-- ISSN 0049·2310

Complete Simulation Game

in this • Issue:

EnelllYat

PlUS

Ttia Battle for Chemical Warfare •

Gates

Wilson'. Creek arid Dragonalayar Upda_

2 SEtT nr. 79, publis hed Ml rchl April 1980

In this issue page

StraQy ~ics BERLIN '85 4

The Enemy at the Gates

The Magazine of Conflict Simulation cl<cull' ian' 36.500

Kerry Pendergast David Ritchie

Edito. I P"bli.he, James F. Ounn;g;o,n Maneglng Editor. Brad H8S!eI. Raben J . Ry&r

Art Director/ Co-Editor Redmond A . Simonsen

M .... glng Art Ol.ecto, Manfred F. Milkuhn

Simulation: R1 A .. ocl,la Edito .. : Joe Bllikosic i. John H. Bunerlield IFeedbackf. Eric Goldberg, Michael MOOfS, David James Ritch;" lFYEO I. Editorial SUlH:

BERLIN '85

TnolT\lls Hudson, Elic Smilh. Contributing Editors : H.A. Barasch, Rich8.d BMg. Oavkl C. Imy, Su.phan e. Parrick, Sid SKhon. GOlIphic Production: DaVId E"9~r. Rosalind FrUChtman , Ted Koller. Sub.crlptlon Fulfillment: Jotm P. G,_ Imgd, Rick DiNardo, larry Fye, MIchael Georg", Rebecca GrllOOb!\,g, Salldra Hudg50n, KlIf1l11!lh W. Johnson. Yvett"Middleloo, Angie Pugl>eso't. Whol".ale Fulfillmen!; Theresa Canto (mgr.I, Rona Hertznet. R;chard Hom, Annll Lombardo. Finance: Barbara Nolan (mgr.l. Donagll Neel. Warehou.e; EVllreu lin Imgd, William Davis. Productlon: BeatnceLi.

The Enemy a t the Gates James F. Dunnigan David Ritchie Redmond A. Simonsen

Orlglne' Editor and founder: Christophm Wagn"r Maglume Game Componem P'mMg." Renex Offset, Gllrden Cily, 1.I. Prmrmg & Bmdmg." American Press. Inc .. Go,donsv;He. Va. OIitCullmg." F,lIIKIm11n Die-Cutters, N_ York, N. Y.

THE BATTLE FOR STALINGRAD The Struggle for the City, September-November 1942

25

David Parham

STRATEGY & TACTICS MagaZIne IS copyrighl 1911) by SimulatIons Publical ions, Inc, P,imed in USA. All IIghlS resarvOO. All OOilonal and gen&r&I mail should be sent to Sim<Jlal rorlS Pubiicatiolls. Illc .. 2fi7 Park AV/Irl"e South, N. y" N.Y. 10010. STRATEGY & TACTICS i. p<lblished bi­rTIOf1thly. One Y8llr (6 issuel aubscr;pl ions a,e $16.00 (checks Or money OIde<sOOlyl. BBsicad nneisSl .560 per page lor game-related products. GREAT BRITAIN & EUROPE: 8ritiil-h and Europeall euSI=->! soould p~ lheir orde<s for SPI products or subs<:ript>Ofls with SIMULATIONS PUBLICATIONS. UNITED KINGDOM. C,own Passages, Hale, All rincham, Cheshire, WA 15 9SP. United Kingdom. 885IC subscripl ron ,ate for SPUK Is (pourldsl 9.90 per year. AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND residenl. should place orders with MILITARY SIMULATIONS PTY LTD .. 18 Fonceca Sueet, Mo,daiHoc, Victorill3195, AUSlfalia. Simulations Publicatior1l, 1m:. does nO! usulilly coo$ide' fa' public<lt>Ofl un· solicited games arld art>tles submilloo to S&T or SImulations Series Games. F'/lQuemly. however. unsolicited material delih"g with 9<lme desrgn or practice wililirld p<lblications in MOVES Magazine. In all cases. SPI cannot assume r""llO".ibililY 10' such unsolicited material.

OUTGOING MAIL

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY

BRIEFINGS

FEEDBACK

S&T or. 79ENCLOSURES:

The Editors 2

21

39

Vox Populi, Vox Dei 42

The publication of PIIid IKIv8f1.rs&men1S in SPI publications does not cun· Slilu te an IIf1dor$8lTll!rlt bV SPI 01 the goods or services oll"'ed. SPI does. however. atlemptlo preveotlraudulllf1t or misleadin9 PIIid "d~rllsemen," from appearing in 111 p<lbIlQltions. SPt ,eserves Iha light 10 ,eject any pard iKllle<tlsemerll it conslde<s milleading 0, harmlul, or Oflllflsive to the SIIfl­

sibilities 01 the editors or the readersnip. 1. BERLIN 'SS Playing Piecel 3. Bualness Reply Ordar Form 2. Berlin 'SSGameMap 4. feedback Form

Ad ...... ti$emllf1t5 01 SPI products 8re backed bV ~ gu"r ~nlaed credIt 0 ' Qlsh rlltur.d lupon pfOmpt rerurn ol lhe product) il the buV'" Is dissati5lied or replacement illhe prodUCI is damaged in transit.

SIMULATIONS PUBLICATIONS . INC. 257 Park A llenue South, New York , N .Y. lOO1OTelaphone(212)673--4103

Looking Ahead to Next Time Our g1lme in S& T 80 will be Wilson's Creek, a grand-tactical simulation of the 1861 Civil War bat· lie using the award-winning TSS·system. An ani· cle on several of the signif icant smaller battles of the war, including Wilson's Creek, Pea Ridge, and Monocacy Junction, will also appear, in addition to our regular features. Domestic Subscribers: If you have not received your copy of S& Tao by 29 July 1980, notify our Custome, Service Depart· ment. Please include your Custome, Code and issue of sub el(piration, bolh of which should be f ound on this issue's mailing label, just abolle your name. ForeIgn Subscribers: add eight weeks to tha ebove date to allow for the casual pace o f in· Ternational mail .

Outgoing Mail M","'''"'"Il ROI>O<I. p. 2 aig T....""... p. t. W"'k . ... p,_. p 15 Due p,,,,,_. p 20 F_, p . 36 Goso.p. p. 36

Marketing Report

The uncert<lIn aCI o f match,ng gamer deSires wlth publishers' capabl lllles IS what I cal! marketing. It's about lime fa, another updaTe on what SPI IS doing in this department

Ovel the paST 51;'; months, we have made a number of changes In au' mafke\lrlg Some of The changes, Irke the new one inch boll and the lower pllces of the games Within (hem , are obVIOUS 01her eVident changes are the greater numbel o f sc ience fi ction and fantasy games lespeclally when you look al what's upcomIng I Some 01 The less obVIOUS changes Include OOller edlilng 01 game ru les. We have always tended to be oller

Cover !>halO: British Chieftains in from of BII,lin's Olympic Stadium. MoD photo II'ia Geo'ge Fony. Mode/ll Combar VelricliJs , ." Crne-fram,lao All"" Ltd .. 1979).

senSl1rve m Th,s area, making a b ig fetish o f cor reeung any errors IAI ler all. who else publishes enata sheets; lind accordIng to ou r SUf'lIIVS. we need thllm least I

An even less obll 'ous change has occurred m· Ternallv wllh regard to stafilln1ehness and budget cont rol. Th is last Item, budget control. has allow ed us 10 bllng OUT the lower pllced games. We have a computer program that calcu lates what pllce we must sell a game for The program takes mto account some dOlen Of so cos t factors, how many uniTS 01 a game ale gomg to be sold, and so on ThiS system onlv workS If all elements are kepi under conllOI. We've had alaI morecon"ol!ll thiS endeavor oller the past yeal Games ale done when they are supposed to be done and are sold at the Ollg lnallv planned pllce

As has happened so o ften m the past when a project gal Into trouble. we Just conlmued to work on II until II was completed The cost In lime and money was ohen prod'glOus Because other peo. p ie would ohen have to Stop Ihell own prOjec ts to baIlout the folks w, th problems, thmgs tended to go Irom bad to worse. Naturally, even under the best 01 conditions bad thmgs happen . Take S&T

/ron"n~M 0" PfI~ 141

OF·THE·MIDDLE·AGE5

+ Sociol s ••

ift ift UNREST UNREST

ift UNREST

A Dynamic Simulation of Medieval Europe, 771-1467

+ s"'" State

ift UNJI1'ST

fJI UNREST

+ ""'" S ••

(formerly" Medieval" )

+ + ""'" "'" s •• s ••

ift UNflEST

+ .... , s ••

-= --

Bet ..... een the glories of Rome and the ri~ of nalional Slates stretched an age in which each domain was defined by the virtues and failings ofi[s monarch. When Charlemagne assumed rule of the Frankish Empire in 771, he helped move Europe OUI of the Dark Ages and into the Middle Ages. Not only did he inhibit Byzantine innuence in the West, he also sct a standard of ex­cellence for laler monarchs to follow. During the following ccn­turies, the kingsofEuTOpe would attempt 10 establish themselves and their heirs as emperors of increasingly larger domains.

Empires oj the Middfe Ages is a multi· player game in which up to six players, assuming the roles of dynam, atlempllo build their historical kingdom§ into va§t empires. The seo~ of the gante. which covers the entire Middle Ages, allows players to represent an entire ruling house. not just one ruler. From genera­lion \0 generation, players vic to strengthen the foundation of their power and pass on ever larger realms from one descendant 10 Ihe nex\.

The game system of Empires oj the Middle Ages is highly in­novative and includes many of the sociological influences that dominated the ~riod. The fundamental aClion§ of the game -such as conquest, fortification, diplomacy. administration, pillaging - are resolved through the use of cards. A play of an Action card represents the undertakings of one ruler for a year; thus, the whole era can be experienced year by year as the tides of power flow back and forth from player to player. In addition to the Action Cards, Event Cards are played 10 si mulate such occur­rences as rulers dying heirless, outbreaks of heresy, the plague and famines, and new advances in weapon technology. Special rules cover such fascinaling events as Ihe Crusades, the Schism. religious con\'ersions, and raids by Vikings , Magyars, Saracen Pirates and Ihe Mongols.

Empires oJ Ih~ Middle Ages comes with a 22" x )4· map of Europe. 112 cards. 600 cardboard playing pieces, rules booklet, and various playing aids.

Empires of the Middle Ages will sell for $18 Available from SPI and in stores nationwide 28 April 1980

3

4

The Enemy at tbeGates The city 01 Berhn stands as an enigma before the world Once the capital of one of the great nalions of Europe, Berlin today is a city diVided, a victim 01 post-war blunders and modern day power politics. Half the City IS an mtegral part 01 the Soviet-dominated People's Republic of East Germany The other half IS a bastion of Western values and culture, Isolated deep in hostile East Germany, forever CUI off from Western Europe by enemies. That East and West Berlm were once a smgle entity means little today , Thlrty­'Ive years of divISion have made them as different as day and night. and the tensions and pressures of east-west politics Insure that they shall remain 50.

Wesl Berlon prides llself on liS beauly, liS al­lracllVeness 10 lounSIS, .ts n.ghillfe, culture, and h'StOl'Y· Modernoty and progress are everptesenl themes on the hterillure of the munic.pal govern­ment If one word can characterize Ihe altllUdes and desires of the average West Berloner, It IS "normalcy," the desire and ablilly to Ignore the ISOlated state 01 the city and to act as If the pre sence of hos\l1e enemres wlthon a few meters of one's schools and homes were the most natural thing on the world thIS IS the undellYlng allitude behInd the serres of agreements enabling West Berliners to travel faIrly freely bock and forth aCloss the bonier, and It IS the frame of mInd that sparks the specral ef lon of Wesl Berliners to maIn­taIn COmmunICatIonS with I"ends and relatlvas In the east

Yet, 101 aU of thIS "flOrmatcv," thele remains for all West Befl'nefs one rem onder of the central fact of thetr eXistence the Wall Llkea ragged scar, II stretches through the heart 01 the CIty, d,Viding east trom west The Berlin Wall can be seen tram almost every pomt rn West Berlrn. Constructed of concraleand barbed Wire, land mInes and machine guns, It IS tha one remInder ot the cIty's vulnerabIl­Ity that can suber even the most lovial West Ber Irnar On one SIde of tha wall are the sale, lam.lrar confInes of the enclave On the other Side IS a lorelgn country InSIde ale the besieged; outSide the besregers Thera IS a cenarn pathoS In the tact that obselvallon poStS and elevated platforms have been bUilt all along the Wall to allOW West Berhners 10 see Into Easl Berlin and East Germany

Bertin Since 1945 Bertrn was once a major urban cenler 01

Europe It held gle'lI IIbrarres al'ld museums It was the home 01 Intellectuals, the opera, ballet, and symphonres Once, It was lhe envy of OIllet' Cllres because of ItS phys.cal beauty, the lovely avenue, Unter den Lrnden, WIth the towerrng Brandenburg Gale, tha magnIficent Aelchstag. Ihe Tlerganen and tha zoo lIS palaces, Ihe Charlot tenburg, the Bellavue, gave the city the !lavol of eleganca and loyalty lIS unlverSltres produced great thinkers, teachers and wrrters

WIth lhe lise of NaZIsm, the c.ty became more spectacular, yet tess allract,ve to outSiderS Freedom of movement was halted Free thought was suppressed. W,th the onset of the Second World War, Berlin was cut off from much 01 the outsIde world

The war d,d temble things to the city even dUling the so-called "years of VICtOry." RelChs­marshal Heffnann Goaling neve' made good hiS boast that flO enemy bomb would ever' tall on the G6fman caplIal. The bombarsalwavs gol through, and by 1943, the damag.e was severe m some par ts of the Ctty Aller' June 1944, 25,000 tons 01 bombs fell on Berlin each flight ThIS cascade 01 rum cea,­ed only when the Red Army moved In lor the final assaul l and the SovlOta!\lllery Ojleood up, churn· Ing Hle rUins .nto rubt)le

In February 1945, Roosevelt, ChurchIll, and Stalrn met at Yalta In the Cnmea to map out slla­tegV and to diSCUSS the POSt war d,sposltlon of Germany At thaI time, zO(l(ls of occupation were estllbllshed Meanwhile, the fighting contInued unabated In April, the SovietS reached the out skllts of Berlrn and began preparatIons for the assault on the clly

The SovlOt assault all but completed the de structlOn of Berlin It began wl\h a maSSfveartrl1efy barrage thatlah the cIty COfe a mass of IIames and smalte AI the end of Apnl, SavlOt troops entered the clly from the east, nOrtheast, and southeast The trOOPS were preceeded by tanks and followed by focket-ilflng trucks. FacIng them wele small groups Of Volkstufm, HI/ieriugand, end SS (the lalter well aware of the average RUSSian's attitude

toward captured members of thelr brothefhood and less than Willing !O surrender) What ensued was a street to street bailie charaCteflle<! by tre­mendous losses to both SideS There wasespec.al-1'1' heavy flghtmg rn the T I~1fgarten and the zoo_ In Ihe end, l orce 01 numbers prevailed Berhn lel l on 2 May 1945. The reSt of Germanv was not far behrnd

In July and AugUSt of 1945, the AllIed leaders met once again, thIS Itme rn Potsdam, lUSt outSide Bmlm Of the wart,me leaders, only Stalrn 'emaln­ed Roosevelt was dead, Churchill soon out of power It was here that the plans deVised at Yalta came to IIUllton Gelmany was dIVIded mlO lour admlfllStraltve ~ones the American Zone in the SOuth; the FrenCh Zone In the southeast, the Bri tIsh Zone m the nor thwest; and the SOVlOt Zone In the east and center Berlin was also d,v,ded Into four zones. the Freneh Zone In the northwest, the Brrtlsh Zone m the west. the Amerocan Zone.n the SOUthwest, and the SovlOt Zone rn the east AI· mosttotaUy destroved and Incapable 01 governIng I\sell, Berhn was put under the contrel 01 an AlI+ed Control CommISSion compllsmg the four mIlitary commanders-In-chlef Despi te the four areas 01 separate conllolln both Germany and Berlm, the beleaguered country and CIW were to be governed as a whola When order had been lestored and rehabilitatIon begun, the cIty and the natIon were to be reunited

It was al thiS Juncture tha t the differences and tenSIons among the alhes made themselves appar· ent The VIctims 01 these d,ff,cultles were the ci ty 01 Berlrn and the nallon of Germany From thevelY begInning, the Kommandatura, the mlhtary gover­ning body, faced nothIng but dIffICultIes The Western AllIes had agreed to make Germany's recOYely therr numbel one pnoflty. The SovlOtS seemed bent on hmdeflng that recovery In an effort to gain greater reparauons, lhe Sov+elS re­fused 10 share lood stocks In their Zone The more the Western Allies plotested these and othel dra­conian pohcres, the greater became the Soviet demands_ The foreIgn mrnlstersol the four nallons met In several frUItless attempts to lion out thelf countroes'dlfferences FlIlaily, rn 1948, the SovlOtS wllhdrew Irom the KOmmandalura, making II VIr­tuallydefunet rnall but name Shortly, theWestern Allres mtroduced currency relorm In lhelr zones, and the Soviets adopted an mdependenteconomlC polICy on thelf Zone. The result was, effectively, a dual Germany

It should be pOlnled out that Soviet RUSSia was, Itself, In a devastated state Between 20 and 25 mIllIOn Russtans had died rn the war The coun­try's economIC burden Irom the war was about $200 billion Irn 1939 dollars, no lessl In short, the nalion had been savaged and could not be ex­pected to look wl1h much tolerance on the enemy responSIble for 1he mauling The SovIets took 200,000 casualties in the Sattle for Berhn alone, whIch shows something of the IIltenSlty of the conlllCt ,n the easl To the Sovrets, reparalions were not merely a means of payIng the flnanc.al costs 01 the waf, but of rebUilding their shaltered homeland

The Ulockade of 1948 The late 1940's saw a nsrng tIde of mUlual feat

and dIstrust between the nations of the west and thelf erstwhile allres to the east Caught up In that tenSIOn was the diVided c.ty of Berbn. Eventually, as a result of the refusal 01 the West Berlrn clvll.an governmem to accept the East German mark as Its currency, the sollt developed Into somethIng very near to war On the nrghl of 2J June 1948, lhe Soviets turned 011 the electrICIty to the western parts of BerlIn, Ciling a shortage of coal Shortly, railload and highway routes rnto WeSt Berlin began to develop rnexpllcable technical dlfflcul-

... MOOphoIOl .... G.or~ For1y, ModemComNl V~S I:ChlefliJlfl. ~n"'IIerlL1d .. 1979),

Ires Wllh.n a lew dayS, West Berllh was cut all from the rest of West Gefmany except by all Sup­pl+es wefe Sholl The stluallon, rn fact, was soon desperate. Plans wele made to rellOY!! the CIty, and the Western powers pledged to marntaln West Berlrn's sovereIgnlY President Harry 5 Truman chose General Lucius D Clay to maStermInd the only pOSSIble response short of war a maSSIve alr­hit of VItal suppl+es rnlO the City The Royal All Force JOined rn lhe e1IOft, and wllhln the fllst month 20,000 fllQhts had brought 100,000 tons of supplres IIltO the ctly

Soon the blockaded cIty developed new cus toms and methods of hVlng based on ItS Im­mutable Isola \Ion. Every 45 seconds anoHl(!r plane landed at Gatow or Tempelhof airfield or at a third, smaller allfleld In Tege! whICh would open as a new large allport rn the 1970's AmphIbIOUS al/­crah landed regularly on the Havel See In the wes­tern d,strICts West Berliners grew accuslomed to a few hours of electrICity each day, to cold meals and cold rooms Pllvate chantres began supplYIng the CIW wltl1 food and clothrng In the atmosphere 01 criSIS, IIlewent on December 7, 1948 waselec­tlon day III West Be,lrn, and 86% 011he city'sellgi­bla voters went to the polls 10 eject a mayor The .. chOICe, Emst Rl!\.Jter, was soon to become a sym­bol of the CHV'S defiance of the Savrets

Throughout lhe era at the blockade, II re­maIned posSible to enler East Serlm from the west In the east, the hardships were fewer There the rations were greater Yet It is a po.nt ot prIde among West Berhne's that lew chose to cross ovef. In Ihe end, Ihosewho stayed won. The Siege lasted 11 monlhs The airlift con trnued to Septem­ber 1949 In that 15-month pe"od 13 mIllion tons of goods were brought Into the city at a cost of $10 5 mlUlon. The frnanetal cost was nOlaJi The blockade also COSt 79lrves 31 AmellC8, J9 Brrllsh, 9 German

With the end of the blockade, aU hope 01 Ger­man leunlficallon III the fOlseeable fUlUle was also ended FurthermOle, though the waSt learned something of ItS ,mmense capacilies lit IS, aller aJl, no hght thlflg to supply a City und8i srege 100 moles rnSlde "enemy" temtory 101 well oval a yearl, With thIS knowledge came Olher tess pleas· ant fsalt~ahons. The COSt had been enormous It was not an easy VICtory, and any repell(lon would be even more COStly

West Bedlners attended to economIC recovery rn the years alter the end 01 the blockade Wllh tha aId at Ihe Marshall Plan, the clly made a soectaculal recovery Although 33% 01 the c.ty's work force remained unemployed for a number of years, consumer goods were soon more aOOn­dan!, rndUS\ly pICked UP, and the CIty'S hIe was restored With thIS recovery, West B8iltn became even more attract,ve to those hVlng In East Berlin and nearby East Germany Belween 1949 and 1953, over 600,000 East Germans emigrated to the ci ty that was now being called "the show Window of democracy" ThiS vemendous emIgration was, Itself, a SOUlce 01 grOWIng len$lon

The Berlin Wall, 1961

The rntense unresl rn East Germany III the 1950's expressed Itsellas major nots In both East Berlrn and East Germany in 1953 - partICularly on 17 June, a date fOf which a s.reet waslaler named In West Berlin Renewed voubles rn 1956 COin­Cided WIth $Imllar problems In Poland and, later that year, In Hungary The gfeatest rndlC8llOns 01 thIS unrest were the 1,000 people pel day fleeing the SOVl8t sector for the west dUflng much of thIS pelled By August 1961, some 28 mlll.on East Germans had emigrated. many 01 them Intellec­tuals, SCientiStS, teachers, and the young

In the early momrng houfsol 13 AuguSI I961, the East Germans, unde, SOViet sponsorship, Im-

5

6

plemented their solution to the problem Some 4O,<XXl East Gmman soIdl6fs and polICe sealed the border between East and West Berlin. Trafhc on the subway and lhee\evaled was cut Barbed wile was la,d bene!!lh the watchful eves of aml8d soldiers DecISion makers In the wtl51 were unaware &1 thall.me that the weapons were not loaded and Iha\lhere was no InlenHon 01 forCing a confrontation By the lime Western stalesmen realized the Opposl110n's bluff, It would be too late The barbed wire would be replaced by concrele Watchtowers would be In place Land mines would be sown The cordon san/fairs woold be complete

The rsason given by the East GermanS and the SovietS for the construction and progreSSive Strengthening 01 the wall was the need to keep out Westtlfn 5P16S and subverSIves But the mines covered the eastern approaches 10 the wall, and the barbed wire was POSitiOned \0 prevent escalade I,om lhe east The Isola 1101'1 01 West Berlin was complete. Only the goodWill 01 the East Germans Kel)t open Ihe lew air corrrdors, three rail lines, and Ihree roads to the west, and such good Will was obViously tenuous

In 19n, as pari of detente, a Quadripartite Agreement concernrng West Berlin took eltec!. It permitted a closer link between lhe city and the Federal Republic 01 Germany (West Germany! and, rn elleet, recognized the e~lstence of West B8flrn as part 01 the Fede/al RepublIC TraffiC to and from the cIty was 10 be unimpeded under thiS agreementlwhlch has operated qUite weU, alleast Insolar as tralllC oot of the City IS concerned! Closer ItnkS between the two Bel1lns wele to be established E~acUy how well the agreement Will hold up beneath the collapse of detente IS open to Question It certarnly does not guarantee Ihe e~ Is tence 01 tho city. Today, Bedln remains as It has been lor thirty-live years, a city under sl8ge

The Demographics of West Berlin West Berlin COt\SlSIS 01 an area 01 165 sqi.J.are

miles, loughly 48 kllomet8fs north tc south and 54 kilometers 68SIIOwesl, 01 whICh 44'6 IS woodland and waterways The City, ongrnally bUilt on marshy ground, IS today crosscut by numerous drainage ditCheS and navlgauonal canals AmongSt ItS 62 lakes and 127 waterways are numel ous Islands The Haval River (really a charn of lakesl runs north and sou th through theentlle wa$olern dlSlrrct 01 the City, and the Spree River flows through the ci ty center rn an eastwesl a'<ls There are over 100 wor~lng larms, numerous lorested areas and open loelds, and scores 01 parks, making West Berlin one 01 the least "urban" urban areas In Europe Wesl Barl.ners cl.OQ fervently to these open spaces as recreational areas where lhey can escape the clauStrophobia which IS part of berng under siege

The city's 1980 populallon IS sllghlly und9! 2 million It IS an odd phenomenon that West Berlin'S population IS slowly declining despite an average Influx of ~,OOO people annually The cause IS a high dealh lale due 10 the lactthat 30% 01 tha popula tion IS over the age of 60 The city also has a large population of young people, rn­cludrng many young men who have come to the c.ty to aVOid the West German draltlplohlblted by law 10 elttand to West Bert'n! The smgleperson household frgure 01 44 2'11. of the populauon In 1971 was double that lor the lesl of Gelmany Non·Germans, foreogn workers and students conS\l1ute 9 3'11. of lhe populatIOn Thera '5 prac­trcally no unemployment, leading to &n Influx of lorelgn labor lespeclally from Turkay! The 1975 per caPita Income, at 32,675 DaUlschmar~s lap­prOXimately $S,OOO! was generally above other Common Market countlles

West Sarlrn remains Germany's greatest In· dustoal city Its GNP In 1973 was 39,000 miliron

OM The city boasts over 1600 Industllal plants, With electrrcal englneerrng accounting lor over 28'6 01 the lotalrndustllal makeup Ovar 75'6 at tha c!ly's trade IS With the Federal RepublIC, but In· 19!zonal trade has Shown sleady Increases

As a result 01 the Quadoparute Agreemenl, CIVilian \faU,c to and from the city +I'Icreased 31 'II. In 1975, 12.2 million peop~ travelled between West Berlrn and East German telfl\ory (rncluding East Berlrn\. In addition, !relgh! traHlc Showed a substan\lal Increase at thiS lima The pattern 01 Iralght tralllC emphaSizes the changing pattern 01 Berlin's communications In 1975, 54 8% 01 freight traffiC went by road, 26 5% by waterway, IB 5'6 by rail, and 2'6 by air All and rallllafllC have dropped steadily over the years as the city has become mOl"e and more dependent on lIS roods and autobahns

Three malar auports s\lll eXist Teget Airport Ires north of the cHy center mthe French Zone and IS surrounded mostly by parkland The Tempelhol Arrporllol World War II lame! Ires to the south 01 the city center amidst sprawling Industoal areas The smaller GalOw Allf leld located In the BlIllsh Zone near the East German border, IS seoarated Irom the City cen ter by lhe Havel See

There IS only one malor railroad stat ion In the West, located off Hardenburg Strasse, near the zoo and lhe Kurfufstandamm Rail traffiC IS pllmarlly carned on the S-Bahn IStadtbahn or elevated liulway) whICh IS controlled by East Ber­lin. ThiS elevated railway, starled In 1871, covers a network of more than 200 miles There are 77 stallons In Wesl Berlin and 51 rn EaSI Berlrn. The U·Bahn, or subway systam, covels 55 miles rn both East and West Berlin and conSists 01 92 sta­lions Those in East Berlrn are closed except for the FrredrlChstfasse stat ion where all passengers are discharged Soldrers With lliias are visible In the closed and darkened Slallons The admrnlstra­tlon 01 thiS system IwhlCh runs benealh the bolder In four places) has been diVided between Easl and Wesl Berlrn since 1948

The Berlrn Wall runs 47 kllomelers between Easl and Wesl Barlln It IS a fortolred lone 01 con­crete and barbed wife and has 10Uf cheCkPOlfllS lor passage between the east and west Two checkpoints ara open to West Berlrners to the nOrlh of the city cen tar IS ,he Bornholmer Strasse checkpOint, and 10 the easl 01 tha ci ty cen ter IS another checkpOint al Hellwch-Helne Strasse For lorelgn VIS itors, passage by car IS limi ted to Frredrrchstrassea-Zlmmerstrasse, better known as Checkpoint Charlie There IS one other checkpOint al InllalrdenStraSS9

What With the large number 01 lakes and waterways.n West Berlin, It IS nOI surpllsrng that Beiliners are aVid lans of water spans They hold the largesllelsure lime lleet In Germany, consist· rng 01 some 70,000 vessels, from collapsable boats to luxury cruisers In addlHon, Ihere are over 60 passengar steamers and lemes which can accom· modate o~ar 16,000 people

Rlngrng the city rn East Germany IS the Ber· liner Ring, a vast autobahn which connects the road nelwork around the city and el\ectlvely by­passes <lny roadblock posed by West Berhn. Just south 01 the city tS the main easlwest rail line Ihrough north·cenual Germany

Terrain Wesl Berlin, Ilka many other old European

Cl\ICS, rs a mass of streets, soma narrow and Wind­Ing, others very WIde and \lee-hned Many are barely Wide enough to permtt the passage of small European cars. The city IS la.d out rn a ser~s 01 concenlllC cllc les through which Berlrn's major avenues cut Also cuwng through Ihe heart of the Ct ty IS the Spree and a selles of Interconnected canals Ithe Hohenzollern~anal, the Teltowkanal,

and the Westhafen Kanal berng the throo mOS1lm­portant Impinging on the center of the crty)

At Ihe very heal! of the clly, lIterally and frgur­atlvely, IS the Trergarten Palk whICh extends to the wal1l1self ConsiSting of broad e~panses of lawns and trees II'Iterspersed With old masonry bUlld.ngs and modarn glass and concrete structures, lhe Tlergarten has always been at the centar of the City'S leisure IIle The southwestern part of tho Tlergarten IS given over to a world lamous 100 Soma of the more Important bUlldrngs In the VICin­Ity are the Europa·Center, standing 22 510r18S on the Tauentzrenstrasse, Ihe Kongresshalle, design· ed by an Amallcan archuecl and standing In the Trergarten Itself, Ralhaus Schoneberg at John F Kennedy Platz, housmg the City gOllarnmenlllnd boasting a beaulJlul 250 loot tOW9!, and lhe Relchstag standing 11'1 the shadow 01 the WaJI

Farther out are three great palaces lhe Char­lottenburg, Bellevue and Humboldt hhe laSt slIU­ated north of Tegel allport! In the western dls­trocts, ImpOftant landmarks Include the Spandau Clladel and lhe Juhus Tower All of these land­marks ara 01 monumental cons truction, and most offar Important pornts 01 abseil/al lan domlnallng vanous sections of lhe cl\y. In the Funkturm, the e~hlblttOh grounds, IS another tmportan t lIanlage POtnt, a 500 foot radiO lower The h.ghest polnlln the City IS the Schaler Berg 1338 feel), located on the Wansee, an Island con taming one of Barlln's moSt beauiliulresrdenlre' d,strICts AtOJlthos hili I! a second radiO tower 6951001 high In the busrness dtstrICI IS the Kreuzberg, II hili standing 216 foot whICh domlnales much of Schoneberg

There tS one cunoos element to the geography 01 West Berlrn which serves as a con­stant reminder of days gone by DOlling the cl\y ara 16 man-made hills, reltcsolthe Second World War Over a million cubic yards 01 Second World War rubble wenl 11110 cons truction 01 these hills The best known IS "Davit's Mountarn," a popular sport area In the Grunewald 1I!i.ng OUI 01 the com­paratively lIat lorest floor to a height of 377 feel

There are two major Indust"a] areas In the cIty To the northwest Of the cny center, .n the Moabot dl$tllCt. the canals and fivers are bounded by nu· merous factorlCS and lank farms ThIS concenlla tlon rncreases as one moves further west until Slemensstadt and Haselhorst are reached These districtS are almost e~cluslvely rnduslilal To the soulh of the city cen ter and Ihe T empelhof, rn tha Mallanlelde, tS the site 01 a former muniCipal farm which has been turned Into an IIldustnal park ThiS IS tha City'S second malar Industllal concentration Thera are 48 fac,ollas In Ihe distrICt, holding com· panres whICh produce goods Ihal raqulla Illtle spaca and labor, Includrng plBCISlOn rnstruments and syntheliCS ThiS alea abuts drrectly on East Germany

Thele are fewt!f pllnlrng and garmentlactor­les rn the city now than there on<:e were WeSt Berhn's lsoialion Ifom outSide supphers has seen to thaI There IS also hllie In the way of haavy tn· dustry, SUCh as steel produCllon and chamlcals, because of a lack 01 available raw malella ls AStde 110m alack 01 malellals, space IS the second malor Inhibitor of rndustrrel growth. land lor housrng, lecreatlon, and manufaclullng IS becornmg ever more scarce, even as lhe population declines Ber Irners are Simply reluctanl to allow lhe CUy'S preci­ous open areas to be eaten away by conStrUC1l0n

One at Ihe great problems 01 the city IS the lack of space for publIC Ulllltl8S East Berlrn has agreed 10 accept some of the City'S waste water and sewage because 01 the lack at space lor d.spo­sal wlthrn West Berlrn Electflcal powar plants, desperately needed, are elien more difficult to conStruCt tn West Berlrn than elsewhare because of the lack 01 Viable sites Waler supphes Within the CllY ale rnsufflclent and, desp.te lhe space

problem. seepage ponds have had to be con­struCted to keep the water level consu,",

Housing also remams a problem, Stemming In

part from Ihe number of single-occupancy unrlS deSired and partly hom Ihe aforementioned dllll· C\Jlry In fUld'ng someplace to bOlld new umlS The eXisting 150,(XX) UMS Ble scanered fairly eyenly across lhe city H\8le 15 no dlslIlCt WhICh does not COlllarn 31 least one malDr oubhe hOUSing proteCt

The Berlin Garrison The Western AIiJeS (France, Great Butaln,

and Ihe United Statasf hold responSibility for Ihe defense of the city An odd dualism prevails here The responSIbility lor all Olher aspects of eny ad ministratIon reSIS WIth the munICIpal government. but defense 'S WIthin the bailiWICk of the AIII8d Control Comml$lon, desp.te the fact thaI 100 West

1. The Tiergarten •• Charlonenburg Palace g. Kongresshalle 13. Wannsee

2. The Reichstag 6. Bellevue Palace 10. Brandenburg Gate 14. Marienfelde

Berlin Polrceare an IndubItable element In the milI­tary garrISOn Another cunous element In the Sl lual.on IS the lact that West Berlin IS an obVIOUS mili tary target In the event 01 an east west war, vet France IS no tonger paft of NATO Since one can assume that NATO woutd control the derense 01 the CITy In any general European war, France's anomalous poSItion becomes even more starkly Outlined

17, Gatow Airport 18. Teufelsberg

3. Sthoeneberg City Hall 7. Humboldt Palate 11 . Funkturm 16. Tempelhof Airpor1 ~ Checkpoint

•• Main Train Station •• Ci tadel alld Julius Tower 12. EUropa CfIflter

EAST GERMANY

17 ,

EAST GERMANY

16. T egel Airport

.... EAST

8QRLlN

7

8

Wuhm [he Clly, therB ale aboot 15,000 W1!S

lern troops In three blogades (one French, one 8n\ ISh, and one Amencan). This 1191.IIe81so Includes a number of troops In the Amencan sector assigned 10 the Unned States Army HQ, Europe. The West German defense forces, tho Bundeswehr. are for bidden by !aw 10 operllte Within the City Theu place would soom 10 be amply filled by the West German PolICe, a 15,000 man lof(;e 01 whICh three Quarlers 81B pal!IITllilC8ry Theta IS a polICeman IOf approximately evefY 200 West Berlmers. making Berhn 0118 01 the most heaVily polICed Clites In the world To Ihls total muSt be ad<led the Volunteer PolICe Roserve and other branches of Ihe police. including the new neighborhood police. The prob able tOl81 01 aVilllable torces IS thus someTh,ng on the order of 35,000 men

The West Berhn PolICe Force can be diVided mID three maJOr groups Schupos. Sapos and K,, · pos The Schupos arB the unllOl'med lorce of about 10,CXXl SchutlPOlllei ("protectIVil POllce"l, The Knpos IKnmlnalPOlized Include 1,400 detec· tlves and inVestigatorS The Bepos IBereltschafl pollzed ara the true par/lmilltaiv police Thev are treated, trained, and diSCiplined as soldlers_ Thev live In barracks and go OUt on maneuvers TheV carry machine guns, dove armOl'ed cars, and are trained In the use 01 grenade launchers, light anti lank weapons, and Similar Infantry paraphenaha The 5,CXXl man VoIun!BBI PolICe Reserve resembles an Amefl(:an NatIOnal Guard Unit, lIS lob IS to rellBVe the regular police and defend essenllal West Berlin InstallallOnS In the event of a "disturbance." An lB yeer old can 101n_ RecrUits are putthlOugh a two·week training penod They par tICIpate In IWlCeyearly maneuvers Many youtlQ men who have come to Berlin to aVOId sel vlCe.n the Bundeswehr opt fOf thrs form 01 m.lliary &CtlVl tv Ten percenl of the munICipal budget (twICe what IS spant on streelS, h.ghwayS, and the U Bahnl IS spent on defense 01 the cl ly by the West German government The police malnlaln arsenals believed to con lain weapons as SOphlStl caled as anvthlng ISSUed to the Bundeswehr, and lhey are often compared to a light Infantry diViSion In hrepoweo- equIValency

The purpose ollhese paramlhtary forces IS to rellElYe the Wastern bllgades from the necessltv of Pl'otectlllg the clhzenrv Irom Internal disturbances SO that thev can turn thell anentlons to the task 01 guarding the Cl tv from an ack and keeplIlg Ihe ac­cess routes open In a plIlch, Ihough, the police could be mobilized in a shOH time to aSSis t III the detense of the cuy from el(tarnal threats Slgnll,. cantIl', the Federat RepublIC of Germanv has been lit to proVIde the City admlnistratlOfl wllh a bomb Pl'oof underground bunker WhICh, presumably, also contains a control center

Warsaw Pilei Forces While West Germany IS nOt permmed to sta

lion any 01 115 regular army In West Berlin, the SOVlBtS make no effOlt to hide Ihe fact that both lhey and lhe East Germans maintain slgnlhcanl IOfees In East Berlin and thesurroundlllg ar8il The drafl IS open to East Berliners and recruttS are sworn In OO"ng publIC ceremOnies There IS a weekly changlllg of lhe guard ceremony on the Unrer den linden, and each yem on May Dav, lhe People's Armv marches through the cilV In near by Potsdam, the 1st East German Mechanized DrVISIOn IS galflsoned Guarding the watt are !4,CXXl men, the equivalent 01 thloo bllgacles

Also In the area IS lhe SOVIBI 20th Guards Army WIth liS headquarters at Eberswald ThiS army conSists 01 three mechanrzed diVISions and an ar\llierv diVISion scanered around Berlin In a crescenr running roughly norih to weSI to south Headqu81I9IS ol lhe atlached 34lh Guards ar tiliefy diVISion IS In Potsdam. The mechanized d'VISions

are pOSilloned as fOllOws 6th Guards (al Bernau, north 01 Berllnl, t4th Guards (at JUlerborg and Brandenburg, southwesl of B8fllnl; 19th Mechan­IZed DIVISiOn fat Dobelltl. a Ifalnlng area north· west of PotSdam and west 01 Berl lnl. In all, 20Ih Guards Army could bnng some 5O.!XXl+ Iroops to bear on West Berltn That 20Ih Guards Army would be used In th,s tole IS purelv contecture, btJt no Olher units appear to be In nearly the same POSI ' tlon 10 breach the Wesl Berhn defenses

The Stralegic Options II war broke OUI between the Warsaw Pact and

NATO, mOSI mllilarV expefls agree Ihal the malll a~ls of any Warsaw Pact assault would be eaST 10 west In Ihearea 01 the North German Plalll It IS the eaSlBSl roule to the Atlan tiC. The terralll IS 1/IIIIy lIal It IS there lhalthe Warsaw Pact Supellonty In lanks can be mOStletling But even wllh the Soviet echelon system, unrts must rllCelYB some supply and. of course. the second echelon must be brought up 10 replace all those units lhe Soviets e~pec l 10 burn out It IS thiS conslderallon thaI makes the POSl liOn of Berhn so strategically Signi fi­cant. lor the Cl ly S,15 squarely aSl llde Ihe commu­nlflcallons of any army allacklllg westward &ClOSS the North German Plsln Over lhe years, the SOVIBIS and East Gmmans have created a bypass system whICh aVOids the problem 01 haVing com. mumcatlons run dllBClly through an enemy 1011-ress, bUI those bypasses are all With,,) amllerv range of the City, even If the Uni ts ollhe Western gamson never SOrtlS

Givan all of IhlS, Ihe Warsaw Paci strategiC planners have essentlalty two options a failly ac­tIve SlBge deslQned 10 force the gamson to "look 10 ItS own salvatlOO"; or a lull·scale assault to lake the CITy and remove lhe Ihreal

II Ihe Stege option wela chosen, sufflclBnt all andartilierv would have to be commllled to Ihe C,ty to make the defenders ·'keep thell heads down,'· and probablv some ground attacks would have to be launched to keep the Berlin command offbal­anco The assault OPhon woold reqUlle s.gnl fl cantil' greater lorces to be effective While three diviSions fwnh afliliery supportl mlghl be suffICient 10 seal off the defenders, 10 captUre the CrlV would reQulle SOmethlllg more substanllal rn the way 01 a troop commitment CltVflghl lllg IS, alter all, the COSlhest and sloweSI form 01 warfare In lact. the Soviets eSlimate Ihal the normal 3 to 1 manpower ral lo necessary 10 breach a POSI tion would be lotal­Iy InsuiflClBnl lor Clly lighting and Ihat a 10 10 ! ratiO IS nOlloogreal when allempllng 10 Insure VIC· lory III an operation In a built up area

Both Sides recognlle thai any European war Will, 'of neceSSity, IIlvalve a great deal of CrtI' fIght­Ing BOlh SideS are aCllvely trailling for It Yel, for bolh Sides, Berlin may well be a massive prOVing ground cum classroom The SovIets have not fought a lull-scale banle for an urban area since the BaUleof Budapest III 1956 (Czechoslovakl<'l hardly COUnts, hthls regard I Furthl!TmOle, mOSI SovEt doctrme IS based, not on thatr more reeenl el(pe"· ence, but on lhe great battles 01 World War II at Stallngrad, Kiev, Leningrad, Warsaw. and Berlin The same can be realtSlically said of bolh the East and West Germans. Amellcan e~penence IS really IImlled 10 Vietnam Ithe Second World War and Kotean e~pllflences being IIrelevanl by nowl Sim tlarlv, lhe BfllISh may draw some small lessons from thatr con,,"UltlQ embroglio In Northern Ireland, but these are not reallvvalldrna hlQh threat seu lIlg The French have no real modern Clly light· Ing el(perEnce to draw on Thus, any Battle 101 Berlm m the future Will, m all probability, presenl Doth Sides Wllh a number of more or less unpleas­ant SlJrpilSes In an effort to prepare fOI such su r­PIlSBS. both SlOes have developed a growlllg body 01 doclfillal literature on CltV fightlllg

OpPOSing Docl rines In any anKk on a maiO!" Clly, the elOOlent 01

surpflse - or at IeaSI a qUick ('·hasty"l allack _ IS uppermost In Soviet strategV Bv IhlS method lhe SovlelS hope to selle a cl ly before Its defenses can be properly organized Spearheaded by a rOln· lort:ed machanlled ballallon, the anackmQ force IS lasked With by passing enemy forees where posSIble and seizing such key oblectlves as bfldges, espec.ally tailor soIlCIly-constructed bUlldrngs, political centers, mlillary Installallons, supplV depots, and publIC ulilities. Whme POSSi­ble, such anacks are 10 be proceeded by an artll· lery barrage Ishort and sharp In the case of a hasty anack, longer and heavier if a prepared anack is necessaryl Once the Inilial aHack has gamed a foothold wllhln theClly, follow up unllS move In to clean out any pockets of reSiStance whiCh may have been bypassed and 10 drIVe on rememlng sllatBgIC objectiVes

The assault elements 01 both echelons would be heaVily relll lOlced by englflOOrS, tankS. and dlloct ·lore artilierv Up to 50'*' of divIsional al\lllery assets are e~pocled 10 be aSSigned 10 Ihe dll8C1 support 01 assaul l etements Total dllect Illearlll­fefy may equal In some cases as much as one bat· tallOn of artillery pe' mechanlred ballallon (pllma Illy SP Quns, towed 122's, and POSSIbly BM2! multiple locket launchersl Smce tankS ale not Ideal Clly fightIng weapons, II IS unlikely that the lank reglmenlS 01 Warsaw Pact diVISions would operate separately Rather. they would pfobably be broken up and parceled ou t III a sUPPOrt role among lhe mechanized ballaltons

In the evenl of heavy rBSlstance, SOVIBI doc. tllne IS to Iso/ale the City and by pass 11 However, In lhe case of Berlin, It IS unlIkely that a Simple by­pass operation would be poSSible or advantage­ous. AnOlher POSSlbllltV. II a hasty allack falls. IS the o/ganizalion of a maSSive, lull scale assaull With a long arti lierv preparation ThiS IS Ihe mOSI likely aliernaliVil

The NATO doctllne for dclendmg III a CIIV concentrares on allalOing and ffi811ltalnlllQ a slable Sl luatlon . "Once an enemy force 01111"15 II foothold , he can be dislodged only at e~tenslVil COSt 10 lhe delender Therefore, enemy penetratIOns must be allacked Immediately before lhe enemy can con­soltdale 01 reillforce hlsgams '·IST 90 101 Oelense would be based on decentralized opera lions, I/le use of obslacles and the establishment of 5lrong­POrlllS In sUl lable burldlllgs w,th good fIelds of file and allernatlVe fall-back poslhons

Frontages In City flQhlltlQ are el(tremely com­pressed. generaliV no more than one Ihlld 01 nor mal frontages In anack, SOVIBI ballahons would have a Iront 014 to 6 blocks lsomewhalless than a kllometerl. In some cases, Ihls Iront mIght be even less, and one formula calls fo r Ihe comml1ment of two ballalions per kilometer 01 a Clty·s cllcumler ence In 1116 case of Bel!!n, thiS would requlle a force 01 about 300 bauallons. and 11 IS IIkel~ thaI only somethlllg Slightly more than a thlld 01 thaI number WOUld be avaIlable Icounting police) NATO fronlages are Similar, wl1h defenses organized In hedgehogs four to elghl blocks Wide and four 10 Sl~ blocks deep Each banallon would be deployed wl1h two companies lorward and one III reserve, and a Similar pal tern would be observed by company commanOers when deplOYing thell platoons Company frontages would ancompass IWO 10 lour Cl1y blocks, and pla toon areas would be no more than one or, al most, two blocks on a side In fact, US doctllll9 holds Ihal many aspBCI­ally large or strongly·cons tructed bUlldlllQs Will re­qUlle an enwe plaloon lor lhell defense

There are a numbO! of problems Wllh bolh SIde's dOClilne Insolar as a baule m Berlm IS con. corned The Importance a! these problems IS a

mailer for debate among those wrohng doctrine, and they are certainly aware 01 Berlrn's uniQue d,1 licull,es as a balliegroond

For the Sovrets, one thing whICh must be taken mto account IS the plesence 01 "the walt" Both SIdes have, over the years, lorllioed the" pefl­meters unt,1 today a delenslve wne aboot JO) met els deep e~lendsout 01 each Side of the wall. There are seven meror entrances to West Berlon through th,s area All are guarded None could hold OUI lor more than an hoor I(lnd probably for fa, less tlmel agalflst (I determined assaull BUI the wall and 1\5

guards Ihowever ,nsubstantlal a mllrtary balller they may be) does constitute a sort o f ear ly wain· Ing system lor Belhn Any hasty anack moonted against the clly would have to be designed tode(l! the bar/l&! and anendam mmehelds lalrlYQulCkly " tho element 01 surpnse was 10 be malnt(llned Pres· ern Soviet doctrine mcludes Ihe use of massed ar tillery to " blow holes" In m'nelrelds and barrrers m such Situations

A second plOblem for lhe SOVICIS IS thai 01 In­IIlat,ve. ThiS element IS not unIQue to Bmlin It IS an element 01 all City lighting The urban envl­ronmer!! demands of those who would I,ght there a high amount 01 IndiVidual mltlallve at the lowest levelS of command It IS Ihese very levels at whICh the Sovrets are at the most severe dlsadvanl(lge In terms of training lor the e~erclse oflnlua\lve. On Ihe other hand, both Amerocan and Brol 'sh Iraoning emphaSlles the developmem ollnillat,veand onde­pendence on the part 01 NCO's and IUnior offICerS In the sort 01 hghtlng m whICh control tends to dls­Imegrale rapidly, leaVing squads and plaloons ISO­lated from higher dlse,plrne, Ihls difference m uall1lng could be cruciaf Berlrn wou ld present Just Ihat kind 01 fragmenled Muatron

The Sovret's th"d problem '5 the lact that the defender's natural advanlage: IS srgnllrcanlly In­creased In the type 01 s,tuaHon pertaln,ng In Berlin NOl only Will the dofenders be Ilghl lflg from delr~de in an enVlfOnmentlfl which each blOCk ~or even each IndiVidual bUlldlngl ,s a potent,al fort strung wnh Wile, loopholed, mouseholed and pro­tected by mInes, booby traps and barners, but the are(l Will be the defender's home ground I! Will be a known QuanHtv to him Furthermoro, the popu­lallon can be presumed to be overwhelmlflgly hrendly 10 the defender and hostile to the attacker rn such a Situation, making each clvlhan a posSible source 01 Info, mahOn, even " no more formal organilalion 0 1 C'~lll3n resoulCes IS attempled

On the other hand, the defender Will also be ~borrng under lather sevCle d,fflCultres ,n any bat­tle lor Wesl Berlin Flfst and loremos\. It'S a large area to defend With (In e~ceptlonally long pell_ meter Even sUPPoslflg that Ihe West Berlrn Police w,1I be a Slgn,flcant aid In holding that perimeter, the Ime muSt St,II, o f necesslly, be lather Ih,n A specral po'''1 01 rn lerest ,s the fact that mOSI of lhe ImpO/t(lnt govefllmental InSlallallOns are In the In­ner cl1V, whrJe the vnal servIces, communications and, mOSt importantly, the mllnary IflSlallotrons are In the outlYing areas. It IS Slmplv ImpoSSSlble to abandon sulflCrent nonClltocal areas to reduce the penmeter FUllhermofO, many of the most ,mPDf­tant mllrtary InStallations are wlthrn small arms range lor at most a lew kllometersl 01 the border The small S'le ol lhe garrison would nOt be such a severe lrablhfY were II nOI lor thiS curiOUS dlSPOsl­lIOn of StrategIC obtecflves II Should perhaps be noted that thiS diSPOSltlO" does make P6ffect sense from a "on-military POIIII of ~Iew even II It seems hke mlhtalY ,dlOCY No one, alter ell, wan ts a tank tralflrng area or rille rllnge In therr back yald Consequently, all 01 those ,mporl<:lnt mllrlary In­StallatIOns hlIIve had to be tilled InlO Ihe OUtlYing d'StrlCts where lhere are lewer people IIround to be botperod by Them Along w,th The mllr lary Ifl-51all(llion5, other Vital , bu t unplellsantlnstallat,ons such as prISOns, heal'flQ, wa ter, sewage and giIr-

bage trealment ptants and the l,~e have also been e~lled to the ou ter d'SlllCTS

A second problem wh.ch Ihe dolendtlrs mUSt face up to IS the tact that theTe WIJI be Im1e abool the City'S delenses that IS nOI known flOm the SIan 10 the Warsaw Pact Berl,n has always been a cemer lor spYing and rnUlgue The lact that ,t IS a ci ty d,vlded, a city In WhICh naTIonal bonds and political atf,Ir(lhons tend to c~sh rn a roch soup of conlloctlng allegrances and suspec:tloyaltlCS, mUSt almost lnevnably compromise secunty In born BOflrns. For e~amp~, The WeSt Berhners may, In­deed, tlilln In the sewers below the city and There may, mdeed, be plans e~tant 10 use the U-Bahns lor resupply (lnd troop movement, but II IS doubt ful thai the defenders' knowledge of Bmlrn's netherworld Will be s.gmlrcanlly greater than the anackers' Similar consldera t,ons apply to all aspects 01 the city delense plan Further, Sovret doclllne stresses the use of aggreSSIve leg patrols In city frghtlng and the .mpouance 01 (llilorms of Intellrgence In short, II can bee~pecTed thaI much of Ihe "home advantage" wl!1 be eaten away by e~tenSlve Warsaw Pact opeJat,onal and tactical pre pl(lnning

A third problem, and one which v,nually no crtyllghtlng thoor'SIIS Willing 10 address, IS what happens when 150,000 (lrmed men st(ll1 (llIempt­Ing to kill each other Wi th the most modorn weapons a~al lable in a cny 01 almost 2,000,000 CIVilians. Needless to say, thOse two million souls do nOI Simply vanish They (or at teast a s'gnllrcant porTIon of them) cannol be expecled to llee Afto!" all, where is there to flee to? It's nOt (IS Il lhe bailie has any real "rear .. The rear IS Simply an area far ­ther behind the batt le area, nOI a fm,te refuge W"h modem long lange al1.lIery filing rocket­aSSISTed rounds, there IS no pall o f West Berhn that can ever be 001 01 aniliery range In thiS con­text, lleelng toward the rear becomes a meaning lessconcep\ Some, but not all may Imd relugeon Ihe city's man\, Islands A few may escape v,a the mland w(ltBfWays For most, however, the only alternal,ves are 10 attempT to cross the lines and hope that The enemy Wilt accept clVrlran refugees or 10 huddle In therr cellars

While there ale pohtlcaf leasons why the Sov,ets and East Germans would perhaps be Will-

Ing 10 allow substan1lo)t hne cr05srng, rt should nOl be enlilely 10rgotten tha t Berlrn loll 10 Ihe Soviets once belore AT that t ime, Ihefateof Getman non­combatants was n01 enCOUlaglllg NOIIO be too Indelrcate, buT the orgy 01 rape and murOOf which characterrzed the RUSSIan campaign rn Germany In 1945 remains one of the great atrocoues 01 lhe Second World War Crrcumstances are cerlarnly dltterent now, but rt IS doubt fUl thatlhe Image Ie tarned 01 the average RUSSian has allered much Certainly, lhere wltl be many who Will be unenthu SlaSIOC about placIng themselves ,n SOVIet hands Ithough surrendemlg to EaSt German troops mlghl be a different storyl

G,ven that much of the populace w,1I remain ,n theclly It can be e~pected that a large number of ciVilians (poss.bly as many as I 5 m.lhon rnsrOO Wesl Berlin) w,1I become casualtr9S of one sorl or (lnothel Many 01 these Will sutler nothlllg worse Ihan treatable, but not sorrous conTUSions, abra SlOns, and laceraTIons Others WIll suffer concus· Slon, Shock and trauma whICh can be handled on II !feal and ,elease baSIS However, as many as half the casualties can be e~pected 10 be sonous enough to reQUlle a malor allocaflon of medical facollhes If they do nOI Involve OUtright death Dependrng on Ihe duration of the bailie and the methods used to conduc t II , c.v,lran deaths couk! reach as hIgh as 50,000 01 course, all the dead and wounded Will not drsappear Irom the field once Ihey have become medical stausllcs They WI!) contrnue to eXISt and SO Will have to be dealt With. The dead Will have 10 be diSposed of; thellv ,ng Will h(lve to be moved and cared for Thev Will ,mpedo operaTIons TI,ey WIll drain manpower In the end, they could force the surrender of the cITy

Those who th.nk SIliCIfy Illlmms of SlllUStlCS Witt perhaps deny Ihal Clvilliin casuaftlCS per sa coold force a mllrlary surrender But leI It not be forgotten that, however much the Fedoral Republrc may Wish 10 hold onto Bertm, the CIVilians berng killed and maImed Will be Germans They Will have Ie!atrves and frl8flds III West Gm many hncludlng In the Bundeswehll on whom their late Will have a delrnlte elfect As lor the other western UnitS In the Crty, the problem of clv,1 .an dependents actually locaTed w,thln the Berlin peflmel8< poses (I speclill morale ploblem There IS an evacuahon plan In e~IStence, but It IS doubtlul that the plan could be Implemented Wi thout ad vance warning Do soldiers light beller or worse when they know that lhelf wives and Children are Within a k,lometel or two of the batllefreld? Cer la,nty, morale and human,tarliln arguments must wergh heaVIly on those who w,1I calry on the" shoulders the burden of deciding when m.lr tary conSldor(l\lons must give way and the figh t mUSt be abandoned

Both Sides Wlil doubtless be hlIImpored by the sheer confuSIon to be e~pecTed In an operallon.n Berl.n Add to Ihe normal nOISO lind smoke 01 bat t ie the danger 01 IlIe, falling rubble, downed power Imes, Clacked waTer and gas mains and the dimenSIOns of The chaos become apparent Yet, these are only some of the most obvIOUS elements of the urban ballielrefd In theclfy alt wlrelesscom­munlcal lonS become degraded even If EW mea sures ale nOt In elloct The presence 01 clvlhans mal' not be as great a problem for the Warsaw PIICt lorces as for NATO, bul It 100 .ema,ns a fac­tor In slOWlng operations

A number of p'OPQSilIS have been made 1081 ievlale Ihese problems. Among othel things, ,t has been suggested Ihal lhe undelground telephone systom be used to leplace or augment oonvef!' 1!011(l1 communicationS In Wesl Berlrn The cables are deeply btlroed and shouk! surVIve any holo­caust Of course, security could be a problem lor the SIde that does not contro l the Telephone E~· change To handle the problem 01 power, gas and

9

10

wilIer hnes Impeding operauons, 1\ has been sug gested that such servICeS would be Shut down 1m· mediately upon the outbreak 01 Iogh1U'I9 Olher than these measures, tlule concrete has been pro­posed 10 make oper('llionS eaSICI except thaI run­ners be used 10 augment communocatlons and SUbslanl<a1 numbers of military police be employed 10 move the CIVilian population OUI of the way so [Ml lhe armies can fight One gels the definite ImpreSSion thaI !r"hlaIY theoflS!5 Simply don', know whal \0 expect 01 hOW to doal wnll some o f Ihe dl!flcul l 18S Ihey do expect In Ihe end, much w,1I depend on which Side has guessed best arn:llOI IS best able to muddle Ihrough the d,S<ls \B'S engenooltKI by Ihelr own bad guesses

The Cosl US Army Field Manual 100-5 says In regard

10 hgh\Ulg In II city "The deciSion \0 attack or de­lend II city may be tantamount 10 II deciSion 10 deSlroy 1\ "This assessment can certamly be said to appl~ 8t least In part to Berhn In the e'o'ent of 8 Warsaw Pact assaul1 on the CI1Y, refall'o'e COSt becomes lar more ImpOrtant than the Question 01 whether or nOt the ci ty could be taken Simple math indicates that If the Warsaw Pact commllS enough trOOPS and equ,pment againSt a gamson whICh IS eflecll'o'ely cut oflfrom re'nlorcemem and resupply, they wlUtake the City sooner or later It 15 the "b'g pIClure," so to speak, that determines 11,.151 how many HOOPS Will be commilled fr e could be spared) and how much damage Will ha'o'e to be done.n orOeI to take the elly

Blumly, the extem 01 destruCIIOn.S gOing to be dependent upon the extent to which the SO'o'lets feel the~ must bomb and shell WMt Berhn tn O.der to crush Ihe delenses ThiS faclor 15, In

turn, partly a function 01 the attotudes 01 the East Germans toward the destruclion 01 hal f 01 Berhn Icontalnlng cl""hans With friends and relatl'o'es ,n the eaStern parI of the CIlY), piuS the extent to whICh the 50'o'181S feel II Incumbent upon them to linosh With Bertm and mo",e the aSS8ulung force weSt The 20th Gualds Army 15 a potent force whICh woutd be of loosllmabie 'o'alue In any bailie 'Of WMt Germany Cenalnly, heavy concenlra liOns of fllepower and/or the use 01 "weapons 01 mass deS1fuction" would tend to reduce casual, lies In the al1ack'"g force and get the lob done more qUickly The wlllingnMs 01 the Sovlll tS to take a "massive barrage" approach would prob ably be tempered, however, by a reluctance to lose the coopera tion of a less than enthuSiaStiC East German all~

Assuming that Ihe Soviets are unwllhng 10 use mass destruCllOn type weapons !tactical nukes and suchl on lhe City, an ,"Iense bombard­mem a la 1945 would Stili do great damage SUCh a bombardment IS, In facl. likely since SOVI9I doc· ".ne calls fOf such preparalory 111M preceedlng an assault The resultmg damage would be severe, certainly, but nothing on Ihe scale 01 that occurrng dUfing the lasl Battle of Ber"n Berlin today IS Simply not the ci ty It once was There IS a large amount 01 rocent construction 01 Iho steellramc type With Wide expanses 01 glass and f limsy Inter­Ior walls It can be expected Ihal most 01 Vlftually all OllhB Window glass In the Cl ly Will be shallered HOWO\lBf, as thO hghllng In Bellut indicates, modern steet frame bUildings are almost Impossl· ble to dest10Y Much of Ihe Crly may be rUined, but It IS unlikely that It Will be levelled

The main danger comes from life. Here, Berlin sulters unIQuely due \0 the lact that lhe Western POWsrs and the cIty fathers have deter mined never 10 be caught as they were during Ihe blockade In 1948, there were only 10 days fuel supply and one month's food supply In West Berlin when the bloc~ade was Inltra!ad To aVOid 11 Similar 5ltutallon, Serhn has been supplied Wi th what has beon rumored to be SIX monthS worlh 01

lood and luellor the cl'o'llian population and two to three years (depending upon the source one con· SUltSI worth 01 mlhtary neceSSIties and supphes lor the garr!SOll These SUPptlllS have been dispersed throughout the eoclave Needless 10 say, the PIS­sence of large numbel's of lank farms filled With volaule luel wrll pose B unIQue life hazBrd, espect­alty since lhese tB llks are scattered ac/oss the city Instead 01 being confined to Industrial areas as IS lhecommon practlcs The lact that Berlin IS cut by so many waterways las well as the fac l that the distance between bUildings IS often substantial , especially In the out lYing areasl should do much 10 confine the fues, but It cannOt prO\lent local areas from belllg devastated

AI a guess. then, II can be expected thaI deSlluctlon 110m all causes as a result of a two to 1I\Ie day high IntenSity bal1!f1 lor the cny WIll prob­ably leave 20% to 30% 01 West Berhn totally In rUins Theother80% or soollOecltywouldnOI be untouchf!d, howevor It can be expected Ihat60% to 80% 01 the Windows In the CITy Will be broken and a scattellng 01 bUildings In all districts Will be made unmhab,table even If they are nOI deslfoved In short , Ihe city would not cease to eXls\. as Im­phed by FM 100·5 Rather, the Ille 01 the CIN would be disrupted and some dlstllcls would beall bUI levelled

In terms of casuallles, ,I lhe prevIOUS history 01 Crt'll IIghtmg Since WOlld War II IS a guide, an esllmate 01 upwardS 01 5O,OCO CIVilIan dead IS probably accurate In Budapest In 1956, as an ex· ample, some 25,OCO Hung.allans are beheved to have doed ,n four days 01 heavy street flghtmg Budapest and West Berlrn are apprOXimately the same size and feature many of lhe same geo­graphIcal and slIuctulal elements (Ihough Buda­pestln 1956 did not ha'o'e the numbel 01 steel frame bUlldmgs tha t Borlln has todayl It IS reasonable 10 assume that lhe Introduct ion olla.ger numbers 01 tanks, guns and .ockels InlO the banlefleld sllua· l ion should be produc\lve of hIgher c.vlllan casual­Ires, desplle the lact thaI most new bUildings In

BerlIn ale eqUIPped wllh basement bombshelters MIlitary casualties ShOUld, .1 present proles·

SlOnal estimates are any gUide, run between 25,OCO and 30,000 In the aHackmg lorce Th1s assumes a 50% casualty rale among the assault elements of the army That IS Ihe expected loss rate In fact, a loss rate 01 00% among assault troops might be closer to Ihe mark

For the defender, such calculaltons are mean­mgle$s II must be assumed by any reasonable per­son Ihat me City Will eventually lall Ibalflng some moracle of OUtSide Intervention) Such being Ihe case, any survl'o'ors among the gamson could ex peel to be pUt In Ihe bag as a grouo If, agatnst all logiC, the cny were to hOld out againSt a lull scale attack, defender casualues 01 to.OOO to 15.000 would be Irkely tn the COUlse of a stiff bailie of no more than ll'o'e dayS duration

The Battle 01 Berhn, li lt IS ever lought, Will be no walkover Largecllt9sdefended by profeSSional soldiers <l.e never objectives 10 be attacked hghtly II the Warsaw Pact chooses to take It, the ci ty Will fall Whether II Will be worth the COSI 's the ques­lion which east bloc planners must answer The destruction 013J% of a greal CIIY? The deathsol 40 to 5O,QCO clvII.ans of the same nallonallty as one's BII,es' The loss 01 25-30,000 01 one's besl trOOpS and the poSSible Cllpphng 01 an army} These a.e the antiCipated COStS 01 an assault on West Berltn In all the" starkness Whethe< the elrmlf\lltlon of a POIBflhal threat to theu communrcatlons 15 worth these costS IS somethtng only the Warsaw Pact's Strategists can answer Whether the opportUflity to threaten the enemy supplv hne IS worth so much destruCllon 'o'ISlled upon ono's Irrendsand allies Isa question which onl~ NATO st.ateglsts can answer So lar nellhe. Side IS d,scuSSlng theu In,enl lons

••

BERLIN DIARY

Editor', Note: Desprte Ihe publicall()fl m (htJ /IISI few months o{ numerous volumes o{ reminiscences and analyses concerning the recent hOStl'lltlf1S, much remams shrouded In

mystery_ 't 's VI,wally cerrern Ihat many o { the events o{ August, 1985 will never be known, Too many o{ those whQ pllrtreiplned rn (hose events are now dead. Too many o( the records necessary to reconstruct the context o( the events were destroyed In the chaos of baltle. Among the emgmas o( the Third World Wltr, none is more compelhng than thllt which has come to be ClJllttd thtJ ~Berllner Kessel. N Accotdmgly. the edItorS of S& T are pleased to be able 10 publrsh thllse eXCMpts {rom Ihe dl(lrY of Clip 111m GeOIge Mll'sh. Caprllin Marsh was, IJ/ the time of rhe bailie (or Berlm, IJ/tIJched 10 the sta" of the US Commenda,,1 and, thus, WIIS uniquely placed 10 record somelhmg o { the COurSIJ of Ihe struggle. We Wish 10 expreu our sincem thllnlcs to Captain Marsh's WIdoW; Mrs. Ju/rlJ Marsh, {or permission to publrsh these frtlgments o { cOnltmportlry hrstory and to thtJ mdefatrgabfe Irwin Ca~r for h,s IJUistaf1C1f in helping us (ind f,rst·hllnd IICCounts 01 thtJ Berlin barrie. Those With more than a pIIssmg interlfst In thlf baffle may wish to Sift up the game inc/udttd m thiS rssua and 10How the action usmg Ihe enclosed unit counters and map, Alternatively, an Alter Action Report on the Sattle of Berlin will IIppeal in MOVES 50 ,

David Ritchie & Nick Karp, Editors

4 AUlu~t , 0340:

I have been called to headquartefS8nd am taking this opponunity to sclibble a lew notB\! before my driver arrives. How to 58'11 it .... In­credible a. it sounds, we life at war. It's true, No Queslion. The word began coming in from the Outlying districts about two houf1 ago that tanks could be heard on the other side 01 the border. I don't know what sob managed to have us put on alen then, bUll'd like to shake his hand. The Russians started to blast the wall apart half an hour ago and Tuck says we got word a couple of minutes la ter that they had crossed the borde. into the FRG near Helmstedt. you tan hear lhe $OIJnd of anillery on the out"irts olSenin! What can I say? I am .tunned. There was no warning, Nothing. Just the sound of lanks and then the artillery open­ed up, I have a bad feeling aboul this, II somebody hadn'l had the brains 10 gel an alen declared, we'd be in pretty bad shape here. A. it ii, things may be all balled up and I just don't know it. Tuck couldn't talk tol course), so t suppose I'm about as ignOfant as any buck private and maybe moreso,

I don' t know how well I'll be able 10 keep up on this diary in the next lew days, bot I'm going to try. I have this leeling like I'm involved in some great event and maybe my kid will one day read this and say: "Gee, that wal myoid man that WlOle that and he was really there and saw it all. ~ Anyway. I want to gel il all down as i1 happens because I have a kind of suspICion that aftef the fact, once all the adrenalin weIrs off, it's all 90ing to lun togelher lor me and I won't be able to separate things OUI in the proper sequence. Damnll'm so e~cited I can hardl~ write ... like being a kid again and asking a girl out for the fifst time.

