sport and ethics: how far can you go?

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Sport and ethics: how far can you go?Mlkael Llndfelt aa Åbo Akademi University , FinlandPublished online: 11 Mar 2011.

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WORLD LEISURE No. 412005 O Copyright by the author

Sport and ethics: how far can you go?

MIKAEL LINDFELT dbo Akademi University, Finland

Abstract

This article deals with the relationship between sport and ethics from comparative and conceptual perspectives by examining key concepts in (competitive) sport on the one hand and ethics on the other. This is done by focusing on a distinctive methodological question through which certain features of both sport and ethics can be compared. This distinctive question asks, "How far can you go?" The key concepts introduced for understanding (competitive) sport reside in the phenomenological structure of sport. Three different aspects of this structure are distinguished. The analysis from the ethical perspective focuses on the two questions; what do we actually believe morality to be, and how do we normally try to justify something as being morally good or right? By aligning these meta-ethical issues with the overarching question in this paper, illuminating differences are traced on how morality is understood in the context of (competitive) sport. The main conclusion is that ethics in sport tend too often to be based on an impoverished and narrow view of morality, which deals only with surface rules, categories of acts and mechanics of control.

Keywords: Competitive sport, ethics, morality, phenomenological structure of sport, conceptual analysis

++ * ++ 1. Introduction "How far can I stretch my morality?" From an

This article focuses on the relationship be- ethical perspective, this i s already illuminating,

tween sport and ethics from a comparative and as it reveals something about how one can pic- conceptual perspective. This will be achieved by ture morality. By contrasting this view of moral-

addressing a distinctive question through which ity with other views, we can draw some interest-

to locate and examine certain conceptual as- ing conceptual conclusions.

pects of both sport and ethics. The distinctive From the perspective of modern (competi- question asks simply, "How far can you go?" tive) sport, the same question appears, very dif-

The question "How far can you go?" has not ferent at first glance. Indeed, this question been chosen randomly. There are some good seems to be the most fundamental issue in arguments for choosing this question. From an sporting culture. "How far can you go?" could ethical perspective the question probes for a cer- easily be answered by saying, "As far as I possi- tain kind of moral understanding. Merely by pro- bly can as this is expected in (competitive) posing this kind of question, one seems to adopt sport". In athletics disciplines such as the long an underlying picture of morality as something jump, the high jump and the javelin, the ques- restrictive or limiting, as if one would soy, "I tion of how far an individual athlete con push would like to do this, or be like that, but (my) himself or herself is the ultimate test. Trans- morality prevents me from doing it". By asking, ferred to other sports, the question could be for- "How far can you go?" one is actually asking, mulated in a similar manner by simply changing

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the word "far" to either "good", "long", "high" or "fast", without changing the meaning of the question.

2. Ethics and sport - or how to get quality and quantity to meet?

In his published lecture on ethics Wittgenstein tried to point out some characteristics of morality by contrasting relativist and absolute approaches to the issue. In order to illus- trate this contrast, he drew on the example of tennis:

Think of a man who plays tennis and you say to him: 'You play tennis very badly'. If the other then answers, 'Yes I know, but I don't want to play any better', you could leave it at that. Then think of a man telling a complete lie and you said to him: 'You are behaving quite awfully'. If he then answered, 'I know I behoved badly, but I don't want to behave any better' - could you respond, well alright, that's your business'?'

To my knowledge, Wittgenstein was not par- ticularly interested in sport. For persons familiar with tennis, Wittgenstein's statement may seem quite odd. At least, one could reply: "From your writings, I can easily conclude that you have never played tennis seriously. One can behave as you describe, but most people don't behave that way. To be a serious tennis player, one must strive to improve." To my mind, this kind of reply would be apt and appropriate, but it would miss the point made by Wittgenstein. Tennis skills are not perfected by not coring how one plays the game and whether or not there is room for im- provement. But it is a possible approach to sport and tennis in particular. Wittgenstein actually ar- gues that an individual is perfectly entitled not to hold any interest in tennis. On the one hand, one can be very keen on playing tennis, even on a professional basis, or, on the other hand, one can be totally apathetic to tennis. Both ways of relating to tennis are within the bounds of rea- sonable behaviour.

