special proceedings under atty. tiofilo villanueva

CASE DIGESTS IN SPECIALPROCEEDINGS

Submitted in Partial Compliance to ATTY. TIOFILO VILLANUEVA

Submitted by:Estella AgustinGrace AquinoJennilyn BacayJay Michael De MesaCarmi DignoRoel EsperaKatrina Dianne GimenezMaria B. ObbaniaMaria Donna PantojaLawrence Villamar

Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data

Title: Secretary Leila De Lima vs. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528Facts

Respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ ofAmparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. This case was docketed and raffled to the salaof Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary LeilaM. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of theNational Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, et al) Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. “to ceaseand desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing boguscharges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambushincident”. RTC rendered a “Decision” granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTCalso granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production andinspection orders. The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filedby De Lima, et al.Issues

1. Whether or not the filing of an answer is appropriate.

2. Whether or not the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of thewrit and the filing of a RETURN is proper.

3. Whether or not the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo is the same as the Writ of Amparo.

RulingOn the first issue, the Court ruled that the insistence on filing of an Answer was

inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for theissuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention ofthe Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security areviolated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.

On the second issue, the Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame theissues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. Withouta Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.

Memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. It is asynthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required beforethe case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since thesesubmissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.

On the third issue, the Court pointed out that the privilege of the Writ of Amparoshould be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilegeincludes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. After examiningthe petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in thesummary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents thatwill mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life,liberty or security. A judgment which simply grants “the privilege of the writ” cannot beexecuted. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor tothe petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of veryreal and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic orritualistic as “granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.”

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Title: Spouses Nerio vs. Brgy. Capt. Arcayan, G.R. No. 183460

FactsPetitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio

Pador was a marijuana planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17 March 2008,respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalayafarm to search for marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid, petitioners Nerio and ReyPador received invitation letters for a conference from respondent Barangay CaptainArcayan. They referred the invitation letters to their counsel, who advised them not toattend and, instead, send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain Arcayan. When the latterreceived the letter-reply, he allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign areceipt of the document. Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the raid, the sendingof the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent barangay captain to receive their letter-reply – as well as the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and possibleviolence from respondents – gravely threatened their right to life, liberty and security andnecessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo. After examining the contents of the petitionand the affidavits attached to it, the RTC issued the Writ and directed respondents to make averified return. Respondent filed a verified return. The RTC then heard the petition. On 3 July2008, it issued the assailed Resolution finding that petitioners’ claims were based merely onhearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures, and that respondents had sufficientlyexplained the reason behind the issuance of the letters of invitation. It thereafter proceededto deny petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo.Issue

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the privilege of the writ of Amparo.Ruling

The Supreme Court held that to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitionersmust prove by substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are beingviolated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission. The writ of amparo was originallyconceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforceddisappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to addressthese extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rightsto life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond thoseavailable under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it isnot, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writthat we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.


Title: Gen. Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3 2009

FactsTagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the

Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Morethan a month after his disappearance, the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, directed against Lt.Gen. Alexander Yano, et. al. The petition stated that Engr. Tagitis went out of the pensionhouse to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed tobe police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehiclethen sped away without the knowledge of his student and according to a reliable source;that he was in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNPZamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involveand connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; That the respondent filed acomplaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, but instead ofhelping her she was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of thepetition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, whichis a clear indication of the refusal to help and provide police assistance in locating hermissing husband.

The petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparopetition filed before the CA. Petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d),and (e) of the Amparo Rule.

IssueDoes the Amparo Rule intended that the petition be complete in every detail in stating thethreatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights for it to be given due course by the court?

RulingThe Court ruled in negative. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section

5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’srights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate factsconstituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of theproceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able todescribe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap,abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information maypurposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type ofsituation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitionersapparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicialconcern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read theRules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, thetest in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details availableto the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing aviolation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private partyaction. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolatedcomponent parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, theState or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty orsecurity – are present.


Title: Gen Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010

FactsThis is a motion for reconsideration on the ruling of the Supreme Court on December

3, 2009, finding that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and inparticular, the Chiefs of these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fullyaccountable6 for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, it was held that Col.Kasim was accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information relating to theenforced disappearance; for the purpose of this accountability. It was ordered that Col.Kasim be impleaded as a party to the case. And held the PNP accountable for thesuppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could, but did not, provide with the sameobligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries.

However, before this directive was given, Col. Kasim was already dead.

IssueWhether or not Col. Kasim’s death renders the directive to implead him moot and academic.

RulingThe Court held that the directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case

has been rendered moot and academic by his death. Nevertheless, it is resolve to deny thepetitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Undisputably, this directive can nolonger be enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic, given Col. Kasim's demise.His intervening death, however, does not necessarily signify the loss of the information Col.Kasim may have left behind, particularly the network of "assets" he utilized while he was inthe service. Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves aninterwoven network of informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with thepolice and the military. It is not farfetched that a resourceful investigator, utilizing theextraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires,13 can still access orreconstruct the information Col. Kasim received from his "asset" or network of assets duringhis lifetime.


http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_182498_2010.html#fnt6

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_182498_2010.html#fnt13

Title: Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795Facts

The petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of Amparo alleging that they have beendeprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in ourConstitution, as the result of the nefarious activities of both the Private and PublicRespondents. Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy.Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time of filingof the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment which wasaffirmed with finality in four other cases.

IssueWhether or Not the writ of Amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners.

RulingNo. The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threatened

demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included amongthee numeration of rights covered by the writ. Hence, the court finding no legal basis for theissuance of the writ dismissed petition outright. It rationed that new remedy of writ ofamparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highestpossible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Courtwill not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature.However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered bythe writ.


Title: Arthur Balao vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050Facts

On the early morning of September 17, 2008, James Balao was abducted byunidentified armed men. With no idea where he is, the siblings asked the assistance of theorganization Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) and other NGOs to locate James. One of theteams also went to the office of the AFP-ISU (PA-ISU) in Navy Base and the office of theMilitary Intelligence Group in Camp Allen, both in Baguio City, but the personnel in saidoffices denied any knowledge on James’s whereabouts. Contending that there is no plain,speedy or adequate remedy for them to protect James’s life, liberty and security, petitionersprayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo ordering the respondents to disclose whereJames is detained or confined, to release James, and to cease and desist from furtherinflicting harm upon his person.

The RTC granted the petition.IssueWhether or not the order of the court granting the petition for writ of amparo was correct.

RulingThe Supreme Court partially granted the petitions and modified the judgment of the

RTC. Writ of Amparo was formulated amidst rising incidents of extralegal killings andenforced disappearances.

The trial erred in granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of responsibility onthe part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence. However,the Court agreed with the trial in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials arevery limited, superficial and one-sided.