Son 01 a combination of fear and anticipation. I should calm down once I gelID work.

"AUIlIl!I, 1700:

I guess it was kind of stupid of me to think lnall could keep Ihis diary up in the middle of alilhis. I wooldn'l even be writing now, but His Nibs is really big on sleep drill and 50 I've been sent off 10 cilich. couple 01 hours 01 rack lime while Chaney runs the comm cenlOr. Can', sleep, though. I feel ~kfl I'm in one 01 those dreams where you kl"lOW if you can juSt wake up, it will all be ~Yer, IxII hard 8S you lIy you can' l seem to gel awake. II's hot II dream, Ihough. t wish it were.

So lar I' I can tell this is what', happalled. We've been hit aod hit good. Worse Ihan Pearl Of Clarke Field 018ny of \hoseOlher disasters in Ihe lasl big one. I guess we should I'Iave seen it coming. The tension'. been growing evel since Ihal Afghanistan thing livi year. ago end especially since the embargo. Fact is, though. we got caught with our pants down. Must have been that nobody figured them to just roll out of their barracks and hit us. It does seem like there must halle been some preparations that we could have detected that might halle tipped us off. Anyway, whatever the reason, we never knew what Wile going down until just an hour or 10 before they came at us . Sad.

I don ' , know what's going on in the FRG, but ~'VII taken one mother bad shoc::k today. The worst was up In lOa French Sector. Word is that the 6th Guards came rolling across the border in Frohnau in the wake of 8 pretty heavy barrage and just kepI driving all the way down to the Foc::h Barracks. By the time the Frogs were saddled up the Russians were driving through the 98tes (literally!. There was no place 10 deploy and nOt rTKlch hope of ac­complishing anything, I guese, so the French just fell back and tried to regroup north 01 the airpan. Anyway, we've lost just aboul everything up nonh. That's hun the British badly because the 19th mach sent 01"18 regi­ment down intO Kontadshoha and now they've got the whole triangle between the Havel and the Tegaler See. Bad stuff. That means the Brits in Spandau will have an enemy regiment behind them.

Those guys can probably handle it, though . I hear there's been some skirmishing Iiong the wall over around Staaken and there may be something brewing. but the British are manning their border positions and the Rus­sians aren' t going to have an easy time of it there . Down in the south of the British ZOI"l8 things loole really hoI . You can sea a lot of Slnoh and fire in the direction 01 Gatow and it looles like thera's the better pan 01 twO regiments o f the 19th mach dnvlng on the air­field . Somebody $lid there had actually been lOme lighting on the runways of Gatow, but you hear a lot of IlJmors around here alld it's besl not to take these things tOO seriously.

We "1 holding fairty well down in our Seclor. There was a lot of confu!lion at linlt, but it doesn 'llook too bad now. As best I can determine, Ivan has led two divisions and most 01 the anillery from army into the US Zone . Ovel in the east around Marienfelde and Rudow. the 14th Guards division c rossed the wall in about si~ places and they' ve simply overrun both districts along with moSt of Buckow besides. There wasn' t even time to get anybody down there to make them deploy. They just blew up the minefield, with artillery

fire and barrelled across in column. Fonunate-1'1', some of their junior offk:ers seem to have had some trouble with their rOld maps because it looks like a couple of the columns got lost for awhile. A stroke of luckl If it hadn' t been for that, they probab/ywould have forced the Tehow Canal and had the barracks before we knew what happened. As it ia, Benedict has fed the 4/6, 3/6, most of tOa armor and engineers and lhe Special Forces guys inlO • rough line about five kilometers south 01 the Tehow. That' s not 8l(8Ctly where we had pl8n­ned to stan Ihis battle, 8$pecially since the main fuel depot is down there, but what the hell! The til"l8 has been reinforced by some police companies and tooles lairly strong. Anyway, the enemy is plobing around thele, but nothing really big is going down yel .

I wish I could say the $lme lor the western part of our Zone. There's an East Gelm8n divi, sion over there, the 1st. They're pretlV good. TheY'le also getting a frightening amount of air support. We've got the 2/6 Oller in Nikolasee right now Irying to reestabli$h the $ituation with support from lOme HQ odds and ends and paramilitary police IVpes, but nobody i, very pleased. least of all His Nibs. We didn't really have anything over there until this after­noon and the police were all but swamped by the East Germans. There's a nasty story mak­ing the rounds that a lot of polk:e types just gave up when they found out they were lacing other Germans in$tead of Russiallll . Whatever the case, the 1st EG is solidly established on our side of the border 8nd it looks like Wanssee has fallen to them_ Too bad. Nobody likes to see this son of thing happening 8nywhere, bI.It lhere are some places you like 10 see the war reach a lot less than others. Wannsee is one 01 those. I really hate the ide8 of 8n'(One (even our own guys) running tanks along those beaches. Tuck had to ron down to 2/6 HQ earlier alld he says that a lot of the houses on the i,land .re burning.

" AUllust, 2JOO;

An odd situation. We just had a st8ff meeting and it looks like there's going to be an evacuation. The plan was always to try and get dependents out before the outbreak of hostilities. Now, it looks like we're going to take a big gamble and try lIying at least some of them out tonight . The Tegel and Tempelhof airports are still both in good shape and there is passenger space available on commercial liners juSt sitting there so we're going to ask lor volunteers and give it 8 shot. Beekman wants me to go over 10 Tempelhof and set up a comm centel to control the evacuation while Chaney runs things here. I am not enthused,

More news Irom the west . It look, like the Pact is making its big j>Ush out that way, a two-­pronged drive along lhe Havel. That's just speculation, but ITI05t of tOa fighting seems to be going on in Gatow, Nikolasee 8nd Wann­see. I'm not sure whether to be encouraged 01' depressed by the news from thallrOl'lt . There seem to be some tllJly awesome police IVpes holding OUI down around the Potsdamer Strasse on the island. They' ve blown the bridge across the Grosser Wannsee 8nd now are cut off and surrounded, but 8S 01 an hour ago were still in the fight. Farther north , a cou­ple of police companies were chewed up along the border lind the 19th mech have taken about hatl of Gatow airfIeld. Tuck had a chat wilh the British liaison here and Nys that the

guy was a little down because his old unil, the Royal Scots Dr8g00n Guards hasa unit here (8 squadron, I think) and they have gOtllfl pretlV badly wasled in the airfield fighting. Tuck NYS RSDG tried 10 counterattack and ran into the better part of a battalion 01 T on's. Grim.

Up north the French are pulling back little by little, making the Russians PIIY as heavily as possible for whatever that get . They are taking it slow, though, not wasting men. It's as if they want 10 keep the French busy without Pllying too high a price. If tllJe, that's very good for us s ince it means that we can concentrate our lesources down south here.

The silualion in 8ritz· Mariendorf is stable now. The 14th has 8 solid foothold and has taken a big chunk of the city, bul they have been content to probe and patrol since noon. There was a minor ftare-up whlfl the com· mander of 8 police company got overly 8g­glessive and provoked a minor battle 101' a piece 01 the 8ritzel Slrasse, but nothing serious. After the disasters of this morning, all 01 this Is very good news, indeed.

No news Irom tha west. yet. I am disturb­ed about that . It would be terrible to hold out hele only to lind lhat the war had been lost . Anyway, stopping the main drive is their job, not ours. I just wish therewC\ssomenew5.

Incrediblel Tuck just rolled in Irom another IlJn down to the 2/6. Hewasn't able to gel through. Seems the 2/6 has managed to get itself surrounded. Whether the EG's are behind them in lorce isn 't cenain, but the com­muniu':ons are definitely cut. Benedict NtS calld(l out the LGS boys to plug the gap while they try to move some police down there to reopen the roads. As Ihin as we are stretched, I e~pecl tMt there will be more infiltration through our line belore the night is over. Tuck also $lid that the Wannsee police are off the ail and firing has died down over there. Looks like they've bought it. Time to go. M.y driver ia hell to gel me over to the Tempelhol.

:5 A,uluSt, 0300:

I leel sick to my stomach. The evacu8110n is off alter a disaster like I never hope to ever see again. We didn't even gel 01"18 plane out. They must have had the field targeted in ad­vance because when the first 737 rolled onto the runway from the ta~i strip it was like a Chinese New Year. The pilot had no sooner started his take-off than they hit the 8irfield with anillery and rockets. I don·t even think they knew whal hit them. II all happened so fasll'm not even sure 01 what lsaw. But I think thele was a hit right under the pon wing thaI sent the plene over and ruptured Ihe luel celli all at once. AnYW8Y, thele was an I)(plosion maybe two seconds Later and then nothing. Just llames and sirens and this erie quiet . A minute before you couldn't even hear yourseH th ink because there were so many people in the terminal yelling 8nd fighting for places on lOa eV8cu8tion craft . Not just Americans either. Germans. lots of Germans. I can't figure out how they knew about the evacu\l· lion, bul they did. So here are all these thousands 01 people scrabbling fOl' a chance to get away and making an incredible racket and then all of a sudden it sto!)S. The artillery is rip­ping up the runway which is loud enough, but inside the terminal everyone is dead silent Wit­ching the plane burn. I c8n' t help but think how gl8d I am that Julia and Raymie are back in Pennsylvania and away from all this .

11

12

Other bulletins areo', as pel'SOflnally nightmarish, but slill disturbing. Wo.d came through while I was al Tempelhof Ihal the Gatow airfield was definitely fallen. The Royal Anglian. and II company of police II. sy,. rounded in 1!wI Montgomery Barracks area and I" under auack by a regiment of the 19th mech . The Russians infiltrated lllound them to Ihe north and cut them oN. One company 01 police has managed to cross the Hevel and set up II beach defense Cliong the eastern edge of the Grunewald, but it's only a crust end is go­ing to 981 blown right away if the Russians CfOSS Ov&f any time soon. Hopefully, they w il' be so preoccupied with mopping up the RA' . that they won ', make it over lor awhile. Mean­time, there', ooe police company left in Galow holding open the marina. I' m told Ihilllll ••• , •• literatly thousands of small boats making Ihe crossing to the east bank. They 8 •• ferrying Ihe civilian, over here, though god alone know, why. The artillery fire has gotten heavier in the eastltrn districts and it must certainly be sa fer to remain In the west and hope that the battle bypasses you. The Berliners, however, seem to have a plJ6itive horror of the Russians.

Except for the breakthru in Gatow, there's not much else in the way of serious news. But the ftghting seems to be getting heavier everywhere and that could pose a problem. There are already guys out there who Niven' t slept in 36 hours 01 mole. The Pact seems to be rotating forces in and out and their people must be getting some rest, but we don't have the manpower to rotate units like that.

We've repulsed two fairly heavy attacks down in Britl by the 14th Guards. Some of the Special FOlces boys caught the spearhead of one attack in Blaschkoalee and waited most of a company. The other anack blew away a police unit, but we chewed up the second wave with Irtillery and they pecked it in. There was also some kind of wicked fight between some reserve police and some Russian combat enginoors in the Westphalwttg station of the Mariendorf line of the U·Bahn. The police had blocked the line with wire and old raJlroad ties and the Russian engineers tried to blow away the block . We apparen.tly lost most of I com· pany before retiring and Ivan losl about the same.

Up north the French are hanging tough righ t now. Maybe they were a lillie embarrass· ed al Nivlng to abandon their barracks. There's a joice making the rounds that the French Com· mandant wasso surprised by the attack that ha didn't 8V1Ifl manage to gel his panls on before having to make a quick exit from the camp with a BMP on his ta~ . Sounds apocryphle lsittlo m • .

Another update on the Gatow situation. The Green Howards attacked across the border inlo East Germany an hour ago in an ef· fort to open a corridor from the rear to allow the RA '. to escape from the pocket around Montgomery Barracks. No reports on their progress e"cept that they've ground up a 101 of rear I rea units and smashed the fight OUI 01 some rltCOn units that were apparently left to keep tabs on them. Even if they don't succeed in saving the RA's, this should teach the Ru,· sians to watch their lIan~ better.

S A U!tU5t, 1100:

I am really glad that His Nibs insists on sleep discipline. The two hours sleep I got this morning has probably helped my performance

more than anything else possibly could have. You never realize how fagged you are some times unt~ you oat to stop and catch a couple of hours rack. It was a good thing too because this morning Nis been a bitch .

We got surprised aoain Iround 0600. This time worse than the last. Things were looking pretty good too. The 2/6 had managed to fight their way clear of the pocketthay were in and the new line they had formed down around the southern end of the Grunewald seemed to be pretty stable. The rest of the southem front was quiet and it really was start ing to 1001<; like we had stopped them down here. That was before the paras dropped on us.

I don't even remember waking up. Just a gradual awareness that there was a lot of noise a lot closer to my sack than usual. I think I was still asleep when I stumbled to the window. What I saw out on the common sure woke me up fast , though. Everywhere I looked there were Russians. Most of them appeared to be dead, but those that weren' t were blasting away at anything that moved . Anyway, I grab· bed my auto and made for the door. I guess I gOt lucky because before I could step out into the hall I see Kos come running past with an M16 in hand and then Zapl He comes flying back past the doorway with his chest ripped open and my ears are ringing from Ihesound of gunfire in a closed space. It wasn't until then that it occurred to me that there were Russians in the BOO. By righ ts I should heve ended up SOL right then, but I made It out the window without getting shot or breaking any bones and just sort of slithe/ed away behind one of those silly hedges that the Army plants around everything. God bless the Armyl

That was four or live hours ago. Since then I've been able to reconstruct some of what happened. The way it looh now, the Russians dropped the l03rd Guards parachute division on us. Not part of it, either, but the whole sodding thing. There seems 10 be a regi· ment down in the Grunewald around Schlachtensee, another in and around McNail Barracks and the crossings of the Teltow Canal and a third square on top 01 Turner Barracks and the American High Commission com· pound. The rt!9iment that landed up here around Turner took a lot of casualties since there was a Police Reserve company mobiliz· ing around Turner at the time. By the time they got on the ground, I would estimate that they'd taken about 50% casualties, anyway. Now, they've got the barracks. but they're pretty well surrounded. We've reteken the ACC compound, but are still setting up a new HO elsewhere ,ince things don't look so good for Ihe guys holding on south of usand the line could give way any time.

Ivan appalently has control of the Tel tow crossings southwest of Andrews, plus most of McNair. The f ighting over there has been pret· ty confused, but it looks like the 3/6 has just about bought it. They were surrounded by the drop and hit by a couple of battalions of the 14th in a cross river allack at the same t ime. So far as I know, one sqUid has made It out of there. The whole right SIde of the line in Lankwitt-Mariendorl has come unhinged.

In the Grunewald, IVln tried to land on the waterworks and ran into another police com· pany. These police guys are better than I thought. They didn't plnic at all, surprisingly enough. Just.sat there real cool and butchered the paras while they were stili in the air. I hear

they did for most of a battalion that way. There' are two other battalions of paras in the lorest now, though. I think they are trying to 18t up e blocking position behind us to keep our guys from withdrawing nonh. No word from the 2/6 since the drop. t wonder what it feels like to be surrounded twice in twelve hours.

The news from the Brits is a little on the grim side. The Howards ran into a couple of ballallOnS of the 19th mech on the Ritterfeld damm just the other side 01 the border and had to withdraw. The RA's aren't answering any messages and the firing hes died down south of Gatow Alrlield. Looks like the r8SC\Je at· tempt would have been late even if they had got paSllvan. So, now the Green Howards and Welsh Guards are holding a bridgehead on the west bank of the Havel around Brook and Wavel Ballack, with the 1st battalion 01 the Parachute Regiment in reserve. That's it for our stuff on the west bank. The 6th Guard, at· tacked cross river this morning in combination with a battalion they had slipped through Spandau Forest and routed the police out of everywhere eltcept the police school. We just got word thai they have taken that by assault . We' re rushing civilians up into Haselhorst to build berracades and tank traps, but I don't_ how we can keep the Russians from recrossing the Havel to take Tegel from the real .

The French Ire between a rock and I hard place right now. The 11th Armor has been pushe1 back almost to the north edge of the airfield and the rest of the brigade is taking heavy losses trying to keep the line steady east of Tege!. The French commander wants to abandon the airfield and set up a new line south of the Hohen~ollem Canal. but there is some resistance to that. I don' t think the Ger· mans are too keen on having the lighting move from the suburbs into the center of the city, which is what abandoning the nonh bank 01 the Hohenzollern would effectively mean. There may be no choice, though, with the en· l ire west bank 01 the Havel in Russian hands. Besides, the Frogs·$ity they are short of am· munition since mOSt of their stuff was stockpil· edat Foch.

There was a little news Irom outside to· day. We are retreating, as expected . Not as last as the Russians thought we would, to be sure, but also nol as slowly as our big brain types predicled . Benedict has been requesting an emergency reinforcement lor the Last three houl1l, but we gel no answer. I am not lUre how he expects rein lorcements to land here even if they get through Pact airspace intact. I still retain a vivid picture 01 what the RUSSIan artillery did to that 737 lasl night lonly last nighat.

S ALl ltu~ I , :tOOO :

It is an effort to write. I don't know if I can keep this journal up any more <lnd, besides, I am not sure that anyone will ever read it or care, anyway.

The RU!lSians conllol Tegel. They Just simply overwhelmed Ihe Frogs up there. It's sad, really . Our estimate is that the French in· flicted almost 1500 casualties on one regiment of the 6th Guards in the fighting for the eirlield . But they just couldn' t hang on any longer Tuck was up al French HQ and says it look. bad. They counterattacked two hours ago to Iry and retake the airfield, but it was hopele!lS. The 11th has only 7 working tanks left! The 46th has the equivalent of a slIong company,

"

•

but they've lost thei, APe's. The French com­mander says they ere definitely withdrawing behind the Hohenlollern lonighl.

Things don', look much belle, for us. Benedict finally had to order Ihal the south bank 01 the Tellow be abandoned. The whole sky is red down below the canal lince we've blown up the main fuel depot and g.al worits in lankwltz to colier our retr83l. All the Tellow bfidgflfl are now down end I doubt that the Russians are going to be able to do much on that front before tomorrow morning. Still, it's discouraging. The one thing Ihal makes it seem not so hopeless is that we are definitely inflicting heavy casualties on IlIlIn. The Special Forces Detachment set up another ambush to help coyer the withdrewal across the Teltow and took OUI about half 8 company of East Borlin police who lI'e now being used to guard the Pact flanks and clean up some bypassed areas.

We'vB been flanked pretty good ourselvtlS in the Grunewald. The 1st EG mounted a crossil\g of the Grosser Wannsee this mornil\g and took Schwanenwerder by surprise. What with all the e .. citement oyer the l03rd landil\g, we kind of missed that fact until the216 tried to fight its way north. They managed to break out through the paras with about three police com­panies in tow, but ran ""ack up against 'st EG in the forest and have been fighting a mean kind of delaying action there since early this afternoon. A report from the 216 HQ indicates that there may have been some kind of atrocity committed by the RuS$lans on that frOflt , They say they found about fifty corpses in WB police uniforms lined up 01'1 the rifle range near the autobahn. They'd been killed by automatic rifle file , That's the second atrocity story I've heard today, The other was that some of the patients in the !\ospital at Steblitz were machin-e gunned when the hospital was briefly oVllrrun by paras this mOffling, WaitOfl, over at Special Forces, told me that one. He also said his boy. aren't taking any mOle prisoners,

The only really good news comes from the Brits, They are still !\oldil\g out on the west bank and have given Ivan one hell of a bloody nose. Two entire regiments ~one from the 19th mach and the other from the 6th Guards) tried to ,oot them OUI of their banacks, but it was no soap, The Parachute Regiment boys ara about done in and the Welsh Guards have taken almost 60% cl5ualties, but they've taken out over a hundred tanks and APC's in the fighting for the bridgehead and they say they think they've wasted about 600 01 the op­position. Tile total casualty rate in the 6th Guards must be phenomenal by now sin-ce both the Brits and the French have put it to them for better than 1200 casualties apiece. Even if they take this hole, I figure that' , one division that won't be bothering the boys in the FRG for awhile.

Still not much news from the west, I hear that Ivan has taken Bremen and hl5 pocketed a bun-ch of our guys In Hamburg, but who knowsl Banedict wants them to drop some paras from the NATO reset\l'e into Berlin. Seems to me that they might a, well just dis­band the units if that', how they are going to usa them. I begin to doubt our ability to hold out nere, It's the second night of the battle and half the city is in Pact hands. Not too good.

Some civilians tried to crOSll Into East ~erlin earlier through Checkpoint Charlie, The

EB police opened fire on them for some reason. Maybe they thought it was a military acllon. Anyway, there 's a smaN battle goil\g on right now around the checkpoint inYOlving our cops against their cops. It would be kind of funny except that the casualties in that area are starting to mount up, Not that there's much we can do about it, but the hospitals a.e full of casualties and an open air refugee treatmetlt center has had to be set up in the Olympic Stadium to handle all of the civilIS from Gatow and Staaken. We're getting a lot of Civilian shell shock and some burns and smoke inhala­tion now. They haven't laid a lot of artillery on Ihe city, bul the areas we've fought through have taken quite a beating.

5 AUl:ust, 2200:

We JUSt had an interesting radio in tercept to the effect that Ivan is starting to get a little concerned about his supplies, We've been lay­Ing a lot of artillery on the rail net outside the ci­ty and that has interfered with traffic between Poland and the FRG , Apparently we got extra lucky and took out some ammo cars earlier to­day and that buggered up the westbound track o f the main rail line south of here. Anyway, the pressure is being laid on 20th Guards Army to take us out of the ballgame before we per­manently mess up the track, Maybe we're d0-ing something to hurt the bastards, after all .

6 August, 0600:

An incredible reprievel Things were look­ing terminal a couple of hours ago, but now Ivan has offered a cease fire to negotiate a su, ­render, Benedict has accepted in order to buy some time. His message to the Russians im­plies that we may be willing to lay down our arms if there are some guarantees concerning the welfare of Berlin's civilis, Good s!\owl I can' t think of anything we could make better use of than a ceasa fire. We have until noon, anyway.

The situation OVerall is not good at all , The French have had it. They got caught by a RUI­sian anack while Irying to evacuate across the canal laSt night. It started with a heavy rocket bombardment whiCh, of COUIllll, caught them In the open. The attack hit while they were still disrupted, Bad luck. Wedding is in flames and the Russians are across the Hohenzolfern in half a dozen places. It's all very mixed up and I don't think the Russians realized how little we had left up there or they would have never of­fered a cease fire. They would have just kept driving into the cente, of the city. As it is, there is the beller part of a battalion of the 6th Guards in the Charlottenburg and anothe, bat­talion just west of the Tiergarten, There are Russian tanks in the Unter den Lindenl All we've got in the area are a couple of police companies and the remnants of the Fren-ch ar­tillery who have been holding one corner of the Charlottenburg, firing at the Russian tanks over open sights.

The 14th crossed the Teltow early this morning and drOve on the Ternpef!\of from the SOUtheast. Once Again the Special Forces came to the rescue and closed the gap after a police company let the Russian. get a foothold on this side of the canal. Unfortunately, the SFDB is about burned out at this point. Wahon says all they've got left is the equivalent of a large platoon, Benedict has scraped up some wild kind of unit that consists of a battalion of

guys from the service and support unit., armed with automatic weapons. He has assigned them as the local reset\l'e around the Tempelhofl Meanwhile, Ivan has two bat­talions across the Tehow massing to drive on the Tempelhof from southeast of the main run­way, What a joke this all seems!

The Brits have packed it inl Wefl , not real­ly packed it in, I guess, 8!,t they are definitely finished. Tuck was in the citadel delivering some new fire plots 10 the British battery that' s set up there and they got an urgent fire request from Brooke. So he went up into the Julius tower to watch. I guess maybe he expected to see the Brits pull off another tank massacre, but it didn't quite work that way. The Russians lost a lot of tanks, to be sure, but they still took both Brooke and Wavell Barracks and put paid the Howards and the Welsh Guards, Some of the Parachute Regiment boys made it acroa in a leakv pleasure boat, but itOOks like the rllSt of the 8rits are dead or in the bag. The eastern shore of the Havel is now being defended by police companies and ciYies who are being armed with LAW's and rifles. I begin to believe that I am dreaming, Much of Spandau is in flames. The b'idges across the Havel are down, When will it end?

No word from CENTAG about .ein­forcernents, I wonder what they think is going 01'1 here, 0 ' if they even care. For sure, they've got probiemsof their own.

6 Augu~I, 2100:

I am being sent to the Tempelhof to organi~e some of the civies to defend the ter­minal. The remnants of the .,6 are scheduled to counterattack acrOSll the airfield In an hour supported by tanks from the 40th, but if they don't push Ivan back the defense will rtlSt on me and a few German police supported by some volunteers, most of them a liability from what I hear. The situation over there is nothing shon of desperate (Benedict's wordsl since the 14th Guards blew away the Special Forces and that scra tch battalion we sent down there, I w onder, though, wh6fe in the city thIngs a,e flOt dll$pllfate.

The Russians have crossed the Havel in so many plaC1;ls that they eHactively conlrol the east bank now. The Grunewald hal been aban­dooed e~cept for sorne police holding the Teufelsbe,g. The big hunting lodge over there is burning and there are BMP's 01'1 the autobahn,

The 191h mech control most of Siemenutadt. They crossed the Pichels­werden at noon exactly and just brushed aside the beach defenses, I hear thaI they are fighting In the area around Olympic Stadium.

The 6th Guards have taken all of Moabit in the last couple of hours. There is heavy fighting in the rlllrgarten and the ~oo. Tuck says the aquarium hal been destroyed by rocket fire and the fish are dying outlide their tanks, He is really upset about It , Tuck il a big fan of tropical fish and the aquarium was one of h" favorite places in the dty.

Over in SChonebefg the ratheu. has fallen and the mayor is m!$sing, Tuck says he's pro­bably in hiding since no matte' who catches him, theyH put one in his neck, What a lovely waf!

I have to go now, We are bound for the airport. I don't know if I will ever finish this since it looks like the lot of us will probably get

13

14

bagged within the nell! lew hours. I can hear small arms firing coming from the zoo and there arB civilians building barricades on Ihe KuriUrSlen<iamm. Somebody just came in and said Ihat the Viktoria has been downed by ar­tillery tire. Supposedly, there lire Easl German police snacking through the Brandenburger Tor.

lima to split. Chaney is taking over the comm center. Tuck is coming with me. I doubt that I will SIHI any of the HO people again ... al least nOI until we all get bagged. Benedict is moving the moSt asSEt"I;al people to the new field HQ at Iha Nollendorfplatz stat ion. They wtli have to use the U-bahn. Communications are lousy now. Too much artillery and too many people in II small area. Like a Bosch print. it's all a bit unreal.

Word just came through Ihal we IIfB on our own. CENTAG has no reinforcements to send .

7 A UII,Llst, 0200:

Tuck is dead. We have been knocked oot of the Tempelhof terminal and are holding a perimeter on the west side of Victoria Park. I feel like hell. Got some smoke in my lungs. We are besten snd there just is no way afOund il. The scratch unit I have been leading started OUI with about 130 police, USAE service per­sonnel, civies and some survivors from Special Forces. That was three hours ago, Now there are about three oozen of us left. There is a lull at the moment while the Russians regroup. After this, though, I expect to get bagged. There are JUSt too many of them and nOl enough of us to matler.

It took us two hours to drive through the U·Bahn to the airfield. The underground is crammed with people trying 10 gat some pro­tection Irom the artillery. It is a madhouse down there. There are wounded and dead lay­ing side by side in the tunnels and no one wants to take the dead OUlside because of the fighting up above.

Tuck was standing by the jeep when a rocket salvo landed in the vicinity. One minute he was standing there and the next there was a whoosh and a crash and he was gone along with the jeep, No wreckage or anything. Must have been a direct hit. I feel just numb <lbout it , Maybe thell 'sa blessing.

There is a rumor that we have sur­rendered . I don't know. ' don't see Ivan acting like the fighting is over. We are out of com­munication, anYW<lY, so it doesn't matter. We' ll have to just keep fighting.

It anyone IInds this, please give it to my wife. Her address is on the flyleaf . there is more tiring on the tarmac e<lst of us, ) think the Russians are attacking , I have to go now.

Ed. Note: This is the end of Captain Marsh's remarkable diary, It was returned to his wife along with the captain's other personal effects in November of last rear by the Internationfll Red Cross. ClIptllin Marsh reportedly died in a Berlin hospittll sometime in {flte August, 1985 as a result of wounds incurred in action. He has been awarded the Silver Star posthumously. The Berlll! gaff/son surrendered 81 0100 hours, Avgust 7, 1985 .••

NOTE: An After AClion Report covering, in game terms, the events described in Berlin Diary will appear in MOVES 50 .

OUTGOING MAIL (ro~II~"t<Jfro"'PIi~ lJ 77, for example. One sentence was left out of the rules to Eban Emae! li t was Ir"I the orig inal manUSCript. was dlopped out during typesettlr"lg. and not caught by the developer durIng the check­Ir"Ig We've SInce tightened the net even more. especially when a novice de\'eloper IS InvolvOO, as was the case with Eban Emile/.) That one miSSing sentence IGerman el fec tlveness ~vells 4, Belgian IS 31 made playing the game more of an unex pecled adventure

The consIderable Increase In R&D slaff capabiliues 'n the past year has allowed us to put more game Ir"I to less paper As OUI compu terIzed priCing program shows US, the cost of manufac· tUllng the game IS a c!ltrcal factOI. So the thought to Keep uppermost In one's mind is: "IS II worth killing a tree for ttus?" USing OUf graphiCS deSign capabllrty, plus some skill and effort trom the deSigner and developer land play testers, etc I, we try to get more game Into less paper. USing Ihe smaller lone Inchl 00_ and foregoing the plast iC tray (which has l!rpled in pnce these past lew years, along WIth the Oil from whIch II 15 made), plus the greater eff iciency In game components, allows us to price any game in a one Inch box under $10. We hope to malm aln that capacI ty for a whIle.

Some 01 the games in the one inch boxes are quite substantial ("full size" as we say, WIth a 22")( 34" Inch map, 200 counters, and eight or more pclges of rules) This IS accomplrshed pr imarily through economies 01 scale The 5&T games appearrng In thiS pclckage benefit from the lalge plln1 run fOI 5& T 140,COl unllS!. Other games, such as our Grea! Bat tles of the C,Vil War land SImilar series) have thelf rules pllnted In larger quantIties Ibecause 01 the use 01 the standard ru les for more Ihan one game) These lalget games ale also a few dollars male expenSIve than the $6 items

Response 10 thiS approach from the retaIl outle ts has been vety good The stores depend more on "impulse" bUYing The lower price, cou pled With the more att ract ive graphiCS, makes for a very saleable store Item. ThiS IS tmportant as more and more games are sold In the stores. The maJOflly of gamers Ilhose who buy g<lmes delrberatelyl pre fer the convenience of SlOle buy­ing. Needless to say, the casual gamer (who buyS on impulsel IS nothIng but a store cus tomer. It's a ralhel perverse Situation , what With direct mall sellrng berng so important to the smooth fUnctIon­Ing 01 SPI 1ge11lng the money lor a game Without waIling two or three months makes a big di l ­ferencel Yel much of what we have done In the past year (intentIonal ly, or otherwlsel has only served to increase slore sales at the expense of direcl mall sales

The feedback contrnues to gIve us protlY clear indicatIons about what we should be dOing And With the publrcat lon of Ares magazrne, we will no longer ha\'e 10 worry about filtering science hClion and fantasy rnterests Ihrough S8 T This IS no small matter as some 25-30% 01 your ha\'e a strollg Interest In these subjects rn add 11101'1 10 your interest in hIstorical events.

But e~en the feedback needs some other in put. ThIS we gel from two sources Fltst, there IS our actual expeflence with the games we publish How did they do in the feedback? What dId gamers say In their letters? We even pay anentron to published game reviews. Since I know many of the reviewers personally, I tend to r69ard a published reV iew as haVing as much, or often less, Impact than a lener or conversation WI th an un­published gamer. Garners are, In general. a very know ledgable lot Knowledge. however, of ten tends to make one humble I often obtain the mOSt penetrating crrtlClsms about a game !rom conver-

sauons I have no compunCtions about eircl l rng negative comments about my own ,games lal though It IS mOTe fun to heaT someone else roas ted.J But then I'm In a po51110n to repaIr my own mIstakes, or at least learn Irom Ihem. What ollen distingUishes a good game rev~wer IS the energy and l or courage 10 set hIS views down on paper for all to see FOI Ihis reason I have always put great credence in the feedback ralrn95 for games It IS a collectIve oprnlon via secret ballot. True, you ol ten don't know how a game raled a 7 0 was conSIdered relat ively supellor to one rated 60, but I hava never known the leedback to be w rong about a game. Theabsolute truth I leave to those who feel they possess II

GIven the Importance 01 laca-to· face leed back, we have made It a PO'nl to attend as many 01 the gamrng conventions as pOSSible At these af­farrs we set up a booth tose!1 the latest games, and provide <I convenient place for gamers to !rnd us More Importantly, we conduct a lalge number of semInars. At these sessions (whIch are usually freel we focus on ~aflous aspects of what we are dOing lor supposed to be dOing) We constantly change the nature of these varrous semlnals as we search for better ways to !rnd out how best to pTO· ceed Currentlv we run a semrnar for S6T subSCribers ThIS one has alreadv produced a number of changes in S6 T (like expanded Work In Progress. more In formative ads fOI new games, etc.) Other semrnars cover such things as how games are desIgned, developed, and pubtoshed. details of work rn progress; recently published games; and so on

We announce the conventIons we WIll attend In Outgolr"lg Mail I would toke \0 encourage you to attend any held rn your area ASide from all the In­teresting \hlngs Ihat go on, it's one 01 the bettel means of frndlng out what we're doing Tight, or not so fight JFO

Rig Tsimmis

When role-playrng games began to become popular in the hobby back In the mId-seventies, there was a dlstlnctlvelv negative leaction among many grognards, Includrng the rTlalorrty of the staff and playteslers at SPI BaSIcally, the reactIon was grounded on snobbery Man.,. of us had assumed at tha t time a sor t of defenSive postule of ovel · blown dlgnl\V In an attempt to " 1 1 ~e down" the bad repu tation that w8rgamlng had engendered among some of our more aware fflends thanks to the actiVIties of the ersatz Nall clubs that had pro· Irferated In the SiXties We did not see such a manr· festly SI lly and chI ldish actIvI ty as gett Ing together With a group of people and ptetendrng to be a hob­bit In sealch of treasure as complementIng the sober and seriOUS aura 01 respectabili ty that we craved After all, anyone can see how sellOUS, sober, and respectable pretending to be Napoleon rn the Pllvscy of one's well-furnIshed den is

Another snobbISh objectIon that we had to role·playrng games was grounded rn a iegl1lmate professional CritiCism The aarly lole-playrng games rncluded poorly w ritten and disorganized ru les and mechaniCS tha t mashed each other fear · fu lly as of ten as they meshed The games seemed endemically Incomplete and sloppy, charactells­tiCS tha t the SPI system trains people to shun Parl ly because of the poor rules, we fSiled at the time to appreciate that a "good" role-plaVlng game would be, by ItS very nature, " Incomplete" The concept of the open-ended role-p laYing is based on a time-honored human tradI tIon: story­te llrng And as any good storyteller can tell you, the story tellrng goos better II an element of sus­pense IS plesent A set of role·plaYlng ru les that was "complete" lin the prosaiC SPI sense of <ld dlessing every possible eventuality) would not on­iy be a while elephant, but 'Pretty boring, too

Thus, the requlJ8menlfor a GamesmaSter to run a role-plaYing game was not an Inherent weakness. necessllaled only by the fact that the rules W9ta so bad that a referee was needed to 'nterpret them On the contrary, the Gamesmaster element was lhe greatest strength of the lole-playlng concept, a formal sharing 01 the game development process With lhe game player We ,II SPI wel~ Tramed to conSider tha t SOrt 01 sharing only as the Inevl lable result 01 IrresponSible error Ie, "errate"l, and therelore IPSO facto "bad" And the fac t thaI the early rules were poor allowed us to maintain this misconception for a considerable lime But not any longer Brad Hessel

Works in Progress Do not OHler these games In advance ollhe<r

pobllCatlon antlOuncementln S&T

Dragonslayer Dragonsia'(8r IS SPl's Iltst open-ended role­

playIng game It IS se t In a lanlaSy world, WIth a quasI High M,ddle Ages European background M8glC IS a part of every-day eXiStence, and all sorts of fantas tiC creatures roam the countryside. Char actelS begin Wi thout skillin the ails 01 magic and melee comUat, and seek to gain fame and fortune whIle /lSk,ng Therr lives. IllS a hard fl Klslenca, but the rewards ala greal

The rules are structured 10 Introduce novICe .QIe-ptay8!S 10 a new game form Fltsl 15 a Slnpped-down verSIOn of the combat system. so thaI veleran wargamers may latch onto somethIng famllra., and nov1C8 garners may begIn WIth somethrng Simple Two essayS on the concepts 01 role-plaYing and gamesmaSlerrng follow, whrch are really eKtended designer's no tes Marketing

$(JlVeys show that such nOles are popular. and they WIll help to explaIn a radrcally dlUerenl game form 10 tho unInitiated Though the IUIes and pro­cedureswlli beas streamlined as posstble, they are bemg designed to appeal to lhe eKperreoced .00e­player

A character's phySICal and mental capabllrtres 8re defined by a serres of values known as ctrarac-18nstics. A player generates these charactenstrcs, construcllng a personalrzed character In Dragon­slayer. the player rollS dice 10 generate a total bet­ween 82 and 98 He may then assign these points to any of SlK prrmary charac terrst,cs (so-called because the player chooses each value). At leas t 5 POints must be placed In each characte/lstJC. and the hlghef the character's polnltotat, the Iowet hiS maximum characteristIc may be. Thefefore. a charact81 With a high POint total IS more Irkely to be II I8ck-of-atHrades, whrle a character Wi th a low point total Will probably take advantage of hIS higher charactefistlC ceiling, and become gl fled In one capabilrW· The SIX prrmary characl81lsltcs are 8S follows

• I'hyslcal Stun,/h: A measure 01 a character's muscle coordination and strength A high value WIll increase tho damage done on an opponent in melee, and Will allow Ihe Character to perform gfeat feats of strength

• Manual Drxtrri,)': A measure of the dIgital con­trol a characler possesses A high value Increases the character's chance of slIlklng an opponent (WIth miSSIle or melee weapon), Increases hIS parry chances, and allows lhe Character to perform those tasks requiting fancy 100\ or hand work

• Axilit)': A mea$(Jre of a character's body con-1101 and the speed 8t which he moves A high value

makes Ihe character a dlfflcul l largello st"ke In combat, Increases the speed at whICh he moves. and allows lhe character conSIderable aptitude '" those skIlls rnvolvlng body movement

• Endurancr: A measure 01 the pUnishment a char3Cl8!'S body can sustarn before the charactBf becomes UncOnscIOUS, IS mOflally wounded, o. does A hIgh value. of course, allows tho ch8ractel to SUSt81n more damage and rndlC81es a healthl8r and hlghlV recuper8trve na ture

• MUlkal Aptirudr: A measure of a character', ab'lt ty to harf"l8ss and control magical energies. A high value Increases a character's chance of castrng a spell successfully and reduces the amount of learntng \lrna necessary before use of a spell

• Mrnral IJisclplinr: A measure of a chalacter', contrOl OV8! hIS own mind (or wdll and body A hrgh value allows the character to restst spells more often (smce magrc dltected agamSl a sen­toent Target requites the ImpoSItion 01 tho caster's Will upon the t8rget'sl, and to perform acts border­ing on the SUICidal The laSt IS necessary because a human's Will to su rvive IS far st ronger than that of a player whose character has not amounted to much so f8r

In addrttOn to lhese SlK charactetfStICS, all characters eKhlblt at least two secondary characteristICS

• filtlxur: A measure 01 the degree to which 8 charact8! may e~ert hImself. The e~pendlture of fa tigue IS requited to cast spells Gef"l8rally. 8 char­actel Will e~haust hiS 'a\lgue before hi' endurance is affected

ADVANCE ANNOUNCEMENT

Eric Goldberg'.

KURSK History's Greatest Tank Battle

Kursk was the battle that decided the Eastern Front war. will acquire a wealth of inro rma tio n as a result. The map is the most highly detailed study or the terrain and man-made features in the bailie area, and is complemented by the mOSt accurate division·level Order or Baltle to be found outside or the USSR_

The desperate defense in front o f Moscow in late 1941 and the annihilation of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad in late 1942 are accorded larger places in popular histories, but neither was as awesome in scope or as conclusive in result as Kursk, which en­sured that Germany, once master of the blitzkrieg, would no longer take the offensive in the Soviet U nion.

Most military disasters from the pages of history result from poor planning or d octrine; the battle of Kursk was no exception, The Soviet s, fully aware of German plans, had constructed six lines of entrenchments and had more troops than the Germans could muster. Still, the Germans very nearly achieved a breakthrough before being repulsed by the Soviet reserves during a climactic tank battle near Pro kho rovka.

Kursk examines this crit ical bailie from a new perspe(:ti\oe. Players will be able to sec the historical lessons of that battle and

Kursk is not only an in valuable tool for the historian, bUI a challenge ror t he military gamer as well , A player chooses which posture he wishes his units to assume, through which line he wishes to conduct an attack, and which criteria to fulrill for vic­lOry. Every important aspect of the batlle is recreated : the air war will be waged; the Soviet partisa ns will bedevil German logistics: the e nt renchments will prove a formidable defense line; the Ger­man armor reserve will be crucial to victory.

The Kursk package includes an allractive 2r x 34- map, 600 full-color counters, 32 pages of rules and historical informa· tion, and two large deployment displays, Kursk represents a new approach to t he Eastern Front , that is certain 10 spark the in­terest or any simulation gamer.

Kursk will sell for $15 Available from SPI and in stores nationwide 28 March 1980

15

16

• "uctpt/()n: A measure of 11 character's IfllUition based on his eXptlrlences. A char<lcter's abili ty 10 ant,eipa1e ambushes, 10 aVOid social gaffes In alien cullums, and 10 correc tly guess the Intentions of strangers IS somewhat dependent upon the Perception value

A ll characters begm with a fixed value lor Ihe above tWO characterostlcs They can be increased as the resu lt of expeditions. There IS one op1l0nal characteriStiC'

• Physico! Rt uu/)': A measure of II character's at­tractiveness 10 a member of hiS own race II

players decide to use Ihls characteristic, liS usages are obVIOUS

A charac ter is not necessarily 01 Ihe human race. When a player generales hiS character. he must declare whether he IS attempting \0 be of another race. A percentage chance is listed for each race, the player must roll equal to or less than the given number 10 be 01 thai race. If the player farls to have a character of a certam race, he may make up to two moro altempts to be of a drfferent race Ithough once the roll for a particular race is missed, the character may no/ be of that race) . If a character is non·human. It wrll cosilha t character a greater number of Experience Pomts to progress m any skill m return for immedIate advantages. Thus. Ihe player of a vampire character Will, m all likelihood, be the most power/ul when play begins. but. after e.tended play. should be sur· passed by human characters

Since a player IS assumed to have a character aged abOUltwant'( years. the character IS presum­ed to have occupiad himself somehow m the prev,ous score of years. ThiS IS reflected In the amount 01 money and number of Experience Points wllh which the character begms. These, 111

turn, are affected by the order in which the character was born. and the parents to which the character was born. Needless to say. the bastard son or daughter of poor trash w ill be low on funds, but high on e.pellence, after years of lendmg for himself

The oblecl of a ro le-plaYing game. if there can be said to be one, IS to Improve a character's capa­bilities. E.perlence, which IS gamed as the result 01 characler performance dUling e.pedltions, is e.­pended in return for gams in pa'rtlcular abill\ies A SChedule IS gIVen for the COSt to increase each ability; II costs more, for e.ample, 10 improve a character's fa tigue than II does to Improve his pro· liclency With a weapon.

Knowmg the tendenCies of role-players, the combat system IS a very Important pan of the deSign. The aClion takes place on a he.grld A Character has an allotment 01 Action POlnlS. and undertakes hiS actIons by e~pendmg them One can cast a spell, swmg, file a miSSile weapon, change weapons, hurl a weapon, move, fall prone. aSIde from any e~tra ab,htles granted the In· dlvldual character

Combat IS resolved by determining the percentage chance to hit the target character Each weapon IS rated for Its base chance of stnk· ing an opponent when Wielded by a competent frghter This number Will be modif ied by, among other thmgs, the Rank which the atlacker has at­tained Wi th the weapon, the manual dextell ty 01 the attacker, the agility of the defender, and con­dit ion of both's Endurances These modifiers are added (or subtracted) from the base Chance to give a f inal strike percentage. The attacking player rolls percentile dice Iglvlng a rango from 1 to 100); If the resultmg number IS equal to or less than that percemago, the target character has been struck.

When a character IS struck, ha Wi ll lose Faltgue Points, and then Endurance POints Fallgue POints reprasen t the minor cuts, brUiseS and bashes a Character can take before he suffers seliOUS phySical Injury When the last 01 II

character's Fatigue POints is eliminated, the char acter begins to lose Endurance POints. If the char ­acter IS reduced to exaclly zero Endurance POints, he IS knoded unconscIous; II reduced below zero, he becomes grievously injured. A rather ghoulish grievous injury chart describes in detail what hap­pens to unfortunate characters

E.traordinary results can occur as a result of e.treme rOllS. If the roll IS one-temh that needed to strike the targe t, the damage Infhcted IS upon En­durance POints, even If there are Fatigue Pomts re­mainlng. lf the roll is one-Il ftieth that needed to hit the target, a grievous injury IS scored upon the target. If the roll is extremely high (dependent upon the targe t'S Parry Rank), the attacker has been pamed, which can result m the attacker be· mg struck, weapons being broken, etc.

Combat is a very bloody allall, and so players who Wish long-lived characters Will refrain from melee whenever pOSSible. The Inlent 01 the deSign is to domonstrate that only the Incompetent role· player constantly seeks combat IWl!h apologies to Conan the Barbaflanl. Any combat whIch involves ten or fewer characters should take under an hour, which prevenlS a smgle combat from comprrSlng the whole e.pedl tlon

The cynosure of a fantasy role-plaYing game IS always the magic system. The system used m Dragonsldyer requ ires construc tion of spells by the players and the gamesmaster. Spells are cata· gomed by what they affect: the Inammate, the in­tangIble, and Irving entilles These categofles refer to the subject of a spell In liS natural state. a lOm· ble, for mstance, would be conSidered an In­animate subtect. because it IS a magically animated dead body ,

A spell IS made up of components and modi fiers. The component!s) IS the subject or the stale to which the subJect IS to be changed. The modlfrer Identifies the actlonlsl being performed upon thesubject(s). The Inanimate spell "Preserve and Enchant Glass" IS made up of two modifiers (Preserve, Enchan\f and 01 one component IGlass) Similarly, the inanimate spell "Transform Water to Wood" contains one modifier !Trans­form) and twO components IWater, Wood)

The advantage of the spell generation system IS the staggering number 01 spells Ihat can be con­structed The disadvantage IS that Individual spells mUSI be defined as part of the gamesmaster's tasks. A set of gUidelines are prOVided to narrow Ihe range in which a spell may vary. For example. a Spell IS strictly limited in what it can do toa sentient bemg A series of conventions mitigate against "crocks" (spells which are overly power/uil and improper use of magic. Of course, as wllh al l role­playmg games, the games master may decide to re-define the rules on spells, but he does so al hiS own risk.

A charac ter's control over a spell IS measured by hiS Rank With the spell. This directly controls the effect of a spell - Preserve and Enchant Glass 1 could crea te a serviceable mirror for a journey while Preserve and Enchant Glass 9 could cream a glass pr ison - and the duration of the spel l The Rank also modi fies the character's chance of suc· cessuflly caSling a spell

A spell must be cast successfully to take ef­lecl. Each learned spell has 25% chance of being cas t successfuliy at Rank O. ThiS may be modified by the character's Magical Apll tude Iwhlch presumably IS high if he Wishes to specialize m magic), the conditions under which the spell IS cas t !'lIS not clever to attempt a spell on conse­crated ground!. and Ihe Rank which the character has attained w ith the spell. A spell may back file, w ith all sortS of appropriately disastrous results, or a highly successful cast may resu lt In the gain of Expenence POintS to be applied dllectly to that spell If a spell is successful or falls Wi thout

backf lle, the charactel attempting spell caSt mUSt expend fatigue. This hmits the number ofaltempts whIch may be made during a given day. •

1/ a spell IS successfully cast at a target sen' tienl being, tha t being may attempt to resist the spell A character's resistance IS determined from hiS Mental DISCipline characterlsllc, and may be modified if any E.penence Points have been m­vested Into magiC resis tance Should the target reSist, the spel l has no effect; If the target falls to reSiSt, Ihe spell's effect is applied In full If the largot is mammate or intangible, there IS usually no chance for reSISlance, unless the spell attempts somethrng excepllonaily difficu lt. like convertrng fire to water

MagiC IS not an easy an to plactrce In the wOllds of Dragonsfayer MagiC representS a con travenuon of the natural phys.callaws The mage uses manna ~ t he stuff 01 magiC) to suspena these laws temporarr ly, and these laws are not IIghlly superseded

The presence of great amounts of manna allows lor the eXistence of superberngs, eqUivalent to mythological gods. These superbelngs have learned to Channel manna In a highly eff lcl8nl lashlon. They are worshipped by mOl1ats liS gods, ana thelf power IS measured by the number of devotees who plly them homage A dei ty's power IS sustained by behef

A character Will choose a dei ty when he begrns play He Will choose to whllt degree he follows hiS god's precepts, and thiS Will 10 turn af­fect the Character's chance 01 receiving aid from hiS god In limes of need A character may choose to become a priest of his god, but thiS will Impose a conSiderable number 01 restrlClions upon that character. A Pllest Will be able to function as any other character, and Will receive Improvements to some spells related 10 hiS god's aUfibutes. How­ever, a pr iest Wi ll aahere stnctly to dogma, which Will resu lt 10 uncom lor tabia situat ions if the rest of the party IS not of hke mind.

All sentient beings that are not controlled by a player are known as non-player characters (or NPC's) NPC's are generally controlled by the gamesmaster, unless one has a close lie Wllh one of Ihe characters Even In the latter case, the games master may always take control of the NPC: no player may have fu ll conlrol over more than one character at a time NPC's Include whal are generrc­ally known as monSters 10 other fantasy ro le­plaYing games.

The beasts that charac ters are likely to meet are descnbed by a se t of characterrstlcs Similar to those 01 the player characters. Intelligence IS the most Important Single fea ture' II determrnes whether a NPC can cast spells Ithough certain creatures have an innate ablhty to "cast" a particu lar spalll Creatures are then ra ted by therr combat abilities, thell magic resistance, ana the hkelrhood of them possessing any loot. Each char­acteriStiC for a crea ture IS given ill a range A player charac ter Will be unable 10 determine whether he has encountered a weak or Slrong member of a particular species until his Perception rncreases.

MagiC Items ale quite valuable possess,ons, Firstly, they allow the use of magiC wilhout back· fire A magic Item Will augmenl a par1y's magic capabi lIty, Increase a character's chance of Survl ' val, and prOVide rn formallon These can be pur· chased at exhorb,tant pllces, galnea In return for services rendered, or fi lched or taken by force from thell right ful owner. A magic !lem represents a pre-determmed focus of manna Within a phySical object.

MagiC Items are assessed In terms of pOin t values. If a creature is killed Ihat possesses a magiC !lem(sl, the gamesmaster Will be given a point total from which to conStrUCt U1e Item Three factors determme the total value 01 a magic

Ilem one. the object In whICh 11 IS contained ithe e<lSIef 1115 10 utilize the lIem, the hrghef the cost !. the number 01 limes II can be used, end the magICal elleet the nam has. SOffill IIams have II Ilxed number of charges I, 8., usesl. while o thers may be used mdellMalv. bUI have II percentage chance of falluro whenever used In Hie ~tter case, the number of charges 10 which e po,nt value IS escltbed ,s determined by the 8)(Pf/C1OO number of Charges. A schedule w,lI be provided lor those whO do nOl wish 10 le-Ieam probabilities

Charactars can acquire slllils as they venture 1hroogh the world A skill can be anything from thIeVing 10 linguIStic abdlty Characters eCQl.me II skill at Rank 0, and can, as usual, Increase lhelr Pfohcleocy through rhe eXJlUIlCMure oj bpenence POIniS ar'Ki utlhzatlon of the 51011. Each Rank 018 skill allows the chalecler some naw ability within thai skill A character can do qune well by concen· tratmg entlroly on s~llls. ond .gnormg combat and magic related abi litieS

Oragons/ayor IS currently being read,ed fOI blmdtest, so edenSlVe development work IS Stili to come The mechanics descnbed above Will un­doubtedlY be greatly modified by the time the fmal product 15 available thiS summer However, the Ideas themselves give good md,catlon 01 the design ,ntent 111 characters should not be reSlnct ed to a PIIf\lCular class, (21 the game reqUires a gamesma~ter, (3) the ru~ are Intended to be modlhoo to Indlyldual tastes. and (41 Ihe game should appeal to the emry-Ievel role-player These Should combme to make Dmgons/ayer one of the bast second generation role-plaYing games

The plavers Will be provided with much sup port millorlal. including concise ly orgal1lzed charts and a characler sheet Tho rules Will be laVishly

Scimce fk:tion and fanlUY imeract wilh simulation pmina to briq: you a totally new mqazinc tltper~. Every bbnoalhly iIIue' of .. m. cludes an oriaiuI wort of fiction pramlcd U a compIet:c .... "'. fealure lenath stories and uticles, reviews of til media. aDd Om qudlY dcsip., ar-phics, and illuslration.

~" is now availOlc in stora and specially shops DIIlionwide, with: .",..., simuW.iD& a planet's desperate defense qainsl a -.. ........ ratimtbipo •. . Da .......... M. Lude Chin's aa:own of a 211t ccn.lUIy IIIUI'S ..... eniaI i:D .. ancieat iaad where cIntaGas IlI'C more thaa myth ••• a.C5 .... Hcnrit NordIic's .. of CODfIict bctwcea two IfOCIPI with yay dlffercat interest ill the futUR of Buth ••. __ .. _-.. ..... _ __ "'.0 .......... thcDOtic:.:aoftravei tollle ...... .mvtnaatlOlllCP i "lsIc cnacbllioDl.

Alwft wm ' ..... : Jar. ... "'file,... ..... a ..... ~1UI'e in which pIQa:J vic 10 wrest control of tbdr d ....... II**hip from daI ure fonm before the ....... _, ..... Jar. 11M., Mb:.,. a.t. Richard Lyoa ud Aadrcw Offuu's IICCOUOI of ...... iq priDce iD lands of terrible endwntwnt .. c.-.: · 1'1 • .atI ....." L Spo .... '" c.ap M ..... the _oIeo-a, .... -. .. ...... _, ... ..-....... -.... "..-..,---........ oIber.--. ...-01_ ......... __ _ ud_.bookud_ ........ ud ___ . _ ,,..(fIIr_JU. .. ,_m_,,,, • ..... _u. ..

and completely .lIustrated The package Will also Include a map, under 100 COUnt91'S, and dice And It Will sell for under ten dollars

We intend Orsgonslayeras an Inuoducllon to role-plaYing We believe that I( willmlroduce peo­ple who have never e~penonced hobby gaming to the hobby In a way that Will encourage them to stay Wi th us. We beheve that it Will ,ntroduce peo­ple who have never Hied rola"plaYlng to that genre In a fashion that IS conSistent With the sort o f ru les and mechanical ral!onahty and lucidity one generally expectS from SPI And finally. we an­tICipate tha i DragOll$/ayer Will Ir'Itroduce SPI to a dlflerent approach, one ,ha, Will e~pandand d,VOT­slly our abIlity 10 publish Simulations

Eric Goldberg

Greal Battles from the American Civil War. Vol, J: The BailIe oj Wilsorl's Creek

The phono JS nnglrlg I'm In bed, I can't get up The bed is covered With manuscnpl pages. counter manllests. maps. Counters, Clgarelle bullS, garbage from the doh, etc Someone knocks at the door I go !O Wille some hasty notes but can', find any Pllpel • turn to Wille on the wall but the wall IS totally covered With scubb!es and proolreader markS At least SI.teen VOICeS break In

wnh rules questions I wake up That dream IS not very far from the reahty of

the paS! tWO monthS. or SO l\ seems. eight solid weeks spent In the SPI play test rooms at mid­night. With dice clenChed In one hand. note pad In the other, muttering to mysolf Bul , fmally, Ihe firs t tWO volumes o f the prOJect, which has been vanouslv known as the TSSISlonewall PrOtoct.

aro Imrshed, and at chIS wrillng learly Jan I Wind Ing their way through the Art Department

The prOJect IS now offiCially known as GrOat Banles from the AmerICan CIVil Wer All games are based on RIChard Berg's Terrible SWifl Sword syStem Each game Will have one standard map and TWO hundred coun te. s, and Will be marketed In SPl's ne ..... packaglf1g format - a ona Inch bo~ With no counter tray

Volume 3, WI/son's Creek,whlch was design­ed by Richard Wnght !hls l irst game lor SPI), IS schedule<! for pubhcallOn In S8TfYJ tne~t ,ssue) Other games current,y under conslder3110n In­clude Cedar Mountain, BrlCO'S Crossroads, Bel­mont. and New Market

Volumes 1 and 2 of Great Batlles 01 the AmerICan CIVil War are Dnve on Washmg/Off -/lle Battle of Monocacy Junc1l0n, and Pea Ridge. Pea Ridge was probably the mOSllmportant bailie In ihe Trans MrsslssrppI, ending forever Confeder­ate hopes 01 secuflng M'SSOUfi The Batlle o f Monocacy Junction occurred during Jubal Early's ra id on Washington In 1864 Monocacy Junction ..... as probably one 01 the mOSt ImpOftant "un­known" battles 01 the C,v,l War The fact that the battle was lought at all was a strategIC UnIOn VIC' tory The UnIOn force at Monocacy Junction was the rora/defense of Washlf19ton al the time 01 the battle II the bailie had not been lought lhe COn federates woold have undoubtedly been able to burn and sac~ Wash,ngton The destructIOn 01 Washington ..... ould have boon of II\IIe military value by 1864 but ..... ould have had Immense politi' cal conseQuences lor lincoln, coming as II did In an election year The ....... hat Ifs" boggle the mrnd

Both games ha~(1 boen Imansely play· tes te<! Ene Smith, my co-developer, and I went full bore

17

18

for two monthS. We play-tested the games 51)( days a week lsometlmes seven) With one 01 Ihe besl corps of play testers ever assembled at SPI Without thelf help and ellort we would never have gotten the two games finished on lime

When Enc and I walked Into this project It seemed simple and straightforward We were to develop the two games simultaneously, and since Ihe system already eXisted fin fact the TSS system IS an award winning system), 1\ was supposed to be a piece of cake

Soon aher Eric and I gal down 10 work 1\ was like a bomb went all, With alarm Signals everywhere

The nQubla was tho\ there were no standard ru les. We had \0 cull and boll·down ambiguous and con tradictory rules from three different games (Terrible Swifl Sword, Slonewulf, and Bloody Apnfl to find some sound body of standard rules Ihal can SUppoll an as yel limitless number of games in the Great Baules of the American Civil War series.

Our problems could baSically be broken down Into two groups: problems we discovered in the system llsel f; and problems we had In trying to for· mat a Standard set of rules that was functional and fleXible

Most of the problems we had were of the se­cond kind. The TSS system as Richard Berg designed It IS very good and fun to play, but it was deSigned for a specific SlluatlOn - Gettysburg. Most of the difficulties we had were In making concise standard rules Ihal could be used In as many and vaned Situations as posslbla.

We hope WI~Son'S Creek w,11 beat us out in our belief that we've taken a good system and made it a httle better by clean,ng ,t up and stream­lining 11 .

