specific aspects of exercises for response to emergencies arising from malicious acts - general

IAEA Training in Emergency Preparedness and Response

Specific Aspects of Exercises for Response to Emergencies Arising

from Malicious Acts - General

LectureLecture

L-057L-057

L-057: Specific Aspects of Exercises for Response to Emergencies Arising from Malicious Acts - General

2

Introduction

• Preparedness for Response to malicious acts involving radioactive materials is now an integral part of emergency planning

• Laws of probabilities do not apply• Terrorist acts can happen anywhere• Security and law-enforcement are major

elements of planning and response• Exercises must reflect the specific nature of

such acts


3

Contents

• Definitions• General nature of malicious acts• Exercises for response to emergencies arising from

malicious acts (for nuclear and radiological exercises):• Purpose• Types• Process• Safety• Specifications• Injects and data• Simulation• Public affairs aspects


4

Malicious Act Involving Ionizing Radiation

• Any illicit action or activity with the intention to cause harm to persons, damage to property or an adverse impact upon the environment by exposure to ionizing radiation


5

Sabotage

• Any deliberate act to destroy, damage or otherwise compromise the integrity of facilities or other resources that contain nuclear or radioactive materials, with the intention to cause harm to persons, damage to property or an adverse impact upon the environment by exposure to ionizing radiation


6

Threat

• A threat of a malicious act may be deemed to exist when information has been received that terrorists, criminals or other persons intend to commit a malicious act.

• Terrorism threat emergency threat (as defined in EPR-METHOD 2003• Emergency risk vs. intentional threat• Emergency vs. Intention


7

General Nature of Malicious Acts

• Terror is a weapon• Influence minds

• Invoke sense of shock, fear, outrage

• Affect confidence in authorities

• Political or ideological aim


8


• Seek high profile and maximum publicity

• Normal for perpetrators to claim responsibility• But not necessarily immediately


9


• Laws of probabilities do not apply

• Spectrum of possibilities limited only by imagination of perpetrators

• Wide range of:• Potential scenarios

• Potential consequences

• Required response


10

Response to Malicious Acts (General)

• Consequences do not necessarily depend on the cause• Accidental consequences often the same

whether intentional or not

• In many cases, the response is almost the same

• In many other cases, the response infrastructure is not designed to deal with the unusual consequences of malicious acts


11

Terrorist Acts - Main Differences

• Security

• Media impact amplified by fear factor

• Potentially extensive medical consequences• e.g. Goiânia (not terrorism)

• Directed impact to maximize harm

• Secondary threats

• Unknown and large choice of locations

• Many… many jurisdictions effected and involved


12

Response - Main Differences

• Security procedures and protection• At the scene

• Media centre

• Medical triage, transport and facilities

• Crime-of-scene procedures


13

Response - Main Differences (1)

• Coordination of medical resources on national level

• Coordination of large number of organizations• Many are not normally involved in nuclear or

radiological emergencies

• Command and control under law-enforcement agency


14

Exercises for Response to Emergencies Arising From Malicious Acts Must…

• Focus on the differences

• Be integrated with other exercise programs

• Not duplicate other drills and exercises

• Complement the existing exercise schedule


15

Purpose of Exercises

• Test the coordination:• Between security and law enforcement agencies

with first responders, specialized radiological emergency response units and facility teams

• Of media management organizations on a national level in a situation of increased public fear and media scrutiny

• Of national medical organization to respond to an event with mass casualties and a full spectrum of potential medical impacts within the context of increased security threat

• With organizations that are not normally involved in the response to radiation emergencies


16

Purpose of Exercises (Cont’d)

• Test the ability:• Of specialized response services to

respond anywhere in the country

• Of all response organizations to operate in a response structure where the lead may be a security or law-enforcement agency and where there may be residual security threats against response personnel


17

Types of Exercises

• Drills

• Table-tops

• Partial and full-scale exercises

• Field exercises

• Main difference• Nature and number of organizations

• Organizations that do not normally participate


18

Drills - Examples

• Intrusion• Crime-of-scene procedures• Triage of mass casualties

• Conventional injuries• Contaminated casualties• Overexposure

• Media management• Large number of organizations

• Mobilization and dispatch• Source search in urban areas• Source recovery under security procedures


19

Process

• Same process applies

• Three major differences• Coordination

• Confidentiality

• Safety

• Major impact on preparation time


20

Coordination

• Many more organizations

• Different from normal “traditional” nuclear/radiological exercises• Law-enforcement agencies

• Intelligence services

• Security units

• Explosive ordinance teams

• All must participate


21

Confidentiality

• Surprise is a key element of malicious acts

• Surprise must be part of the exercise scenario

• Confidentiality is even more important


22

Confidentiality - Challenges

• Many more organizations involved• More difficult to keep a secret

• Surprise may make people panic

• Surprise and media do not go well together

• Surprised violent act (even simulated) may generate surprise violent response• Safety issue