In view of the foregoing evidentiary gaps, respondents clearly failed to dischargetheir burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of James’s abduction. Suchineffective investigation extant in the records of this case prevents us from completelyexonerating the respondents from allegations of accountability for James’ disappearance.The reports submitted by the PNP Regional Office, Task Force Balao and Baguio City PoliceStation do not contain meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of theinvestigation made.

In order to effectively address thru the amparo remedy the violations of theconstitutional rights to liberty and security of James who remains missing to date, the Courtdeems it appropriate to refer this case back to the trial court for further investigation by thePNP and CIDG and monitoring of their investigative activities that complies with the standardof diligence required by the Amparo Rule.


Title: Edgardo Navia vs. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467

FactsThis petition for review on certiorari challenges the decision6 of the RTC of Malolos

which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo7 filed by herein respondent against thepetitioners. The petition was filed due to the mysterious disappearance of respondent’shusband after he was arrested by the security of Asian Land. The petition does not containany allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that thegovernment or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance. In fact, none of itsagents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petitionwhether as responsible or accountable persons

IssueWhether or not allegation and proof that the persons subject of the petition for Writ of

Amparo are missing are enough for such writ to issue.

RulingThe Court ruled in the negative. The Court pointed out that “in an amparo petition,

proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that suchdisappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support oracquiescence of the government.” The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforceddisappearances or threats thereof.

"Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, orabduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or apolitical organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or togive information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removingfrom the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive thefollowing elements that constitute it:(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the Stateor a political organization;(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or giveinformation on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of thelaw for a prolonged period of time.


Title: Lourdes Rubrico vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871

FactsOn 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa

Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and SecuritySquadron (AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite.She was brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was released a weekafter relentless interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would be amilitary asset.Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaintwith the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrarydetention and grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, butnothing has happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to theDasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resultedfrom their investigation.

Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation whichindicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abductionof Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo withthe Supreme Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist fromperforming any threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsmanto immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravatingcircumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and forrespondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.Issue

Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an Amparopetition.Ruling

No. Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparoproceedings Command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied underinternational law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. There is no Philippinelaw that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility – Whilethere are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law thatprovides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended thatcommand responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to thisjurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes aprinciple of international law or customary international law in accordance with theincorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to theseproceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as aform of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, ifthere be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in suchproceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infractionof an administrative rule may have been committed.

Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not topose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in questionto its natural end.


Title: Daniel Masangkay vs. Judge Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484

FactsSpouses Gregorio and Mar Lourdes Samson filed a complaint for forcible entry and

damages with a prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against hereinpetitioner Daniel Masangkay Tapuz et al, for entering without permission and against theirobjection the disputed land in Aklan registered under the name of the spouses armed withbolos and carrying suspected firearms and unidentified persons numbering 120 and forbuilding a nipa and bamboo structure. The Municipal Trial Court decided in favor of thespouses, herein private respondent. The herein petitioners appealed the ruling to RegionalTrial Court which affirmed the decision and granted the issuance of writ of preliminaryinjunction and subsequently, ruled positively on the motion of the spouses to demolishedthe structure built by Masangkay Tapuz et. al. While their petition for review of thepermanent mandatory injunction and order of demolition at the Court of Appeals is pending,the sheriff issued notice to vacate and for demolition. Petitioners now seek the succor of theSupreme Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court andissuance of writ of habeas data and writ of amparo.

IssueWhether or not writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is the proper remedy.

RulingNo, the Supreme Court found the petition for certiorari and issuance of writ of habeas

data and writ of amparo as fatally defective in this case.

The writ of amparo does not issue to protect concerns that are purely property orcommercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Itwas originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings andenforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies toaddress these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to therights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond thoseavailable under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.

On the other hand, the writ on habeas data on the other hand, is intended to addressthe unjustified/unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty andsecurity, which was not concretely alleged in this case to merit an issuance of the writ.


Title: Fr. Robert Reyes vs. Raul Gonzales, G.R. No. 182161

FactsPetitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on

November 30, 2007. Petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crameto await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice(DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz andAristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there wasprobable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/orInciting to Rebellion. Upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalesissued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner ofImmigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration andDeportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned casein the interest of national security and public safety. After finding probable cause againstpetitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed anInformation before the RTC, Branch 150 of Makati City. RTC issued an Order dismissing thecharge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Petitionerfiled the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case againstpetitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists. Every time petitioner would leave and return to thecountry, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutesbecause of the existing HDO.

IssueWhether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.Ruling

No, the Right to travel is not covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The rightsthat fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rulesthereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. Therestriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminalcase filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his rightto travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a seriousviolation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily availablelegal recourse or remedy. Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparodue to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner’sapprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat tohis right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by the Supreme Court isintended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or herright to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part inorder to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste itsprecious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.


Title: Noriel Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November15, 2011

FactsOn September 6, 2009, Petitioner was forcibly taken to a military camp and was

forced to confess to his membership in the NPA. During his 11 days of captivity, he wasrepeatedly threatened, detained and mauled. He was also forced to confess thewhereabouts of NPA camp and his fellow NPA comrades, sign documents declaring that hehad surrendered to the military and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he becamea military asset. On his last day of incarceration, September 17, 2009, he was ordered tosign a piece of paper stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scaredand desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not to report anythingto the media.

On December 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petitionfor Writ of Habeas Data with prayers for the Protection Order, Inspection of Place andProduction of Documents and Personal Properties. The Supreme Court granted therespective writs on December 15, 2009, after finding that the petition sufficiently allegedthat Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by the members of the 17 th

Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.

IssueWhether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by the Petitioner maybe granted after

the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.

RulingThe Supreme Court held that the provisional relief, such as the interim reliefs of

temporary protection order, inspection order and production order are intended to assist thecourt before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. Being interimreliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case,it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarilyentails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since the Court grant the petitioner theprivilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a ytemporary protection orderindependently of the former.


Title: So vs. Tacla, G.R. No. 190108 (2010)

FactsPetitioner David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and

amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of QualifiedTheft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Prior to the institution of the criminalproceedings before the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment andcare at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest ofGuisande, issued by Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for BipolarMood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge," as certified by her personalpsychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan. Acting on the prosecution’s Urgent Motion to ReferAccused’s Illness to a Government Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to theNCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health to determine ifshe would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft.

Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisandebe physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary legalcustody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order ofconfinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMH’s determination that shewas ready for trial. During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various eventsoccurred which ultimately led to the incident before this Court, The Criminal Case forQualified Theft was dismissed.

Issue1. Is issuance of writ of amparo and habeas corpus a proper remedy based on the facts

at hand?2. Does the dismissal of the criminal case for qualified theft warrants the dismissal of

the petition for writ of habeas corpus and amparo?

Ruling

On the first issue, The Court ruled in the negative.The Rules on the Writs of HabeasCorpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omissioncomplained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat toviolate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.In this case , the confinement and custody of Accused Guisande is proper.