FollOWing, I am gOing to presenl reade!s w, th a fairly detailed descnpl,on of WI~son's Creek as 01 stands al thiS stage of developmenl

I remember the debate during Ihe sta ff meeting In which we discussed the new, longer formal for progress reports The two main points of conientlon were that 50mB staffers were a IIule leery of giVIng away "state secrets" and some were afraid that readers would be disappOinted if everything in a progress report didn't find its way Into the f in, shed game. Concerning the firs t pOint. I have no WOHoeS; very few gamers are unfamiliar Wi th the TSS sysem. About the second pOint I am a bi t concerned Wi/son·s Creek IS In the very earliest stages of development. and I want readers to be aware Ihal the things und(;', diSCUSSion here are the very first frUits of d(. ~ Iopment and are subject to heavy reviSion

The TSS games In pllnt were all des'gned before work on Volumes 1 and 2 had begun. One 01 the problems we ran smack ,nto Wi th Pea Ridge and Dnve on Washington were the LOS rules. Gettysburg. Shiloh and even Kernstown are relallvely f lat areas. We felt that the rules lor higher terram 10 TSS/SlonewalllBlorxfy April were makeshi ft at best

Now the terram at Monocacy Junction and even Pea Ridge is pretty Uat too. but we surmised that some of the games In the selles would have pretty rugged terra," When I first saw the Wilson's Creek map, I had a sneaking suspicion Ihat we had a battlef ield that was rugged enough to SUIt even the most hard core grog nard

The hrst thing I did was to try to make a proto­type map. editing the deSigner's onginal map to fit the new line of Sight rules we had hammered oul. My naive hope that the area 01 Wilson's Creek was more Of less flal las the deSigner's map mdlcated) proved to be totally unfounded That f irst map had some preuy wend terram. 10 say the least 0 1 course, the lactthat the whole area IS wooded on­ly added to the fun. Fmally, I gave up. Either the

deSigner des'gned a map of an area that had been hl1 by an earthquake. though fla ! . Of I was trymg to shove a round peg into a square hole

Ne~t I got some Survey maps of the area and Lol Just as I suspected - the area was Incredibly convoluted. The area 01 lhe battle field IS actually two ridge-hili masses With W ilson's Creek meandenng In a gully 10 the center 0 1 the map bet­ween the twO ridge masses

The whole area IS a shifting mass of eleva­t ions With no more Ihan five congruent hexes at the same elevation. The elevation di fference between ground zero and the highest elevation !S 200 + leet, With woods covenng the whole For fans of TSS thiS is somethmg new

I had the survey map blown up and made an elevation key from it which I transferred leIter three aborted effortsl to a blank he~ sheet

The map should be loads of fun for the Art Department. Every hex is color coded for eleva­tion, besides bemg a woods hex )well, not qUi te every hex is woodsl , not to mention vanous mfor­mat,on on the hexsldes. Lucki ly RAS cons,ders thiS map a bit of a challenge and promises something new

Readers might l ind II interestmg to know that woods hexes don't block LOS for artillery, and they block LOS for small-arms only slightly (Units can fire through woods hexesl We tiled somethmg like thiS m Pea Ridge With twO flavors of woods - light and heavy. Theworkmg term for woods 10 Wilson's Creek is ·'brush"

At this pomt I'm pretty happy With the map, but there are st ill a few bugs to iron out. Each hex is color coded for lIS elevalJon, so we·ve done away w'th cres t hexsldes per se, as It would be superfluous Where two hexes of differing eleva­tion meet the congruent he~side. there is a ··crest" hexs,de. Each elevation level represents an eleva­tion difference of 35 feet. We slill have some mfor­mation on the hexsides for sleep crests and IIdges There IS an extra movement penalty lor crossmg such hexsldes. In the f inal version, artillery Will probably not be allowed to traverse steep creSIS or ridge hexs,des.

The problem I·m Sllil havmg With the map is the "wedding cake" effect. The vallous eleva­t ions, With the LOS rules as they now stand, repre­sent an area With plateaus. and Ihis IS, I believe, quite inaccurate. The area in Missouri around Wilson's Creek IS more gently slopmg lalbelt With many slopes) than ndge-like. How thiS translates mto game mechaniCS IS that units silt ing back off a crestline can't "see" to fire at Units allower eleva­tions. because the crestline blOCks LOS ThiS forces UnitS 10 511 on the cres tllnes 10 order to have an all around held of fire . Units back from a crest lme can fire al umtS on higher elevatiOns only If the target Uni t IS also on a crestline. All thiS gLves a very arti fiCial aspect to the game. and neither the designer nor I am qUlle happy With the LOS ru les as Ihey now stand

I'm huddling Wi th vartous staffers here and feel cor fident we'll solve thiS problem. The tenain ensures an mterestmg place for a battle

Tilis brings us to the nexi major problem With the game, and agam it has nothing to do With Richard's deSign When EriC and I gOt Into the \lrSt two games. the area that absorbed mOSt of our aI­tention (besides cleaning up the system Itselll was the command Structure rules or lack of rules.

In TSS/StonewaIlIBIood'I April officers above brigade level were just extra chrome With no real game function other than extending brigade off icers· Effectiveness Ranges and rallying units They were like super br igade officers. All the previous games could be played Wi thout diVISion. corps or army commanders Each bngade operated like an ,ndependent brigade. Eric and I cast around for some means to integrate officers

above bngade level Into the baSIC fabllc of the game.

We finally came up With something called DiviSlonallntegrllY Divisional lntegnty IDU works very eaSily; each Bngade Commander must be withm SO many hexes of his Division Commander leach DiviSion Commander IS rated for Dil In the Inl\fal Command Phase A Bngade Commandel outside of his Division Commander's DI range may only move one hex in the Movement Phase . The regiments of a bngade whose Brigade Com­mander IS outside 01 DI may continue to function normally ThiS rule Simulates the tendency 01 brigades that don·t ·'recelve·· orders to go "dead lit the stick." They sort of iust stand around ThiS IS now standard for Great Battles of the Amencan CiVil War games

There IS doctrine that allows players to detach bngades and create "Independent" bngades With varying effects dependmg on the partICular ex­clUSive rules for the vallous games

Players Will f ind that the varying command structures are mterestmg and very important In the play of the games. for e~ample, m Dn'1I6 on Washington the Union command structure is very loose (to reflect the nature of the hastily assembl­ed Union forcel. In fact. one of the Union brigades was no brigade at all and has two '·Bngac:ie Com­manders."' All thiS allows the Union player great freedom in the game. The Confederates on the other hand have a very different sltuallon. The Confederate forces were tightly structured Into diVISions. and the presence of the corps com · mander IEarly) is very Important m the play of the game.

In Pr=a Ridge the Union command structure IS again loose (though not as loose as in Drive on Washmgron) The Union over ·all commander IS not even inCluded In Ihe counter -miX - the Union player IS the Union commander The Conlederate command IS again very t ight, m lac! the t lghtesl of any Side 10 all the games so far The Confederates musl ~eep a tight diVISion structure. Though the Confederates have the capacity to detach a bllgade or two, any brigade designated as detach­ed 'ncurs a decrease 10 morale Furthermore when a Confederate officer IS killed. he IS very dlff,cult 10

replace. Needless to say. Ihis has a great effect on the play 0 1 the game

In Wilson's Creek the Union Command situa­tion IS not as open ended as in, say, Drive on WashmglOn, but illS very clean. The Union force consists 01 one large diVision under General Lyons With the capacity to create one mdepandent brigade lunder Sigel) The Independent bngade suffers no III effects for bemg mdependent

The Confederate command Structure is very different. The Confederate force IS composed of two diVISions; one of Confederate regulars under McCulloch. and the other of Missouri Militia (the Missouri StatB Guardl under Pllce Pllce and Mc · Cul loch hated each other; accordingly troops of nei ther diVISion may stack: or ml\fate melee together

McCulloch, beSides being a diVISion com­mander. doubles as a bngade commander. which shou ld be very mteresllng. If McCullOCh should die hiS replacement should be smooth (though there is a one game-turn delay In replaCing officers. for both players) while If Pllce should die It could be very difficult to replace him This brmgs us to the play 01 the game

The Banle of Wilson's Creek bears SUperfiCial compaflson to the Battle of Shiloh In both ballies the numerically mferlor force surprised the larger force encamped. Both battles were a close thing In both bal tles Ihe attacking side lOSt their over-al l commander In both ball ies the aHacklng Side lost the bat tle Though the Confederates won the bat-

/<WLrl~ostd ow J1ClltZQI

~ Strategy & Fantasy World

Centers for Wargamer, Fantasy Gamer

and Miniaturist Six centers for the wargamer and fantasy buff, each store convenientlylocateci in or adjacent to a ma}or metrolpolitan area- and each organized as a one-stop shopping center fOT oyur gaming needs and requirements.

Strategy and Fantasy Worlds feature :

• Military and Fantasy Games - a wide selection - new and standard - bestselling and "hard-to-find"

• Military and Fantasy Miniatures

• Military and Fantasy Accessories and Magazines

• Military and Fantasy Books - history, reference, wargaming -includes a full choice from the country's leading military publisher ...

Valley Forge Shopping Center King of Prussia. Pa. 19406 Tel. 215-265-8562

505 Cathedral Street Baltimore, Md. 21201 Tel. 301-751-8268

102 Massachusetts Avenue Boston, Mass. 02115 Tel. 617-267-2451

Colonial Arcade 530 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115

103 East Broad Street Falls Chur ch, Va. 22046 Tel. 703-532-2477

Croasdaile Shopping Center 1821 Hillandale Road Durham, N.C. 27705 Tel. 919-383-4766

19

20 OUTGOING MAil /<'tHIlmwdf __ /lfJ~I"

tie. they have thel! work cuI out lor them In the

""" The Conl9deune fOlce Slaf1S the game en-camped and spl6ad 00\ TYPically. brigade com­manders lire relauvely far away Irom some of their units Even without the encampment rules the Confederelss have II hard IIIne organwng the'l trooPS; the encampment rules onlv add 10 the Conledenlte chaos For players ol8/oody Ap,,/Ihe Idea of "encampment" IS nothing new However. 10 Wilsoo's Creek the encampmelll rules have I,tlie resemblance to lhoseused ,n 8100dyApni At this wrnmg here's what we've cooked up all Con­fedefate unus Slarllhegame encamped, unns thaI IIle encamped must pay so many movement POints 10 assume II lormauan Encamped units all!

always conSIdered enfiladed lor purposes of fore Encamped Units may not assume a formation len­camped uMS may neither move Of fuel unlll they've been alened The Confederates IIII! alerted In ono 01 three ways: (11 If any ConfederalO unit "sees" II Union uM, all Confederale unllS arB alened; 12) II any Conledera te Unit IS !ired upon a/l Confederate UMS are alerted, (3) lhe Conlederate Player tries to alert hiS unllS In the Inllial Command 01 each 01 hIS player turns by rolling on the Con­federate Aler! Table Tho Confederate A lert Table IS a sliding scale ma~ing II very d.I!tcull for the Confederates to be alerted tn thIS way early In the game and a Imle eaSier as the game goes on

The Un.on play9f has all the tnlllalive early on In the game. The Un.on player can enler the map In any ooe of 10000r wtdely 5Ca"ered he-.:es for two duectlons II he detaches Sigel) 01 course the Conlederale player has no Idea Irom which duec· ttOn the blow wtll fall

If the Unoon player .ssmart he WIll use the fltst three or four game-turns to maneuver hiS force while lhe Confederates sleep As long as the Con­federates are unaterted they have no playeHurn ThIS prOVISIon, lagathar WIth the rela\!Vely small number of game-turns USI, makes the game ac· tually playable In one four-hour 511loOg

In actual playlngs so far, lhe game seems to be vef)' balanced Though the UntOn force!s out numbered two to one, With the IMtal deployment and alert rules, the Union player can r&<llly make hay when he smashes tnto ,the Confederates Ifrom wherever he choosesl In the last two playlr1gs we'lle had II marginal Confederate victory and a dectslve Union victory

The bookkeeping ,n the game IS mlr1lmal We've decided not to use Brigade Combat Effec­tiveneSS !n WI/son's Cleek Ithough th,s IS ont:' of the things that mtght be changod In the fmal vel 510n - youcand0810tofthlng5w.thpI8Vb8Ia~

by USIng BCE) At thiS pOlr1tlhe only bookkoollong plavers wtll have to dO'5 kecplr1g track 01 ammunl t,on and casualties

Another thlr1g we·re tOYing wlth!S the ammo Sltuallon There are no supply wagons In the game lor &I1her player, so ammo deplel,on Will be a lev lactor 10 thegarrt4l What we're thlnk,ng 01 dOIng IS finding a syslem 01 koopm9 ammo deplelOd'e rOllS a secret I, seems odd wneo un,ts run around largo re~Jlfnents wnh Impumly when they know the regI­ment .S 01.11 of ammo We'll see how that goes

We're lliso consldeung uSll'lg dummy or blan~ counters (lor lhe Un,on) At thiS parnl I really can't say how th.s w,1I work out, and I can't promISe II wtll be m the IInished game, but II would be nlceat Jeast as an opllonal lule Of COurse, a lOt depends on the counler miX and whether we'll have room for twenty o. so blank counters

The game IS fun to play and should be" real "playe!'s" game Thllt's the most ImporHlnt thmg tome I'm p.clled about tMgame, andesa gamcr mysel f I'm tOOKlng forward to all the Great Baulas of the Amencan C,v,l Wa! games all Richard IBerg), what hastthouc.efJI{!d1 Thom{lsHudson

The follOWing lis t Includes all unpublished non-S& T prOjects CtJrrently be,ng worked on, The IIS\lng for each game Includes the title, subJect, designer, develope., and a one word descllpt'on of the CUffenl SlatuS of the game These deSCflP uons .nclude Design Ilhe game'5 currently belr1g designed); Develop (the game 15 being teSled either hele at SPI or by outSIde bllndtCSlers under lhe watchful eye 01 a member 01 the R&D Stalil. Edit (developmenl work on the game IS com­pleted, at least In the oPIniOn 01 the developer, and the game IS be"lOg checked OUt by d,Slnterested R&D Stallers herel. A D (the game IS being graphically created at SPI by the Art Departmenll. P.oduc:;t ion tthe game IS beIng pllnted. d,e-cut, Ioided, COllated, or whatever!

Acros.. Sun (Egyptians vs Israelis, 1973) Herman! Jervis & Hessel AO

Again5t four World1 1SF mterstellar war! Hessel & Simonsen/Hessel Develop Biondtest Report In MOVES 50 Air Cn Imodern helic:;opter combatl Memdy/ Rl lchle. Develop

Banlt of Austrrllt l lloo·counter g8me on Napoloomc bail ie!. Ritch ie/Ri tchie Develop Rall it O~·tr IIril.in ISpll(ores vs Me· I 09·s, 1940) Buttefleld/Butterfleld. Develop

lIaseball lstatlsllcally-based profesSional baseball game) Berg/Berg AD

lI.fIIt for Sti llngl"ld 11942 bat1le for the Volga cllyl H,II/Bullerl leld Producllon

Barb.rilln Kings (swords aoo sorcery on 8 mythical Island conUnent) Costlkyan/eOSllkyen Oevelop

Ctntl"ll front IQuad concern,ng attack by SOVl8t

Union In Western Europel Dunnigan/?_ Desogn

Dl"Igonsl.}tr [fantasy role-plaY"'9 gamel Goldberg/Goldberg & R.tchle Develop See Stafftest Report thIS ,ssue

Orht on W ashinlton ITSSsystem, Monocacy JunC\lOnl. Hudson/Hudson & Sm'th. AD

EmpirH of tht Middlt Agn IEurope, I !XX) to 1500 ADI. Dunnigan & Simonsen/Buccm' AD

footba ll Iprofesslonal 100tbaii game! Berg/Berg AD

JuliuJ CaHlir ICaesar In Gaul! Berg/Schachter Develop.

Kursk (WWII Eastern Front tank ban le) Goldberg/Goldberg. Production

NATO 1Ji--ision Commandrr (modern operat,onal game of combat m Europel Dunnigan/Dunnigan AD

"'u Kidgt (TS5-system gamel Smi th/Smith & Hudson_ AD

Task .-ot"« (modern naval combat I Bal~oskl/ Balkoskl Develop

Timtfripprr Itimeuavel by Amerocan GI from VlElmam). Dunnigan/Dunnigan at a/ Develop

Tlto (YugoslaVian resistance movement. 1941·5!, Rustlro/Balkoskl Develop

Wilson'l C rH I< (TSS-system battlel Wrogh\ Hudson. Oevelop See BI,rodlest Repot"t In thts Issue_

Wr«1< of tht "'andon ISF game depoctlrtg survIVors trapped on damaged spacecraitt Dunn'gan/Rltchl8 AD ThiS game Will be publIShed in the second ISSue of AleS

Due Process In the pas!. we h<lve diSCUSsed Ihe program

mmg changes planned 1o. OUt mall order and suI) scription compuler prOC8':iSlng Well, the lime has come when pliJf'lning IS becoming ImplemenUl uon The purposes 01 these proqrantmlng changr.s

am to Improve the sYSlem, allow.ng bettcr ullhza tlfln olth .. computer. 8nd to prevent the Is~udderl hOtrOfS that befell S&rs 69-72 For those newcomers to S& r, b.,etly, the computer liIe thaI recnrds the suhscflbers was blown lie. Wiped out! 'he recovery has been ted,ous and somHwhat h,t and miss due to the I,me that lapsed betwf'en thl! d,sastf!< and the .ecovery It IS Stili on OOlrtq. as I'm sure many SUMCflberS w(.~! know

The new programs oong wr"'en are tn COBOL. a murh belter languagf> than the RPG-2 of lh!' old!" software Also, as the old proqrams we.e WJlII!'n '>even vears ago, and continuously ··"ateh<'!r1·' by progtammers Ovt'f the yeats, tht,y hay!' become so fragile and Interconnected that a complet" .ewflle was absolutely necessary

The flfst part of thtS software rewflle IS nearly completed as 01 II Feb. eo and hopelully Will be opt'ratlOnalln earlv March These chanqt>S In pro· gratflfmnq ,md til'!' ml('flm peflod 01 ICSllOg that they leqlH,e Will cause us to use 8 tew dl!terent prO("f'(hues that need to be e-':IJlalned

S&r sUbSCr lPIiOnS that h,lve 8n expulllIOn Issue 01 )00 are being serviced wllh labels that State <In eXPlfatlOn Issue 01 00-95 ThiS IS because the old p.ogram does not accept any number 0195 or more We are ~eeplng a 115 \ 01 these subscrrbers. and when the changeover IS ac· compll~h<!d. rhelf e-.:puat'on ISSue numbers Will be COtfecled

Only one address can be mlllnlairted on II P8f ntanent f,le lor each customer SO II YOU have S& r gOIng to one address, we would have to have MOVES gOing to the same ThiS would not apply to normal game orders, however

All Changf!S 01 address requests lor an magalmes muSt Include your CUStom/l'f Codel (ThiS IS a 6leuer alphabet code loo,cated on the fust tme 01 vour mall,og labell We w,1I be main ta!nln'1 all lhree subSCflp1ton files on one master ItSl T hiS method Will be the cheapest and mOSl 01 hClonl lor everyone III we used three sepafate hStS, ,.." would have to e~ecut'" each eOA thr!;!8 limO'l') BUllhe potenllal lor conlUSlOn on our end as to whICh "John Smith" you are IS now Iwlth A18s1 Slqnlflcantlvlftcreased 11 you dO not md,cate YOUf customer code

ProceSSing's goolls to process your order and send a 18bel to lhe warehouse wnh'n three days We have mamtalned a 5--6 day processing lag lor about a monlh now, and hopefully Will be able to got to thai three day gool short ly There are many demands on the compute! and process.ng latelv, but 8111s progressing ra ther smoothly

S&T77. the premier Issue of "Duo Process," W:lS (11 courS(! delayed Murphy's law was In full sw,nf! ,1galn. The ,ssue wasa! the U S POSt Office m NYC by the fltst week of December, but Ute powers that be m the Poslal S8fVlCe chose the bUSIeSt Ifme 01 the ~ar to change locations So, all the tn.111 fS&T Inctudedl was bundled up and dumped at the new locatIOn It was then mailed sporadocelly WIth, presumably, a I"st·m-last-out Pflo"ty tl wasn-t unt.llate January-early February that west cOOSt subscnbers8'len staf\ed to receive theu s&rS Now York wasn't affoctedsomehow, as slall members have subs senl to vanous N Y addr~ses as a Qua"ty control check, an.(j these a. "'led In lhe second week 01 December Needless to 511\1, Customer S8fVICO was deluged with com­pla.ntq ahaut lhe "m'SSlng 5&r"

1 hiS problem, of course, begal others, but S& r 7B shoold be go"'g out thIS wee~, alonq With AII';·.~ 1 Yes, that's light - Ares 1 has been com plewd, attd Will be malilld shonlyl

In ordf'rfull,'lment. measures are bemg taken to enSurf! your ordf!rs Will be completed ThiS however. IS no! solely a Process,ng Depar tment lunCtlon The Production Departml'nt and the w1llChou5l~ people hav" 10 keep uS Informed I'll

In:HI"lIl1<'f1o~ f1'Il~ Jj/

FORVOUR EVES ONLY Nr.79

Edited by Jame8 Dunnigan and David Ritchie

An Open Intelligence Summaryof Current Military Affairs

RUMORS: EnginHrllin IhfIG')

On the basis or the 135\ three REFORGER's. the US Corps 01 Englneflrs ha!ldenlll1ed a number of orgal111illional and equIpment changP-'S they hope to Implement In IhefrJ's Desired changes In­clude: eqUIPPing eng;neers ..... ' l h APe's as II SUNI val measure Ho be Implemented by 19651; replae mg the CUffent earthmoving equIpment wllh tho UET IUnrversal Eng,neer Tractorl, II combonatlOn APe. SCrapei'. doler, IoIIder. npper capable of travelling w1\h mechanIzed un.ts, ISSUing now como gear WIth 60 TO 80 lulomete! ranges; deplov Ing breaehlnq eql,lIpment (plows, lollers and luw cMrgesl throughout combat units, Issu,ng new camouflage assets (espoclIIlIv lor winterl for all equipment; either increaSIng Ihe engIneer comp'-­men! of the diVISIOn \0 regImental size or adding 2 platoons to ae810a Il'\Inl·ballahon commaoded bV II rTI8JOr linste&d of II captllin 85 under the current AO), transformatIOn of the dIVISIOnal bridge com­pany Into a line company, founh bngaOO, or caval­ry SQuad/on; IntroduCllon oltha GEMSS (Ground Emplaced Mlnehelcl Scattermg System), MlIll rapid Oal6fm9 system and a hand-fuzed vel"$lon of tho FASCAM AT mines II has been noted Ihal, ellcept IO!' budging componentS, engineering eQuipment In Inventory today IS overdue for modemlHltlOn Engmei1T, Wmter/79

'UI' ~'nnch SSN

France has recentty launched her hrst nUCIBar·powered anack submarlf'le, theProWJf1Cf:l, In Ch{!fbourg. DISplaCing 2,670 tons submerged, the submarm,e is capable 01 travell.ng under water al a rMl(Imum speed of 25 ~flO,s and has a patrol t'mB of 45 days Of more. The shiP'S overall Iongth IS n, metolsand u hasacomp!emenl 0166 men The subrnanne IS armed With fourteen anu-lUb and ant.-surface ship torpedoes lind IS eqUiPped With lour IUbes_ Plans cal! for lhe eveotual arrmr mel'll of the ship With anti-sur/ace ship miSSiles Inrerl'la/loool Defense ROVH1w, 7/79

Cobns. ~ _rl"oas Ind The TASVAI. Trills

The US IS conducting OngOing lestS of bellh filled wing ground S1JPPOltailcrai!and a\lack helr­copters al FI. Hunter ll998t1, California ThIS TASVAllJOint Test of TllctlC8l AItCraft Effective· ness and SUlVlvablhly 10 Clow All Support Anl l IIrmOf OperatlOnsl I;!lI.ercrW Pits an armored com­pany of ten MOO's and a TOW sectron With A 10's and f,H l's 119II,nst II remforced Thr&8ttan~ balta hon ISimulated by US eQUipment) lasers are used 10 simulate Ihele5peCilve weapons systems, and a computen~ad hll system PIOv,OO5 near-reaH,me SCOling. The objeCt oftha elle/Clse IS to det6lmlne lou rates againsl vallous types 01 defenses by dif­ferent miKes 01 allcral t uSing the lull range ol avall ablo weaponry under vaned waa ther and EW con­diliOM TASVAL also seeks to determine what ellect A 10's and AH-I's working In COflCeft las opposed to opera\ll'lQ separately! can be expac;tad to Ol(lIft on Threat forces Av,",uoo Week 6 Sf)«f! Technology, 8/27179

SS-ll Blooptr!

New Inlormallon that has recently come to hghtlP1dlCllteS Ihal the deploymenl 01 5S·21 mis­SIles In Eastern and central Europe may have been

reported enoneously In lacl, II IS now app.arom thai the mISSIle is nOlO missile at aU, but more like­Iya new member of the FROG IFree Rockol Over GroundJ family Although no techniCal data has been released aboulltS pedOIll'laflCO, II IS assumed lhal ItS range IS In lhe hunclleds of ~,lomeIBfs_ Afml6S and Wea.oons, 11179

lAAT Proltram In Ihvtlopmtnl

The US Army lind Air Force are cunently co· ope!'allng In lhe development of a new program designed 10 Increase theellectovenessof both '1et­

v!C8S' air assels The JAAT IJoinl Aenal AttBCir. TlICtlCS) program Involves assogmng an Air FOI(:::e FAC 10 an Army OH·58 travelling In company With a plotoon 01 attac~ hehcoplers (lIve Cobras end throo OH-5B's!. The FAC ond hiS Army pilOt assign targets both to on·S101l0n Cobras and loilBflng A 10's. TIw:! coordinaiion 01 Illled·wing alrcreitand ottack hellCOPlers III II Simultaneous anack IS designed 10 overwhelm Tf)reat all delenses The JAAT corteept IS being tested dunng the TASVAl \IIals at FI Hunter ll9Q6tt. If the progress remains on schedu!(l, e live· fire exelCISII Will be conducted by the 61h Cov Bngade 6t Ft Hood In lhe fell of 1900 US Army AV18tion 0190s/, 10/79

Mldt In Tlh"ln

Taiwan's government has reported thai, beglnnrng In 198), they will have an Indigenously produced "ghter-bomber that bears the destgna· lion, XA·3. The aircraft was prlmanly designed With the Idea of close 011 S1Jppon for ground troops, bUI Will 0150 havo lhe ablhly to double as a Ilghler At the present time the armament that WIt) be earned by the tWill engJfled aircraft IS undecrd· ed The engines that wltl power the XA 3 w.t) also be manulactured In TlIlWlIn In cooperation Wllh an unNlmed lorlllgn company No detaIls wern given as to the Blrcrsft's speed and fange ImernartOnal Defense Review, 7179

Sm'ltl! Uw CW

US Government Intelligence ollicials have feported that SOVIOI forces have used a !(llhal chemical agem In their campaign 89<t,nst Iflsur­gents In Afghanistan. The report Cites five In· stances In whICh lhe chemICal was employed, Slat­Ing thatlhe Informatron came Irom Afghan army deserlersand refugees. Amencan intelligence offl· Coals say thai they behove the'll reporlS becaUSfl Norih Vie tnam used the same ChemICal agent In lllos under the gUiding hand 01 Soviet adVisors. As of yet Ameflcsn ollielals have not publicly ac­cused the Sovoels of uSlflg the cl'lermcsl, whICh 19 banned undet- the terms of an Inlernalionallfealy to whICh the Sav>elS afe a SIgnatory, because of lack 01 evidence, such as samples of the agel'll The polson gas IS dropped from elthel oltc,aft or hetICopl (!fS In a canISter Of bomb that ellplodas In the alt When Inhaled, tt mduces hard breathlflg, VOmit ing, e~cretlOn, palalysls, and death New York Tiff/6S, 1/24/80

04·10 TlC,tics

A 10's IIYlflg Irom Forward Opera ling loca­lIOns fFOl's) wlll1e9ve numerous O~>1Ions open 10 PIlots becauw of the aIrcraft's aorl)orne endurance and ability to ope-rale from austere locatlOnS_ For oxample, wllh lour AGM 65 Mavonck miSSiles and a fully loacledXlmmgalhnggun, theA 10could Ity 150 mrles, lOiter ovel the larget area for two hours,

and then relurn to base With Iwenly minutes of fuel remam,ng An average mlS~on reedy plio\. ,n a lBrget-nch env'l'Qnrnel'll. should be a\JIQ 10 make about IoIteen attacks Inot le-attacksl 01 whtch Iwelve 0/ Ih,rteen should fOSlJlt In kill!!. With the same ordnance, the A- to could Ily 100 miles. SInko a smaller array of targets Immedoalely, and then llind alII nearby dispersal location lsuch as an Autobahn! perhaps lwentyhve miles (live minUles by all! Irom Ihe lal9'lll area The pilOI could lhen go on ground aten by leavlflg the llifcralt's power unit on to maintain communlC8\1OflS and be ready IOf a QUIC~ response 10 reQuests IOf additIOnal all support_ It IS not unhkely that he could relum 10 the larget several ltmes before retumlflg 10 the FOlof to the ma.n oper-allng besalO refuel and re­arm_ Although the Oil-IO·/lit thrMI cannot be en­tl/ely Ignoroo, the altitudes the A-l0 IS Ollpeclecl to maintain mllkes the threat of enomy Inle-rooptor! negllgtble. The A 10 IS extremely difficult to demcl and even harder 10 tlack from the all, but AA defenses could prOV1ltroublesome_ It is ,ntereshog to /'IOt8 Ihat 8 ca/eleSS Interceplor pilOI could Quickly chaoge Irom hunter to hunted, hnd.ng himself outmaneuvered and alwavs outgunned by tho A·IO Air Force Magazine. 8/79

Suo-Itt Tnnsparl Ittlieopltf'lf

Although al present lhere ere only ten Mt 10 helICopter t1ansports III servICe, should these heIi· copIers be deployed on a reasonllble scate lhey could prove a substan\laJ assel to SOV!llI loglstlCS_ Wi th a hit CllpaCltyol 16.5 Ions. the MI·l0 lHar~eJ IS capable of li fting a small bwldlng The main SOVIet transport helicopter at plesent IS the MI-6 IHoo~I, 500 of whICh are In deployment The Hook IS capable of lofting up to 10 tons ellternally Of 13.2 tons Iflternafly The MI--6 and the M,·10 both generally tr8\lel unarmed Military Rev/6W, 10/79

Tlmt 8C'1 .... ffn Ootrhlul

One way of meaSUflng the technological level of Sovlel hellCoplers IS by chec~lng lhelr fhght lime between overhauls. Up un{ll 1960, the lime between oVOfhaul was apprOlllrmrtely 150 hours andlotal operllltngblewasaboul5OOhours. In the decade of the 60's, lhese times Increased to aboul 300 and 1,000 hours respecllvely Today these figures are estlrmrted al some 500 lind 1,500 hours whICh repre!\8nts a levelaboutlhfoo \imBSas good now as dUflng the lele 1950's and 6IIfly 1960's Imernatlonal Defense Review, 8/79

,4,·10 Sorlie SUral'

In recent SImulated war e~ercases, lhe 81st TacllC81 Fighter Wing flew m()fe lhan 450 mISSIOns In a two-week paned With rts A·IO arfcrail Flying !rom Its bases In Bentwater and Woodbt-Idge, England, the wing hi! targets In England and Gel­many When deploVOd in Germany, the wing operated from Forward Operallng locat.ons IFOl's)In SembaCh and Anlhorn, West Germany Flighr/nrernatlonal,12179

~Ir hi 1M .'lftJ)f)

In lhe midst 01 unprecedented military growth, the SoY!IItS are turfllng OUI new lighter and feconnalssance arrcrait al the fate 01 neariV lOOcralt per month ThIS "gure represenlsenough planes 10 replace lhe enure US All Force "wen tOry III Europe fNetV 7 months_ Backflle bombers are

21

22

Curro",I", bemg pfoducod at 11 fate of ~per y63r In electromc. weriell:!. Ihe Warsaw Pact alreadv en· fOy5 an overwhelming advan!<lgfl In Blrborne Idm­mlng platforms lind QfQundbasad tammetS In thtil IaIUIf coso tho rl110 • lJ 10 I and WOrsenIng In Theatre NlICIelll FOfC~. the SOVI(I!~ l1a"f' ,ntra dllC'.!d sovtlfal new nuclear Mlllle,v IIIf'Id 5urfacelo surface mlSSllei The S5 20 fOl~ now numbets mOfI:! than 100 deploylKl \aUI"ICOOf$ Nn\,:ouroWlg SA-J's Iwl'liCh are haM-heidi, thentarenetlflv loul SAM"s '01 !MtfY NATO t'gh,III' jeploVed In the Central legion ()I Europe Fltghl Imema/ronal, 12f19

Rllmon of 1M T-80

Accon1"lO '0 senIOr US mt6ll gtmC9J'''CIiII • the SOllocts rnllV deplOv th1"ir new T 00 '<1"k ,n mid to-181l1900 Thel8nk.lllldlllrNembIGlhel 72," SllhoUlltlf', may have Irad ,kl'ts StfTlilar 10 those on Ihe XMl Tn!! !enk Will moll! likely mount a 125mm uun Similar 10 Ihlll used on the T ~ and T n Thell1nk Will have now IIrmOf specoal tOllwli and d,lh'r8nl ltom thaI usod on Ihe T -641 12 'hl'lfe IS II chance thallhe lan~ may be powered by 1:1 ga$· turbine engIne Inteli'genO:l ik)urces have said that Ihe T -80', look PDrl In a nlghl exercise near Moscow allhe end of 1911 IITI1I$ IS True, II Tends to confnm thll estImated 0oploymem dahl IfII(/t~IJQMI Delom. D1flI.'sf, 8/79

Klnk.t In ~(I~I~I ArmQr 1)001rin ~

In the opor\lon ~f Roehard E S '1pl" a"'lhOl 01 a new boo~ on tank w/lflare, tli. Sovlel hroad hom tltralagy has 1leV8Iiji prohlom h hIS book, 81'lJ3Sry's Tan/{ Warla!1t An Ana/yllia of SOIlIeI .nd NATO Tan h,losophr. Slmpk,n pOintS rnJl that I"I8v.gahon p.ublefr'dl for ,,"8" Ul1IIS w.y be a problem To m~ m<lld'- W"ltIS SlITlpk,". the advance w,lI lose moml'tltum somply because the spearh&atl companes Wr 1 get Iosl Take an~ arm ,)t an~ arm~"lywherl' Ih",' how ohEln ~ou tee II lan~ ')1 $eChon commander dft$peralely compar "'g the map w'lh Ihe SIgn DOSI Of Village Sign 1 wQl'loor .f the RUSSoa'.., ,re any d.lfe.enl ' A"other problem w>ll be oot{,(;l,on 01 SOVIOI mass· Ing OO8rll l t005 b~ IIIlelhtM Supply will Illso be a faclor. as w,'1 the Inahil' ! ~ !JI Snv>el Operational leve! commanoots to respond to bold NATO ~unle.strok8"

Army Times, 10179

T .71 'I I·la t~ Armllr a Thrfllt

Or Karl Schn" '. e.·commflnde.-ln-chlfOl 01 Alhed Fotces Cenlfal Europe. has stated Ihat we~tem tank eng.neers are very d,sturbed by the SOYl8t T 12's plate armor "We had Ihoughl untIl thIS appeared that Ihe developmenl 01 ilulomat,c homing Ihre and loryullanll 18f1~ w6llpons wOl.lld be the an~wor for lhe lulure Now we are laced Wtlh haYIng \0 reOOs'<)r> wlfh4lllds In ortler 10 oenelralelhc " .. wdel Army TIfTIG, 10179

So~kl5 In the "~nlan ('ulf

The Soviets have c')flC8rlUaled between 151)) and 2IXXl Sov>et and Easr German advISOrs ," their rna," mIddle 68Storn client Slate, ElhlOPIll In addl hon to the adv'SOIS, Ttlere are 15.CXXl Cu08n com· bal troops tn ElhlOpt8 The Cubans.re not there to tra," or a,d the 22O.CKXl man ElhlQP1lln a'm~ so much as they ale 10 plOtect the advisors As or 8 obselVef has staled "50 long a, the Cubans are ,n Ethlop,a, Wllh bayorl(ltS fl~ed. nobody's gOll1g to lOSS the Russ.ans oot .. After being tossed OUI of EgVpt and Somalia, lhe SOYlElts have apparently learned a lesson In addl\Jon, the SovIets recently put on a ShOw 01 stlongth bV auhfllng elements ot sevan d"o'lSlons Irom Southern RuSSia 10 EthiopIa lind South Yeman, The alrhlt demonstrated the

SOVJllI abllily to a.tend m,lltary lorC6lnl0 the horn o f AfrICa In as Imle as 36 hours Military Elet;tfOnic;sICovnrerrneasVreIJ, 11 79

W est Gum. n Na") Hdttep'ff'

To IflCUHI5e liS strike C8pab'(,IV In th .. 61 IIIC

SEta In lhe 1990'5, the Wesl German Navy IS COl Sloonng lhe use 01 combat helICOpters The hell · copteTS would be used 10 leduce reacllon times. relay data Irom fast palrol boal$ OV(lf the honlDn. and as 8 secondary WeBporl Iymm As 8 l,~t

~tep, lhe West German Navy ISconS!denngadd""Ig armament packages to ,IS 20 Sea Kings Intf1rlJvIB. 12179

\\nl Gfrman Arm(lr l nib Rfllll('fd

Accord,ng 10 a senil)r West Gelman defense OIlICIaI, Iheslla 01 West German armor com pan," w,1I be reduced f.om 17 lanks 10 t3 The reasons for lhe re(juction ere the use 01 the leopard tank, which can f,re on lhe move and has 1:1 hll)11 Ilrsl roun{J kill rate, and the lact Ihal armOl' units areac compal1led bv Infantry In mechilnlzed flghllng vetw::les Aflny Times, 10/79

Mo6OAJ Iltplo)fd In t.:uNP~

The firST M 6OA3 \(Inkg have b{;.'fl deployed In Europe The '''51 unl" to receIVe the lan~ are the 151 B8l\ollon/32nd Armor and 3rd Battahonl32 Armor, bolh Of the 3rd Armored O,vlllOn The ne.r unn scheduled 10 ger tim tar>k 15 In· 1st Bat tahOrtl70th Armor, ,11h!,8th Infantry DNI Armf)F, 12119

F· 'S/ F·ui t;nglnu \\tt+r 0111 u ti)

The oowerplant tor the F-IS and F·16 ,.el lighters IS weilnng OUI III rwlCe the expected rate­AccordIng 10 General Alton Stay, head 01 Air FOfW'S SystemS Command. the USAF IS 45 to 50 englr>e$ shen becaus.eol p.emall,neW681' OUI The eng,ne. lhe Prall and Wh,lr>ey FICO. wase~pec:led 10 wear out ala late 01 1 15c~CIIIS per engine fhgllt hour Theactual rate IS showmg 2.2 cycles on the F-15 and 3 1 cycles on the F-16 The rllSUlt+n9 shortage "cOl.lld resuilin as many as 43 F 15'5 end 53 F 16's wllhoul eng,nes by summer," Stay says Another problem has been slagnatlon Slalls, 1he F·15 !>a5 recorded 155stails, although the problem has largely been overcome Ihlough mO(ilIlC8110ns, Currenl plans call for 3,540 FICO's 10 be bought al a cost of SI5,CXXl mllhon, 1\ Will then cost $1.100 millIon to Improve and modify Ihe engines, The All FOlce IS already spending !>ell of FIOO Research and Development monev on durablilly ,ather Ihal1 Ihrust Illcreases FJ/ghr International. 12119

NfW St-lf·Proprllfd HO"'ilur

The flTSt sh,pmenls 01 the new M I09A2!e11 propelled hoWitzer ha~e arrived al Fort Stewa.t. Geo.gl8. The Q\ln is the I,rsl new 156mm weapon In the Army Invenlory smce 1969. The Army In· lends to oroduce 51)) A2·s In the nexl three years Most of lhe guns w,1I be senl to Europe_ The A2 has Improved ammun'tlOn storage 136 rounds. m­cluolng 22 of the recently developed long 155mm 101.lOdl. eng'ne mon'tonng IIISlrumentS. Improved gun mount. and an Improved eflgUle The ma~· Imum ran~ 01 the A2 Q)t;ceeds tB.CKXl rnere~ with COl1venIIONlI roonds and 24,CXXl mole" w'lh rocket aSSIsted rounds Amw Times, t2/79

US KedeslRRJI Ill! Llah. Inr.ntf)

Army planners are allempltng to secure $100 millton from the 19130 Army budget 10f a redesIgn of the light Inffln l ry d iVISIon, COf1ventlonflllnlanlry diVISions would be up-graded to light In anv tYpe of envlfOnment The unIts would be equ,pped wllh mobIle weapons to allow qurc~ deployment It IS

lell thaI .'Ieg'. ,nfanlfy w,1l be more usefUl 'n CllY fighting than mOChal1rled Of armol un,b Army 71(1~ 12/79

101 Airbornf I,. ndt'l"il~nglh'

Army P8f!M.mnel :ht(!/. II Gen. Robe.t G Yerks, said m 8n address g,ven 'n November. Ihill due 10 Uflmel rocru,tmg g08l$ 1J 01 81 r,lle pl. loons," one 01 lhe moSI promlnenl dIVlSlOns"r!' al lem suength The un,t was nol IlientlllEld How ever, inSlders5ilY the UM ~ the 101st AtrborT-Sla· I!Oned al FOf\ Campben Kentucky Armll T,m9S. 12179

Surprlst, \\ ~ .~ ~Ol Surpri§f(f !

In Oclober. eI8me 1\S of 1M 2nd Arm red D,v'SIOn f.tahoned al FOll Hood, Te~as ware )ldeled to EuroDO on a supPOSedly no not,r;;,e readIness Tes1 D,d lhe order come as 8 surpnse? Probably not 1\ 'I was tndeed a surprlge not,ce. Ar my sources ind,cale. II might be it mileslonl'! jn a number of prevIOUS no-notice deploymenlS, un'ts were 'n some manner tiPped off In advance of then Impend'ng orders Army Times, 10179

Plckf' : Th~ ~~W Anli·TMnk Mbsllr

A new shoulder·launched anll-armor Wflapon C81100 The Plc~et has been Introduced by the IS­mellS The miSSile IS 13 mches long. weighs 13 pounds. and ~ capable of superSOniC speeds The m,SSIIe 'I controlled alO<1g altne-of-Stght trajectory and no In-fltghl CrnJ'se COflOCtlOrlS C8n or flOOd be made Thus lhe mISSIle oS secure agamSI Ctltlenl O::OI.lntflfm8aSUres, The gutdance unit uses a gylO· scope which senses and correcls ,rt'lg<ll8r ve40Ct ties cau..oo by CiO$5w,nds and gunOf" movement allaunch AW8r~m W8ekandSp;lCfJ Technology, 11179

Tllnin& /'loBe C;apabililks

Fort Benning, Georgta IS lhe Planned ,Ie lor a nt1W N6C tramong area ded,cated pllmarlty to docOl"'am,nat'on lechn,ques usmg the lull 'nvon­tory ot available matenal and eQU'pmenl Concern has boon growing 'n lhe Wesl Ovellhe Critical defi­CIenCieS of US and Western EurQpean alml8S In regard 10 NBC warlare. Infantry, 1-2180

Slo pping thf Gap

The DH ,56C Klowlt has been slalP.d to become the Interum Scout Heircopter (lSHI to 1111 the gap un\!! the Advanced Scout HelICopter IASHI becomes available In Ihe middle 01 thiS docade To !til the role. the Kiowa has been given an ,mproved engine and transm'SSlon, Improved !light conlfol systems. radar detectoTS. IR SUPtJresSOIS, and the now s!1lnda.d flal plare Windshields 10 ledUce gl'nt The OH-58C also has the modilled VHFJ FM radiO equ,pmtml to enable lhe crah (0 r&maln In

communlcal,on willie flYing NOE . US AnnyAv.iBtlOnDI(J8.SI. 11179

\\ irr CUllffll rOf' C hopprrs

A sysTem of delleClors, saw loothed cUII,ng edges. and wedge-typa CUtlers 10 PlolOCt tow fly,ng hehcoptOf$ from honlonlally strung wife and cables IS bemg cof1Sldered fOf use bv lhe A" my The system would COSt about S2,CKXl per hellcopler II has already been approved for use by ea", .. Atmy Times. 11119179

I'Re SarfllllH

The People·s Republic of China w,11 have Ih(' caPBbilrt~ 10 place an early warnIng satellite Into synchronous orbit In the eady 1980's_ The satellite would be placed IOto orbit by 8 J-.Slllge CSS-.-4 ICBM I<JN&ST.11119/79

The Enemy at the Gates CopVrlght @ 1980, Simulatiorll Publicat ions, Inc., New Vori<, N.Y., 10010

Read this First: The rules of Ihis s ri simulation game arc or· gani~ed in B formal known as the Ctlu$ys"m. This system of organization divides the rules inlo MfljO, St'rtlotU (each of which deals with an important aS1)('C1 of play), Th~ Sections arc num~"d sequentially ilS well as being named. Each of Ih($(' Major Sections is intro­duced by a General Rule, which brieny de­scribes the subject of the &clion. Many times Ihis General Rule is followed by a Proudurc which describes the basic aClion the Player will take when using the rules in Ihal Section. Final­ly. the bulk of each Major Section consists of Corsu. These arc the speciric, detailed rules Ihal actually regulate play. Each of these Cases is also numbertd-. The numbering follows. 10llieal system baSC'd upon the number of the Major Section of which the Cases are a pari. A Cas~ with the number 6.S , for example, is the fifth Primary CaSf! of lhe sixth Major Section of the rules. Many times these Primary Cases are fUrl her subdivided into S«ondary Ctu6. A Secondary Case is recoaniuble by the faCI that it has two dillils 10 the right o f itS decimal point. Each Major Section can have u many as nine Primary Cases and each Primary Case can have as many as nine Secondary Cues. The numbering sYStem is mean! as an organiUllion. al aid. Using it, Players can always easi ly te ll where a Case is located in the rules. As a fur· Iher aid, an oUl line of the Major Sections and Primary Cases is liven at the beginning of the ru les.

How theS«tion lind Case Numbers Work:

Major Sec/ion Number

I Primary Case Number Ilndar)' Case Number

[6.53)

1.0 INTRODUCfION 1.0 GAMt: EQUIi'Mt:NT

1. 1 TheGa~M.p U Charts and Tabln !oJ T .... Plllyini Pi«a U Galnl' Sc:ak 1.' Parts Invnnory

J.O St.TfING UP TlU: GAMt: •• 0 St:QUENCE Of PI.A Y !.O MOYEMENT

' .1 MOVenJf'nl Rl:lItrkllc)lts and PrOhibitions

The precedin& example would be the number of the third Secondary Case of Ihe fiflh Pri · mary Case of the sixth Major Section of Ihe Rules.

How 10 Ltarn 10 Play the Game: Familiarize yourself wilh all of the compo­nentS. Read all of IheGeneral Rules and Proce· dures and read the Iilla of the Primary Cases. Sct up the game for play (after reading the per. tinem Section) and playa tri al game against yourself referring to the Tules only when you have a question. This procedure may take you a few hours, but il is the fastesl and most enter· laining way to learn lhe rules shon of having a friend teach them 10 you. You should not al· lempt to learn lhe rules word·foT·word. Mem· orizing all that detail is a task of which few of us arc capable. SPI rules arc written to be as complele as possible - they're nOl designed to be memorized. The Case numbering sySlem makes it easy to look up rules when you are in doubt. Absorbing the rules in this manner (as you play) is a much beller approach to game maSlery Ihan allempling to study them as if crammin& for a lest.

We hope you enjoy this SP I game. Should you have any difnculty interpreting the ru les, please write to SP I, phrasing your questions so that they can be answered by a simple sentence, word, or number. You must enclose a stamp­ed, self·addressed envelope. We cannOI guar· antet a proper answer should you choose to phone in your question (the right person is nOI al ..... ys available - and since SPI has publish­ed hundreds of games, no one individual is capableof answering all questions). Write to;

' PI Rules Questions Editor for Berlin '85 257 Park Avenue South New York, N.Y. 10010

5.1 Effe<:u of Terrain 5.J Effe<:1J of Other Friendly Units

i.1 ZONE'S OF COSTROL i.1 Effe<:tl on MOYemml i .1 Mult,pIe Zones

1.0 COMBAT 1. 1 Whidt Uni" An-.c:k 1.1 Mult,pk Unit and Multi·Hex Combat 1.3 Combat SlTen,th Unity 1.4 Effe<:t.of Terrain 1.S Divcnlonar)' Attach

Rt~tO\'ING Till:: It UU ::S FItOM THIS ISSUt::

1.i ComlHot Re§Oiution 1.1 How 10 Retreat 1.1 Ot5p~mcnl 1.' Adyan« Aftc. Combat

1.0 ARTILU:RY 1. 1 8ar.aae Al1acks '.1 Combined Anach I.) Adjacent Anad. 1.4 Final Prot«1iYe Fire (FPFj I.' Ddcnsc I.i TCl11lin Eff«1S 1.1 Unit IntqnlY U Poi$on Gas (Optional)

9.0 AIRPOWt:R 9. 1 R~lricl ionl and Prohibillons 9.1 All Superiority

10.0 COLLATERAt. I)AMAGE 10. 1 Ho .. Collaleral ~ II Eff«ted 10.1 Whkh HUI:lI Can 1n<;U' Collatcral Damaac 10.) Tnrain Effecll On Collateral Dam&&C 10.4 LlmnallOM on Collateral Dam~ 10.5 EffeclJ of Ruin on bistin, T(1'Tlin 10.6 Coll.lt,.1 Dam.ac T.bk to.l Fi,cslo.m

11.0 UNTRn:n UN IT STRt:NGTH 12.0 BRIDG E tn;MOUTION 13.0 RnN.·ORC.::~U:"'TS

1).1 Rt$lric!lorut on Reinf()f'temtnll 13.1 Airlandm, Reinforccmm"

14.0 SUPi''''' 14.1 Supply Soo.tel 14.1 Tradn, Ltnl:ll of Supply 1~.3 Supply Efre<:ls

lS.0 TIn: lJ·BA I-iN 16.0 NIGUT GAM E-TlJRNS

\6.1 AilllO"'er al NiJht l i.1 NiJht MoYelnl'nt

n.o NATO Ef>U: RCF,NCV RElNl'O RCEMENTS 17.1 Reinfor«mcnt Table Rewlls 17.1 Reinfor<:Clnl'nI Prohibitions 17.1 Reinforcement Table

" .0 PARATROOPS 11.1 Sc:al1er uta.ram 11.2 Plratroop Oatruction 11.3 DrOp Eli,ibility 11.4 First Tllrn Rl:lIt rictioM 11.5 SU .... tVlI T.bk 11.6 SU .... i~.1 ModiflCl"l

19.0 " IIONOMS m' WAR" \9. 1 Rl:lIull5 19.1 Rl:lItrietiorut It.) Ilono ... of Wlr Tabl~ 1f.4 Surrende. Points It.5 Surrender Poinll Record Tnd

20.0 VICfOtl\, CONOITIONS 20. 1 City Conlrol le.1 YltiOTY EVII'"l1ion

1 1.0 SCENAtllOS 11.1 Opt-ration Unily 11.2 Opt-Tllion Werewolf 11.) OpcTltion Medicine. Whttl

Open Iht ml,uint to Iht ernie" brnd tltt ~ llplrs .. I,h I pcnl.:nift o r sc,tl'l·d,h·tr; lifl oulthe ,"IH I nd elOK 51.p'~.

Rl

R2

[1.0] INTRODUCTION Berlin, '85 is an opcralionallcvclsimuialion of a IiYPOlhc\ica! allcmpl by the Warsaw PaCI to seize lhe city of West Berlin wilhin Ihcconlexl ora gen­era l conventional Easl~Wesl war. The playing pi~s r('presenl the aClUalunits which could con­ceivably bl'(:ome involved. The game map rcprt'­StillS Ihe aellla] Inra;" of Ikrlin and East Ger­many o\'cr wllich such a baule would be fought. Tht' two players (NATO and Warsaw Pact) ma­neuver thcir units across the map and conduct combat according 10 the rules of play. Victory is determined at the end of Game-Turn 16 or when· ever lhe Warsaw Pact Player achieves comrol of the city (whichever comes first).

[2.0] GAME EQUIPM ENT GENERAL RULE: The game equipmclIl consists of Ihe rules, map. chans and tables (primed on the map). one sheet of 200 die-cut playing pieces, and two dice.

CASES:

(2_11 T Ht: GAME MAP The 22" x)2" game map represents all of West Berlin as well as the mrrounding countryside. A hexagonal grid has been superimposed over Ihe terrain features on the mapsheet in order to regu­late the positioning and mo\'cment of the playing pieces. To make Ihe mapsheet lie nat, back fold it against the machine-made folds_ Players wi ll note thai each heJlagon (h~r~after called Itu) has its own four digit identity number.

\2.2] CHARTS AN D TA BLES A number of aids are included to assist in play: the Terrain Effects Chart. Reinforcement Table. Combal Results Table, Turn Record Track. Survi­val Table. Surrender Points Record Track, Colla­teral Damage Table, Sl:aller Table, and "Honors of War" Table. The- usc ofe-ach is explained in the appropriate Rules Sections.

[2.31 THE I'LAYI NG PIECES The cardboard playing pieces (hereafter called unils) represent Ihe military and paramilitary for­mations whkh could be- involved in a balliC' in the Berlin area. The numbers and symbols on Ihe pieces represent their Combat Strenglhs (Allack and Defense), movement capability. type, size. name, and (in the case of artillery) Barrage Strength. Final ProtCl:tivc Fire (FPF) Strength, and Range. Each unit is printed on both sides. One side is an untried side. which is wrned up at the beginning of play, and Ihe other is a tried side. which is turned up when Ihe unit participates in combat. Note: Artillery unilS do not have an un­tried side. Their back face bears a tag showing their unit type and dC5ignation as an aid to sorting between games.

A number of markers are included to represent the allO(ation of Air Ground Support Points. Each marker represents one Ground SuppOrt Point _ A few piCl:cS do not represent military formations. These are markers used to indicate fires, ruins. persistent poison gas, and destroyed bridges, and to record the passage of Game-Turns and the ac­cumulation of Surrender Points.

12.3 1J How to Rud the Unit De:si&nltions NON-ARTILLERY UN IT

UnIlS;~~

'" Ullit [)esignQtion $ I§§J UnilTy~

AlI<lCkStrength 3-6-12

a,f~fLJt!!St"ngth MoW!mentAlloWQncc

~" $ I§§J

U-12

ARTILLERY UNIT FPFStrength

/JarrtlgtSlrrngth

Unll Type

4·0·20 1 "I;;;

1·10 '"

D<:/ellMStrength

UNIT TYPES Fronl

, :0 WI

':: 0.2.S

.. ....!!.... ... ' -2-S

c 8G 'II

EI8l~ 1-2-S

" "'§ iQ 4·3·12

" -.. ~~ 2·3-6

~" -I§] 5-2-12

,~ o@g 2-1-15

West Berlin Police

Infantry

Paratroop

Tank (Armored)

RangeAlloWtlncc

Unit Designation

G!J,

1!;ijJ ­

U.1t

~" =[Q] U·12

, . - Ii>!" U·1SZ

" gl8J 2·5-12

, "1!Bl& 5·2·12

, fii!B!] ' ·2·12

*rnID5 0·3-12

~ ~

3·2-14 "'@l§ 2-12 .

4420 ~. 1_10 °

1-2-4 e ~. 4-12

Commalldo

Military Polict

Towed Artillery

Ruin Marter

UN IT SIZI:'.S

., ~181 U-12

I '~' I U-12

c " ' ~~ U-'2

c ,

EffiID U-12

I=Company: II = B3ttalion: II I _ R~gimen!; BO = Bailie Group.

Units may be identified by a single number or by a two-pan designation. In two-part delignations, th~ number to the right of the unit symbol is Ihe unit's superior formation_ This may be a division, regiment, or brigade. Police uni ts are identified by a neighborhood or administrative district name. Battalion-sized units are numbered consecutively within the division. when the division is the superior formation shown. As a general rule, there are three battalions per brigade, and three brigades or regiments per division.

Some designations have been abbreviated: G = Guards; EB .. East Berlin: EG = East Oer­many; SI'B = 5ccteur Francais de Berlin; SFDB = Special Forees Detachment Berlin; LOS - Labor Guard Service; USA.E ~ Uniled States Army Europe; SSG ", Support Bail ie Group; WG = The Welsh Guards; RAN .. The

Royal Anglians; GH _ The Grcen Howards; PR _ The Parachute Regiment: RA .. RO)'al Ar­tillery: RSDG - Royal Scots Dragoon Guards; Jg _ Jagerbrigade; C:"C" Company: F . "F" ComP'lny.

[2.lll Odlnltion of Tu ms

iff/lid Slrenl,h is the rehllive sHength of a non· artillery unit used to attack other unin, and is ex­pressed in terms of Auaek Strength Poims.

Orf rnsr SfrC'nlfh is the relative strength of a unit u'it'd 10 defend against the anacks of Enemy units. and is elCpressed in terms of Defense Strenglh Points.

Combaf S,rtnl,h is the relalive st rength of a unit (as used in either attack or dden'it') and is e:tpress­ed III lerms of Combal Strenglh Points.

&rrlll' Slrrnllh LS the relative strength of an ar­[illery unLt when attacking Enemy units. and IS cx­prnscd in terms of Barrage Strenglh Poinn.

Final Protrrl/,·' Fir, (FPF) Strtnllh is Ihe relati"e ability of an arlillery unit to add 10 the Defense St rength of Friendly un its, and is e:tpressed in terms of FPF Strength Poims.

M"",mC'f!I AII" II'anu is the ma:timum number of clear terram he.\" Ihrough which a unil may move in a single i\;IoHmem Pha'it'; each such hex reo qULres the expendilure of one Movemem Poinl of the Mo,emenl Atlo"ance. More than one Mo,e­ment Point may be expended for some hexes.

Hanf' AlloII'lIner is the m3JIimum number of hexes that may lie bet .... ecn the hex OCCUPLed by an artillery unit using its fPF or Sarrage Strength (e\­elusive). 10 the defending unil' s hex (inelusivc).

[2.41 G AMt: SCALE Each hc.\ on the map represems one kilometer of real terrain from side to side_ Each Game·Turn is equivalem 10 8 hours of real lime. E'ery third Game·Turn is a nighl Game-Turn (tinted on the Turn Record Track) .

(2 .5[ PARTS INVENTORY Each copy of Hulin, '1$ should include: I 22· x 32" map I sh«t of 200 die-cuI playing pieces I rulebook 2 dicc (nol included in S&T Edition) I Uo~ assembly (nO! included in S&T Edition)

If ally of these paris arc missing or dUlllbgcd, fill OUI the Complaint Card endosed iothe game (nol in S&T edil ion) and return it to SP I with the ap.­propriate items ~hecked on the card.

Thosc who ha. e the S&T edition of Berlin '8' should address their complaints 10: Cuslomer Scf\'ice Simulations Publicat ions, Inc. 2H Park Avenue South New York. New York 10010

Note; The process used in Ihe manufacturing of the die·~ut counters used io SPlgames sometimes results in colors from one counter o~crlappinglhe color of a neighboring ~oumer, or in the slightly off-cenler prillting of the letters and/or numbers on a coumcr. SPI cannot replace coumcrs display· ing these minor manufacluring inaccuracies. Only coumers that arc illegible can be replaced by SP I.

[3.0] SElTlNG UP THE GAME

GE~ERAL RULE: Thc ~ardboard playing pieces should be carcfully punched out of the uoil coumer sheet and sorted by color and type. Players should then decide whlc~ sidc each will play and sclect a scenario. Thc playing pieces are SCt up according to the rules for

each indi~idual scenario as described in this Rules Section.

PROCE DU RE;

The Players consul! the Initial Deploymenl listed in the scenario. Included there is a list of Ihe st rengths of each unil which is in play (on the map) during the first Game-Turn. Unit values are lisled as follows; Combal Strength (shown as a "U" )­Movemem Allowance. For artillery unilS: Barrage Strength- Final Protcrlive Fire (FP n Strenglh­Range Allowance- Defense Strength-Mo"ement Allowance. Players will be instruc ted to sct up their units wilhin defined parameters. In all ~ases Ihe NATO Player SCtS up his forc" first. follo-..--ed by Ihe Warsaw Pact Pla)·er. Units used in the scenario, but not av"ilable on map at the start of the game. arc set aside and brought inlo play ac­cording to the rules gO"crning reinforcement. 1'1101 all unilS are used in every scenuio.

[4.0] SEQUENCE OF PLAY G ENE RAL RULE:

The game is played in successive Game-Turns, composed of allernatin, Playef-Turns. During each Game·Turn the Players maneuver their units and resol"e combal III sequence acrording to the following outline and "' it hm Ihe limits of Ihe rules which follow . AI the conclusion of Game-Turn 16 (or at the conclusion of any Game·Turn in which the Warsaw Pact Player controls Berlin) Ihe game ends and ~iclory is a$sessed.

SEQ UENCE OUTLIN E The Game-Turn is dividl-d into a Warsaw Pact Player·Turn and a NATO Playcr-Turn. The War­SH W Pact Player-Turn is always executed first. The Player whose Player-Turn is currently in progress is lermed Ihe Phasing Pla)·er. The acti~ity which he may undertake is outlined be'low.

I. Mo\Cment "hllst The Phasing Player's un liS may move in any direc· lion(s) up to the limits of their indi,-idual ]'.Iove­ment Allowances within the rest riclions of the rules of movemem. Zones of Control, terrain ef­fecl S, elC. The Phasing Player may bring reinforce­ments onlO the map according to the reinforce­ment rules and as allowed by the Reinfor,emcnt Schedule for the scenario. Thc non-Phasing Player may not mo,'e his units. No combal is allowed.

2. Combat "hast The Phasing Player condUClS attacks againSI the non-Phasing Player'$ unilS in Ihe ord~r chosen b)' the Phasing Pla)~r . Each anack is ~onducled ac­cording to th.c followmg sequenced procedure: A. Th~ Phasing Playe r 5ta les which of his ground units arc altacking which ddeoding units. U. The Phasing Player allocales Sarrage Stnngth Points (if he wishes) from non-adjacenl artillery units and Ground Support Points. C. The non-Phasi ng Playcr allacaln Final Pro­teclive Fire Strength (if he wishes) from 11011-adjacem ar!illery units and ground support points. D. The Combal Differemial (Iotal allacking Slrellglh minus lotal defending strength) is calcu­lated. Ihe die is rolled, and the indicated r" ult (see Combat Results Table) IS immediately applied. The "They Shall Not Pass" oplion may now be ex­ercised. E. The Phasing Player checks for collaleral damage where such is possible due 10 con~emra­tions of arti1l~T)' and hex Iype.

This concludes the Player-Turn . This sequence is repealed by Ihe opposing Player in the same man· ncr, at which time the Game-Turn is over and the Game-Turn Marker is ~dvanced one DoX on the Turn Record Track. Players continue to follow

Ihis sequen~e unlil Ihe Warsaw Pact Player cap.­tLlres Berlin or the end of Game-Turn 16. which­e"er comes first.

[5.0] MOVEMENT GENERAL RULE: During the Mo,·~ tnenl Phase, any numbe'r of Phas­ing unilS may move through contiguous he:tcs in Hny di rcclion(s) within the limitat ions of 5. 1 through 5.3. Movemem may be affected by night (16.0). supply status ( 14.0) or Ihe use of undf'r­ground mo,'emenl via the U-Bahn (15.0) . Warsaw Pact unilS may be forced to imerrupt mo,'ement "hile the NATO Player rolls for bridge demolilion (12.0) .

PROCEDURE:

Unils mo,'e one al a time, lracing a path of con­tiguous he:tes through the h~:t grid . Each umt pays one or more Movemenl PoinlS from il$ Movement Allowance 10 enter e3~h he:t .

CASES:

[5. 1[ MQvt:MENT Rt::5TRICfIONS AN I) PROHIBITIONS

[5. 11 1 Movement may never take pla« out of se­quence. Phasing unilS may move during their own Mo\ement Phase. only. During the Combat Phase, a unit which is aHacking or defending may be called upon to ad"ance or retreat after combat is resolved. This is not considered mO\ement and uses no Movemem Points. During the Enemy Player's Movement Phase. f riendly unils may nOI mo~e.

[5. 1l] A Friendly unil may ne~er e111er a hex con­taining an Enemy unil.

[5.131 A unit may never e~pend more MO\'emenl I'oims than lIS total Mo'ement AUo"'ance in any one Mo~ement phase. A unit may expend any or all of ils Mo'emem Poims in its 1I.lovement Phasc. Units are never forced to mO\e. Ho .... ·e'·er. unuscd Movement Pomts may not be accumulaled or Iransferred .

[5. 141 A unit may nOI e:tit an Enemy COlli rolled he.\ during a Mo'cmenl Phase of a day Game­Turn. An Enemy controlled hc~ may be Idt only durin!, a retreal or advance HS a result of combat or as D result of Dlsengagemenl during a nigh I Game· Turn (sce 16.22).

[5. 15] Orlce a unil has moved and the Player's hand has been wilhdrawn it may not move fLIrt her during Ihe Player-Turn.

[5. 161 The ability of units to mO\e to their full allo"ance IS affected by their supply status. A unll may be eilher supplied or unsupplied. Unsupplied units ha\e their Movement Allowance halved (round do .... n). St!t 14.0 .

[5. 111 Wesl Ik-rlin police unils may not move or rei real oul of West Uerlin. Irforced 10 do so, they arc eliminaled.

[5. 181 No police units on either side may e\er volunlarily entcr an Enemy zoe. If forced to do so, they arc eliminated.

(5.2] t:n "[(.,.s OF TERRA.IN [5.2 1] A unit must upend one Mo,'ement Point to enter a eIear terrain hex. To enter other types of he.\es. a unit may have 10 expend more than one Movement Point. St!t the Terrain Errecu Chart printed on th.c mapshect.

[5.lll A unil .... hich movcs from one road hc:t di rectly into an adjacent road hex throullh a road hexside (i.e .. one conlaining the rOlld symbol) e~­pends only I Movelllent Point rega rdless of the other terrain in the hex.

