swiss milita report

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THESWISS REPORT

A special study for Western Goals Foundationby General Lewis W . Walt, U.S.M.C. (Ret.) andGeneral George S. Patton, U.S.A. (Ret.)


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WESTERN GOALS309-A Cameron Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314 (703) 549-6688Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald, ChairmanWestern GoalsAdvisory Board

Rep. Jean AshbrookMrs. W alter BrennanTaylor CaldwellR oy M. Cohn, Esq .Rep. Phil ip M . CraneGen. Raymond G. DavisHenry HazlittDr. Mildred F. JeffersonD r. Anthony KubekRoger MillikenAdm. Thomas MoorerE . A . MorrisVice Adm. Lloyd M . MustinMrs. J ohn C. NewingtonGen. George S. PattonDr. Hans SennholzGen . John SinglaubD an SmootRobert StoddardRep. Bob StumpMrs. Helen Marie TaylorDr. Edw ard TellerG en. Lewis W altDr. Eugene Wigner

Western GoalsExecutive StaffLinda Guell , DirectorJohn Rees, Edi torJul ia Ferguson, Research

Des ign/Type: Ellis Graphics

March 1983LETTER FROMTHE CHAIRMANDear Reader:

In th e contemporary arena of political chica nery, realitycounts fo r little and illusion is frequently king, but in thestruggle for the survival of Western Civilization, it will beth e real world, not i l lusions or delusions, that w i l l deter-mine which way the future will go. This basic truth isespecially the case in areas of natio nal defense. P oliticiansm ay play politics as usual right up to the time of actualconflict; after that point , only th e mislabeled fool ordedicated traitor would continue the deception.National defense matters present many real problemsat both the p olic ym aki ng and electorate levels. One suchcase may be found in the question of a draft as a means ofsupplying the necessary military manpower. A militaryservice draft causes apprehension to eligible teenagemales, and this is especially the case when the inequ itabledraft of the Vietnam War era is remembered.The all-volunteer military force is an alternative to adraft, but it is an expensive way to go as illustrated by thefact that approximately 60 percent of the defense dollargoes to personnel and perso nnel related costs (by way ofcompar ison, in the Soviet Union th e comparable figure is22 pe rcent, th us leaving the lion's share for w eaponsdevelopment and prod uct ion) . Too, historically, there areserious questions as to whether a paycheck is an ade-quate subst itute for patriotic fervor.

While Americans wrestle with th e defense matters ofgrowing costs, manpower needs, volunteerism vs. thedraft, and even th e matter of a national will, it is refreshingto note that there is one country that has adopted a for-mula that has resolved those same vexations. That coun-try is Switzerland, and amazingly , th e Swiss have suc-cessfully applied this national defense formula for cen-turies wi thou t th e problems of popular divis ion. To the(continued on inside back cover)

Publ ished by WESTERN GOALS, 309-A Cameron Street , Alexandria, Virginia 22314. (703)549-6688. Ad ditio nal copies of this publication are available from th e foundat ion at $4.00 per copy.This study should not be interpreted as an effort to influence any legislative program of the U.S .Congress. The view s expressed in this publicat ion are those of the authors an d contributors and dono t necessarily rep resent th e position of W E S T E R N G O A L S .W ESTERN GOALS is a Virginia Corporation and is recognized by the Internal Re venu e Service tobe an organization described in Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code.Copyright 1983-Western Goals


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TH ESWISS REPORT

A special study for Western Goals Foundationby General Lewis W . Walt, U.S.M.C. (Ret.) andGeneral George S. Patton, U.S.A. (Ret.)


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The AuthorsGeneral Lewis W . Walt ,USM C (Ret .)

Genera l Lewis Will iam Wal t , who has seen more com-bat on the battlefield t h an any other l iv ing Marine , ledcombat t roops in three wars , was a U . S . Marine Pla toonLeader in the defense of the In ternat ional Set t l ement inS hangha i , C h i n a in 1938-39, and ret i red from act ive ser-vice in the Corps on Fe bru ary 1, 1971.During his act ive military career of nearly 35 years,Genera l Wal t was awarded 19 personal decorat ions fo rcom ba t , i nc lud ing tw o N avy Crosses , o ur N at ion 's secondhighes t combat award . He was also awarded twoDis t ingu i shed Serv i ce M ed a l so ne as C o m m a n d e r oft he Mar ines and o ther combat t roops in V ie tnam , and one as Ass i s t ant Co m m anda nt o fth e Marine Corps.Fol lowing h is r e t i r emen t , the 4-star General served as Director of the United StatesMarines Y o u t h F o u nd a ti o n and subsequent ly he headed up t he U . S . Senate Invest igat ionon In ternat ional D r u g Traffic. From September 1974 to September 1975, G eneral Wal tserved as the sen io r mili tary m e m b e r of Pres iden t Ford 's C lem ency Board , fol lowed by hisservice as C o nsu l t an t to the Dep ar t men t of Defense in the areas of weap o ns d ev e l o p m en tand co mb a t t ra in ing .Genera l Walt , one of 12 chi ldren who worked his way t h ro ug h co l lege , was born on afarm near Harveyvi l le , Kansas o n Feb ru a ry 16 , 1913. H e graduated with h o no r s from th eMilitary D e p a r t m e n t at Colorado State Universi ty with a degree in C h e m i s t r y . H isau thored works inc lude Strange War, Strange Strategy (1970); America Faces Defeat(1971) ; and Th e Eleventh Hour (1979) .T he General currently resides in Orlando, Flor ida with h is wife, the fo rm er M rs . JuneBurket t Jacobsen.