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individualseeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under someform of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted via some legal process, thewrit of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ ofhabeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntarydeprivation of freedom of action.

On the second issue, The court completely agreed with the OSG, that with thedismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril tobe confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person,and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longerbe subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases havenow been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of superveningevents, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."


Title: Castillo vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165 (2009)

FactsRespondent Amanda Cruz, who along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses

Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused tovacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (theProvince) which intended to utilize it for local projects. Amanda and her co-respondentsrefused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC Order of PermanentInjunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing thelatter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and otherforms of light threats. Thus, respondents filed a motion for writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Issue1. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights.2. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal

case already filed.

RulingOn the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of

Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protectionof rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats ofunlawful acts or omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intendedto address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Tapuzvs. Del Rosario also teaches: What is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purelyproperty or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertaingrounds.

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, reposndents must meet the thresholdrequirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with anunlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arouse out of a property disputebetween the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexusbetween the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty, andsecurity, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.

It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation,imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitionerswill not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undueconfinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail forthe offenses a day after their arrest.

On the second issue, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo andhabeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them hadcommenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against inaccordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or theproceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents duringtrial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.


Title: Burgos vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155

FactsOn April 30, 2007, the petitioner held a press conference and announced that her son

Jonas was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if theperson abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent police investigation and LTOverification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLTvehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The poloce was able to generate cartographicsketches of two of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. On August29, 2007, the PNP-CIDG presented Emerito Lipio @ KA TIBO/KA CRIS, Marlon D. Manuel @ KACARLO, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes @ KA LISA/RAMIL to support the theory that elementsof the New People’s Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas. As for the PNP-CIDG, theCA branded its investigation as “rather shallow” and “conducted haphazardly.” The CA tooknote that P/Supt. Estomo’s investigation merely delved into the administrative liability of Lt.Col. Clement, Lt. Col. Feliciano and Lt. Col. Caga of the 56 th IB, and failed to consider them assuspects in the abduction of Jonas. The CA emphasized that the PNP-CIDG’s investigationshould focus on the criminal aspect of the present case pursuant to Section 24 of RepublicAct No. 6975, which mandates the PNP to “investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrestof criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution.

IssueWhether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and

meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of theirduties is fatal to the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

RulingThe Supreme Court ruled that, “Considering the findings of the CA and our review of

the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed toconduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos,and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Ruleon the Writ ofAmparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot ruleon the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, isundertaken.” It was further noted that no independent investigation appeared to have beenmade by the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the veracity of Lipio’s and Manuel’s claims that Jonaswas abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unitRYG.

The case was referred to the CHR as the Court’s directly commissioned agencytasked with the continuation of the investigation of the Burgos abduction and the gatheringof evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to theCourt.


Title: Melissa Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155 (2010)

FactsIn the September 7, 2010 Decision of the Supreme Court,[1] after finding that the

failure of the petitioner to present substantial proof as to the respondents' responsibilityanent her abduction and torture was in part attributable to the lack of extraordinarydiligence on the part of existing police and military investigations, this Court ordered theconduct of further investigations, this time, to be spearheaded by the Commission onHuman Rights (CHR) as the designated lead investigating agency for purposes of thispetition. The CHR was then required to submit a report of its investigations as well as arecommendation to the Court of Appeals which, in the meantime, retained jurisdiction of thiscase. Finally, the Court of Appeals was directed to monitor the investigations and submit tothe Court its own report and recommendation, for its consideration and, ideally, finaldisposition.

IssueCan the Court of Appeals conduct a summary hearing to require the personal

appearance of confidential witnesses interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegationsunder oath?

Ruling

The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court pointed out that “while the CHRinvestigations have already been concluded, no additional evidence tending to implicate anyof the public respondents in the abduction and torture of the petitioner have materialized.CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 is quite clear that the evidence gathered during the CHRinvestigations were still not sufficient to identify any of the respondents, or anyone inparticular for that matter, as the persons responsible for petitioner's abduction. Neither didthe ocular inspections of various military facilities and firing ranges in Pampanga, conductedby the CHR, definitively point that petitioner was detained in any of them.”

The Court agreed that bringing the persons interviewed in the CHR-Region IIIconfidentialreports or at the least, the CHR field investigators themselves, before a summaryhearing before the Court of Appeals will serve as a huge step towards identifying thepersons behind the abduction and torture of petitioner. Certainly, it may aid an on-goinginvestigations by pointing them at an alternative, if not the right direction. Before disposingof this case once and for all, the Court must ensure that each and every possible lead ortheory was pursued and verified, and no stone left unturned.


Title: Gen. Yano vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640 (2010)

FactsCleofas Sanchez filed before the Supreme Court a petition for issuance of a Writ of

Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon, the thenChief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Supreme Court resolved toissue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the writ beforethe Court of Appeals. Cleofas amended her petition on January 14, 2008 to include MarcianaMedina ) and to implead other military officers including Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos astherein additional respondents.

In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana alleged that their respective sonsNicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, BarangayBueno,Capas, Tarlac. On September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., the “wives” of Nicolas, namely,Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed menin soldiers’ uniforms passing by; and that that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdezand Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and He her son but only saw their caps, slippers,pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains. They likewise alleged thatJosephine Galang Victoria informed them that she saw Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp ofthe Bravo Company sometime in 2006. the respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ ofAmparo, the production of the victims’ bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspectionof certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, andthe rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.Issue

1. Whether or not failure of the respondents to present substantial evidence to provethat the public officials observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of theirduty is ground for the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.

2. Whether or not the grant of provisional remedy in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule isproper in cases where the public respondents were absolved of the disappearance ofthe alleged victim.

Ruling

As regards the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Evidence is required inAmparo petition. Effect of failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinarydiligence in the performance of their duty the requirement for a government official oremployee to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses theextraordinary measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every citizen’s constitutionalrights as well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and enforceddisappearances. The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinarydiligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilegeof the Amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim bysubstantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides,however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interimreliefs.

On the second issue, the Court also ruled in the negative. The interim or provisionalremedies provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are intended to assist the court before itarrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition – Section 14 of theAmparo Ruleprovides for interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia,protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, Theseprovisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judiciousdetermination of the amparo petition.


Title: Gamboa vs. Chan, G.R. No. 193636 (2012)

FactsMarynette Gamboa, the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, filed a petition for the issuance ofwrit of habeas data before the Regional Trial Court alleging that her right to privacy wasviolated by her supposed inclusion in the enumeration of indiiduals maintaining a privatearmy group in the report of the Philippine National Police, made pursuant to theadministrative order no. 275 by then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. She also prayed fordestruction of the report which she claimed was unverified and to restrain the PNP fromforwarding it. The RTC denied her petition for failure to establish the source of theinformation.