Could the same be said, however, about an individual's moral behaviour? Is it possible for an individual not to care about how badly he or she behaves in a certain situation? Wittgenstein

' Wittgenstein 1965, 5

stresses that this implies an absolute approach to morality. One has to care about morally relevant behaviour if the meanings of concepts such as "good" or "bad" behaviour are recog- nised. In the first place, a disregard for one's behaviour amounts to being blind to moral questions. Understanding correctly phrases such as, "You are behaving quite awfully when deliberately lying as you did", results from refusing to accept not trying to behave better as an excus- able option..

The point made here is not empirical but conceptual. It i s possible to find individuals who pay no attention to their own moral behaviour. The conceptual point is different. As regards tennis, one could not show any enthusiasm for the sport but still be judged quite normal. In the case of deliberate lying, one can make a choice and carry on, not believing it to be bad behaviour. This choice, however, is not morally indiffer- ent as in the case of an apathetic approach to tennis. Instead, to continue acting as if one did not care about behaving badly is in itself a morally relevant form of behaviour.

By using Wittgenstein's main argument I in- tend to tease out some underlying conceptual issues in sport and ethics. I will then draw some conclusions regarding the character bestowed upon ethics in the sporting field. Leading on from this is the question concerning possible ways of approaching ethics in sporting culture.

3. Understanding competitive sport from a moral perspective

Let us continue by focusing on some central characteristics of modern (competitive) sport. As the above examples already indicate, it is not at all easy to provide a comprehensive list of common characteristics in the many different kinds of sporting activity. In fact, one could ask if any such common characteristics exist in different sports. What could be the common ground, for example, in such contrasting sports as golf, har- ness racing and downhill skiing, not to mention chess, darts and snooker?

On the surface there are similarities between some sports; those which can be played indi- vidually, for example, whereas others have different requirements. Equipment is used in many sports such as tennis, while in other sports the athlete's body is the only piece of equipment

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utilised. Thus, one cannot discern any specific similarity counting as common ground for all the activities we commonly brand as sport. A number of philosophers of sports, therefore, have attempted to devise a solution that does not stress explicit similarities but uses Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance. I have nothing against the idea of family resem- blances, but when focusing on common charoc- teristics in sport I would argue that one can seek answers in another direction. I suggest that attention should be focused on common characteristics evident on a meta-level when seeking to understand sporting activity.

A number of definitions have been sug- gested in order to fully grasp the common features of different sporting activities. Kathleen Pearson, for example, defines competitive sport in the following manner: "I suggest that the purpose of these games, in an athletic setting, is to test the skill of one individual, or a group of individuals, against the skill of another individual, or a group of individuals, in order to de- termine who is more skilful in a particular, well- defined ~c t i v i t y " . ~ Warren Fraleigh outlines a similar definition, although he focuses on the sporting event, when he says: "... a sports contest (is) an agreed-upon event in which two or more humans oppose one another in attempt- ing to better the other's performance on the same test of moving mass in space and time by means of bodily moves which exhibit developed motor skills, physiological endurance, and so- cially approved tactics and ~t ra tegy" .~

My objective is not to discuss in detail the strengths and weaknesses of these definitions. In fact, I do not find the notion of trying to find an ultimate definition convincing. The problem, as I see it, lies in the fact that a proper understanding of sport needs to take account of underlying assumptions. These assumptions are needed prior to the given definition in order to grasp the idea of the very definition. Further- more, one cannot go on making definitions for everything, and therefore I agree with Graham McFee, when he states:

(P)utative definitions must be tested against one's experience. I must be able to recognize

Peorson 1973, 263. Froleigh 1982, 267.