R3

R4

[S.B] A unil wllich moves from one AUlobahn hex to an adjacent Autobahn hc~ through an Au tobahn hexsidt expends VI Movement Point rcgardlcss of the olher terrain in Ihe he",

[5.24] A unit which moves from ont U-Bahn hex directly in10 an adjacent U-Bahn hex through a U-Bahn hexsidc while "underground" e)l~nds 2 Mo"emenl Poims regardless of the other lerrain in the hex. The Phasing Player must stale that he is using underground movemen/ upon enlering a hex in this manner. Units may n01 use U-Bahn move­ment to exil an Enemy cOlllrolled hex in which they begin thcir Movemem Plmse (5«' 15.0).

[5.25J The C0515 10 cross waler hcxsides. ferry hex­sides. bridge hexsides. and border hcxsides aTC

assessed in addition 10 the costs to enter the lerrain in the hex. Note thaI bridges are implied wherever a road or Autobahn nosses a water hexside. Unit~

crossing ferry o r bridge hexsides pay the ferry or bridge cost (not the water COS t) for that hexside. Roads and U-Bahns do not extend across border hexsidCli. Autobahns do extend through border hexsides. Note: The rail line has no effa:t on movement.

[5. 26) A unit may not enleT a hex if it does nOl have sufficient Movement Points remaining \0 pay the Movement Point cost \0 enter the hex and the hexside being crossed. Nott': Units may enter lake hnes, but may not end Iheir Movement Phase in a lake hex . They arc destroyed if they al1emptto do so. 1t costs 9 Movement Points \0 traverse a lake he}! ( I for the he)! and 8 for the entry and e}!it hn· sides). Thus, a police unit (8 MP's) would never be able to enter a lake hex becau~e the unit would not then have sufficient MP's left to continue moving out of the hex.

[5.21) Terrilln Efr« ls C harI (see mapsheet)

(5.3) HH:<'.'TS Ot" OTHER FRIENDLY UNITS

[5.31 ) A Friendly unit may move through Friend· ly occupied or controlled helles at no elltra Move­ment Point cost, but may not end the Movement Phase stacked in the same he;.; with another Friendly unit. Slacking is prohibited.

[5.32) There is no limit to the number of Friendly units that may pass through a single hex in one Game·Turn.

[6.0[ ZONES OF CONTROL

GENERAL RULE: The si}! he~agons immediately surrounding a hex constitute the Zone of Control (ZOC) of any unit in that he}!. HeJles upon which a unit exerts a Zone of Control are called controlled hexes and inhibit Ihe movement of Enemy units. All units must cease movement when they enter an Enemy con­!rolled hex (EXctpllon: see 5.24). Units in an Enemy Zone of Control are forced to a!lack dur­ing their Combat Phase. Supply cannot be traced through an Enemy controlled hl'}! which is nOt oc· cupied by a Friendly unit (Exerplion: sec 14.22).

CASES:

(6. IJ EFF[(.'TS ON MOVEMENT [6.11 ) All units exert a Zone of Control at all limes. The presence of Zones of Control is never affected by other units, Enemy or Friendly. except when tracing supply.

[6. 12) Units do not pay any additional Movement Points to enter an Enemy controlled hex. Units us­ing the disengagement option during night Game-

Turns pay two Movement Points to exit an Enemy Zone of Control.

[6.1J] T here are only three ways to exit a hex in an Enemy Zone of Control: by retreat or advance a~ a resull of combat; by removal orthe Enemy unit e}!­erting the Zone of Control as a result of combat: or by disengagement (see 16.22).

[6. 14] Zones of Control extend into all types of hexes except ruin and urban hexes and across all types of hexsides except water hexsides. Zones of ContrOl do nOl extend into ruin or urban hexes. They do extend OUI of urban and ruin hexes. The presencc of ferries or bridges does not negate the effa:t of water hexsides on Zones of Control.

(6.2J MULTIPLE ZONES ]6.21) If there are both Enemy and Friendly Zont'!i of Control exerted in a given hex, both Zones ca­exist and the hex is mutuall) controlled by both Players.

[6.22) There is no addi tional effeet when more than one unit exerts a Zone of Control into a given hex.

[6.23) In mOSt instances, if a gi\en unit is in an Enemy controlled hex. the Enemy unit is al~o in its controlled hex and they are equally and mutually affcrted. When a unit is in an urban or ruin hex, that unit' s Zone of Control extends out of the hex, but the Zones of Control of adjacent units do not extend into the urban or ruin hex. This principle is important in determining" ho must a1\ack and/or be 311acked during the Combat Phase.

[7.0J COMBAT GENERAL RULE: Combat between adjacent opposing un its in each other's Zones of Control is mandatory. Art illery units are the only units which may attack units 10 which they are not adjacent. See also Ai rpower Rul l:S (9.0) for the effect of Ground Support Strength Points. The Phasing Player is termed the attacker; the other Player is the defender. regard· less of overall strategic situation. All auacks mUSt be announced at the beginning of the Combat Phase, and Ihe defender must be given the option to allrn;ate FPF. AIl1!cks are then resolved indivi­dually according to the following procedure. NOlr: Players may disregard this stricture and both announce and resoh'C each comba t sequenti­ally upon mutual agreement. T his method of con­ducting combat allows anomalies 10 creep into the rules and is fro" ned upon by the developer, but it does tend to speed play.

The OUtCOme of each combat situa tion may be af­fected by the terrain occupied by the units. their supply Status, morale. and by the presence of ruins and poison gas as well as by special bonus shifts. Combat eHeets are exprl:Ssed in terms of units of one o r both Players retreated or destroyed.

PROCEDURE:

Total the Allack Strcngth, Barrage Strength. and Ground Support Strcngth of all attacking units in­volved in a specific attack : tOlal Ihe Defense Strength and the Final P rota:tive Fire of all units which are Ihe object of a speci fic at tack. Subtract the total strength of the defending un its from the IOtal strength of the allacking units. The result is the Combat Differential expressed in Points. It may be either a positive or a negali" e number. The Combat Differential may be adjusted fo r terrain, supply, gas, and morale by shifting the appropri· ate number of columns to the left o r right on the Combat Results Table. All shifts a rc cumulative and are applied by SUbtracting the total number of shifts in each direction from each other so as to ex-

C\:ute a single net shift in one di re(tion or the other. [xample: If thirteen Strength Points were auack­ing a unit with fO ll r Strength Points in a park he}!, Ihe combat differential would be + 9. Bcrause the defender is in a park hex, before re~olving the at­lack , the a llacker shifts one column to the left (from the + 9- 11 column to the -+ 6-8 column).

Having determined Ihe proper column on the Combat Results Table. the auachr rolls the die. The result indicates a line "'hich is cross·indexed with the proper Combal Di fferential column. The interseet ion of line and colum n yields a combat rcsult. This should be immediately applied to the invol\'ed units before going on to resoh'e any olher combat. Separate combats may be resol,ed in any order that Ihe aHacker desires.

CASES:

(7. 1) WHI CH UN ITS ATTACK ]7. 11 ] All Phasing units whieh are in an Enemy Zone of Control must attack at least one adjacent Enemy unit. All non·Phasing units "hich h3\'e a Phasing IInit in their Zone of Control mUSt be at­tacked. The Phasing Player may reso!\'e his atta~ks in any manner desired "ithin the provisions of this rule. Phasing units which are nOt required lOattack may still voluntari ly participate in combat.

]7.12) A defending unit may be a!lacked by as many as si~ adjacent units, "ith possible addi· tional artillery Barrage Strength (~ee 8.0) and Ground Support (see 11.0)

[1. 13] No unit may attack or be attacked more than once per Combat Phase.

[1.14) Non·artillery units may only attack if in a hex adja(ent 10 the defending unites).

17.21 MULTIPLE UN IT AND MUl TI·HEX COM RAT

[1.2 1) If a Phasing Player's unit is in the Zone of Control of more than one Enemy unit. it must at­tack all those adjacent Enemy unitS which are not engaged by some OIher auacking unit.

[7.22] Uni ts in two or more different hexes may combine their Combat Strengths and attack a single hex. if all the attacking units arc adjacent to (or are within range of) the Enemy occupied hex.

[7.23) Attacks may involve any number of auack­ing or defending unit s. For the attacks 10 be resolv. ed as a single combat, howe~er, all the allacking units except barraging artillery must be adjacent to all the defending units.

(7.3J COM8AT STRENGTH UN ITY A given uni t's Combat Strengths are always unitary. That is, a unit's strength may not be divid­ed among different combats. or lent 10 other un its.

(7.4J EFFECTS 01-- TERRAIN ]7.41 ) Defending uni ts, only, benefi t from the ter· rain in the hex they occupy and/or that hex's peri· meter he~sides. Terrain in hexes occupied by al· tacking units has no effect on combat.

[1.42) The effect of terrain (on combat) has been integrated into the Combat Results Table. After establishing the Combat Differential column, the Player will shift a number of columns to the left as ~peci fied on the Terrain Effects Chan for the ter· rain which the defending un it occupies.

]7.43) The effects of terrain are cumulali\·e. A defending unit benefits from the terrain in the hex it rn;cupies as well as the terrain in all hcxsides through which it is SHacked by adjacent units. Howe\'er, hexside benefits for a type of he~side apply only if all allacking unilS are attacking through that type of he.uide.

[1.44J When two or more defending units are being attacked in a single combat and are on two

different types of terrain. ea~h ha~ing a different effect on the combat differential, then the entire anack is modified by the one terrain type most favorable to the defender.

[7.5] DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS [1.51 1 Anacks at differentials less than -7 are resol\'l~d on the - 7column on the Combat Resuhs Table. Auacks at differentials greater than + 12 are resolved on the + 12 column.

[1.521 The Phasing Player may never voluntarily reduce the differential of any gi\'en attack. That is. he may never voluntarily shift to the left of his combat di rr erential column.

[7.53] A Player may choose to execute an auack at an unfavorable Combat Differential in order to achieve a beller Combat Differemial in another at­lack. There arc no restrictions on a Player's ability to mount such "diversionary auacks."

[7.6] COMBAT RESOLUTION Combat is resolved by indexing the results of a die roll with a column representing the adjusted Com­bat Differential on the Combat Results Table. Results arc interpreted as follows:

1)1.2 , 3 or 4 _ Defender retreats the indicated number of hnes (I . 2. 3. 4). Each Player retreates his own units. He must retreat his units in accor­dance with the Retreat Rules (sa 7.7). Uni ts may retreat only through traverseable hexes. A tra­verseabk hex is one the unit could enter during its Movement Phase. Units may rlOI retreat across water hexsides. A I. 2 or 3 _ Attacker retreats the indicated number of hexes (I. 2 or 3) as in a " DI, 2. 3"' result. Dr .. Doth the auacker and defender mUSt retreat one hex. The defender retreats firsl. (Note: this means that if the defender is surrounded by units or Zones of Control. it may beeliminated). The at ­tacking uniu then ret reat. Ae _ All at tacking units eliminated. Defender may advance into the hex. De _ All defending uni ts eliminated. Allacker may advanl~ into the hex. EI _ Exchange. All of the defending units are eliminated first. then an equal or greater number of the allacking Strength Points are lost. Note that all exctmngC"S take place using the printed strengths (Allack Strength for allaeking units: Defense Strength for defending units) of the units in~ol~ed. Non-adjacent allacking artillery units are ne~er af­fected by Exchange results. Ax _ AI! defending units are retreated one hex. Then a number of attacking Strength Points equal to or greater than the Defense Strength of the defending unit(s) are losl. Note tha t this loss is calculated in the same manner as a normal Ex­change result, except that the defending unit is retreated rather than eliminated.

(1.61 1 Cumbat Resul ts T.bl~ (see map)

[7.7] HOW TO RETREAT When the combat result requires units to retreat . the owning Player must immediately move those units individually the indicated number of hexes away from their combat position. This movement is nO! normal movement and is subject to the fol­lowing restrictions. If the unit is unable to retreat within these restrictions. it is eliminated instead.

p .71] A retreating unit may not enter an Enemy controlled hex. Friendly units do not negate Enemy Zones of Control for purposes of retreat.

11,121 A unit may not retreat across a ..... ater hex­side (Including a water hexside crossed by a bridge or ferry).

P. 731 Where possible. a retreating unit must retreat into or through vacant hexes. If no olher route is available, the retreating unit may enter Friendly occupied hexes. displacing every Friendly unit whose hex it moves into or through (sec 7.8).

(7.741 A retreating unit must terminate its retreat the combat result·indicated number of hexes away from its former combat position. If it cannot do so. and can retreat only a portion of the number of required hexes. it is eliminated in the last hex to which il is able to retreat. The retreat path (see 7.91) terminates in the hex in which a unit is eliminated. ( t:xcepliuns: 7.7S and 7.76).

11.751 A unit retreating through an urban hex has the option to end its retreat there, even ifit has not retrealed the full number of hexes mandated by tile combat result. It must. however. have retreated at least one hex in order to use this op­tion. There is no adverse effect upon a unit for ex­ercising this option.

p .76] A Player who does not wish 10 execute a combat-mandated retreat may declare " They Shall Not Pass." The die is then ro lled. If the resulting number is less than or equal to the number of hexes the unit must retreat. it is destroyed. If the number is greater than the number of hexes the unit would have had to retreat. the unit remains in place. It is not re­quired to retreat and suffers no adverse effects due 10 the re fu sal to ret real. Only units which arc cur­remly in supply may employ this option. When more than one unit is forced to rctreat, each unit retreats (or uses the " They Shall Not Pass" op­tion) individually in sequence. Eumplt: If twO at­tacking units are required to rctreat . one could ex­ecute the "They Slla l1 NO! Pass" option and the other could retreat normally. The first opt ion would be executed before the Player was requi red to state .... hat action the second unit was taking.

[7.81 DISPLACEMENT 11 .81J [f Friendly units occupy hexes in the only possible retreat rome a~ailable to a retrea ting unit, those Friendly units arc displaced (moved out of their hexes) by the retreating unit. Displaced units arc moved one hex (by the owning Player) as if they .... ere themselves retreating. Then the retreating uni t enters the vacated hex and. if necessary. continues its retreat. The retreating unit rna)' displace as many units as necessary to com­plete ils retreat.

17.82] If displacement would ~ause the elimina­tion of any of the displaced units. the relrealing unit is eliminated inslead. Displaced units arc sub­ject to deslruction in the same manner as retreat­ing units (i.e., they would be destroyed if they were forced 10 displace into an Enemy ZOC. etc). Di~­placed units can themsel ~es displace other Friend­ly units in a sort of chain reaction of displacement, if that is the only permitted path of displacemem open to them. A unit may be displaced more than once per Combat Phase. if that is the only a l1 erna­tive. Displaced artillery units which have not yet engaged in combat, may not (ire during that Com­bat Phase. Units may not displace Friendly units if other paths of reneat arc availabk.

17.831 A unit against which any allack has been announced may not be displaced during that Phase until after Ihe attack in whiCh it is involved has been resol~ed. Similarly, a Phasing unit which is panicipating in any allack ma), not be displaced until after the attack in which that unit is involved has been resolved.

[7.9] ADVANCE AFTER COMBAT [7.91] Whenever a defending unit is forced to ret reat as a result of combat, it willle3ve a path of

vacant hexes behind it called the path of rctreat or retreat path. Any or all Friendly victorious non­police units which participated in the combat and were adjacent to the retreated unit may advance along the Enemy path of retreat.

(7.921 The advancing ~ictorious units rna)' cease advancing in any hell along the path of relreat.

17.93] Ad~ancing victorious uniu may Ignore Enemy Zones of Control.

17.94] Only victorious non-police units which were adjacent to the retreating unit during the combat and participated in that combat may ad­vance. Non-adjacent arti llery units may nO! ad­vance after combat. Units which usc the "They Shall Not Pass" option may no! ad~ance.

17.9S] An advancing unit may not stray from the path of retreat. Exefp lion: sa 7.98.

(1.961 The option to advance must be exercised immediately before any other combat resolution. Units are never forced 10 advance after ~ombal. Ad\'ancing units may neither allack nor be al1ack­cd in lhe remainder of that Phase, e~en if their ad­vance places them next to Enemy units whose bat­tles ha"e not yet been reso lved. or wllo were not in_ volved in combat. Advances are c.,ecuted after all retreats (or "They Shall Not Pass" options) stem­ming from the combat have been executed, but before any collateral damage checks are made.

[7.971 Example (sa map sheet)

[7.98] Attacking units may advance Iwo hexes whenever a defending Enemy unit is eliminated as a result of an unsuccessful auempl 10 apply the " They Shall Not Pass" option. The first hex of the advance must be the hex vacated by the eliminated uni t. The second hex of the advance may be any adjacent traverseable hex.

{7.99J Attacking uni ts may always advance into the hex vacated by a unit eliminated in combat. They must cease their ad~ance in the hex. and may not advance into a second hex as in 7.98.

[8.0J ARTILLERY GENERAL RULE : Artillery units may participate in combat from ad­jacent and non-adjacent hexes. The artillery unit's Barrage Strength may be used to anack Enemy unils. The artillery unit's Final Protective Fire Strength may be used to supplement the Defense Strengths of other Friendly defending units. In cither case. artillery uni ts need not be adjacent 10. but must be within range of the defending unit. An artillery unit may use both its Darrage Strength and Final Protective Fire Strength in a single Game-Turn. When SHacked, an artillery unit defends its.clf with il5 own Defense Strength.

CASES:

[8.1] HARRAGE A'rTACKS A barrage allack is an attack made by an artillery unit against an Enemy unit in a hex that is not ad­jacenl to the hex occupied by the artillery unit. Such an al1a~k may only be made by an artillery unit which is nOl adjacent to any Enemy unit.

[8. 11 ] Artillery uni ts may (but arc not forced to) attack non·adjacent Enemy units within range.

[8. 121 Range from the barraging artillery unit to the defending unit is counted by including the target hex (defending unit's hex), but nOl the bar­raging unit·s hex.

[8.13] Art illery units may only allack a single Enemy oc~upied hex when barraging, except when ma king a combined allack ..... ith other units auack­ing from adjacent hexes (see 8.2).

R5

R6

(8. 14) Barraging artll1\'l')' sufFer no combat results; they arc nevcr dc-stroyed or retreated 35 a result of their own allads. Of course, other units cooperating with the barraging artillery units from an adjacent positiOIl would be affected by combat results.

(8. 15) Attack.s made solely by Artillery arc ind­fective unless a result of D2, 03. 04, or De is roil­ed. Any other resul1 is read as "No Effect."

(8. 161 Artillery un its may barrage allack unoc­cupied haC!5 in the same manner as Enemy oc­cupied hexes. Artillery units may nOl allack hexes occupied by Friendly units. Nolf: Ih is tactic can be useful in crealing fireslorms or ruins or firing gas \0 temporarily interdict hexes. When an unoc­cupied hex is barrage auackcd, lhe normal combat procedure;s bypassed. Instead, collateral damage is chcrked for and any ancillary effects (ruin, firt". gas) arc applied to tht" hex.

(8.2) COMBINED A'rrACKS [8.21 ] Artillery units may allack alone, in concert with other barragi ng artillery and/or ground sup­port. or in concert with any Friendly units making adjacent allacks, adding their bombarding Com­bat Strength to the attaCk. These attacks are called combined at tacks.

(11 .22] When Friendly units are allacking adjacent Enemy un its in more than one hex in a single com­bat, the barraging artillery units need to be within range of only one of the defending un its to add their Barrage Strength to the Duack.

[8.31 ADJACENT AlTACKS [8.11 [ When in the Zone of Control of an Enemy unites), artillery units must participate in a "nor­mal" allack (i.e .. nO! a barrage auaek) against that Enemy unites) (see 7.0). In making this allack, the artillery uni t uses its Barrage Strength.

[8.32) In a Combat Phase in which an artillery unit must allaek from an adjacent he~. it may at­tack as many unitsas it is adjacent 10 (as per 7.2 1). An artillery unit conducting a "normal" allack against adjact"nt units may not aBack non_ adjacent units (barrage a llack) in the same Com· bat Phase.

111.11] Artillery units allacking from an adjacent hex suffer any results oflheir attacks (as per 7.6).

(8.4J FINAL I'ROTECTIVE FlRt: (FPt) [8.4IJ A non-Phasing artillery unit which has nOt yet been subject 10 an allack in the current Combat Phase. has suffered no adverse combat results in its previous Combat Phase, and is not in the zoe of an Enemy unit may usc its Final P rotective Fire Strength (FPF) to supplement the Defense Strength of Friendly units which a rc under allack. A non-Phasing artillery unit which does not meet these criteria may not use its FPF during the cur­rent Enemy Combat Phase.

[11 .42] The Friendly defending unit receiving Final Protective Fire must be in the range of the artillery unit providing the FPF. This range is computed to the hex occupied by the defending unit (the Friend­ly unit). not to the hex occupied by the allacking unit (the Enemy unit).

111.41] FPF Strength Points are added 10 the Defense Strength of the un it receiving Final Pro­ttttive Fire.

[11 .44) When an artillery unit supplies FPF it is not affected by any combat result.

[8.45) FPF may not be used to supplement the Defense Strength of Friendly units which arc under allack solely by Enemy artillery (either adja­cent or non-adjacent).

18.SJ DEFENSE When an arti llery unit is attacked in any fashion it uses its Defense Strength, nO! its FPF Strength or Barrage Strength.

18.61 T ERRAIN EFFECTS (8.61 [ An artillery unit may use its Barrage or FPF Strength anywhere within its Range Allowance. regardless of intervening terrain or units (either Enemy or Friendly).

[8.62) Defending units benefit from the tnrain in the hex they occupy when allacked by artillery (regardless of range). Defending units do not receive any hex~ide benefits if allacked solely by artillery. Defending units do receive hexside benefits if they arc subject to a combined attack in­vol~ i ng adjacent non-artillery units, a ll of which are a ltacking across the terrain hcxside type in question.

[8.1J UNIT INTEGRITY [1I.71[ Non·adjacent Warsaw Pact rocket artillery units may only engage in combined a llacks against units which art" being auaeked by one or more ad­jacent units from the same division as the rocket art illery units. Uni ts from other divisions may also be participating in the allack, but at least oneadja­cent attacking unit must be of the same division as the supporti ng rocket arti llery. This rule does not affect the ability of Warsaw Pact rocket artillery unil$ to attack unlls to which they a rc adjacent or to bombard non-adjacent units which are not under attack from adjacent hexes .

[8.72[ NATO artillery un its may only provide FPF to units of their own nationality. NATO artil­lery units may only engagt" in combined allaeks against units which are being allacked by at least one adjacent unit of the same nat ional ity as the barraging artillery unit. T his rule does not affect the ability of NATO artillery units to attack units to which they are adjacent or to bombard non_ adjacent units which are 1I0t under attack fro m ad­jacent hexes.

[8.73] A rti llery units may never supply FPF to police units (regardless of nat ionality). Artillery units may not partkipate in a combined allack unless at least one of the adjact"nt allacking units involved in the combat is a non-police unit.

[8.74] Air Ground Support Points may be used to support any Friendly non-police units. T hey arc not subject to the restrictions ofg. 71 and g.72.

18.8J POISON GAS (Oplional) [8.111) Warsaw Pact artillery units (only) may firt" poison gas at NATO units or unoccupied hexes. The Warsaw ['act P layer simply decla res that he is firing poison gas. The effects of the gas arc applied immediately, regardless of any combat effects which may (or may not) occur in the hex being fi red upon. Gas may not be fired into he~es which already contain a gas marker.

[11.112) A gas marker is immediately placed in the hex being fired upon. The marker remains in the hex unt il the end of the Gamc-Turn following that in which the gas "'as fired (i.e. a gas marker placed in Game-Turn 2 would be removed at the end of Game-T urn 3).

[8.Il) The MP COSt \0 enter a hex containing a gas marker is doubled. In night Game-Turns. the COSt for entering the hex would be tripled (rather than Quadrupled) to simulate the combined effects of night and gas.

[8.84[ During the Game·T urn in which the gas marker is placed in a hex, all allacks against units occupying that hex are resolved 2 colu mns higher on the Combat Reliults Table than would normally be manda ted by the Combat Differential for the allaek.

[8.85] During the Game-Turn following that in which a gas marker was placed in a hex, all atlaeks against units occupying that hex arc rnolved I col­umn higher on the Comba1 Results Table than would normally be mandated by the Combat Dif­feremial for the allack.

III.g6] Supply may not be traced through a hex containing a gas marker.

[8.87) The Warsaw Pact Player may fi re gas at hexes occupied by Warsaw Pact units only as a form of FPF. In this case. a die i.~ rolled. On a roll of 1-4. the unit receiving FPF recei~es a 2-column shift in its favor on the Combat Results Table and the effects of 8.84 are ignored for that P layer-Turn only. The I-column defender penalty for defend­ing in a gassed hex is applied on succeeding Player­Turns. If the resUlting die roll number is 5-6. the effects of g.1I4 arc applied normally.

[8.88[ Artillery unhs which fire gas apply their Barrage alld FPF Strengths 10 any t"ombats in the hex again~t which they are firing gas juSt as if they were firing a normal barrage or FPF mission. The effects of the gas are applied in addition 10 the ef­feclS of normal fire.

(11.89] Only Warsaw Pact artillery ullits may fire gas. NATO arti llery units do not have this capaci­ty. No air ground support points of either side may be considered to be employing gas.

NOI~: T his is a (very) optional rule. T here is some debate as 10 whether the Warsaw Pact would use poison gas against a populated area. Further. usc of the gas rule gives the Warsaw Pact a huge (a lmost insurmountable. ill fact) advantage. The rule is included simply as a mailer of speculative interest.

[9.0] AIRPOWER GENERAL RULE: Air power in the game is represtnted by the alloca· tion of Ground Support Points on a T urn by T urn basis. Only the Warsaw Pact Pla)'er receives Air Points except during NATO Emergency Rein­forcement Turns. Warsaw Pact Air Point alloca­tions are listed on the Turn Record TraCk. Players record the use of Ground Support Points by plac­ing the Ground Support markers providl'd on the units being assisted or a llacked by the Ground Support Points. Ground Support Points arc presumed to fly in from off the map. T hey do not operate from on-map airbases.

PROCED URE:

Ground SuppOrt Points may be used during an~ Combat Phase in the same manner as arti llery, and can function as Barrage Strength and F1'F. They may nOlo however. barrage attack Enemy units ex­cept as part of a combined attack. t;Jlllmple: A Player has 10 Ground Support Points allocated in a given Game-Turn. When he is the Phasing Player he may use thest Points as Barrage Strength Points. When he is the non-Phasing Player he may use these same Points as FPI'. The Player Places a number of markers equal to the number of Points being allocated directly on the hn where they will be employed.

CASES:

[9.I J RESTRICnONS ANI) PROIIiHITIONS

[\l . 1 I] One Ground Support Poi nt equals one Ar­tillery Strength Point (both Barrage and FPF).

[\l . Il ) A Player may assign any number of his available Ground Support Points to a target unit. or he may split them up between targets.

[9.1l] Ground Support Points hale unlimited range. They may anad;: an) Enemy unit on the map. The)' are nO! subject to the restrictions of g.7.

[9. 14] Ground Support ]'oi ll! ' may not be ac· cumulatcd from Game·Turn to Game·Turn . If they are nO! llsed in thc Turn allocatoo, they arc los!.

19. 151 No Player e":r receives Ground Support Points on night Game-Turns. Air superiorit)' is determmoo normally during night Game-Turns, howeler.

[9.2] AIR SU PERIORITY 19.21[ During Tums in which the NATO Player has air superiority, the Warsaw Pact Player may not recehe any AIr Ground Support Poinu. He may nO! use airlanding, aIr ~upp l)'. or paradrop options Ihat turn. Only NATO airlandmg and aIr supply l.s possible. ~pite the presence of NATO parachUle units in the game, no NATO paradrop operations aree\"er posSible. e~en when NATO has air superiority.

19.22) During all Game-Turns except Ihose during which the NATO Player has air superiority. the War~w Paci Player is considered to have air superion\ Y. The NATO Player achiel·es air superiority as a rC'Suh of a dice roll of II or 12 on lhe Remforcemelll Table (printed on the map). NATO air superiority lasl$ only for one Game­Turn (but may be achie,·ed again Oil new dice rolls of II or 12 on the Reinforcement Table). During Turns in which the NATO Player has air superiori· ty. only NATO airlanding and air supply opera­tiolls arc permined. During Turns ill which lhe Warsaw Pact P layer has air superiority. only War­saw Pact airlanding. air supply. alld paradrop operations are permilled.

[1O.0J COLLATERAL DAMAGE

GENERAL RULE: Whenever the concentration or e1lplosives employed against a given he~ reaches a critically high level. there is a chance lhat collateral damage will resuh in the hell . Collateral damage represents the rubbling of buildings, blOl;king of roads, and obliteralion of landmark! used for sighting and fire ,orrec!ion. Collateral damage has Ihe effect of maklllg a hu more difficult 10 move through and easier to defend.

PROCEDURE: Whenever the tOla l number of Anillery and Oroulld Suppon Barrage and FPF Slrength Poims of both sides firing into a he~ equals or uceedJ the number In the Ieft-mO$! column for thaI lerrain type on the Collateral Damage Table. the Phasing Player must roll a die. The resulting die roll number is indued with the column representing the number of Artillery and Ground Support Points firing into the hex (found by reading along the row of numbcTl for thaI he~ Iype until a number is found which equals Ihe strength of the units of both sides firing illl0 the hex). The imer-5«lion of tile die roll hne with the eolumn representing Fire Strength ~ields a re!iul1. That result will be either "-" (no effect) or "d" (Col­lateral damage). If collateral damage results, a Ruin marker is placed in the hex. T he hex then functions as a "ruin" hu and the MP costs and combat shifts for rulllS arc added to the normal MP eO$ts and combat shifts for the he~.

CASES: (10.1] now COLLATE RAl- DAMAG E

IS ":Ht:(.T lm 110.11 ] All ,ollatcral damage chech are made in­dividually u an imegral part of the combll pro­cedure for a particular combat. Checks arc made and results arc applied after retrealS and advances are ellecuted. bUI before going on to resolle any other combats.

110. 12] Wilen more than one hell is being at lacked III the same combal. a smgle eollaleral damage check is made for bOlh he~C"'l. The die is rolled once and modified according to the lerrain in each in· dividual hex attacked. II is thus possible for Olle hn allacked to surrer collateral damage while another hell allacked in the same combat is unaf­fected due 10 a difference in modifiers affecting the die roll.

[10.2] WHIC H HEXES CAN INCUR COLLATERAL IlAMAGE

Only urban, industrial, suburban. fore~t. rough. and park he~es arc checked for collateral damage. No (It her hexes ~u ffer col1alC'ral damage ullder any circums13nces.

]10.3] TERRAIN U 'n :CTS ON COLLAn~RAL DAMAGE

The effects of terrain arc ineorporaled into the Collateral Damage Table. Only Ihe row of numbcrs corresponding to the t)·pe of terrain m the hell being fired into is used when allempting 10 find the column correspollding to the Fire S!rclIglh direcled against Ihe hell.

]10.4] LIMITATIONS ON COLLATERAL DAMAGE

A hex may only suffer collateral damage once dur­ingthe game. A hex containing a "ruin" never ac· quires a s«ond Ruin marker. No collateral damage check is ever made for a hex which con­tains a Ruin marker.

[10.5] O ..... ECTS 0 .. · RUIN ON EXISTING TERRAIN

110.5 11 Roads cease to function in Ruin he~C"'l. Ruin helles may nOl be entered at the road move· ment rate.

1I0.52J Autobahns cominue to function in Ruin helles. Ruin hexes may be entered at the Autobahn movement rate (sec S.23).

(10.5J] The functioning of bridges. ferries. alld border hCllsides is unaffected b~ the presence of ruins.

{l0.54] U-Bahns continue 10 function in ruin hexes. Ruin helles may be entered al the U·Oahn mo~emem rate. (See 5.24.)

110.55] T he o~era ll terrain Iype of the hcx is flOI allered by collaleral damage. Places represented by special symbols contained within lhe hex (supp­ly, barracks. etc.) continue to function. t:Xetp· lion: 10.73. Movement alld combat effects assessed as a result of the presence of a Ruin marker are in addition to those effects assessed for the hell'S normlililerrain fealures.

[10.6] COLLATt:RAL DAMAG .. : TARLE (sec mapshcct)

[10.7) FIRE.STORM (10.7 11 Arti11cry or Air Points auading or firing at a POL (Pet rol·Oil· Lubricants) hell ha~e their Barrage Strengths tripled for purposes of deter­mining collateral damage. If the hell suffers col­lateral damage. a Fire Marker is placed in the hex. The Fire Marker remains in the hex untllthe end of the Turn fo11owinglh81 in which it was placed. at which lime the marker is replaced by a ruin. Any unit occupying the hex when the Fire Marker is

placed in it is immediately eliminaled. A Unil ""hieh allempts 10 retreat as a result of combat out of a ha containing a POL s~mbol is destroyed if Ihe hell suffers collateral damage as a result of thaI combat.

[10.72] Hexes containing Fire Markers may 1101 be entered by any unit for ally reason. Once the Fire Marker is remOI·ed, the hex may be entered nor­mali)'. It is treated as a ruin . Supply may nl){ be traced through a ha containin. a Fire Marker.

[10.7J] Once a he~ has suffered a fire effect. it may nClcr agam be subject to fire. The POL sym­bol in the he~ is considered destroyed (unlike a normal ruin in which the basic terrain type is altered bUI Ihe symbols still e~ist). The other sym­bols in the hell (supply. barracks, objeclive) still count for purposes of assessing cily comrol and 'Surrender Pom/s, but hal'e no effect on the game for any other purpose.

[10.741 AI the beginmng (If each Player-Turn. the Phasing Player rolls one die for each POL hC')! which is adjacent 10 a hex contlining a Fire Marker alld which is not separa ted from that hu by a water he~side. On a die roll or I through 3. the fire spreads 10 the hex for which the die is tolled. A Fire Marker is placed in the hell and it is treated in all ways as if it had just suffered a collateral damage result.

[II.OJ UNTRIED UNIT STRENGTH

GENERAL RULE: All units ellcepl artillery units arc unlried . This means that when untried units are deployed on the map. they arc placed on the sideoflhe coumer lhat shows only a capital "U" (inslead of combat strengths) and the unit's Movcment Allowance. Neither Player wi ll know thccxact value of an un­tried unit until the unit is aboul to engage in com­bat. Artillery units have a lag Oil the back oflheir counter indicating their !y~ and the superior (01'_

mation to which they are attached. They do not, howel'er. ha'·e an "Untried" state.

PROCEDURE: Units rcmain in an untried state unti l involl·ed in combat. Once a unit has been comm illed to com­bal - arler the allocation of all Barrage, Final Protective Fire, and Ground Support Points - the true strenglh of the unit is revealed by nipping the counter ol·er 10 its combat side. Once unilS ha'e bc-cn eomml1led to combat. they may flOt be: withdrawn. elen if - because of the re'·ealed strengths - the combat has now b«ome un· favorable to the Phasiflg Player. Reillforcemeni s always crucr the map in their untried state. (Nott: A unit with a strength of "0" equals iii

strength of "I" for exchange purposes.)

[12.0J BRIDGE DEMOLITION GENERAL RULE: Allhe inSlanl Ihe first Warsaw Pact unit movt'S in-10 a hn or Wt'S1 Berlin of""hich one (or more) hell' sides is a bridge, the NATO Player, at his option. may altempt to demolish the adjacent bridge(s). A die is rolled once ptr hellS ide 10 S«' if the bridges in thaI hexside arc demolished. If the NATO Player docs not ellercise this opllon whcn a Warsaw Pact unit first moves adjacent to Ihe bridge he may not allempt 10 demolish that bridge for the rest of the game. Demolition is emirdy al Ihe option of the NATO Player: he is never forced to Dltempt demolition.

R7

RB

PROCEDURE: A die I~ rolled for demolition immfiil31dy. no mallcr "'lIai Ihe Phase .... hClH:lc:r Ihe: firs! Warsaw Pact unit mOles or retreats into any ht.~ of which Ihe: bridge forms a side:. A die: roll of I, 2. or ] by lilt' NATO Player demolishes 1he- bridge:. If demolilion of a bridge sut'Ct<'ds. note is im· mediately made of Iht faci that tile bridge no longer CXi5U. The hcxsidc is treated as if i1 werc a normal walCT hexsidc. This cliangt in Ihe stalus of Ihe htxsidc is tff«l ivc im mediately. A Destroyed Bridge' marker is used 10 indicate IhoSt' bridgts which no longer exist.

If demoliTion of a bridgl' d~s nOI suctc'C'd, the bridge is considered 10 be intact for the remainder of the pme:. No a1!cmpl may be made 10 deslroy 11Il' bridge a1 any olher pc:!inl in the game.

[13.0] REINFORCEMENTS GENERAL RULE: Both Players may receive reinforcementS depend­ing upon the scenario. T hese appear during the owning Player's Movemem Phase on the Game­Turn indicated on the Reinforcement Schedule for Ihat scenario. The Reinforcement Schedule states Ihe number and types of units received (including suenglhs). Warsaw Paci units may arrive via air_ landing or par.drop. NATO units may only arrive via air landing.

PROCEDURE: During his Movement Phasc, the owning Player places reinforcement units on Jhe map within the limitations of 13.2 and/or 18.0. Airlanded units may be placed at any time during the Movement Phase of arrival. Paradropped units may be placed only at the end of the Movement Phase (Ihey can­not move during the Turn in which they are dropped).

CASES:

(13.1] RESTRICTIONS ON REINI-'O RCEM ENTS

[13. 11 [ The Warsaw Paci P layer may deliberately withhold reinforcements from Game-Turn to Game-Turn. bringinglhem into play (if at all) on some later T urn. NATO emergency reinforcemenl$ may nOI be withheld. They must appear during theiT scheduled arrival turn or not at all. The NATO Player may not refuse to accept emergency reinforcements. He mUSI altempt to bring them in_ to play if possible.

11l. IlI Untillhey enter the map. reinforcements ha'e no effect on play. They may in no fashion at­tack Enemy units or hinder Iheir mo~·ement.

(13.2] AIRlAN DlNG REINI-'O RCEMf: NTS

[0 .211 All NATO reinforcements must be air­landed. I r Ihey cannOt be: airlanded for any reason. they may nOt enter the game. Soviet paratroop unilS may voluntarily enler the game via airlandillg instead of paradrop (see 18.0).

[0 .221 To alrland a unil, it is necCS$lry locontrol an airfield. Up 10 nine units may be airlanded on a Friendly F1ushQjcn . Up 10 thrcc units may be landed on a Friendly FluWIQI:t, Flushiifen have control towers attached. There arc Ihrcc of these: Templchofand Tegel in West Berlin and Schone· feld in East Germany. The four smaller (I to 4 hues) FlusplQ/l type airfields include: Gatow in West Berlin and Johannesthal (East Berlin). Staa· ken and Schonwalde in East Germany. Airlanded units are placed on any hex of the airfield on which they land. They may move up to hal( their Move­ment Allowance (round down) during the Turn in which they arc airlanded. Notc: Some units rna)'

be: placed on thc airficld and then mo,ed after which other Ul1lts may be airlanded on Ihe same hu(es).

113.13] An airfield is Friendly for airlanding pur­~ ifit was Friendly at the start of the game(sce 19.44) andlor if Friendly units were the last to move through all hexes of the airfield 3nd any ad­jacelll control tower hell.

[13.241 Air!anding may only take place during a Turn in which the airlanding Player has air superi­o rity. T he Warsaw Pact Player has air superiority (sec 9.2) during all Game-Turns CJlcept those in which the NATO Player is receiving emergency reinforcements. During those Turns. the NATO Player has air superiority. Units may be airl3nded during night Game-Turns.

113.25] Reinforcemenu which arrive in an Enemy Zone of Control may nOt mo'e during thc Game­Turn of arrival.

[14.0] SUPPLY GENERA L RULE: All units arc either in supply or out of supply. If in supply they funclion normally. If out of supply they suHer a diminuation in their ability 10 con· duct combat and move.

PROCEDURE: In order for a unit to be in supply, il must be: pos.si­ble to tracc a line of supply from that unit to a sup­ply source. Supply is determined althe beginning of the Mo"ement Phase and at the moment of each combat during each Player-Turn.

CASES:

(1 4.11 SUPPLY SOU RCES 114. 11] A West Berlin police unit is in supply if a line of supply can be: traced to any supply hex in Wr-st Berlin.

[14. 12] All other NATO units arc in supply if a line of supply can be traced to a barracks hex in Wl:$t Ikrlin.

[14. 13] A Soviet or East German unit is in supply if a supply line can be: traced to a Friendly road or Autobahn hCJI on any mapcdge.

[14.14] During Turns in which a Player has air superiority (sec 9.21 his non-police units may traCe supply to any airfield which could be used by him for airlanding purposes.

(14.2] TRACING ti NES or SUPPLY [14.21] A line of supply may be traced only through Friendly tra,crscable hexes which arc not in an Enemy ZOC. Supply may be traced across water hexsides (but nOt through lake helles). A line of supply may be: of any lenllth. The presence of a Friendly unit in a hell negates Enemy ZOC's for purposes of ITadnll supply (only). A hex is Friend­ly to a Player's units if it was "held" by the Player at Ihe beginning of the game or if Friendly units wefe the last to move thrOUllh the hex (see 19.44).

[14.22J Supply may be: traced through a U- Sahn hex which is in an Enemy zoe by using thc U-Sahn (as if supply were a unit mo' ing through the hCJI) if Friendl)' unils ...-cre the last to paSli through thaI U-Bahn hex (sec 15.0).

114.23] NATO supply may nOt be traced through more than one border hexside.

[14.24] Supply may not be traced through helles containing Firc or Gas markers. The presence of fire or gas in a hex supercedes all Olher terrain in thc hex for the purposes of tracing supply. Thus, the U- Bahn could not. for nample, be used 10 trace supply through a hex containing a Gas Marker.

(14.3] SUPPLY EHECTS [14.3 IJ A unit which is out of supply at thc Mlin· ninll of the Movemcnt Phase has its Movement Allowance halved (round down) for the duration of Ihe Phase. II does not regam full mo,emcnt capacity that Phasc e.,.en if it subsequcntly mo'" into supply.

[14.321 A unit which is unsupplied at the moment of combat suffers 3 2-column shift in favor of the opposillg Pla~er. Unsupplied units IIIDy n01 employ the "They Shall Not Pass" option.

6-2-18 ·8~ 1-IO i!i

[t4.33J Arttllery units v.hich arc out of supply may nOI provide FPF and may not barrage allack non-adjaccnt units. Warsaw Pact artillery units which arc out of supply may no\ employ the "Gas" option.

[15.0] T HE U·HAHN GENERAL RULE: The U-Bahn (Sub"'-'ay) which runs under both Eut and West Berlin is usable to circumvent Encmy ZOC's for purposes of movement and supply and to move through hexes at a slightly fastCT rate . Whenfvcr a unit enters a U-Bahn hex via a U· Bahn hexside, the Player may state thatthc unit is mov· ing via the U-Bahn. The unit then entcrs the hex at the U·Sahn rate and ignores all ZOC's and hells ide crossing cosu. Both sides may usc the U·Bahn freely. Atthe end of its Movement Phase. any unit which has bcen using U-Bahn movement is con­sidcred to be: abo"c ground.

[16 .0] NIGHT GAME-TURNS GENERAL RULE: Every third Turn is a nillht Game·Turn (tinted on the Turn Record T rack). During night Game· Turns. the normal rules arc modified to account for the confusion of night fighting. lack of air sup· port. and increased abilil~ of units 10 infiltrate and exfiltrate along thc front line.

CASES:

(16.1] AtR )' OWER AT NIGHT

[16. 111 Neither side may rexei\'e or usc Air Ground Support Points during night Game· Turns. Air superionty (sec 9.2) is dctermined nor­maliy, hov.c,er.

[16.121 Airlanding and air supply operatIons (but not paradrops) arc pt'rmillcd at night. Only the Player who has air superiorilY may conduct these types of operat ions.

]16 .2] NIG UT MOVEM ENT 116.21 J The MP cost for cntcring all terrain t~pes and crossing all hexside types is doubled during night Gamt-Turns.

/16.22] Unns which bt-gin their Player·Turn to an Enemy Zonc of Control during a night Game­Turn may exit that Enemy ZOC by Disengagement at a COSt of 2 additional Mo,'ement Points. Thcy must SlOp upon cnterinll another Enemy ZOC. Units using the Disengagement option may nOt move directly from one Enemy-controlled hcx into another Enemy-controlled he~. They may nit an Enemy ZOC only into a hex which is not Enemy­controlled.

[17.0[ NATO EMERGENCY REINFORCEMENTS

GENERAL RULE: Beginning Wilh Game-Turn 2 and on any suc­ceeding Game-Turrls, Ihc NATO Player may choose 10 roll for NATO emergency reinforce_ melllS. He may continue 10 toll for rcinforccmcllls during each G ame-Turn thaI a ccase fire is not in effecl unlil he either receives land (n01 air) rein­forcements or rolls a 2-j result on lhe Reinforce­ment Table, after whid\ he may not roll for rein­forcements for the remainder of lhe game. The NATO Player is never forced 10 roll for reinforce­menu. Ho ..... ever. once he rolls the dice, he is obl i­gated 10 abide by Ihe resul!. Reinforccmems arc of twO Iypes: air and land.

PROCEDURE: T",'o diet arc rolled secretly before the Warsaw Pact Movcmcm Phase. but afler the Warsaw Pact Player has had [he option to offer '; Honors of War" alld the resuh correspolldillg to their tota l is found on the Re inforcement Table. This result is applied immediately. If a "No reinforcements" resuit is receh'ed, the NATO Player is not obligated to inform the Warsaw Pact Player of this fa ct. HI' may "fake" a reinforcement dice roll on succeedillg Game·T urns. If any reinfofcmcnt is received (induding air rei llforcement), the NATO Player must immediately inform the Warsaw Pact Player of this fact. Regardless of the results of sue· ceeding die rolls, the NATO Player is considered to have air superiority during the entire Turn du r­ing which he receives reinforcements (induding just Air Ground Suppon Points).

CASES:

[17. 1] REI Nl-OHCEMt:NT TABLE RESU LTS

No Reinforcements. The NATO Player is inform_ ed by NATO HQ. Belgium that no reinforcement will be fonhcoming. He receives no reinforce­ments and may nOt roll for emergency rein­forcements for the remainder of the game. He may continue to roll the dice each Turn, but may never receive any reinforcements, regardless of the result.

No Ufrcl. The NATO Pla)'er receives no rein· forcement, but may roll for emergency reinforce­ment during succeeding Game·T urns.

Air Support. The NATO Player receives an emergenc)' reinforcement of 6 Air Ground Sup­port Points which he may use during both Combat Phases of that Game-Turn only. NATO has air superiority for the entire Game-Turn. Air Points are not received during night Game·Turns, but NATO;s still considered to have air superiority.

Air Support ~nd J~gerbrigllde . The NATO Player receives an emergenq reinforcement of 6 addi ­tional Ground Support Points alld has ai r superiority for the duration of the turn. In add i­tion . NATO HQ dispatches the 10th Jagerbrigade to Berlin as an emergency land reinforcement. A d ie is rolled. On a roll of 1-2, the reinforcement;S recci\'ed on any eligible airfield via airlanding. On a 1, the reinforcement is forced to abort due to heavy Warsaw Pact air activity and the reinforce­ments arc permanently los!. There is no other adverse effect. On a roll of 4-6, the entire Jager­brigade (7 units) is considered destroyed in the air. The unil5 count as losses for Surrender Point determination. There is no other ad~ersc: effecl.

[17 ,2] REINFORCEMENT PROHIHITIONS

(17.2I r If all or some of the 7 units of the 10th Jagerbrigade cannot be a irlanded due to a lack of

airfield capacity, they a re j)eonanently lost as if they had been forced to abor1 their mission.

(17.221 There is no effect on the receipt of Air Points or the establishment of a ir slIperiority due to a failure (for any reason) to receive emergency land reill forcements.

117.23] Once a 12 has been rolled on the Rein· forcement Table, the NATO Player may Jlever again roll for cmcrgenc~' reinforcements, regard­less of the resllits of the second die roll or his own inability 10 airland the reinforcements.

[17.3] REINrORCEMENT TABLE (see mapshcet)

[18.0) PARATROOPS GENE RAL RULE : The Warsaw Pao Player receives paratroops at the beginlling of the game which may enter the game as reinforcements on anyone Game-Turn during which the Warsa ..... Pact Player has air superiori ty. Paratroops may enter the map via airlanding o r paradrop. Any number of paratroops may be paradropped during anyone Game-Turn in which air superiority is achieved. Once any paratroop unit has paradropped, no fu rther paradrops may be initiated on succeeding Turns. Paradrops may be conducted on only one turn per game.

PROCEDURE: Atthe end of his Movement Phase and after com­pleting all movement for that Turn. the Warsaw Pact Player may announce a paradrop. He places all of the units which are to paradrop in their drop hexes and then rolls two dice for each un it on the Survival Table (lS.S). The tOlal is then modified for terrain and Enemy ZOC's. On an adjusted roll of" I" or less the IInit is destroyed. On a roll of "2." "3," or "4" the un it scatters. On a roll of 'T' or greater the unit lands successfull y on target. If the unit sca tters . the Scatter Diagram (18.1) is consulied and a die is rolled to determine the direction of scatter. The unit scatte rs into the adjacen t hex ind icated by the die Toll number.

CASES:

[18 .1] SCATIER DlACRAM (see mapshect)

[18 .2] PARATROOP DESTR UCfION A paratroop unit ..... hich begins the Combat Phase of the T urn in whkh it was dropped stacked with any other unit, including another paratroop unit, is destroyed. Non·paradrop un it~ which begin a Combat Phase stacked with paratroop units are unaffected. A paratroop unit which begins the Combat Phasc of the Turn in which it was dropped in a lake hex or a hex with a Fire or Gas Marker is destroyed. Destroyed paratroop units arc perma_ nently removed from play. They may nOl drop again. When a paratroop unit is destroyed as a result of scatter o r a fa ilure to survive its drop, the unit may nOt be considered to have made any hex Friendly prior to destruction.

118.3] DROP ELIGIBILITY A paratroop unit may only drop once per game. Only a paratroop unit may exercise this option. Paratroops may ne\cr enter the map except by paradrop or airlanding (sec 13.0).

]18.4] FIRST TURN RESTRICTIONS 1111.4 1] Para troops may not move except as a result of combat during the turn in which they arc paradropped.

(18.42] Paratroops may not be targeted to land on a hex containing lake terrain or a hex occupied by another unit or a Fire or Gas Marker. Only one

unit may be targeted to paradrop into a particular hex during a Turn.

118.43] Paratroops arc in supply during their en­tire Turn of arri~al when paradropped.

(18.5] SURV IVAL TABLE (see mapshcet)

[ 111.6] SURV IVAL MODII: I£RS ( \8.61 ] One is added to the survival d ice roll of H

unit dropping into an open or airfield hex.

(18.62] One is subtraC1ed from the survival dice roll of a unit dropping imo an industrial or subur­ban hex.

(18.63] Two is sllblraCted from the survi~al dice roll of a un it dropping into a rough hex.

[18.64] Three is sub1racted from the survival dice roll of a unit dropping into a forest o r urban hex.

11 8.65] A modified dic roll number greater than " 12"' is read a5 "12." A modified die roll number less than" I" is read as "I."

118.66] A summary of all survival d ice roll modifiers for lena in is included under the "Survi­val" column of the Terrain Effects CharI.

118.67] A paradropped unit which is ploued to land in the Zone of Comrol of an Enemy un it sub­tracts 2 from its survival d ice ro ll.

[19.0) "HONORS OF WAR" GENERAL RULE: The Warsaw Pact Player may attempt to induce a NATO surrender by offering the " Honors of War. ,. Depending upon the currem military sit ua· tion, the NATO Player may be forced by the NATO high command (for humanitarian reasons, if no others) to accep1.

PROCEDURE: At the beginnillg of any Game·Turn (before emergency reinforcements are checked for), the Warsaw Pact Player may choose to offer Honors of War. If he does, a column on the Honors of War Table is found which is equal to o r less than the IOtal number of Surrender Points recorded on the Surrender Poim Record Track on 1he map· sheet (use the column which most nearly approxi­mates the total, but does not exceed it). Two dice are ro lled and their tota l is indexed with the proper column on the Honors of War Table. The results arc in effect for the entire TUTU.

CAS ES:

[19.1 ] RES ULTS (19. 11 ] A "8" reSll1! means that for the duration of that Game-Turn , one side or the other reccl"es an addilional one column shift (plus or minus at the discretion of the Player using the shifl ) for pur· poses of resolving combat involving adjacent units. The die is rolled a second time to see which side gets the bonus shift. On a 1·3, the NATO Player gets the shift: 4-6 lhe Warsaw Pact Player benefits. Bonus shifts may be employed both when allacking and when defending. This shift represents the morale effects that negotiations have on the troops.

(19.121 A "C" result means that there is a possi· bility of either a surrender or a cease fire. A die is ro lled. On a roll of 1-3, a cease fire is in effect. No units may be rnovcd and no combat may be resolv­ed. The entire Turn is skipped. TheTurn Marker is advanced one TuTtt and thc game cominues. On a ro ll of 4-6, the NATO Player surrenders, the game ends immediately, the city falls, and viclOry is evaluated.

R9

R10

, ' 9.1l1 An "5" Tl;'Suh mtans that lhert' is a passi. bilil)' of a NATO surrender. A die is rolled and NATOsurrc:nders on a roll of 4·6. Any other roll is a "No Erf~l" and play proceeds normally.

, 19. 141 A " - I." " - 2," "+1." "+2" means thai the second die roll is modifi~d by thai number.

119.21 RESTRI CTIONS [ 19.1 1\ The Honors of War may be offered at any lime after T urn I. Honors of War may bc offered once per Turn on any number o f T urns duringlhe game. A result on the lable d~ nO! prohibit the Warsaw Pact Player from making II new allcmpl nexl Turn. HOlol('\'l'r, for each Tu rn in which Honors of War art offered lind the result is nO! a NATO surrender, the Warsaw '>act VP lotal is reduced by 20 points.

119.31 I-IONORS Ot' WAR TARtE (~ map!lhC'Cl)

r:=lRr=li-=l ~~~~ 1111.4) SURRENDER IlO INTS (19.4I J Surr~nd~r Points are awarded rhe War\aw I'acr l'luy~r during lhe game for desrroying Enemy units and/or hold ing rerrain. The Warsaw l'aCl Play~r records his Surrendcr POllin on th~ Surr~n­der Point Record TracL The NATO I' la)'er recei\es "negati\e" Surrendn Points .. hich he adds 10 Ihe Warsa .. Pacl Player's total. Th~ Sur­r~nder POinl Markers ar~ mOH'(1 along Ih~ track 10 indical~ changes in Ih~ lev~1 of Points aecumu­laled. If Ihe NATO Player has accumulaled more pointS than the Warsaw Pa,'1 Player, the marker~ are lurned over 10 show Ihal Ihe number on Ihe track bnegali\'e.

119,"2] Th~ NATO Player recei,'es one Surrender Point for eaeh Warsa.. Pacl po[ic~ unil he dnlroys. 1"0 Surr~nd~r 1'011115 for ~ach Warsaw l'acl mechanized or anillery .. hich he dl:'$lroys, and lhree POIliIS for each Warsa" Pact p;lralroop ullil which he desl roys.

[19"'3] Th~ Warsaw PaCI P layer rec~ives one sur­render point for each Wesl !krlin police unil which he destroys and two Surr~nder 1'0il1l$ for ~ach NATO unir of any ()lher type "hich he deslroys. The NATO MI' unil is considered a mililary. nOI a polic~, unit.

[19 ..... 1 The Warsaw PaCI Pla),n r~c~ives one Sur­render Poinr for each objecli'e he~ or a irfield hell in Wesl Berlin ,,'hich h~ holds and twO PoinlS for c3ch Ir.lrracks he.' or ai r conrrollo .. er hc~ in W~SI

!krlin which he holds. Th~ NATO Playn may reduce the eurrent Surr~nder Point I~'~I b)' recap­luring OOjecli\e, airfield, air conrrol lo .. er. and barraeks hues. T he Surr~nder Point "alue of Ih~ rC('aplured hexes is sublracted from Ihe currenl Surrend~r Poinr le\eI. " Hold ing" a he:c. is defined as being Ihe last Playcr 10 mo\c Ihrough a h~:c. and/or having held lhe he:c. allhe beginning oflhc gam~. In all S(:enarios, hexcs in West Serl in 3re held by Ihe NATO Player allhe Slarl of lhe game, and all Olher hexes are held by the Warsaw Patr Player. Th~ h~xes which a Player holds arc t~rmed "Friendly" to that p[ayer,

119"'51 Honor$,of War may only be: orr~red when th~re is a rOlal of at least + 6 Surrend~r Poims ac­cumulaled.

[19.5J SU RREN!)ER l'O INTS RI-:CORD TRACK (S« mapsheel )

[20.0) VIC.TORY CONDITIONS

GENERA L RULE: The game end~ al Ihe end of Game-Turn 16 or "henever Ihe Warsaw l'acI Play~r al Ihc end of a Game-T urn has comrol of the dly of Wesl !krlin. Viclory is Ih~n delermrned according to 20.2.

CA SES:

[20. IJ CITY CONTROL [20.11] Th~ Wars.aw Pact P layer is considered to havc comrol of Ihe cily if he was Ihe las l lo entcr o r pass through all he.~es of lhe Gatow, Tegel, and T~mplehof airfi~lds (including Ih~ Teg~1 and Templehof ~-onlrollOwcrs). a ll obj~clh'e he~es and all barracks hues. or if NATO 5urr~nd~rs (S« 19.0).

120.2J VICTORY t:VALUATIQN [20.21 ] Victory is determined by awardinll the Warsaw Pacl Player Viclo ry Poinls for conlro ll inll Ihe d ly. T he Warsaw Pacl Player receives a number of Vic tory Poinls equal 10 Ihe number of non·pol ic~ uniu he has on th~ map when the dly falls multiplied by the VP multiple for Ih~Turn in .. ,hich Ihe city falls (5tt lurn rC('ord ITack). No VP's arc a .. arded if Ihe eily does nOl fall. Any Soviet mcch or airbornc divisions may be: wilhh~ld from Ihe gamc. All unilS of .. ilhheld divisions are worrh, VP's when Ihc cilY fa lls. r~ga rdlcss of Ihe Turn in which Ihat occurs. P reviously wilhheld unils may ne,'er Clllcr the game e)(cepl for Ihe Sovi~1 parachule dh'ision which may nller Ihe game al any limc IS a rcinforcemenl. Once Ihe p;lTachute division enlers Ihe game. it may no longer rC('eh'c Ihe VI' valuc for being withheld.

[20.22] The NATO Player recciH'S ~ VP's per Turn for each Turn during " hich on~ or more of his eligible arlillery unils "imerdicIs" Warsaw I'(ICI communicalions. An cligible unit is an anil­Icry unil wilhin range of Ihe raillinc belween he:c.es 0108 and 2302 "hich does nOI c.~C('ule any olher miuion durinl Ih~ NATO Combal PhaSt' and .. lIich is eligible 10 fire during Ihal PhaSt'. The NATO Pla)'~r announces Ihe ~xC('ution of Ih~ miS' slon and rC('ords Ihe VI' accumulalion al lhe end of lhe Phasc. NATO VP's ar~ recorded as negaliv~ numb<rs sublracted from the Warsaw PacI VI' lOla! a lthe end oflhc ganlc.

120.23] The NATO Pla)'cr receives 8 VP's per lurn for each Turn during "hich any NATO unn (of any Iype) occupies a hc:c. of Ihe rai l line bel .. ecn he)(CS 0108 and 2302. indusive. T hest- Poinu may be: awarded only once per T urn (r~gardless of how many rail line he:c.es are occupied) and are awarded in plact' of (nOl in add iT ion to) VP's awarded ac· cording to 20.22. T he uni l(s) occupying Ihe rail line need nOI be: in supply.

[20.24] The level of viclory is gh'en below depend· ing upon how many VP's th~ Warsaw Pact Play~r

has accumulated al lhe cnd of the game.

Warsaw PaCI l'.>e1;ishe Victory 200+

Warsaw PaCI Subslantl\~ Viclory

Warsaw Pact Marginal ViclOry

NATO Marginal ViClory NATO Subslanllve Viclory

NATO lkcish'e Viclory

[21.0) SCENA RIOS GENERAL RULE:

160- 199

120- U9 80-1 19 40-79

39 or less

T here arc lhrct> scenarios in Berlin: '&5. The in· Sl ruClions for each scenario i n clud~ histo rical nOles, delai ling br ieny t h~ ant icipa ted evenlS and

circum~tances of tll~ sc~nario; C'3eh sid~'5 initial order of bailIe and St'1'UP inslruclions: aller.tions in Ille ground supporr S(:hedule sho .. n on lhc Turn RC('ord Track; sc~nario I~nglh (in Game·Turns): special rules ill cffC(' t for Ihal scenario: and alt~ra­lions in Ih~ standard victory conditions.

Units wilh an unrned sid~ always beglll the S(:en· ario wilh Iheir unlried side showing. Units ar~ lisled by 5lr~ngth and t)'pe(a lett~r and numbe:r for most uniu; fi\c numbers for anillery). When mOf~ Ihan one unit of a lype is included in the order of ballic for a superior formalion (Le., Ihc 9 mechan­ized baualions in each Soviel mechanized divi­sion), Ihe Sl r~n8lh and type wi ll be fo llowed by lhe appropriale mu ltiple. Th~ Combat Str~n8lhs of unlried uniu are liven as "U. ,. The lellerabbrevia­tions used for unit types ar~ as follows: M _ Mech. anized, A - Artillery, T ~ Tank, R _ RC'COn, 1' _ Pol lC~, MP _ Military Police. I - Infanlr)'. PC - Parachule, AT _ Ami·Tank Artillery, SF _ Special Forces. E _ Engineer, HQ - Headquarlers.

t::Xamplt: T he 61h G uards Mechaniled Division would include nine mechanized ballalions and one rock~1 anillery unit porlrayed as fo llows: U· 12Mx 9, 4-O--20--1- IOA x 1.

CASES:

(21.1 ] OPf:RATION UNIT V HI510rin i Nolu: When th~ balloon goes up in Europe, the Warsaw Pacl planners wi ll be faced wilh Ihe d~dsion to dlher mounl an assaulr against the NATO ~ncla"e in !krl in or 10 mask Ihe cily and conrain any at­lempl by Ih~ garrison to sortie. If Ih~ir dc-cision is to assauir, il is Irkely Ihal Ih~ 201h Guards Army (reinforced) Will be lapped for Ihe job. To maxi­mize KCurily , Ihe assauh elemenls would probably mo,e up 10 Ihdr slarr linc for th~ assaull somctime in Ihe early morning and mov~ direclly from these: starl posilions to thc anack withoul benefil of ar­liller), prep;lralion. The scenario hegins in the seasonal mists of an August momin, .. ith 60,000 Warsaw Pact Iroops massing wilhin a fe'" kilom~t~rs of !krllll. Operalion UnllYls about 10 begin.

[21.1 1] ln ltl. 1 Stl-Up The NATO Player sels up all of his unil~ firSI. The Warsaw Paci Player scts up Ihe units he will usc in Ihe allack (wilhholding 3ny desired divisions). The Warsaw PacI Player mo\'es first.

T ht NATO Pla) t r·' Units

It'tst RtrHn Pullct Unitl: U-8P x 36. Sct up one per he:c. on any supply hues or air conlrol lower hexes in Wrsl Ikrlin. Uniftd Stutt'l Unltl: U- 12M x 3. U- 12E x I, U-S[ x 2, U-12SFx I, U· 12MP x I . U- I2HQ x I . [-1· 1 ~· 1 - 1 2A x 1. Sct up one per hex in any h~:c. wilhin t" o hexes tone imervening he~ ) of a barracks he:c. in U.S. lOne.

British Uni,s: U· 12M x 3. U-9PCx I. U-UR x I . 3-2· 14-2- 12A x 2. Sct up on~ per hex III any h~x within twO he~es (on~ imervenrng he~) of a bar­racks hex in STilish zone.

Frtnch Units: U- 12M x I, U· 12Tx I , U- I ~ R x I, 4-3·20·2· 12A x I . Sct up on~ per h~:c. in any hex within IWO hexes (on~ intervening he~) of a barrad.s hex in French zone.

The Wanllw l'.cl l'll )'u 's Urlils

' st EQn GtrmQn M«hQnh td I)il'i$ion: U-I2M x 9, 4-O--20- 1- IOA )( 1. Sct up one per he~ in any he:c.es of 1'015dam (3409, 3~09, 3~ I O, 3610,36 11 .371 0,3711. 38 10, 38 11 . 3911) .

14th Guards Mlc/wn/ztd I)II'/s/on: U- 12M )( 9 , 4-O--20- 1- IOA )( 1. & t up one per hell

in any hexes within thrce hexes of the southern mapedge. 19rh Soder Mcchal1iud Oil'ision: U-121\1 x 9, 4-0-20-1-IOA X I. Sct up one per hex in any hexes in hex rows 3hx, 38xx, 39xx north of he.uow xx l S, inclusive. SQ";er 6fh Gllards Mtchuniud lJil'ision: U- 12M x 9, 4-0-20-1-IOA x I. Sci up one per hex in any he.~es wilhin Ihree hexes of Ihe norlh mapedge. SUI'itt J4th Artillery O;,'/s;OI1: 6-2-18-1-IOA x 6. 5· 1 -2~- 1 - 10 x 3. Sci up one per hex in any hexes in East Germany or Easl Berlin within j hnes of any rnapedge. All units mUSI be sel up wilhin 6 hnes of each other. East Rerlin Police: U-SP x S. Sci up in any urban hex in East Bedin.