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Major GeneralGeorge S. Patton, USA (Ret.)

Major General George Smith Patton was bornDecember 24, 1923, in Boston, Massachusetts, th eyoungest of 3 children of Major George S. Patton, Jr. andBeatrice Ayer Patton.General Patton graduated from The Hill School, Potts-town, P ennsylvania, and from the U.S. Military Academyat West Point . H e holds a Masters Degree in InternationalAffairs from George W ashington University. The Generalalso attended th e Armed Forces Staff College, th e U.S .Army Armor School, and the U.S. Army W ar College.General Patton served in Korea as Company C o m m and e r and volunteered for servicein Vietnam, serving initially as Special Forces Operations Officer concurrently with anassignment at the American Embassy, Saigon. One of his several other Vietnamassignments included his service as Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regi-ment .Peacetime missions include General Patton's service as follows: Headquarters and Stu-dent Company Commander and Commanding Officer of the Tank Training Center and63rd Heavy Tank Battal ion, respectively, in Germany (General Patton's career with th eU.S. A rmy includes approxim ately 11 years E urop ean service alone); Com pany TacticalOfficer with the Department of Tactics at West Point and similar duties at the ExecutiveDepartment at the U.S. Nav al Academ y; Assistant C om m andant of the U.S .Army Armor School in Fort K no x; D irector, Security Assistance with Headquarters at the

U.S. European Command; an d Director of Readiness, H Q D A R C O M .The General 's decorations include th e Distinguished Service Cross with one oak leafcluster; Silver Star with one oak leaf cluster; Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters;Distinguished Flying Cross; Meritorious Service Medal; several South Vietnam decora-t ions, and the Purple Heart .G eneral Patton is m arried to the former Joanne H olbrook and they reside on their farmin South Hamilton, Massachusetts.


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AcknowledgementsWestern Goals wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the following in-dividuals for their inv aluab le assistance in the presentation of th is s tudy :

1. Div is ionnai re (M G) Edm und MullerDeputy Chief of Staff, LogisticsFederal Military Depar tmentBerne, Switzerland2 . Colonel Jean Rossier

Chief of the Territorial ServiceStaff LogisticsFederal Military Depar tmentBerne, Switzerland3. Colonel Philippe ZellerChief of Operations, General StaffFederal Military Depar tmentBerne, Switzerland4. H ans M um enthaler , D irectorFederal Office of Civil DefenseBerne, Switzerland5 . Honorable G. A. Cheval lazMinister of DefenseT he Federal CouncilBerne, Switzerland6. Br ig . G eneral Heinr ich Ko opm an and staffOffice of the Swiss Military AttacheWash ing ton, D .C.7. Colonel George E . Th o mp so nT he American EmbassyBerne, Switzerland

T he Foundat ion wishes to say a special "thank you " to Charley Reese, Orlan-do, Flor ida, for his edito rial assistance and contr ibut ions .


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The Swiss Report

Switzerland l ies landlocked in W estern Eu rope, a sm all densely po pulated na-tion of nearly seven million people. To the west lies France, to the south Italyand to the north and east, West Germany and Austr ia. By modern jet fighter, i tis ten minutes from the W arsaw P act natio ns of Eastern Eu rop e. Since 1815Switzerland has remained an inv iolate island of peace in the mids t of war. EvenAdolph Hit ler 's W ehrm acht , w hich conquered all of Europe in the early monthsof World War I I , chose not to attack Switzerland despite th e fact that th e smallcountry was in the crossroads of W estern Eu rope.Switzerland is, of course, neutral , but it was not mere respect for its neutralitywhich kept the Nazi armies and others before i t out of the t iny count ry . It wasthe determinat ion of the Swiss people to defend their neutrality and the credibil-ity of their means to do so. That determination remains alive today in the faceof weapons of mass destruction. So, too, does the credibility of the means.Within 48 hours, the Swiss can field an army of more than 600,000 m e n ,100,000 mo re than the present arm y of W est G erm any . To day, i t can provideshelter space for 85 percent of its civilian population and by the 1990s intendsto have shelter space for the entire population. War supplies, medical suppliesand food supplies are meticulously stored in more than 100 kilometers of tun-nels. Abou t 4,000 permanent obstacles and barriers and more than 2,000 dem-olition devices are in place, read y to ham per and block an aggressor's progress.In short , S witzerland is an armed bu nker .Yet, there is no s tand ing A rmy , no bunker mentali ty, no enormous drain onthe Swiss economy, no militaristic threat to Europe's oldest an d most fiercely in-dependent democracy.How the Swiss have achieved this credible deterrent to invas ion is the subjectof this report. The Swiss security system is u n iq u e as well as an example of whata dem ocratic nation can accomplish by app lying reason and logic to p roblemswhich have been realistically and carefully analyzed.

