statcon cases set1 final

8/6/2019 Statcon Cases Set1 Final

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee, vs.ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant. Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO,J.:

In the year 1960 the Caltex(Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to asCaltex) conceived and laid the groundworkfor a promotional scheme calculated to drumup patronage for i ts oi l products.Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest",it calls for participants therein to estimate the

actual number of liters a hooded gas pump ateach Caltex station will dispense during aspecified period. Employees of the Caltex(Philippines) Inc., its dealers and itsadvertising agency, and their immediatefamilies excepted, participation is to be openindiscriminately to all "motor vehicle ownersand/or licensed drivers". For the privilege toparticipate, no fee or consideration isrequired to be paid, no purchase of Caltexproducts required to be made. Entry formsare to be made available upon request ateach Caltex station where a sealed can willbe provided for the deposit of accomplishedentry stubs.

A three-staged winner selection systemis envisioned. At the station level, called"Dealer Contest", the contestant whoseestimate is closest to the actual number ofliters dispensed by the hooded pump thereatis to be awarded the first prize; the next

closest, the second; and the next, the third.Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burnerkerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle anda Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; andan Everready Magnet-lite flashlight withbatteries and a screwdriver set for third. Thefirst-prize winner in each station will then bequalified to join in the "Regional Contest" inseven different regions. The winning stubs ofthe qualified contestants in each region will

be deposited in a sealed can from which thefirst-prize, second-prize and third-prizewinners of that region will be drawn. Theregional first-prize winners will be entitled tomake a three-day all-expenses-paid roundtrip to Manila, accompanied by theirrespective Caltex dealers, in order to takepart in the "National Contest". The regionalsecond-prize and third-prize winners willreceive cash prizes of P500 and P300,respectively. At the national level, the stubsof the seven regional first-prize winners willbe placed inside a sealed can from which thedrawing for the final first-prize, second-prize

and third-prize winners will be made. Cashprizes in store for winners at this final stageare: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500for third; and P650 as consolation prize foreach of the remaining four participants.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the

mails not only as amongst the media forpublicizing the contest but also for thetransmission of communications relativethereto, representations were made by Caltexwith the postal authorities for the contest tobe cleared in advance for mailing, having inview sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of theRevised Administrative Code, the pertinentprovisions of which read as follows:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging toany of the following classes, whether sealedas first-class matter or not, shall be importedinto the Philippines through the mails, or tobe deposited in or carried by the mails of thePhilippines, or be delivered to its addresseeby any officer or employee of the Bureau ofPosts:

Written or printed matter in any formadvertising, describing, or in any mannerpertaining to, or conveying or purporting to

convey any information concerning anylottery, gift enterprise, or similar schemedepending in whole or in part upon lot orchance, or any scheme, device, or enterprisefor obtaining any money or property of anykind by means of false or fraudulentpretenses, representations, or promises.


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"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Uponsatisfactory evidence that any person orcompany is engaged in conducting anylottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for thedistribution of money, or of any real orpersonal property by lot, chance, or drawingof any kind, or that any person or company is

conducting any scheme, device, or enterprisefor obtaining money or property of any kindthrough the mails by means of false orfraudulent pretenses, representations, orpromises, the Director of Posts may instructany postmaster or other officer or employeeof the Bureau to return to the person,depositing the same in the mails, with theword "fraudulent" plainly written or stampedupon the outside cover thereof, any mailmatter of whatever class mailed by oraddressed to such person or company or therepresentative or agent of such person orcompany.

SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use ofmoney order system and telegraphic transferservice.The Director of Posts may, uponevidence satisfactory to him that any personor company is engaged in conducting anylottery, gift enterprise or scheme for thedistribution of money, or of any real orpersonal property by lot, chance, or drawingof any kind, or that any person or company isconducting any scheme, device, or enterprisefor obtaining money or property of any kindthrough the mails by means of false orfraudulent pretenses, representations, orpromise, forbid the issue or payment by anypostmaster of any postal money order ortelegraphic transfer to said person orcompany or to the agent of any such personor company, whether such agent is acting asan individual or as a firm, bank, corporation,or association of any kind, and may provide

by regulation for the return to the remitters ofthe sums named in money orders ortelegraphic transfers drawn in favor of suchperson or company or its agent.

The overtures were later formalized in

a letter to the Postmaster General, datedOctober 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thrucounsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rulesand endeavored to justify its position that thecontest does not violate the anti-lotteryprovisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed,the then Acting Postmaster General opinedthat the scheme falls within the purview ofthe provisions aforesaid and declined to grantthe requested clearance. In its counsel'sletter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought areconsideration of the foregoing stand,stressing that there being involved noconsideration in the part of any contestant,

the contest was not, under controllingauthorities, condemnable as a lottery.Relying, however, on an opinion rendered bythe Secretary of Justice on an unrelated caseseven years before (Opinion 217, Series of1953), the Postmaster General maintained hisview that the contest involves consideration,or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "giftenterprise" which is equally banned by thePostal Law, and in his letter of December 10,1960 not only denied the use of the mails forpurposes of the proposed contest but as wellthreatened that if the contest was conducted,"a fraud order will have to be issued against it(Caltex) and all its representatives".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicialintervention by filing the present petition fordeclaratory relief against Postmaster GeneralEnrico Palomar, praying "that judgment berendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded PumpContest' not to be violative of the Postal Law,

and ordering respondent to allow petitionerthe use of the mails to bring the contest tothe attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the respective memorandaof the parties, the trial court renderedjudgment as follows:

In view of the foregoing considerations,the Court holds that the proposed 'CaltexHooded Pump Contest' announced to beconducted by the petitioner under the rulesmarked as Annex B of the petitioner does notviolate the Postal Law and the respondenthas no right to bar the public distribution ofsaid rules by the mails.

The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayedagainst each other upon two basic issues:

first, whether the petition states a sufficientcause of action for declaratory relief; andsecond, whether the proposed "CaltexHooded Pump Contest" violates the PostalLaw. We shall take these up in seriatim.

1. By express mandate of section 1 ofRule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which wasthe applicable legal basis for the remedy atthe time it was invoked, declaratory relief isavailable to any person "whose rights areaffected by a statute . . . to determine anyquestion of construction or validity arisingunder the . . . statute and for a declaration ofhis rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification,this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid downcertain conditions sine qua non therefor, towit: (1) there must be a justiciablecontroversy; (2) the controversy must be


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between persons whose interests areadverse; (3) the party seeking declaratoryrelief must have a legal interest in thecontroversy; and (4) the issue involved mustbe ripe for judicial determination (Tolentinovs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No.L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al.

vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2,pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al.,G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). Thegravamen of the appellant's stand being thatthe petition herein states no sufficient causeof action for declaratory relief, our duty is toassay the factual bases thereof upon theforegoing crucible.

As we look in retrospect at theincidents that generated the presentcontroversy, a number of significant pointsstand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex),as a business enterprise of someconsequence, concededly has theunquestioned right to exploit every legitimatemeans, and to avail of all appropriate mediato advertise and stimulate increasedpatronage for its products. In contrast, theappellant, as the authority charged with theenforcement of the Postal Law, admittedlyhas the power and the duty to suppresstransgressions thereof particularly thru theissuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code,against legally non-mailable schemes.Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, theappellee laid out plans for the salespromotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. Toforestall possible difficulties in thedissemination of information thereon thru themails, amongst other media, it was foundexpedient to request the appellant for anadvance clearance therefor. However,likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the

premises and construing the pertinentprovisions of the Postal Law, the appellantsaw a violation thereof in the proposedscheme and accordingly declined the request.A point of difference as to the correctconstruction to be given to the applicablestatute was thus reached. Communications in

which the parties expounded on theirrespective theories were exchanged. Theconfidence with which the appellee insistedupon its position was matched only by theobstinacy with which the appellant stood hisground. And this impasse was climaxed bythe appellant's open warning to the appelleethat if the proposed contest was "conducted,a fraud order will have to be issued against itand all its representatives."