bachelors (prior to your giving me a definition of that term) to see if your putative definition is correct - or even plausible. So definitions do not really aid understanding. Test- ing the truth of putative definitions requires that one understands before one has the definition. Your account of, say, sport must be recognized as correct - I can only do that if I can recognize sport prior to or independ- ent of the definition. Further, since the meaning of expressions in the definition must be known, the definition is not a neutral starting point: if I have no undefined starting place, the search for a complete definition will go on for ever. But if there is an undefined starting place, definition cannot be as fundamental to understanding as was assumed: it would not be the starting place. So what definitions offer requires a background of understanding prior to the definition: but, having such understanding, the definition offers little new - at best it offers a new word for something already under~tood.~

Instead of dwelling on definitions, I will further my arguments in a more flexible manner. I will point to some central sporting charocter- istics which belong to a proper understanding of sport but are not presented in a short-cut way by using definitions. Three different aspects will be identified in what can be called the phenomenological structure of sport. This phenomenological sport structure can be viewed as implicit for our recognition of certain human activities as sporting activities.

The first aspect can be titled the autonomy of sport. By this I mean the basic idea behind Pearson's explanation of sport as a "well-defined activity", or Fraleigh's corresponding formulation of sport as an "agreed-upon event". From a certain conceptual perspective it makes sense to regard sport as a specific rule-governed activity which, in a way, places it outside ordinary life. By agreeing to play or take part in some sporting activity, we transform, for a set time and at a certain location, the ordinary world into a sporting event or a play. By agreeing to these conditions, we undertake to abide by the rules of the sport and are guided by them in terms of categorising what kind of behaviour can be

McFee 2004, 22-23

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counted as important, good, justifiable, wise, bad or unfair and so on.

On the surface these descriptions resemble commonplace accounts of morally relevant behaviour, yet the sporting context i s not normal. They are not really moral judgements but functional descriptions regarding the context of a sport or a game. Meaning is derived from the context of the changed reality engendered by games or sporting activity. K L Schmitz calls the changing context of reality a "suspension or the ordinary world" and goes on to say: "This suspension of the 'real' world by means of a play- decision releases a world of 'unreality' which needs no justification from outside itself. It is a self-sealed world, delivering i ts own values in and for itself, the freedom and joy of play."5 A similar notion is shared by Graham McFee who says that the rules of sport define it as being "in isolation from other human practice^".^

Whilst I do not totally accept Schmitz's exact formulation of sporting activity as a self-sealed world, delivering its own values, I totally agree with the idea that an individual participating in sport voluntarily undertakes to abide by certain rules that serve to give meaning to the activity. In a way, this is explicitly stressed by Alasdair Maclntyre's well-known use of the concept of "practice". He stresses that:

A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goals. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own as judged by them.7

A second noteworthy feature in regard to the autonomy of sport is that the rules of a sport such as football define the key elements of the particular sport. In other words, there is nothing outside these agreed rules that holds weight on the football pitch. The accepted rules create the game w'ith its own valbes and internal logic. Therefore, one can state that there are no benefits in playing football outside the praxis stipulated by its rules. This is, I stress, an internal view from the rule-governed praxis, not

Schmitz 1979, 34. See also Beardsmore 1971, 43-44.

Mclntosh 1979, 83 och McFee 1998, 9. ' Maclntyre 1985, 190.

an external perspective, which focuses on the motivations of players to play football. We should keep in mind the important distinction between internal and external aims in sporting activities.

From this internal-praxis perspective, the autonomy of sport is constituted by referring to itself. This is stated succinctly by A. Skillens in his comparative argument, which states:

Whereas military and political greatness, let alone success in commercial enterprise, are inherently compromised by their utilitarian dimension and may even be vitiated by the misery they inflict, sport stands out in relief and not just as relief, in the purity of its point- lessness - it takes place in the arena of the exercise for i ts own sake of noble human qualities: dedication, strength, endurance, courage, patience, judgement, sharpness, style and enterprise; as well as the sportsmanship that is bound up with the love of a game whose laws and customs define what is to count as a fairly achieved or suffered o ~ t c o m e . ~