HistoryNiccolo Machiavelli, th e 15th century Italian s tudent of power, remarked ofthe Swiss, "They are the most arm ed an d most free people in Europe." In-

deed, Switzerland was born in the 13th century out of a desire to be free of d o m -ination by the H absburg family. In 1291 three Swiss cantons signed the Perpet-ual Co venant whi ch m arked the beg inning of the Swiss C onfederation. In the1300s, th e Swiss fought several wars for independence with Austria and in 1499Switzerland won its independence from the Holy Roman Em p i re .The policy of neutrality originated in 1515 when th e Swiss suffered a s tun-


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ning defeat by the French, but that early neutral i ty did not save i t from an in-vasion and occupation by the French under Napoleon in 1798. T he Congressof Vienna of 1815 restored Swiss independence and guaranteed its neutral i ty .Switzerland adopted a new const i tut ion in 1848, m odeled som ewhat afterthe A m erican const i tut ion and th is was amended in 1874 to increase the federalgovernment 's powers in military and court matters, al though the cantons (equiv-alent to American states) generally retain considerably more power than Amer-ican states.The Swiss economy today is built arou nd precis ion m anu factu r ing , chemicals ,bank ing , and tour i sm. It has one of the highest standards of living in the worldand the land is criss-crossed by a 3,150-mile railroad network and 30,000miles of hard-surfaced roads. Three major rivers have their origin in Switzer-l a n d t h e R h i n e , the R hon e , and the Po. Most of the popula t ion and most ofthe agriculture are located in the plateau region between the Jura and theAlps. Swiss agriculture can produce only three-fifths of the nat ion 's food sup-p l y , a factor carefully weighed in the Swiss security system pla nni ng . Th e natio nis greatly dependent on imports for food and most raw materials for its ndus t ry ,including oil, natural gas, and coal.Since 1815 the Swiss have not f o u g h t in a fore ign war, yet they have main-tained th e tradit ion o f a citizen arm y and r i f l e and pistol shooting are among thenation's most popular sports with almost every vil lage having a shooting range,over 3,000 ranges in all.Today Switzerland maintains i ts neutral i ty , but practices what i t calls so lidar-i ty participating in in ternat ional h um anitar ian projects , offering i ts good officesfo r the resolut ion of disputes, and p rov idin g technical assistance to Third Wo rldcountries. The Swiss participate in those internatio nal act ivit ies and organiza-t ions which do not require it to violate i ts policy of neutral i ty . Neu tral i ty is cen-tral to Swiss thinking and, in fact, is the determining factor in the Swiss securitysystem.

Swiss Strategic ThinkingDivisionnaire Major Genera l Edmund Muller, deputy chief of staff, logistics,sum m arized Swiss strategic th inking th is way :

"Historical experience shows that if a nation is not able to defend i t s e l fand to protect its spiritual and material values, it will become, sooner orlater, th e target of power politics and force. E f f o r t s to defend ourselvesagainst force are therefore still necessary. These e f f o r t s must be integratedwithin a comprehensive security policy expressed in the form of clear guide-lines. Our government is convinced that we can successfully undertakepeace-keeping e f f o r t s in the future only if we can ensure at the same timeour own security in a credible way. The security policy of a country is onlycredible if a realistic evaluation of the threats and a sober estimation of itsow n possibilities lead to the implementation of a concept capable of inspir-in g confidence at home and respect abroad."