IssueWhether or not the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper.

Ruling

No, it is not proper. In denying the petition, the Supreme Court cited the ruling of theEuropean Commission on Human Rights in Leander vs Sweden which it says, illustrates howthe right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may yieldto an overriding legitimate state interest. While the Court held that petitioner establishedthat the PNP was indeed the source of the report, she nevertheless failed to impute that theleakage came to third parties on the PNP and such made her and her supporters moresusceptible to harassment and increased police surveillance. The Court ruled, takingcognizance of the Constitutional fiat of dismantling private armed groups, the state interestoutweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa as the collection of forwardingof the report was pursuant to a lawful mandate.

In this case, the Court also cautioned investigating entities that information sharingmust observe strict confidentiality and the intelligence gathered must be releasedexclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information.

It must be emphasized the in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, theremust exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to life , libertyor security on the other.


Title: Meralco vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769 (2010)

FactsRosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at

the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). An anonymous letter was posted at the door of theMetering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at whichrespondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOSMONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONGPALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO,LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…. Copies of the letter were also inserted in thelockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter to thePlaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By Memorandum, petitioner AlexanderDeyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent toMERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” effective July 18, 2008 inlight of the receipt of “… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against[her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety andsecurity.” Respondent, by letter addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President,appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns andmisgivings on the matter, claiming that the “punitive” nature of the transfer amounted to adenial of due process. Citing the gruelling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabangand back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective BargainingAgreement (CBA). Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation ofher transfer. No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition forthe issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Bulacan.IssueWhether or not a labor-related issue is within the parameters of the Rule on the Writ ofHabeas Data.Ruling

The Court ruled in the negative. Respondent’s plea that she be spared fromcomplying with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector,under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, doesnot fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. Writ habeas data will NOT issue toprotect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support ofthe petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right underthe context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’sreservations on the real reasons for her transfer a legitimate concern respecting the termsand conditions of one’s employment are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinaryremedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with theNLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presentedthat petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right toprivacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. Her posture unwittingly concedes thatthe issue is labor-related.


Rules of Special Proceedings (Rule 72, Rules of Court)Title: Hagans vs. Wislizenus, No. 16680 (1920)

FactsThis is an original petition for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in the petition are

admitted by a demurrer. The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that theprovision of Act 190 permit him to appoint assessors in special proceedings. The petitionercontends that no authority in law exists for the appointment of assessors in suchproceedings.

IssueWhether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in special proceedings, is

authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due toan administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care, management, andsettlement of the estate of a deceased person.

RulingThe Court held that in the proceedings like the present the judge of the Court of First

Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. The only provisions of law which couldpermit this are sections 153 – 161 of Act appointment of assessors in a special proceedingare sections 153 – 161 of Act No. 190. Section 154 provides that “either party to an actionmay apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of suchapplication, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided…”

Upon examination of Section 1 of Act 190, there is a distinction between an “action”and a “special proceeding”. Said section 1 provides that an “action” means an ordinary suitin a court of justice, while “every other remedy furnished by law is a ‘special proceeding.”


Title: Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129242 (2001)

FactsTroadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his

eleven (11) children, who are all of legal age. The Respondents, who are eight (8) of thesurviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, filed a petition with the respondent RegionalTrial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, TroadioManalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator.Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 with the CA, alleging that there wasabsence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family.According to them, the petition is an ordinary civil action involving members of the samefamily hence the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rulesof Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground thata condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with.

Issue1. Whether or not the case on hand is in the nature of an ordinary civil action involving

members of the same family.2. Is Article 222 of the civil code applicable to Special proceeding cases?

RulingWith regard to the first issue, the Court declared that the nature of the case partakes

that of a Special proceeding. The court reiterated that it is a fundamental rule that in thedetermination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character ofthe relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. Thesaid petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement ofestate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio, as well as hisresidence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of thedecedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all thesubsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. It also contains anenumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left bythe deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, therelief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of thepetitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate oftheir deceased father, Troadio Manalo. Although, it contains certain averments which may betypical of an ordinary civil action, the Petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purposeof the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The rule hasalways been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant natureof an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defensescontained in the answer.

As to the second issue, the Court declared that Art. 222 of the civil code whichprovides that : " No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same familyunless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but thatthe same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035" is applicable only to ordinarycivil actions and NOT WITH SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. This is clear from the term 'suit' that itrefers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice inwhich the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injuryor the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filedin a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or theprevention or redress of a wrong.


Title: Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000 (2001)

FactsSpouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel ofland. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, enteredinto an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate adjudicating and dividing amongthemselves the mentioned real property. In 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner PatriciaNatcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to hiswife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage,as heirs. The private respondents filed a civil case against the petitioner before RTC Manila.They alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment offraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear thatGraciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation ofTCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence ofsuch fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

IssueMay a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for

reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to thesettlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancementof property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

Ruling

The Court answered in the negative. The court ruled that an action for reconveyanceand annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlementof the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent,partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the applicationof specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.Matters which involve settlement anddistribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probatecourt in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules ofCourt, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased toany heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estateproceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raisingthe questions and on the heir.

In the case at hand, RTC is acting in its general jurisdiction is devoid of authority torender an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor ofherein petitioner. Moreover, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as aprobate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedentGraciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.


Title: Reyes vs. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405 (2006)

FactsRespondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of

administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui,Tarlac. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, ErlindaLising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents ErnestoLising and Erlinda Espacio.

According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the municipalitiesof Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and money which wereallegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of abond, pending settlement and distribution of Lising’s properties to the legal heirs

Petitioner Anna Reyes opposed such petition, claiming that she was an adopted childof Lising and the latter’s husband, Serafin Delos Santos. She asserted that the petitionshould be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, sinceshe was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. She hasattached, as supplement to her opposition, the judicial decree issued under seal by the CivilRegistrar. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition forannulment of the adoption decree. They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption ofpetitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG) had no records of the adoption case. Petitioner’s natural mothersupposedly connived with the court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adoptedby the Delos Santos spouses and that the CFI’s order for initial hearing was published in aweekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in special proceedings.Issue

Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding that petitioner had to prove heradoption due to imputations of irregularities in view of Section 47 of Rule 39.Ruling

No, petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than thosewhich she had already presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted acertification from the local civil registrar’s office. Both certifications were issued under theseal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumedto have been regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform. Itshould be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document required by law to beentered into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicialpronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as wellas the court which rendered the judgment. Documents consisting of entries in public recordsmade in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the factstherein stated. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on theadoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof tothe contrary is offered.