The second aspect of the phenomenological structure of sport is the constitutive equality which is based on the same rules that govern the activity. The function of rules i s to define how to practise a sport, to indicate procedures governing how to decide or judge sports results and to state the given conditions for how a player or a competitor is able to achieve a good result in a game or competition. The ideal of equality in sport focuses on the best way to ensure all competitors are able to compete on a level playing field when competing. This is achieved in different sports in various ways, de- pending on the character of the actual sport and what is regarded as a decisive difference in competition. In official javelin throwing compe- titions, for example, all competitors are given precise rules specifying which types of javelin can be used and their legal weights. One can, of course, practise with any kind of javelin, but in the competition everybody is bound by the same rules. In football, weather conditions may give some advantage to one team, but these problems are solved by the teams changing ends at half time.

Skillen 1998, 169.

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In theory, rules are devised to regulate conditions but in practice external conditions cannot be eliminated and continue to affect the outcome of sporting events and activities. During a football match, for example, the wind can change at any moment and in the javelin this natural element can significantly benefit a thrower at a particular moment. These kinds of circumstances cannot be controlled, and therefore we must be pre- pared to accept certain limitations when striving for total equality in sport. Equality in sport is absolute, however, in the sense thot it is unaccept- able for a competitor to gain advantage by way of factors such as age, wealth, money, fomily, gen- der or race. Even if the Queen of England wanted to take part in Wimbledon, for example, she would be required to compete using the same set of rules as anyone else.

The third feature of the phenomenological structure of sport concerns the idea of competition. One would think that competition is taken for granted in sport, and, therefore, that point- ing this out i s just a truism. On the one hand, I completely agree with this assumption, but on the other hand there are some points that must be spelled out in order to bring more clarity to the concept of competitive sports. One such underestimated point is that the very idea of competing is not, as with other aspects, articulated in the rules that constitute the activity. In- stead, competition is incorporated into a wider understanding of sport as a meaningful activity. A rule-governed activity is actually based on the tacit intention of undertaking the activity in a competitive manner. This intention, however, cannot be spelled out in the official rules for fear of appearing ridiculous.

A related matter worthy of note in the aspect of necessary competition, i s the tacit demand that every participant should always try to do his or her best when taking part in any game or competition. This should, of course, be carried out within the framework of sporting equality. The Norwegian philosopher of sport, Sigmund Loland, writes that this particular feature of sporting activity is a foundation intention - the "play to win" ment~l i ty.~

The importance of doing one's best in a game or competition is tacit, in the sense that it

i s best seen whenever someone is intentionally not trying his or her best in order to win. You can well imagine, say, a football team that decides to play a very defensive game using unconven- tional tactics. Imagine that their tactics were to kick the ball out of touch whenever they got the chance. This might be effective defending, and it would also be within the rules. Therefore, nei- ther the referee nor the rules could prevent this being carried out. This kind of tactic is possible, but in an important sense it would destroy the game, at least as a spectator sport. Note that no abuse of the rules takes place. The rules are being constructed upon an agreement, stating that this way of playing football is not included because it destroys the very meaning of the sport. This agreement, on the fundamental intention of doing one's best, could be called a moral commitment to sporting activity.

The aspect of necessary competition could be said to include another distinctive feature, which rarely comes to the fore in discussions about sporting activities. It is another way of in- dicating that the meaningfulness of sporting activities lies in a fundamental agreement concerning the voluntary character of participation. This feature is well articulated in K. L. Schmitz's writings, in which he discusses the character of competition. He writes about a worthy oppo- nent and he continues by saying: "In the en- gagement the player must encounter his oppo- nent not as an enemy in war but as one whose excellence challenges him and makes possible his own best perf~rmance". '~ In a similar manner J. H. Kupfer outlines what he calls the cooperative basis of competitive sport. One thinks there has to be some kind of misunderstanding here, because competitiveness and cooperation cannot be combined in any way. Kupfer ignores these responses and goes on to proclaim:

There is a cooperative basis to all competition, at the very least on the level of fair play

'O Schmits ( 1 979, 37-38. R. L. Simon pays attention to the same position when writing: "... that competition in athletics is best thought of as a mutual quest for excellence through challenge. Competitors are obliged to do their best so as to bring out the best in their opponents. ... The good competitor, then does not see opponents as things to be overcome and beaten down but rather sees them as persons whose act calls for appropriate, mutually acceptable responses" Simon 1984, 293.