T he words, "credible", "respect", "realistic", and "planning" occur over and


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over in Swiss defense documents and briefings. T o a remarkable degree, theSwiss government has approached i ts problems in a supremely logical manner,setting out basic premises and drawing the correct inferences.T he objectives of the security policy are set forth as follows: (1 ) preservationof peace in independence; (2 ) preservation of freedom of action; (3) protectionof th e population; and (4) defense of the terri tory.Each of these objectives has been carefully analyzed and the choice of wordsis not careless. What the Swiss mean by "Peace in independence" is made clearin the fol lowing excerpt from a report of the Federal Council to the FederalAssembly :"The preservation of peaceno matter how much we are interested in itis not an end in itself. It can neither be separated from th e preservation ofself-determination nor can one be played off against the other. O ur goal is peacein independence; both aspects are therefore of equal importance."In defining preservation of freedom of action, the Swiss make clear they meanf reedom from foreign pressures, which can be achieved only by having avail-able a powerful means o f resisting them and freedom from internal pressuregenerated by illegal means or the use of force.Ha v in g defined their security policy objectives, the Swiss then proceed to ex-amine the threat. I n doing so , they include "the state of relative peace" alongwith indirect war, conventional war, war with weapons of mass destruction,and blackmail.T h e following quotations from the same Federal Council report reveal no t

only the Swiss view of the present threats but provide an insight in their th ink-ing processes:"Today, peace does not correspond to the ideal and conditions usually asso-ciated with i t . The general situation is characterized by continuous confronta-t ions, also in those cases where there is no open employment of force.""The danger of a breach of international agreement is always present. Thecollective security system envisioned by the Charter of the United Nations hasnot been allowed to become effective, particularly because of the lack of una-nimity among the permanent members of the security council....today's state

of relative peace is to a great extent due to the fact that the two superpowersneutral ize each other. T he balance of fear, maintained only by the mutual threatof annih i la t ion, is not stable. I t can be jeopardized by the excessive armamentsefforts of one side, by technological breakthroughs as well as by irrational ac-t i ons . . . . unde r the protection of this relative balance of forces, powers an dgroups of powers attempt to enlarge their spheres of inf luence through polit ical,economical, propagandistic and psychological pressures.""Conflicts are increasingly being waged by indirect means, with the goal ofinf luencing, weakening and finally overcoming the opponent through polit ical,psychological and terrorist means.... this type of warfare takes advantage of theincreasing vulnerabi l i ty of the modern state with i ts numerous vital facilities(such as power utilities, communication, transportation and information facili-ties) . Those who resort to th is k ind of warfare, whether they act in the interest ofa foreign power, a foreign ideology or out of anarchistic motives, take advan-tage of the frictions existing within a society, as well as of all fo rms of political


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and social malaise of certain populat ion groups. By attempting to break up theexisting liberal order through the paralysis of the publ ic inst i tut ions, facilitiesand the democratic processes by way of defamat ion , in t imida t ion and the em-p l oy m e n t of force, they hope to be able to achieve their goals.""The possibil i ty of black m ail exists at each level of conflict , taking advantageof the opponent's fear of the threatened act ions. B lackm ail acquires a partic-ular d imens ion if it is exercised by nuclear powers. The authori t ies of the stateagainst wh ich the b lackm ail is directed co uld be p ut un de r intense pu blic pres-sure and be forced to make decis ions of such a magn i t ude as to be withou t h i s-torical para l le l . . . . t he four levels of conflict are characterized by those methodsand means wh ich wo uld , a t each level , be predom inant ly em ployed. D ur inglarge confronta t ions , the parties to the conflict will try to combine these methodsand m eans acting s im ul taneous ly in a direct and indirect man ner."T h u s , the Swiss take a hard look at the world and i ndu lge in no escapist th ink-ing. They recognize that they could become the victim of blackmai l , of subver-s ion , of a convent iona l or a nuclear at tack. Yet they also real ize that becauseof their small size, they are not likely to be a primary target and therefore can-not justify a cont inued state of mobi l i za t ion .The Swiss see the mil i tary as only one co m po nent of a spectrum of strategicmeans to achieve their security object ives. Their foreign policy init iatives are astrategic means to defend their policy of armed neutral i ty, to provide access toraw materials and markets to exports. Social policy is a strategic means to pro-vide the stability necessary to withstand threats. Economic policy is a strategicmeans of insur ing tha t in t imes of crisis or war, the Swiss people can cont inueto exist. The Swiss G ov ernm ent has actual ly form ed wh at i t cal ls a war econom yorganizat ion with the specific goals of planning for self-sufficiency in t ime of war.In this regard, Swiss cit izens are required to mainta in in the ir homes a two-m onths ' supp ly of foo d; industria lis ts and imp orters are required to m ainta in warstocks of raw materials and f ood . Civil Defense is seen as the strategic meansof insur ing surv iva l of the popula t ion . I n short , the Swiss approach the problemof security with a tota lly integrated m ethodolog y that involves the entire nation.