Against this backdrop, the stage wasindeed set for the remedy prayed for. Theappellee's insistent assertion of its claim tothe use of the mails for its proposed contest,and the challenge thereto and consequentdenial by the appellant of the privilegedemanded, undoubtedly spawned a livecontroversy. The justiciability of the disputecannot be gainsaid. There is an activeantagonistic assertion of a legal right on oneside and a denial thereof on the other,concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or issue. The contenders are as realas their interests are substantial. To theappellee, the uncertainty occasioned by thedivergence of views on the issue ofconstruction hampers or disturbs its freedomto enhance its business. To the appellant, thesuppression of the appellee's proposedcontest believed to transgress a law he hassworn to uphold and enforce is anunavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent tohold the contest and the appellant's threat toissue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the

contenders are confronted by the ominousshadow of an imminent and inevitablelitigation unless their differences are settledand stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration(Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of thePhilippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955).And, contrary to the insinuation of the

appellant, the time is long past when it canrightly be said that merely the appellee's"desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or bythe fears of others" which admittedly doesnot confer a cause of action. Doubt, if anythere was, has ripened into a justiciablecontroversy when, as in the case at bar, itwas translated into a positive claim of rightwhich is actually contested (III Moran,Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed.,pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox WestCoast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).

We cannot hospitably entertain theappellant's pretense that there is here noquestion of construction because the saidappellant "simply applied the clear provisionsof the law to a given set of facts as embodiedin the rules of the contest", hence, there is noroom for declaratory relief. The infirmity ofthis pose lies in the fact that it proceeds fromthe assumption that, if the circumstanceshere presented, the construction of the legalprovisions can be divorced from the matter oftheir application to the appellee's contest.This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is theart or process of discovering and expoundingthe meaning and intention of the authors ofthe law with respect to its application to agiven case, where that intention is rendereddoubtful, amongst others, by reason of thefact that the given case is not explicitlyprovided for in the law (Black, Interpretationof Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here.Whether or not the scheme proposed by the


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appellee is within the coverage of theprohibitive provisions of the Postal Lawinescapably requires an inquiry into theintended meaning of the words used therein.To our mind, this is as much a question ofconstruction or interpretation as any other.

Nor is it accurate to say, as theappellant intimates, that a pronouncement onthe matter at hand can amount to nothingmore than an advisory opinion the handingdown of which is anathema to a declaratoryrelief action. Of course, no breach of thePostal Law has as yet been committed. Yet,the disagreement over the constructionthereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. Ithas taken a fixed and final shape, presentingclearly defined legal issues susceptible ofimmediate resolution. With the battle linesdrawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of setting the disputeat rest before it accumulates the asperitydistemper, animosity, passion and violence ofa full-blown battle which looms ahead (IIIMoran, Comments on the Rules of Court,1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot butbe conceded. Paraphrasing the language inZeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal.Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am.Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief tothe appellee in the situation into which it hasbeen cast, would be to force it to choosebetween undesirable alternatives. If it cannotobtain a final and definitive pronouncementas to whether the anti-lottery provisions ofthe Postal Law apply to its proposed contest,it would be faced with these choices: If itlaunches the contest and uses the mails forpurposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk,but is also actually threatened with thecertain imposition, of a fraud order with itsconcomitant stigma which may attach even if

the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if itabandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant toput into effect a virtual fiat of previouscensorship which is constitutionallyunwarranted. As we weigh theseconsiderations in one equation and in the

spirit of liberality with which the Rules ofCourt are to be interpreted in order topromote their object (section 1, Rule 1,Revised Rules of Court) which, in theinstant case, is to settle, and afford relieffrom uncertainty and insecurity with respectto, rights and duties under a law we cansee in the present case any imposition uponour jurisdiction or any futility or prematurityin our intervention.

The appellant, we apprehend,underrates the force and binding effect of theruling we hand down in this case if hebelieves that it will not have the final andpacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At thevery least, the appellant will be bound. Butmore than this, he obviously overlooks that inthis jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying orinterpreting the law shall form a part of thelegal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of thePhilippines). In effect, judicial decisionsassume the same authority as the statuteitself and, until authoritatively abandoned,necessarily become, to the extent that theyare applicable, the criteria which must controlthe actuations not only of those called uponto abide thereby but also of those in dutybound to enforce obedience thereto.Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings thatour resolution of this case will terminate thecontroversy at hand.

It is not amiss to point out at this

juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without precedent. InLiberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399,117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engagedin promotional advertising was advised by thecounty prosecutor that its proposed salespromotion plan had the characteristics of a

lottery, and that if such sales promotion wereconducted, the corporation would be subjectto criminal prosecution, it was held that thecorporation was entitled to maintain adeclaratory relief action against the countyprosecutor to determine the legality of itssales promotion plan. In pari materia, seealso: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207,234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh,supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super.124, 82 A. 2d., 903.

In fine, we hold that the appellee hasmade out a case for declaratory relief.

2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of theRevised Administrative Code, using almostidentical terminology in sections 1954(a),1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns asabsolutely non-mailable, and empowers thePostmaster General to issue fraud ordersagainst, or otherwise deny the use of thefacilities of the postal service to, anyinformation concerning "any lottery, giftenterprise, or scheme for the distribution ofmoney, or of any real or personal property bylot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon

these words hinges the resolution of thesecond issue posed in this appeal.

Happily, this is not an altogetheruntrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922,in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278,283-284, which significantly dwelt on the


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power of the postal authorities under theabovementioned provisions of the Postal Law,this Court declared that

While countless definitions of lotteryhave been attempted, the authoritative one

for this jurisdiction is that of the United StatesSupreme Court, in analogous cases having todo with the power of the United StatesPostmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery"extends to all schemes for the distribution ofprizes by chance, such as policy playing, giftexhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs,etc., and various forms of gambling. Thethree essential elements of a lottery are:First, consideration; second, prize; and third,chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S.449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903],194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson[1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker[1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919],39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel ConstructionCompany vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)

Unanimity there is in all quarters, andwe agree, that the elements of prize andchance are too obvious in the disputedscheme to be the subject of contention.Consequently as the appellant himselfconcedes, the field of inquiry is narroweddown to the existence of the element ofconsideration therein. Respecting this matter,our task is considerably lightened inasmuchas in the same case just cited, this Court has

laid down a definitive yard-stick in thefollowing terms

In respect to the last element ofconsideration, the law does not condemn thegratuitous distribution of property by chance,if no consideration is derived directly or

indirectly from the party receiving thechance, but does condemn as criminalschemes in which a valuable consideration ofsome kind is paid directly or indirectly for thechance to draw a prize.

Reverting to the rules of the proposedcontest, we are struck by the clarity of thelanguage in which the invitation to participatetherein is couched. Thus

No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't needwrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't haveto buy anything? Simply estimate the actualnumber of liter the Caltex gas pump with thehood at your favorite Caltex dealer willdispense from to , and win valuableprizes . . . ." .

Nowhere in the said rules is any

requirement that any fee be paid, anymerchandise be bought, any service berendered, or any value whatsoever be givenfor the privilege to participate. A prospectivecontestant has but to go to a Caltex station,request for the entry form which is availableon demand, and accomplish and submit thesame for the drawing of the winner. Viewedfrom all angles or turned inside out, thecontest fails to exhibit any discernibleconsideration which would brand it as alottery. Indeed, even as we head the sterninjunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, tothe substance, in order to unmask the real

element and pernicious tendencies which thelaw is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc.vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. Inour appraisal, the scheme does not onlyappear to be, but actually is, a gratuitousdistribution of property by chance.