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and agreeing to compete. But more, it is a "contest" in which each tests the other and testifies to his effort and ability. Each depends upon the other to bring the best out of him, as in a friendship or educational exchange. In this way the opponents are united, forming a whole whose opposition is also a cooperation."

This very kind of cooperation in sport does not necessitate working together in order to achieve something. It is more akin to a conceptual linkage between competitors: a framework of meaning which is embedded in the activity. If all other competitors agreed to let someone else win, the victory would not be cherished, nor would anyone enjoy such a competition. In this particular sense, there has to be a cooperative basis in order to render competition meaningful. This thought is excellently stressed by A. Caille:

Winner and loser are firmly bound and indis- pensable to one another. Indeed, a game is impossible if the victor does not make it understood that the loser could have been, or could in the future be, the victor. This is not merely a question of style, an empty courtesy: if the loser were not in fact capable of win- ning, the winner would have fought against a worthless adversary, and his victory would itself be worthless. In an exchange of presents, it i s the pleasure shown by the receiver that, at the end of the day, shows the value of the gift. Similarly, in a game, the respect shown by the loser gives the victory its value.'2

In summarising my main arguments thus far, I would like to underline the fact that some common ground exists in understanding different kinds of sporting activity. This common

" Kupfer 1983, 464. R. S. Kretchmar also focuses on the relation between the concepts "test" and "contest". He writes: "The transition from test to contest is the change from human singularity to community. Simply, it is finding someone with whom one can share a test. In addition, a commitment is made by each side to attempt to better the other's performonce. ... Oppo- nents try to do the same thing as one another, only more so. They attempt to pass the same kind of test better, to a greater degree, higher on the scale, than another. Opponents are not essentially opposites but rather much alike" Kretchmar 1975, 227. See also Kretchmor 1998, 23-28.

l 2 Caille 1998.

ground can be outlined by analysing the phenomenological structure of sport. The main aspects in this structure, in my reasoning, con- sist of ( I ) the autonomy of sport, (2) equality or at least a striving for equality and (3) the necessary competitiveness. The first aspect is constructed by the process of rule-governance, while the second aspect is carried out with and through the rules that constitute the activity. The third aspect differs from the other two in this respect, because necessary competitiveness is tacit in the sense that it cannot be conceptually located at the level of rules. Instead, this aspect has to be traced beyond the level of rules. Or even more precisely, it has to form the basis of a fundamental agreement on which certain rules can be constructed.

4. Morality as seen from a delimited perspective of meta-ethics

While the field of ethics is as broad and com- plex as the concept of sport, I only need to con- centrate on certain aspects. I will begin by con- centrating on two questions. First, what do we actually believe morality to be, and second, how do we normally try to justify something as being morally good or right?

When trying to unravel the basis of morality, three possible and reliable options are available. First, many would answer by saying that morality is basically a question of opinion and taste. It can be translated to a question like, "How do you feel about this?" without losing any of i ts content. We can call this a relativistic understanding of morality. Then, think about the question raised in my introduction, "How far can you go?'' It is easy to note that this question displays a relativistic character. How far one can go depends on one's own feelings and taste, and can even de- pend on one's own sense of normality.

A second option is to adopt an objective understanding of morality. This option stresses that morality has some objective standard by which to judge people's deeds, thoughts and different kinds of situations and circumstances. The problem with this position is that there is no easy way of discerning this desired objective standard. Moral, religious and philosophical traditions differ, although both a desire for the objective and an easy logical solution to problems characterised by relativistic understanding are

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combined in them all. The objective approach, however, has always faced the problem of who possesses the correct knowledge, and who has the given right or power to interpret and imple- ment correct solutions? The question of how far one can go can be summed up in this option as a matter of power and knowledge. One can go as far as one wishes if one is sure one has the right knowledge. At the same time, one will probably need to force others to share one's view of what is right.