Title: Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868 (2006)

FactsSpouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American

citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter,Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entireestate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate improvements atForbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Twoyears after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter,Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, exceptfor his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter. Petitioner, as ancillaryadministrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a motion todeclare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. Themotion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator withregards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undividedinterest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereofwas allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the lawof the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee theentire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.Issue

Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under thecircumstances.Ruling

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the landof the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal.Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, inexceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack ofjurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested ina probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason ofcircumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable tonegligence. Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estateaccording to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted toextrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.


Title: Domingo vs. Landicho, G.R. No. 170015 (2007)

FactsPetitioner Crisologo Domingo filed for the registration of parcels of lands in Tagaytay

and was opposed by Landicho et. al. During the pendency of the case, Domingo died and hislawyer failed to inform the court. The Regional Trial Court ruled in his favor, but was laterreversed by the Court of Appeals. The heirs of Domingo interposed the defense that therewas no valid substitution of parties and therefore, they are not bound by the reversal of theCourt of Appeals. Hence, they now come to the succor of the Supreme Court.

IssueWhether or not failure to substitute parties is fatal to the proceedings.

Ruling

Yes, the Supreme Court held that when a party dies in an action that survives and noorder is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs ofthe deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution hasbeen effected , the proceedings held by the court without such legal representatives or heirsand the judgment rendered after such trial are null and void, because the court acquired nojurisdiction over the person of the legal representative or of the heirs upon whom trial andjudgment would be binding. However, in this case, the Court deemed objection on thejurisdiction over the person of the parties as waived as the surviving heirs participated in thepresent petition, albeit belatedly.


Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons (Rules 73-90, Rules of Court)

Title: Maloles II vs. Phillips, G.R. No. 133359 (2000)

FactsOn July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his will. He claimed he

had no compulsory heirs and had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo deSantos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximatevalue of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of thenamed executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. On Feb. 16 1996, MakatiRTC Branch-61 under judge Gorospe issued an order granting the petition and allowing thewill, the court found that the testator was of sound mind and freely executed said will.Shortly after on Feb. 26, 1996 Dr. De Santos died.

Petitioner (testator’s nephew) claiming to be the only son of the deceased’s sisterAlicia de santos, filed a motion for intervention as the nearest of kin, and also as a creditorof the deceased. Defendant filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in MakatiBranch 61, but then withdrew the same. Later defendant then filed the motion in Makati RTCBranch 65. Petitoner then filed a motion for intervention also with Branch 65, stating againhe was a full blooded nephew and that a case already related to the subject matter waspending in Branch 61.

Judge Abad Santos, referred the case to Branch 61. Meanwhile Judge Gorospe inBranch 61 denied the petitioner’s motion to intervene, and denied taking cognizance of thecase forwarded by Branch 65, because the case in Branch 65 involved the Estate of DecentArturo De Santos, while the one in Branch 61 was filed by Arturo de Santos Himself when hewas alive and had already been decided back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed the will.Branch 65 did not want to take the case, but reversed it’s decision and again tookcognizance of the case to expedite proceedings.

Issue1 Whether or not Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate

proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.2 Whether or not Makati, Branch 65 acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance

of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.3 Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a

right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filedby the respondent.

Ruling

The Supreme Court held that Branch 65 now has jurisdiction. Petitioner’s contentionthat that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawfulheirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, §1 of the Rules of Court iswithout merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court islimited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being ofsound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.This was already done in the ante-mortem probate of Dr. De Santos’ will during his lifetime.

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was


nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the willpursuant to Rule 73, §12 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule

73, §1 which states:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of thePhilippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, orletters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in theprovince in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreigncountry, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court firsttaking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction tothe exclusion of all other courts.

The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the

settlement of the estate of deceased persons. It could not have been intended to define thejurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law ofprocedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction overthe subject matter is another.

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with

approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in MetroManila) belongs to the regional trial courts. The different branches comprising each court inone judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with eachother.

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition

for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of thesame court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after hisdeath.

Lastly, regarding petitioner’s claim as heir and creditor the Court said that “The

private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo deSantos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateralrelative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since thedecedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his propertiesthe private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in thedecedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. His claim to being a creditor of theestate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to theopposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported byevidence.”


Title: Malig vs. Bush, G.R. No. L-22761 (1969)

FactsThe plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged natural

children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush; that thedefendant, by falsely alleging that she was the legal wife of the deceased was able to secureher appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased; that she submitted to thecourt for approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the deceased left a will; thatthe defendant then knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of thedeceased; and that they discovered the fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by thedefendant only in July, 1962. They prayed that the project of partition be annulled. Thedefendant filed a motion to dismiss stating that since the action was one to annul a projectof partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court alone which could takecognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.Issue

Whether or not the case should be dismissed on jurisdictional ground based on Rule75, Section 1 (now Rule 73, Section 1) of the Rules of Court.Ruling

No. The case should be remanded for further proceedings. Section 1 of Rule 73 of theRules of Court fixes the jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for the settlementof the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on the place of residence of thedecedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter really concerns venue, as the captionof Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assumejurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of thesettlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all othercourts."

In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition alreadymade and approved by the probate court, and to reopen the estate proceeding so that anew partition may be made, but for recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their allegedinheritance of which, through fraud, they have been deprived.

Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the defendant, the Courtbelieves that the plaintiffs' cause should not be foreclosed without a hearing on the merits.


Title: Rodriguez, et. al. vs. Borja, et. al, G.R. No. 180906

Facts

Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerkof Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile thepetitioners filed a petition before the court to examine the purported will but which was laterwithdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez wassubsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal ofthe special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purportedwill, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

IssueDoes CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?

Ruling

Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon thedelivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowancewas filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio,have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the correspondingnotices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules ofCourt. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlementof the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts,intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy onlytakes place in the absence of a valid operative will.


Title: Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-24742

FactsSenator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two

minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters ofAdministration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator diedintestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. Whilepetition was still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed apetition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was namedexecutrix. Hence, Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but thiscourt held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted onthe probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon,on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu alreadyacquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss weredenied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFIQuezon.

IssueWhether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in

taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings inpursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence ofprobate over intestate proceedings.

Ruling

The rules on venue and jurisdiction, under Rule 73, provides that the court first takingcognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts. However, upon learning that a petition for probate of thedecedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously hadhis conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and thatthe allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate maybe actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition beforeit in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition forprobate of the decedent's alleged last will. The residence of the decent or the location of hisestate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If thiswere otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. Therefore, the CFI ofQuezon City did not act with grave abuse of discretion nor it acted without jurisdiction.


Title: San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. No.