There is no point to the appellant'sinsistence that non-Caltex customers whomay buy Caltex products simply to win aprize would actually be indirectly paying aconsideration for the privilege to join thecontest. Perhaps this would be tenable if thepurchase of any Caltex product or the use of

any Caltex service were a pre-requisite toparticipation. But it is not. A contestant, ithardly needs reiterating, does not have tobuy anything or to give anything ofvalue.1awphl.nt

Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion thatthe scheme, being admittedly for salespromotion, would naturally benefit thesponsor in the way of increased patronage bythose who will be encouraged to prefer Caltexproducts "if only to get the chance to draw aprize by securing entry blanks". The requiredelement of consideration does not consist ofthe benefit derived by the proponent of thecontest. The true test, as laid down in Peoplevs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App.(Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays avaluable consideration for the chance, andnot whether those conducting the enterprisereceive something of value in return for thedistribution of the prize. Perspective properlyoriented, the standpoint of the contestant isall that matters, not that of the sponsor. Thefollowing, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum,should set the matter at rest:

The fact that the holder of the drawingexpects thereby to receive, or in fact doesreceive, some benefit in the way of patronageor otherwise, as a result of the drawing; doesnot supply the element of consideration.Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ.App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).


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Thus enlightened, we join the trial courtin declaring that the "Caltex Hooded PumpContest" proposed by the appellee is not alottery that may be administratively andadversely dealt with under the Postal Law.

But it may be asked: Is it not at least a"gift enterprise, or scheme for the distributionof money, or of any real or personal propertyby lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", whichis equally prescribed? Incidentally, while theappellant's brief appears to haveconcentrated on the issue of consideration,this aspect of the case cannot be avoided ifthe remedy here invoked is to achieve itstranquilizing effect as an instrument of bothcurative and preventive justice. Recalling thatthe appellant's action was predicated,amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217,Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, whichopined in effect that a scheme, though not alottery for want of consideration, maynevertheless be a gift enterprise in which thatelement is not essential, the determination ofwhether or not the proposed contest wanting in consideration as we have found itto be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannotbe passed over sub silencio.

While an all-embracing concept of theterm "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled outin explicit words, there appears to be aconsensus among lexicographers andstandard authorities that the term is

commonly applied to a sporting artifice ofunder which goods are sold for their marketvalue but by way of inducement eachpurchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, LawDictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, LawDictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p.55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce

of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507,509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived,the term clearly cannot embrace the schemeat bar. As already noted, there is no sale ofanything to which the chance offered is

attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualifiedcontestants irrespective of whether or notthey buy the appellee's products.

Going a step farther, however, andassuming that the appellee's contest can beencompassed within the broadest sweep thatthe term "gift enterprise" is capable of beingextended, we think that the appellant's posewill gain no added comfort. As stated in theopinion relied upon, rulings there are indeedholding that a gift enterprise involving anaward by chance, even in default of theelement of consideration necessary toconstitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimesvs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russellvs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154,58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d.,689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is onlyone side of the coin. Equally impressiveauthorities declare that, like a lottery, a giftenterprise comes within the prohibitivestatutes only if it exhibits the tripartiteelements of prize, chance and consideration(E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142,113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563,565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denvervs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E.,605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words andPhrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The

apparent conflict of opinions is explained bythe fact that the specific statutory provisionsrelied upon are not identical. In some cases,as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms"lottery" and "gift enterprise" are usedinterchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); inothers, the necessity for the element of

consideration or chance has been specificallyeliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352,citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel.Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls TheaterCorporation, supra). The lesson that wederive from this state of the pertinentjurisprudence is, therefore, that every casemust be resolved upon the particularphraseology of the applicable statutoryprovision.

Taking this cue, we note that in thePostal Law, the term in question is used inassociation with the word "lottery". With themeaning of lottery settled, and consonant tothe well-known principle of legalhermeneutics noscitur a sociis whichOpinion 217 aforesaid also relied uponalthough only insofar as the element ofchance is concerned it is only logical thatthe term under a construction should beaccorded no other meaning than that which isconsistent with the nature of the wordassociated therewith. Hence, if lottery isprohibited only if it involves a consideration,so also must the term "gift enterprise" be soconstrued. Significantly, there is not in thelaw the slightest indicium of any intent toeliminate that element of consideration fromthe "gift enterprise" therein included.

This conclusion firms up in the light of


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the mischief sought to be remedied by thelaw, resort to the determination thereof beingan accepted extrinsic aid in statutoryconstruction. Mail fraud orders, it isaxiomatic, are designed to prevent the use ofthe mails as a medium for disseminatingprinted matters which on grounds of public

policy are declared non-mailable. As appliedto lotteries, gift enterprises and similarschemes, justification lies in the recognizednecessity to suppress their tendency toinflame the gambling spirit and to corruptpublic morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839,143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it isinherent that something of value be hazardedfor a chance to gain a larger amount, itfol lows ineluctably that where noconsideration is paid by the contestant toparticipate, the reason behind the law canhardly be said to obtain. If, as it has beenheld

Gratuitous distribution of property bylot or chance does not constitute "lottery", ifit is not resorted to as a device to evade thelaw and no consideration is derived, directlyor indirectly, from the party receiving thechance, gambling spirit not being cultivatedor stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs.

Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695,emphasis supplied).

we find no obstacle in saying the samerespecting a gift enterprise. In the end, weare persuaded to hold that, under theprohibitive provisions of the Postal Law whichwe have heretofore examined, giftenterprises and similar schemes thereincontemplated are condemnable only if, likelotteries, they involve the element ofconsideration. Finding none in the contest

here in question, we rule that the appelleemay not be denied the use of the mails forpurposes thereof.

Recapitulating, we hold that thepetition herein states a sufficient cause of

action for declaratory relief, and that the"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as describedin the rules submitted by the appellee doesnot transgress the provisions of the PostalLaw.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealedfrom is affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon,Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivarand Sanchez, JJ., concur.


ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners, vs.THEHONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO, COMMANDING OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, andZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, respondents.


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Jose C. Espina and Potenciano Flores for petitioners. The Solicitor General for public respondents. Gaspar V. Tagalo for private respondentZamboanga Wood Products.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This Court is confronted once again with the

question of whether or not it is a court or alabor arbiter that can pass on a suit fordamages filed by the employer, here privaterespondent Zamboanga Wood Products.Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma 1 then ofthe Court of First Instance, now of theRegional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, wasof the view that it is a court and denied amotion to dismiss filed by petitioners NationalFederation of labor and Zambowood MonthlyEmployees Union, its officers and members. Itwas such an order dated July 20, 1982 thatled to the fil ing of this certiorari andprohibition proceeding. In the order assailed,

it was required that the officers and membersof petitioner union appear before the court toshow cause why a writ of preliminaryinjunction should not be issued against themand in the meanwhile such persons as well asany other persons acting under theircommand and on their behalf were"temporarily restrained and ordered to desistand refrain from further obstructing,impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of itsproperty and free ingress to or egress fromplaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities atLumbayao, Zamboanga City and on its roadright of way leading to and from said

plaintiff's facilities, pending the determinationof the litigation, and unless a contrary orderis issued by this Court." 2

The record discloses that petitioner NationalFederation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filedwith the Ministry of Labor and Employment,

Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, apetition for direct certification as the soleexclusive collective bargaining representativeof the monthly paid employees of therespondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc.at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao,Zamboanga City. 3 Such employees, on April17, 1982 charged respondent firm before thesame office of the Ministry of Labor forunderpayment of monthly living allowances. 4

Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitionerunion, a notice of strike against privaterespondent, alleging illegal termination ofDionisio Estioca, president of the said localunion; unfair labor practice, non-payment ofliving allowances; and "employment ofoppressive alien management personnelwithout proper permit. 5 It was followed bythe union submitting the minutes of thedeclaration of strike, "including the ninety(90) ballots, of which 79 voted for yes andthree voted for no." 6 The strike began onMay 23, 1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, privaterespondent Zambowood filed a complaintwith respondent Judge against the officersand members of petitioners union, for"damages for obstruction of private propertywith prayer for preliminary injunction and/orrestraining order." 8 It was alleged thatdefendants, now petitioners, blockaded theroad leading to its manufacturing division,thus preventing customers and suppliers freeingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Sixdays later, there was a motion for thedismissal and for the dissolution of therestraining order and opposition to theissuance of the writ of preliminary injunctionfiled by petitioners. It was contended that theacts complained of were incidents of

picketing by defendants then on strikeagainst private respondent, and thattherefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs tothe Labor Arbiter pursuant to BatasPambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of firstinstance.10 There was, as noted earlier, amotion to dismiss, which was denied. Hencethis petition for certiorari.

