strategy & tactics - number 208

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  • Update Afghanistan Pearl Harbor British-Afghan Wars

    NUMBER 208

    Also: For Your Information Toolkit for Holy War:

    Afghanistanjo

    i p

  • OUTGOING BY JOSEPH MIRANDA

    Editor-in-Chief: Joseph Miranda

    fYl IdftoirTimothyl KultaDesign Graphics Layout: Wlie'Cirimins

    'Copy Editors: Cory'Andersort, tob DeanySaiyRomano, and Dav Vandenbroucke. >Map Graphics: L Hoffman & Meridian MappingCounter Graphics:,L Hoffman ,,. , . . . . . - , ,

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    PERMIT NO 92

    This is a special issue of Strategy & Tactics. After considerable discussion, we decided thatgiven the current situation in Middle East to run articles and a wargame that deals with not onlythe current conflict, but also the historical background as well as a future "what if' war againstIraq. Veteran game designer Ty Bomba takes the lead with his Back to Iraq feature. AndrewPreziosi and Gary Romano look at once and future wars in Afghanistan. Tim Kutta over in theFYI section provides an update on the continuing crisis, with some background on the Talibanand Osama bin Laden. And we close with my "lessons learned" analysis of the last war inAfghanistan, the Soviets versus the Mujahideen. With the next issue of S&Tv/e resume ournormal schedule with First Indochina War, the French vs. the Viet Minh, 1946-54.

    Back to AfghanistanI did a quick check of ScSTback issues. In the last decade or so we've covered quite a few

    topics related to the current conflict in the Middle East (it's the middle of October 2001 as I writethis). S&T 139 included Arabian Nightmare, a complete simulation of the Gulf War, designedwhile the conflict was in progress. Issue 144 had Chad: the Toyota Wars which wargamedthe intricacies inherent in low intensity conflict in acountry fractured by civil war. Number 147was Holy War: Afghanistan, a simulation of the then recently concluded Sovietcounterinsurgency against the mujahideen. Number 158 had a retrospective on the Gulf War.Issue 166 included an analysis of modern terrorism, and what counterterrorist forces did rightand wrong (admittedly, back in the 1960s and 1970s, but still there are lessons to be learnedfor today). Issues 170and 171 presented extensive coverage of the UN intervention in Somaliain the early 1990s, this being one of Osama bin Laden's stomping grounds. 174 was oursimulation of the Indo-Pakistani Wars, and 197 looked at both nations' nuclear capabilities ingreater detail. First Afghan War was published in issue 179, wargaming the ill-fated Britishexpedition of 1839-42. Issue 180 had articles on two different air wars against Iraq (the firstbeing the little known campaign of 1941, the second the well publicized Desert Storm). Andfor more on this topic, issue 180 included a piece on simulating airpower in low intensityconflict. Issue 202 was Invasion: Taipei which, while set in a different part of Asia did includesystems for modeling modern electronic and cybernetic-based operations. Number 204covered the Iraq-Iran War of the 1980s, a conflict which has had considerable repercussionsfor today. Finally, issue 206 provided an analysis of US strategic deployment capabilities inAsia.

    Simulating Modern WarfareWhen designing wargames of modern era conflicts, say from 1946 to the near future, there

    are several dilemmas that have to be faced. These include:Asymmetry in tactics. How do you account for the differences between, say, US AirLand Battle

    doctrine and Soviet-style echelon tactics? Do you use special rules to give each nation'sforces special capabilities in combat? Or do you just give each force different combatresults tables, with the outcomes reflecting the differences that occur on a lower level?

    Reconstitution versus unit burnout. Some nations try to keep their combat units as cohesiveformations by providing them with replacements and enhanced logistical support. Otherssimply keep their units in the line until ineffective, pull them out, and replace them withfresh formations. Do you give units operating under the former system the ability to replacecombat losses (say, by providing "replacement points" or enhanced disruption recovery),while the latter receives additional whole unit reinforcements instead?

    Helicopters. How do you portray helicopters and assorted airmobile/air assault formations?Are they a special form of airpower or a modified form of land power? They use flight toquickly concentrate and break off combat. But these units also can operate in a mode similarto armor, that is, as maneuver units capable of taking and holding terrain.

    Technology and other stuff. Electronic warfare has considerable impact on the modernbattlefield, yet it is not a combat maneuver force. The related fields of command-controland cyberwar also are becoming increasingly critical. One solution (used in S&T 202Invasion: Taipei), is to model them similar to airpower, as theater level assets effectingunits on the operational and tactical levels. continued on page 26

    Next IssueNext issue: Indochina. The First Indochina War, French versus the Communists,1946-54, your chance to win in Vietnam before the United States got involved (JoeMiranda, designer; Brian Train, developer).