T he Militia SystemThe purpose of the military forces of Switzerland are two-fold: (1) to deterwar by the principle of dissuasion; and (2) if deterrence fails, to defend theterritory and the popu la t i on ."Dissuasion is a strategic posture which should persuade a potential aggressorto avoid an armed conflict , by convincing him of the disproport ion exist ing be-tween the advantages gained from an attack on the country and the risks en-tai led. The r isks wh ich a po tential aggressor m ust be m a de to perceive consistsin the loss of prest ige, military forces, war-potential and t ime , as well as in r un -ning cou nter to h is ideolo gical , pol i t ical and econom ic interests."T he Swiss have no illusions about the ir ability to defeat a major militarypower . They could no t have defeated th e Nazi a rmy wh ich for a t ime con-s idered invad ing Swi t z er land. They m obi l i zed , ho wever , and m a de i t clear be-yond a shadow of a doub t t hat if the Nazi a rm y i n va de d , i t w ou l d be fiercely re -sisted and tha t the tu nn els and passes into I taly wo uld be d estroy ed. In a classic


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example of dissuasion at work, Hitler 's general staff recommended against aninvasion on the grounds that the costs would be disproportionate to the gains.The Swiss military forces are composed almost entirely of the militia. Only800 out of 50,000 officers are professionals. They, and the recruits which hap-pen to be training at any given t ime, are the only people in Switzerland on"active duty"The Swiss militia system is unique and is not comparable to the present Re-serve and Guard forces in the United States. The basis for conscription is theconst i tut ion, which mandates military service for every Swiss male from age 20to 50 (55 in the case of officers). There are no exceptions. Conscientious ob-jectors are given a choice between A rm y non-com bat units and jail. Those phys-ically unfit for military du ty but employable are required to pay a tax . Womenare not included in the compulsory military service system, but small num bersof them are accepted on a volu nteer basis for non-com batant posit ions.

The universality of the Swiss system provides several advantages. It is fair andtherefore enjoys popular support . In the 1970s a nat ional referend um was heldon the question of pro vi di ng alternative service to conscientiou s objectors. T heSwiss people defeated it by an overwhelming majori ty.A second advantage is that the Swiss Army does not have to operate a voca-tional school system, training unqu alif ied people in special skills which they take,as soon as their enlistm ent is com pleted, into the civilian market. The Swiss sys-tem operates in reverse. The Swiss Army, because everyone is obligated, canchoose those people trained in their civilian roles for the military jobs whichmatch their specialty. In the Swiss system, th e burden of specialized training ison the civilian sector.A third adv antag e is tha t every male, age 20 to 50 , who is an elected officialor civil servant in the government at all levels is also a member of the SwissAr m y . This helps prevent the jealousy and hostility that armies sometimes con-front in compet ing with other government services for their share of the publ icresources. The lack of separation between the army, the people, and the gov-ernment is one of the u n iq u e and valu able characteristics of the Swiss system.A fourth advantage is that Switzerland does not hav e a h igh proportion of itsdefense dollars going to personnel costs. There are no military retirement sys-tems (the 800 full-t ime officers are included in the civil service pension sys-t em) , no veterans benefits, no massive payroll of a large standing arm y. T here isa medical insurance program to take care of injuries or death while serving onactive d ut y . C ons equ ently, 50 p ercent of all Swiss defense app ropriations canbe directed toward the acquisit ion of weapons and equipment. A comparablefigure is 30 percent in the Republ ic of West Germany .At the age of 19, young men are given physical and mental tests in prepara-tion for military service. By this age, most young men in Switzerland have al -ready chosen their career path s and so permitt ing the A r m y to channel them intoth e proper slots. Some consideration is given to the recruit 's preference and tohis locale, but the A rm y makes the final decision according to its own needs.At age 20, recruits report for 17 weeks of t ra ining. The Swiss do not operateseparate training facilities for recruits and then others for military specialties.Each training camp handles bo th the recruit 's basic training and his military


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specialty. In other words, a young man destined for the medics reports directlyto a medical t raining company; an in fant ryman to an infantry t raining camp.A t the end of the t ra ining cycle, the recruit , now a member of a milit ia un i twith which he will stay in most cases for the duration of his obligation, returnshome. H e carries with him h is rifle, an allotment o f am m u n i t i o n , un i fo rms , mil-itary pack, and CBR mask. He is responsible for the maintenance of th is equip-ment and is inspected annually. Once a year he is also required to qualify withhis personal weapon on a rifle range or face an additional three days of t raining.Once a year, he will report fo r three weeks of military t raining in a rugged fieldexercise set up as a problem the type of which his particular uni t would face.T he Swiss Army is organized into f ou r Army Corps. Each Army Corps con-trols three Divisions.The Field A r m y Corps are composed of two Infantry Divis-ions and one Mechanized Division. The Mountain Corps has three MountainDivisions. I n addition, each Field Army Corps has some separate Border D e-fense Brigades and the Mountain Corps, separate Fortress Brigades.These 12 Divisions plus the Air Defense Command constitute the elite. Youngmen aged 20 to 32 serve in these Divisions. Men of the "Landwehr", 33 to 42years old, are f o u nd in the separate Brigades. Those in the "Landsturm", 43 to50 years old, serve in the Territorial Forces. Thus, the duties of the militiamenare adjusted as his physical capabilities change with age.