Four days after such petition was filed, onAugust 3, 1982, this Court requiredrespondents to answer and set the plea for apreliminary injunction to be heard on Thursday, August 5, 1982. 11 After suchhearing, a temporary restraining order wasissued, "directing respondent Judge and thecommanding officer in Zamboanga and his

agents from enforcing the ex-parte order ofinjunction dated July 20, 1982; and to restrainthe respondent Judge from proceeding withthe hearing of the until otherwise caseeffective as of [that] date and continuingordered by [the] Court. In the exercise of theright to peaceful picketing, petitioner unionsmust abide strictly with Batas Pambansa Blg.227, specifically Section 6 thereof, amendingArticle 265 of the Labor Code, which nowreads: '(e) No person engaged in picketingshall commit any act of violence, coercion orintimidation or obstruct the free ingress to oregress from the employer's premises for

lawful purposes, or obstruct publicthoroughfares.' " 12

On August 13, 1982, the answer of privaterespondent was filed sustaining the original jurisdiction of respondent Judge andmaintaining that the order complained of was


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not in excess of such jurisdiction, or issuedwith grave abuse of discretion. SolicitorGeneral Estelito P. Mendoza, 13 on the otherhand, instead of filing an answer, submitted aManifestation in lieu thereof. He met squarelythe issue of whether or not respondent Judgehad jurisdiction, and answered in the

negative. He (i)ncluded that "the instantpetition has merit and should be given duecourse."

He traced the changes undergone by theLabor Code, citing at the same time thedecisions issued by this Court after each ofsuch changes. As pointed out, the originalwording of Article 217 vested the laborarbiters with jurisdictional. 14 So it wasapplied by this Court in Garcia v. Martinez15and in Bengzon v. Inciong. 16 On May 1,1978, however, Presidential Decree No. 1367was issued, amending Article 217, andprovided "that the Regional Directors shallnot indorse and Labor Arbiters shall notentertain claims for moral and other forms ofdamages." 17 The ordinary courts were thusvested with jurisdiction to award actual andmoral damages in the case of illegal dismissalof employees. 18 That is not, as pointed outby the Solicitor General, the end of the story,for on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No.1691 was issued, further amending Article217, returning the original jurisdiction to thelabor arbiters, thus enabling them to decide"3. All money claims of workers, includingthose based on non-payment orunderpayment of wages, overtimecompensation, separation pay and otherbenefits provided by law or appropriateagreement, except claims for employeescompensation, social security, medicare andmaternity benefits; [and] (5) All other claimsarising from employer-employee relations

unless expressly excluded by tills Code." 19An equally conclusive manifestation of thelack of jurisdiction of a court of first instancethen, a regional trial court now, is BatasPambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 ofthe Labor Code. It took effect on August 21,1981. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is now

worded thus: "(2) those that involve wages,hours of work and other terms and conditionsof employment." 20 This is to be comparedwith the former phraseology "(2) unresolvedissue in collective bargaining, including thosethat involve wages, hours of work and otherterms and conditions of employment." 21 It isto be noted that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130made no change with respect to the originaland exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiterswith respect to money claims of workers orclaims for damages arising from employer-employee relations.

Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than themeritorious character of this petition.certiorari and prohibition lie, respondentJudge being devoid of jurisdiction to act onthe matter.

1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it isworded. The exclusive original jurisdiction ofa labor arbiter is therein provided forexplicitly. It means, it can only mean, that acourt of first instance judge then, a regionaltrial court judge now, certainly acts beyondthe scope of the authority conferred on him

by law when he entertained the suit fordamages, arising from picketing thataccompanied a strike. That was squarelywithin the express terms of the law. Anydeviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So ithas been the constant ruling of this Courteven prior to Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico,22 a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the

ponencia of Justice Moreland still call forobedience. Thus, "The first and fundamentalduty of courts, in our judgment, is to applythe law. Construction and interpretation comeonly after it has been demonstrated thatapplication is impossible or inadequatewithout them." 23 It is so even after the lapse

of sixty years. 24

2. On the precise question at issue under thelaw as it now stands, this Court has spoken inthree decisions. They all reflect the utmostfidelity to the plain command of the law thatit is a labor arbiter, not a court that possessesoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction to decide aclaim for damages arising from picketing or astrike. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez,25 the issue was set forth in the openingparagraph, in the ponencia of Justice Escolin:"This petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus raises anew the legal questionoften brought to this Court: Which tribunalhas exclusive jurisdiction over an action filedby an employee against his employer forrecovery of unpaid salaries, separationbenefits and damages the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of theNational Labor Relations Commission[NLRC]?" 26It was categorically held: "We rulethat the Labor Arbiter has exclusivejurisdiction over the case." 27Then came thisportion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over thesubject matter in a judicial proceeding isconferred by the sovereign authority whichorganizes the court; and it is given only bylaw. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it mustbe conferred by law in words that do notadmit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction ofcourts and judicial tribunals is derivedexclusively from the statutes of the forum,the issue before us should be resolved on thebasis of the law or statute now in force. We


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find that law in presidential Decree 1691which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3of which reads as follows: ... Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and theCommission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shallhave the original and exclusive jurisdiction tohear and decide the following cases involving

all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims ofworkers, including those based onnonpayment or underpayment of wages,overtime compensation, separation pay andother benefits provided by law or appropriateagreement, except claims for employees'compensation, social security, medicare andmaternity benefits; 4. Cases involvinghousehold services; and 5. All other claimsarising from employer-employee relations,unless expressly excluded by this Code." 28

That same month, two other cases weresimilarly decided, Ebon v. De Guzman29 and

Aguda v. Vallejos. 30

3. It is regrettable that the ruling in the abovethree decisions, decided in March of 1982,was not followed by private respondent whenit filed the complaint for damages on July 9,1982, more than four months later. 31On thispoint, reference may be made to our decisionin National Federation of Labor, et al. v. TheHonorable Minister of Labor and Employment,32 promulgated on September 15, 1983. Inthat case, the question involved was thefailure of the same private respondent,Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., to admit thestriking petitioners, eighty-one in number,back to work after an order of Minister Blas F.Ople certifying to the National LaborRelations Commission the labor dispute forcompulsory arbitration pursuant to Article264 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Itwas noted in the first paragraph of our

opinion in that case: "On the face of it, itseems difficult to explain why privaterespondent would not comply with such orderconsidering that the request for compulsoryarbitration came from it. It ignored thisnotification by the presidents of the laborunions involved to its resident manager that

the striking employees would lift their picketline and start returning to work on August 20,1982. Then, too, Minister Ople denied apartial motion for reconsideration insofar asthe return-to-work aspect is concerned whichreads: 'We find no merit in the said Motion forReconsideration. The Labor code, asamended, specifically Article 264 (g),mandates that whenever a labor dispute iscertified by the Minister of Labor andEmployment to the National Labor RelationsCommission for compulsory arbitration and astrike has already taken place at the time ofcertification, "all striking employees shall

immediately return to work and theemployees shall immediately resumeoperations and readmit all workers under thesame terms and conditions prevailing beforethe strike." ' " 33 No valid distinction can bemade between the exercise of compulsoryarbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor andthe jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass overclaims for damages in the light of the expressprovision of the Labor Code as set forth inArticle 217. In both cases, it is the Ministry,not a court of justice, that is vested by lawwith competence to act on the matter.