[21. 12) Reinforce rnenl Schedule

Wuuw ]>!lCI Rt inf" rct rn t nlS Tht SOI'itt IOJrtl Guartls Puruchute Oi"ision: U-6PC x 9. May arrive allY time 011 Game-Turn I or succeeding Turns via airlanding or paradrop.

NATO Reinfo rcemenlS The Wtsr German 10th Jagubrif(utle: U-12Mx5, 1-2-4-4-I2Ax I. 2·j-15-2-12Ax I. May arrive only as NATO emergency reinforce­menlS (see 11.0).

[2 1.1)) Ground Supporl Schedule See Turn Record Track on maps heel.

[l l.14[ Scenario l ength. The scenario is 16 Game-Turns long.

[21.1 51 SpedMI Rules

I. Warsaw Paci police unils may nut move or auaek umil Game·Turn Three.

2. The Warsaw Paci Player receives a combal bonus of IWO column shifls in both Combal Phases of Ihe firSI Game-Turn, This shifl is usable in allacks involvingadjacem unils only.

[2 1.1 61 Vie lory Condilions Sec 20.0

[21.2J OPERATION WEREWOLF Uislorical Noles: It is lale summer. ]985 . EuroP<' is in Ihe grip of war fever. Soviet supporl of Ihe OPEC boycou against America and Western Europe has led to increased East-Wesl friction. Economic and political con­niCt has generated military preparalions. In Ihe isolaled enclave of Wesl Berlin, lension is high as units of the 20th Guards Army mme inlO posilion on the perimeler of Ihe cily. The NATO training areas ill the weslern districts have bCt:ome collec­tion poinlS for neal rows of gleaming new APC's. their hatches dogged, Iheir markings oblilerated. For Ihree weeks heavy CrateS labelled ., Worldwide AmusemenlS: PariS" have been arriving al USAE's Berlin HQ. Sirangely enough, the likelihood of war has hardly affceled Berlin's tourisl industry. The Templehof lerminol daily te .... ms with new arrivals, deeply lanned, well­muscled ~oung men in ill-fiuing sporl coalS. Only a handful of people inside Berlin know Ihal Ihese new arrivals are pari of the 10lh Jagerbdgade. Operation Werewolf is in progress. When Ihe ex~ pected Warsaw Pact assault commences, there will be a surprise lurking wilhin the cily. (21.2 1) Inilial SCi-U p The inilial SCI -Up is identical to 12.11 with the following exceptions:

WeSI Berlin police unils ma~ be set up anywhere in West Berlin. They are nOI confined to selling up in supply and air control lower he~es. The 3 Soviet mechanized di~isions (19th, 141h GuardS, 6th Guards) and Ihe 34th Artillery Divi­sion may set up anywhere in EaSI Germany or East

Berlin nOI in an Enemy ZOC. The len units of a mechanized division mUSI all sel up within 12 hexes of each olher.

After all Warsaw Pact unilS hav .... set up, Ihe NATO Pla~er may set up Ihe following units con­slilUting Ihe ]Olh Jagcrbrigade an~where in West Berlin: U-12M x 5, 1-2-4-4-12A x I, 2-3-1 S-2-12A x t.

(21.22J Reinforcemenl ScheduLe The Reinforcemem Schedule is identicaL 10 2].12 wilh the exception Ihat NATO receives no lalld unilS as emergency reinforcements. Inslead, Ihe NATO Player receives 6 Ground Supporl Points and ma~ roll again for reinforcemenlS on any suc­ceeding Turn(s). In effecl. a " 12" on Ihe Rein­forcemcm Table is read as if it were an "] I" for purposes of this scenario on]~.

[21. 23) G round Support Schedule Sec Turn Record Track on map~heet.

12 1.24] Scenario i ,cngth The scenario is 16 Game-Turns iong.

121.25] Sptcial Rules t. NATO police units receive a one column shifl in Iheir favor on bOlh allack and defense Ihroughoul the game. This bOllus shift applies even when bOlh police and non-police units are in­vo]ved in the same combat. This rule represents Ihe a!lachmcnt of mililia 10 police companies dur­ing the period of lension which is assumed 10 precede the scenario. NOle: A quarter of a million Siands of arms have supposedly been slockpiled in Berlin for just this purpose.

2. NATO may demolish POL hexes in the same manner used to demolish bridges (12.0). Whenever a Warsaw Paci unit moves adjacent 10 a POL hex in Wesl Berlin, this option may be exercised.

121.26} Vfclo ry Condilions See 20.0.

[21.3J OPERATIO N MlOiCIN t: WH EEL llis lorinl Noles: II is 1600 houlS on day IWO or Ihe war between NATO and the WarS;!W Pacl. As Ihe twO behe­mOlhs wreslle 10 Ihe wesl. Ihe lOP level leadership of the isolated Berlin garrison meelS 10 discuss the implememalion of COl1lingenc~ plans for a mass raid illlo East Germany. The four brigades of Ihe secretly reinforced garrison are being masked by elemenlS of the 20th Guards Army. There is a pos­sibilily Ihat a strong enough thrusl can be mount .... d 10 CUI Ihe main eaSt-WeSt rail line running just soul h of thc city. Olher possibililies include the culling of Ihe road nelwork around Ihe enclave and a nuisance allack inlo Easl Berlin. Time is shorl, however, and any raid must be mounted wilhinlhe neXI 24 hours if il is 10 have any value at all for Ihe troops fighling to Ihe wesl. Outside the cil~. the Soviel screening force prepares 10 comain Ihe expeCled sonie. Behind their protective guns long columns of vehicles snake westward 10 rein­force the Warsaw Pacl assault on Germany.

121.3] ] Initial Stl -U p BOlh Players receive Ihe same inilial for~es as in 21.11 e~ceplthallhe Warsaw PaCI Player does nOI rttciv .... Ihe IOJrd Guards Parachute Division or Ihe lsi Easl German l\1eehaniled Division. The NATO Player selS up all of his police unilS nrsl anywhere in Wesl Bcrlin (nOt nceessarily on supply he~es) . Then Ihe Warsaw P3cl ]>Iayer sels upall of his unilS anywhere in EaSI Germany or EaSI Berlin. When all Warsaw Pact unils have been set up the NATO Player selS up all of his non-police unilS anywhere in West Berlin (regardless of zone). Unil s may set up in Enemy Zones of Conlrol. There is no Warsaw Paci Player Turn on the firsl Game-Turn. No units may ever be wilhhe]d from the inilial set-up in Ihis scenario,

(1 1.J 21 ReinforcemenlJ Neilher side receives reinforcemenls of any kind (including NATO emergency reinforcements). Emergency reinforc .... mems arc ne\'er rolled for in this scenario.

[2 1.3JJ Ground Support Seht dule The Warsaw Pacl Player receives a random nllmber of Air Ground Support Points each Turn during Ihis scena rio. The NATO Player never rec .... ives any Air Ground Supparl Points. The Ground Support Schedule on Ihe Turn Reeord Track is ignored. I nSlead, Ihe Warsaw Pact Player rolls a die at Ihe beginning of each Game·Turn. He receives a number of Ground Suppon PoinlS for use during Ihal Turn (on]y) \'ilualto !he resuiting number on Ihe die.

(2 ] .341 Scenario lrnRth The scenario begins on Game-Turn 7 and con· tillues for 10 Game-Turns (until the end of Game· Turn ]6).

12 1.35] Sptdyl Rules I. The "Honors of War" Table, Reinforcemem Table, Survival Tab]e. Scalier Diagram. and Sur­render Poims Re.::ord Track are nOI used in Ihis scenario. SeClions 17.0, 18.0. ]9.0 and 20.0 arc in· operative for purpos .... s of this scenario. 2. West Berlin police unils may enter Dolh EaSI Berlin and EaSI Germany and may trace supply Ihrough one border hexside. They may also elller Enemy ZOC's. 3. NATO (bul not Warsaw Pacl) units may exit Ihe mapedge during IheiT Movemelll Phas .... (only) by paying IWO additional MP's toexilthc mapcdge (regardless of the type of terrain in Ihe hex from which Ihey exit). Units may exil Ihe north. south and wesl (bu t nOI the east) mapcdges. 4. The Warsaw Paci Player's units are out of sup­ply at the beginning oflhe game. They remain out ofsupply untillhe Warsaw Pact Player succeeds in gelling a new "'supply priorilY." AI Ihe beginning of each Game·Turn starling wilh Game-Turn 8. Ihe Warsaw Paci Player may allempl 10 place his unilS in supply by rolling a die. On a roJi of 5 or 6, all Warsaw PaCI units remain unsupplied. On a roll of 1 ~4, Ihe Warsaw Pact IInils arc given a higher supply priority. Beginning on the Game­Turn after the new priorilY is achieved, all Warsaw PaCI unilS are considered to be in supply if they can meel the requiremems of 14.0. This new supply priorilY pertains for the remainder of Ihe scenario. If an allempt 10 achi .... ve a new supply priority is unsuccessful, a new allempl may be made on each succeeding Game-Turn unilithe priority is achkv­cd. ]f the NATO Player has occupied the rail line running belween 0108 and 2302 at any poinl in Ihe scenario. "I"' is sublracted from the die roll 10 achieve a new supply priority.

S. The Warsaw PaCI Player may demolish bridges in EaSI Germany and Eas! Berlin whenever a NATO unil firsl moves adjacent to those bridges. Th", melhod used is Ihe same as in ]2.0.

12 1.J6] Vlc lO ry Condilions The Victory Conditions in seclion 20.0 are in­operative for purposes of this scenario. Instead , both sides arc gi~en Victory Poims (Vr's) for destroying Enemy unilS and occupying lerrain. In addilion, the NATO Player recei"es VP's for ex­iling unils from Ihe map. VP's arc awarded according to Ihe following Viclory Poim Schedule: NATO VI" s: I VP

2 vr's

2 VP's

For ea~h East Berlin police unit deslroyed. For each Warsaw Pact non-police unit destroyed. For each NATO unil exited off the nOrih or west mapedge.

Rll

R12

1 Vp's

8 VP'!

, "P's

8 VP' s

WP VP 's;

For each NATO unit eJli led orr the south mapedgc.

For occupying an)' one hell of Ihe Autobahn nmnins between hues 0131 and 1440(bul nOI the branch road end­ing in hu (626) allhe end of the game.

For each Game-T urn during whkh onc or more hexes of the rail lirK: between heus 0108 and 2302 is inlerdicled by NATO arlillery fire.

Foreach Game-Turn durinll which one or more htxes of the- rail line between hexes 0108 and 2302 is occupied by one or morc NATO uniu al any lime dur­inllthe Game-Turn.

I VP For each West Ikrlin police unit destroyed.

2 VP' ,

2 v P 's

For tach non-police NATO unit destroyed.

For each barracks or obj«livc he~ in WtSl Berl in through " 'hich Warsaw Pact units wen: the lasl 10 pass or which is physically occupied by War-511111' Paci units althe end of the gamC'. If the NATO Player fails to occupy one hex of the Autobahn runni", btt .... etn he~"O I J I and 1440 at the end of the game.

For each full Game-Turn duri", which the NATO Playel fails to interdict or OC("upy one or more he.u s of the rail line btt .. ·etn htxts 0108 and 2302.

E~ited NATO units mUSt be: in supply at the end of the game 10 COUllt for NATO VP's.

Any e~iled uni ts for .... hich a line of supply cannot be: tract'd from their e~it htx to a ~alid supply source al the end of the game are considered eliminated and count double for purposts of War· saw Pact VP determination.

The Player with the higher VP total at the end of the ,arne is the .... inner. The level of victory is determined by the level of Victory Point susx-rior­ity achic\"C~d Over the Enemy. This is detcrmined by subtracting the lo ... er VP total from the high~ VP total and comparing the resulting numbe:r to the table be:low.

Mar,inal Victory Substantive Victory Strate,ic Victory

I· IS VP's IS-29 VP's 30 + VP's

DESIGN CREDITS Designer: JamH ~' . Llunnill:lln Physical Systems and Graphics: Rttlmond A. SlmonSfn Developer: Ib~ld bmts RUehle [)c1.·elopmcntal Assistant: Nick Karp Rules Editing: O .... d II tsStl Playtes t; ng: C hriJ tophu J)ulnnniud., Jon Gllutle r , Mk hael Georl" Gary G lllelle, I)lck Hammu . .. hlllp Marchal , lliot Mohde, ScOIl KO!itnthl l. Mark Starn. Sam Shermtr. JlmSlmon. Koger Ta) lor. Tim Robbins. Mu Wrissmln Production: Oa" r t:nglrr , MlISl lind Fruehtmlll , P. J . llendtrsnn, l 'w Koller. Ml nhN F. Mllkuhn. Mlchllel!-:. Moore. Rob N)"cr

+ ....

J; .. . J; .. ~ .. .. ,I .. .. -! .. ..

+

....

.... J; .. .. ..

+

+

....

....

....

....

....

....

....

.. ..

.... .. .. +It It It It It It Ita It It II * II II

II II

II * +lI * +lI II

* II * II II * * * * * * II * * * * * *

.. - .... -, .' .. .. ,:~,

't- 'i' .. ,,, .. " ; •. ;tit. .. !;'., .. 510,

;1-. " - iii: ; • . ~", .. r"

. 1 ' I ~ ' ." .... '" ~~ :l ~ ~t

't, .. '.

....

.... ....

.... ....

....

~ .. ". .. ~" """

III III

III III

III III

III III

III III

III III

, """."". of, ~ • !J" 11-;1 h· ..' --. :." . .

'-I '1-,-it. "" ""

0 ' .1 ~I' 0,,:';' C OO ~ .. I

0 ' ....

~i' .~,.

~r ~,.

III III III

III III III

~'T "

III III III III III III

!Ul: ,UI: !Ul: "Ut

lUI; ,Ui:

", ... ,

: ( ,~. , , ~i; ~II

:; •

f." ,II F~ ~ ~-;

c·.. " .. iI' .. 1Jo

f ~I,

~II fl'

~IJ ~ II

~II ~ ••

... i I ~I ~I '

~I' ~!

a-,,' a ~!

~t 'I. a· ~I 0,1_ °, . . '.

i 1

Murin, Hf1Ius ll r lkgplers

A spt ,r und has be- n prOp! 'Ild t( help proter;:t the rE ,If areas of US dIVISIOns frr.. the for mldabl8 Tht"-'lt ,wmoblte capabllitv bv g', '09 US monars the capaC'lv to saturatE! enemy LZ" w'th high teOSIIa I1ref19th cables destgl1ed to enSn3.e rotor bl,,J .. , Theconoopt IS lor Itn HE round w,!l1a $matter thlln normal charge, tUTle luse, /lnd two compa'lmllf\11 containing lengths of synthet,C cable lSim!l{,r 10 lhe Iype found In raO,di Ilresl Each c~bltJ would weigl' 51:': pound~ and be 500 mel(!fS long The 1I16th Inch CIIbles would be

SOFTWARE:

SOVIET CW CAPABILITIES "The SOVl"IS /Iav" Iha world's mosl ful/)' Inrmed andtlquipptHf cherrocalwa"are fCW, force, whIch IS prePllred 10 operate In a chemlclIl, b/fcterrolo(p­cfll, II/ld flJdiological ICBR) enVironment, Their offenSiva and def(Jnsive capabllllH1S contmue to improve. " The United Stalas Military Postura 101 for Fiscal Year 1980.

SInce the Second World Wal,leln/!: ;hemlCal agents have been .ntroduced by lhe SOViets Of

lhall cr.anl ~latf!S InlO conflICts ,n South Yemen, Laos and, mOM recenlly, Afghanlslan StalementS to the contrary notwllh5landlf'lg, II should be obvi 00$ that the Sov«'15 do not voew Iha use of cham, eal JQ1!flls as "unlhlnkable " NO! ale ~ch agents Ifeated as "weapons of mass dllSlIUCllon" Reiher, lila SOVI8IS clearly v,p.w lelhal ChemICal agef'lts as tactical woopons whiCh w,1I ,nevllab!y be uS6d In any general European war. Such weapons are already 10leg'lIted lOtO lhe SOVIOI dlvl$lonal commander's fue plan, and CO\Intermaasures al8 pract+eed at eVOIY If>vel of organll8l!on

SOVI6I Chemal T roopsafecleSl,loed as "spe· ClallSl troops .. The,r ta~k '5 prom8uly defensIve In nalure In Isr.\. IheIr only offenSive operatIOnS ore limlled to identification of enemy CW StIes and Oloof polAnllaltargels 10/ Sovl£lt chemical stllkes Mflnly, CW IInlts a'e charged ...... th deconlamlf'la· \Ion and (I'.'aC\(Vation of equipment. personnel. and stluCtulflswh,ch have boon eKpased to chem' ca l or fadlollCHve agenls Aocillary du\+es Include chemical and radliltlon f8Coonal5$am:a, chem'cal defense, /lnd Ihe operation of smoke generators. There ale 8),000 10 100,000 SOVtel IIOOps In the CW servlC8

In add,tlon to the Chermcal Troops lound In all branches 01 Sovoet mll'lary servICe, lhe SOVII,l\ Ground Forces ffi8.nliilf'l p8lalle! CBR delense IliemenIS N1l.1notS as small as companies Each So­V!!!I diVISIon has an organIC chemlCBI defense bat lallon and II$8OCl8led personnel These UOIts dole out protecl've eqUipment, assist In deconlam+na lion, and conduct reeon miSSions slm,lar to those o f the Chem,cal Tfoops. In addillon, Ihese organiC elemenlS ale charged W.lh Iralnlng o thar "oop~ In CBR defens .... a mooSllres,

Soviet field umts are I,bei-ally eqUIPped wrth CBR detectll)n and deconlamlnat,on kits Racon­niI'uanee vahicleS artt now eQuippecl w,th semt IlUtomatlC alarms whICh sense the P'8-~ 01 ChemlC1ll agents and warn the crew The VPKhR kit lu!8d to detect and ClaSSlfv chemical elementS! IS capable 01 idont,lymg mustard gas, phosgeno, d,phQSgIJnfI. hydlogen cyanide, cyanogen chlof Ide, end IWO types 01 nerve gases. IllS plesemly ava,lable 10 lhe CIVllJan sector as well as 10 m,llt/lry unm. The Sovilli medical serViCes are equ,pped With a11111 scal" Ilnld lab, lhe Pkhl-54. capable o f IdentifYing chemical agents In almost anyenvlfon·

muted by the round Iea ... ,ng the morlar tube unlit the \lme fuse detonated the 8Kploslve In the fOund and allowe(llhe cable& \0 float freely onto lhe Ll, hopefuliV entangling the rotors )f 1ny heliCopters unlucky enough t( be In 1he wey (nfanrry.9-10/79

FRG lninillit PrUl",m

~ an anSWllr \0 the pmblem 01 gaining realiStic traIning IOf then (lIllolCe In densely PopUlated Europe. Ihe West Germans fire reportediv mcplOfmg Ih~ poSSIbi lITy of rOUllong itS squadrons to Canada lor pllrt 01 their low-level

""ent or su~lance An 110 'PS a,e :sued the IPP, a VJII decontam,natlon ~II C/lpableo'treallng local

dpcon'ammal,on of slun 01' clothing and lhe lOP kIt It)( use In decontamul8ung weapons Sma'i

HIS eaflY HIt! IOP·S ~nd IOPS·69 "',t~ tol decon­lam,nat'ng weapons ,lnd unlf()fms lat the 'all.! 01 f,v\) 10 len 6mall arms and t('n sats 01 unllOlms docontamrnatad per kill For largtlf l\Ilms, Ihere .110 the DKV (for dnconlamln(lI'"O vehlclesl and the PM-OK (lor deconlamrnatlf'lg machine guns and mortalsl Crew sefV9d weapons have IhElI! o ..... n kilS attached fo' decO!ltllmlnal,on purposes Of ccw.se, 101 reallv large rons. It)<;re are the ARS 14 jra(liaclf'lg the old ARS l1U), ·apable 01 decontaminat,ng 15 or SO MBT'I ami lhe: fMS 65, a !l'W Sy5tem ..... hlCh can be used 10 docon· lamlnale an enllfe column on the mcvtt

In addmon to detection and deeontamlnallon eqUipmenl, Iha Sov16ls have eCQu,lt;!d an awe-­some airily 01 prOtoc\lve devICes and eqUipment over Ihe years, At present. two masks are aVa,lable to Ihe military, the ShM Sl!lf'Idald protective mask and the ShMS Imploved'mod'l! A vllflety o f boalS, capes, OVer,lllS, hoods, leggings, gauntlelS, and prOlecwesullsaraalso provided SOVI6I tanks and APC's are currently ~ned fOl survIVal 10 a CBR enl'ltonmenl. Wllh a" t,lters, prOtOCtM) sealS, and overpressure SYStems be'!lg promlroenl features of ell new venlCles

FOf lhe soIdl8f unlucky enough 10 become a ChemtCal Cllsualty, an IndiVidual medical 1:,'1 It he MSP t81 IS prOVII:led as standard lS$1Je personal equipment The kn ,ncludes $y'ettes containing llealments lor nerve agent COfllamtnallon and CVilnlde po,son!ng as well as PiI,n killers, ampules 01 amyl ""rete, and a subSlanl':8 for comba\tlng smoke pOlsonlf'lg

01 cour:se, II IS one Ihlng to prOVide a cornu­copia of expensive eqUipment and QUite another to IIalf'l soldiers In Its use. However, the SOVl6tli seem deadly senous.n Iegilrd to I.allling as wall as eqUipage. Over 1,000 training ranqes have been sel up 10 ."tIOOUce personnel to the CW envoron· menl Some 01 these ranges are capable 01 handl-

training Such tow-level tr81n,ng has evidently been curtaIled over Garmanv_ AW8S7, 11,19'79

ta5er lHftJlSt ProjKI

The USAF Aerospace Propul ·<on Lab .nd II d.v1S/Ol'l 01 Boomg Aucralt are 9l(Bm,n'"g possible delnnt118S for satellite SOlar cells exposed to laser attack Among the pos5IblitllElS being examined ars. textured surfaces; back surface fields, bat\( surface refleclors; electrostatically bonded COval!!; and multilayer enll-reliectlve coatings AW&ST. 11/26/79

,ng 8fll,ra regiments on maneuvers, DoIutOO Chem~ eel agentS are used ,n e:.:erclSElS to produr min" dl'SCOmloll or sbght bh:ael,ng In troop' who have not properly uullled lhell protective equipment 0 who have Igno'ed det8(;11OO mils. S,nce Iho SOV'l:lts e~peclto operate at nlghl, maoy of these exercises lake place al OIght Since '115 expected Ihal unlls w!11 have 10 figi'll In conlamonaled urban ar6lls 115 well as In the open, exerCises Includo movement 1I1Iough hazardous areas repll'I'l wllh I"es and tumbl.ng masonry wh,le In lui prOlecUvtl goo,

OlfeosJVely. the SOVl8ts are even betlAf p(~red lhan defenslvely_ Delivery Sy-!;lomS for wtllch lhe SovlOlS are believed 10 have aval <lble Cheml I mun'tlOnS Include. the 8M 21 multiPle­rocket launcher, all verSions of the FROG aod SCUD, 122mm and l52mm arl,llerv, varIOUS iI,r craft, land mmes; and, posSIbly, cruise mISSlI,~ It has been esllmaled Ihal up 10 501MI of ~II filled munllionS Stockpiled tn Eastarn-Central Europ{l are chomlCal In nalUfe, Most of Ihese stockp,led Items probably COnsiSt of mustard gas (already us­ed In South Yemen snd presumablv SlIllthe most eflect,ve perSIStenl wer gas), hydrogon cy,,",de la blood agent), and S&\I9f81 vafletoes of nerve gas lsoman, sa"n, luban, VR-55 have ~ mentIOn edt In additIOn, seororal typesolsmollegene,ators mclude tO~IC agents (mostly lH1tants) as pan of then polentlal load TheSe ilfa the YaD·11 YaO·2t, DSh·IOO. BDSh-5 and DB 11 SITIoka generalors. AslI;Ie from the substances kno ..... n at beil8Vt.ld 10 be In Ihe SOVl6t arsenal, II '5 08ftam lhitl the SOVIOIS have lhe technICal capablilly 10 produce vutually every known !ilandard agont If'I

sul!tctenl quanlllll1S fOI full-scale operaiions In IIdd'llon 10 Such obVIOUS lact'cal uses as

cl6<l1,on of blocked poSIt,ons, supprl!S5lon of targels nOI eaSIly destroyed by COnvenllonal means (auI,elds belf'lg pume talgets!. and the terdtCllon of tones of commurucatlOn, Ihe SOVlf't$ VIF'W chemICal ..... eapons as Slgn,flcant "mass wUllpons' The leehflQ IS apparently that to_1C chemICals can be 01, umable beoehl In IIChtev·

23

24

Ul9 iii 1nO;I<Y pene1fal"Jfl .,,<1 fragmenllng and destrOVII'lQ 'BSlSlance In II IocJlarea I,n a mann81 remlnoscent 01 lhe rn<IS3.ve HE barrages of World War II) Whether chemICal IIQonlS would be used 10 \1'1" fllstllon would btl up \0 Ihe IndIvidual field commander.! once II gl!l'If!11I1 policy ID u~o

chemlC8l'l had been handed down Suct1 8 dP.CI

•

HAROVIIARE:

THE MODERNIZED COBRA GUNSHIP

Recent 8f1ocles In SOVtf1t pub! :al,onsestlmale thol 41S much 85 50'" 01 tM OOsHUCII¥i3 ftrepow'lr pat(ltltlal m modern Hlcta:ol war/ale IS suppllfJd by aVliUlon A good PIIII 01 thot Itrcpaw(lr on the US SIde lests loda"r - and WIll fOOl m the lutura WIth heilCllptel gunshIps

The AH-lG Cobra was lust muoduced mto combat ,n 1967 as a reptacemenl lOt' Ihe pnmlilve Huey lash upswhoch had been servmgasgunshlp$ up unlll that tlm& SII'IC4I tlmn, the Cobra has gone Ihrough many evolU\lons and Improvements The Impetus lor the chanGOO has boon the mplacemenl of uucks, troops and sampans WIth massed AFV's as POtenlllll UlrgetS Today, the Advanced Attack Helicopter IAAHI. armed wllh the hellhre mISSIle, IS the Almy's prelafled an~wer to the hlQtHnt(ltl lilY at! defenses aSSOCIated WIth m8SSed almor on themodllrn balliefteld But $llppagesand the sheet dImenSIon 01 "the ThrSilI' have brought about lhe concept of a "hIgh lOw mIl(" of AAH's and AH IS's the AAH being used m lhe toughest areas where survrvablltty d,cta1es lhe use 01 only lhe mOSI soph,st,cated systems SInce only 5J6 AAH's ale scheduled 10< dolIVOfV between 1964 and 1992, 1he h.gh low mI. 10'0',11 consiliI of 500 AAH'sand UXXlAH-1S's

To Insule the avaIlabilIty 01 sufflCl9nl numbelS 01 the AH-1S, eU el(ls""9 models of Cobra w,lI be modlhed Into "S" mod'lls by early 1985 urWor a program begun In 197&. When com pleted, the program 10'0'111 assure that all Cobras operata on toughly the same level The modlflca hons necessary to achl6Ve thiS goal are descr,bed ","ow

To Increase survlvabollty Cobras w,q all haYft 7 plOCe Uatgl~ canoplBS lnecessary to reduce teUtale gilnt) and 10'0'111 be painted dark greenwllh IR absorptIVe pa,nt. Rotors will be paInted lIa\ black, and lhe new main fOtor Will hstYe a reduced rlldar ClQSS-Sf\Ctlon and produce 19$$ "oise ThIS new r010r Isalsa de:s>gned to permit JO mlflutesol flight altel' smgle hll~ bl' 23mm HE. Incendtary, or tracer rounds and IS proof against "n.g1e hIlS by founds up to 12 7mm SIngle Mdamageofllhonew rOIOt' blade IS a three-hour reptlll JOb nol requlllng r8l11O"<'31 of the blade from theal/ctait The ImplOV eel blade has a prOtected 10,CKXl hour "r,le" (ten urnes the present rulOf Illel

The (allboom IS also duslgned to wllhsland 23mm damage, and Ihe new transmISSion IS able to operate lor 20 mlnules WIthout Iub!lC3tlon There IS an 'mproved hVdraul1C back-up sr.>lem and Imptoved beatings throughout the engIne A flfewaffl'"'g sensor loop and Improved decl-. ha¥i3 also been added 10 the engIne

Better IR counterffi6/lsures added to the new Cobras Include an Improved IR S1JppreSSOI in the lorm 01 Ihe HM + P (Hot Meml + Plume) sup­pressor, which suclo;s In lal9" amounts 01 au to cool tna hal metal 8round the engIne eXNusl,

SIOn would have 10 C<Jme from the POLITBURO Once "IIfSI use" had been doclded upOn, however, 1\ IS probable thaI "second use' would bedelermr"eO a! flll.veI85Iowas(hvISIOn

Perhaps 1h8 best indication ollha senousn."s with which the 50 ... 18\5 have approached the sub­Ject of chemical werfare is the fact thaI the

thus reduclllg the effecllve range of the 1M< sophrs tlcated IR homIng miSSIles, Complementing the HM + P IS the ALa 144 IR /<immer, an active COUntermeasuro deSIgned to confuse hommg miSSIles

To combat 8CquISI!lOn radars, the Cobras 10'0'111 calry IneAPA-39RWR fRadarWamtng Recetverl, a system of 5 antennas, 2 recewers, a comp~lJaIOf, and a CRT dIsplay The system rsdeslgned towarn a PIIOI VI8 an audIO tone and a CRT strobe thai M

has been acqUIred by a radar-drrected weapan The system works bost al NOE. It IS Intended to add a laser-warfllng receIVer module to the APR-39 to 11,111111 the same luncuon III ragard 10 laser desl9nators and langellndo~ The Ala 136 IlImmllf IS also to be a<kled to the Cobras_ Th.s pess. .... system adopts an actIVe brea~lock mode when the Cobra IS &eqUlled and revells to liS passrve status once the shIp Ili no Ioogef beIng tracked. The modIfied Coblas Will no langei cally the M t30 chaff cartridge dispenSing system

The modified "S" model Cobras 10'0'111 callY J new smaller, lighter lad lOS compallble With VOlce­seculesYSlems' theARC·1 14, 115and 164

In terms 01 weapons and target 8Cq1.JI$ltlOn systems, the new Cobras 10'0'111 be Illtoo for up to 8 TOW's, a 30mm cannon, 2,75 Inch rockeTS, anda variety 01 sensors and a computer, The co-pllot, gunnel (S6!Ited In Iiont 01 the prlot) maflllges the TSU ITe!escoplC SIght Until The eye-pieces are center-cockpIt so tha t the co-pilO t loans forward 10 target and guide TOW's, Augmentu'lg the TSU IS a power/utlasel rangellnder (to become In the modi­fied "S" verSIons a FACT Forward-looklng·lnlra· Red Augmented Cobra TOWI, The system has a range 019,90) matm and Will Increase overall ef· IlICtl .... ress by 4O'lI due 10 the system's night filing capability Data IS led 1fl4 dlgrt values to both Ihe fire-control computer and tho pilots' HUD (heads-up display) The range fmder is capable 01 mulhple target d,scr,mlnalron end the establIsh­ment of a minimum range gale_ Finally, the Cobras 10'0'111 be eqUipped WIth the AAS-32 Al T (AI/borne laser Tracked fOf purposes o f searchIng lor, oc­qUlnng and trockmg targelreflected lasel energy The system IS compatable wllh the AN PAG·' and Slm,lar desrgnators_

Accuracy o f both cannon and rockets IS great Iy enhanced bv a 16 bi t memory flle-conllol com­pulEu T!1e computer solves ballis\lc problems based on data led from lhe TSU and the alf data

DOSAAf IVolunteer Socoery lor ASSIstance 10 The Armv. Au Force, end Navyl ,s reputed 10 heve In

lhe order Of 40 millIOn members. The purpose 01 DOSAAF 15 10 provide CIV" Ciefense for real area CQmmunicalions lind 10 instruct Ihe Onll1$ pOPula­tion In the fundamentals of "chemIcal dnlansa "

David J RI/C:hl6

sub-system, takIng IIltO account lOS aogles alld angle ratO!l, TSU range data. J-dlmen5tOl'l81 all speed, slatlc pressure and aIr lemperature, J dimensIonal ground-speed from the doppler radar altImeter and pnch/roll from the gyroscope AU data Iscombmoo to produc:eallmuth and eleva· tlon ollset angles to ochte\'e 18lget hilS BorBSlght correctIOns due to weat are added d,loctly by the oompulef The system's memory can glow l00'll WIthout addIng cards and performs sell-dlBgnOStlC tosts Rangel lfld81 data IS not avaIlable and must beesllmated when the helmet Sights are used, but all of the rost of the a1:;ov(' data 15 aYollable

The universel chin turrol, moun\lng elthe. the MI97 20mm gun or Hughs JOmm chaIn gun can trsck y,a the TSU or can be dl/ected bV either p.lot using helmel IIghtS_ The 2 7&- rockets can be delIV6fOO dlf8C1IV a. Indirectly Thecomputer adds downwash compensaTIon to the e~ISllng calcula­tIons for direct Itr8. In Indtfect mode lit rangos '" excess 01 4,8OCI meterS, the TSU IS used to acqulle and treck whllo Ihe computer places allie-control r6Cllele on the HUD_ The system allows 18!98ts to be engaged 6If(ln whon II IS necessary to elevate thealrcraft's nose 54Jch that IhePJIOlno longer has lOS 10 the larget In thIS mode the pilot fileS so as to supellmpose the rectlCie on the bof8--s.ght reforene9 on lhe HUD

The HUD lIse/lIS moumed alop the PIIOI'S in­S!fument panel and proteClS Into the centra! 206 01 the pIlo t's field o f VISIon data on weapons sys· terns, fife control, flight slatus and flight contlol, among other thlngs_

The Cobra WIll be capable of carrYIng 5 dIf­ferent types of 2 75- rockets Irom It selectIOn of 2 types of flechelte rounds, HE walheadS (10 Of 17-poondsl, smoke, 54Jb-mufll\lOn, dual purpose, flare, <lnd chat! As many 8S 76 rockets can be car· lied," four 19 rocket podslnaddlhon to TOW'i!o

Other allerat.ons Include equipping the Cobras wllh a PMD (PrOjected Map Dlsplav~ to 1m· p.ove navigation, upratlng the oogll16 from 1,8OCI shalt horsepow8l' to 2,000, and ,nstaillng an el(piD­SIV8 8f8C"on system lor both pllotS 'designed 10 blow all the canopy and entrance doors)

Taken In the aggregate, these Improvements writ st~1 fall to make tho AH· 1 S the technical equal of the AAH, but II Will make the AH· \ S a potent weapon system lor thoBO's, one whICh Will constl' tu te the bulk 01 our attack helicOPter forces

DaVid M flobens

..... "'- ...... - .. •

, J-r - ' ..-. ...

-

26

The heal of the lale August day was slI11 upon them as the soIdl(lrs of the RUSSian rocket bat­lallon SlOPped WOI'k on their earthen emplace ments The bamllion had lust moved ,nl0 poSllions 10 the west of Sparlanovka, " nonhern suburb 01 Slahngrad. and white the el/lcers were anxIOUS to complete Ihe defenses, no one was parllcularly concefned. Aher all, The enemy was Stilt beyond the Don River, some 35 miles away. Many SOVIllI forrn311onsslood between the Donand the Volga

Suddenly, a sentry reported 10 hiS com· mander thaI some slrange lanks and scout cars were occupyll'lg a nearby hili Since flO fnendly ar­mored formahons w&fe reported In the area, the oillce, decJdecllO Inspect the vtlh.cJes They were now SlOpped and already covered With camou­flage netting which obSCt.lred INm shapes A few yards from the l18aresl tank the SOVl(l1 officer shouted an order for the commander \0 come for­ward. A figure we8f1ng the helmet Bnd coveralls of a RUSSian mnker 5!ood up in !he open turret hatCh and rephed that there was no problem The Sovle! officer puul&d over the man's poor accent, then noticed the e ~posed tracks o f the tank The road­wheels were unl ike any Sovie t armored vehiclel Stepping back to alert hiS soldiers, the RUSSian of­ficer w as cut down by automauc fire from the bogus tank commander W,lhon seconds a fire­ltgi'll elUpled between the rockel troops and lhe now hosl llearmOled UM

Thus, on 23 August 1942, began a struggle which has been deSClibed as the major turning pomlln World War II. The batlle of Stalingrad was pmhaps the suPloma confrontation on the Eastern Front, Both the NaZI and the CommumStlegJmes were seeking deciSIve results After a year 01 war In RUSSia, Germany had to eliminate the enemy whICh denl9d the conquests so Vital to Its expan­SIOnist designs For Its part the USSR was forced to malOta,n an effective delense of the homeland wtule developmg the assets necessary to drive OUI the IOvaders, Whal began as a skllmlSh Oil an un­Mmed 1'1111 near lhe Volga soon Involved mllhons 01 combajanls and atl/acled the atlentlOIl 01 the world The hlQh drama would unfold ,n the slreets of Slalingrad

By mld-I942, the Sovlflt Union had IOSl mil­hons of lIS Ci tiZens and large Chunks of liS termory Nearly 6,000,000 RUSSIan soldiers were dead or captured, Moreover, the remaining forces seemed Incapable of halt ing Ihe enemy onslaught which now headed southward, The Germans appeared POinted toward the Volga River, a north-south a~ls 01 unusual Importance Enemy occuP8l1on of the waterway would jeopard'le Allied aid Ihrough Iran; II would also deny the Soviet economy vl lal manufactured goods and raw materials, par tlCularly 011 The German Intent had become clear. due to lhe rePQfIS of spettel petroleum detachments operahllg behmd Ihe lead columns With fuol for hiS panzers, the enemy could can­solldale gains made In lhe Caucasus Mountains and lhen advance around the Medtterranean Shore to Suez orev91l drIVe toward Indlll

CaS(' Blau Indeed, the Wehlmachl was IrYlng to Win the

southern area ollhe USSA On the orders of Adolf HIII9I all plans wae suspel'lded except for the conllnuatlon of Operation 8/au II called for A rmy Group South to be diVided IntO twO efforts Army Group A was 10 clear the Caucasus region, while Army Group B. under Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock, was to advance toward the Volga, Two German armies ' Ihe SIMth and Four th Panzed and two RumMlan armies IIhe Third and Fourthl were to secure the fiver hne. A veteran o f the campaigns In Ihe wes l and RUSSia, the Fourth Panzer Army, led by Generaloberst Hermann Hath, was to prOVide Ihe cUlling edge o f the ad­vance II would be followed bv the SI~'h Army,

which had seen aCMn In Poland, the Low Coun­IrteS. and France. The SI~t h Army was commend ed by General Friednch Paulus. lIS lormer chie l of staff and an e~pert In logistICS and Iraonlng The Rumanian armieS were to prOVide addilional covellng unots desplle their Inielior equipment and leadership

OperallOn 8/au began With some success. By July 1942. the SI~lh Army had Cleared the Don Betld 01 mOSt resIStance However, the extel'lded supply hne had prevented the steady replenISh­menl necessary for lhe Germall mechanized forces. Moreover, while the Russten losses were high, the Red Army had been able 10 withdraw many units, nOlably al Voronezh. Slung by thiS failure, the Fuehrer replaced Bock Wi th General­leldmarschall MaMlmillan von WelChs To encour­age the southern advance. H,tief directed Army Group B to send half of liS motor transport and two 01 its panzer diVISions to Army Group A Asa form of compensatiOn, a brigade o f neb8lwerfers (rocket launchers) was assigned 10 lhe SI~ th Army. The addiMnal flfepower would help Ihe SI ~ th Army In liS neXI assignment - 10 secure Stal lngrad.

So.,;e.n . rfllCking 'rom rM rubble of . ! IIC/orr

Significance of Sialingrad Although H,Uer dtd not order the SI~th Army

10 lake Stallngrad untJl19 July, Ihe deciSIon was predete.mmed by the City'S Importance and the NaZI plan of conqueSI Slahngrad was a greallll­dUSI" al cenlllr of the Soviet UnIOn. BUill upon an ancl8nt town on the west Side 01 the Volga RlVar, the city w as !hllty miles long, but only love miles Wide By 1942, mOSt 01 the adul ts In ItS half mIllion populallon lOlled on fac torl8s conV8fted to war In­dustry. The largesl factory was lhe Ozelhezonsky Tl aClor Works, a sprawling comple. deSIgned 10 manufacture lalm Implements bUI now a p"me source of tankS Similarly, the Red 8arncades (8 arrikady) Faclory w as assemblong heavy artillelY pieces. Various armaments came ou t o f the faun­drl8s and machine shops of Ihe Red October IKlCIsnv Oc/Vabrl Factory Smaller plants produc­ed goods rang ing !Iom medicines to clOlhlng Graon harvests were stored In a giant elevator. while canneries preserved local cropS As lhe

greateSI I!ver In EUrope, the Volga was a Mtural conveyor of large Sleamers and barges. I I was complemented by loads and rail !ones whICh made Slahngrad a major transponal lOn center The Clly was also an Import anI military lIam.ng Sde With speceallzed schools for artillery and lanks. Several Red Army d,VISIOns wele acttvated In lhe area. and a large manpower pool was stili available The CommUnist Party staffed a malar olllC9ln Stahn­grad because It was an admInIStrative headquart­ers lor the SOVl9t government

Beyond these ob]9CtlVEl conSideratJons, Stal­mglad had an almOSt mysllcal allraCtlon 10 ,he leadel'S of the Thlld ReICh. Part of the reason for lhe eaSlern mvaslon was to reoMe the GmmanlC peoples of Russoa WIth the rest 01 the TeutonIC race. Thousands 01 Volks-Deulsch Inhabited Ihe Volg.a area, pnmalily hVlIlg In agrlClJllUral settle­merns The region was also closely IlIlked WIth Bolshevik VICtOIiOS in the Revolution and C,v,l War. Stahn, then named Josef Dlugashvlh, had won hiS fi rst battle around the old lawn of TsallS lsyn. Now a ci ty there w as ca lled Stallngrad III hiS honor To capture such a place would atfirm the superior ity of Nat ional Socialism . Finally, Adolf Hitler look great stoc~ In an old proverb which predicted that whoever crossed the Volga River would conquer "MOlher Russl3 .. Clearly, Germany's destin" was to be realized at Sta­hngrad

The stralegle and symbOliC Importance of lhe City was nOl los! upon Ihe Sovl8l Supreme Com­mand (S/avkal. As the enemy drove eastward In mId-summer, Stalin ordered the Stahngrad Front commander, Marshal S K Tlmoshenko, to actl­val8 tWO reserve arml8S. These became the 62nd (Malol Genera! V KolpakChl1 and the 64th (Major General V N Gordovl armies Ttlelr haslily lfailled and poorly led d'VIS'Ol1S soon proved defecllVO In early August, while praparm9 forward POSIlIons weSt of Kalaeh on the Don Rivet, the 62nd Army land nelghboflng UIlllS) lost 50,000 men and almOSI 01 all of ItS diVISiOns III a German encncle­ment Kolpakchl was sacked ,n favor of Malar General A L0P3l1n. The Stallngrad Front was soht InlO two sectors Gordov took OV9f the old front Ifrom lhe temporalily dISgraced T,moshenkol. and Colonel General AI Yeremenko atrlved to com· mand the new South-Eastern Front whICh InClud­ed the city 01 Stallngrad A specla! comml\tee was aSSigned by Stalin 10 raport on all ac tions III the Clilicalarea

From the Don (0 the Volga Now POiSed on the Oon, the German SI~lh

Army prepared Its ne~ t move on Stahngrad The COntinUing logIStical dltflcul\JeS prevenled a broad advance eastward so It was decided to send the XIV Panzer Corps Weneral Allied von W,eter­shelm) to the north while the XXXXVItI Panler Corps lGeneral Werner Kempll on loan from the Fourth Panzer Army moved III from the SOUlh With lhe area sealed off, the LI Corps (General Walther von Seydhtz-Kurzbachl w ould clear the center alld actually assault the Cl ly Alter monlhs of campalgnlllg, the lead diVISIOns 01 the 1I Corps w ere weak In ,nfantry and transport, but It was hooed that all supremacy andsufpllse~ld over­come these defects In any case, the Soviet foe was Judged to be tOO d,sorgantzed lor an offecttve defense

In the early hours of 21 Augus t, the SI~ th

Army began liS push to the Volga. A t Ka lach the 71S1 Infanl ry D,v,s,on (Generaimalor Hartmann) qUickly developed a blldgehead. Further north, the 76th IGeneralmajor Rodenburg) and 29511'1 'Generalmajor Kor fes) Infantry Divisions crossed In boats and ra fts Soviel resistance was ehmlnated, and pontoon blldges enabled the 16th Panzer D,VISion IGeneralmajor Huba) of the XIV Panzer Corps 10 begllll tS Splint toward Stahngrad,

near ly thllty five m,les away Shell,ng and bomb­mg by the Russians caused some casuil ltres ,II the br,dgeheads, but the unmarked armored column drove bOldly along a highway as Soviet traff ic con­trollers obllg,ngly diverted slower-movmg veh,cles. By the evelling of 23 August, a battalion of the 2nd Panzer Regiment had staked a claim to a hili near Spal\anovka Wl thm mmules fatefu l contac t had been made witn the Russian rocket launcher bauallon Smce no fnendly lorces had been able to koop up with Ihem, Ihe tankers of the 16th Panzer D,v,s,on formed a hedgehog defense tOllwa,tremforcement

Soviel Preparalion The Soviet military command had expected a

German BIlliCk, bUI tho'll were unprepared for ,tS speed and direction. Only remnants of a few nile regimen ts stood In the way 01 the panzers_ How ever, the narrow penetration allowed other Rus­s,an for matrons to fall back and regroup Tank lind mechBr.ized groups recoiled from Ihe enemy at tack, but they were soon able to reoccupy most of the area, thereby cu ttmg 011 11'10 1611'1 Panzer D,v,· s,on. In Slalrngrad itself the German advance had made useless the outer lings 01 defenses, so ef· forts were concentra ted on the Inner or "G" I'ne. CI~,l l ans of all ages were orgarllled In work gangs to expand antHank ditches and to erect stroot barrrcades Regiments of the new 10th NKVD (Internal Secufltyl D,VISiOn (Colonel Saraye~1 were f,lIed WI th able-bodied men, then rushed to the hnes. Factory workers found them­selves m special tank·kliler squads armed only With Molotov cocktails. W,th most of the regular mili­tary UIliIS m the area awaiting rep lacements, the only addItIonal reIn forcement was a group of armored !rains They were to prOVIde mobile arlll­lery and a boost 10 morale until more substanual forces were avaIlable

While by their presence Red Army formations were at least able to slow the enemy advance on Ihe ground, there was no protection in the all Sovlel ailpowerin the area was reduced 10 150 ob­solete alrcrafl of the Blh All Army (Malor General Khryuklnl Although soon to gain In numbers, the IIntl-allcraft baltelles were made up 01 machlne­guns and light cannons. Thus, there was little res iStance when the German VIIi Air Corps (Gen· eralleutnant F~blgl began Its attacks In early Sep­tember Usmg superb maps, the JU-8B's and HE-111's carelully sought out and destroyed mili­tary targets, particularly artillery and rocke t bal ler­les. Incendiary bombs sel ablaze Ihe wooden houses of the crty workers. causrng a paniC which lammed the streets near the fiver Boats tryrng to evacuate the civilians or trans fer military personnel were strafed by low-flying lighlers. Rail tracks and roiling stOCk were alSO shot up. Factor~s shelter­Ing workers and soldiers were collapsed by bombs, and nearby SChools and shops were also destroyed Perhaps 40,000 people pellshed In the all al\acks. Only when the cIty was obscured by a pall of black smoke did Ihe VIII Air Corps reaSSIgn Itsallcraft to other operations rn the south_

With Stalingrad now under direct attaCk, the Srallkalssued stnct directives lor Its delense. Rifle diVISions from nearby armies were to be sent as re­inforcements Large blldges to the easl bank were deslroyed to prevent 8 Simple crossover by the enemy Boat traffiC would be subordinated to mIlitary reqUirements, and the only evacuees were to be the severely wounded, children, and the aged, In that order. Communist Party olflcials were e.· pressly lorb,dden to leave the clly Since the 62nd Army was ordered to hold the CIty, a more vigor ous commander seemed necessary Alter consul­tations with both his spec,al adVisor, Colonel General G K Zhu~ov, and the Front commander, Yerem'enko, Stalin selected Lieutenant General V.I ChUlkov to ta~e overthe62nd Army_ Chuikov,

a professional soldier since 1918. had many times shown a tactical fla", most recent ly Wi th the 64lfl Army

The resources available 10 Chulkov would lil)( even hiS IngenUity When he alflved rn Stalrngrad on 12 September, Chulkov found the remnants of several shattered formallons Rif le diVISions, such as Ihe 33rd Guards (Colonel Utwenlcol, 131st ICol· onel PesoChkrnl, 19611'1 (Colonel Ivanovl, and 399th (Malor General Glazhovl had only a few hundred Infantrymen and no heavy guns The35th Guards (Colonel Dublanskyl and 2441h IColonel Afanas.evl Rifle DIVISions were somewhat bettor off, though stil i far below thel! authorrzed strength. A steady I low of diSCiplinary prisoners helped maintain the 112th Rifle D,V,Sion IColonel Yermolkinl The 10th NKVD DiVision had nearly 10,000 men bUI no heavy arti llery Chulkov's only mobile troops came hom the baltered brigados of the II and XXII1 Tank Corps and some motollzed II­lie unllS. A few Independent art illery and rocket regiments were also avalillble, along w ith the en­thUSiastic but groon mlll\ la 10rmatlons. The gun· boats and feffles of the newly-organized Volga Flotilill IRear Admiral 0 D. Rogachevl had limited value because of the" e~posure to German artil lery and allcraft. Altogether, Chulkov had some60,OOO soldiers, over 500 guns, and 80 tanks

The 62nd Army was deployed along a strange front over forty miles long but only fIVe miles deep. Between the outer defenses and the Volga, the area was checkered With deep gullies lbalkasl and hIgh railroad embankments Eleva\lons such as the Tartar Wall and Mamayev Kurgan wereimpor­tant ~antage pornts. The natural ~egetalion was low brush, but orchards and woods offered some concealment. In the factory area, the large con­crete bUildings were likely fortresses Multi-level apartment houses, department stores, and office bUildings also had defenSIve pOSSibilities To en· sure the survival of hiS army, Chul~Ov had to retain the river docks near the lactofles and the biilkas Since he could nOi greally adluSt hiS meager forces, Chulkov could only hope that they could hold tong enough for reinforcements 10 afflve from across the Volga

State of the Sixth Army As Chulkov took charge in Siallngrad, hiS op­

ponent was atso evaluating h,s assets Paulus was an able officer but alwavs before his command had operated rn coopera tion w llh other armies ThiS time the SI~th Army was to fight on its own rn the doopest penetration of the Soviet Union For­tunately, the northelll lIank had been secured as the 16th Panzer D,V'Sion was lorned by the rest of the XIV Panzer CorpS Russian probes did not yel appear to be too dangerous To the south, the XXXXVllI Panler Corps had dllven through to Yelshanka by 8 Seplember, but surprising re­Sistance had developed near Ihe Volga A Sizable concentra tion of Soviet uni ts at Beketovka had yel to be ellmrnated In the middle, the 1I Corps had frnally marched up, delayed not so much by the enemy as by the lack of supplies and I ranSport In­deed, logisticS appeared as the cllt ical factor Since the Sixth A rmy had to proviSion nearly a quarter of a mil lion men from the Volga back beyond the Don Only a srngle railroad and a few mads stretched that distance, while brrdges needed to be rebuilt over many of the smaller livers

Even If supplies were ava'iable, Paulus wondered if his combat unus were up to assaulting the city. Alrpower was presenl though often diverted 10 other miSSions. Several army ar­l il ler'll baUlllions were on hand, but hea~y caliber ammunition was already being rationed Assault guns and rocket launchers promised close suppOrt If they could be replellished_ However, Ihe key ele­ment In city fighting. the Inlanlly, was rn ferror In strength. Tha banallons of the 71st and 295th in­fantry Divisions which were to lead the attack

were alreadv below offenSive standards The 389th Inlantry D,V's,on (Generalleutnant Jaeneckel was also on line but so weak Ihallt was used along Wi th Ihe automatic weapons of Luft­waffe Kampfgruppe Stahel 10 screen operations near Orlovka Pau lus presented hiS conclUSions and ml5glvrngs to Hitler rn a spec,al mootrng at V,nn,lsa on 12 September The Fuehrer. however, rnsisted thaI Ihe Sovlels wera nearly ready to abandon Stahngrad He ordered the assault to begrn al once. The S')(th Army had already drawn up a plan of a!lack for Stahngrad. The enemy was known to be weak but so dispersed in the city that a srngle blow could not be decISive Also, the German unIts were 100 few to assauillhe ent ire area. The only pOSSible scheme was to ex­ecute a series of small operatIons, aimed Illst at the central City, then the fiver docks, and l ,nally, the factorres By keeprng up the pressure, the Sixlh Army would chop up the RUSSIan defense one sector al a lime. II rern lorcements could be blocked, the Soviet would have to surrender or lace annlh,lallOn Despite Ihe hardshrps that the combat meant for the German troops, Ihell com­manders knew that any delays would be fala l

The (nilial Assaull At 0445 hours on 13 September, Ihe 1I Corps

began ItS attack into the central ci ty Heavy ar II llery pounded suspected enemy emplacements, while dl~e-bombers hunted for rehef columns As the ,nfantry closed WIth the Sovlel defenders, Ihe guns and aircraft had to lifl therr support to aVOid hlltlng fnendly 1I00PS The 71st Infanlry DI~lslon made good progress through several housrng groups before stoPPing lust west of the downtown distnct The 517th and 51Bth Infantry Regiments won the arrfield nearby bUI had to clear plllbmo:es dug IntO the Sides of adjacent ball<as Belween them, the 295th and J89th Infantry Divi­Sions destroyed two dozen T·34 tanks, many of whIch were used as slallonary freld poeces_ As night fell. the Germans found themselves under artil lery frre ranging In from the east bank

To the south armored groups from the 24th Panzer DIVision IGeneralmaJor Hauenschrldt), lormerly 1st Cavalry D,vrsion, combrned wl\h the 94th Inlantry DIVISion !Generalleutnant PfeIHefl to advance along streets blocked by dug-rn tanks and barr icades. Bmer f,ghtrng cleared houses held by small groups of Soviet IIlIemen and anll-Iank teams The 29lh Motonzed Rifle Division IGeneralieUlnant Leyserl tried 10 move along Ihe liver bank but ClIme under rncreasrng life from the far shore. Gradually, the panzergrenadlers were able to drrve nearly 500 enemy soldIers intO the grant grarn Silo near a boat dock The concrete lower and its outbuildrngs were a natural fOllress Fanatical commissars bflckad shul the e~l ts and exhorted the Sov.et soldiers to lIght 10 the end When artillery and lank guns failed to raduce the POSition, Ihe Germans wheeled up heavy hOwitzers to blast open entrances IntO the massive structure Af ter an hour of sustained filing, only 140 survivors were left to surrender

Sacflflces such as these enabled Chuikov to develop his inner defenses and to deploy hiS few reserves As the enemy pushed toward the central CIty, they found their way blocked by mines and field art illery filing with open sights German tanks and assault guns could not maneu~er In the clogged streets, so 11 was up to the rn lantry to go lor· ward alone to clear a passage By dusk 01 14 Seplember, the 71st Infantry D,v,s,on held nearly a mile ol lhe liver bank However, darkness allowed battahons of Ihe 13th Guards Rille DiviSion IMajor General Rodimtsevl to cross the Volga The ax­paratroopers qUickly rnflltratad German hnes through unguarded alleys and biilkas. By dawn Ihey reoccupied Rai l Statton No 1 German sold'ers had 10 now defend therr lines of com-

27

28

mumC<lllons, lhefeby dIVenlng unliS needed 10 ell pand rhe nV8f corudol. Armored groops hom The 24th PanzOl' DIVISIon gavtl welcome support, bYlll took O\lef 8 week lor lhe Germans 10 clear the sourhem cuy completely Finally, on 25 September. Paulus could report thai the Reich's battle standard Hew over the Communist Pany headQu!lrtOfS in Red Square

During the IMlal clashes, the SO\llels had continued \0 hold several ~ndlllg Sites These enabled troops trapped along the liver 10 be eVBcualed to other soctors. Aell110rcemenls also needod the landing S!les 10 JOin the 62nd Army formed OfIly II lew weeks belore, the 951h Rille DIVISion ICoionel GOflshnyl starledsend.ng across regm'Klnls by 19 September They look up POS'­tIOns near Mamavev Kurgan and were soon JOined by Sibeoan smpe" of the 284th Alfie OW'SiOfI ILoeulenanl Colonel Balyuk!. A few days later, lhe half-streng!h 193rd Rifle ol\llSlon (Colonel SmekholVorovl also came on line An armored br.g.ede was also e.pectoo, but the barges COuld only carry tiS light tanks across the fiVer Substan­tial artrllery suppor t was developing on the east bank and rrver rslands. Speclilltargets were enemy troop concentra tions and supply dumps

The S,.th Army, however, received 00 such aid Aside Irom convalescents returning to thelf unitS, there W8fe 00 replacements 101 the combat IOtmallOns Many Inlamry compames had only hi ty men and one or TWO oillQ!rs. The 24th Panzer DIVISIOn whICh had entered the bailie al reduced strength could held but thirty tanks The assault gun battaliOnS were no better 011 While most of the artillery was stili present, the hOWitzers and heavy rocket launchers needed ammunition The 100th Jaeger D,v,sion Weneralleutnant Sannel was assigned to augment the attack, desprte its mounlaln baHalions lacking the heavy weapons and training fOi street l ighung As RuSSian probes oontlOued on the nanks outSide 01 the City, Ruma ruan diVISIOnS wele ordered InlO the line although Gelman units 51111 had 10 relO lorce thell sectors

The Leaves Fall. . . But Not Stalingrad Srnce he lacked the power 10 altack the city

all at once, Paulus was lorced to continue hiS pIecemeal advance Mamayev Kurgan was 51111 partly held by Ihe Soviets. Between the hili and the fiver, enemy artillery covered pillboxes built In-10 the railway loop known to the Germans as the "Tenn,s RaCQuet " Acoordrngly, Paulus decided 10 hold the southern line and swing hiS (lHack In from the west The l00th Jaeger D,v,s,on held the ught Uank, while the 94th Inlantry D,vlslOIl moved on the north. In between, the 389m Infantry DIVI· soon and 24th Panler D,V'SIOn, remlorced by the 276th Infantry Regiment and assault guns, led the oll8Oslve on 27 September Following an arliliery barrage and dive bombing runs, Ihe panzer grenadrers and tanks plunged IOtO the Owrashnaya Woods They ClIme under .mmedrata fife from heavy machlneguns and dug-In lanks apparently unlazed by the prevIous shell ing Pioneers tried to clear e.lenSlve mlneflelds, but snipers kept them undercover

The diVISionS conllnued lhelr assault Both the 241h Panzer and 389th D,VIS'onS suffered high casuallres, but wlthrn 24 hours they could claIm 900 prisoners, over 100 machlOBguns, and the destructIon 0/ XJ tanks. The advance throogh the workers' settlements was brought to the edge of the I{lctorres. Furlher progress was hampered, however, by the poor perfOrmance Of the l00lh Jaeger D,v,s,on The mounl8rn trOOPS could not clear and hOld the bUild lOgs around them One hOUSing group adlacent to a mea! pllcklng pial'll was particularly d,fi,cult Over 600 men were lOSt 11'1 four days of combat, and the Sovrets stilt oc cupted some 01 the structures

To reduce a dangerous sahent to the Im­mediate OOllh, elements of the XIV PanlOr Corps and U Corps moved 10 cut 011 enemy !llIe brigades around the town 01 Orlovka on 29 September The Soviet command had lelt these statIC lormatrons to thrmllen the German hnes. They could offer ht tie oppOSl!ron to the rockels and aellal bombs whICh showered thell trenches. Panzergrenadlers 01 the 16th Panzer D,v,s,on moved In from the north, while elements of the 94lh and 389th Infan­try DIVisions advanced from the west and south Soon the two assault groups hnked UP near HeIght 977 Artillery and flak guns were turned on the pocket, while hasty defenses prevented rehellrom SOVIOI folCes In the city By 8 OCtober, the Orlovka pocket wasebmlnated wrth the capture 01 over 600 pffsoners and many heavy machrneguns and mortars

To replenISh hiS army Chulkov depended en­Itrely on allOlments from the Front command which was try.ng to rernlorce the enTire Volga hne When In la te September the 39th Guards R.fle D,v,s,on (Major General Gurrev) was marched rn Irom the east, 115 troops were bivouacked rn welt camouflaged camps where daytime movement was forbidden. The men received Instruct,on rn street lighting, while their officers were brleled on cond.tlons In the city OnlV morta~ and anll­lank guns were taken across the liver s.nce Chu.kov onSlsted that heavy artillery be telt behInd to reduce the logIstICal straon on the west side. The camps were soon !rIled by the 37th Guards R,11e D,v,s,on IMaror General Zholudovl, then the Dth Rifle D,VISIOn (Colonel GUr l revl RapId transfer was required both bt.K;ause 01 the pace oltha com bal and the danger 01 cholera and other diseases w hich periodically flared up along the swampy east bank

To bolSter the Stalrngrad position the SflJvka rn early October ordered a Specral Defense Com­mand be set up opposite the city T waive Irghl antl·aorcraft artillery regimentS and one medium antl-alrcralt alliliery regiment came under the drreclron of the staff 01 the former II Tank Corps Rille and cavalry diVISIOns took UP poSlllons while a ItfteCOlps was kepI In reserve Two rille drvrSlons

the 169th and XlOth actually Stll'll

replacements 10 the west SIde Perhaps even more Important lor the 62nd Army, an Independent heavy artillery diVISion was created on the east bank It controlled ten artillery regimentS, a half dOlen rocket regimentS, plus several heavy mortar and mach,negun battalions The Trans-Volga Ar tillery Group contributed 203mm guns. The bat­telles were dug rnto camoullaged emplacements hnked With concrete; alternatlVil and dummy poSl-1001'15 were also prepared A central command post dllected by General N N Voronov tthe top artilleryman In the Red Army) coordinated shelhng after communicating dllectly wtth Chulkov's haadquaners. By filing lor only a few mlnules, the guns usually avoided OOtectlon SeVilral batter lOS

were linally located and destroyed, but the real reslflcllon on the arti llery W{lS the {lva,lab,h ty of ammunl(lon wh.ch was managed by Ihe Front commalld

Attack on the Tractor Works "' he early days 01 October saw both srdes try

109 to probe for a weak "pol In the opponent's oolOllsos To the north oltha cny, RUSSIBn llOOPs made nutnefouslOrays agamS! prepared poSitIOns 01 the S,.th Army lend lease tankS were used 10 test German artIllery In one day the 3rd Motollzed Infantry D,VIS,on knocked out29 Churchill and M-3 tanks Often Soviet guns would shell German \lenches at night South 01 Stallngract the Fourth P{lnzer Army had to patrol a Iront hundreds of miles long The con tlnumg enemy concentrallon at Beketovka required {I cons t/lnt watch Such condllions prevented Army Group B hom Increas-

'"9 ItS IOI'CBS at Stalrngrad Indeed, ..... t.en Paulus requested tMttne replenished 14th Panler-o,v, Slon and 29th Motorized Infantry D,v,s,on be sent tohlm, he was told that they were theonlyresefVe available on the southern Iront Paulus renewed hiS appeals, warnIng that further attacks could 1'101 be perlormed Without fresh manpower Fmally, the J05th Infantry D,v,s,on IGeneralmalOr Slernmelzl and a maror portion of the 141h Pan~er D,vlSlon IGeneralmaror He.ml were ordered to the S,. th Army The 29th MOtOliled D,VIS,on, which had been pulled OUI 01 the clly at the end of September, was not returned to SI~th Army

Paulus now readied a new offenSive aimed dllectly at the lactory area It would be d.rected by GeneraJleutnant Jaenecke. an old trlOnd of Paulus leading the attack 11'110 the Tractor WorkS woold be IheJ05th Inlantry DIVISIOn, supported by armored elements 01 the 24th and 141h Panzer DIVISions On the light lIank parts of the 24th Panzer D ..... s'on would ma.nl8ln Contact, while on lhe lelt SIde the 94th and 389th Inlantry D,VIS,ons would clear the balkas. Pioneers and assault guns would be on hand All artil lery battalions 01 the Ll Corps would be 11'1 support although ammUnlllOn was hmlled Hopefully, a separate operation would Wipe out resr51ance around Spartanovka and Rynolc

The assault was planned lor 14 October A moderate ra.n the night belore dId oot dlsrupl the hmetable, but a SovlOt sporhng raid With tanks did catch some battalions moVIng forward rusl aft8f midnight At dawn the artilierv began (0 shell the Tractor Works and rIver landings. As lIght 'flCreas· ed, d.ve-bombers Irom the Vill Air Corps ranged over preselected targe ts. The panlers and Inlantry crossed the rail line embankment and came undel immediate l ire from machlneguns and mOrtars So close to the enemy that Irlendlv artillery and bombs were a danger, the tanks and IIl10men had 10 loghl lorward 11'1 small teams, cleallng one posr­lion belore engaging another Although the SOvlOt (lrtlliery was Silent, losses were h.gh In the first eoght hours, the 305th Infantry DIVISIOn had 53 men killed and over 100 wounded, dozens were mlssmg By dusk the Tractor Works was sur­rounded on threesldes

As the combat settled IntO lIS usual evening lull, Germ{ln SCOUIS checked Out lhe SovlOt lines By midnight troopers 01 the II Battalion, l03rd Panzergrenadler Regiment, /Oponed th{lt a street to the river was apparently open and undelendoo The battalion commander, Hauptmann Domaschk, QUICkly shi f ted hiS unit, fotlowed by tanks 01 the 36th Panzer Regiment By dawn 0115 OCtober, a narrow corridor was secure to the Volga German 'nl{lntry fanned OOt along the IIV8f bank and attacked SOVlOt positions hom the rear The 94th and 389th Infanlry D,v,s,ons Storm­ed Ihrough nearby hOUSing Quarters to 1011'1 up With the main attack In 115 dally report the vlCtOl'IOUSU Corps could list the deslructlon of twenty ef'lOmy tankS and Ihe capture of 1,028 prisoners, foor locomotives, Sl.ty !relght cars, throo disabled railway guns Ithe last 01 the III· faled IIrmored trarns), plus scores of machlneguns, mortars, and light artIllery pieces For thel! boldness both Hauptmann Domaschk and lhe panzer com mander were awarded Knight's Crossos

"Houst-to-Houst Fighting Continues in Stalingrad .. _ ..