These elite field forces with the eight youngest classes of soldiers plus all Com-missioned Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers are mobilized fo r threeweeks of t raining each year. "Landwehr" forces train for two weeks every twoyears , and "Landsturm" uni t s for one week every fou r years.All officers are chosen from the ranks. A young man chosen to become an of-ficer while he was a private must attend a one-month non-commissioned of-ficers school. I f he is successful, th e soldier is promoted to corporal and, to payoff his new rank, he must serve as a group leader for a period of 17 weeksimmediate ly fol lowing recruit school.T he requisite number of corporals to meet requirements are sent to officertraining schools for four months. After successful completion of this school, heis promoted to lieutenant. This is fol lowed by service as a platoon leader with an-other recruit t raining un i t . After f ive years in grade, he will be promoted to firstl ieutenant .

After two years as a first lieutenant, he is eligible fo r promotion to captain.To be promoted to captain, a first lieutenant has to attend a three-weekweapons school, a four-week tactical school and serve as company commanderin a recruit training cycle. A s a captain, he will command and administer acompany.After eight years, a captain can get promoted to major , and then, if he com-pletes successfully special t ra ining, he may become a battalion commander.Subsequent promotions to lieutenant colonel after seven years as major and tocolonel two years later depends upon ind iv idual ability and vacancies. T he high-est rank a militia officer m ay attain is that of brigade commander. Divisions an dA r m y Corps are commanded by professional officers.

A first lieutenant or captain who desires to become a career officer has to at-tend a series of branch schools and then attend a one-year course at the Military


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Equipment (value $2,000.00). Every Swiss militia soldier has the above equipmentready at his home. (See opposite page fo r itemized list)


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Cyclists light infantry

Volunteer in Civil Defense telephone exchange


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The infantry in action

Farmer on the way to his unit


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Mechanized troops

Air-defense


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Militia pilots for jet fighters

Telecommunications

Dogs fo r protection and rescue


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Repair shop

Sheltered surgery


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shops. There is an automatic survei llance and guidance system to help engagethe a i r defense and gro und at tack arm am ents .The n u m b e r of m ain weapons in the Swiss Arm y is as follows:350 aircraft800 tanks1,200 armored personnel carr iers900 artillery g u n s (self-propelled or m obi le)300 artillery tub es in fortresses2,000 mo bi le an t i - tank guns300 ant i tank gu ns in bunkers2,000 anti-aircraft guns3,000 ant i - tank guided miss i le sys tem s20,000 bazookas

Th ou sands of grenade lau nchers and mill ions of mines are also on hand aswell as 30,000 arm y-o wned special vehic les and 50,000 civi l ian-owned vehiclestagged fo r m ob i l i za t ion. Each owner k now s precisely wh ere to br ing h is vehiclein case of mobi l i za t ion .These and other war supp lies are stored in arsenals and u nd erg ro u nd facilitiesal l over the country. They are stored by uni t . A military un i t , fo r example , willdraw the s ame equ i pmen t from th e same arsenal each year for i ts annua l train-ing exercise so tha t i t becomes famil iar with i t, with i ts locat ion, and can assist th e

civilian maintenance personnel in spot t ing problem s.The Swiss logistics system is a work of gen ius and is tailored to the require-ments of a militia army in a neutral country which, if it fights, cannot count onallies for re - supply or assistance.Of 17,000 civil servants in the Ministry of Defense , 10,500 are in logistics. In1981 the b u d g e t was 800 million Swiss francs and it main ta ins 5,500 bui ld ingsand installat ions, 600 war bases, 170 main tenance facilities, and more than 100kilometers of unde rground facilities.These u n d e r g r o u n d facilities not only conta in stores of a m m u n i t i o n and otherwar suppl ies but a lso u ndergro und repa i r facilities fo r t anks , artillery pieces, elec-tronics equipment and vehicles. The va lue of the Swiss Army inventory is 12.8bill ion Swiss francs.T he Swiss A rmy m ain ta ins 40 military hospi ta ls , ten of t h e m u n d e rg r o u n d com pletely equ ipp ed, spotless and ready. Th ey are used o nly for t ra ining pur -poses. W h e n the Swiss purchase a weapons system f rom abroad, they purchaseenough spare parts for both the life of the system and for war reserves. This isto insure cont inui ty of use in a war even though Swi tzer land is cut off from th eoriginal source of supp ly .