FactsThe case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis. During his

lifetime Felicisimo contracted three marriages. From the first marriage contracted in 1942 hehad six children, two of whom are the petitioners in this case. His first wife died in 1963 andhis second marriage to an American citizen ended in the wife getting a divorce in 1971. In1974 Felicismo married Felicidad, the respondent in this case, in the USA. They had nochildren but lived together for 18 years until Felicismo died in 1992.After Felicisimo death,Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and filed a petition forletters of administration. The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage opposed this onthe grounds that Felicidad is only a mistress, the second marriage to the American wifesubsisting. The petitioners claimed that Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code cannot begiven retroactive effect to validate the bigamous marriage because it would impair thevested rights of Felicisimo is legitimate children.Issue

Does the respondent Felicidad have legal capacity to file the petition for letters ofadministration?Ruling

Yes, Felicidad haslegal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, as she may beconsidered the co-owner of the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during theircohabitation. Sec. 2, Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by aninterested person.


Title: Macias vs. Uy Kim, G.R. No. L-31174 (1972)

FactsPetitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed on December 2, 1969 a petition for review

by certiorari against respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, ManuelSosantong, Reliable Realty Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance. Itappearing from the complaint that there is presently pending in Branch VIII of this CourtSpecial Proceeding No. 63866 for the settlement of the inheritance of the deceased RosinaMarguerite Wolfson. That the plaintiff claims to be a beneficiary by hereditary title of herestate. It being unquestionable that the authority to distribute the inheritance of a deceasedperson and determine the persons entitled thereto belongs exclusively to the court orbranch thereof taking cognizance of the proceedings for its settlement (Branch VIII) in thiscase. The orders sought to be annulled and set aside by herein petitioner-appellant in hiscomplaint against private respondents which was assigned to Branch X of the Manila Courtof First Instance presided over by Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelonapresiding over Branch VIII of the same court. The Petitoner filed a separate civil case inBranch X, seeks to recover his distributive share of the estate of the decedent Rosina.Issue

Whether or not the Judge of Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance can legallyinterfere with, or pass upon the validity of said orders of the Judge of Branch VIII, as theprobate court.Ruling

No, Branch VIII as the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of thedecedent, including the validity of the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition of theestate for the payment of its liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the residuethereof. Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking cognizance of thesettlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of allother courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the settlement ofthe estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII ofthe Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by former Judge, now Justice of theCourt of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlementof the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is stillpending. The reason for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate of adeceased person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the successful administrationof that estate it is necessary that there should be but one responsible entity, one court,which should have exclusive control of every part of such administration. To intrust it to twoor more courts, each independent of the other, would result in confusion and delay. TheCourt cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to file several actionscovering the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief, which is undulyburdening the courts.


Title: Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18148

FactsCapili died in 1958, testate in which he disposed his properties in favor of his wife,

cousins all surnamed Capili and Arturo, Deogracias (petitioner) and Eduardo, all surnamedBernardo. Reyes died the following year. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernando, executor ofthe estate of Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs. Theexecutor filed a project of partition in the estate proceeding in accordance with the terms ofthe will, adjudicating the estate of Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception ofReyes, whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives. These relatives filed anopposition to the executor’s project of partition and submitted a counter-projection of theirown, claiming ½ of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Capili on the theorythat they belong not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void for the reason that it

falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code which prohibits donation between spouses during themarriage. In the same order, the court disapproved both projects of partition and directedthe executor to file another, dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testamentof Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, between the instituted heirsof Capili and Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of thedeceased spouses.

IssueWhether or not a probate court in special proceeding had jurisdiction to determine

the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title orownership of the properties mentioned in the will.

Ruling

The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. The Court held that thedetermination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Theprobate court has the jurisdiction since there is a necessity to liquidate the conjugalpartnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributedamong his heirs who are all parties, who are all parties to the proceedings, including thewidow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted uponpetition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily.

The petitioners, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputedlands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband) put in questionthe issue of ownership of the properties is within the competence of probate court.


Title: Ermac vs. Medelo, G.R. No. L-32281 (1975)

Facts

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent court in itsSpecial Proceeding No. 1517 approving the project of partition filed by private respondent,pursuant to the order of the same court providing for summary settlement of the intestateestate of the deceased spouses Potenciano Ermac and Anastacia Mariquit as well as of theorder of denying reconsideration of the first order.

The above-named spouses both died leaving as the only property to be inherited bytheir heirs a parcel of land with an assessed value of P590.00. Accordingly, a grandchild fileda petition for the summary settlement of the said estate which was consequently granted.However, Petitioner Ermac, one of the children of the deceased spouses, moved forreconsideration on the ground that it belongs to him and his wife. The motion was denied,the court ruling that the proper remedy is a separate suit. Accordingly, the petitioner filed acorresponding action. And when upon submission of the project of partition, the respondentcourt approved the same over his objection. The petitioner moved for reconsideration butthe same was denied. Hence, the present petition.Issue

Whether or not respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused itsdiscretion in approving the project of partition notwithstanding that it is being claimed bypetitioners in a separate civil action to be their property and not of the estate.Ruling

No. The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estateof deceased persons with the least loss of time. This is especially true with small estates forwhich the rules provide precisely a summary procedure dispensing with the appointment ofan administrator together with the other involved and cumbersome steps ordinarily requiredin the determination of the assets of the deceased and the persons entitled to inherittherefrom and the payment of his obligations. Definitely, the probate court is not the bestforum for the resolution of adverse claims of ownership of any property ostensibly belongingto the decedent's estate. While there are settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regularadministration proceedings, it is not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceasedperson just because an heir or a third person claims that certain properties do not belong tothe estate but to him. 3 Such claim must be ventilated in an independent action, and theprobate court should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legalobstacles to it, for after all, such distribution must always be subject to the results of thesuit. For the protection of the claimant the appropriate step is to have the proper annotationof lis pendens entered.


Title: PCIB vs. Escolin, G.R. No. L-27860 (1974)

FactsThe instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well

as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about five years and a half.In their respective wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of themprovided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue andremainder (after funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, bothreal and personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to holdunto (him/her) — during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition that upon thedeath of whoever of them survived the other, the remainder of what he or she would inheritfrom the other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of thelatter.

Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges wasappointed special administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same date, hewas "allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, (buying andselling personal and real properties) and to perform acts which he had been doing while thedeceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will hadbeen probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, uponhis motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part owner of the properties left asconjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie JaneHodges", the trial court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated December11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances, leases andmortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by theExecutor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is furtherauthorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of theproperties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishescontained in the last will and testament of the latter."

IssueDoes the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes

ineffective hereditary substitutions?

Ruling

The Court overruled PCIB's Contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favorof her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. The Court ruledthat by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would have completerights of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the formerwould be only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereasthey are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was notobliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentarysubstitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple case of conditionalsimultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partialresolutory condition the operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of thesuspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner ofinstitution is not prohibited by law.


Title: Ocampo vs. Potenciana, G.R. No. L-2263 (1951)

FactsThe petitioners filed an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeal.