4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No.1691 and the enactment of Batas PambansaBlg. 130, made clear that the exclusive andoriginal jurisdiction for damages would onceagain be vested in labor arbiters. It can beaffirmed that even if they were not thatexplicit, history has vindicated the view that

in the appraisal of what was referred to byPhilippine American Management & FinancingCo., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-AmericanManagement & Financing Co., Inc. 34 as "therather thorny question as to where in labormatters the dividing line is to be drawn" 35

between the power lodged in anadministrative body and a court, theunmistakable trend has been to refer it to theformer. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court hasbeen committed to the view that unless thelaw speaks clearly and unequivocally, thechoice should fall on [an administrativeagency]." 36 Certainly, the present Labor Codeis even more committed to the view that onpolicy grounds, and equally so in the interestof greater promptness in the disposition oflabor matters, a court is spared the oftenonerous task of determining what essentiallyis a factual matter, namely, the damages that

may be incurred by either labor ormanagement as a result of disputes orcontroversies arising from employer-employee relations.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is grantedand the order of July 20, 1982, issued byrespondent Judge, is nullified and set aside.The writ of prohibition is likewise granted andrespondent Judge, or whoever acts in hisbehalf in the Regional Trial Court to whichthis case is assigned, is enjoin from takingany further action on Civil Case No. 716(2751), except for the purpose of dismissingit. The temporary restraining order of August5, 1982 is hereby made permanent.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero,Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova andGutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.


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Concepcion Jr., J., took no part. De Castro, J., is on leave.


ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969

CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION, FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J.BUCHHOLZ petitioners,vs.HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.1st Assistant City Fiscal Dionisio C. Claridad, Augusto Tobias and Feria, Feria, Lugtu and La'O for petitioners. Bernardo C. Ronquillo for respondents.

SANCHEZ,J.:

Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of theCourt of First Instance of Baguio to reopencadastral proceedings under Republic Act931. Private petitioner's specifically questionthe ruling of the Court of Appeals that theyhave no personality to oppose reopening. Thethree-pronged contentions of all thepetitioners are: (1) the reopening petition wasfiled outside the 40-year period nextpreceding the approval of Republic Act 931;(2) said petition was not published; and (3)private petitioners, as lessees of the publicland in question, have court standing underRepublic Act 931. The facts follow:

On April 12, 1912, the cadastral

proceedings sought to be reopened, CivilReservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No.211, Baguio Townsite, were instituted by theDirector of Lands in the Court of First Instanceof Baguio. It is not disputed that the land hereinvolved (described in Plan Psu-186187) wasamongst those declared public lands by finaldecision rendered in that case on November

13, 1922.

On July 25, 1961, respondent BelongLutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopensaid Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to theparcel of land he claims. His prayer was thatthe land be registered in his name upon thegrounds that: (1) he and his predecessorshave been in actual, open, adverse, peacefuland continuous possession and cultivation ofthe land since Spanish times, or before July26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2)his predecessors were illiterate Igorotswithout personal notice of the cadastralproceedings aforestated and were not able tofile their claim to the land in question withinthe statutory period.

On December 18, 1961, privatepetitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr.,Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J.Buchholz registered opposition to thereopening. Ground: They are tree farmlessees upon agreements executed by theBureau of Forestry in their favor for 15,395.65square meters on March. 16, 1959, for 12,108

square meters on July 24, 1959, and for14,771 square meters on July 17, 1959,respectively.

On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguiolikewise opposed reopening.

On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes'opposition, the cadastral court denied privatepetitioners' right to intervene in the casebecause of a final declaratory relief judgmentdated March 9, 1962 in Yaranon vs. Castrillo[Civil Case 946, Court of First Instance ofBaguio] which declared that such tree farmleases were null and void.

On May 18, 1962, private petitionersmoved to reconsider. They averred that said

declaratory relief judgment did not bindthem, for they were not parties to that action.

On September 14, 1962, the cadastralcourt reversed its own ruling of May 8, 1962,allowed petitioners to cross-examine thewitnesses of respondent Lutes.


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On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied toand moved to dismiss private petitioners'opposition to his reopening petition. OnOctober 25, 1962, private petitioners'rejoinder was filed.

On August 5, 1963, the cadastral courtdismissed private petitioners' opposition tothe reopening. A motion to reconsider wasrejected by the court on November 5, 1963.

On January 6, 1964, it was the turn ofthe City of Baguio to lodge a motion todismiss the petition to reopen. This motionwas adopted as its own by the ReforestationAdministration. They maintained the positionthat the declaratory judgment in Civil Case946 was not binding on those not partiesthereto. Respondent Lutes opposed onFebruary 24, 1964. On April 6, 1964, private

petitioners reiterated their motion to dismisson jurisdictional grounds.

On September 17, 1964, the courtdenied for lack of merit the City's motion aswell as the April 6, 1964 motion to dismissmade by private petitioners.

On November 13, 1964, all thepetitioners went to the Court of Appeals oncertiorari, prohibition, and mandamus withpreliminary injunction. 1They then questionedthe cadastral court's jurisdiction over thepetition to reopen and the latter's order of

August 5, 1963 dismissing private petitioners'opposition. The appellate court issued a writof preliminary injunction upon a P500-bond.

Then came the judgment of the Courtof Appeals of September 30, 1965. The courtheld that petitioners were not bound by the

declaratory judgment heretofore hated.Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled thatas lessees, private petitioners had no right tooppose the reopening of the cadastral case.Petitioners moved to reconsider. It wasthwarted on May 6, 1966.

Petitioners now seek redress from thisCourt. On July 6, 1966, respondents moved todismiss the petition before us. On August 5,1966, petitioners opposed. On August 12,1966, we gave due course.

1. Do private petitioners havepersonality to appear in the reopeningproceedings?

First, to the controlling statute,Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953.

The title of the Act reads

AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THEPROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN

CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLETO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEENDECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF

JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THEFORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE

APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.

Section 1 thereof provides

SECTION 1. All persons claiming title toparcels of land that have been the object ofcadastral proceedings, who at the time of thesurvey were in actual possession of the same,but for some justifiable reason had beenunable to file their claim in the proper courtduring the time limit established by law, in

case such parcels of land, on account of theirfailure to file such claims, have been, or areabout to be declared land of the publicdomain by virtue of judicial proceedingsinstituted within the forty years nextpreceding the approval of this Act, are herebygranted the right within five years 2 after the

date on which this Act shall take effect, topetition for a reopening of the judicialproceedings under the provisions of ActNumbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, onlywith respect to suchof said parcels of land as have not beenalienated, reserved, leased, granted, orotherwise provisionally or permanentlydisposed of by the Government, and thecompetent Court of First Instance, uponreceiving such petition, shall notify theGovernment through the Solicitor General,and if after hearing the parties, said courtshall find that all conditions herein

established have been complied with, andthat all taxes, interests and penalties thereofhave been paid from the time when land taxshould have been collected until the daywhen the motion is presented, it shall ordersaid judicial proceedings reopened as if noaction has been taken on such parcels. 3

We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28, 1962, a land registrationcase where oppositors were "foreshorelessees of public land", a principle washammered out that although Section 34, LandRegistration Act, 4 "apparently authorizes any

person claiming any kind of interest to file anopposition to an application forregistration, ... nevertheless ... the oppositionmust be based on a right of dominion or someother real right independent of, and not at allsubordinate to, the rights of theGovernment."5 The opposition, according to


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the Leyva decision, "must necessarily bepredicated upon the property in questionbeing part of the public domain." Leyva thuspronounced that "it is incumbent upon theduly authorized representatives of theGovernment to represent its interests as wellas private claims intrinsically dependent upon

it."