They also practice th e principle of commona l i t y so that mili tary, civil defense,and civil pol ice equipment are the same. An example of Swiss ingenui ty ap-plied to logistics is the storage of perishable medical supplies for war- t ime use .These suppl ies are obta ined f rom ph armaceu t ical com panies , s tored, and thenat the appropr ia te t ime, re turned to the Pharmaceut i ca l s fo r sale in exchange fo r


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fresh supplies for storage. B y arrangement, the Swiss government would actual-ly pay for the supplies only in the event of their consumption duringa war.Military Doctrine

Once mobilized, the Swiss Army would f ight as a conventional force. Swissmilitary doctrine calls for meeting the aggressor at the borders and waging totalwar. This is a departure from earlier doctrine which in World War I I called forabandoning the plateau area for the mountain fortresses.In the event o f mobil iza t ion , the 4,000 permanent obstacles and barrierswould be activated and the more than 2,000 demolition devices already bui l tinto key bridges and tunnels would be set off. Industrial machines would be dis-abled; water levels in the more than 900 dams lowered; fuel tanks burned.

The Swiss terraina hilly plateau region between two mountain rangesw ould necessarily channelize the aggressor's attacks. These obvious avenuesof approach are heavily fortified and would be defended from built- in positionsand by mobile forces of the three Army Corps backed up by the Air Force. TheSwiss plan is to make every inch gained by the enemy a bloody and costly gain.In the event main units of the Army are destroyed, Swiss doctrine calls for con-t i nued passive and active resistance by means of guerrilla warfare.This combination of powerfu l resistance by conventional forces, continued re -sistance by guerrillas, and the self-destruction of Switzerland's industr ial , com-municat ions , and transportation networks constitutes the strategy of dissuasion.The message to the potential aggressor is clear: after a bloody, expensive, time-consuming war, he will have gained nothing of value. H e will be faced withoccupation of a hostile area, denuded of economic or transportation value, andcont inued resistance by a determined and armed population.T he armed population is no bluff. Swiss mil i t iamen are not required to turnin their weapons upon completion of their obligation. It is said that every Swisshome contains at least three weapons, for not only is there the militia system,but there is a long tradition of civilian ownership of f irearms and, as pointed outbefore , rifle and pistol shooting are virtually the national sports of Switzerland.There are few restrictions on the Swiss purchase, ownership or carrying, of fire-arms. A n armed occupation force would indeed be literally faced with the pros-pect of a Swiss r if leman behind every tree.

The Territorial ServiceA unique component of the Swiss Army is the Territorial Service. I t has noequiva len t in the United States and so deserves special attention in this report.With in the army itself, the Territorial Service operates as logistical uni t s , but i tdoes much more and is the main link between the army and the civilian sector.I t is composed of those men in the "Landsturm" who are 43 to 50 years of age

as well as some younger men assigned to it for Air Raid Rescue Battalions.The duties of the Territorial Service can be summarized as fol lows: (1) It hasthe mission of providing warning services to both the A r m y and the civilian pop-ulat ion in case of danger from air, atomic, biological and chemical weapons aswell as dam bursts; (2) it is responsible for coordinating th e lowering of the water


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level of hydroelectric reservoirs and for other measures concerning the electricalsupply system; (3) it has the mission of caring for internees, prisoners of war andrefugees ; (4) it provides military police to assist civil authorit ies when neces-sary; (5) it is responsible for the military economy se rv ice to supp ly all thegoods needed by the a rmy from the civilian sector and to hand le the d ism ant l ingor destruction of civilian economic assets that could be used by the enemy; and(6 ) to protect important and vital instal lat ions.This Territorial Service is primarily designed for war, but port ions of it can bemobil ized in peacetime to assist civilian authorit ies with non-mil i tary catastro-phies.Structural ly, the Territorial Service is designed to parallel the Swiss civil gov-ernment structure. T he basic civilian uni t of the Swiss Confederat ion is the can-ton . Some of the larger cantons are div ided into districts. C antons are groupedtogether to form Territorial Zones.

At th e level of a district (a port ion of a canton) there is a District Civil Staff anda Territorial Reg ional Staff; th e Territorial Service equ iv alent of the canton iscalled a Territorial Circle. Here again , th e military staff works with the civil staff.A t th e Territorial Zone level (groups of cantons) , there are also parallel civilianand military staffs.To make this relat ionship clearer, we might imagine a United States militaryservice which had a com m and structure at the level of the F ederal G overn-me n t , at the level of the Federal Regions, at the state levels, and at the districtlevels within the states with the missions of providing domestic intell igence, se-curity for key installations, control of the economy in t ime of war, and assis-tance to civilian authori t ies in han dli ng d isasters and civil disturbances. There is ,of course, no such organizat ion in the Un ited States.