A third option is to advocate a position between the two first options. This third position could be called a morality of responsibility. This position identifies the moral person as the key to understanding morality. The focus is on understanding a person's sensitivity to his or her responsibility when faced with a morally relevant situation. This position contains both subjective and objective elements. The subjective element consists of self-judgement, and the objective element consists of an individual relating to a morally relevant situation and the demands faced. It is not a matter of taste, but a matter of sensitivity to relevant traits in different situations. Once again, 'How far one can go?' now looks very different. The extent to which one can be sensitive to one's own responsibility is, in a way, a question of learning about normality, heroic deeds and cowardly behaviour. It i s a position that admits the subjective character of morality. It is not a subjective perspective, however, if it takes serious account of viewing responsibility as based on a common and ongoing discussion on different levels and an understanding of what is required in different situations.

The second question in understanding morality addresses normativity, that is, the justification of moral accounts. As in the question of understanding morality, there are three possible and reliable options. The first i s very common and is a position that judges according to the consequences of actions. If the consequences are good, or at least better than other possible outcomes, the problem of judgmental normativity is solved. Concerning moral motiva- tion in sport, this option tends to lead to a sort of tactical thinking which states, "If we will not get caught, then.. ." When putting this option along- side the question of how far an individual can go, it appears very attractive for people who

hold morality in high regard as a means of maintaining a clean image in the public relations field. As long as everything outwardly looks fine, everything is as it should be. Thus, a sportsperson can go as far as he or she can in order to achieve the best result, as long as the person is not caught. The case of doping in sport is a relevant example as it appears ex- tremely tempting to a number of athletes. The same applies to sponsor-contracts and professional sporting teams which demand good behaviour on and off the pitch. The main concern is being able to keep up a good appearance, and thus a good commodity value.

The second option in making claims for justifiability is to focus on actual deeds, or, more broadly, on a category of deeds or acts. In this position, the focus is not on consequences but on certain ways of behaving regardless of the outcomes. According to this perspective, even very good consequences cannot justify a way of behaving. The position can be described in relation to lying. It suggests that it is always wrong to lie, no matter what the outcome or the circumstances. In a sense, this option equates very well with the idea that acquiring the right knowledge is the central issue in understanding morality. If one knows the difference between what is right and wrong, there is really no problem in applying morality to actual situations. With regard to doping, for example, the moral problem, in this perspective, is solved once we check the list of forbidden substances or methods. The distinct question of how far one can go concentrates on the need to assume effective control in favour of things that are obviously good and right. Thus, the problem regarding morality seems to centre on uncovering the wrong kind of behaviour by strict reference to outlined rules.

Both these options share one feature, namely, they take morality to be something essentially external or accidental with regard to the acting subject. The third option challenges this conclusion and suggests that much more attention needs to be focused on the relations between the intentions, character, sensitivity towards the actual situation, and personal stokes of the acting subject. To put it simply, the moral focus is now laid on a person as a moral being and how certain decisions can be combined with one's own estimation of one's morally rel-

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evant identity. This option is conducive to an understanding of morality as dealing with one's own sense of responsibility. The ultimate question here is not about consequences, nor certain categories of permissible and prohibited behaviour, but mainly about what kind of person an individual becomes in certain situations. The crucial question is: "Will I see myself as a cheat or substance abuser rather than as good at sport?" Thus, the relationship between acting or behaviour and the person underneath is not accidental but conceptually internal, and the two levels need to be examined together. From this perspective, the question of how far one can go turns into a matter of what kind of person an individual would like to be, or what kind of person is admired in morally relevant ways.

