksmehr15.11.1970 Finanzordnung des Bundes 55.4 9,0:13,0 Ständemehr04.03.1973 Bundeskompetenzen Bildung 52.8 10,5:11,5 Ständemehr02.03.1975 Konjunkturartikel 52.8 11,0:11,0 Ständemehr27.03.1983 Energieartikel 50.9 11,0:12,0 Ständemehr12.06.1994 Kulturföderungsartikel 51 11,0:12,0 Ständemehr12.06.1994 Erleichterte Einbürgerung für junge Ausländer 52.8 10,0:13,0 Ständemehr
Beinahe Kollisionen Ergebnis
18.02.1979 Atominitiative 48.8 9,0:14,0 abgelehnt18.02.1979 Stimmrechtsalter 18 49.2 9,0:14,0 abgelehnt06.12.1992 EWR 49.7 7,0:16,0 abgelehnt03.03.2002 Uno-Beitritt (VI) 54.6 12,0:13,0 angenommen
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The Council of the States and the majority of the cantons: an increasing disequilibrium
One person from Appenzell Innerrhoden = 35 people from Zurich
Theoretically about 9 percent of the citizens can block a political project, in reality this percentage, however ist higher (20 – 25 percent or even higher)
Do you know about similar problems in other countries? Are there any solutions to solve the problem?
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„The Reform of financial equalization and task allocation (RET)”
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Problems of the old system
1. Increasing centralization, cantons and municipalities
are increasingly concerned with the execution of
federal projects
2. Increasing inequalities between the cantons
3. Opacity of the transfer system
4. „Violation of basic principles of political economy and
fiscal federalism“
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Goals of the new system
Modernizing and strengthening Swiss Federalism through
clearer assignment of tasks and disentangled of
responsibilities between the federal state and the cantons.
Increasing the performance of the equalization system
and decreasing the cantonal differences as far as the
financial resources and the tax burden is concerned.
Making the provision of public services more efficient
through a more modern form of co-operation between the
different layers of the state and through a stronger inter-
cantonal co-operation.
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Expected efficiency gains
At the beginning of the reform project:
about 3 billion Swiss francs (vgl. Klöti 2000: 20)
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Four instruments to achieve the above mentioned goals:
1. A disentanglement of tasks and financial responsibilities
2. New forms of co-operation and funding
3. A more encompassing inter-cantonal co-operation with
an equalisation of the financial burden
4. A new financial equalisation scheme
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1. Disentanglement of tasks and financial responsibilities
Disentanglement of tasks: 15 task will be entirely assigned to the cantons, 6 tasks will be entirely assigned to the federal state.
The guiding principle for the assignment of tasks is the principle of subsidiarity.
In the course of the disentanglement of the funding of public services conditional grants are abolished as well as payments depending on the financial situation of the cantons. The new financial equalisation scheme (see beyond) will provide the cantons with more freely spendable resources (unconditional transfers).
-> These changes should stop the increasing centralisation, increase the responsibilities of the cantons and provide them with more unbound financial resources.
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Tasks which will entirely fall into the realm of the federal state
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Tasks which will entirely fall into the realm of the cantons
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2. New forms of co-operation and funding
In spite of the effort to disentangle public functions there still remain a number of shared tasks.
In general, the Confederation will be responsible for the definition of strategies, the cantons for their execution.
Through this differentiation cantons will be able to decide for themselves on the way a specific public good or service should be produced to meet the citizens’ demands.
Instead of subsidies the cantons will receive global transfers based on the services they provide (products).
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3. A more encompassing inter-cantonal co-operation with an equalisation of the financial burden
In a number of sectors inter-cantonal cooperation can be declared mandatory. Among those sectors are universities, special health care institutions, cultural institutions and public transportation in urban areas.
The general conditions for mandatory inter-cantonal cooperation define a well qualified majority of the cantons (eighteen) which can ask the Confederation to declare inter-cantonal cooperation mandatory.