The petitioner executed a document purporting to convey the subject property located inBinan, Laguna by way of pacto de retro sale to the defendant. The petitioner also executedanother document making it appear that for the period of redemption, an annual rental ofP300 or 12% of the purchase price shall be paid for the lease house and lot. Although thesubject property is registered only in the name of the husband, Edilberto Ocampo, the sameis actually a conjugal property. Also, the original period fixed for repurchase was one year,“extendible to another year”. However, several extensions were granted up to its lastextension in 1937, with the vendor paying the principal in addition to interests. After thelapse of the last extension defendant, and without the right to repurchase being exercised,Potenciano filed with the register of deeds of Laguna for the consolidation of the title underthe names of Sps. Potenciano.

In 1939, defendant, Potenciano gave the wife of Edilberto, Paz Yatco an option torepurchase the property within 5 years. Yatco sought to exercise the option by tendering toPotenciano but being rejected, she then deposited the money (P4,000) in court and broughtan action for in her own name as administratrix of the estate of her husband. Defendant’schildren, intervened by way of cross-complaint. They alleged that the option given by theirfather to the plaintiff was null and void with respect to the share of their deceased motherwhich passed unto by right of inheritance. Also, the defendant’s children wanted to exercisethe right to redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common.

IssueWhether or not the surviving spouse (Potenciano) has the authority as the de facto

administrator of the conjugal estate to enter into an agreement after the death of his wifewith respect to their conjugal property.

Ruling

NO, the court of appeals erred in the supposing that the surviving spouse had theauthority to as de facto administrator in of the conjugal estate. The supreme court pointedout that the decision relied upon by the CA is now obsolete. The rule that, upon dissolutionof the marriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership affairshas been changed by ACT No. 3176, now section 2, Rule 75 which provides that whenmarriage is dissolved by death of either the husband or wife, the partnership affairs must beliquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. The court alsonoted that CA found and it was undisputed that the pacto de retro sale was in reality a loanwith security or an equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for interest. Also, the optionagreement in question was nothing more than mere extension of the time of payment of themortgagee, since in the mind of the parties the real transaction between them was that of aloan with security or equitable mortgage. Consequently, under such view there it is nolonger necessary to consider the claim of the defendant’s children, Victor and LourdesPotenciano, since the consolidation of title to the property in the name of their parents wasnull and void.


Title: Reyes and Arcon vs. Ysip, G.R. No. L-7516 (1955)

FactsThis is a petition for a writ to compel the judge of the CFI of Bulcan to permit and

allow petitioner to submit evidence of her claim that she is a natural daughter of thedeceased, Juan Reyes Panlilio. Probate of the last will and testament of decedent was filed inthe CFI. Leonor P. Reyes, herein petitioner filed an opposition. The special administratix, whohad presented the will for probate, object to the personality and right of the petitioner hereinto contest the will and asked that the court resolve her right to contest the will before thehearing thereon. The Honorable Judge held that only the probate of the will was at issue andthat the question of the presentation of evidence as to the filiation of the oppositor,petitioner herein was out of place. Counsel for petitioner made attempts to have the courtreconsider its order but the court refused to do so.

IssueWhether or not the natural child is allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the

probate of the will.

Ruling

In distribution proceedings where a will is sought to be admitted to probate, a personwho can have no interest in the succession cannot be allowed to intervene and oppose suchprobate. A person intervening in the proceedings should be required to show interest in thewill or the property affected thereby. For such purpose, it is sufficient that he shows orproduces prima facie evidence of his or her relationship to the testator.

The court did not amount to a prohibition to take part in the hearing for the probateof the will and was motivated by desire to avoid multiplicity of the issues and the limitationthereof to the execution of the will. The court did not therefore deprive the petitioner of anyright which she is entitled to under the rules of law.


Title: Cortes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117417 (2000)

FactsPetitioner Reselva, private respondent. Cortes, and Florante Reselva are brothers and

sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia AguirreReselva. During their lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a house and lotconsisting of 100 square meters, more or less. Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead ofTeodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed a holographic will which was probated in this case,Cortes was appointed Executrix. She filed a motion before respondent probate court prayingthat Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the property, be ordered to vacate the propertyat No. 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the possessionthereof.Issue

Can the probate court decide a question of title of ownership?Ruling

General rule provides that a probate court cannot decide a question of title ofownership. By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties are all heirsof the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of titleto property.Here, the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. Moreso, when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate actionwould be most expensive and inexpedient.


Summary Settlement of Estates (Rule 74, Rules of Court)

Title: Rodriguez, et.al. vs. Tan and Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-6044 (1952)

FactsThis is a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the order of respondent Judge dated

August 11, 1952, wherein after overruling the opposition to the institution of the intestateestate proceedings of the late Flaviano Rodriguez, he appointed Abelardo Rodriguezadministrator of the estate upon filing a bond in the sum of P2,000.It is averred in thepetition that Flaviano Rodriguez died on February 8, 1944, at Parañaque, Rizal, leaving anestate with a value of P10,000; that the surviving heirs are the widow, Fortunata Vda. deRodriguez, and six children who are the petitioners and respondent Abelardo Rodriguez allthe heirs, who were then already of age, entered into a verbal agreement whereby theyagreed not to make a liquidation of the estate but to place it under the administration of thewidow with the understanding that each of the six children would be entitled to receive aportion of the income in equal shares from year to year for the needs of their familiesprovided that they do not exceed the participation to which they are entitled. March 19,1952, or eight years after the death of Flaviano Rodriguez, respondent Abelardo Rodriguezfiled a petition for administration of their intestate estate of said deceased in spite of hisknowledge that the estate had no debts and all the heirs were of age. Petitioners herein,objected to the petition invoking the rule that if the estate is free from obligations and theheirs are all of age, no administration proceedings shall be allowed.

Issue1. Whether or not respondent Judge acted properly in maintaining the administration

proceedings.2. Whether or not respondent Judge is correct in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez as

administrator of the estate notwithstanding the fact that the estate has no debtsand all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the action of the Judge is correct. Section 1,rule 74 of the Rules of Court, if the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of age, or theminors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing lettersof administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit, and should theydisagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. Section 1 does not preclude theheirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts orobligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition.While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit,or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they havegood reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory orcompulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intentionwere otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done inother provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may is used not onlyonce but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to thediscretion of the heirs.

On the second issue, the judge is also correct in appointing Abelardo asAdministrator. The petitioner in this case appears to be qualified to act as administrator ofthe estate of the deceased Flaviano Rodriguez and does not possess any of thedisqualifications. Moreover, he is one of the heirs left by the deceased.