But the Leyva case concerned anordinary land registration proceeding underthe provisions of the Land Registration Act.Normally and logically, lessees cannot therepresent issues of ownership. The case at bar,however, stands on a different footing. Itinvolves a special statute R.A. 931, whichallows a petition for reopening on lands"about to be declared" or already "declaredland of the public domain" by virtue of judicialproceedings. Such right, however, is made tocover limited cases, i.e., "onlywith respect tosuch of said parcels of land as have not beenalienated, reserved, leased, granted, orotherwise provisionally or permanentlydisposed of by the Government." 6 Thelessee's right is thus impliedly recognized byR.A. 931. This statutory phrase steers thepresent case clear from the impact of theprecept forged by Leyva. So it is, that if theland subject of a petition to reopen hasalready been leased by the government, thatpetition can no longer prosper.

This was the holding in Director of Land

vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966. Thereopening petition there filed was opposed bythe Director of Lands in behalf of 62 lesseesof public land holding revocable permitsissued by the government. We struck downthe petition in that Case because the publicland, subject-matter of the suit, had alreadybeen leased by the government to private

persons.

Of course, the Benitez ruling cameabout not by representations of the lesseesalone, but through the Director of Lands. Butwe may well scale the heights of injustice orabet violations of R.A. 931 if we entertain theview that only the Director of Lands 7 can hereproperly oppose the reopening petition.Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Willlegitimate lessees be left at the mercy ofgovernment officials? Should the cadastralcourt close its eyes to the factof lease thatmay be proved by the lessees themselves,and which is enough to bar the reopeningpetition? R.A. 931 could not have intendedthat this situation should happen. The point isthat, with the fact of lease, no question ofownership need be inquired into pursuant toR.A. 931. From this standpoint, lessees havesufficient legal interest in the proceedings.

The right of private petitioners tooppose a reopening petition here becomesthe more patent when we take stock of theiraverment that they have introducedimprovements on the land affected. It wouldseem to us that lessees insofar as R.A. 931 isconcerned, come within the purview of thosewho, according to the Rules of Court, 8 mayintervene in an action. For, they are personswho have "legal interest in the matter inlitigation, or in the success of either of theparties." 9 In the event herein private

petitioners are able to show that they arelegitimate lessees, then their lease willcontinue. And this because it is sufficient thatit be proven that the land is leased towithdraw it from the operation of RepublicAct 931 and place it beyond the reach of apetition for reopening. 10

In line with the Court of Appeals'conclusion, not disputed by respondent Lutesherein, the cadastral court should have ruledon the validity of private petitioners 'treefarm leases on the merits. Because there isneed for Lutes' right to reopen andpetitioners' right to continue as lessees to be

threshed out in that court.

We, accordingly, hold that privatepetitioners, who aver that they are lessees,have the necessary personality to intervenein and oppose respondent Lutes' petition forreopening.

2. Petitioners next contend that thereopening petition below, filed under R.A.931, should have been published inaccordance with the Cadastral Act.

To resolve this contention, we need butrefer to a very recent decision of this Court inDe Castro vs. Marcos, supra, involving exactlythe same set of facts bearing upon thequestion. We there held, after a discussion oflaw and jurisprudence, that: "In sum, thesubject matter of the petition for reopening a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia was already embraced in the cadastralproceedings filed by the Director of Lands.Consequently, the Baguio cadastral courtalready acquired jurisdiction over the saidproperty. The petition, therefore, need not bepublished." We find no reason to break away

from such conclusion.

Respondent Lutes attached to therecord a certified true copy of the November13, 1922 decision in the Baguio TownsiteReservation case to show, amongst others,that the land here involved was part of that


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case. Petitioners do not take issue withrespondent Lutes on this point of fact.

We here reiterate our ruling in DeCastro, supra, that the power of the cadastralcourt below over petitions to reopen, as inthis case, is not jurisdictionally tainted bywant of publication.

3. A question of transcendentalimportance is this: Does the cadastral courthave power to reopen the cadastralproceedings upon the application ofrespondent Lutes?

The facts are: The cadastralproceedings sought to be reopened wereinstituted on April 12, 1912. Final decisionwas rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutesfiled the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961.

It will be noted that the title of R.A.931, heretofore transcribed, authorizes "thefiling in the proper court, under certainconditions, of certain claims of title to parcelsof land that have been declared public land,by virtue of judicial decisions rendered withinthe forty years next preceding the approval ofthis Act." The body of the statute, however, inits Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that"have been, or are about to be declared landof the public domain, by virtue of judicialproceedings instituted within the forty yearsnext preceding the approval of this Act."

There thus appears to be a seeminginconsistency between title and body.

It must be stressed at this point thatR.A. 931 is not under siege on constitutionalgrounds. No charge has been made hero or inthe courts below that the statute offends the

constitutional injunction that the subject oflegislation must be expressed in the titlethereof. Well-entrenched in constitutional lawis the precept that constitutional questionswill not be entertained by courts unless theyare "specifically raised, insisted upon andadequately argued." 11 At any rate it cannot

be seriously disputed that the subject of R.A.931 is expressed in its title.

This narrows our problem down to oneof legal hermeneutics.

Many are the principles evolved in theinterpretation of laws. It is thus not difficult tostray away from the true path of construction,unless we constantly bear in mind the goalwe seek. The office of statutoryinterpretation, let us not for a moment forget,is to determine legislative intent. In the words

of a well-known authority, "[t]he true objectof all interpretation is to ascertain themeaning and will of the law-making body, tothe end that it may be enforced." 12 In varyinglanguage, "the, purpose of all rules ormaxims" in interpretation "is to discover thetrue intention of the law." 13They "are onlyvaluable when they subserve this purpose." 14

In fact, "the spirit or intention of a statuteprevails over the letter thereof." 15 A statute"should be construed according to its spiritand reason, disregarding as far as necessary,the letter of the law." 16 By this, we do not"correct the act of the Legislature, but

rather ... carry out and give due course to" itstrue intent. 17

It should be certain by now that whenengaged in the task of construing an obscureexpression in the law 18 or where exact orliteral rendering of the words would not carry

out the legislative intent, 19 the title thereofmay be resorted to in the ascertainment ofcongressional will. Reason therefor is that thetitle of the law may properly be regarded asan index of or clue or guide to legislativeintention. 20 This is especially true in this jurisdiction. For the reason that by specific

constitutional precept, "[n]o bill which may beenacted into law shall embrace more thanone subject which shall be expressed in thetitle of the bill." 21 In such case, courts "arecompelled by the Constitution to considerboth the body and the title in order to arriveat the legislative intention." 22

With the foregoing guideposts on hand,let us go back to the situation that confrontsus. We take another look at the title of R.A.931, viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILINGIN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAINCONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEENDECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THEFORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THEAPPROVAL OF THIS ACT." Readily to be notedis that the title is not merely composed ofcatchwords. 23 It expresses in language clearthe very substance of the law itself. Fromthis, it is easy to see that Congress intendedto give some effect to the title of R.A. 931.

To be carefully noted is that the sameimperfection in the language of R.A. 931

aforesaid from which surfaces a seeminginconsistency between the title and the body attended Commonwealth Act 276, thepresent statute's predecessor. That prior lawused the very same language in the bodythereof and in its title. We attach meaning tothis circumstance. Had the legislature meantto shake off any legal effects that the title of


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the statute might have, it had a chance to doso in the reenactment of the law. Congresscould have altered with great facility thewording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact isthat it did not.