    #208

  • CONTENTS

    NOVIDEC200I Number 208

    FEATURES

    4 Back to Iraq: A StrategicAnalysis & Update for 2002by Ty Bomba

    16 Update Afghanistanby Gary Romano

    22 The British Warsin Afghanistanby Andrew Preziosi

    40 "A day that will live in infamy."by Gary Romano

    47 The Soviet War in Afghanistanby Joseph Miranda

    DEPARTMENTS

    2 OUTGOING MAIL

    26 WORKS IN PROGRESS

    27 FYhFORYOURINFORMATION

    33 TOOLKIT FORHOLYWAR:AFGHANISTAN

    63 FEEDBACKQUESTIONS

    RULES

    RI BACKTO IRAQ, 3RD ED.

    On the cover: Photos from aroundthe Middle East

    STRATEGY & TACTICS 3

  • ack To Ira ciStrategic /4n a lysi

    by Ty Bomba

    The Ai>li< - ' < - - ! ' ' >=. ': -n air power, as given expression by the US and other First World air forces, can

    npi>:/" s '' ' ' v | ; , : : . ; ' ' : . . in the 1991 Gulf War, the month-long aerial offensive conducted preliminarytoi /,": : : : ; ; > : ? < ; . : JJjjj f - - i : ; -i : ...

    ; ; ; | ! : , : ; fi percent of all Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery o . , ' K - ? - ' . - . p H-, "i: ;-! ; : : ' ! g ,conducted primarily by I3-52s, also worked to undermine the moraleof the

    j i '; ' ' ; ' : : ! ' : ; :; . : , , ; i : ; nahe 140-iTiile-long "Saddam Line" along the northeast border of Saudi Arabia.1 ' ' < '.' : ; : : : ! , : ; ? : . , , . : , , ; ; i . s o hard that their formations effectively ceased t o operate.

    - . - . - - - . _ ... . S^S^^pJ i^|AI|^ ^^?AtAA ! \' ! . : ' ':' ' . - i p | . M : : : p s , ! - ||| j : ; : i r ! M ! , i : , , , : ') i :, 'i ; ;ck Jong enough to allow for Iraqi mobile forces,

    i ; ^ : ' ::.u< | ; , : : i ; = . : ; u > ; . ; ; : , ;; ,;..\ , ; iietratioiis. In stead, by the time the Coalition ground attacki's'iu!.*' ; . ' , - - } ' , : , i-: : ; i :^ ' . ' > : : i : . ; : ; v : : ' ;* -.'uced by casualties and desertion to the point they hardly

    / ; : . K . , r ; i T: , i \ . - :> ' . ; , i ;mi;\ 'vri'":^ [ 'o . ; . , ; : - . ; : i : . r . ' i j ' ' 1 ,5 \ h : - = . i , : ' , i :::s\a.-\." ' . . - a i / i - ' i- -. . ' ^ ; . - i i . : ;' > . . : ;!;;:::'! | ;- ; : - , : ; ; Jjj ; : ' : : : i . M vehicles the Iraqis had in the Kuwaiti theater of

    -.- - : : . -> ; ' ; : ;'i ' ' :; ., r : ; . : ;. :- : : . 1 ' . L i v . ' "\ i : : : - < i i ; r, though, because most Iraqi truck drivers,' ' : > ' ' v ' : : s : : ' i : - : : : , - , . ' . . , : . < , - ' . : - I , ; . . ; - , i : . . : ' , : , r , - = ; ! . . ;v,, ' ' : ' lier increasing their army's supply

    : - , i i ' c H , , : : : M u:";:::' : ' : ; ; : . " : r - t . ; ; ; . . .>; i , : - , - j r ; : ' i.Sdam's ill-fated. Kliafji counter-offensive wereU U n O l , - :V.:^ M l l J ' O.:" , ' : ' : : , . ' ; ' "0 | fiA

  • All that was accomplished by air power in the 1991Gulf War. And it was accomplished even though lessthan nine percent of the munitions used were of the so-called "smart bomb" type. Elsewhere in September1995 during a three week NATO aerial campaign con-ducted using about 70 percent Precision Guided Muni-tions (PGMs), the Bosnian Serbs were undeniablybombed to the peace table. Executed just four and a halfyears after Desert Storm, and under the much worsevisibility of Balkan skies, that effort showed how muchPGMs had been improved since the earlier war. The USAir Force and Navy claim the PGMs hit their targets 97percent of the time in Bosnia, heavily damaging orcompletely destroying 80 percent of those so struck.

    More indicative of the ongoing limitations of the airpower only approach, though, the late-1998 "OperationDesert Fox" air offensive over Iraq, aimed at gettingSaddam to readmit UN weapons inspectors to thatcountry, failed miserably. Despite the creation of anominal (an