1 he 62nd Army was now spht mto two parIS With most of Its diVISions .n the lactorres and rallyards and the rest In the towns to the norlh Chulkov admits Ihat 3,5OCl wounded wllre femed across the Volga In the firs t twenty-four hours 01 the attack and th{lt casualties contrnlloo 10 be heavy The 37th Guards and 95th Rifle DIVISions were to lose 75% 01 the .. men and most 01 the,r

heavy weapons In or near the Tractor Works. The 112th and JOBth Rille DIvISIons were also hard hot, and theB4th Armored Brrgadewas reduced 10 less than a company 01 tankS German !lOOPS unknow ,ngly advanced to wlthrn 300 yards 01 lhe head Quarters 01 the 62nd Army (00 the east SIde 01 the Barricades Factoryl but were doven oil by a special securrty detachment and two lan~s

Chulkov sent stall ollicers to evaluate condI tions and to encourage the commanders. No POSi tIon, however weak, was to be abandoned Regiments 01 the 138th Rifle DIVISion IColonel Lyudnrkovl somehow braved enemy fire to cross to the ci ty Though they were at half strength, Chul~ov

O/dered the new UnttS Into the line Service unllS and the moderately wounded were also sent lor ward The Front command directed artillery and rocket regiments on the east bank to life on enemy concentrations Night bombers also Increased thelf miSSIons over the German !ear areas

While Gruppe Jaenecke pressed liS attack. toward the Bamcades Factory, a separate battle was ta~lng place around the northern towns 01 Rvnok and Spartanovka The XIV Panzer Corps was detailed 10 neu trallzo these towns SO thattholl landings could not be used by Soviet roin lorcemems. Altllf a Short rocket and artillery bar· rage on 15 October, tanks and panlergrenadlersol the 16th Panzer DIVtSIOn moved on RUSSian delenses along the railime. The most prommont 01 these W9fO the "Mushrooms'" These twO broodrng elevallOr'ls were really huge bunkers arm· ed With m&chlneguns and light arllllery An oxten­slVe trench system covered thearea A battalIon 01 tho 79th Panlorgrenadler Regiment won the smaller lort, but even wl1h assault guns the 64th Par'llorgrenadler Regiment could nOt Subdue the "Big MuShroom" In the towns, pioneers and In lantry lound themselves fighting house-Io-house Demohtlon teams had to set their e~plOSlves so close thaI they were splintered by clcbrrs When night lell the cooks and mechanICS 01 the diVISIon had to mount guard for lhe e~hausted combat soIdl8ls

SOVlOt reSIStance In the aroa came hom rem nants of several nile brrgades and some remnants 01 the 112th Rille DlvtSion, collectively known as the "Northern Group" An a\tempted landrng by UnitS 01 the JOOth Rifle DIVISion was drrven off by the Germans Gunboats gave some support, but artillery on the east bank was trarned on Sla ~ngrad, nOI these towns Stili, the IsolMed delenders died hard The German at18Ck loree was able to drrve the RUSSians rnto a pocket near Spar­tanovka but lost 30% 01 Its strength In the pro­cess The 16th PanZIlf DIVISion had no more llOOPS to help the assault The "NO/them Group" was to SUrvlVil until mid NOVilmber !!ViIn as German guns COVilred both the liver and land approaches

Between the nonhern towns and the Tractor Works, the 94th Inlantry DIVISion moved to clear the Orlovka creek Its regimen tS wore so depleted that roc~etlaunchers had to be teamed wnh the II fie companies Tough enemy resiStance, plus e~ tanSlVe mlnefrelds, slowed the progress One daytime at1ack COSt the 274th Inlantry Regiment nearly every company and battalion olllCer As the diVISIon neared the Volga, II came under increas· Ing frre Irom lhe east bank Enemy barrages also worked over the Gllfman dIVoSlons west of the "TennIS RacQuet" and the Red DClober Faclory The 71st and 295th Infantry DIVISIons WOfe 100 wea~ to challenge the guardsmen and S,beroans opposite them The 10011'1 Jaeger DIVISIon dod stage some assaults but With meager gains

In the lactorres Gruppe Jaenec~e 10000nd ItS headway reduced by a number 01 lactors. The workhalls and Clu ttered StreetS hampered the movement 01 the tanks and personnel camers; several were disabled by Soviet anti-tank guns hr

Ing polnt-blan~ from the rubble All suppon was beong Siphoned off by mosslons oulSlde 01 the Cfty, and German heavy artillery could not always react because 01 oncreaSlng ShOftages on ammumtlon Flghtmg by day, then having to drg In IOf protOC-1IOn from enemy harassment bombong and shell­rng at nrght, the German soIdrers began to suffer serious fallgue. Many became vlCllms 01 the "Rus­Sliln disease," Ie, dysentory Since thero were no replacements available, the semor medical olfrce! of the SI~th Armv warned Paulus that combat effi­ciency was Ii~elv ro drop all drastically rn the com Ingdays

A totl was also berng exacted upon the Sovret lorces. Positions were buroed under enemy bar­rages or cut off by German attacks. Many badly wounded soldiers became pnsoners when they could not be evacuated by thell comrades. SI.II lhe Russsan delenooMllought on. Foundarres and pIles 01 scrap were converted ontO pollboxes whICh had to be blown apart to Silence them. Infrltratlon through streets, tunnels, and sewers ~epi the poSitions manned The 62nd Armv also made up an "active defense" With the deployment of storm groups Theil targets were often fortified Dulldrngs Just taken by the Germans. Sometimes a tunnel would be dug beneath an enemy posmon whICh would be blown up in sapping technIQUes reminiS­cent 01 the FIlSt World War BCSldes aggresslVil &etlons, the Sovrets also made use 01 propaganda broadcasts and leallets whreh onvl1ed the Germans 10 surrender A former Landser, now a POW 01 the Red Armv, would address hiS old buddies by name and urge them to ,om him In the relative safety 01 captiVity

Faced With a tough, Imaginative foe, Paulus had to break the resiStance in the Barricades Fac­tOry Fortunatelv, tWO veteran regimen ts of the 79th Infantry DIVISion IGeneralmaior Schwellnl had arrrved to lead a new assault These were combmed With the 54th Jaeger Regiment, plus two assault gun battalIOns and three rocket laun­cher battaloons T agathar, they assailed the outer shops of the Barncades FactO/yon 23 October A short aHlllery barrage Stunned the Sovret defenders, but once on the workhalls, the 79th In· fantry DIVISIon lound 115 way blocked by rnterlock­Ing fife tram machlneguns and Irght cannons At­tempts to skirt the frllng POSitions were frustrated by additional pOints bUilt IntO the balkas and ro· tarnrng walls By late a!ternoon five 01 the ten workhalls were OCCUPied, but the lead battalions had lOSt 83 men and another 364 wounded_

To the north a mixed force of panzersand In­lantry tried to wIn a SQuat structure known as Bread Factory No.2 They ran onto an unexpected concentratron 01 SOViOt armor {mOStly Immobile T-34'sl. Tan~ battered tank, OOt the Germans were able to destroy a dozen 01 the enemy vehicles. Panlergrenadrers of the 14th Panzer DIVision stormed nearby apartment buildings and a sports stad.um Exllemoly heavy casuailies le fl the diVISion With only 750 rnlantrymen Clear weather lei the V!l1 Air Corps lIy several close sup port miSSIOnS. A lso, the combined a!tlilerv 01 the diVISions and the 1I Corps was used 10 dlfecl sup­presSIve life againSt Sovret balteliCS on the Volga Islands and east bank When a Soviet observa lion post was d.scovered atop a high smokestack rn theclIV, an assault gun battery blasted II apart

Other targets 01 the German guns were the SOVIOI gunboats and barges whreh recklessly ap­proached lhewest bank They were Irymg tobllng remiOlcements to the 39th Guards Rille DIVISion whICh stubbornly held the Barrocades Factory The 300th Rifle DIVISIon was able 10 cross a regiment of new recruits They were followed by other lorma­t;ons 01 raw troops To provIde some e~penenced soldiers, the 34th Guards Altle Regiment sent a battalion trom the oil refinery 10 the sou th. In addl-

tlOO to combat lorces, Chul~Ov also recerved delegatIOns Irom the Stavka and Froot commantl, trYIng to evaluate the SlaYing power 01 h,s army To Them Chulkov emphaSl~ed that hos prlO/ltres were ammunitIOn, men, and I1IlIons, In that order All of the obsefvers Pl'omlsed to do whal they could, but the mOSt senior oillCers pnvately adVIS­ed the general that hos army must hold With what 11 had whIle operauonswere prepared "elsewhere ..

VISitorS Shit came to lhe headquarters of the Sixth Army, bUI they wero 11 dillerent SOrt than those who had appeared at The early Stages 01 the bailie Then there had been propaganda teams looking to 910ll l y the VICtOry whreh seemed so 1m mlnent Foreign dlgnltanes and top generals had also !locked In to be present at the hlstorre hap· penrng After nearly two monthS of stalemate, however, there wore no longer any well wishers arrrving to congratulate Paulus Instead, oilicers llew In from lhe General Stall to gather material lor then repor ts before hurrying bac~ to Germany The mOSt prominent 01 these was MaJO/ Engel who had boon sent by Hiller to assess the SltUllllon at Slahngrad. The survey was not encou ragrng The 24th Panzer DIVISion had Ihe manpower lor hmued oftensive action but barely a dozen tanks The Irght battalIOns of the tOOth Jaeger DIVISion wefe considered capable 01 attaCks although they were badly undergunned The rost 01 the dlVI soons In the CIIV WOfe fated as SUitable OIlly lor delense Indeed, the 7tSl and 94th Infantry DIVI soons had not a baltaJoon 01 IIflemon between them Major Engel assured Paulus that the short ages would be reported \0 the FuehlCf, bot he warned that major reonlorcements wore Impossl ble as the Wehrmacht prepared for another wrnter rn RUSSia

The Llls! AUllck Paulus knew that bl\ler weather could kill hiS

men as surety as SOVlOt bullets, so he readied one more ollenSIVil to crush the foe In the laCtoriOS The thtfd regiment 01 lhe 79th Inlantry D.vISlOn had atflved, and that plus a long aSSOClatron With the d!VOSlon commander, Generaimalor SchwOfrn, prompted Paulus to name h,m to lead lhe new assault It would be called Operalton Hubertus. All available combat troops would be combined rn liS execution In addition, five pIoneer battahons were sent Irom lhe west Although somewhat understrength, they Included flamethrowers and demoh1l0n o~perts which wero considered crucral to elrmlnatrng the lortilled enemy positions

Because of the poor vlslbill1y over the City whIch might Irustrate alf a\lacks, Generaloberst Wollram von Rrchthofen lcommander 01 the FOUrth All Forcel offered to use hIS arrplanes to brrng In artillery ammuflltton for the Sixth Almy However, the shuttle was not Implemented 10 any great extent because 01 the need IOf the allcraft elsewhere Artillery ammunrllon was saved up IOf theanack, but In the meantime, 210mm howitlers trred two .0undS an hour, day and night. on cer tarn S\longOOlflts To compensate lor the lack 01 tan~s and assault guns, a dOlen e_pellmental vehlclos mounting 150mm guns would be used lor the Illst Irme The operation would stili be an rn fantry endeavor, however, so unIQue measures were taken to develop a lorceable 10 Irght and WIn at close quart8fs. The result was the Swrmkom paille based 00 heavy automatIC weapons Three diVISIons rn the city WOfe dllected to O/gantle these UflitS while another SWrmkompanl9 was marched lolrom the northern perimeter The men who were to lead the assautt s1udred a secret report on attacking fornlled pos.tlonS, plus e5l1matos 01 the enemy based on hazardous reconnaissance patrols made by pioneer oltlCers

fhe SoviOt delenders were well aware that a German ollenSlve was In Pleparlltlon The slackenrng In ar tillery file suggested that ammunl-

29

30

uon was b81119 hoarded lor a new anack JuSt as they had In prevIOUS weeks, Ime,clos58fS brought back userul bits ollnlormatlOfl about the enemy's aCtlYlI1IIS Numerous CIvilians sIll! lived In S's , hngrad, ohen on the edges of I.he banlelooe5 The Germans had troed \0 ,dentlfy and control thIS non milItary population, bul roadblocks and pa1rols coold SIlIl not completely Slop 1nl,In8tlon by the CI ­

I~ natives Even withOut such aids lhe Sov~t com­manders could 83SIIV foresee the likely target of the enemy attack The 62nd Army was compress ad InIO a lone approxImately six mIles long lind one mIle deep Since the best German ur1l\S were opposite the Bamcades and Red OClober Fac· lones, they wttIe the logICal obJ8Ctlve5

SOVIEII sokIters Improved ground level bunkers protectmg heavy machloeguns and an­,.tank guns Holes wele dnHe<! through thICk sleet plates which COVefed hrlng shts so thaI only mUlzles Ollhe weapans would be exposed MInes lind booby traps cluttered lMlfy approach Tan~

~lller and Iiamethrower Units were organIzed Irom peflal companlllS The Front command w!lhheld hBB~y artIllery sheils but assured Chulkov thai the artillery dl~lslon on the east bank would be abla to help him. The general was prepared to distribute small arms ammunition and chocolate rations to the :JJ,OOO troops slln In the central arell Inlantry battaJoons 01 lhe 45th Rille DIVISion Il.Jeutenant Colonel Sokolovl augmented the west bank defenses Further r8lnlorcemenlS were unlikely Since the Volga had begun 10 1III With ICe blocks whICh disrupted boat traffiC. The harrowing weeks 01 battle end Increasing sense of lSOIalion so weakened molale that K M Gurov, the com­mfssar of the 62nd Army, ordered poliucal officers into the front hnes to maintain discipline

Wllh a short artillery barrage at 0300 hours Operalion Hubertus began on II November Ten battalions of German Inlantry, piuS tanks and pioneers, entered parts of the Barrtcades Factory, the Red October Factory, af'ld nearby shops Clear weather allowed the VIII Aif Corps to do pinpoint bombing on both SIdes of the Volga Near the Red October FaciOry, pari 01 Gruppe SchW9f1n ran Into II Sovlllt Slorm group lust moving InlO POSllIOn Inside a work hall, hea~lly-armed soIdllllS hred point -blank al each Other As the rest 01 the attack sWlded aroond them, the men InSide 01 the workhall CIIrfled on thel! own private Wllr amidst lhe rubble Finally, lIamathrowers and hand grenades were used to stille thll SOVIIII resIStance The resl of Gruppe Schwelln was slowed by ellllmy Dunkers whICh had 10 be tackled by exploSIves-laden pIoneers In lhe afternoon, a lew SOVlllt tankS Ined to split the attackers, hoi tl/nely InterventIOn by an armored groop of the 24Th Panzer DIVISion destroyed the tanks

To the Immedlille north the 305th Inlanuy OI-.I5Ion ballied near a group 01 OIl tankS to win heightS on the rl~er bank The 389th Inlantry 01~1 Slon OCCUPIed a 35G-yard area along the Volga, then had to delend Itsell from a SO-'IIII counterat tack which bOiled out of the nearby Bafllcades Factory. Near Ihe rlllllOop the 71st and 295th In lantry DI~ISlons combined to clear a housmg groop. The looth Jaeger OWtSIOn enloyed a rare ~ICtOf)' In destrOYing nineteen small bunkers Along the &nlile line, howe~lIf, the Germans suI fered Iremendoos losses For e.ample, m thell Illst day of action In The CHy, the lIVe new PIOneer bat tallOns lost 440 men . The 389!h Infantry O .... Slon could locate 190 CIIsualtleS, but another 189 men were rePOlled mlSSlngl

The 62nd Army had also been 5e'Jllfely depleTed Atlhe 011 depot Ihe commander 01 the 112th Guards Rille Regiment coon ted only 100 men In each of hIS ballalions. The 193rd Rille DI~ I

slOn had lileraHy bled "TO death" m the Red Oc­tober Factory When Russ,an rein forcementS ttled to land, they wele dtl-.en back by blaZing flak and

machlneguns_ Many soldiers drowned as thell boats were sunk by Geffnan Ille As seliouS as the losses In manpowlIf was the redUCtIOn of temtOf)' held by lhe SO-'lIIt defenders . Many Outer posi­

lionS had been OVllfrun, and the enemy now oc­cupilld new areas of the Volga helQhlS The 138th RIfle O .... slon was CUI 011 along the fiver betund the Bamcades Factory; the dl~'Slon was to remam !solated until mid December

Despi te the pressures pu t upon II , the 62nd Army displayed an amaZlflg tenacIty and reSIstance Counterallacks wele qUlc~ly organiZ­ed to challenge almost e-.ery German ad~ance Many 01 These efforts were too small to be ellec­II-.e, but when carrilld oulat nlQhlthey unnef'led lheenemy Chulko-.and hiS staffluggled UOlIS and suwhes 10 malnlalfl an ellectlve defense. Small arms ammunmon was aJioled by need, not re­quest Artillery on the eaSI bank also JOined the defense. Smce the Germans were now so near the fiver, almos! any barrage lUSt beyond Ihe far shore was bound to cause damage. Night bombers flew o~er the clly dropping e.plos,-.es and lIares to disrupt German mo~ements on the ground. Ahel less than fl~e days, Gruppe Schwenn suspended Its attacks merely to letam what I! had won. The hghtmg broke oil as bolh Sides were o~ercome by the \lemendous carnage

Turning Poinl : Operatio n Uranus ImpaTlllnt \0 finally cla,m hiS pfl~e, Adolf

Hiller dIrected tOO Sixth Army 10 resume the at­tack Paulus acknowledged the message With a promIse to win the CHy, but he was not to get the Chance_ On 18 November, $!Wen 50-.,et armres of nearly a million men marched aga,"51 5tahngrad They were part of the OperallonS Umnus, the long-awalled CommuniSt ollensl-.e With powel and precfSlon the SO-'Iel auackers e.plOl ted the e.tended hnes of the Fourth Panzer Army and the weak po5lliOnS of the Thlfd Rumanian Army On 22 November, the SO-'lel pincers met alKalach, some forty miles west of Stalingrad The 51ilth Ar mywassuHounded

leh InslOe the pocket were 260,tXXl soldiers !including 13,<XXl Rumanlllns, 19,<XXl HivvJS, af'ld a SCilllerlng of other na\lonal,hesl represenTIng twenty-three df~ISlons and O'Ief tOO lfIdependent formations CasualTIeS qUickly Increased due to the IntensNe figh l lng, the temble weather, and the reduced rations Disease and sheer e.haust ion In­

capaCllaTed many men. Belore the last airfield was cloSC<1 on 24 January 1943, o-.er :JJ,<XXl wounded men had been flown OUt In addition, 7,000 speclilltSts Imostly stall ollicers and tank malfltenance personnel! were e-.acuated to the west A week later, the 123,<XXl remammg sur­~lVorsllncludlng 24 generals and over 2,<XXl other ofhcers) became pllsoners Shorn 01 thell alms and -.aluables, they marched eastward under The guard 01 the NKVO

In Retrospect To lust,fy the loss of the 5,.th Army, Nazi

propagandists clmmed that ItS sacoflces had gl-.en time for German armies In the Caucasus Moun­tains and other regions to wl lhdraw befole the SO~te l onslaught Certa,nly these rellealS had been carlled out In good order, but the German puollc was stunned by IheCOSt While Wehrmachl censors WIthheld the lasl melancholy letTers Irom the soldiers of the S,.th Army so as not to com­pound the feeling 01 despair, SUf'll-'Ors 01 the catastrophe already In Germany qUletry told lhe" rela\l~es and Irlllnds the details of the debacle Throoghoul the Rerch doubts began to lorm abour Ihe conduct and purposes 01 the war Why had the banle been lost?

For many an ob-'louS answer was Ihat Sta hngrad should not have been attacked at all. ITs Im­por tance 85 a transpOflatlon and manufacturing

center was secondary to the destruction of lhe Red Army Wilen the aperatlOns lfIlhe sulT)rner 01 1942 lalled to eI,mlflate the enemy, a sober rOO'latuallon should haVi! been begun Hitler seemed 10 have rocogfllzed the true prlOfI!Y las shown by hIS dlSrrussal 01 Bockl, but he was also determined to take Stallflgfad Some of hIS generals did Question the logiC 01 the chOICe In light of the Other ongoing batHes, but most Ger man mlil lary men accepted the target Once In the city It should ha~e been the respons,b,luy 01 the Oberkommllndo des Haeres IOKH) to InSist on alternatl-.e tacllCS 10 Ihe meatgrlndef methods whICh were used by the S,.\h Army One option woold have been 10 seal off the cuy entirely Since lhe Volga prevenled a rapid en\lillopment. en­cnClemant woold have had \0 come from the skIeS Rather than droppmg thousands of bombs on the City, the Luftwaffe coold l'Ia-.e used the same e.plosl-.es against the east bank to cut off relnlorceme",s and to block e-.aCUllhon 01 lhe CI · ty A more e.lleme mo-.e Iproposed by Kurt Stu dent and others) would ha-.e been 10 send In

paratroopers and gilderS to seize the east banI and bar 50-'let reinforcements while Stallngrad was cleared by regular Inlantry ThIS scheme lalled to conSider. howllller, how the airborne lroops were themsel-.es to be supplilld or extllC3!ed

Since the long clly could fealty only be I'IP proached Irom one SIOO, the reasonable course woold have been to ad~ance enough UflilS to engage the SOViet delenders, Then Stop Once the ends 01 Stalingrad wele secured af'ld a contlQuous line was esTablished near the lactorlllS, the soldiers 01 the S,.th Army could have patrolled the captl-.e RUSSIan gafllson AggrllSSl-.e PIObeS would have 10lced the 62nd Army 10 man every mch 01 Its line Arlillery harlages and all bombing IlIIIen w'th resilictionsl would have kept lhe enemy al bay and prevented a bUild-up of forces These condl­lions were met In mid-OctOber The S,.th Army would have been able to d'g In for lhe winter and not have had to endure the strain 01 mounting fU1i1e attacks InSlead, lhe bu.oon would ha~e beef! placed on the 62nd Army, thereby revelSlng the dilemma 01 Stalingrad SOV08tS. not Cler mans, would ha-.e had to challenge welilortihed poSitiOns lithe Red Army chose not lodoso, the S,.th Army would have been able to Improve ItS rear aleas and supply Situallon. Threatening enemy conCentra l lOns, as at Beketo-.ka, COuld ha-.e been eliminated by Army Group B OperaliOn Uranus might ha-.e been aborted had Paulus not decided to enler lhe factolles

For the Stavka lhe defense of Stalingrad was really a Hobson's chOICe. Not to do so would haVi! encouraged the NaZI adVance and perhaps haVi! lost lhe southern flank To light In a city beyond a rNIIf, however, was no s.mple matter The SO-'lIIt5 apparently thought thaI The Germans would recoil once they had meta stout delense When that did not occur, the Red Army had to coun ter e~efY enemy effort Wi th an equal effort Those who have argued thaI the CommunlSIS used Stallngrad as ball to Ilap the S,.th Army have not appreciated how the Germans almost prll'lailed In the early weeks 01 the bailie Only In October when 1\ ap­peared lhal the Germans were OVele.lended and Irrallonally Commilled to taklflg the City did Stalin and hIS ad-,'SQrs begm to see an une.peeted op­ponun,ty II The SI.lh Army was held on the Volga, ItS weak flankscoold be crushed To do so meant suslalnlng Chulko-.'s arm,(long enough to keep It al,-.e but not al the e.pense 01 greater OperahOnS. The tosses in manpower and mateflals were frightful And 5tahngf8d was destroyed However, the Sov,ets accepted the COSt Since In relUm they ehmlnated an enemy almy and 5er-.ed nOllce of then own Strength . The war on the

-

Eastern Front was nevel the same afler that momentous conlromallon 01 the Volga

As the fIghting surged to the west. Stallngrad was left to begin Its long recovery For several years afler the war. Stallngrad was called the "CIty WIthout Street numbers" because Ihe many months of bailie had Ilierally Obliterated every road and every bUIlding Thousands of homeless re fugees JOIned Ihe native Slahngraders 10 clear Ihe rubble and bUild a new CtlY Known todav as Volgograd (sInce the old WWII dictator IS no longer 1n favorl. the emphas1s is stili Oil ,"duslrral produclion

THE ARTILLERY Even as the battle of Stalingrad began,

both the Germans and the Soviets realized that a critical componem in their arsenals would be the artillery. In previous campaigns on the Eastern Front, the Germans had used artillery WIth great effectiveness. The Russian fond­ness for the "God of War" was also well ­known. In a set-piece battle like Stalingrad. whichever side gained a superiority in artillery could well be the victor. Howeve;', both Ihe German, and the Soviets faced problems in the emplOYme'flt of their guns. in part becauSll of the ballJefield itself, but also because of cir­cumstances peculiar to the two armies.

All of the German divisions entering Ihe bailie zone had theil ful! complement of guns and baueries. These were usually in the 75mm to 150mm range with a few divisions using converted 01 captured guns. In addition, as many as nine battalions 01 army artillery were deployed, some with guns above 200mm. These units also included heavy howitzers capable of high angle fire over buildings or inlo ballcss; they could also be deprC$Sl:ld to fire directly imo reinforced positions. With the absence of the Red Air Force, the Germans werll able to use their rapid· lire antiaircraft guns as infantry support weapons. The thr6ft regiments of heavy and light nebelwerfers were also appreciated by the riflemen. Pe/hal» the most popular close support weapon. however, was the assault gun. The Sturm­geschuerzll could accompany the infanlry In nearly every situation to provide both devastating firepower and armored protection.

As the retreating divisions end brigades of Ihe 62nd Army fell back to Slalingrad. they abandoned much of their artillery. The deficits were made up in part by new guns found in the city, bUI few of the Soviet units on the west bank had their authorized amount of artillery during the battle. R<llher than try to redress their disadvantage. Soviet commanders wisely built up the artillery on the east side of the Volga where it could be more easily supplied and also protected from the German advances and the ever prowling Stukas. When the enemy entered the city in mid·September. the 62nd Army could fire only 575 guns and mor­tars. 8y 1 OCtober, thanks to the creation of a new artillery division, the number had risen 10 Oller sao pieces. In early NOllember, Chuikov could count on nearly 1,200 guns <lnd mortars to defend the city Irom both sides of the Volga. Most were standard Soviet artillery weapons in the 76mm to 122mm range along wilh several bahemOlhs of 203mm caliber. Several bat­teries of antiaircrah gun' helped protect the

TestimOfllals 10 the bailie are everywhere A museum houses rehcs of the IIghllng and gIves a (Sovlel-oroentedl Imerplelatlon 01 the cOllllicl A small bUilding With bul letscal1ed walls com · memorates the valorous aCl lon 01 the guardsmen BrOllze stalues near Mamayev Kurgall remind VISitorS of Ihe blood shed for that ancrenl hIli A huge mOllument lists the Ilames of every RUSSian. sotdler orclvlhan, who died ,"the Ci ty , Oil sHl te oc­casIons veterans proudly wear a medal "For the Defense 01 Stahngrad" wllh Its khaKI rrbbon spill by a Single cnmson band

river crossings. Finally. numerous rocket laun­chers peppered the west bank. Indeed. one "Katyusha" regiment survived in tha cily, by firing from the river edge. and then retreating back inlO tunnels dug into thesl6ftp cliffs.

To use their artillery properly, it was impor­tant that the Germans and the Soviets be able 10 see the enemy and then adjust Iheir guns ac­cordingly. The Si~th Army had SlJperior larget acquisition capabilities for selleral reasons. Conlrol of the air enabled artillery spotters to discover Russian poshiolls on both sides of the river, and en<lbled the Germans to emerge vic· torious in the early artillery duels. Occupation of key heighls. such as Mamayev Kurgan, pro­vided excellent vantage points lor artjllery ob$ervalion teams. Once a likely target was nOled, information about it was evaluated by corp$ lellel artillery staffs which would coor­dinate fire by both the divisions and the separate battalions. Most German batteries were readily mobile and benefited from a very fle~ible organization, so that the guns could be shihed along the front, as needed.

By cOlltrast the Soviet artiltery lacked any help from aviation spotters. Observers on the low-lying and !lat east bank literally had to "look up" to see into the city. Soviet soldiers did infiltrate German lines to identify targels, but their range was limited. Once a targel was discovered. that information had to be con· veyed Oller to the east bank. either by under­water telephone lines (which f,equently malfUnctioned) or by courier. The Soviets rare· Iy used radios because of the superb German intercept service which constantly monitored the area. To coordinate the fire mission. com­pelent artillery commanders were available, but their flexibility was reduced by the static positions of The guns. Concrete-lined emplacements protected the weapons from anything short of a direct hit by a heavy bomb or shell but also limited the traverse of the guns. Many could only fire straight ahead. Thus, the growing concentralion of artillery on the east bank was dilected to cover specific areas, such as the fectory area, the rail loop. and the most important landing sites in Sta­lingrad.

Within the constraints already descfibed, the city battle might have stll! developed into history'S greatest artillery duel except for the shortage in ammunition which plagued both armies. For the Germans the deficit was in part cau~ed by tha prolonged fighting which e~·

hausted the original allotment of Shell. forcing the Germans to chose between either massive barrages or support operatiolls, but not bolh. Another limiting factor was the long supply line from the west which depended on a single reilroad, trucks, and horse-drawn wagons.

No memorials eXISI tor the Sunh A rmv Years alter the war barely 5.000 of liS sotdlers SUrvIVed Soviet prison camps to re turn home They wele among Ihe lasl enemy pllsoners released by the Communists MOSt 01 thelf countrymen had alreadv lorgoUtIfl about these veterans During the bailie Adolf Hitler had consrdered a "Sla­Itngrad Shield" 10 honor Ihe victory. but Ihe pro· Ject was cancelled as Ihe lighting ill the CIty took 115 lalal turn He should have done beller lor the ar my which hlerally died tor hiS ambition m the slreetsofStalmgrad ••

Delays and bottlenecks were inevitable. As a result, the heavy artillery was chronically fore· ed to a weekly rather than daily bombardment. German QUnners in Stalingrad could ruefully joke that "hundreds of batteries are in position before the city. but each has only one round of ammunition." Ironically, the Luftwaffe kept its batteries well supplied by flying in more than enough ammo 10' its20mm OI8Bmm flak units_

However, these problems wera mote like a nuisance when compared to the Soviet ones. The 62lld Army had 10 depend on shells ship­ped across the Volga fOI lIS artlUery in the cily The guns on the e<lSI bank suffered severe restrictions ill ammo supply. at lirsl to build up reserves In case the Germans did cross the river, then 10 provide an abundance 01 shells 101 OperatIOn Ura/Jus Chuikov and hiS ar· tille'ymen prOtested these limitations but to Iii· lie avail. Russian munitions sometimes con­tamed defec!S In malellals or manufacture which caulied misfires or rUined the artillery piaces.

Faced wilh a constant Shortage of am munitIon. bOlh armies had to develop specialized filing techrllques. The Si~th Army usually hmited Its artillery file to a very intense thirty minute barrage designed to bombard the defenders into oblivion - Just before the major assaults. There was Simpty not enough ammo for the around-the-clock fumQ or the constant harassment shelling the Germans would have preferred_ As a result, the Soviet soldiers became aw~re of Ihe enemy timetable, and once the barrage lifted. they would come out of their shelters (which could reSISt all but a direct eKplosion from a heavy shell) and lake up Ihelr POSitionS to engage Ihe German infan­try. Occ<lsionally, aCllng on good intelligence IIlformallon. Ihe Germans would coordInate a surprise shelling against a likely Russian head· quarters bunker or supply dump. Such tactics often were spectacularly successful.

The Soviets also concentrated their ar­hllarv. arther to support an attack bv thelf soldiers or to shatter German troops assembling lor an assault. Russian guns on the west bank seldom fired fOf more than a few minutes, both to conserve ammunt!lon and to avoid alimrnalion by the ever alert Germans and their brutally eHicient counter·battery fifes. Harass­ment barrages, particularly by the rocket 001-talrons on Ihe easl bank, kept the Germans wary of most open spaces. While the battle of Stalingrad had the potential to become totally decided by a greal artillery conlest, il developed instead into a conhontatlon of limited bU/1ll

rense cannonade.s aga,nsl specific area. And If il wele not for the nagging shell shortage and Ihe nature of the City itself, the whole bal /lefreld might lileraily have been plowed under by a sheer blankel of high explosives .••

31

32

THE TACTICS Neither the Sixth Army nor the 62nd Army

had extensive experience in fighting hOUSIHO­house. so thei' conventional tactics proved in­adequate in the StrOOtS of Slatingrad. As Ihe Clggressors, the Germans found that thei, ux:hniques of envelopment and breakthrough meanl little when the enemy held block after block. In trying to eject the invaders, the Soviets leCirned that their usual methods were too slow aoo clumsy. As it beCCIme obvious to both sides tha i artillery and airpower alone would not be decisive in the city, Ihey turned to relining thei. infantry tactics lind organiza­lion In hopes of gaining dominance on the strange battlef ield.

Thorough reconnaissance was attempted before 8vt1ty operation. The S ixth Army relied heavily on aerial photographs, radio intl!f!::epl, lind prisoner interrogations to pinpoint enemy positions. Since the divisional reconnaissance units were usually kept back as a mobile reserve, the front line baoalions sent out their own men as scouts. Pioneer officen; proved especially adepl 8t evaluating Sovietfonil ica­tions. All information was keyed to low-scale maps w hich identif ied features by a grid system. The data could then be used by the eir arm and artillery as well, an important key in all German operations. Because it lacked Ihe technical means for long-range recon­naissance, Ihe Soviet command had to depend on priSoner reports and p.iltrols. The latler were dispatched by the sector headquarten;, usually in four-man teams. A few trained individuals remained behind the lines to radio in reports on enemy activities. landmarlr.s were often deS(:ribed by nicknames. As the fighting raged around certain obiect ives, they became known to averyone by either their configuration le.g., the "L-shaped House"I, function \e.g., the "Chemist's Shop"!. or location \e.g .. Reil Sta­tion No. 11. Captured documents were eagarly examined by both German and Soviet in­talligence officers.

Because of the density of multi-level buildings land cellan;) in Slalingrad, both sides had to reduce the frontages assigned to their assault units. Simply passing through the city blocks was not enough, since each building had to be entered and searched along the way. One infanlry comp.ilny was considered ade­quate to clear a single ci ly block, alloting one squad or platoon per building. An apartment complex or factory might require a reinforced battalion of riflemen plus engineers and tanks. Built-up areas also impeded movement so that objectives were kept short range (sometimes, only the next' block or major strUCturel. The Germans usually aimed for specific phase lines (such as a street or balka) whereas the Rus­sians tried for more general objectives (like Mamayev Kurgan or a housing project). •

Once an objective was chosen and analyz­ed, Ihe support (aviation, anillery. etc.) Wi> .. tailored to the mission. The Germans used bombs and heavy shells to reduce and isolate the objactive and then hopefully stun or demoralize Ihe defenders while the Soviets were more indiS(:riminate, preferring sature­tion over precision. Actual jump-off times varied. At first, the Sixth Army had opted for dawn attacks, but then shifted to later morning assaults. In pan this was done to increase visibility for the ground artillery spotlers and air

alamenlS. Also, Russian spoiling raids and ba, rages postponed some German operations. When Irying to regain lost ground, the Soviets might counterattack al any time. Usually the fighting broke off at dusk, although by mid· October, the soldiers of the 62nd Army displayed an affinity for night actions which was seldom matched by the Germans.

Once undelWay, the attacker would use speed and concealment !including smoke) to close on the objective. The infantry would usually move in single file along the street, with men assigned to watch for mines, snipers. etc. The Germans often assigned tanks (or assault gunslto the motorized infantry. The riflemen would stay in their half -tracks until con tact was made. The reluctance of the panzergrenadiers to dismount forced the German commanders to strip the fOlWard elements of their vehicles and to deploy the men along each side of the street DeSlde the tanks. Mobile cannons and flak guns added punch to the assault. While lhe Sixth Army usually attached Om! tank pla­toon pel infantry company. the Soviets com­monly employed their tanks as stationary field guns or as blocking forces. If tanks were used offensively by the 62nd Army, they were sent ahead alone or in pairs, followed by a cluster of

SOWCI sold,,,, IJsmg.'lifmelh,ower BI Slal'-"gfad.

riflemen. To their credit, however, the Soviets were the first to get their troops off the streets in order to move through buildings, yards, and even sewers. These new roules added an im­ponant element of surprise.

Once an objective was reached, entry could be made in a number of ways. At first, the Germans had arrogantly gone through doors or ground-level windows, but enemy booby traps and firepower claimed too many lives. Two (liternatives were then \fied. One was 10 blast open a new entrance through a wall l:sing heavy howitzers or axplosives. The Soviets also used this method but refined it by goi"g through adjacent walls to neighboring buildings or else excavating a tunnel from.to cellar to cellar. Another alternative was to enter the building from as high a level as possi­ble, then clear the structure downward, floor by floor. Somelimes a crude bridge of planks could be devised to connect nearby buildings. The Germansoften ascended ladders to these­cond or third story, while the Soviets were masters at S(:aling walls and climbing ropes held by grappling hooks.

Once inside, the lead man would toss a hantl grenade into the room or hallway. Before the smoke had cleared, his partner would stick

his weapon Ihrough the opening and spray the are(l. Deployed as learns, tha assault group would clear every room, attic. and cellar, while a covering team outside would stand raady to cut down any enemy who might try to llao. Speed was essential. Besides automatic sidearms Imany Germans preferred the Soviet PPSh-41 over their own machine pistols), dag­gers and blackjacks were wielded in hand·to· hand fighting. The Soviets also carried the so-called "Stalingrad spade" 10 lob grenades or 10 bash skulls. Crowbars helped dismantle walls. while satchel charges and flame throwers were usually decisive against particularly difficult strongpoinlS. Even as the building was being secured, friendly machineguns were set up at the corners and on the roof to block any enemy counterattack. As the structure was occupied, communica­lions were established with the main head· quan ers, and fresh units arrived 10 reinforce the position .

While these tactics were known to be the most successful, they placed a strain on the average German or Soviel infantry company which was trained and equipped to operate as pan of a larger unit. not in independent teams. Leadership and firepower were especially defi· cient. The 62nd Army made the first organiza­tional change by creating " storm groups" of80 to 100 volunteers to speci(llize in house-to­house fighting. Every man was given a specific lask and briefed on the overall operation. He was armed with a submachinegun and hand grenades, while mortars and machineguns were added to his group. One Of two assault teams. composed of a dozen men each, would le(ld the attack, followed by a more heavily armed reinforcement team and then e reserve detachmenl. Soviet commentaton; have im­plied that every regiment had a storm group, but the battle records show that only the mOSI elite forma tions could train and equip the storm groups. They were quickly consumed in the many counterattacks but did ruin the Ger­man chance for a rapid occupal ion of Ihe city.

The value of these shock troops was not 1051 on the Sixth Army which devised its own special units for Operation Hllbertlls in mid­November. These were known as SllIrmkom · p8nies 01150-175 men each. The SllIrmkom· panie consisted of thlE!e rifle platoons, II heavy weapons platoon, and a supply element. Of­ficers and NCO's carried submachine guns, and the men had rifles and pistols; every member had at least two hand grenades. Each section manned a light machinegun, while heavy machineguns and mortars were used in support. PioneelS with high explosives and flamethrowers were assigned as necessary. Despite efforts to brief every man on fighling in fonifled areas, the Swrmkompallies were essentially up-gunned infantry companies. Well-armed and slight ly ove.strength, the Sturmkompallies were always expected to lead the attack into the factories. Little relief was available Irom Ihe neighboring units which had been stripped for lheir benefit. The Swrm­kompflnies were a desperate gamble by the Sixth Army, and as events proved, they were asked to do too much. Paulus and Chuikov both came to realize thaI what they needed in Stalingrad was not so much a handful of elite formations to carry the burden, but rather an entire army suitably trained and equipped to light house·to-house .••

•

•

THE COMMANDERS For Generals Paulus end Chuiko .... the bell­

lie 01 Stalingrad was more than an armed con­flict; it was a lest of two military systems. Neither commander was allowed by his coun­trymen \0 forget Ihe importance of his mission. oot neither m,ln enjoyed the fleedom of action that he felt he needed to do Ihe job. Some 01 Ihe constraints were derived from Ihe type of combill. Others wele imposed by the institu­tions of the Nazi end Communist slates. Paulus and Chuikov bore these pressures every day. Victory In the Streets of Slalingrad would come to Ihe general who could overcome his enemies both inside and outside the cilY.

Friedrich Paulus was raised in II family of civil servllnts in the province of Hesse-Nassau. He was not a Prussian aristocrat and never placed II "von" belore his surname. Paulus us· ed intelligence and industriousness, plus social grace, to e"celas a staff officer and instructor. The growing pan~er corps helped him advance in rank despite a small army. When war began, Paulus served brilliantly as tho Chief of Staff of the Si"th Army in its initial campaigns, then shifted to othar duties lor a year and a half. When the commander olthe Si"th Army died, Paulus returned to take charge in January 1942. The successful encirclement of Soviet forces at Kharkov earned him the Knight's Cross. As Operation Slau unfolded to the east, there was no reason for the man known for his organi~ational skills to question the plan or tho e"perts who designed it.

The son ofa shoemaker, V. I. Chuikov had taken up arms as 8 toonagar in the Bolshevik Revolution. His military talents kept him in the Red Army whem his low rank protected him from the Stalinist purgas which destroyed many of his superiors. Service with the troops improved Chuikov's knowledge of men and weapons. Despite a reputation for com· petenoo, Chuikov was also known for a certain abrasiveness. He fought we!1 in the Russo· Finnish War, then was sem to China as a military Itrlllche. Such e"posure to foreign ar· mie! was rare lor a Soviet officer. When the NeW invasion threatened Ihe Volga, Chuikov was ordered home to serve in a veriety of unils as either lamporery commander or chief of staff, Importanl superiors, such as Yeremenko, took note of hi1l determination and innovati\ftl lalenl. When it became necllSSilry to change Ihe leadership at 51 .. 1· Ingrad, Chulkov wasa logical choice.

To command effectively, a ganeral must have good working relations with those below and above him. In dft<lling wilh his subor· dinall!$, Paulus adopted a conventional at· titude, relying haavily upon the staff system. Sim::e his area of operations e"lended along a wide front from the Volga to miles west of the Don, Paulus could not pef1lQnally inspect every sector, He usually stayed at his headquarters • and only rarely visited the front lines. The legendary efficiency of the General Staff pro­vided the data and advice needed for routine maners, However, because 01 his isolation, Paulus lacked a "Ieel" for the fighting in the ci· ty, On important points he seems to have deferred 10 his chief of stalf, Arthur Schmidt, 0' to hiS principal comlHlt leader, Seydlilz. Ma· jor operations were turned over to old Iriends, such as Jaenecke end Schwerin, so they could gain command e~perience !however futile the

efforts). This eschewal of responsibility did nOl go unnotiCed. After the Russian encirclement, Paulus losl control of major elements 01 his ar· my, like the U Corps, and seemed unabla to re­assert his authority.

When Chuikov took charge of the 62nd Army, thare was lillie opportunity for radical change. The army was already backed up against the Volga, and the old staff was stilt in place. Despite the urgency of the situation, Chuikov at first kept a low prome. He allOWed the chiel of stllfl, N. I. Krylov, to continue operations while he evaluated the situation. Then, Chuikov took swift aCllon. Subordinates who showed a lack of resolution Isuch as the commanda, of II tifle brigade who hid on an island while radioing lalse reports) were sum­marily ramoved. When units leadars (e.g .. Sarayev of the 10th NKVD Oivision) question· ed his orders, Chuikov coldly reminded tham that his authority came from the highest levels, Perhaps most importantly, Chuikov lived with his army in the city. He Inspected fronl line headquarters and knew most of the com· mandllrs. Chuikov was also personally aware of every facet of his army from tha disposition of supplies to the deploymanl of anti·tank guns, This Willingness to share the hardships of his men generated strong loyalty 101 Chuikov.

As the vanguard of German operations in Russia, Paulus could have been e"pected to enjoy a special claim to the means necessary for victory at Stalingrad. Certainly Army Group B made every effort to support the Si"th Army, even at the expense of other units. However, the battla in Stalingrad was only one pert of a vast campaign, For those in Berlin and Vinnitsa it seemed enough that Paulus' army

..h .. d more divisions than any other German field command atlhet time. Hitler himself declared that with such a force Paulus should be able to storm the heavens. Such an outlook did oot allow an accurate appreciation of the man and material requirements for city fighting, When colleagues of Paulus on the General Staff tried to point out these problems, they were remind· ed that tha Fuehrer himself had called for the lall of Stalingrad.

It did not help that some of Paulus' peers, such as Richthofen of the Fourth Air Fleet. lamented the toctics employed by lhe infantry units in the city, As the con flict continued, the spokesmen for the luftwaffe, tho supply com· mand, atc., all defended their services and

Fitild MlJrslW P,,,,/US SUlIf",ders

critici~ed the other branches. When the Si"lh Army was encircled and appeared headed for e"tinction, much of this animosity subSided in the general effort to save the army. Even Hitler was willing to tum oyer some local cOnlrol to Manstein in the breakthrough operations. But by then it was too late, both for the Si"th Army and lor ilS commander.

If Paulus had to contend with competing bureaucracies and high level carping, Chuikoy suffered from e"cessive allention from his superiors, The Red Army sought compliance by delailed plans and inquiries which stifled in· dividual initiative. To the military command was added a political component 01 advisors from the Communist Party who shllred equal status with army leaders at every level. Throughout the battle Chuikov had to please committees and managers who controlled nearly every aspect 01 his army. Visitors, both in and out of uniform, constantly monitored his performance, Such interfe/eoce agglavated Chuikov's nalural belligerence and often put him at odds with other commanders.

As the build·up continued for Operation Uronu:;, the needs of the 62nd Army were subordinatlld to the forthcoming offensive. Reinforcements were regulated, sometimes by the Slavklt itself, so that Chuikov had little voice in the choice or arrival of troops in his ar· my area, Indeed, Chuikov's zone of control ex· tended barely east of the Volga bank. OUI 01 the city, his supply dumps, staging oreas, and river transport ware all determined by the Front command, The east bank artillery of the 62nd Army wos centralized in the special division which helped coordinate fire , but it was nOi always responsive to conditions in the city. Chuikov had to plead daily with the Front com· mand for enough shells to prolong hiS defense. In many ways, Chuikov was treated more like an assistant of a minor corps than tha com· manding officer of 0 principal army.

The operations at Sta!ingrad e"posed iln ironic dichotomy between the German ilnd Soviet methods of making war. A Nazi com· manderwasgiven a mission and then e"p8Cled to perform like a hero. A Communist com· mander was issued his orders which he was to carry out like iI clerk, whatever the costs, Chuikoy bridled under the restrictions of h15 system, while Paulus could not live up to the ideals of his army. Their frustrations ware in· creased in late 1942 by the demanding bat· tlefield on the Volga .••

Qi 4 ••

t

33

34

AIR POWER The commitment 01 airpowllf II 518-

~ngrad was a one-sided affall', heavily weighled I" favor 01 the Luftwaffe. AI this $tage 01 Ihe war. the Red Air Forcawas Inferior to the Ger­mens in the quality of pilots and alfcrall. In the summer offensive of 1942, the 3d Fighter Wing "Udef' cleared the sides above the advancing SIKlh Army, By Ihe end of August, tha 8th A" Army whIch was to delend Stalingrad had lost elm01lI all of its righters. leaving but 150 air­cralt, most of which wele obsolete 01 in need 01 repair, SOVl8l airmen then turned to amall· scale raIds, Throughout the battle groups 01 twO 10 twelve bombers lahen crewed by womenl would fly night mlra"men! mINion" dropping bombs on German supply dumps or troop concentrations. These !lueck, rarely clused great damage beyond disturbing the enemy's sleep, As the Sixth Armv p!.Ished into the City. the Red Air Force also senl bomber. on daytime missions. Usually they were diverted Irom their targets by German lighlers. Attempts were made toalf-drop agents behilld the enemy lines. but most were capl\lred upon landing_ Occasionally, a pair of Sovietfighte~ would streak across the Volga to strafe a Ger man aMlllery boIInery or column, then disappear before lhey could be Intercepted. German air and flak l\Jpet'iorny inhibited docisive action by Ihe Red Air Force unlil bad weather grounded all aircraft.

The German VIII Air Corps. under Generalleutnant Martin Fiebig. controlled three bomber wings, six dive bomber groups, a ground-allack group, plus four fighter groups.

THE HIWIS The war on the Eastern Front was a terri­

ble drain on the manpower of both the German and Soviet armies. Even by 1942 there had been so many caSlJahies that both sought to augment their fighting forces by any possible means. The dictatorship of the Soviet Union wes obviously able to press any and all of its cilizen. into service. The populace of Sta­lingrad wal no exception. Males Irom eighteen to fiflY were organized into m~itia units and sent directly against the Germani. Mao and women dug anti-tank ditches or erected street balficades; many acted as liller beare~ at the overflowing field hospitals. As the enemy oc­cupied more and more of the city, the Com­munist Party appealed to the patriotism of Ihe local people to act as spie.. Despite the deVastlllion, many residents still lived In the ci­ty. German field police manned check' points, bul it was impossible to cover every alley and ba/ka. Some Stalingrade~ became saboteurs, but moll of the fioe-CfOSSefli merely gathered intelligence on the invaders. Young women and curious teenage~ could easily extract in­formation from the unsuspecting Landsers. This dati was then used to plan raids and ar­tillery bombardments and to anticipate Ger­man operations.

The Si_th Army had also developed a dependence on the native population. There were simply not enough uniformed Germans

Bombing raids in late August and early September were eimed al enemy aMdlery p0si­tions and ra~ lines in Stalingrad. Individual tergets, such as factory buildings, were pin.­pointed on aenal photogl8phs. Successive air e!tacks dropped some 2.000 bombs per square kilometer. Rubble from the collap5tid StruC­tures was strewn across streets and roads, thereby limiting enemy movements. However, German glound units also had to traverse the city, so lhe destruction was not always helpful. Gutted buildings also made ideal cover for Rus­sian sni~ and anti-tank guns. Attempls to neutralize Soviet strongpoints by all were thwarted in part because of Ihe smaM targets alld also because of the close prOXimity of IlIeOOIy troops. Smoke and dust reduced ac­curacy of even 1ow-IlYlng dive-bombers.

By the end of September, major elements 01 the Viii Air Corps had to be transferred to operations outside of Stalingrad. This reduc­tion, plus the continuing futility of bombing in the city, prompted Paulus to call lor a greater ellolt against Soviet supply lines and artillery batteries on the OPPosite bailie 01 Ihe Volga. Bombing rUM by the VIII All Corps, however, failed to destroy permanently any ra~ fine or rood that brought reinforcements from the east. Rivel trattic could be $lowed but not blocked by air attacks; ground-based automatic weapons senk more boats than did German allcralt. Soviet artIllery on the east bank could also not be silenced because of Ihe S1Jpero camouflage and disciplined firing techniques 01 its guns. Lultwaffe airplanes fly­ing to the east were limited by their range (they

or allies to tight the war. Many city residents were employed as ~bOfers, kitchen helpe~, and guides. With the prisoner-ai-war pens bursting with thousends 01 prime candidates, Wehrmacht recruile~ began 10 screen Ihem, at first only as laborers, latellor more responsi­ble roles . Rear service units needed men for lood construction and teamsters . By mid­September, severely depleted formations, like the 94th and 295th Inlantry Divisions, had several hundred Soviet volunteers (Hilfs­wiNigen or Hiwis) in their pioneer battalions and transport units. It was not unusual for an Intire company of u -Soviet soldiers to be led by a single German NCO. As the city fighting ground up more of the infantry, desperate commanders needed replacements im­mediately. With so much of the artillery in diSlJse as a result of tha ammunition shortage, approval was granted by the DKH in early Oc­tober to convert the gunners Into riflemen. Their original roles were filled by the Hiwis. Most German divisions In Stelingrad had one Soviet-manned batte<y per artille<y battalion. When shells were available , they otten fired captured Soviet guns at their form8f com­. """.

What motivated the Soviets 10 fight against their countrymen? Certainly physical well-being was a major cause. Although Hiwis wele allotted the lowest grade of rations, they could be assured 01 at least one meal a day, plus clothing and shelter, unlike ordinary

left from aIrfields larwast of StahngllldJ and In: CreaSIng enemy anhairclatt file (partiCUlarly by mid-OClober). Most ominously, the Vltt Ail Corps lacked the allcraft for long-range recOll­naissance. D8Splle the indications of a Russran build·up, there were not enough camera &Quipped arrplanes to study the activity beyond the Don and Volga Rivers.

Once the Si~th Army was encircled in NOVtImber, the Luftwaffe had to be called upon to supply the besreged force by all_ Paulus' quaMermaster estimated thai the army would require 1SO metric tons of S1Jppl/es per day Luftwaffe transport office~ calculated titatthey mrghl be able to fly in 200 tons daily, but Reich$marscitall Goaling IIlSlSted that 500 tons should be Ihe goal . Due to a scarcity of transport allcraft, medium bombe~ were also used to haul the S1Jpphes. Allcrews wele sent from other fronts and training units In Ger­many. Plunging temperatures grounded many allcraft end snow storms cancelled several flights. As lhe Soviet armies reduced the alea of the Sixth Army, Russian antiaircraft guns lined the aooroachn to the onlv two anfields $t~1 open in Stalingrad. Deliveries did avelage 90 tons a day Uodel mostllying condnions, but rarely was the delivery above 150 10IlS_ When the airfl8lds were occupied, the German all crews Iried eir·drOPPlng pl"ovisions Into the city With lillie success. In the fUlile effort to supply Fesrung S/e/m9rl1d by air, the Luftwaffe suI fered the irreplacaable loss of over 2,000 men, 500 tlansporls, and 200 olher allcla!t. For tha Gelman' air supremacy at Stalingrad could nOI make up for failure on the ground .••

prisonera and civilians. There was little in the Nazi Ideology 10 appeal to most Soviets bul , lortunltely, the absence 01 political agents with the Sixth Army 9,pared them the senseleas bigolry which had alienated potential allies in other occupied regions. Rather thall being pro· German, many of the Hiwis were anll· Communist . Some were disillusioned with the socialist system. Others sought revenge against tite SlCret police and lhe cruelty 01 Stalin. Several professional soIdie~ were so disgusted by Ihe ineplness 01 the Red Army that Ihey were willing to fight alongside their reclnt enemy. Indeed, as the battles in November lurthlt! depleted the infanlry units 01 the SiXlh Army, some division commanden began S1Jrrepthiously to assign Soviets 10 the front lines.

By doing so, these office~ were defying the orde~ 01 the Fuehrer himself, who had decreed that the honor of the German arms should not be tainted by cooperation with former enemies. Most 01 the officers in the Sixth Army, however, were well pleased wilh their ~new" soldiers. The commandlt! of the 24th Panzer Division noled that the Soviets showed great skil in house-to-house combat . Even as the Soviet Offensive S1Jrrounded 5,,­Nngrad, the HNvIS remained true to their units and did not try to flee . When the Sixth Army finally SIJlfelldered, the Hiwis were quickly separated flam the Germans by the ubiquilous Soviet &ecret police .••

OUTGOING MAil {ro~rl~~"'fro"'ptl~lO/ which l1ems Iwell over 200) are in and out of stock Controls and checks on lhese departments, along With new parsonn~I, ar(l slowly Implovrnq pedor­manca on Ih,s problem area A recent a_curSlon to rhe war(lhQlrse on New Jersey mad" IJV JFD and mYSf'llrflSullPd on ~ lot 01 bad orders billng filled, as "OUT of stnd" IHlrns were laund to be aCTually on Slock and were finally shipped

Ttl(! dllcc\llJn SPI has he~ded on IS positive, but all thongs lake t ime The task 01 cleanrnq up over a vears' problems and deroq~lory repu ta llon IS a dllln,:<l11 one, hl" n('ll al all Insurmountablp Soon, SPI WIll be back to ,IS lormer sel! In Older lulilltmant, qlv'nq the customers the servIce thf'Y d"!)erve JPG

.' eedback

One effect of the increased activ ity on SPl's ProceSSing Department lsee Due Process) has been a delay In the processong of Feedback results We are currently one Issue behmd; we hope 10 ca tch up With S&T 8 1

Co·mcldental with our early work on The China War, the PLA was preSSIng Its essault on Vietnam. the Soviet Union was threalenlng Chma, and war clouds were as thick as enytlme m 1979 SPI staHers bemusedly speculaled Ihat The China War might never be plln ted, as on the event of war ail lhe prototypes would be reduced to radioaCt ive sleg (not to mention all the SPI sta ffers) Never­theless, work proceeded apace and, m the event, no explOSions preceded the publlcauon 01 the game As II turns out, none have greeted It either The China War, along with mOSt all 01 S&T76, has received very Ordinary raungs

.'n :VHACK Kt:SULTS,S&T 76

Rank Irem Rarmg

I Bloody Apr il 6.'" 2 Outgoing Mall 6.58 3. The Chona War (gamel 656 , The Chona War lart lclel 6.55 5. FYEO 6'" 6 Bnellngs 622 7. Sovi9t Motorized Rifle Battalion 5.00

IOF 1021)

S8TDvarail 6.57

II not e~ploslve, al leest consistent FYEO and Briefings were UP. and once agam the Data File brought up the rear We arB experimenting with the format of Bnefings and arB r e-thln~lng the Data File concept

No S&'T game proposals did especially well Road \0 MeSSina, 21st Century, and Dealhmaze had mediocre ratings Road to Messina has been assigned to AJa_ BUCCino and Deathmaze has JUSt been published (remember, these results are being reponed two monthS laler than usual! The mOSt enthUSiastic reponse was for The Chma War e_· pansion module. ISo much lor the I,me·honored theory tha t area-mOvemBm games Bre an anathemal

The quesllon about the plastiC counter trays cerna out as lollows. 29% approve of lower proced games without trays; 23% are neutral or did not respond; and 48% disapprove of publishing games Without trays. We Bre all caugh t between a rock and a hard place on thiS one, Many 01 the people among the 29% Bre already "vOling wllh thelf feet" as It were, In passing by games pnced Over $151h81 they would have probably laccording \0 our leedback prOJec tions) purchased If they were less e~penslvB And plastiC IOII-basedl trays afB not getting less a_penslvE!_ BUI by the same loken, we cannot go 8gamst a large plurality of our subsclibers. What we Will probably do is keep

searchIng for an acceptable solu tion, We Will not stop selling the trays, one way Of another One op­lion we are emplOYing IS milking Ihem available as separate items, which would allow us \0 sell them cheaper - sold In a pack of si_ - than II IfI­divldually sold In games. The problem With thaI IS whether we could make the trays available In

stores We have been soliciting opmions I rom store owners, and we think we can work 1\ out In Ihe meantime, we are contmu lng to pul them mto ali the games thai we can, Watch Ihis space and Ihe feedback sectlon lor more on thiS Hessel

Gossip The question, as usual, IS where to Slart, 5111ce

qUite a bit has transpired In a few shon months For mOSI companIes In thiS hobby there are two mileStones to a,m lor one IS OflglnS, the malar consumer show, and the other is the Hobby Indus try of Ameflca (HIA) Show, the national trade show Some eighteen companies from the hobby gamlng/advemuregaming (we're suit debating the name) made a presentauon to U S dealers and d,st flbutors January al lhe HIA show

Avalon HIli preViewed War & Peace and Crescendo of Doom as eXpeCted; both had price tags 01 $15.00, thell new pllce POint Tha.T other t it les have also undergone an Increase In price_ Source of the Nile was shown, but Wilt not be released until the summer By Ihe way, thiS game has the beSt looking cOver art 01 any AH game to date. Other AH products 01 ,rllereSt are TJtle Bour (pTa bOXing), ForeJgn Exchange-fl'nd out how hll ie our dollars are really worthl, and Inrern (spot Er,c D01\'s son Jackson on the cover and win the operation 01 your choice) Newly acqUired and revea ling was Class Srruggle, which was kicking around Independently lor awhile The Banlehne games were also shown, KeVin Zucker, new AH R&Der, IS already enllS!lng the md 01 DaVid Isby to help wah Dauntless and AJrforce. Watch out, Dav,d IS blln9mg hiS A/rWar files down to Baltimore

SPI displayed almost all ItS ne_t SIX months worth 01 game box cnver art DUlte Impressive looking particularly the lull color art 01 the fantasyl SCience fiction t,t les. My personal favorite IS Dra­gons/ayel. though Time TlJpper, beheve lIar not, comes across qUite well There was a great deal of interest about SP l's sports games SOJmmage was before Its t ime AH has discovered thaI there IS a lot o f mterest in sports games Could be Ih,s IS Ihe next trend

Wilhout a doubt Dungeons & Dragons was the mosl lal~ed about product at the show In lact Its success IS helping draw attent ion to ou r en\lle hobby Gary Gygax IS emerging as a top celebr it¥ Wi th hiS name, face, and product mak ing If on na tlonal TV, People, US and Parade magazines plus a hosl 01 local shows and numCiOus articles The way D&D and Its suppor t Items are sellll1g, TSA w ill probably become the largesl company In the hobb¥ Thev most likely have surpassed SPI ,n total sales to emerge as number two

As a continuation olthell suppor t lor D&O, TSA has released a supplement called Rogues Gallery TSR IS also making avai lable another Tom Wham ISmt'sReyengel speCial, The Awfu/ Green Thmgs from Duler Space - very car toony look­mg Bufore you all starl smckermg out there, con­Sider who D&D's major audience is the 10-14 yeal aids For those 01 you Wi th dll ferent lastes In gam Ing Ihey have Top Secret, a O&D lor spies and closel James BondS. Down the road is Knighrs of Comelot a 510·12 quesl boardgame With mce cover art

Metagammg 01 Auslm, T e_as has moved InlO the fi eld of hlStorical micro games as they promiS­ed The fi rst IS Rommel's PanzelS. On the sCience fiction micro end IS Artifact !lunar combatL A

change 01 stratBgy has put the" In lhe LabyrJl'/lh, part 01 the Famasy Tflp ro le·plaYlng sys tem, In a 54.95 paCkage as opposed to Ihe Ollglnally an­nounced 519.95 bo_ed format. 01 course they have cut the number of player aid components -presumably by $15.00 worth ~ to squeeze II into the smaller lormat. ThiS Famasy TTlp System Will be Metagamlng's challenge to D&D They have already tested the water through the success of Melee and Wizard Dearh Tesl2,s another Mlcro­Duest game being announced

A small Sized boxed selles IS underway from Metagamlng and some of Ihe future tilies Will be multi-player historical subjec ts Those menlloned cover WWIlIn Europe and one of social cl imbing of the 19th oentury, Not to forget Scoence fic tion IS a proposed Warplorrfs game.

Yaqu into Showed 88, tactical North Alnca, uSing thelf Panzer syStem and Myrhology, a 2·10 player game of Greek Heroes and Gods. looking quite good was a senes of four album games These smaller lormated games have e $7.00 pnce tag and are USing a double sided record atbum jacket caver With the map laminated m Ihe center. There will be 200 counters and between B·12 pages 01 ru les. 01'1 yes, I shOUld mention the game lilies Swashbuckler 19reat collage of Errol Flynn movies); Hero (adventur ing in the dungeons, or catacombs, as they PUt It); Fast Attack Boats IArab·lsraeh Naval War 1973 stylel; and B€8chhead Ihypothetical invaSions of PacifiC islands)_ An interesting twist to the mini game glut.