23

Safety

• Always paramount

• Problem: exercises for response to emergencies arising from malicious acts may involve aggression:• Attack

• Hostage taking

• Threat


24

Safety

• Some examples of weapons used against players when law-enforcement not aware that this is an exercise

• Some examples of players and controllers jailed during exercises• e.g. Halifax 2003


25

Safety

• Blank rounds can be dangerous

• Use of live ammunition is VERY dangerous• Stupid emergencies happen

• Safety vs. confidentiality• Better safe than sorry


26

Example: Quebec NPP exercise for response to emergencies arising from malicious acts 2003

• Hostage taking

• All police forces involved

• Old building used to simulate situation

• Actual use of explosives to end hostage crisis

• Success… and safe


27

Safety

• Better not to use live ammunition

• Need for tight control of weapons before and during exercise• Exercise safety officer

• How do you deal with weapons of forces playing in exercises?

• Better to compromise confidentiality than jeopardize safety


28

Specifications: Scope

• Depends of type of exercise

• Must involve key agencies

• Many of which are not normally involved in emergency exercises to test preparedness to response to radiation emergencies


29

Specifications: Objectives for Threat

• Assess the threat in terms of credibility and potential impacts

US example


30


• Effectively communicate the threat level to emergency response organizations and, when appropriate, the public


31


• Inform potentially exposed segments of the population, in a period of heightened threat, about:• Nature and likelihood of the threat• Threat recognition• Basic protective actions in case the threat

materializes• Methods by which authorities would inform

them on what to do in case on an actual emergency


32


• Develop an appropriate plan for precautionary protective actions in case of a credible threat

• Implement appropriate precautionary protective actions to protect people and workers from the potential impacts of a terrorist act in a threat situation

• In periods of heightened threat, activate a network of medical services and facilities capable of responding to a terrorist event and keep the network informed about the situation during the threat period


33

Specifications: Objectives for Response

• Establish an effective command and control system at all levels in a multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response environment

• Implement appropriate automatic actions to protect people and workers from the potential impacts of a terrorist act in a response situation (e.g. evacuation of appropriate radius when a "dirty bomb" is discovered)


34

Specifications: Objectives For Response

• Rapid dispatch of medical teams to the scene of a terrorist act to triage and manage a large number of casualties

• Arrange for triage points/facilities staffed with medical, radiological, counselling and security personnel

• Arrange for security of medical staff at the scene, during transport of casualties and at the hospital

• Coordinate with media teams to inform the public on where to report if contamination or exposure is suspected


35

Specifications: Objectives for Response

• Dispatch victims to the appropriate medical facilities

• Establish a joint media centre near each scene of a terrorist act, with one designated media liaison officer at each location

• Provide security to protect each media centre

• Promptly brief all emergency responders on the media relations protocol to follow in case they are approached by the media


36

Specifications: Constraints

• Public areas• Are where malicious acts are likely to

happen

• Exercise disrupts normal activities

• Need to choose time and day to minimize disruption


37


• Short vs. long exercises• Short: good for on-scene response

• Long: good for• Medical management

• Exercises involving large number of potentially exposed people, dispersed in general population

• Exercises involving ill-defined threat

• Stolen source or sources at unknown locations


38


• Long time frame can be divided into exercise parts• Day 1: acute phase

• Day 2: long term phase


39

Injects and Data

• Same procedure as “traditional” nuclear/radiological emergency exercises

• Additional challenges• Large number of controllers

• Especially if mass casualties

• Need for consistent data at the scene

• Intelligence input

• Need to minimize simulation


40

Simulation

• Must be kept to minimum

• Stage setup must be realistic

• Safety vs. realism


41

Public Affairs Aspects of Exercises

• Contradictory needs• Confidentiality before the exercise

• Ensure that the exercise itself does not set off an adverse reaction on the part of the public

• Ensure that the disruption caused by the exercise, if any, will remain manageable

• Meet exercise objectives without undue interference from the real media

• Avoid attracting attention on vulnerabilities and system weaknesses, which could be used in favour of potential terrorists


42

Public Affairs Aspects of Exercises (Cont’d)

• In practice• Proactive strategy is usually preferred

• Balance the needs for confidentiality and media management


43

Summary

• Exercises for response to emergencies arising from malicious acts are an important part of exercise programs

• There are important differences in the preparation and conduct of exercises for response to emergencies arising from malicious acts

• More complex

• Bigger scope

• Safety

specific aspects of exercises for response to emergencies arising from malicious acts - general

Documents

specific aspects of

specific nature

applyterrorist acts

radiological exercises

emergency risk

emergency preparedness

adverse impact

radioactive materials