As seen in all these cases, the distinct question of how far one can go is flexible and depends on underlying assumptions about morality or questions of normativity in ethics. In both of these basic meta-ethical questions, the main difference lies between the first two options, on the one hand, and the third on the other. This difference mainly consists in what role, or conceptual space, the morally acting subject ac- quires in the different positions. Whilst the first two examined options are not identical, they share the view that an acting person is inciden- tal to what i s of real interest in morality. In the options that take more account of the moral person and take moral identity to be the key issue in understanding morality, the question of how far one can go does not make as much sense as in the other examined options.

What does this tell us? Is this conceptually revealing in any important sense, and if so, why? A short answer to these questions is that this way of examining ethics can trace the same kind of surface patterns and underlying assumptions and agreements as are found in the phenomenological structure of sport. Namely, certain aspects of sport, such as necessary competitiveness, are tacit in the sense that they lie beyond the level of outward rules. The same can be seen when viewing morality. Some important issues of morality are, and have to be, judged by consequences, or on the level of rules. Other important issues are out of sight, however, unless we go beneath the surface and ask for a more internal understanding of an acting subject and

his or her moral space. The question of morality in sport has to be seen as something external, and as something internal, and as something distant and exclusive, as well as something close and inclusive and, finally, as something objective as well as something which is demandingly subjective.

5. Some typical characteristics of sport ethics

When one combines the two parts of my argument and relates them to sporting reality and praxis, a very clear picture appears. This is a cri- tique of the more or less biased attention given in external accounts regarding ethics in sport. Let me give an illuminating example. Arne Ljungqvist, the influential and well-known IOC Board Member, the Chairman of both the IOC's and the IAAF's Medical Commission and a Board Member of the WADA (World Anti-Dop- ing Association), gave his views on the question of why both international and national sporting organisations should be keen to fight doping in sport at a Conference on Sport and MedicineI3 in Stockholm in October 2002. He expounded four main points regarding the unacceptability of doping: (1) health reasons, (2) medical ethics, (3) it is against the rules of sport, and (4) because it undermines credibility in sport. On this last point, Ljungqvist underlined the moral and practical problems concerning recruitment to sport and the manner in which sporting activities can benefit upbringing and socialisation.

As far as I am concerned, the stance of Ljungqvist is appropriate and relatively unproblematic and is representative of the organisations he represents. When he goes on to describe the strategy for tackling the ethical problems in sport created by doping, he also outlines four main strategic points: ( I ) the need to glo- bally harmonise sporting rules and praxis, (2) the need for more information and education, (3) the need for more effective control, and (4) the need for better (mainly medical) research.I4

If we compare these two lists, it is not at all difficult to note the almost total imbalance between the external and internal aspects of ethics

l 3 The conference in Swedish was named Sport, halsa och genteknik - bruk och rnissbruk, 3rd Octo- ber 2002.

l 4 Ljungqvist 2002.

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as I have described them above. In all, it seems that most effort is always placed on improving rules and control, and research in order to sup- port these efforts. In many ways this is understandable. The main reason is that this way of focusing mirrors the actual construction of sporting reality. It i s a rule-governed activity, as highlighted in the concept of autonomy in sport, and the rules are also the basis for the ideal of equality in sport. These aspects cannot be ignored in sport ethics. In a way, sport ethics have to be outlined by and in accordance with the given logical structures for the activity.

I do not want to question this part, but would like to stress that this manner of viewing ethics is too narrow in scope. According to the opinion of Ljungqvist, sporting ethics will have certain inevi- table features. One could soy that this view takes account of an objective morality, deter- mining acts as being either good, bad, right, wrong, desirable, non-desirable etc. Thus, the problem of morality is seen as a question of ob- taining and maintaining the right information or knowledge about correct rules or acts. In all, it views morality as something external to the acting, or sporting, person involved.

This is a very functional form of morality. It is narrow in scope, and entails that one will never get to a level of intentionality, morally relevant attitudes and feelings, sensitivity towards a situation or any way of taking on board morality as part of one's own personal narration, character or identity. A focus on rules in regard to morality and actions cannot change in any degree the attitude of a sportsperson. A football player, or coach, who pays due respect to the unwritten spirit of the game, cannot be separated from the player or coach who only adheres to the rules on a superficial level and tries in every way to take advantage of formal rules by abstaining from responsibility for the game.