GOW IS finding great success Wi th 115

Traveller ro le playing game and has now decided to concentrate on prOViding additional adventures hke the already pubhshed Kunuif They are Research Srallon Gamma and a double adventure, Shadows/Annic Nova On the way IS a poSSible $20 boxed set of Shipboard adventure With 14 maps coveting 00 decks For OllglnS IS a France 1940-DNO series game. DNa Itself Will undergo a major revIsion by year's end. Narvik Will elsa be revised and boxed Shortly, Also on the baCk burner IS a role·playing Chivalry game. The Workshop folks have taken the beSt of the 120 series Ithat'S right. more little gamesl, boxed them and added others; Dark Nebula, using the Im­perium game system; 194(), France and Low Countries; Beda Fomm, Itahans vs. BrI\lsh; 1942, WWII ,n the PaCific; Mayday. SCience IICI 'On: and Baltle of the A/ma, Cllmean War battle

Task Force games of Amarillo. Te)(as made an impressive shOWing With more pocket games_ They Include: Intruder, SCl6nce fiction, Sword­Quesr/, fantasy; Valkenberg Castle, fantasy With a htt le modern weaponry thrown In; Prochorovka, WWII eastern front; and Operation Pegasus, US in Vietnam Allin a $3.95zlplock lormat Besides these games, there is also a senes of bo_ed pro­ducts at $9.95. They are War of lhe Worlds, from the H,G. Weilsclasslc; McPh€/son·sRidge, Which covers the first day at Gettysburg; and Wa~w Pact, conlemporary European warfare. Schedul· ed lor the lale spring are more pocket games. Slar­fira II, Spellbinder. Robots. Gunship, (modem), To No End (Budapesl , January 19451, and Bat­tlewagon lnaval combal), A llen Eldridge has gone partners With a pnnter and is gel1lng good grades on presentation and product. Good work He has obviously taken some lessons Irom Avalon Hill and Yaqulmo - make sure the pllnter has as much II not more to lose than you do, ( also note that he has gone to SPl's die cutter for qual itY coun ters

Simulat ions Canada has Just added three new lilies to their lis t o f pubhshed games' Torp6do, submarine warfare in WW\!; Warring Stares, a mu lti-player uni l icalJon 01 Chllla game 200 BC style; and I Will Fighl No More Forever, an IIlter· estlng subject ~ the Nez Perce Indians \IS Ihe US Army Commg In are Lee at the Crossroads, brigade level Gettysburg, and Kriegsmarine,

35

36

which IS the 3rd In the tactICal WWII naval senes games. Upcoming tal Ihe lall IS Assaulr Of!

Tobruk, Rommel's successful assault aller Gazala, June 1942. and the company's f,lSt science f,c tlon game, Dark St8rs. No gaming com­panv 15 complete without one

S,mpubs ,formerly Simulations Publications, UKI IS SPl's exclus","B agent In the Untted Kingdom They have been publishing a MOVES­type magazIfI8 called PhoemJ( and now nave found II d'Slllbutor for the mag In the US Firelight Enter Pflses, working out 01 the Compleat Strategist 01 New York Cny. IS making PhoemJt available 101 $2.50 per copy_ Also soon to be handloo by Ihem IS Simpubs remake 01 Normandy, the old SPI game

A tew more fantasy ,ole-plaYing games are on the market and are cellamly trYing to make thelr nIChe The Arduin Gnmorelfllogy IS being offtlfed by International Garners ASSOCICI\IOn of California A newcomer, TWlnn K Inc 01 IndIana, who was present at the HIA show, dlspl8yed Its Htgh Fan, rasygame Soon to come are Dave Arneson's fan· tasy role·plaYlng game and D,mens,on SIX'S KIng of the Mountam FRP game Heritage USA IS also aiming to entElf the la tesl race with Its own sel 0 1 FRP IUles. Well folks, It IS obvIOUsly gOing to be a lime for fantasy role plaYing and mini/midi/mICro and moe games lor awhIle Don', worry; I hear some compantes are sull dOIng w8rgames

II you're Into something new In gaming 85 a change of pace, then take a look at a line 01 Italian made games Imported by Polk's Hobbles. There are 12 In the hne 8nd 8re advertIsed as the "finest graphICS in the Industry" Many might even agree with that Stalemcm Thev certainly arc atll8ct,ve The rules 8rewrllten In four languages, luckily one IS EnglIsh, though Just barely They cover hIStory,

The most secu"," simulation of profeuionBl_111

SPI Basrballis a table.top simulation of professional baseball which allows players to become managers of profes­sional baseball teams and vie for victory in individual games, the pennant, even the world championship. Team charts give accurate statistics of ball players' abilities, such as pitching. balling. running. steal· ing. and fielding , Pitchers face off against bailers, and simple di«rolls determine the hits, catches. runs. and outs . Every sit uation thai can ariSe in a ballgame has been incorporated inio SPI Bas~ball,

SPI 8ssebs/l will sen for $5.95. Available in April 1980,

fantasy and SCience f'ChOn In a sImple format Some of the lilies 8re Jolly Roger, Med;o~ largo's Lord, Odyssey, YOlk town and KloJl ft Pumm DefinItely wOflh checking out, though the price IS slightly ste(!P, $25·$4() apIece

Looll.lng lor somelhmg for the younger SCt, given the DftD player profile IS curren1ly delrned 85 under 10 yearS old, AtlantiC makes a number of very Slml1le boxed games that use a squale gild plaYing map and plastiC lIgures and vehICleS AdvertISed as HO scale h,storIC wargames, they have one serres on World War II and one serres on the W,ld West Theil live WWtI titles are 1942 EI A/ilmein, 1942 S/almgrad, 1944 Cassmo, 1944 Ardannes and /9450kina\fa The other group 1$ '

Washlla Rlllal (a Custer VictOry), Fetterman Massacfe, Apache Pass, Assaull on Adobe Walls, and naturally BaUM of the LiTlIe Big Hom All are $198 and are being offered by AllantlC, another Ita han Complln.,. As Herrtage bows out of bo8rd· games, Grenadier sleps In Primarily they are a mlntatures company whIch pioneered ligurrnes In boxes. They have come out Wi th lour mIdi games' Dwarl Moun/am, SeBwolf, H~dra ISF tac l lcall, and Journey (galactiC power), Also released by thIS company IS an Advanced DungtKJns ft Dragons Ilgure hne plus a l1mm line of 80lls Valle­JO dIoramas based on hrs fantasy art

Ral Partha has also broken IntO the boxed "gure markel, and added a game or. ralher, a miniatures orrenled game wllh each SCI Two cover lantasy Wllch's Cauldron & Cavern's Deep_ The other two covor SCience fiction Final FronrlfH and GalactiC GrenadlfH$

Herrtage has chosen the same audIence to aIm ill WIth liS IntroduclOry Paint 'n' Pia.,. SCtS An Arnold Hendllck SCI of SImple adventure gaming

rules accompanres the lIgures and paInts Th,s Dallas company also showed ItS Dungeon Owe/letS boxed frgures to be used espec1811y With the baSIC DungtJOns ft Dragons game. Also 01· fered were Oungoon BUIlders, which are serres 01 walls and 110015 tor those who hale Ihe hght of day It lookS hke they're dOing 3·0 lor DaD GHO, who dominates the mlnrature WWU and modern vehICle market, came OUI wuh lull color packaging and IntrodUCed a mICro· team pack whICh holds fIve dIfferent vehICles wllh p!llnllng lips and Ifl­

strUCt,onS There has been grailt growth and ob· vious Improvement In al! companies, especially In graphiCS and presentation I hope lor the con­sumers' sake thatlhose ImprovementS are carlled through ,n the actual productltsci! The QUCSllon 01 who WIll survIve should rest there Time Will tell

01 passlflg coocern to some IS Ihe formallon of the Hobbv Gaming & Mlhtary Mlfll8tures dIVI­Slon In the n8llooal Hobbv Industrv 01 America, an Important step In the matuflng 01 au. hobby among 1\5 hobby Indust,.,. peers and Store owners and then dlSl"bul0lS 1 om Shaw 01 Avalon HIli was elected Charrmlln, Redmond Simonsen, V,ce Chanman, and myself as Secret(l,~!lrcasuler Lou locchl 01 Gamesc,er>eeand Glenn Kldd of Ral Partha were also elected Board members 01 the d,vOSlOn Believe II or not, 11 manulaclu'ers par lIclpatffi In thIS COOpelallve me(!I,ng

The Game Manufacturers A\SOCIJtlon 1o,­mally assumed Ihe overseeing 01 Orrqlns, and a funclIonal comnllllOO was fo!med 10 carry out those dulles Anyone mleresleu In mA~lnq a bid for running an 0ll{lln5 In er the! 1981 a! 1982 should contact nwself for ,nfo,mallon Please Wille 10

Hertlage USA, Inc 9B4O MOnloc Or '116, Dallas TX 75220 HowlfJ Balasch

Coming from SPI this June! o SPI 257 Park Avenue South, New Yo rk , N . Y . 10010

MEN, ARMS & FREEDOM LANGUAGE OF VIOLENCE Edpt O'Ballance

Violenct is the Ollt IolltlUJ!1! the wrsrefll drmocracicl am rmdrrstand.

C.rlos the hckal. terrorist

An impressIVe chronicle oflOtcrnalional terrorism. The author coven hundreds of incidentS and idcntifict the terrorists involved. thclr causcs. and thclr methods. o $12.95, ISBN : 0 -89 14 1-020-\

INTERNATIONAL WEAPON DEV ELOPMENTS A Survey of Currenl Devclopmcnls in Weapons Syucml lTd Edition

An invaluable reference book on current developments and fulure trends in the wide field of inlcrmnional wcapons develop­ments. A clear and concise compendium orinforrnat ion presented in nontechnical

STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT Vietnam in Retrospec t Adminl U. S. G. Sharp

"We could ha'c won." So says AdmIral U. S. G. Sharp. Commander in Chief Pacm~

durin)! four of the most critIcal war ycars H~ pinpoinu thc mistakes in dccislOn· makinJ!: undnlying the Ion!!, c.~uperating struggll' in Vietnam.

0$12.95. ISBN: 0·89 141-053·8

HIE ALMANAC OF WORlU MILITARY POWER, Fourth Edition Cols. Trevor N. Dupuy & John C. Andlews. Grace P. Hayes

In revised format. this edi tion prcsentS completely updated facII and J5 new countries. Analyses of politico-military policies, strategic problems, and alliances of e"'~ry nation accompany detailed statls· tics on armed forces Olganiution. numerical strength. deployment. weapons inventory. etc. ". 0 540.00, ISBN 0·8914 1-070-8 "",-".,.,..,..,pI-

The Almanac '. of World

MII,tory Power

0 $7.95. ISBN: 0-8914 1-089·9

ROMMEL IN NORMANDY Reminiscences by Friedrich Ruge

NumtrOUI gf{mpftl of the penonlllity of the off-duty Rommd. It " /111 elrlighuning picture of the WIIr in fhe Welt from fire

8RJNGING UP TIlE REAR ~o"

GernUI1I I·iewpoint. Publishers Weekly o 512.95. ISBN: 0-89141-0 104

COMMON SENSE TRAIN ING Lt. Gen. Arthur t. Collinl , Jr .

Tht "Ace" illHiC/c in town. this rime QS lire QUIIrO' of the btlt book 011 military IrQinilrg from plQ/oon to dMslolI lel'l'I tIrQ/IrQI bUll publitlred fir Qlly Qrmy. Army 056.95, paper, ISBN: 0-89141-067-8

ESCAPE FROM lAOS Dieter Dengler

ReCOlllmended retldillg. Soldier of FO'tullt. I' cbruary, 1980

The author's unllrecedented escape flom a Pathet Lao prison clm p and his dramatic Itscue made headlines around the world_ !lele Is the true 1I0lY of an epic struggle fOI su""val. 0 510.95, ISBN: 0-89 141-076-7

MAIL TODAY!

Presidio Press. P.O. Box 3515.

San Rafael. CA 94902 Please send the books checked to :

A Memoir S. L. A. Marshall Edited by Dte Marshall

In rhi$ gullY. colO¥ful. immemcly reodilble summing up of Iril excitillg life (po'" humous/y edited by his widow, L~lon""II J hiu lire higJupols and lowtpor$ Iilol ofren didn'l get into books flkt! --Pork Chop 11m ... '"Ambuth , .. elC. JIll ironic QCCOIInI of HeminKWllY ~ alleged "libera/ioll ,. of PQrll il a juicy example ...... hile some IIow·iI-can · be-laid fOOlllOteS to history. Qbou/ $IIclr slIbjeclSQs Ike I'S. ),fIJcArtlwr, Qdd we/. cOllie seQtollillg. t'ublishcrs Weekly o 511.95 , ISBN: 0·89 14 1-084-8

S L

" ""8 ("41<.0" ~ ~ .... L l. ......"

Name ___________ Address __________ City ______ State ____ Zip __ _

o Check enclosed (PleQlt! Qdd Illits /QX Qnd SI.50 poslIJge Qnd IrQndling.}

Chalge my : VISA 0 Muter Charge 0 American Expn:s5 0 Numbel _________ Explres _______ _

o Yes. I would like a copy of youl current catalog. Signature _____________________ _

37

38

THE $2,160 WARGAME. That's right. $2160. and Computer Bismarck IS

UJOrth e'v'Zll,) cent of It HOlM Computer

As the first home computer hlston· col UJC:»'gane. CO'Tlp..Jter Bsmorck IS as for ahead of paper & penCIl worgomes as they ore ahead of Chinese checkers. Why? Because In Simulating the bottle OOtweef1 !he most pou.erful warship of Its [Ime and the Bntlsh Home Fleet the computer remembers all the rules, c()()­dltlons end operating fcx:tors. ,.freelng y<>lX moo for the srrotegv and t<xbcs of bottle

Play a Human Opponent With the cOIl"pJter os the

perfect referee. neither plover l:-::;':;:~:: (on make CYl Illegal move truly "blind" wcygomng With no errorsl If the game IS In·

terrupted. the computer soves It on a mlnl-dl5( for resumption loter

Play the Computer It pays !he German

cOf'M'lQ"lder so well that you muse: IT"()("IeU­

ver the Bntlsh shiPS and Qlrcraft per­fectly to avoid oong your \,1[01 con­\IOys to Bismarck and the U­boot wolfpcx:ks.

Uke War College Wargomes

W,thout !he dnx:lgery of the OfgornzotJOflOI 0Jfl,f­

head of poper & pen<iI gomes, yc>LII' mind IS free to de-..elop ond test s0-phistICated search. com­bo!: and logistICS strote­gles. which IS why octuol War College stoff officer tralnlflg worgames ore played on compu­ters. like the War CoJlege games. Computer BIS­marck tokes place on a VIdeo saeen (In color or block & white) With all the vanables which chol­lenge a commander In bottle, YOu deploy bottle­shiPS, cruiserS, comers, destroyers, U-boats, oilers, merchant convoys, recOIl planes, and txxnbers.

each With unique and realistic a~rotlng para­meters You must COllSIder evw<hong­Ing foc:tors like Olrcraft endLmnce; I"ICMlI fuel. nrepo..uer oocI danoqe. shadowlrg obIlirv CYd seach p<:llJ..0'" (better 1(') rcx:kY­equpped ~ssels); CYd VlSlbihrv u.tllch IS a functton of weather, utllch VCYIes With geography CYd time.

The Warga .... of the Futu .. Computer Bismarck is the first of

rrony comp;ter wargomes from StrategiC SirruloDOOS. Inc. 8<Jt to play 0I:'i of !hem.

you'lI need a SUitable video-equlpped home computer. for about $21 00 yoo

CCYl get fWIe II f'1us (or !he older Apple 11 With an Applesoft Firm­

ware cad) U.llth 48K rnemcI\J cYd a mlni-tlopp.,! diSC dl\.e,

P" additional $59.95 gets yoo ...:.~.~_' Comp...<er Bismarck. Incled-

irg !he goroo progran OIl mini-disc. 2

mopboord crots (for plot­

ting YOlX strategies between mo.oes). 2 ship data charts. 2 system command charts. a set-up In­struction sheetord a lerg oed cotr'jJ­Ilceted rvlebook

.ui1lch you never hove to

read be<ouse the cOfl'lpt..ter odmnlsters the gamel

The Futu.. is Now Credit cord holders.

If you already own a sUitable Apple II, you con hc:.lve Computer 815-

morck In a few doysby coiling 8O()..648.S6OO (toll free) oocI telhrg

Operator 180 that you wont to charge It to you­V1SA or IlASTERCfmGE. (Nevada re~derls coli 8()().992·5710 ) TO OI(IlU: til' MAil : Seod no money. Wme Slnnegic Smut. tlOOll, Inc., Box 5161, StanlOtd CA 94306 .• nd Comp .. n.,. Bismarck will be sent to you COO It $69.96. piul COO charges. Money back guar..,t" 101" merchandise retu rned intK1 within 14d8 .... 01 deIive<)I. Computer Bismllrclt will be IIIIlIilfblt $DOn lOt the TRS-8J .nd other home computers.

COMPUTER BISMARCK. There's never been anything like it.

Briefings

800ings ;. • , ...... 1*1 coIeeIion of ahort announce-11*10 QI_1P'JIeI and book ,-. TheM notic:el do not constItute Il'COITVT*ldIIoo.., and they .clemp1 10 describe IhfI .- publica!iDna oIJteCIiWIIy

BRIEFINGS ONE: RECENTLV PUBLlSII ED WA RGAMES

Tile geoc:en ter 01 "somulahOlI" pubhSh'J1!I has taken an .n' .... esl'''9, gradual SWIng ove< the 1)11$1 ~a ' 01 $0 Over ttlel!lSt OI>cado, almost evervn,,"9 seemed 10 come j,om tl1e ea51ern SC<'IboI'Iu;, wtlNea, we n.ow have two major cQmpanteS ," TexlIs Ins wa41 as 111 least one In­IIIfflSI' II9 mono< ooel arid II ",,,,no 01 ~It()rl om on lho tabled West Coast IDesognlllg IJlIme!I ,n Call forma rs B tough 0I0je(:1. ,1', d 'f hcult 10 th,nk wUtl VOIlJ fOOl on tile wheels 11M vou. brll'" hangUlg teo ) Comm,md De/spec-11W5 13522 Polk AYl!f1ue. SlIn O.ego. CA 921041 has IUS! released ,~, S«OIld e .... 1 Wal tnagrnlm opus, Kault or SKond Hull IIlIn . U$lng tile !lame syStem ,nuoduced ,n !tIe recent SfI6rpsbur9, Ihe''''w managed loeleaon up theor lOCI II Iotlle by OIgi1"'llng the rules and produong IIOmOI ,n-1_10"9 graphICS In the map Tn" os a IaCtoeal !lVSt8m

(much more so than rSSt and, ~ wch. demands a ta"ly large COITWTI!\JI"lefII or ,.me 'rom tl>e pl3yerS Oe/,n01\11v a group to keep an !lYe on . ....., though pleyabdoty 15 not their 10lle for 522, the game 01 OOKed rnot \IfJIIY 8t1rllC trvelyl ""t" lQXl + cOlmter •. ruleS bOokie .. one IIIrgecol­Oflul m.10 Iwnocn u!leS terrarn'grlldaliOll $19''''1191 ()Ius

two~_.andlheuS\lIllW>gent""~iIIIlhIIrnah8 MOvrr'!leasrwao-d. I _ that yet enot,* paelage 01

games hom the boys at GOW tIM IKrl'o'lld Included 11& three m&jor lIems .• 1 selhllO III the 51214 ra"!18 Blood_ I,.... RrlwHlu. OS IIn()lhef O! mo. mlfl()f 5P&Oe ooeo-IIS that GOW 5I!erTl!i 10 he-.. a lock on ThIS lIme It'S a revoll on some $011 01 dlslanl ot.net Wllh the mao reptesenllng operatlOtlltl kwfII IlIIraln ~hat $Imrlllr to SPl"s Sworos lind S~ (although not ItS colofiult Rrd SI .. /W~ltr t:.~1r covers the AUHl)-Por"h War 01 the 1920'1 and WltSdos<-gned by O .... Wllhams. whose ,,"I ef­lorI, If I'm nol mr5 Ia~en. WItS AH's AnllQ (which now seem, destrned to be Tom O~'s lola wOl k .• ,,,Ia hom collectIng FOIrans and money. to revIle and upda te! NOI 100 compHi! • . the game has loIS 01 d ,ffOlen t nellonalrtre5 and un,l tv"," trnclud lr>(! arfTlOled carsl wllh an oddS/'lItOO CA T !jMIlq 'elrMts and ~Imslsxchanges Aal l nets. C3V11hy Cha'gf'S. 5<mple supplv. elc and rnondled In lhe GOW mold ~ ~lIr 1l ... lh OS II AUSSI8n Fronl game IVatr~ Ive l ukl IS lhe SUb;ecI, and I'm nollOO$Ul(twhelrrer lhal', a CIty 01 a hock.., oIDyvrl whoch 58I!!TI5 to be an alTlftlg.;lmatrOn 01 ROild 10 rile Rhlnf/ tnd ()pefarlOfl Crusader II hItS a IOf"MWhal amorphous play sequence. wI11'I botn D~"""lT>O'o'Ing seemlngrv - II WIll. makIng for some _y Inllllesl'ng Slluatoons Support. antHIIf1~ mOIllfe. and lhe ~ East.n frOnt o,mITllcb ThIS IS a notch aoo-.e most '11If"M 01 tills d~. and the SYSlem alone os WOfIn t"" efforl Oh .... , ltIso.eIeItSed by now ~ these cond eo'bon of Purllb ...... . The .ules hIMI sup()OSedly bMn eIeIoned uo IJnd lhe sel-uD problems ~ II YOU owned lhe old one YOU can gel the.-- 1<'IIOII'"(llron I.M by sendtng them YOU' old ,ules

A .... !on H"I,Ilf/ty IJO' SQm(lln'ng oubl>shed bv F .. nk Dave. anllough not DO OIoglNI (Ieo;rgn IFOf that. Tom. you have 10 booIc al least lour Y81K1 In adviIfICP t " Ir .nd r ...... IS [he &I)IC. and Its "",re to {!(1m. much com­ITIIIfII. If on!>! 101 lhe glaphlCS The cover IS nree, but lhe re5lfl1adrSMtOl Them.1DlookS ,leanolhefYt8WofRvs -" Campillgn. whdl flIllO!. In ,,~ f , bad, bul ""rely d~pp()Inl lng III 18<ml o f Vf!IueIlmtlllCl Bul tM P'8CfI d9 I"fISIIlla<'ICI 101 the coop de 9,_1 15 the coon tOls· In a WOfd. awfu l And tM1'1 gIVIng them lhe bene"t 0 1 lhe dQllbl. All thlll asrde, ~.r I nd I'tlcr IS I I.,rlv n!Oll (;lime ,,!,oth good h'5torocal I()U.C/>OS BIISoC.BIIV QUlta s<mple l\IIme pros w,11 ba p lavlng IIlS+I:ie 15 rrunutes) Wllh a CAT 11>&1 has ~ I oOd!Ias Its bMl ratio Most !I(l8N1rros a,e ar:: tually m,nl-games. Dlaved on 0119 or two 01 lhe lour sma ll

maps. There IS some gOO<l hlSlorlC'tV Irr 11I<m5 01 Iflln 100cemeflIS/rCOtacemcnts. ;'Ihough much 01 lho noslo"cal fUrl IS In lhe veoomr., long campaogn game. and lots 01 ImemstlllQ rules cases frke prlSOtlBfsol .... a' II P/<!VS ve<y lasl, but somehOw seems deract>ecl emolron~'lv !.om ItS sulJte<;l Also ._\II'!d I.om AH os an rnleo-esllng IIIIm called TI.", Boul. a sImulalton 01 protllSSl()nBl bo~lng I hapoen 10 hke bo"r>(! latrel not '" a parlIClpalory sense!. and thIS IS. ""'thout h8srtatron. tho basi ~a'lable\}llmeOI lIS kInd Uulrarl Cornplorr's DlIIiJ·8o~mg 15 ma<e def'M ..... _ bul lhe'ufolSarewntl&rllll M.oddteGlbbeflsn ) II mdudes t..nd.eds 01 boXOIS, Wltn 0\Ief 100 berng he;wyweoghlS. all rated QU'ts noeetv Each bout ~es abou t 15-20 IT"OITutes and .fs a 101 of lUll t know Don Gleenwood had doubts aboll! lhos. but tills "me AH 1lCI~

done a bang up JOb 51""" Pool< !o""lty senl me the ent"e YaqulnlO hne

last week I thought I hMl Inheflled UPS 12 13 games came In two 9",nl bo~es. the va'IIIty IS Impre!iSlVe<" .,e the game graphICS Th,s IS hr{lhlv prolessronal SlU t! . presen ted wolh etan Some ot the art wor~ mav be a !rille w&IId. bul everylhlng else. In terms 01 componentS, IS tOP hne Pubhshed last s-ummel were such Ilems as Pl nlrr (,ndrv.ou.al lank ballles orr a SC/Ile a nd sVSlem qU lle s<m,l. , to A" FQICti). I 'on<l.d~ lsame 115 Plnur. onlv 1M) tl ma iI 'S C,vil W a, gunboa!sl. C\'. lcomplex M,dwDY \lime from lhe emm,nenl C'a'g favtOlI, and a h~1 01 sc;IIIrrce/lamasy nems. some of whICh borde, on tl1e faughabkl hen mo'e ,mp'essr...a lI'e lhe new YIIQu lnlO re46ases Twe are lWO Nltpoleonoc bailie games Thin Nrd liM fWa terloo1 lind Gnll Nrd<ll.lbl lBo'odlnol The games - both by Cra Ig Tay\ol - look $Imple bula's nol, and lhey use double-SOled COU ntOlS w llh huge hexf'S to .ecreate many 01 lhe /iJehcal problems of the bal1tes Muchempha!.ls IS ~ on mar.eu ..... 01 uM'. and there IS a plethofa of OPtronal ruJes BOlh are onemeD 0IIrne5 selhr>g for SIB Iot lriM 1002, anolhef 01 the ,aptdly muluplYlf1!J sc->c&-llCt>Oll Ilerns. deals WI th not too· dOStanl lulu!!! combal The IIIsI new netn os Mur· flftObo .... , lhe 1862 CIVIl W I! bailie. egalll U$lng <Iouble SIded coumers but thIS ume WIth stalldald5<:eO hexes. creaung some nree mo.....,,1 problems W"le YIIQulnl0 al Box 24167. Oilllas Texas 1'5224

Some linal notes - OSG hits JUSt leleased Ihree new .... nl-games Nobin llood. Armlo (NapoIeonl and lO1h Mw iM Ilmle Round TOPI The ttMtmen15 are all UfllQ\l8c and!he Ql"api11CS lI'e the ~l 1'"", seen by lar In any 1TlIf>I­

games mSG. \261 B.OIdwav, NY. NY lCXX1ll hslt Force Gllmes lor Cole Reduxl IS now bolOng the S-U'PlIS "'Illy good QUi!SO-Sta, Trri games they rnl 'Qduoed at Orrglf1s last Vt'iIr, they'rewof\h a tool< lor thoSe ,nteresled "'Ihe sub,ect Finally, the Eng lISh l"nII98~me W .. ~""" a SOI"l 0 1 comb'na toorr F&M ... S& r - COI1 talned3games ,n lIS las! two >SSUeS. Chinr ... eMI w •• IMao ver5<on), and then Albur'nI lind VIIIII't. (T he Pllflirrs-u!a' Wal) The W llrpilmfff IElon l odge. Hoghw()()(l III ChetmsfOld, hsex. Engla ndl has PIC~ed sollla mteresurlg subJeCls. I onlvwrsh they' tl dovrsasoma Ima resnng SVS t~ to hI

RICh Berg

BRIEFINGS TWO: RECENTLY PUBLISHED SELECTED NON-WA RGAMES

'"" i,.rd '5 QUHI. by Garren Oorrllllf. (for tWO 10 51' p1;!yers) IS conducled on Mllr"Oll. an ISland ""'th eo.ght castles and thwty-SI. terrrtoroes To stan. the forly· loul wacesa'e IllIed. somewrlh lhe Dlavers' menand somebV ""Sly ~1I1e "OICS" generated by dICe rQIIs Pan way Ihrough lhe ,Moal sel-up. Ih'M"trellS\l'III" belonging 10 each player are placed. by Irl Ofl9OrlIIIlt. In spaces III d,f hcullto rooch;tS p<.>SSIbfe Allhe 51",t Of 8IChgame Will. Mld,llonal 011:5 a,e generated. aod wh8nevef four 8SS8ITI bIe on a 5P&Oe I~ attack n.ghborrng me<"! A dlagon then lIa~ BCfOSS the ISland gobbling UD orcs 81 limes bul nol endIng lis 16It$1 unt,l allelSt one mMl beOor'neS Its desserl Hero!! and soo-cerlllS CiIlI appear !Of each player. and a uavelhng Wllard enl'lChes the POPUlal..", oll.nlory

somamre. 1TIIIfI. somellmes orcs In genGfal. lhe p1avers attemOI to conquer and hoid lIS 11'98 a krngdom 8S possoble. 51na! r8lnloro&ments /lfe based on lhe ~Irlgdom'S Sllf! Irl order 10 WIn. 8 plllYIII muSI !I gnt hl1l wa~ itC.oss lhe <SIand and collect hIS Ih,ee UM""'es Al taCks all'! mad!I upon oerghbonng spaces and combal .esoiullon IS S4mple but IrrgGf1IOUS ElICh comba tllf11 hItS a "lange" wtl,ch IS based ()r1lhe rllJmber of oreces III a t.,.. nto'Y. olus 01h&1 laclorssvch as heros . 8O' C8f"S, IOII81n, atc. n tho "'n[lll '" Ihrett . for e xample. 8 throw a ! one, two. 0' tn.ee resulls In lhal manv 1l<10l1W prece5 beong deslrovOO. A higher th.ow IS 8 miSS The bIlllle COrlllnuOS

uml l 0"" SIde IS Wooed out or lhe allICkrn- decIdes IOSIDil !AvalonHIII $1200)

39

u.n.".~, IS a snuggle wwe the POWer o l thl! m,nd earl ohoo O\fCfcome s.uperl()l fOfll(! The baulelteld:mows a cenlflll(loma,n surrounded by 5<XOlhe<S each domaon conlalnlng a lower, a caslle and iI number 01 plaIn a,eas The four pi;lvers 1\iI...a setS 01 numbered tokQn$. lhelf "cfa.n' Th4lSe clans enter lhe board III arxordllll()(l w,th lhe pI;oy of "pIol" cards '8PI'85er1llng the 51' outer do­ma,ns Alter lhe set upa ota_ pIa(:es two tokens on the board lor eac,h castle he oca.rooes on a lum. or he may d,aw "pel'll chIps" , .... t801(t Theplayer tnen moves a loken and may ma~e onelKkl'looI\II move lor each lower heOC­CUp0e5W1lh threttOl more tokens TI'III <lUmber orlnled orr a lokenlS ,ts ~t hmrl When "" enemv-.occupoed 8'911 IS enlered. a bailie en$U8$ between the two hlghesl tokens on each $!(Ie TheCQmbatants see<etlyChOO5llone of Ihree "1)OWCf dISCS" III lherr possessron ThIS CiI!1 be Keeps<. whICh beats Starslone. whICh t.aIS SWOfd. wh!t;h boats KOOJ)ef The loser removes h<!l tokens from lhe board. (hsca,ds hIS power dISC. and Iller draws a new one The wInner keeps hrs own power dose. grvlng ooermes ImPO'lant In tOlmalion ThB Io:sftr can try lor flMlllge. USIng per,) Ch,ps to hu'la "psychIC spell " AgaIn 1I1$eCfet , each p1al"lfexp(\"nds II rllJmberO! Ch' j)lI, lheWlrl­ne< 10$85 hiS tokens unless hIS total ,s a t least equ81 10 h" orm onent's As w~ 1 a' g iVi ng e xt.s mo'ffl5. OCCUPy'ng 8 10W(lr ill lin OUte< doma ,n g,a nts powerful psyChO!: giltS. e;l(h IOWIl<'$ berng dIfferent. OccuPYIng lhecertlral tOW&! wo th 8 S!)8Cllred number 0 1 lokens and hoId'l"IQ II 101 one BillICk w Ins the game Qune a few othef thl"ll' can NIp· pen. Incfutllng 5<)rT"I81 chose not 10 try s uch lIS a player "",nnlflg a balHe by sra"ll9 down hl50pp0nenl lEon PIO dUCIS. 96 Slodtlon SI . Dorchesler, MA02124 $1200 t

,".,,-. 1 W •• IS II SImPle but eJIC1l1ng pa$l,me lor three to $I' would be admr,ats f,om a deck 01 cards showing WW U warshIPS. each player ",dealt. lleet 01 fove. which are placed belOfe tum These - elCcept fOf .. rc:ralt ca",ers whrch have only the "hit" number - ... e """,ked W'lh a gun 5</e and a hll numbef A. second declo; consoslslargal~ 01 Salvo$, whor;h..-e mar~ed wrlh the gun.--;oo 10 hre and lhe number 01 hll$ lhey .n!lrct Qlt-er cards In lhe deck I)fOVIde allernate wayS 01 damaorng the enemy A M, .. held III!h(:lS two hots on an shIPS In an IlnfIITlV INlet unless ,I IS lemoYed Wllh a MIIlII$W9Ilp8I' A. Oeslfoyer $.QuMlron m.1y be played to the cermw 0 1 the table. II a player does nol desl'oy ,I be/OIS hIS roe>1 turn. l'1li shakes a che and loses tllat m.1ny sh'P5 On a lurn. a pia .... plaVS one card from a hItnd 01 I,ve. Irv<ng 10 be lhe one 10 even­tually 51nk an enemy ship 0. a player WI !h an /tIleralt ear ,,., may. Inslead o ! plaYIng a card. ct\oose a sh><.> and Iry to Sln~ II by tn'OWIng a dte roll 01 one The \}lime end, when onlv one player 1\85 shIps ,emalnlng. or when a ll o ! the ca,d, have been used Each plaYIl< ,ece.vas II seo •• equal 10 the hll numbers 01 lhe sh lP5 he sanl: (Avalon HIli. 45 17 Hafford Road. B81tlmom. M02121 4 $8 95 A, · rnurSup.rm.~,. bv Boll ConflOf. _vas a 51 m, la, Durpose IOIIWO to $I X POlenual PanollS. T ile baSIC calds IIle Huffs ollhr{J(J d,flerent ma.ks. Tu"e ts 01 thfee dltle renl ma, ks, and Gurrs of e->ghl (J,IIe<en l S4 Zes l a nks 8re f",mad u5<ng one ca.d lor each paTllnol a" combrnatlQfl5 are campatr blat Other cardS. sure as ('xl.a Arma< Plate or s SPQ1'lSOIl Wll h a second Gun, can be added to a lank When a tank IS shOWn on lhe lable. Ille player scores Ihil POtIlI value of all ca.ds thaI make up lhe tank He ItIso compalM the penelratlng powef 01 hIS gu<'l ""'I h the Mma< 01 eacn enemy tank and SCOles kall the pornl value lor arryheCBII penetrate The ~lS 50ITIIlarly SCOre 101 Guns on IheI' tarrks lhat CitIl penetrate the new rank A Modlhce Iron ca<d allows a !.Bnk 10 be ad(Ied to or changud, the player ,oo"ng 101 8ICh new card pla.,.oo. penelnurons 01 erremv tBnks are not scored A pIayIIf can also form one antr-tank gun by mounlrng any Gun on a Carnage He scores !Of Ills cards. plus any enemy tarrks penetraled Flfst toreachasel pornllOIIllWlns. IAvalon HrII 56 95 I

AU 1M K(III'S Mr. osa new. andsloghtlvallllled._ $Ion of a 1970 game WIth the 'epugnanl IlIIe S~ 1M N","~'$ Ch6ss I\ IS. rwo-hand game 01 DU'eslfalegv lhill can be learned .n mlnU les The bQa.d r;onmts 01 eoglll fOWS 0 1 seven spaces. each space hItS a conlrgu.auOIl o f arfO~. wUh anywher"e hom onetoeoght d"ectrons malk ed A player', limy CQIlSIS15 o t seven An:trers, frve I(nrghll, and a ICing All p!fIC8S mcrve!rom II soaceonlv In lhe d "8Clron 01 one of It'S a"ows Arche<s and K,ngs moYII one soaoe. wh,1a ICnrg htS can COfltlnue In lhe &tll ling d"ecloo<'l 0""" IInV numbef 01 vacant SPIIC(!$ Csp\U la COn5<$\s 01 landong orr an enemy pieCe. the oblec t 15 10 trap the enenw I(,ng In!IU-Ch a WItV thal lI can't avoid cap tu re lP",kef Brott1erl; ca $7 50 I Sid Sackson

40

BRIEFINGS THREE: SELECT ED HOOKS FOR TH E HISTORY·GAM ER bell book II grven IN.,. tet ... -codeI:. IromA lbeRl lo D (wors,' Thefitat len • ..,,_h Ihe book', ph~ ...... gflpt1ic pr_·".,ion. The ~ repreMntl t IM ... 0<1<', IIIlIllicalion to 1""111181.1' ..... .,98_ designer •. The 1851 ~Ier indica!1IS ' .... IiIe..'" qualily 01 , .... book in q .... ' ion. The rev;ew ..... inili11is follow 11M! codeI.

T .... Ih'8dM \ 'non \h. by Desmond Seward New Yo<\ Al'-m. 1978 296pp, $1198 Thos "'1V9V h,SIOfY C(IYef' • topIC Ilia! has seen bene< wOfk The sub­)OCI IS rl!fTlllrbbly ,merIlS1tIlg. but Seward', Irootmen! <5

sometImes hard 10 follow Whde the 5' ..... 01 the "'aH3t'V1l IIIIOIds pedantry." SIIH IS rootll!l rfNlClabil:ll POPUlar hlsu).y lIS" should be It found Barbara Tuchman', deIIIer,ptlO<l of tile We., much IT"I(q 1!nJ()'fabIe. If nol Qu,te 115 ,f'IOSMI )

The _81 maps ,1'1 the book .,. 51mp1,she and 101 the r.eophyte. lhe geooologlca l tables, hoW8'lle<, Ilelp somew~IIO follow who" doi"ll what to whom At least Seward doesn't fTI/fIQI words about It.... unuSIJ.II death 01 ea.-d II BICIB IRHS)

H hltory 0' R .... ~ by MdIiIBI Granl New Yor\ Charles SCt,bn4!<'s Sons, 1978 537"". $1750 Mochaol Grant ~ probal)ty the IO<efTlOSl Er\9hsh-Speak,nIl8uthOf, ty Wfltlng on Rome today." hIS proloflCworkSOI1 the per,od ha-..eshown Th" "arr OV8f8ll'orstooyol Iha .... trrestooyol Rome, and 1I1SSHT..,.ty great read'ng Grantlld, therersnot that much det"', liI'ven the Scope ollhe book, and events seem 1O'1ow ItIoog e , a r_~ably rapid pace Gra'" has e>cceptoonal 'rl$rghl '''10 hIS subtecl ami Slop!! allus, lhe "ghl places toollll< hIS OPInions The r69dor" IrlWlted not only to an "c;eollONllll8<lIt've bur aI:!o ' 0 a IJOOd preoa 01 Ivsloneai Wlltong T here_. OIeat number 01 fTIIIO$, most WIth ITWIIIl'IiII detliOl, lNId a Large number ot the usual busrs and COIns. Mas, 'trlk,ng, howeve<, " the "unn"'llly beau trf ul cen'lr!lO on lhe tront i8Ckfl! H'ghiV racommond lid AICIAI (RHBI

TM OUIt .. 1 MIUIa1') A tlu 0' tilt Ch'lI W • • by M8jOr GecwgeB OIVOS,LesbeJ PII<rv,JosephW Krrktev,com­pried by Capt CIIMn 0 Cowles New Yo<k Arno PlesslCrown Pubbshefs, 1978 821 MapS, 106 EngrlMrlgS and 200 Orewrngs, $(I() Ah ll< many \'Mfs as a lale, ou, o l-pllnt volume, IhlS massr ... compdatron 01 the offICial IT\89S of the C,"" War - a companlOl\ voIume'o,he Of looaI Reconls - IS now8V8lleble '" a magn"ocentedr\lOn The book IS 'lTIma'!se - and Qu'teheavv - andrsl8f'lVTl8d lull 01 lour color mapS cover'ng V>ltually eY'8fY bailie, ar.gagemen t and s'mm'stl In thll CMi War Many 01 the majOr batt les "a OaplCled ,n lour or live o,ffe<en t maos, and all maps ara rndexed to the corr8Sf)Ond'ng Volume and page 01 the OR's As" u~ wrth IT\iIny C,voI WIN 1T\89S, some .. e. brtlnilCCVlate Ithey.e COOI8I 01 rTIiIflS drawn on the spm), but, on '11, they C(H1'(lf15e a" ,n­....... abIe ooIlecnon For anvone w'th a mola than passon!} Int8f8Stln the CIVIl War. thIS is a nm to-be m.ssed Item, _ WIth the h,gh Pllce tag lit h.IS been made ava.lable ,l'Ifough book clubs al a oon5rOtIabie d.scount I There" no tut A/A/nIl (RHBI

Tilt G rn l Mutin): lad'" 11$1 by ChllSIOj)her H,b­ben New York The V,klng Press, 1978 472pp, $15 95 Mr H,bbert ,.a prolifIC h'Storl8n. a"d thIS book - a,med .t POPUlaf COl1$1,1mpllon - rellects hI'S faerl.ty WIth. WIder audl8llCe The boo~ IS Wfll~.rd presenled mostly flom fhe "evewrt/leS$" Vl(!W1)OInt. ard. as SUCh. IS more 01 I ~ tr<story 01 tile Sepoy Mu~ny than ,"Vlh"'l1 aIse Some of ,he descr,ptlON. espec:18IIy ot lhe open'''II 5t&g«; 01 the upIIsrng , become somewhal lediOus and con1uS"'II. but many are Il'\CIs.ve arrd Ilscrnat ll'lQ The book's one map IS Yrftualty useless. but there are some good hthog'8ptls and plates (whrch IS $UlprlSmg. con­SldenngMr H,bbert'sblckgrO\lndlnlhatarea) nrebook lS.n enlOV.bIe read. ard good $I,Ipp!ementary volume for lhe leel of the great tur"'''g po,nt ,1'1 modem I"d",,, "'S'OIY AlOl911RHBI

TM . -n"'''1''' bleH. , l 'M SIO<) 0' 1M Gnm .. C nriM-r C __ i. 'A urld 'A I. I. by ChaI ... Burdoct Clrbondalrl, IIbnoos SOI.Ithern IM,nors Un~,y Press. 1979 lt9pp, $9 96 The Cormoran was D Russ.an mer­cha m "",,, CIIptu,ed by the Germans and ouII'1I11d a. a" ",~,'rarv cru,ser 10< use on lhe Pae,lr<; M,I,'.IIly, the sh.p was nelIriy worthless due to her low sr-I, "gh, (tfma ".,,1. and heavy coal eonsum(lIt01l She SUfYO'Vlld IOUf momhs 01 war br!lore betng IIllll<neO In lherr-neutral AmerlC.",Guttm The stooyot IheConnoran, lheo1. l'Sane 01 ,)rose char8CtellS\lC "SIdeshows" 01 wnlCh World Wa, One had 50 many ,1'1 marvelously obscure and e~otlC 1ocII­to()n$ The book "wafI-wllll ..... w, th clear e~pos"'on, • louch of humor. and aboul as rnud'lSU$p8nW as ceo be

wrought from th!L human dr/lma Ithere was "ttle m~IUlry drama!. Al the beglnnmg there,s a partocul .. ty 10", IhumbMrI skltlch 01 Gel'ma" colonial and 1'1811\11 pojlCreS In addltoon. rhe doings 01 Admr" von Spell'S E8!L1 AsratlC Souadron ara touched UIX>" On Iha whole. the book " a worthwlule IIf1d Cf.'tsma"lr.Lce treatment 01 a $I,Iotect 01 pelnlully sflght SlII,,"hcence "T"WI" would be too harm, but lhere are law lessons to be learned from lhe Cor­ft/Ol3n'seUorts 'o keepherse41 a ilOllt.nd usetul Pnma,,'y • book lor thespeaallS' B/CI91KTHI

B. 11Ift.lp I~l. lad [N.tIOpIMnl 1905-45 by Nor· man frredman New York, M3'o'ttOW8f Boob 1978 176pp. $1495 Ye, 1IOO,11ef battleship book and. lor II change. B moSI wglthwh,1e end uselul 0118 A successful batllesh,p was e compromISe 01 many comPllJ"II 'lIqu"e­menlS: n.ulland sea peo1orrnarrce. orotec'IIon, armamenf. and rnachrnery ThIS book dettds Mdr 01 lhese elements. showrng !he reasons why lhe dillflrflnt ,ed>no!oglCllf developments 01 each class 01 draadnoughts were re­qu,red In edd"oon 10 prOVld'ng Ml und&rSIOndmO olll'oe elemenlS 0 1 drel\d"ooght de9ogn, thE! book IS also 1,11ed WIth use!ul mlormetoon no' ~v8IlabIaeisewhere _ such as tile F.~ not gett'ng central !~e control U"I~ 1919, or how U S and BntiSh lire conTrol dlltered A"yoroe who has read Hough', DffIiJdnoughr or B.IIY'.'f·' SlfUIfIstNp$ .nd fhrrlt1el\JM;etS wollfrnd ,he dreadnough t stOry put InlO its tll(:h",cal PI"pectrve by Ihl$ book BI AlB IDCI)

Comb. I AI!'ttIII o f Wo rld W .. II i>y Elke C Weaf. JOhn A WMI,.nd Fhct>ard F Barker New York MttC­Milia", 19n ZlBop. $17 96 A surprlSlllllly usefuJ com­pd.toon of ,hE! VItal SlallStlCS of 891 World War II allClalr MOSI 01 the ,nlOffn(lIIO" h3$ been ," pfln l before. but !or the true Sluden l or en thuSillSt hevI"1I it together In one place IS WOflh ,he book's pnce _lIIumeso ..... In 1Idd.­tlOl\ to the 513tl$1I(;:5. there are bore! not"O" lhecef_ 01 NCh !lllClah. pI<n o<defs of bettie 101 many ITIIIJOI .1Id monor iIIl forces.t dIfferent porflts 01 the war IIIustl8nons ... e iav1sh 250~ne Slde-Vl<lWS, l76co1or draw,"9S. and a" ,mp",SliIY!! dusl·i&Cket pamting SurprlSlng lv, th,S valuable relerenoe has been rem/I,ndered '" thll US _ chect. your local bookshop AlAIC IDcn

FiKh linl l . T~ Air, T M Offld.1 COlli"" T K.lliqH I llStnr(llolI~ for Bri li.h flthttr Pilo ls 191604$. Naw York, HIPPoculne, 1979 300w, '1995 A vllluable reprl"l 01 nrne 0111Cl81 SfltlSh documents <leahng With the nulS and bolts 01 air lightIng a"d gu"nerv Those we<e the or'lil",al ,nstructrons ISSUed to the PlIoII. leII,ng how to Irghl and how to shoor. $O lhey are 01 gleatlll ,erest to Ihose wrth lIf'I mt8ftlSt rn l1li' combet Ttw.1S no $I,Ippornng lext. $0

some loreknow'eOge 01 jrghter tlleIU;:! IS .-Jed (Johnson's Full Circle ,$ ",lithe bas,) 10 show the f&ader IUSI kow hopeless ,he pr&war "'If hghnng" Ill$lrUCllO"5 wtlfa or how the wBrt,me lessons were tested In combal 0... WIshes lor more books ,1'1 thIS lormat, perhaPS some percepT ..... pubhsher wrli do a 5rmiar volume on USAF trghter tac' lCSlrom 19<\6 to elate B/A/BIOCIi

Confound . nd o.:.IroJ . 100 G rOtl p ."d Iht 8 0mbo r Support C.mp.iKn . bV Mart)n Stlea,l y lolldorr. M!IC­Donald alld Jane', 1978 28tPO . 900 pounds 518flong The tmpOIUlf"IO\I 01 elecuonoc W4'tare 10 aeoal combat 1$

nol • recenl deveIopmenl ElectronIC warlIKe was the most decosrll8 eIemen, III th!L B!I1iSh bombef olltlr'lSlve ag<il"st Gel'many tIl Work! W",r II. and thiS book 8bly analyles Ihe work oltl'>r!l R AF's 5f)8CI.hzed elecUOnlC war­lare group Thework IS detaIled and IS balallCed between OP8!'ellOl\ill accounts.nd a" analYSIS olthearlcuit. 'herr eQu,pment. and,he tactIC:! on both SKIes TI'>r!I materoaf IS QUITe ao;curala. much 01 ,t appeall"ll lor tile lirll lime, show'ng lhe means a"d eltll(:ts o f arrborne electronIC warfare ThiS IS a uselul supplemenl to AI Puce's 11'1-s/l\Jmenrs of lMltness 85. s tudy 01 World War Illllec­tronlC warfare, WIth ado:l.tlOlllll depm gMng thrs work .rs velUrI BIA/B tDCIi

Modt. " Comb. , V~hitlf,s 1: C llidl.ln bV G&orge Forty New York Scrrbnefs. 1979 128 pago!I. $1495 WeaPOf1s boo~5 tend to be utterly bormg Usu.I'y. they ::onsrSI 01 moII""'''S 01 ,rrvraI ter::hnoc:ahloes 01 Interest on­ly to 8UtOlll(ltMl errgora!rS. comboned WIth ImprObable anecdolal ma'lI<rIII GeOIge FQl tv·sC"""f/lJ/t!. pUb\rshed,n lhe U S by SCllbnersand In th!L U K by Ian All." Ltd, IS a haP!lv 1"<:ePtlon to thIS rule ObvIOUsly. the book IS wrot 'en to ,,,Iorm fatne. Than 10 arlne. befuddle or enterta,n Ithough II does ha ... a cerlarn enrer'Bmment value) Fur lhe<more, 11" lean., SO<nelhmg ot • cooperative venture In lhal the mlormaloon relaled olt .... comes dllactly from lho!ll/l ,,,valved In the development 01 The Chreltillfl With _y ,,"1e ed ITlog olther! words bv tl'leauthor In fact, the '"sl Chllpl8l ,s Wllltan by leslie Monge.. oneol the Choel tarn's desog~ Th" chapter. IS, to my mmd, the best ,n IIle .. t"e book, COf\SIStJ"II as It does 01 a doscussron 01

Cl»t1ftam tartIr comII¥nder OSSUH ordtNs to />Is tm\' MoO photo (VIII Gf'OIge Forty M~n ComblIt V.fuc~' I : Cf'''f'~'''. Ilfn Allen Lrd., 19791,

why the Ch"harn was desrgr>ed.n the trUK"'er .t was and wtla, Othe< OPtr0n5 could have Deen deII8Ioped IIlStNd The lIflSU'ng d\aptersare glll8fl O\W 10 I drseussron ot IIle dIMIIopmerrt and debuggrng 01 the ta,,~ alld to I OOtaoled system by systemdlseuSSlc)ll ot ItSWorl:,,-rgs The Oat,"1ed chaPI ... S on the ,rd,lIiduaJ ejements o ! the Ch"haon n"IIPO_. protectoon. mobilITy, CCimmUfIICIIloon,' .re preceded by e ehaQtll<-iong OYIWYI!!W 01 IIl'In'IfIr'I!I ~

10 the ondMcIuat who wants more ~ than. $!IY. ,Hille', proY>des, bu t who does not wrstllo 0111 bogged down '" "onvssentlals. Th!L IUCId,ty 01 , he lext is complemenled by a generous numbel 01 photographIC ,lIus1l0uo'" ."d hne df8W1"IiJS Even those who do not have. bumrng rn· tllfesl In the Ch"IIIIII1 tMlk wolf hnd lhe book ""eresllng for ItS Insoght tnro moIIern tank deSIgn and the r_ suengthS and W8!1knesses 01 AFV', In OP8!'aloon Three IIddltrooa! t,tles (LtIOp6rd. CtlfllUnon ond M48I are scheduled for release as paf1 of Ih,s MIres AlBIA IOJRl

MOU RI'" CO"''''I III VWIlLll m bv G",.....aI Don" A S18rrv Washington Governmenl PJ.,tmg Oflrce, t979 Volume "'., 24Bpo • s.- 25 tpaperl)OUndl In the \atast rn the U S Army's _res 01 Voe1l\8rTl monogf1\PhS. Gener" Starry detalls the use ot armor ,n VietfUK'l'1, drawIng on h,S experl8llCe as commander 01 11M! 11th Cavalry. V Corps, and TRADOC The ac:count IS rhorough, clear. and rei&lrv· ely ' err-handed. one ........ ~Ithe d,lhcuhyrngetbng,he message about the proper use 01 amor across '0 those beh,nd tl'>r!larmor-plaled desks In Washtngton and Sargon More 'l'IBIy5Is 01 "lesions ~froed" and detarls 01 sP8CIIIC Dlmored bellies with StMIl-scale tactlCel maps would haw been u!lelul. bul Since the book'. locus IS $e1 at a hrgher level, there IS 'till ""lIfest,"II and worthwhrie materoaf 'or lhe use 01 armor ., any envrrownenl A~rlllble Irom the Superon ,eocIam of Documents. W.stunglon. 0 C 20402 . stock number (XE.()2()..()()747·' B/BIB !DCI)

toni R.nl~ rot b,,'1r t:qu 'ppofd by Malor General 01 AVl8tlOl\ B.A Vasrt'yev W.stlrngton Govemmer\t P"n ling Oltrce. 1979 (tr.nsiatJOll 01 19n Moscow ed,toonl Vofume WI. 78 PO • $3 25 (paperboundl ThIr \aIMT., file USAF's excellenl "SOVIeI Md,tary Thought" translll,1OI\ serres, th<s booklet IS I SOVrll history 01 long Range AVIII too". ther, IQufYalent 01 The StrategIC Aif Command Th" IS ,he $Orr 01 booI< that gMlS "Socl5hst Realosm" hIStory. bad f'IIIn1II. and_ lhe l"d,YIduaf ~ol World War 11 bor'nbIIf aIMS are .ecounted $0 meIod'IIfT\aIOCllly lhe, the reader's resultant leughlll< does a gl8llt disservice to ,he blave men who 10010.: 0" lhe lultwalta '" obsolete bombers ThechBPter on post war developments IS sultr r;>enIIV ~"'''II1ess to De 8IlnoYIng 1h!L mo5tworthwh,1e perf IS IIlepre-I941 deveiopment 01 Long Range Amatron. on thewhole the book" 01 morwrnaI ~r.re AwrIiIbIe lrom lhe Super,mendent 01 Documents. Wasl""IIton. 0 C 20402. 1979-624-968/111:0-31 CICIO !DCI)

NIK bl .-;K hltr.l bV BIll GunslOl1 New York 1977 200pp An OOt.stand lng • .o.ampleO' how to handle a hl{Jhly rechnoeal $I,Ib,ec:t lUCIdly. thIS book e ....... rres lhe $lory ot tile nrght IIgh,,,,, as.t _looked wrlh ,he dEM!Iopmenl 01 radar.nd eIec\lonoc C()Umer~sur.Iead'''lIlhe reaDer deep ,mo the '''trlCllCr8$ 01 "the WllMerS war " aunslon gu,des tIM! reader lliong SO well. however. IMI It 1'.'1 hard no, to ur>dersrand how the hardware evolved along W'lh the !actlCS and thearrplarres It IS \luly.o e.eellent exam pie 01 a "ted",rcat hIStory " A marn complern,,, the IIOk of depth aboul jl(lST war deveIopmenls - bIama tha, tad­""11 on the small Slzeof the booI< an(! the.uthor's S1~nge bellOl that lhe S'''IIIo-eng,ne, radDr lIQ\J'pped "rght lighters of Wo,ld Waf II were 8!1 ellll(:l,ve!lS their Iar~ brelhr"" whrch they were not All ,n all, a model wor~ BIA/AlDcn ••

GAMES RATING CHART

./' PRE l!thCENTURY I.~ ,,~

l.MalSi9 4. n.ecr.... ' ....... , .. 1,l:-.w..I l • Mi;IIy fonrtsI i-.-10. Ag.

It SevJSIqICII 12. FndIrd .,. GrIM ,,-14. ,..." & Pia

NAPOLEONIC

I. NI!*{ . .. e.M 2. ~1I1Iay 1 Woad~"'MIn 4. W ...... ·.Vinory

5. 1.1 8010 AiofQ

, "'" r~IIW.OuM

i ..... i ...... IQ.!lltlillIIIIIM ....... II./,Ia..,. IlW ... , 11NoydW,.. 11. BlnllIII,.... I5.E .... 16. 8or!Dng

11, Ilfesdon It JontAl.lenudl IUI~W""

" ." '" W. .. '" .. '" ., ."

., "" " '''' .. ,m

., '" .. "" ., "" '" '" '" '" ., '"

.. "" OSG 11111

" "" ., ". .. ",. '" ". .,'" ., '" '" ".

"'" '" .... .. '''' .... .... '" ."

'" '" ., "" .... .....

IOU33U 9 6.1 18 U liU16U 211 6.!i 14 6..5 14 l.S /1 5.9 91.5 106.1

12 U 11 5..5 1l 11 11 s.&

U 13 U U 10 6.G &.4 10 U

12 6.3 31 5.1 4 U 11 U

12 U 14 5.1

16121114 18 1.2 12 6.5 9 1,1 ]I 6.1

JJ 1.1 211 1.S 41l1V5.D , 1.11 23 5.0 IBUllt) I U 11 1.6 , U 21 U

11 6.!1 14 1.1 , 6.1 2Ii 2..9 1 &.12!iS.D

12 U 89 1.0 , U 2Ii U

12 1.5 41 6.D lD 6.!i 24 1.2 12 U 4!> 5.0

U 21 U

" '"

· " 5 " · " · " 4 1.1

'" · " 5 " , .. 5 " 6 " , .. 2 " , "

· " · " '" 12 6.0 2 I,D

2 " 2 " 2 U , .. · " 2" , "

OJ

" 2.' " , ..

2 " , " CIVIL WAR AND LATE 19th CENTURY I. r .... Swill s-.!

''''''­lW.~S­, ..... 5. IIUo & Cit" l8klr&Gny2 ,­i_ t_ ID. en..... w. 1Md "-

., "" .... "'!IT> ., '" '" .. ., "" .... • • ., .. .... ., ""

2t 1.& J2 1.1 !II 5.5 4U32U2&.6 aUIIU!iIILD 12 1.1 !iii U 5 5.5 166.1:111.626.6 156.J11U2U IlS2I4JlZU

10 &.S 8 6.0 211 l.S IU"4.&1U

211 U 19 5.8 &.II U 211 4.& 1.6

HY TO A8811EVIAnONS 1\11 _ Avaloo Hill, Bl ~ Ban_; CGC·C""IIoc, G.,... Co,; EG~E.o_e G.ma; FBI FIy,"II Bull.l<>; GDW - Game I>eoig".... Wori<StIOP; 'G • I"""', .... G..mM;

MGC ~ M"_ C"""""", SPI _S"""",,,ons Publoe.ho ... , ItIC.; TC_n .. C_m; rSR _ r"",oo", Slv<I;a Rules, Aoe"" oinIIl'( R.""9 ;, ,lie game', _0. _Iornv '110 pM'~ .. " .. pmeenlllll" 01 ,_, wl>o . , .. ,. p/31'ed IIIe _ w,,1Hn ,"" Iu,.., mO"11\o C",,,,"" " I'( fI~"''!l'' '1l<I ,,",,live <"""", .. 'V of'lIe game ..... 0<: •• 011 ........ "109

LOWER RATED GAMES

r~'_,,"1_"".au,.'f"d',om5,91~6 2 S'>1~ F"'eIlSPI6 2'. B,"",'''h''~ IS PI 611. Oc'N .... Wa' I$P I 611 Ba"., (oo G",,,,,,,,v ISP I e 11. ! ,.-.;Ie .. ckWY'fi 'SP I 511. >'\n,",'AH5 21, H"""" & , ... ISP l6 21. F .. '111'" ISPI6 ]1, BI"""1 ~"j,1" ISPI6 il. 1> .. F"" Ca­,.," ISPI6 21 0"""""",, M"",'nw ISPIIl 21, W"., W .. , Ouad ISP I 5 ]'. Go""",,,,, ,SPI B.21. Cru",,(!of ISPI 611. Sp.,,,,,, ,SP I 5 21, Pat·,~ IHI e 21. B.,,"II"" ISPIt! 'I, l. G,.'"", A,.-.- ISPI e 21. S, .. <l1,p lre,o!"". IAH 5 21. l&<l'''" ISP I ~.21, ~o,"'" ISPI 5}1 It, •• ""v.II" .. ", ISPII) ii, 30 r,.,.,. w," O'-"'<lISP I Il 21, VI ' ,n<, 'SPI611. S,,,,~, ISP I 62!, D,u,.,o, 'SP I 521, ~m",,,, PNol llw""," r15116 21. fnG.,<loIGDW I) 21. K_'N\P.~, ICGe5 21, V<,<,,,, 3 1$1'1 ~ 71, I""PI' 'GDW 521, l<>l>os.u 'GDW I> 21, 51.'VI',I, IFDII> 21, A,,"I<'11' C<>nq<Jf'".llG 6 il. S"LH"" "I II~, Nd. lOG 6 21, V"'a C'WISPI 8 II, F,a,y", 010 IAH II II, IllfIlAH 1\ II, S· .. Fm'~ ISPI II 11, G"""", ISI'I 6 II. 5","",", ISPI5 11, USN 'SP' 1\ 1" Dan'" ~Il"" Wrldl'""",ISPI5 II. f,I",,~ W.>I 'n ISP' 1\ n. 5.,1"" rSPI 611, S"",""" ISPI 6 11, NdW f.p<o"""~ ISI'I 6 IJ. N,,,'M Ah;a 0u.a<lISPI6 11. lo/lI'" ISPIII II Jul •• nd r"" 6 11 P.""" '''''ISPI ell. C,",'>o' 'SPI e 11, ¥.,.,.".." ISI'I I) 11, I",n St'.'n LSI'I 6 11, Ic~ OIl., IMG B 11 1I""IHd IGDW 5 11 , G .. dl""j C"u,,""""" IGOW6 II. WM~ !It;a,-'RfOd MOO" IIC 6 11. 1 """""/)o!Q ISPI 6 OJ. CO"<I'"''''~''' ISP' 601, W"'''' Wb' 0"" ,SPI6 01, A,OII·I,,_ W""'AH6 01, W",..,WarIl ISP I6 0', ''''00 Wi" 0_ 'SP I 601, 0"""",,,. ISP I 601 1.1",...,,, ISP' 601, a.",;, ,.. ISPI6 01, Alma 'SPI 6 01, W.", Woo rMG 6 01. ~, Wa, 'SP I a 01, F,,"bo"~ ISPI 6.0], B,,,,," Ii"... IMG 6 0) II".", J""",_ W., IGOW 6 0', AI"M O,,.~'" 161 6 Q' N',m..u Goos IIC 5 ~I, R .. ~ ISPI5 91, C/lISP,!} 91, Dan .. ol too !:Iy"", IAH ~ 91 S"u'"'' <SPI 5 91, C"".·t"" Hd'I$P I ~ 9'. V" ,,~y,nT". Par " "IAH 5 9'. GI"t>.:\1 w", ISP'5 gl, K.,,,,,,,,,, rSPI ~ 91. M,,,,·,,,,C..,,,PI'''1'' ISP' ~ 91 . ,.It .. II", H"'O"""ll ISI'15 91, A" 1<"","" on Cre'e IAH 59' DMZ'SPI£ 91, S"a,,,,. II SPI5 9', ~O<;I S,m R'...-.QISPI ~ 9'. R,,'"'' LMGe b 91, O .... '''P"l 'MGC ~ 9'. Sl~" Eo S,,,,,,,,, IMG 5.9' 8a""T", '-'<tv.mvIGOW5 ~I, c"'.' S""'GOW 'i 91. B~III.'u l AI"", ,r,OW£91. 5""1"<>1 J .. u"",'''", 7O'HP5 9'; at.,..--"""A,..,nd. ,e~ ~ 9, S""I" '~fIf 591 ".r >T W.'.~" ,ISPI 5 81. "'''''''dV IAH

./ ,,­,,, .... .... ... '" 5U115.9 9 U lD U

, U

6 "

WORLDWARONE 1. To lilt &.r,.. ,­.-4. Grell W. IUd S. ModI: 1st Wcrid W. 5.~$W. ,.­,,-'" 'm_ WORLDWARII

1. en... III kill Z. ~ GooIIriot ._­...... , ......... I.ONIlo'~ , ...... I. W. IIIht bt1-2nd Ed , " .... 10, W. It EII"I'I 11. Wadri .. "'""' 12, W. iI fte W'" 11 AIiI1it:W. 14 St Yiltl ,,-II. CIm!9t N, Atra 11. W. II Ihr "-iIi: 18. 8ismoni 19 Ed

" .... 20. MijJMy 10 Rem2 " ..... n. Arm!' ~ s...m 23. ea.. Whtli 24, 110-.~ ..-.. -""" 28. W ... w. 29. f'rIzIIl .... Jl. TJrrd R*h llDrMIIIStIrIinpt

' '''­n'" ' .-..