It has been observed that "in modernpractice the ti tle is adopted by theLegislature, more thoroughly read than theact itself, and in many states is the subject ofconstitutional regulation." 24 Theconstitutional in jurisdiction that the subjectof the statute must be expressed in the titleof the bill, breathes the spirit of commandbecause "the Constitution does not exact ofCongress the obligation to read during itsdeliberations the entire text of the bill." 25

Reliance, therefore, may be placed on thetitle of a bill, which, while not an enactingpart, no doubt "is in some sort a part of theact, although only a formal part." 26 These

considerations are all the more valid herebecause R.A. 931 was passed without benefitof congressional debate in the House fromwhich it originated as House Bill 1410, 27 andin the Senate. 28

The title now under scrutiny possessesthe strength of clarity and positiveness. Itrecites that it authorizes court proceedings ofclaims to parcels of land declared public land"by virtue of judicial decisions renderedwithin the forty years next preceding theapproval of this Act." That title is written "in

capital letters" by Congress itself; suchkind of a title then "is not to be classed withwords or titles used by compilers of statutes"because "it is the legislature speaking." 29

Accordingly, it is not hard to come to adeduction that the phrase last quoted fromR.A. 931 "by virtue of judicial decisionsrendered" was but inadvertently omitted

from the body. Parting from this premise,there is, at bottom, no contradiction betweentitle and body. In line with views hereinstated, the title belongs to that type of titleswhich; should be regarded as part of the rulesor provisions expressed in the body. 30 At thevery least, the words "by virtue of judicial

decisions rendered" in the title of the lawstand in equal importance to the phrase inSection 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicialproceedings instituted."

Given the fact then that there are twophrases to consider the choice of constructionwe must give to the statute does not needsuch reflection. We lean towards a liberalview. And this, because of the principle longaccepted that remedial legislation shouldreceive the blessings of liberal construction. 31

And, there should be no quibbling as to thefact that R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial

legislation. In essence, it provides a mode ofrelief to landowners who, before the Act, hadno legal means of perfecting their titles. Thisis plainly evident from the explanatory notethereof, which reads:

This bill is intended to give anopportunity to any person or claimant whohas any interest in any parcel of land whichhas been declared as public land in cadastralproceeding for failure of said person orclaimant to present his claim within the timeprescribed by law.

There are many meritorious caseswherein claimants to certain parcels of landhave not had the opportunity to answer orappear at the hearing of cases affecting theirclaims in the corresponding cadastralproceedings for lack of sufficient notice or for

other reasons and circumstances which arebeyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276, saidpersons or claimants have no more legalremedy as the effectivity of said Act expiredin 1940.

This measure seeks to remedy the lackof any existing law within said persons orclaimants with meritorious claims or interestsin parcels of land may seek justice andprotection. This bill proposes to give saidpersons or claimants their day in court.Approval of this bill is earnestly requested.

In fine, we say that lingualimperfections in the drafting of a statuteshould never be permitted to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent, whichcan otherwise be discovered. Legaltechnicalities should not abort the beneficent

effects intended by legislation.

The sum of all the foregoing is that, aswe now view Republic Act 931, claims of titlethat may be filed thereunder embrace thoseparcels of land that have been declaredpublic land "by virtue of judicial decisionsrendered within the forty years nextpreceding the approval of this Act."Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopenCivil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO RecordNo. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, thedecision on which was rendered on November

13, 1922, comes within the 40-yearperiod.lawphi1.nt

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petitionfor certiorari is hereby granted; the cadastralcourt's orders of August 5, 1963, November5, 1963 and September 17, 1964 are hereby


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declared null and void and the cadastral courtis hereby directed to admit petitioners'oppositions and proceed accordingly. No

costs. So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,

Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,concur.Concepcion, C.J., Castro andCapistrano, JJ., took no part..

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, allsurnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, allsurnamed OBRA;LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamedVILLAR;DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA,

RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX,all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,vs.PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila,respondents.

Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners. Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR,J.:

This is a petition to review the order of theformer Court of First Instance of

Manila, Branch XIII, dated December16, 1968 dismissing petitioners'complaint for damages on the groundof lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceasedemployees of Philex Mining Corporation

(hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, whileworking at its copper mines undergroundoperations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,1967, died as a result of the cave-in that

buried them in the tunnels of the mine.Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex,in violation of government rules andregulations, negligently and deliberatelyfailed to take the required precautions for theprotection of the lives of its men workingunderground. Portion of the complaint reads:

xxx xxx xxx

9. That for sometime prior and up to June28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross

and reckless negligence and imprudence anddeliberate failure to take the requiredprecautions for the due protection of the livesof its men working underground at the time,and in utter violation of the laws and the rulesand regulations duly promulgated by theGovernment pursuant thereto, allowed great


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amount of water and mud to accumulate inan open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the600 ft. column of broken ore and rock belowit, thereby exerting tremendous pressure onthe working spaces at its 4300 level, with theresult that, on the said date, at about 4

o'clock in the afternoon, with the collapse ofall underground supports due to suchenormous pressure, approximately 500,000cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud andwater, accompanied by surface boulders,blasted through the tunnels and flowed outand filled in, in a matter of approximately five(5) minutes, the underground workings,ripped timber supports and carried offmaterials, machines and equipment whichblocked all avenues of exit, thereby trappingwithin its tunnels of all its men above referredto, including those named in the nextpreceding paragraph, represented by the

plaintiffs herein;

10. That out of the 48 mine workers who werethen working at defendant PHILEX's mine onthe said date, five (5) were able to escapefrom the terrifying holocaust; 22 wererescued within the next 7 days; and the rest,21 in number, including those referred to inparagraph 7 hereinabove, were leftmercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding thefact that up to then, a great many of themwere still alive, entombed in the tunnels ofthe mine, but were not rescued due todefendant PHILEX's decision to abandon

rescue operations, in utter disregard of itsbounden legal and moral duties in thepremises;

xxx xxx xxx

13. That defendant PHILEX not only violatedthe law and the rules and regulations dulypromulgated by the duly constitutedauthorities as set out by the SpecialCommittee above referred to, in their Reportof investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof,but also failed completely to provide its men

working underground the necessary securityfor the protection of their livesnotwithstanding the fact that it had vastfinancial resources, it having made, duringthe year 1966 alone, a total operating incomeof P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, aftertaxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth AnnualReport for the year ended December 31,1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P45,794,103.00 as of December 31, 1966;

xxx xxx xxx

(pp. 42-44, rec.)

A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 wasfiled by Philex alleging that the causes ofaction of petitioners based on an industrialaccident are covered by the provisions of theWorkmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, asamended by RA 772) and that the formerCourt of First Instance has no jurisdiction overthe case. Petitioners filed an opposition datedMay 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismissclaiming that the causes of action are notbased on the provisions of the Workmen'sCompensation Act but on the provisions of

the Civil Code allowing the award of actual,moral and exemplary damages, particularly:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causesdamage to another, there being fault ornegligence, is obliged to pay for the damagedone. Such fault or negligence, if there is no

pre- existing contractual relation between theparties, is called a quasi-delict and isgoverned by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.

(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of theobligor consists in the omission of thatdiligence which is required by the nature ofthe obligation and corresponds with thecircumstances of the persons, of the time andof the place. When negligence shows badfaith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wantonattitude, the obligor shall be responsible for

all damages which may be reasonablyattributed to the non-performance of theobligation.

Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplarydamages may be granted if the defendantacted with gross negligence.

After a reply and a rejoinder thereto werefiled, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on theground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation

Commission. On petitioners' motion forreconsideration of the said order, respondentJudge, on September 23, 1968, reconsideredand set aside his order of June 27, 1968 andallowed Philex to file an answer to thecomplaint. Philex moved to reconsider theaforesaid order which was opposed by


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petitioners.

On December 16, 1968, respondent Judgedismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction andruled that in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's CompensationCommission has exclusive original jurisdictionover damage or compensation claims forwork-connected deaths or injuries ofworkmen or employees, irrespective ofwhether or not the employer was negligent,adding that if the employer's negligenceresults in work-connected deaths or injuries,the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A ofthe Workmen's Compensation Act, payadditional compensation equal to 50% of thecompensation fixed in the Act.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition.

In their brief, petitioners raised the followingassignment of errors:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS' COMPLAINTFOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TOCONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN

CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVILCODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATIONUNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIONACT.