This argument can also be derived from the phenomenological structure of sport by paying special attention to the balance between the first two aspects and the third aspect. By focusing on ethics as something merely objective and external, or accidental to an actor in sport, the argument fails to notice that this kind of objectifying morality ignores either the basic assumptions of the fundamental agreements in the activity or deliberately lets someone else carry the burden of keeping the act together.

A further understandable reason for an objective focus in sport ethics is that it is a more concrete activity than involving oneself in moral education in sporting culture. The effect of this kind of involvement is relatively uncountable, invisible and less politically desirable in the eyes of global media. On the other hand, a loss of moral education and a failure to maintain the value traditions of the international sporting community will be seen in the future. The main question, therefore, is: "Who will guard the unwritten spirit of the game in the future, that is, the kind of fundamental agreement that lies beneath the surface structure of sporting activities?"

6. Conclusions In this article I have focused on some impor-

tant, but often neglected, aspects in understanding the relationship between sport and ethics on one side, and the specific problems that seem to occur when focusing on ethics in the context of competitive sport. The main conclusion that arises from my argumentation is that ethics in sport tend too often to focus on a relatively impoverished and narrow view of morality. A lot of morally relevant aspects are ignored, while the remaining interest in ethics tends to lead to an objective morality, almost entirely focusing on surface rules, categories of acts and mechanics of control. From a sporting perspective, this is understandable, and in a way acceptable and even unavoidable. This i s how sporting activities are constituted, that is, by rules that both define the activity and secure, or at least try to secure, sporting equality.

There are certain aspects in the praxis of sport, however, that cannot be raised to the same level as the rules. In this article, these aspects are called the aspects of necessary competitiveness. They go beyond the level of rules and are, in fact, the basis of a fundamental agreement upon which the rules are constructed. These aspects remain tacit in the sense that they are not noticed if they have not been ridiculed by approaches to sporting activities that leave them without meaning.

This way of analysing sporting activities, that is, by using conceptual tools to investigate the phenomenological structure of competitive sport, highlights the main difference in understanding sport on a surface level and on a richer

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Mikoel Lindfelt

plane. There are aspects of sport that are not as visible, and thus often vulnerable.

Exactly the same can be said in regard to understanding morality and its different aspects. In this article I have traced characteristic features of morality in two questions, each with three options. By asking the methodologically distinct question, "How far one can go?" I hope to have succeeded in applying an increased focus, in a sporting context, on the differences between external and internal aspects of ethics. Some aspects of ethics are visible and exert a hardcore morality which focuses on rules, consequences, acts and control. Other aspects, such as intentionality, morally relevant attitudes and feelings, sensitivity towards a situation or any way of taking morality as part of one's own personal narration, character or identity, do not belong to the same category of understanding morality. It seems to me that this latter category of aspects is either grossly neglected or taken as a subjective part that only individuals can deal with on a personal level. This results in a poor and narrow view of morality in which only certain aspects are taken to be interesting and worthy of focus.

To put it more simply, there are a lot of differences in meaning when replying to the question, "How far can you go?". These can be stated in the following ways: ( I ) finding out ways of acquiring the best result (even by cheating), (2) trying to develop a more human understanding of sportsmanship, (3) trying to be loyal to tradi- tional sporting ethics (whatever that means), (4) developing sportsmanship into professional attitudes that can preserve the spirit of the game, and (5), enjoying sportsmanship as a way of being true to oneself.

There are no easy answers when focusing on the more tacit and vulnerable aspects in ethics. A good beginning, however, is to gain a valu- able starting point by viewing what is at stake and contemplating how contemporary thinking, in the context of competitive sport, enters ways of developing the praxis.

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MIKAEL LINDFELT Ass. Professor in Ethics Abo Akodemi University

Finland

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sport and ethics: how far can you go?

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