A inter-cantonal equalisation of financial burdens guarantees the principle of fiscal equivalence.
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4. The new financial equalisation scheme
On the financial side, the equalization of resources will guarantee a minimal amount of income to each canton.
In the new system, the former “index of financial strength” is replaced by a “resource indicator”. The resource indicator measures the financial capacity of the cantons, or, technically spoken, their resource potential.
The resource indicator is calculated on the basis of taxable income and wealth of the natural persons (inhabitants) and the profits of the juristic persons (business, firms, enterprises). These elements reflect the economic situation in the cantons more accurately than does the current system.
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– Resource equalization is accompanied by cost compensation. The mountain regions on one side and the cantons with central cities on the other are confronted with specific production costs that cannot be compensated by resource equalization. Therefore, the reform of financial equalization and task allocation includes two specific instruments.
– The geographic and topographic cost compensation takes into consideration the specific production cost of mountainous cantons due to the steepness of their surface as well as to the low density of their population. Examples for such additional cost are snow removal, expensive road construction, avalanche protection and so on.
– With the socio-demographic cost compensation cantons with high per capita cost for social welfare and infrastructure resulting from central city problems will be compensated. In central cities there is usually a concentration of poor, elderly and unemployed people as well as immigrants and addicts. In addition, these regions have higher expenditure on services such as public security and public transportation.
Cost compensation
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Compensation in cases of hardship
RET is designed to be neutral as far as the cost for
the Federal state and the Cantons are concerned.
However, a political fund was needed (for the next
28 years) in order to prevent some poorer cantons to
be even worse off in the new system (“political
fund”).
Two thirds of the money come from the national
state, one third from the cantons.
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64.4% Yes- and 35.6% No-votes, accepting cantons 18 5/2, refusing 2 ½ (ZG, SZ and NW)
Step 1: Constitutional changes
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Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederationof 18 April 1999 (Status as of 7th March 2010)
The cantons and the assignment of their tasks
New:
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New: Principles for the allocation and fulfilment of state tasks
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Step 2
Two years after the vote (Flims 2006) the Parliament
accepted the necessary changes of about 30 federal laws. No referendum was launched against these changes.
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Step 3: How much money goes into the different „compensation baskets“?
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2,5 billion
-> 72,5 percent(1,8 billion) for the vertical equalisation of the resources
27,5 percent (682 million) for cost compensation.
The contribution of the strong cantons in terms of resources amounts to 70 percent (about 1,26 billion.) of the vertical resource compensations.
The fund for cases of hardship paid by two thirds by the national state and one third by the cantons and amounts to 430 million for the first eight years.
Money initially promised (Federal Proposition of December 2006):
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Final decisions
Parliament accepts the transfers suggested in 2007
The new scheme starts on January 1, 2008
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Finanzausgleich: Ausgleichszahlungen für 2011 errechnet
Bern, 06.07.2010 - Die Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung
(EFV) hat die fälligen Ausgleichszahlungen der einzelnen
Kantone für das Jahr 2011 ermittelt.
Für das Jahr 2011 stellen der Bund und die ressourcenstarken
Kantone insgesamt 3,635 Milliarden Franken zugunsten der
ressourcenschwachen Kantone zur Verfügung. Weitere 705 Millionen
stellt der Bund für Kantone mit Sonderlasten bereit. Der Betrag für
den Härteausgleich in der Höhe von rund 366 Millionen bleibt gemäss
Finanzausgleichsgesetz (FiLaG) gegenüber 2010 unverändert. Damit
stehen für den Finanzausgleich nächstes Jahr insgesamt rund 4,702
Miliarden in Form zweckfreier Mittel zur Verfügung.
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Evaluation
-> Wirksamkeitsbericht des Finanzausgleichs
zwischen Bund und Kantonen 2008 bis 2011;
Vernehmlassung
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Minimal availability of resources after equalisation : 85 percent