A

In the first assignment of error, petitionersargue that the lower court has jurisdictionover the cause of action since the complaintis based on the provisions of the Civil Code ondamages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178,1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on theprovisions of the Workmen's Compensation

Act. They point out that the complaint allegesgross and brazen negligence on the part ofPhilex in failing to take the necessary securityfor the protection of the lives of its employeesworking underground. They also assert thatsince Philex opted to file a motion to dismissin the court a quo, the allegations in theircomplaint including those contained in theannexes are deemed admitted.

In the second assignment of error, petitionersasseverate that respondent Judge failed tosee the distinction between the claims forcompensation under the Workmen's

Compensation Act and the claims fordamages based on gross negligence of Philexunder the Civil Code. They point out thatworkmen's compensation refers to liability forcompensation for loss resulting from injury,disability or death of the working manthrough industrial accident or disease,without regard to the fault or negligence ofthe employer, while the claim for damagesunder the Civil Code which petitionerspursued in the regular court, refers to theemployer's liability for reckless and wantonnegligence resulting in the death of theemployees and for which the regular court

has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensableexclusively under the provisions of Sections 5and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,which read:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.Therights and remedies granted by this Act to anemployee by reason of a personal injuryentitling him to compensation shall excludeall other rights and remedies accruing to theemployee, his personal representatives,dependents or nearest of kin against the

employer under the Civil Code and other lawsbecause of said injury ...

SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen'sCompensation Commissioner shall haveexclusive jurisdiction to hear and decideclaims for compensation under theWorkmen's Compensation Act, subject toappeal to the Supreme Court, ...

Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. FosterWheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it washeld that "all claims of workmen against their

employer for damages due to accidentsuffered in the course of employment shall beinvestigated and adjudicated by theWorkmen's Compensation Commission,"subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Philex maintains that the fact that anemployer was negligent, does not remove thecase from the exclusive character ofrecoveries under the Workmen'sCompensation Act; because Section 4-A ofthe Act provides an additional compensationin case the employer fails to comply with therequirements of safety as imposed by law to

prevent accidents. In fact, it points out thatPhilex voluntarily paid the compensation duethe petitioners and all the payments havebeen accepted in behalf of the deceasedminers, except the heirs of Nazarito Florescawho insisted that they are entitled to agreater amount of damages under the Civil


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Code.

In the hearing of this case, thenUndersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, thenAtty. Edgardo Angara, now President of theUniversity of the Philippines, Justice ManuelLazaro, as corporate counsel and AssistantGeneral Manager of the GSIS Legal AffairsDepartment, and Commissioner on Elections,formerly UP Law Center Director FroilanBacungan, appeared as amici curiae andthereafter, submitted their respectivememoranda.

The issue to be resolved as WE stated in theresolution of November 26, 1976, is:

Whether the action of an injured employee orworker or that of his heirs in case of his deathunder the Workmen's Compensation Act is

exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is tosay, whether his or his heirs' action isexclusively restricted to seeking the limitedcompensation provided under the Workmen'sCompensation Act or whether they have aright of selection or choice of action betweenavailing of the worker's right under theWorkmen's Compensation Act and suing inthe regular courts under the Civil Code forhigher damages (actual, moral and/orexemplary) from the employer by virtue ofnegligence (or fault) of the employer or of hisother employees or whether they may availcumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the

limited compensation under the Workmen'sCompensation Act and sue in addition fordamages in the regular courts.

There are divergent opinions in this case.Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injuredemployee or worker, or the heirs in case of

his death, may initiate a complaint to recoverdamages (not compensation under theWorkmen's Compensation Act) with theregular court on the basis of negligence of anemployer pursuant to the Civil Codeprovisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise.He submits that the remedy of an injured

employee for work-connected injury oraccident is exclusive in accordance withSection 5 of the Workmen's CompensationAct, while Atty. Bacungan's position is thatthe action is selective. He opines that theheirs of the employee in case of his deathhave a right of choice to avail themselves ofthe benefits provided under the Workmen'sCompensation Act or to sue in the regularcourt under the Civil Code for higherdamages from the employer by virtue ofnegligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's standis the same as that of Atty. Bacungan andadds that once the heirs elect the remedy

provided for under the Act, they are no longerentitled to avail themselves of the remedyprovided for under the Civil Code by filing anaction for higher damages in the regularcourt, and vice versa.

On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs ofdeceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed amotion to dismiss on the ground that theyhave amicably settled their claim withrespondent Philex. In the resolution ofSeptember 7, 1978, WE dismissed thepetition only insofar as the aforesaidpetitioners are connected, it appearing that

there are other petitioners in this case.

WE hold that the former Court of FirstInstance has jurisdiction to try the case,

It should be underscored that petitioners'

complaint is not for compensation based onthe Workmen's Compensation Act but acomplaint for damages (actual, exemplaryand moral) in the total amount of eighthundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00)pesos. Petitioners did not invoke theprovisions of the Workmen's Compensation

Act to entitle them to compensationthereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared inthe complaint that the employees died fromaccident arising out of and in the course oftheir employments. The complaint insteadalleges gross and reckless negligence anddeliberate failure on the part of Philex toprotect the lives of its workers as aconsequence of which a cave-in occurredresulting in the death of the employeesworking underground. Settled is the rule thatin ascertaining whether or not the cause ofaction is in the nature of workmen'scompensation claim or a claim for damages

pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code,the test is the averments or allegations in thecomplaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill,Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).

In the present case, there exists betweenPhilex and the deceased employees acontractual relationship. The alleged grossand reckless negligence and deliberate failurethat amount to bad faith on the part of Philex,constitute a breach of contract for which itmay be held liable for damages. Theprovisions of the Civil Code on cases ofbreach of contract when there is fraud or bad

faith, read:

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts,the court may award exemplary damages ifthe defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.


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Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts,the damages for which the obligor who actedin good faith is able shall be those that arethe natural and probable consequences of thebreach of the obligation, and which theparties have foreseen or could havereasonably foreseen at the time the

obligation was constituted.

In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wantonattitude, the obligor shall be responsible forall damages which may be reasonablyattributed to the non-performance of theobligation.

Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code,allow the payment of all kinds of damages, asassessed by the court.

The rationale in awarding compensation

under the Workmen's Compensation Actdiffers from that in giving damages under theCivil Code. The compensation acts are basedon a theory of compensation distinct from theexisting theories of damages, paymentsunder the acts being made as compensationand not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53).Compensation is given to mitigate theharshness and insecurity of industrial life forthe workman and his family. Hence, anemployer is liable whether negligence existsor not since liability is created by law.Recovery under the Act is not based on anytheory of actionable wrong on the part of the

employer (99 C.J.S. 36).

In other words, under the compensation acts,the employer is liable to pay compensationbenefits for loss of income, as long as thedeath, sickness or injury is work-connected orwork-aggravated, even if the death or injury

is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillovs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the otherhand, damages are awarded to one as avindication of the wrongful invasion of hisrights. It is the indemnity recoverable by aperson who has sustained injury either in hisperson, property or relative rights, through

the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).

The claimant for damages under the CivilCode has the burden of proving the causalrelation between the defendant's negligenceand the resulting injury as well as thedamages suffered. While under theWorkmen's Compensation Act, there is apresumption in favor of the deceased orinjured employee that the death or injury iswork-connected or work-aggravated; and theemployer has the burden to prove otherwise(De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308;Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina

Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).

The claim of petitioners that the case is notcognizable by the Workmen's CompensationCommission then, now EmployeesCompensation Commission, is strengthenedby the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, theWorkmen's Compensation Act did not containany provision for an award of actual, moraland exemplary damages. What the Actprovided was merely the right of the heirs toclaim limited compensation for the death inthe amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesosplus burial expenses of two hundred(P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses whenincurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen'sCompensation Act), and an additionalcompensation of only 50% if the complaintalleges failure on the part of the employer to"install and maintain safety appliances or totake other precautions for the prevention of

accident or occupational disease" (Secti

statcon cases set1 final

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