.... " ." SPI 11111 SPI 11m .. '" ~ '" ., "" SP1 W18

SP1 11118

" "" ., .~

" • .. "" '" .,

2m ,m w, "" "" ,,~ w. • ., '"'' ., ,m

.,'" "' .. '" "" .. ""

121.114U 1.a IDU!2 ' .3 U 5i.!i115145.5

206.1125.945.4 18 6.1 II 11 90 10 106.311'.1 5.2 llU2SS.4 U SUlIll i!i SUl151 U

12 H V U !2 1.l ~ 6.0 12 1.l 40 U

.. " ..

12 1.3 16 1.0 I 2.11 111 12 !3 5.8 25 6.0 I~ 11 13 I ,D 100 4,3 5 1:1 11 5.5 4 6.0

:1111Z21.l8ll'.s 10 1.1 15 U l:uJ 5IJ I.G ZJ 1.5 1811 5.D XI 1.G Z2 t5 90 6.5 4Il 1.11 Z2 1.3 1111 4.5 :l31.G15&.5:116.5 5 1.0 13 5.S 6.0

1.0 II s.s 6.11 SPlm"I.o 8.551115.5

'" " .. Y18 5IJ 6.9 " lO Ql 2.G .. .. "" "" .. '" '" '" "" •

" "" .. '" • .. ., AH 11174 AH \1174

'" "m SP1 11118 At! 11 ,~4 · ""

12 6.9 12 6.5 5 4.0 56.9 86.0 llS llU2lII.sIIJ.5 SUI25.54U

1116.8 96.0 36.5 13 U B 1.0 10 8J 29 5.l ~ 6.1 24 5.11

15 11 10 6.9 I1USl12

5 4.5 5 ..

" , .. .. 12 &1i IS 4.5 5.J 10 6.5 l5 1.1 5.0 10 lS 32 6.5 6.0 II 1.5 Z2 U 11 5.S Z2lSliU25U 10 lS 15 6.5 10 ~ 12 &,5 13 6.0 I 1.0

5~" W&""loc IAH ~BI OI.I""W., 'SP I sal, l~" e rSPI5BI, ~",,"lQ~n ISP I5 111, CM'" IIMGC5 61,~' ,,"C'~TRISP I 5 &1, t,~~· ........ S"",,,, IPe 5.BI. s,,,,,,,,, 'sri 5 RI. C ........ ,', l"" "'" IAH 5 81. AI"", Sl>o><fI lll~ 61, Su'''''' IGDW5 81, F,,, .,",flooW,,,' IDl b 81, Goo:l,I,,~ 'MGCI5 81, r.,~ IGDW 5 81 r~I"""w",ga ... ,~'ffimw., ,,,-,,5 8 C""',..",."'-""" ISPI 5 71, rr", C' ........ ISPI 5 II. Pan,,,,,,,,,,,... rSPI 5.7 1, O"",a',,,,, 0 1"",,, ISP I 51,. BJ,t "'''''I IAH b 71, l\jl 'w""~ IAH 571, Woo'" W~. III ISPI 57t, 1<""""",,, C •• rI War rSP I b /I, Nil, 10 IS PI5 71, Mavd.!lVlGOW5 7', M.-.~, 1!~,1\'" IAH 5 71, A"" ,r,., G_, IAH 5 7'. O,,,,to,~ CGC 571. AI"'a ~Ofl>' II<Ii b EI. SI~I, ,,,,'3<lIAH 5 5, S,., Sold.." ISP I b 61, 1f""qP.<l F~,"'" ISPI 5 61, G,.~,>(!o<, ISpl 5 51, Su~cha,1!f' ISP, ~ 61, G<oTl";b"'9 77 IAH 5 61, C".",,""o''''''~ IAH 5 BI, f"''''''''' oT Chi"" lOG fi 51. D .. "" IAH 561, D."., 01 D"'a," 'LZ ~61. ~,,,""o",, IISII 551; P ..... ""'" IGOW 561, PI", ,~ A'''',,,n.''· H""" ISPI ~ &1 f." '. R'<lISPI5 51, F~.t>ot & Pnan ,,,,,,,SP I ~ fil. W .. oT S~" IAH5 51. 6,,,,,0' "'l''''''''''' IGOWS ~I, H,",~< 0<>01> IF&F 5 5'. P~"" W ... ISPI b'l 011,,,,,,,,,_ ISPI5 41, D DII. IAH ~ 41 ,,,,. "",'.,,, .. ,·rt~ 151'15 4, M,,,u''''''''tI 'SP I h 41. 0. ... 1"'" I~ IGTG 5 4', "'",,"'_11 0<0<;",,,,,,,,,, IfB 5 41, C""'I'C E~ ,"",,~, IfP5 41, St'" L.yd Irs £ 4'. nil W'" ISP' 5 3 1: B.,w,OOM

ISP I £ 31. Ot,~ "" "f ww IIIAH 5 J I, M.'""""PhO'" A'pha lISA 531. p""""""",,," W .. ISC 5 31, fl .. IIC 521, UN ISC 521. S,,<JO~ A',,,,.aI$PI5 11, A,,,,,,,," 'SP I 5 II, II .... ,"',~ ,I),. Eo" 'SP I ~ 11, E' Ala,,..,,., 'SPI5 11. Co","'",n C,", Wa' 'SPI5 I', D" ,., ISP' .91. W," ,,1 'I .. W""'~' ITS~ 49 ' , S'It! P,nl", LISA 4 SI. ld G'oin'lIt E",p,,~ ISC 4 ~I, lOCT.;<; IIIAH ~ 41,0,,,,,,,,,: Lrbro ISC ~ II.K'''''i',,, ... 'IAH35'

GAMES PLAYED BY LESS THAN FIVE PERCENT

Op,""'''1fi C"'''''il<'< IGOW 6 91. Ino"'''Cl< .... c. A~,,"~ IGDW6 11, I.,"'" B.g Hom liSA E ] I, D,~.I>I~ S," IGDW I) 01, SC""'IT"'~"" If BI 6 31, S"".., la,,. liSA T 5 91, II .. f .. t F,,,,,, I lCD 5.91, I"" A',~"'" Ca""""'l" ~oo r"""", rlSR 5 ai, M""~,,-<,, IGOW 581, 1066 AD II~H & 61. Ndpoltron 'G IG ~ BJ. Doc'"" & Fa' IWG & 8 1, e,,11"'" F,v~ A,m."IISR£ " . r".lh' '" "'" S~_, ISR!> 11. a'''t'' "I SO"">q" IOC b 11. G'~"'"e IMGC 5 61, Cu"'"" La" S'.n~ 'Bl 5 61. ''''l' loll lEG & 61. T U"" '.l ]90<3 IfG 5 e •. h~, I 1 C 5.&1. S",.,.. "f p,,,, A"~r ISF 5 ~I, B.',,,, ~f I_u' ,eG b51, V"a ["""" L8l5 "- 4C(X) 1<0 rHO 521, II 11 1'''''f'I'IIAW 5 II. c,~,~ lEG 5 11, r"l"'" C",I W., IIG 511, F""""h"", I' lAW ~ II . S ,"" I 'C·C 511 V""",.I>Of\ o,.,."uclIOn lEt. 501, 1<1"'"'" IfG 501. FI","", """~ rLZ bOI, ell, k.""""J'!F6 5()', f,I"",p C, .... I"W 4~] lIa,""" ,,' II", NO'I" lTG 4 9, R,,,,,,,,," ',S ~81, Du"" .... & aur """., IFGU 4 ". C .... " lEG 4.41, V"b IF8 441.711 Ca.'"'" IA'W <121, R"", .. I .. "", fAW 391. W., 01 S,,' sr • .." lAW 191 1',,,,,,, 'AG'J 11. W.,I ", ".ndW",r,_ I I S~1 ~I

...... " .. ll. 1"-110 lilt !hoi >. -1I. KNrta. -....... n$rlpor Q. f'rIzII .w.. Alrib .,,-M. IIGnwnII in T ......

MODERN

I IMdi W •• 2. RId SIIrrIIIIwII S,. l. n.NelIW.

• SuelIO GalIn 5 ......... I. ~efojIt 1.1iiIW. ,,-· ""' .. 10.' ....... 11. on. 12. W..,ug 11 Mod l\.t. ,,­I~ Mod l\.t I 16. Sinoi II. cw.- F.m

GDW 11114 .. ." ... ."

" "" "'"" OSG 11118

"'''' ., "" '" "" "" "" ., .. .. . '" "" "'"" ., ,m .... .. "" ... un .,om SPI 1m

roc '" .,'" '" ., ,m "'"" .,2m .,."

1.5 12 1J II 4,0 I.S I III l l!i

Il151U5IISJI IO UlI!1.G3~.

l1Ull5.J6U 18 6.1 11 5.8 &.II 12UZ21.1 4.s 12 U 21 5.3 18 6.2 "UII" 1:uJ 18 6.3 8 1.G 4.G

'J!i 1.3 13 1.0 20 6.0 1.3 12 1.0 111 6J

34 12 12 1.1 II 5li 201.GIOlOlII6.11 46.112115.32&.0

2O&.824lS I1U12U

5.5

" 10 11 I 1.0 12U251.o 4 1,1 19 5.4 I U 14 6.1 , 6.5 71 5.0 1t1524U , 6.5 11 5.2 1&UJiUl 12U25~1

4U235.D

· .. 'is , " · .. 2 " 2 ..

2 " , " , " 2 "

FANTASY AND SCIENCE FICTION

I.Ft"'It"~"

'''' ,.-4, W. alrho!lrlg

' ... .. '" t. er.nn~ iW"" 9. S.,. & San:a')' 10.""-11 . 0e0Ih TISI 12. ~&Or..,.

" .... -14S_~

" ..... 16. BlI!I!!IItet Man 1 1 Innsoan: ""'-a II. W. ilillt let

"'"" '" . ... . SPI IInJ

MGt ,n MGt • .... MGt •

'" ". GOW 1m MGt • 1SfI \211' .....

MGt "" '" .. '" '" ., ''''' SA ""

Attention Publishers:

20 11 , " \2 7J

" " 10 1.11 I' 1.1 18 U l5 5.S 36.12141

U 21 5.J 4 U 19 U 36.1165.8

II 6.11 lJ IJI 12 1i,1 14 6.2 3 &.1 12 SJ IOUJIlS ZII U II U 96.5!15.J '1.4115.5

\5 U 1& U !I U 11 s.s 12 6.J g U

'" 2 " · " , " " " " .. .. " ' "

5 "

" lD

" " " "

We attempl to keep this chart as complete and Bccurate as possible. You Cl,ln help by sending your latest price list to "Games Rating Chan" here at SPI. Corrections of erroneous or miss­ing data are solicited,

SPI BESTSELL ER U ST Nov/ Dec '79

The list shows the top ten SPI games in terms of unit sales o ... er thB previous lour month reponing period (calculaled as a moving a ... eragel.

R/mk 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

•• 9.

10.

Title Creature .. Sheboygl,ln Bloody April Vllctor 3 Cityfight Medieval Quad StarGate Ti tan StrikB Commando War in the Ice A/my Group South Quad

• Last on list in 5& T75 ,

Pr8.... Times Rank on List

2 5 3

5 5 3 3 6 2 9 5

10 5 4 2

3 7 3

42

Feedback Questions S&T nr. 79, publ1shed M ar/ Apr1980

How 10 lise rhil Feedback Response Card After vOIJ"ve fInished .OOel,ng thIS I5SIie of S6 T, p~se rood the Feed­back questIOns below. and 9've us your answers by WfiI­Ing the answer-n\Jmbers on thtt ca rd In the response bo~as wh>eh correspond 10 each t1uestmn number See c:emer lold for card Please besur6 10 answer all quest ions (but do not ",me anyrhmg In roo box for QUe5non·num bers labelled "no Questlon"l Incompletelv hlled-oul C<lrd5 cannot be ptocessed

WI\'I' (he numbtm; mBan. When answenng Quesuons. "0" atways means NO OPINION or NOT APPLICABLE When the Questfon IS II "yes or no" questH;m , "I" meanS YES Dnd "2" means NO. Whefl the Quest10n IS II fDMg questIon. "I" 15 the WORST ratIng, "9" IS The BEST ra­Mg, "5" 'S 8n AVERAGE rllMg. and all numbers ,n be­tween express various sh1t(!es of approval or dIsapprova l

1-3. No question

The followm9 q uestIOns ask you fa fBle 1M 8WCif!S In ,hiS '''-'UB on" 'tale of ' (poor) through 9 fe~cellent); 0 .. no opinwn ,

4. Berlon'85 (game!

S. NOQuest,on

6. B9fl,n '85lart lclel

1. Baltle 101 Slal,ngrad

I . OUI\}O,ng Ma,1

9. FOIYour£yesOnly

]0. Bnel,ngs

II ·]J. NOQuesHons

]4. Ttusissuaoverllil

IS. Was ThiS ~ebenllf lhan lheiasl onel

]6. Assume lha! YOU don'! sub$Cnbe 10 S&T Wou ld ltie Qua ll\V 01\h151SSUe ~ I olll! monv8Te you To subscflbe?

17. Fa, how many ISSUes have you I>3d II con1tnuous sub­scnOl,on 10 S&TlO B I don'l subscrIbe. I _ fh ,s IS my !"SI Issue. 2 _ ThtS IS my second Or th"d Issue; 3 .. Th,s IS my lourth or hllh Issua; 4 .. ThIS IS my s'~th 'ssue. 5 ~ ThiS IS my saven,h 'ssue, 6 _ Thts ,5 my e'ghTh through twelfth lS$ua; 7 _ ThIS 's my th"toon th th'OU(jn eogh­tOOf1th Issue , 8 ~ ThIS ,s my noneteenlh or subsequent ,!>We. 9 = I am II Lrfel'mt! SubsCriber to S&7 !regardless 01 number of ISSUes roce,V1!d1

II . O,d YOU send In the foodback card for your IIIsl ,ssue o f S&71

19. You, age I ~ 13 yeaTS old 01 younger, 2 _14·17; 3 = 18-21. 4 ~2227. 5~ 28·36; 8 .. 36or old&r

10. Yourse. I~Male;2=Female

1 ]. fducat,on 1 _ llveaTsO,~s.2"12Yllar5;3~13·15

yea,s. 4d 13-15 Y68rS and 51111 '1'1 1;I;hool. 5= 16 yea,s, 6- 17 yea,s or mom

11. How long have you boon p laYing conllW;1 !;Imulat lon game5l0"~lhanayear.l .. IV6i";2~2vear5 Sz8 years. 9~9 or more years

13. What '5 thi!aVlllage number Of hours you spend play 109 s,mulatlon games each manthlO .. none. I .. 1 hour or less. 2 .. 25 hours. 3 .. 8-9 hours. 4~lO-15 hours. 5 .. 16-20 hoors; 6 ~ 21-25; 7 a 26-Xl; B~ 31--40. 9~ 40 Of

fI1Orel\ours

24. How many S4mu l31,on games 101 a ll pubhsllll(5! do you possessl 1- 1-10. 2~11-20; 3~21-:JJ: 4D31--40, 5e4H(l: 8-51-00; 7_61 70;8_71 Ill; 9 .. 81 Or mo'e

25. Whal level 01 complo., ty do you Pfole! tn gamesl Rala YOU! prolBlItf1C9 008 1·9 scala. Wllh h>ghar numbers md>Clltmg I""reasad comple.ilv. Use the 10110Wlng games as gULdeimes 4-5~Clli<;kamauga. 73Parroll, 9~Air

W" 26. P,d lhe Or>6Bfe.l aboot which YOU WOUld mosT h~e to _ games and art iCles done 1'"' Al'\CIef1t (Rome. G'ook, Blb l>Clll, 3:lOO BC-600AO>. 2 ~ Oa r k Ages and Rena's­sance 1600 AO- I600 ADI, 3~:J) Years Wa r and pre Naooleonw; 11600 AD-179m, 4_NapOleonoc 11700 -18:ll1 : 5~ CiVil War/ 19th Ce-nluly !18:ll - l00Jl ,

80S World War I nOCXl - 193:1l; 7", World Wa' 1111930-1945). 8~modern 1194!i-Pfesen t). 9KFan'asy a nd Science FICtiOn

27. Overall. whw;h of lhe follOWing features In the paSl few 'ssues of S&T a re mosT In need of chango Ito ma ke lhi!m better 1hrough changes in Quali ty, Quam,IV. fo rmal, elC J? OB don'! change an Ylhing. 1 .. !t\9 game. 2-lhe I6IId a r ~cle Ion The same SubjeCT as ,he gamel, 3 _ lhese cood malor arllcle; 4 .. 0u lgoin9 Mail, 5 m 8rief>ngs. 6 - For YOU! Eves Only. 7 .. Game!! Ra t, ng Chart, 8K Feedh3ck. 9- some o ther aspecl 01 The magazine that Il<Jgs you

TM rolll)wlflg refers OlOly ro IOo,,-S&T gBmtJS l!vMsllfff'" ,helasl 12 momlls IilalVou IIaveplayed,

18. D,d you h"ve any problems ""ttl lhffl<1 g.a~' ouiffl.1 o O,d no1 play arw non-S& 7 SPI game~ on thi! \a<;1 12 month~. 1 _ No problems wllh gam("< playe!.J. 2 ~ A h!w problems, bul nOI anough to p'''''''''l my play,ng ti'te game, and I was able 10 nandle tnem myself. 3=A tow prob!eoTls. w'ole to SPI lor a dauhcallon a<XI rocenlf'(! <I ,eolv w,lh", a month, 4 - A Ipw p'otol<>", •. wrOle to SPI lor a cla,,f,callOn and roc",yed a reply oyt'f a month "'IP.'. 5~A lew probh:!ms, wroW tu SPI lor II ctalll,cat,oo but neo;m 'OCOIyed <In answe<. 6 = Had se"ous proll',nus wllh 1M rules 'hat D'evemf'(! Dlay. w'ow TO SPI to, Cla"IIC<IIIOn and r..cell/eo:! 'epl~ With in a monlh, 7 = Had serIOUS prab lems w,ln Ih" rules lhat prevented olav. wrote 10 SPI for cla"hcatlon <lnd roceoved replv more lllan 8 monn, later 8~ H<ld .... 'oos nrobl~ms wrtTI the 'ule<; lhal prevented play. w'ol<! \0 SPI (1)1 cl~"flCilhnn but fIe\t<If rec6lved r1lll1V,9 Ha{I problems woth theruiffl.and called SPI

29. If a momt> has pasSl'd ~"',e YOlI la~t orde.ed som!.!

Ih,n-q hom SPI. Illt"a!;(l anSWer The fOllow,,'!! QUll5hons llbout tho s .. rvtcc I I old",R<1 a 9ame(~land rBCP.lvOO m~ orrjpr ,on>nlf'te ""lh,n tl!.ec wee~~ 01 S4'lndrn-q IT m; 2 0 I md",f'(! II (jar!l/l <lnd 'ec<",ved my Older complete w,tlt\n th.t'<' wP<'ks of send,ng" m. but W,th.' game pa.lIsl miss .og Irom 0",", OT \llll ganlffl, 3 I ordered a gBmIl and ,ece,..ro my order w,lrlln th,oo w"',~s. lJU! 0'"' of thf' ga~ was the wrong <lJmt!; 4 I didn't '!"<:"'''''' my order wllhm Ih'611 weeks. but dKfrece'veao out 01 stoc~ not<~, !).I o(d",ed a pre·puh'ICiIHOn sal" qame and dldn't a, oect 10 we " fro( a wh'le. 6 - OVO! nlltle wet'h ha~e !lass­ed, and I have still rercervl'l1 no q.lme 0' nOl lf lC.JIIOn, 7 MV last ",de, wa~ fo' II SUbSC"P!lur>. 8 My I~,t Older w~s lor a non ~ub"""IJI"'O, nC\n''l~mI! .tem and was h"nrtlH:i ~lllIgnt, 9 - My la't O,d<)T "'<IS I", a n',,\·~ub<;~r.p t'On, oon''1a''''' '\I'rn and I r.onsld"r ""W'-" to ha_" \)o""n Unluslillilntv stow or OIhNWl'IC ""'"~t"t'k t"'~

30. PII!iI"'.' mrllr.al~ thl> Dllma'y ,MS'-Tn 1m no! md""n(1 through SPI", ma,l ord~, ~~.v.c" 1m IH"''' (JIliN !ll~1l '''h ';Cr.ptlon. 0- Do u'\t! SPl"s m~lt ""'*1 OO",{'<' r"'luk1rI~, 1- Oon'l want SPI ,"odu"t~ mhl'f tl1an S&T. l-NI!'II,", buy anyIM''l lJy mall orOOr 11rom any r:omp.>nvl, 3~Stoppe<1 uSing SPl's mall o'(\(or .".r~,("" IJecaUS4'l 01 long dplay In ,oceoVl!'O produn'ilqarn<> nOi bemq >en' Out accord ino to DIIIJI,shffll dalesl: 4 I h~YO all the 03""'" I can hHr,,1Ip, 5 ~ PrOducls 100 ,-,XpcnSI'/1l, 8 Plele< 10 buy ,n sto,e; 7 - Have,,'t >eIIn anym,nq worth purchasmq bYt st,11 'MV huy. 8~ P'Oduct (lam.lqt) (ju~ to ~1"pf!\"OI Ion II<lH ord<J-r~1 has (l'SC(,"'~ged me f'Qm onwn"q by nlil',

9-n1\ .. ",

We would lIke 10 flll(loul wl"'t pm/)/etl" varIOUS puMsll t:r.< Imr.iudmg vUfSe/ltesl ar" havlllg WIll! gNllllg all file IIglll parts ttl a gil"''' If you have b/)ughl II ga",,,, from 0"" lor ","rei of lire followlflg pub/,slIcrs IN THE PAST 12 MONT HS, please RIISW<" IIIe QU"S/IOII WIll' tl", approprl­ale .espollse. Cnllsldel ,>Illy Ille LAST GAME YOU BOUGHT. O~ Have IlOl bovgl1/ /I !IIIIT>/! r,()t" 1111.< publlslI­er '" IIIe las/ 12 "!("JlI/h5; I 80uglil a game "'MIi, "0 problem; 2 80uglll a game d"eCl IT""I, '''' problem; 3 8ovgl)/ 1M 9ame dtrecl m/llllfllr/ I//Illd a defecllve Of

""SS""I compo",,"t; 4 Bl)uglil rl)e ga"",relall/Jlldll h'I(/ /I dell.!Cftve ()t ,,)I""'g comp0l!f:IiI; 5- 8""yl1l II 9"",e dlrecl mallllll(l recetved 1M wrollg game

3 1. Av~I"" H,II

32. SPI

33. TSR

34. Meta'p""ng

33 . Old VO\l h3"'l any p'oblems Wllh thC 'ules TO' fbafT fm.;lel lone of The games ,1'1 S&' 771 0 - O.d not p l ~y

f/)dfT fmael, I ~ No ploblem., Wllh the ga"",,,. 2· A lew problems. but no! !'n(IUgh to p,.,.;(JfTI my plav,,,,) th~

game. and I was ab~ to handl" ITwrn m~<;('I!. 3~ A few prob l"ms. w rme 10 SPI for a r;ia"l l(:iItlon and .-..ceM!U a rr-plv w.th ln <I mamh; 4~A fllW p,o-bl<:>ms, ""ot<· to SPI

for a claulocat'On and Hlce,\Ied a '~pry ovar a monU> later. !i. A low p,obIC!"S. MOl!! TO SPI lor a ClarllH;,UOOn but ne_er leceovOO an answer. 6 - Had 5e!IOU~ p,ob~-!nS w,m the ,uiffl. tlmt prl!'llC"tl!d plav. WlOle to SPI fo' ciaulocaloon and receoved feply wnhm a momh: 1 Had _IOUS prob !ems w llh 11m tules thaI p,,-,vomed play. wrOl" 10 SPI for cta"l.cah·on and recel..ro ,ep/v mo,,, lnan a mamh latm, 8 = Had senOUS \lfoblenlS W,lh lila 'uies tha' prl!'llenffld ptaV. wlot!' to SPI To' ClllnflC.J\lon but r\!Ml! rl!C(!lW!(! '''Ilty.9 Had OIOblf!!flSWtl~ thH,ulesand ca lled SPt

36. Old you purchase th iS ISSue ot S67 81 a store 01 rece,ye 'I th'ough 8 SUbSC!lplI0n/ I .. a stOre; l 5ubscnpllon

37. SPI has Innool/ced ~ number of r\Il'W games '" one Inch ldoop! boxes lhal sell lor uode! $10 and h3Vi3 no COlmle! Hay MOSt ot Ihese games Ie 9 ,Lefl/flg,ad. Too 8vlgfl. Demons) ha"'l 100 COUn!IIfS Some 01 them haVi3 no counte,s le.g Foo'ball. Bitsebaill. and some 01 them have 200 coumers !e It. DooII,mille. Pw Ridge. TIJe China War! 10 I'ght 0 1 II\tl loc! ThaT lhi! ~~ ot counteo lIays 'esu lts in a puce allMsT $2 low .... P6! game. aodlll5O assum ing thaI trays."e "Y<lliable from SPlln Quamlncsol SIx 0' mo'e lor $1 apLeC6 IWfl can selllt>em mo,e chooply that wal'l. please tmhcale wht<;h of the Ipl10wlnq respOnses besl des<;flbes your ,eacTlon 1 s I prel .... !Ml SPI sell I ' box games W,ThOUl !tays, 2 E I dO<1't ca,e wheltier or nol lhare are uays In I" box games, 3 ~ I would be less 1,.1111' 10 buy aoy gamB wnh HlOcoun tllfs,t ,I lacked a t,ay, 4 ~ I would be less h~eiV 10 bo,JYlIgamewoth 2COcounters ,I" lacked a Hay; 5 a I wou ld be less likllly 10 buy any game With 400 0' mo'ecount .... s l! II ~~ed a Hay. 6 .. I would nol buy anvgame wnh l00count .... s, f It lack­ed a tray; 1 - I WO<Jld nOI bu. ~ny game wnl! 200 countllfS If 11 lacked a Hay. 8 ~ I WO<Jld nOI buy anY g<lme With 4(Xllof more) counlB1S ,I It lacked a Hill'; g .. I use nays Only ,n games tI",\ I play a lol, but since I can't kflOW wt1etner or noll"ll plaYllgarne<l lot ,n advance, nol hav'ng It Hay ,n II is <I d,awback regardtess ot the numbel 01 count"rs. and lI"en though I p,cb-at)ly wou'd <;ave money bv sepmalelv putcha"ng only !hose Hays I nood. IT would nOI !>ewerth Ihehass le to me

P/eeser8le ",efollowln9 gltmtJs on 8 I ro9scale. Wllir "I" ",dlcalllTg a parl/cula,1y slro"g dislike fOf 8 ga~. 8ITd "9" ItIT "specl/illy favora/)Ie opilTJOft. Please flIle only those games w/llch ~ov have pillyed (agaIl)S/ 8" OPPOlleJJl or so/l la"e) al /eiosr onCe In tbe lasl SIX mO!!llls If yO<J /!ave rJOt plaved 111<1 gal"" III IIIe Ia" SIX momhs. please do nOl r8leil(respfJfJd 'rr 1ft 1M sl}lJce}. All gamesllSledare SPI publIShed. unless O/I'elWlse 5pecIf"M.

3-8. Aolncouf\ 39 . A MoghW FOl\fBSs

40 . N<lpaleon's LBsI 8anles 41. LaBpileATllancl! 42. Llgny 43. Ouaues B,as

44 . WB~re 43 . 80rad lno 46. 1815 WatertoolGDWI 47 . Shenandoah 18L1 411. SlIrboalGahcliI 49. Greal Wa, In II'e East 5<1 . Caparello 51. Von Hond""bu'{I to Poland 52. AIfFOIUlIBLI 53. War.n EuroPE! 54. FialloplBLI 5S. Oltye 00 S tallnQ'ad SiI. lyphoon 57. Ani,olAHI 51. The Ne~! War 59. Flrel'ghl 60. A" Waf 11M Ed.ll0nl 6 1. C,)adlllIGOWI 62. Fulda Gap

63 . Ba. l"'" (CGC! W. Travell!!! (GOWI 65. Patton's Thlfd Alm~ 66. All Wa' IUpdJted Edltlonl 61 . Bulge

68. len'ngrad 69. Ail War Update IK ltl 70. Batt lelYagl 71 . UltllYliltumlY8Q1

11. T,n ..... iI.IY"'l' 71. 1ad,IYiilQl

R.,. t~ folluwmg gll..,. PlOPOsMS on • sclJle of 1 I!) 9, Wllh 1 m(/lc.tl"9 VlIfY litlle ",;::/",.1/011 10 buy the g.". If pub/l$hlHi up through 9 ",dlcalmg a dttfmll& mIen/JOn 10 purchu.'1

74 . TI'ItI rf~n Waf A eoIot lul game COYl!nng HOI' r"~IOIocallmytlbcal conlllCt Troe app,oach woold be l89hs~~ lot hYPOthetlcall ,n UlI'ms 01 IIImy ca.pabol'lIes. geogrilPhv. obteCOVllS, Stege waflare and tacbCS HowtIYef. troe gods and heroes .nvoMld ,n the mult,·ye .. " ~"u99lfl would be 16!llu'ed prornnenlly AChdles. AI)3""''"'''''''. Odysseus fUlvssesl. Pa,,~. HectOl. A)a •. o.omecles. AphrOO'IP pnd [he otnet g'eal hgut8!l 01 Ieq9nd who l)(IthCOpated directly or Ind"eclly ,n lhe 8PJC C8mpa 'gn would be lovmg ly I)OrHa\'tld The GrooO. pn(! TrOlsn l)I3yer$ would allmnot nOl only to lull,11 lheo' OV8fall m,I'lilry obtect've5. bul rhe OI'lillle !loa~ 01 ceflaln cna'a<:ter585 well acomb,nal,oo 01 St3re--ol·lhe'iI'lan oent warfare game 5y'IIemI 8I\d 00' W., of 1"­R'nglFfftdom III/he G.t11>-yctl8fec'8f system Would ,n dude()f"l$IUIi SIze mao, 2!::Ocounte<S. cards and h<stOloca' ,nlOffTlallOll T oseilloo- $12 15

,~. W"'tel 01 00' OJSCOnIfJIII A med_al aftClOf\8do's !!llIIIm come t,ue. stan,ng whOle Kmymake' leaves ott A Slmulauon .rn;OI00/atlntj lhe basll,om the pOW9r pOhhCS gen,e and adding combat d'splays. de)a'~ P'lIhamen lS. ITIIIny more PIlIsonal,!JeS. and genD!allv g'Vlng a ..... ch more $<"CUrilte "1001" 101 the Ofl As a ptaponenl 01 lhe house of llncltS'l!f nr vOlk YOUI Ior'lt mow IS 10 recrU'1 sullOOfllll'sand secule YOUllactlOll'$ pow. Ve.ys,m()ly, you muff. _ a ··k'ngmaklll." ga,n the lul.ng house, ~eeo popula! SUDJlOf1. mamtaon or secure loo-eogn respect. end ma,nta,n peace on the realm And lICcomphsll all 111'5 ,n an 111'& 01 outrllQDOUS chaos and poI,!,cal upllea~altha l ma.k ed lhe exltoclton 01 lhe g 10"005 Pl8ntDger.e1S Game w, 1I ,ncIude so,;ch ,tems as commossoons 01 array. statutes 01 _I, bolis of alla.ode<. ambossadOls. "lty personal'll11S 'aplala W,I11 heraldiC COUntflfS and h05lorocai paI'tlClll ,n surb.iol"". ,n!! Utcll(;aj blilllia d~vs lIIJovo,'ng awry 1lIICU'~ ,I'IOCIOO, ollh05 perIOd 10 urke place Exilmp4e$ol IheM ere lalTlflY grudgeS. "no Qu.ltl ... • f,ts 01 PIQ ..... treachery. """'till' bowmen, log, ~tOlms. sanctuary and _n SQUI.e lOVftllJce 011("'1 PhySICal CompOflflf1lS would ,nclude [WO maps. ComDilI lind Pall,amenl d'splays. 6IXl1JXliu li colo, he'a ldIC coonten;, and wou ld selllo"!800

1'. NNJ(JItIon·s V..-;tQf)' The B/JI/Ie of IwsterlilT A lou, map, 16X1 counter banlJhon IIMtI IItmulaoon us,ng lhe populI' Wellmglons V..-;IO/VINey OI'S Wellmgron SVSlem U_ speaal 'OO-lTIIInon rules. sl;ormrshers. and ITlllneuver Foo' "Cf'I\allOS The Baltie 101 Sokoln'll. Na()Oleon's Counlerattack, Altac~ 01 the RUJ$3n Guard. and. 01 c001SB, The Graod BanleGame To sell IOf 5:l1

n . 8artlf! of Corun"" AlIO' a lI,uell lng lo'ced ma'ch a<:10~~ 11>1) Span,sh Caotab"lIo MowH81ns In the !lead ot Wlnl"'. S" Jo~n Moor",'! BritiSh almv ar,rved III Corunna luSI ,11 I>n'O! to ''''~Pd,a 110 II\/acua!>on by SBoI. HoI on Ih .. " ~ W",I' 20.00) French undO! M ... 5h;l1 Soull TurnH'9 to 'I''''' bania, MOOfe ifoon!!", ollhl! B',,,5/1 "9ht ,lllallllyl 'ooQllly tIan(Il@o(j ,,,,, (lVerCtllllodo"'l F'ench ,n a b'lIel'y CO"I(.WMl '0911, 00lor8 the cn~ ramplil" on Janua.y 16, 19)9 For shoo< dash undoJ< hie. not 10 menllOll rescu'ng ao 'moo,;soble v1CIOfY hom the raws 01 deleat. Co,ullro;l '5 811 ~Imosl unlla.all('il"d OOltt" 01 lilt! NaPOleon,c efll. 8al Ilfi 01 COfUnna wool!! ,,,,,,ealo Moore's ia5t balHo USlnll I~ Wellm9ron's V..-;rOt)' 5ysu,m w'lh mod,"cauons to cover oavai gunl'fD. lI\/ar.u~IOCIn. P"",nsular III'oes. an!! desrfUCltOn 01 storas One 01 two mal>'. 60J 10 9:lO coonl"". rille-; and hto;torocal Illude on the Pen,nsular Wa, Now ¥ou 100 CBr1 condUCI Ihllt ITIO$I a"TtSh 01 all md,1iI"I "p;rral'ons evacuato<,,'under I"e Boxed, $18

-no A Drs/8nt Thundef A W819g'C and lacllCal somula tHl" ollha QP"f1"'g camPII'9" 01 lhe C,v,1 Wa., /rom The SItVtl" D;)ys 10 Ant'el~m PI~\'i!'s woold ma,l/J\JVi!I Ihu" 100Cf!$ on II"oo·day lurns on Iho "'Mogle map unltl lorcas 01 00'" play ..... s were ,n " '" $lime 1Ie~. When plavars WOUld resolve ban"'- on 0 LlCIICIIi ··OOl1r.,loe\d·· laken Irom /I

seIeocllon 01 12 16 5ft1lII1 geomorphIC tllCt"",1 maps G.eet empha"5 would be placed on h,dOOn movement. "molf!'(! ,mell,9I"'C\' 8"'; 8'II)8Oatly on Ie<IdIIr abol,t_ MIIlor malOO­leildefs would be IflCIuded (hom OIogade 1eYeI up) and would be tBIAd 101 llleor .bol,l18S on so>ch ar""" as moW' menllJac~son'S trOOPS w,11 move much laste< thai, thoSe 01 McC~laol. I nt~hgen<:e It" lhe mlhlary oo-n~l. plus many 1f11In\ls pBrllCUlftr 10 md 'Vldual Ieedet5 (hOW is Jack!lC)n I~,r>g loday/) Plavon IIIB st,ategiC map would

be on ~ bo-~}iI~ IeVJit anrl. on II'II! l¥tocaJ ''''P~. recptnen lilI l~5 would aliG be ,ated ,n ITIiInv tar.'o<"-<I1 t:8teq<>'11!5 ,rn;lud,"II po. • nq Oo·I",n_ 100ra,n. and ......" ,nl""""''''9 lhe actuat CI,O!<'fl 01 1ar.I,cal m.J1)1 1"" '''al!!g,e mao wfl\jld co"'" lhe Easl co;,rsl hom No<th Ca.ol1na 10 $Ou,,""n Po"nwlvan ,a, bo,(Je,ed bv ''''' Sh"n~"doah Moun ta,n, Tllf' g;t"'6 woul!! ,nClude nUfTlfl'ous l<>elocal ~"os besodes lhe campBog" game. I(XX) COUOIIII'S. 12 16 11IC1"'111 maps beside IhI! $1'~leg. map. and would 00 lar.,~ h!QII ,n C<lfTlpIex,W S20

19. rt. Geltys/)m9 CaffJ(}8'f}n "s.mu1a11Oll 01 lhe Coo ledera." .nva'AOn 01 the north", June-Ju .... 1883 The \Id<T"! ..... oul!! be 5trnteg..: 'n scope. ""th II SIngle map pO' IfBYlnq V,.!)""a. Ma'ylafl!l. "Ad southern Pennsylvarna Un"s would be on corl>' l"lt. 101 It>e U S A,my 01 the POIOmac ar1t1 rn dlV'SIOn sue 101 the C S A A,my 01 Nor tham V"g'n'~ r""ij scale woul!! be one day pet' Game Tu,o The gam<' sy~mm would empllil<lle 1"n,tOO '0 1~lo98""f' bfotween OPPOStoq IcrC8S. a, w,"1 It'; IhI' Upabol'lKl5 01 hoQIHllnk,n'l "'.au.ns Vmv ,;ho'l plav,n'l t,,,... IlilSVlolea.n,2(X)couolP1~ $10

110. 'fie Ball'" of S"" JlJ4n RIdgo'> T"" SPot"""'" A..-..."Ll" W~, w,., "fl" "I the M>tJ"!OS1 wa.~ I~ A ... ,,,,ca" ""'orv 1 h~ .-lmp.l"l" '" Cuba "'Sled II:tM 1M" I .... "· mo~I"'. and hi" ,;a,n,ooJ II"! ""'Tie 01 '"Ihill 1li<""H," 1'1110· w~, " "". '"i' I''' 11'''''1 ,,111m Amf',ocan ,nvJ""O cot Cuba w~~ ,h" o:.llllU'l! 01 S"nIiolW'. the """n Ilf1rl m,t) !w'!x,la 1>"" ~efl1'" rl>/> r~I" rot Ih,\ CiI'''IM'gn wa-. II ... r .. 'plll'l' tot a 'o:I,j thaI pa_ '''Ihl Ih'(lUgh the San JUlIn RodQ/' and ,I WiI5lhr>rf!. 0" II", mot """I 011 Ju'v 189811." II~ U S !il" CO'~...,I lhe S,,¥lo5h army The Mlll/J "',1' a t()",IiV dc1u'",veutl",t <>n Int. parI ollhe SpantSt" iIS 1M "'Iv Ob!"<'hW Wafi 10 dAlav ille A""'''CiI'1S "",.1 , ... 1"f<"-'ffi('f1\S could aU",,' 1 he Arne<OC<!"s Wf"'" '~1'."m'f'1Iod '" (,'pll".·ltO,· ",1'1<' a"d ,I", .Oild OOyo"'; I",· US WI numhPrPd Ih" Spamsh toy "hoot 700J 1'r>"P~. b'l1 Ilw d,·I,,n<!l·,s rPC"IVI'<'1" "(·""'"d"u~ bonus hom 11"'" rlo·t"n ,I"" W"'~S, w~'rn In~h,,~<d I,v<' 'OWS 01 ha,1:>o!d w·'~. ~ d,~·p \'f'nrt. ;In'I.~ ..... y "/''1' 1,,11 ThP (liJ"'" w,U ,ncIUl~' 'PK",I "j'~' IOf ''''' U S ball,,,,,,. and ao ""no'''' " ..... hill ,11" <;cerra"" ".,nePr0""J 11, .. U S ,,,,nr{"~I~ lhal """",arr ... Jd II·. 17·'TIiIJI. l00counlers,IK,,,,odll,,16

II . BIoodrW<OI'''' NO"'-OC1,n"0(tI'el'ontsaw.t$m,,"" e<ml,nuous MI'''" du.,ng ttlf' ror~1 Wml!! Wa, a~ y,,,,,.. 1 M GflIman' !lrSI "~Silutte<:l u,,~ VIla' com"'''''OCIII'on~ nlot .. , ,0 N"""",""" 1914 A ,,,,,.....,fld a!lad H' A,,,,I 1915. was boI.trne<:l by Ihe use 0 1 gas fOl II", III'! !'mo on Ihe We-st""n From A 1I'"d Gmman al1OC~ ,n II"s IIrll;) ,n Apr.l, 1918. ,nsptfOO Ha,',.~ lamoos "back'i 10 It, wall"·orde.- 10 h,s ""'>OS The B,,'osh mouotBd nu ....... o'" atl"n~ (lUI'" I"" Sit''''''''- !hP fTIOSl lamou~ 01 w',ocn ,n v<,Iv<!d (he e_pl(~,nn "I 3 mdloon pounds 01 h"lh e.1)IoSNe u"d<>. M"s"If-''-'' RodqP, """ ollhe mosl ~;.H):",lul B"t,,o;,, opo'.at'ons 01 tt", witr 8100dy Wipe", would h" a"'"", VMNI'Kl bani .. <;afTlfl 1'0_'''9 Ihf! delleO!''''''''t nl "",~·It waTla'e 0" tM W"5'",n fro", !tom thO) I,ll! " I 1914 rh'ou'lll Ih<l Spunq "I 1918 Sconaft05 would '''clude F,,-,I ypre:, INoOlf'mhfol /9/41. Second ypre .• IAp",-1.915J. Mf!';slnt!'S Rfli{}" /JII'>f!, 1917/, Pa~srhMrla!" tj"", 10 Nnv"",ber /9111, and Ly.~ (A",il. 1911l1l1mon'l olt .... s A po$!.,bl" carllP<l''1n Q¥TII! wou'!!I'nk the 5CeIl8' ,,'" The gatr'" would ,,'" a va,tal'OO on IhI! Green Fot!Ids 8f!'V011d Q31T". s\,,>,em Fealul. would ,nclude gas attad<~. t""l-.:;. rnrn'llIl. ,,,f,ltraloon, la':I'~, a.tlilery orCPillaloon. lal~ue and msI!I"VO commotml'<1t 8100dy WlP"rs would ,nMude one mapstooel sl'UW"'1I 1100 yp'05 a,w I,orn the Yser 10 lhe lys R,Wlf @109X)counle<S,andll"htSIO,OCiIIB.I I'.;'" on Ihotl".",-, "P""'''I "I I"'n,,n w;l,lare $14

n . G<and AIM","" An updatnul SPI", W/JI1d W"r/l The 'If'~~: would be so",,-where 00'-' War III [ufOP#' iIIld World W8' II. ornbat,ly 10 k"O'''''tHfS 10 I"" I .... 30" nnn month per G"I"'" Tu,n Un'!$ would be eo.P!i anda,mMt'l. TIw! IhruS! 01 U~ !If!!;''lo WOUld IlP ,he c'eilli'>" "I" <x,m !lfatwmSOVP p'nducI w,'" "'moOt> mechaOICS. pilIy"blto ,n an alte,oO<Jl1 All ,mpO.t.lnt "'pt.'CIS 01 lhe wa, hom '<Ub ma"nM to pa'I,~,,~w()\"d be co ..... .,ed ," thog~ffi("S baSJ~ svs'ems w,tt-. .tr,~, ',m,la!tons on T11(o "rl(tn W~ I('tn~

Chrome" ,ocludo!d In lhe des'go Two maps. 9X) cooo11115. ext"""'voP'a';,nq ao(k $IB

tJ. Frgnter T"'~ q;l1N! w""<I be 10 S/JIlf'rJIwnal Allw,}, t 10 Fo~bal b Pfl/lfltom the OOI'n,[.vo somul.l"on 01 plane to-pia"" combat hom 1938 10 1947 the uarne would use A,rw",'s h·..-tIIve poon!l31!OtlKlo' ""'~t SYSTems Wl1" aIlP'OD''''te all",al""'" ,n 0;(:(11(1 Url!o~1I the e'!1'lTIiIles used '" Alrw/lf. h;)!d dam on WWII Pt1ItIBS '5 ~va l l~ble. "",k,og IO! a lIuly IICcurale a-s56S.~"_ 1 o f 11111 capabll,tles 01 eat;h II,,~,~II Types from bolh IhIlII",u 01 wa' coold be H'P'~IOO, PIlIm'IM9 FWIO Dora vs

H,-IIr.<l'. GIOM'~ M,"'~" ¥~ Zero (If Mfll'l9 ¥, r, the Ioc~ "I t'TlIUI~oS """" com"Il" ",ar' I'''' MEI6.'!·· Jilgdtau." .... "'.,<1 '8lU1i III a gamor whete ''''' ""'1_ to; on IIV,ng arid ),<l~I''''1 A less lorb>rl(J,nq ,nllorj,,,,!,oO 10 th(' ""-0'11'-"'1 A'N;;tr WSI ... " 1o. 100 lledgtltl<l Fiv'''!1 T""" land a ,1)'\' I", tI"'AIN;~' I~nl, Frghtefwnulll.,.tl lor $15

114. Anvil O'itqnn rhfl Second 'fOOl A 1II'1nI' on Tilt! Arnellc;!n F,~nd' I~od,nqso" lhesoulh C0a51 01 fr;1nn' ,

""gusl 1~, 110" II .. , "'-'hseQul!f\l rlrov.· UP I"" A".,...,. R.ver v~H,'V R .... l"''''''I·'banaloon sued U"''' 1110'_"1"" Amellcan 7!h Armv lIorl Itwo F'enrh 2nd Cmp<;., aod elenv.nt, "I !"'" """mao lSI 3Ild 1!:I'h lI'mes The weal speed w'lhwtol(;h !hlS<;arTIoIJ1IKJOwiKcon<I",'T,'<l, hon, ,roo, m,l,ai amph,bO(lus"" /I,'DO'''''' assaullS w .... 1 01 Ca"nos, TO !he Io,,~ U!) ;'"U, Patton', Jrd Annv 500 ~m 10 tt,,, n"'I" IUS! 2!'t IIBYS 1.11"" m.,~e tillS s.l"al,on ,,~ ... I 1m a PJtuerorup(JI> GIJlI/lllilfl!8111/18s I()I tim A'tlnn"~,1 IYII(! ga ..... 'VSlf>fll nVI All. musl cOfJ\Il'.'tn 1M "P""31o.,n Qwdlv, ".'DI"O') and ':lrTslrny'ng /IS I"'j'!' "I the G .... m3'

~'rIlV '" IXI5I-.b~ ThO German Plavm mu'l do-Iav I"," """,prlul AlioDd "';vane:.. sk"'!lilty lpossoblv """" on the beac~l, so thllt hrslml":e5 can w,thdraw or'!j()O(l (llder I,om _""" Fr"",-", and lo8.ass Patloo ," "10 mO"Ih5 (0

corne OoI,ooaIIU"'" w,..,'d cove< the I'ttf1:l~ 01 G'''man success ,n hl"n,,,,,) II .. NmtTld!ldv lan<lm'-l~ 10 II", noflh. an!! 1111) (X)r,,,,uln,,,nl 01 Alloed 01 Go.man lo,r.as trom Iia Iv The fJ~me w(, • .!ld I,ave one 0' IwO dM Ga, ..... Tu,ns. one 1,,'1 sOle m~p c,wflIlnq all 01 O(lUlilP:m f,~,,,,e. <'CO COUnll!fSand n"'m,~.'1 '(11)1""'1>(111 TOWIl 101 $12

M . rhe Corporllill Wllrs 1031 Thete a'e no more nil

toons 1"""e a'e no more po"tlcal parloflS TtIe<lIere flO

more unoon' 0nIv lhe Corpaoauons ex,sl Only II. Cor PO.allOll$ prOS(lPr II has been ,h" way 1M!! SIne:.. lhe senes 01 dt>v<KjJ"ng wal~ """",h char&ele"ffl(! lheend 01 1I'e 20th century (t!iecl'V1)[y sounded lhe d6<tlh knell olille Mlton Sia ll! Now I"" 9'''''1 muIU·nal,onal Corpor8toO"5 hold unel1a1lf'fll'/f'd POW(l! They CO"t'OI 111B wo,Id's resources. Th .... C011I'01 the wo.ld's "'IoP'I. Th<!" POW'!f 0$

Iomoted only by lhe" mulual m,5I!USI The CorIKHIl/e W"", 1031 would 00 a ..... 11' plilyer, ..... 11' $CtIOIIrlO S<fTIUial"," 01 tl>e po",bthlMt'l. 101 conlllCI ,n sue" I setl'ng hch Pia ...... wou'd adoIl! the,oIe 01 "1he ChaI'tTIiIO" of hos own corparatoon. eng<l(J('(l on a Struggle lor W!Wlh Ind power vl8 porl"clll, er.:onomiC and/or m'I,[,)'~ moe", ..... ,th h,s OP\105Il0 "umbers In olher corllOfal'()Il1 Included would be I'mlted wa,f~r' scer\iI,K)S depoctlng maiO< "ot fens,ves" ,nvo l ~,ng two. th'ee Ot mo'u cO'pOratlons as well 85 II "B'~vo New World"' scena'lO dec<~IH1Q a world· mde .tIVOII "'91IInst thocorpOr3tlOllS bV I SBC11!!!IOOItty 01 commtllOO ,nd .... ldudi'5tS and all A,magrtddOf\ $C1M\IItroo lor up 10 ,,~ ~~ whICh would end "',th ~ player ,n con-1,01 01 the woo-Id or lhe enl'" globe. rl/dlOllCl'wt ondIw The ent"e gamUI of poI,'ocal /lnd mI',lary ~ would be ava,1aIlIe ,f1C'Iu(I'fIQ assassons. 8Q<IIlfOP nets. orbltlll W9aP<lflS plallorms, NBC IJV'Slemsand CO"ver'lloon8i Land. a" aod _ un, I', IItnong others lwo mapsdopM;l'ng the emora\!lobo,9X)counlflls $16

116 . Planel Wilff/Of M"nlo--AI_ Combat III I"" Futuro The cha'ge began A long ragged bnool Loghl Llncon on hza,d mountS des(::ended the 'odgIr. claws thumPIng 3g3lTlSI raw Rmh gl"'" The ComlJllllY WilS not aboll, 10 grve "'10 R"lh ter.oml demands. iInd had Med (he loghl 18nce<s 10 'ecaolu,e 1M powOf plant. bul lhe B,)nd·ot NecossoIV were no! 10 Stlrrend8f lhell v,UtI PO$Otoon. bY 0Idf't 01 IhIt HOI'flltch the 20cm laseguns opened up on lhe charg'ng lat1Cf!11, but Wl!fe 'nelt8f;l,ve aga'nsl 'OIISC· 1'110 mvie, ba,d ,n\! and gogGles. COIIl' Il\l ,nlO 'a"l,lf'. lhe Lancers (>p8I"IIld UP W'lh !heo. submDch,neguns Men and R"lh leU as 1110 eharlJ(! met lhe huge Rftlh delendefS. mountS knoded &sode by d.Jws Thedel~' pr""'I ..... "lies look. hell"" toll arrong the alUlCkers. bul T",r.'5 Man,!esl Oestonv iInd :\Upenor IBChnology won lhe day Planel WamOf ,ncorOO/Bles the WtItI(IOn$ of the IUIUrlt on I ta<:locaI game ba'IOd on the C(l<'nIII9ndo syslem W,th .ules 10' dolens 0 1 aloen laces and scenanO$ ,ang.ng hom mila human WillS on lhe nexI century 10 combal Dbo.1'd spacesh,os \0 opetahons on Jov,an worlds Toseillor $20

11. SllIrGods A rolepiev,ng game .n whICh lhe pBr bopant, a'e the "god$" 01 varIOUS planers IklUaHy $Uj)8f'

""'n95. IlfCKluclS of ge"',I1OI: and electtornc ~,ng) PiaY'orl; beg'n the game by DU.ct\iI5Ing vallOU$ Cl\arKlertSl>C5 from a menu 01 l11nbultlS ObjecT 011118 game 0510 oonlfoi Olher plilnet$arod ,!Idu<;e lhe ",11U8fl(:8 01 the other godlI Plav lat..es I)Iace on tWO IIMII5 god 10 popul~toon, andgod 10 god

43

r Battlefar

-::;;,.-- Baule for 5 falingrad captures the intense back-and-forth st ruggle

AV3/ktbie now from SPI and In stores nationwide

fo,'15.

between German ~nd Soviel forces for control of the vi lal Volga River ci­ty in the fa ll o f 1942. Using an innovative game-system in which the Ger­man player moves and attacks at will until a Soviet reaction is sparked, Baffle/or Sfolingrad gives players a simulation in which no two games will ever play the same, thus cont inually challenging their generalship . The game includes a 22~ x 34- detailed map of Sialingrad and the surrounding terrain. 600 counters, and a 32-page booklet of rules , with various playi ng aids and an historical analysis .

1,--,-1-.LI --.LI -,--I rn 0

Battle_ stallngrad

.e

*

o .I-!- II

Red Square

';;:.---- :tJ 11-£121 I ~

2. A RM ON ANI>Ar"oTI.TA,"IiK U , ... rrs (t'ront and "~ekl

Hn Srrtnllrh A is usc:d .... hen a lt~CkHl" into a clC:lr terra in hex o, ... lIen S1a~k~ " il ll al least one pal· IklpalinJ Infantry. tnJHlC'ff. "·ol~ el. or lecon­nai5SiHlccunii 1st'(' 14 .1 ). fin Sfrt"llf ll 11 1\ used" lien allacklnll lntO an)' leI' r:un hn tXC'f'/lf .:lcal" hen nOI 'I a , ~ td wil II one of the unll I I pc~ lilted Hl A

9J. c.;~. RMANI1"ot·A'TR' l..' n ~ iF,unt ~nd Iluk)

nreStrellllfh Ci, u,ed when f in rig mto arly he~ ex· C'f'pf a hnl) ~lIuct ul e of for llfied lel ram he" (<;('t' )4 .2) .

nrc Srrellllfh IJ I., u,ed when fi n n" inlo II h~ a, y Il ruct u/t 01 furtl fi ed ~ lIu~ tU I(, le rrain h e.~ .

•

,. .~ .. " " I

BUSINESS REPLY MAIL FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 5071 NEW YORK, N.Y.

Pos/.ge wllllH ~id by .dd~"~.

SP. attn: Redmond Simonsen 'JS1 Park Avenue South New York, N.Y. 10010

NO POSTAGE NECESSARY

IF MAILED IN THE

UNITED STATES

Dear Customer: I like to apologize personally for the problem SPI has In­

advertently created on your order. I am acutely aware that recently SPl's service has betn ItSS than what it should. Some of these problems are due to our r~nt change of offices and splitting our warehousing away from our editorial offices. It seems every lime SPI grows, something goes wrong for awhile. I don', offer Ihis as an ~. only as a partial apianation. Remedial action is being taken and service is improving.

I hope that the action taken by SPl's Customer Service has righted what~er individual wrong your order suffered. If, a. of ,.calpt of this card, your problem ha. not been aolved to your ud.factlon - p~ .. u .. the apece below to dHCribe whet needs to be done and mall the card Im­mad!.tefy to rna. "II personelly preHnt It to Cuatomer Service and make lur. you g.t help,

Thank you for your patience and for sticking with us,

/ 7 / / Redmond SimorlSen ~ VkePresidenl

Rttdmond, the 'YIlt" of my probItIm I$deflclentbflClluH."

NAMa ______________________________________ ___

~a ... ~==============~~_===~"'~==~_====== ...... _ ST,o\.TE ZIP ______ __

(Pi .... , u .. this c.rd only to g.t Cu.tom.r S.rvic. to fix .ny ."or th.y m.y h.v. med. on this specific probl.m. Don't Hnd it beck in connection with eny oth.r probl.m or you'" Just ceu .. more confusion - Thenk.l.

Berlin '85, Counter Section Nr. 1 (200 pieces): Front.

I II II " Ii II . II .' II II ' II . II . 4-0-20 '

Quanlil~ of Seclions of t:~s ~d_enlic:al t~ pe: 1. Tolal quanlil~ of seClio1ns (alll~ pes) in game: t. I

r~<D ~~<D ~W~<D ~~<D "'~<D . "'~~ .... ~<D "'~<D "'~<D . ~<D P-4-12 t5-4"2 f-4,12 ~3-12 ] 4-3-12 /4-3-12 12,3-12 . 2-3-12 12-3-12 1,-10 l I. II · 11 :' II ' II II . II II . 'II .II 4-0-20 i , •.. ~.... ',. I" ~ I I ., ',' ~~g> ",~g> ~g> ~~g> ",~g> !' ",~g> .... ~g> ",~g>",~g> ' ~g>.:

_ ~-3-12 4-~12 , 4-3:12 .14-4-12 .. 4-4-1~ .. ~-12 3-3-12 ,_ 3-3-12 3-3-12 ,-,. , .',""t -.' SOVIE.T ll:Slo~ ,. ,

. la la~ la la l~la la la l ,Ia la la la la la la I,a la la1

Copyright © 1980. Simulations Pubhc8tions. Inc ., New York , N.Y. , 10010 283P41

wli 1-2-8

W8

:'02-8

WB

- 1-2-8

m 0-2-8

.• I =~ tj 13-8-12 5-2-12 z ~_-=-_--I

~ 1:-.20 I:m CD 2012 1-1-15

vis WB '1·2-8 : 1-2-8

;, W8 mil -'0-2-8 0-2-8

, IVB WB \i;:l~ ,,·,Ir;

"'-2-8 1-2-8 1-2-8 1 28

WB WB 'Nfl "'.s 0-2-8 0-2-8 .0-2-8 0-2-8

Wt:

'·2-8

W[l

0-2-8

'/;8

'-2-8

:NB

0-2-8

_J.. I

\\ 1 .... 1 HUH I' I'()I 1(1

I - , II :11 ' __ ' n I ~ 3+1~ ~i 2-5-'; 2:: ~

I I I il l 3-2

014 1 3-2014 1 ~ 't-::. ~~ it! 2~! 8

~----------------- ~

a./ a./ a·1 a-I a·la. I a·1 a.\ a·1 a.\ a.\a·1 ,--

MARKERS

1_ 14 Ia l'-a-·la-_./a-_.\-a ra la la l ,a la la la lala la l.a la la4-

. _I

+---

a.1

--

aa

ta

al

aa

' a

al

-- 1f:*

---

,* *

--

!* *

-- *:*

-1

-

*'*

+ -'

* *'

-- * *

-- * *

--

1f *

1-

* *

-1

-

*1*

--1

-~

I~

*1*

-,- *: *

--

1 *i *

+

EFFECTS CHART Movement Combat Survival Point Cost Shifts Modifier .

OT OT OT ·2

0 +1

Ih OT OT

OT OT OT 2

4 I 0 OT+3 OT+ I OT

OT+I OT+I OT

OT+3 OT+2 OT

3 I -3

3 -I

P P OT OT OT

2 I 0 I OT OT

2 2 -2

OT+2 OT+I OT

I J 2 - I

2 OT OT

3 4 -3

OT+4 OT+2 OT

~ex . A "+" hex . P: meahs that the action is pro­~ift is in addi- hibited. "-" means the terrain has no hifts for the Surrender Point Value .

• •

[7.61] COMBAT RESULTS TABLE

Combat OIffereatiai (Attacking Strwngth mlnw IHfending StTmgth)

DIE -7 -6,5 -4,3 -1 -1 0 +1 +1,3 +4,5 +6,' +9,11 + 11 Al Al Br Ax Ex Ex Dl 02 D3 04 Oe ""Del Al Al Al Br Ax Ex Ex D1 02 03 D4 De A2 Al Al Al Br Ax Ex Ex 01 02 03 ~ &-,A2 Al Al Al Br Ax Ex Ex D1 02 03

5 Ae A3 A2 Al Al Al Br Ax Ex Ex 01 02

6 Ae Ae A3 A2 Al Al Al Br Ax Ex Ex D1 Dl(1,3,4): Defender retreats the number of hexes in- and a number of attacking Strength Points, equal to dicated. Al(l,3,4): Attacker retreats the number of or greater than the Defense Strength of the defending hexes indicated. Br: Both Defender and Attacker units, are eliminated. Note: See 7.6 for detailed ex-retreat one hex, Defender first. Ae: Attacker planation of combat rdlults. Combat at a differential eliminated. De: Defender eliminated. Ex: Exchange; less than - 7 is resolted on the - 7 column; combat all defending Strength Points eliminated and an cu- at a differential greater than + 12 is resolved on the qal or greater number of attacking Strength Points + 12 column. eliminated. AX: All defending units retreat one hex

[10.6] COLLATERAL DAMAGE TABLE

A,.,.,.". GrtJIIIItI f:f.'1:::.o ---."" FPF SI7'MftIJ

PtriIR."." 7 • 9 1. FonnlSuburbtul 6 7 8 9 Indu8trltlllUrbtm 5 6 7 8

DIE

1 - j-- ~ -2 - - -J d

4 I - d d j d d d

6 d d l d d - = No effect. d = Damage.

[18.5] SURVIVAL TABLE

DIE Result

1 Unit destroyed

2-4 Unit scattered

5-12 Safe Landing

11 12 10 11

9 . 10

' d

d i d d d d d d d

d d

See 18.6 for modifiers to Survival Table die rolls .

[17.3) REINFORCEMENT TABLE

DIE Reaalt

2-5 No reinforcements 6-10 No effect

II Air Support 12 Air Support and Jager brigade

See 17.1 for explanation of Reinforcement Table results.

O ®0@@1 [19.3] "HONORS OF W AB" TABLE Samader Poiat Record Track Total

41

~ 6 ... 10 11 ••• 1~ 16 ... 20 11 ••• 15 26 ..• 30 31 •• .35 Open Airfield Park Forest Rough

~ 2 B-2 B-2 B-2 B-1 B-1 B B+l

i0@ J I B-2 B-2 B-1 B-1 B B+I I B+2 -=--=-- . :' .' - ' -- - ..... ., - -~ --:= -.. -~.... . " B-2 B-1 B-1 B B+l B+ 2 C-l

51 B-1 B-1 B B+I B+2 I C-I I C-l I C

Bog Suburban Industrial Urban Hexside ' I B-1 B B+ 1 B+2 C-l C-I C

H H r<fJ!:1*.< 7 B B+I B+2 C-I C-l I C C+l , B+l B +2 C-l C-I C C +I C+2

9 1 B+2 C-I C-l C C+l C+2 I S-2

l' C-l C-l C C+l C+2 S-2 S-1 Border Municipal Zone Ferry BrIdge

11 I C-l C C+l C+2 S-2 1S - 1 I ~+ 1 Hexside Boundary Boundary Hexside Hexside

12 C C+I C+2 S-2 S-I S

Movement Terrain Type Point Cost

Air Control Tower OT Airfield hex ~ 0 Autobahn hex Yz OT Barracks hex OT "I OT Bog hex 4 1 Border hexside OT+3 OT+l Bridge hexside OT+I I OT+I

Ferry hexside OT+3 OT+2 Forest hex 3 1 Industrial hex

--- -,..... 3

Lake hex P Objective hex OT OT Park hex 2

0 ~ I) (!) II II II Rail Line

B: Roll again; 1-3 NATO receives a comba. colama Iblf., 4-6 Warsaw Pact receives Supply NATO Air POL Symbol U-bahn I the shift. C: Roll again; 1-3 cease fire takes effect, 4 - 6 NATO surrenders. S: Roll Symbol Barracks Control

0:*' ~:~~L_L_ again; 1-3 no effect, 4 - 6 NATO surrenders. -I, -1: Second dice roll result reduc-

(for West Symbol Tower ed by indicated number. + I, + 1: Second dice roll result increased by indicated Berlin Police) Symbol lP .. hvp number.

Road Hex 1 OT Rough hex 2 2 Ruin hex

---OT+2 OT+l

Suburban hex--- I 2 U-bahn hex 2 OT Urban hex 3 4 Water hexside OT+4 OT+2

OT: Other terrain in hex. A "+" hex . P: means means that the cost or shift is in addi-tion to other costs or shifts for the

!:: -~ .. "'" ,&::1 - <-

~ s:E 6 0

u u'"

N + + +

bb t> M M

- t<> c.. t;

..,. + + + b bb

M _ _

I I + uuuu I +

(Il(/)tI)CIl

NN I I + + I UUUUUVl

N + I I + = uuuu

NN + I Uv>

N N N

+ I I + a:l UUUU

+ I I U", ,,,

N

I I + + u u uu u

N I I + + =CClII!I==

I I + uuuu

• \' .. ~", .. ,;;'

I I U U U

-x ~ .!! .. - .. ;;; c: "0 • 0 = ~ N ' = 0 - "

t-• ~ = g ..... "."

_ N M

111

~

+ b

N M