The Swiss have not only clearly d efined the missions of the Territorial Servicebut also the rules under which i t operates. For example , the needs of the armytake precedence over the needs of the civil sector. Th e T erritorial Service canassist the civil sector only on the request of civilian authori t ies and, even then,author i ty and responsibil i ty for civilians rema in with the civil authori t ies . I n otherwords, in the event of a catastrophe, the Territorial Service is not authorized tostep in and take over operations, bu t only to provide assistance to civil au thor -ities un de r their direct ion.On the other hand, in the event of war, the Territorial Service's first obliga-t ion is to the a rmy and un de r those circumstances i t would overr ide , if neces-sary, th e civil authori t ies in the event of a conflict of interests. It is also th e Terri-torial Service wh ich provi des the manpower earmarked for use b y civil defense.

Civil DefenseSome critics of the Swiss system have expressed the belief tha t the possessionof nuclear weapons has m a d e the strategy of dissuasion obsolete. These are, tobe sure , those critics who view nuclear war as an offense fo r whi ch there is nodefense .The Swiss do not agree. Recalling one of their strategic objectives as protec-t ion of the civilian populat ion, the Swiss government has real ist ically assessedthat objective in l ight of nuclear , chemical and biological warfare. Th eir answer


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would likely be no safer. Therefore, the Swiss opted for "vertical as opposed tohorizontal protection." This dictated the construction of blast-proof shelters.Another was the adoption of the principle that every inh abitant mu st h ave anequal chance of survival . The Swiss seem to be meticulous about th e principleof equal sharing of both responsibilit ies and privileges. The first obligation ofevery Swiss citizen is to their country.Because of the proximity to likely opponents , the Swiss have adopted thestrategy of ordering people into th e shelters as soon as political or m ilitary ten-sion reaches a critical level. From that p oint on, only key workers would leavethe shelters until such t ime as there was an actual attack or the situat ion becameless tense.Finally, the Swiss mad e a basic decision to separate civil defense from the mil-itary operations. The office of civil defense operates under the Minister of Jus-tice and Federal police. While some 30,000 troops from the Territorial Servicewould be mad e available to civil defense, primarily for fire-fighting and rescuework, it is not a fighting organizat ion nor does it replace normal civilian rescueand emergency aid organizat ions during peacetime. It can be mobil ized forpeacetime rescue work, but this is clearly a secondary mission.

SummarySwitzerland, a small country with limited res6urces, has conceptualized,planned , and i mp lemented a rat ional security policy which provides m axim umeffect with m inim um expendi tures . T he militia system, being both universal anda part of the const i tut ion, has wide public acceptance. I t allows mobilization ofa large army without th e draining costs of a large professional army. The per-sonnel savings hav e been invested in redou bts, barriers, eq ui pm ent, storage fa-cilities, hospitals, an d weapons.To a remarkable degree, the Swiss require private sector participation in thedefense effort. These private contributions are estimated to equal the annualgo vernm ent expend itures. By integrating their security policy to inclu de foreig npolicy, social policy, defense, civil defense and economic measures, th e Swisshave, in effect, oriented their entire public effort toward the end of security fortheir nation and their people.The Swiss General Defense system provides a high dissuasive v alue and cred-ibility to this small, neutral country in the heart of Europe. In case of war Switzer-land would not attract the more powerful nations who might consider Switzer-land to be a mil itary vacu um . On the contrary, Switzerland can activate thedensest defense systemon th e ground and in the air on short noticeinWestern Europe.Thanks to Civil Defense as well as intricate economic preparedness, there isa high degree of survi vability even in a mo dern war of long durati on. T he mostimportant factor remains that th e overwhelming majority of the Swiss has a

strong will to defend the country against any aggressor. They are prepared tofight, and will fight whenever and whomever necessary.


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O n Peace..."T o be prepared for w ar is one of the most effectivemeans of preserving peace." George Washingtonin his first annual address toCongress on January 8, 1790

O n War. . ."War is an ugly thing but not the ugliest thing. Thedecayed and degraded state of moral and patrioticfeeling which thinks nothing worth a w ar is worse. A manwho has nothing which he cares about more than hispersonal safety is a miserable creature who has nochance of being free unless made and kept so by theexertions of better m en than himself." John Stuart Mill(1806-1873)


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Chairman's letter, continuedcontrary, th e Swiss concept has promoted unity among th e people of that small butmature nat ion.The people of Switzerland are to be envied fo r their m any achievem ents , and the policyachievement of a plan fo r armed neutrality could be a mo del either in whole or in part fo rthose seeking a rational approach to survival problems.The concept of armed neutrality was a pol icy favored by our Fo und ing Fathers but thewarnings and advice of Founding Father George Washington has been lost to TwentiethCentury Am ericans. Perhaps even at this late date, we could find many answers to ourcurrent problems by observing the Swiss way of a total defense concept.

Sincerely,

"...to rebuild and strengthen th e political, economic, andsocial structure of the United States and Western Civilization so asto make an y merger with totalitarians impossible." WE ST E R N GOALS

Lawrence P . McDonaldChairman and President


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swiss milita report

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