Title: Guico vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-14921

Facts

This is an action for liquidation and partition of the estate. The complaint alleged thatMariano Bautista died intestate in 1947 and that his properties had already beenextrajudicially partitioned among his heirs; that Gertrudes Garcia likewise died intestate in1956 leaving as her legitimate heirs plaintiffs and defendants; that said Gertrudes Garcia,during her lifetime, made several deeds of donation of some of her properties in favor of allthe defendants, but did not provide that the properties donated would not be subject tocollation, so that the donees are legally bound to bring into the mass of the estate by way ofcollation the value of the properties received by them in order that the net hereditary estatemay be divided equally among the heirs; and that the deceased Gertrudes Garcia leftoutstanding obligations to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and the G.A. Machineries,Inc.

On a motion to dismiss filed by defendants alleging, among others, that the actionwas premature because it is admitted in the complaint that the deceased left certain debts,the lower court dismissed the complaint on that ground. From the order of dismissal,plaintiffs appealed.Issue

Whether or not the action for partition and liquidation may be maintained,notwithstanding that there are pending obligations of the estate.Ruling

No. Until all the debts of the estate are paid, the action for partition and liquidation ispremature. There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a deceased person bythe heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition, without the filing of aspecial proceeding and the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of thesettlement of said estate, but this they may do only "if the decedent left no debts and theheirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians".The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is nonecessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and todeprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled

The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending obligations. Insuch cases, such obligations must be first paid or compounded with the creditors before theestate can be divided among the heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as tohow such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably be submitted toadministration for the payment of such debts. As compared to ordinary partition, the regularestate proceedings offer the advantage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to disclosethemselves and submit their respective claims within a comparatively short period (12months under Rule 87, unless claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever barred.


Title: Rebong vs. Ibanez, G.R. No. L-1578 (1947)

FactsA petition for certiorari was filed against the respondent judge of the Court of First

Instance of Laguna on the ground that the latter acted in excess of jurisdiction or with graveabuse of discretion in denying the petition for cancellation of the lien or annotation on thecertificate of title issued to the petitioner, of a land extrajudicially inherited by him as theonly heir of her predecessors in interest to the effect that the property described in the titleis subject to the claims of the creditors and other heirs of the deceased Jose Rebong andMaria Rebong within two years from July 9, 1947, in accordance with sections 1 and 4, Rule74 of the Rules of Court.

IssueWhether or not the judge exercise grave abuse of discretion in denying the lien.

RulingThe court "may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a

memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions,requiring security if necessary," upon application of a registered owner on "the ground thatregistered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate,have terminated and ceased, or that new interests have arisen or been created which do notappear upon the certificate." Applying these provisions to the present case, it is evidentthat, since the registered or annotated contingent interest of the creditors or other heirs ofthe petitioner's predecessors in interest, established by section 4 of Rule 74 has not yetterminated or ceased, for the period of two from July 9, 1947, have not yet elapsed, therespondent judge had no jurisdiction or power to order the cancellation of said lien orannotation as prayed by the petitioner. Neither section 4, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court, norsection 112 of Act No. 496 authorizes interest of substitution of a bond for a lien orregistered interest of any description, whether vested, expedient, inchoate or contingent,which have not yet terminated or ceased.

In view of the foregoing it is plan that the respondent judge has not acted in excess ofjurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion, but in conformity with the law, in denying thepetitioner's petition, and the petition for certiorari is therefore denied.


Title: McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, G.R. No. 6871 (1912)

FactsMargarita Jose died in 1902 and Engracio Palanca was appointed as the administrator with the will

annexed of the estate, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao became his sureties. After theexecution of the bond by Palanca, as administrator, he took possession of all the property left by MargaritaJose.

IssueWhether or not there can be administration of estate even after the partition and division has

already consummated.

RulingNo, The Supreme Court ruled that after the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and

597 have been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had unless there occurthe following requisites: 1.) There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two yearsafter such settlement and distribution of estate."2.) The creditor holding the claim must be the person whomoves the court for the appointment of an administrator.

In the case at bar, no debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four yearsafter the partition of the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective portions before itwas even discovered that Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own use;and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years before the alleged claim against the estate ofMariano Ocampo was fixed. And, no creditor made his application. The necessary conclusion is that theappointment of commissioners to hear the claim above referred to was beyond the powers of the court andwas without jurisdiction. The finding of the commissioners had no force or effect. It gave no right against theestate and none against the so-called administrator. This section creates a statute of limitations whichdeprives all debts which are not discovered within the prescribed time of the power of requiring anadministration of the estate. The partition proceedings are proceedings out of court. Consequently there isno prescribed method of ascertaining and settling claims. The appointment of commissioners, thepublication of notice to creditors, and all the other proceedings necessary in cases of administration in courtare not required in partition out of court. It was not the intention of the law to pronounce the partition void ofno effect simply because not all of the debts were paid before the partition was made. The fact of nonpayment cannot, then, because by the creditor as a reason for attacking the partition directly by assertingthat, inasmuch as a payment of all the debts is a condition precedent to the right of partition, such partitioncannot legally and validly take place while a debt is outstanding. The mere fact, therefore, that a creditor wasnot paid before the partition took place furnishes no ground for are vocation of the partition. It simplyprovides a fact which he may urge as a reason for the appointment of an administrator and the consequentadministration of so much of the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered


Title: Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153

FactsPetitioners herein, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo

Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimatedaughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death ofhis first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children.That Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945 and on May 6, 1948, respondentsexecuted a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased, fraudulentlymisrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased. Althoughthey well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs respondents succeededfraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued inthe name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title to be issuedin their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each. Such fraud wasdiscovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case. Theydemanded from respondents their share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interestthereon but respondents

The petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicialsettlement, insofar as it deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the properties inlitigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey to them their aforementioned share.

The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, byfirst marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaintbelonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife and thatpetitioners' action has already prescribed,

Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelode Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statuteof limitations of action.Issue

Is the petitioner correct?Ruling

Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an actionfor partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendantsdo not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitationsoperates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessorof the property.

Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicialsettlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefore may befiled within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to havetaken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with theRegister of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondentsexclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constituteconstructive notice to the whole world.


Title: Sampilo and Salicup vs. Court of Appeals and Sinopera, G.R. No. L-10474(1958)

FactsTeodoro Tolete died, leaving his wife and nephews and nieces who are children of his

deceased brothers and sisters. His wife executed an affidavit of self-adjudicating saying thatTeodoro had no children or dependents, neither ascendants or acknowledged naturalchildren, neither brothers, sisters, nephews nor nieces. Then, his wife sold the property toSampilo, then Sampilo sold it to Salacup. Sinopera instituted estate proceedings asking forletters of administration. She alleged that Teodoro’s wife, Leonicia de Leon has no right toexecute the affidavit of self-adjudication for there are other heirs aside from her. Thepetitioners now argue that Sinopera’s cause of action has already prescribed becauseaccording to the rules of court, person’s deprived of their right due to the partition or self-adjudication must bring their action within two years from the date of partition or self-adjudication.Issue

Is the rule apllicable to persons who had no knowledge or not participated in extrajudicial settlement?Ruling

No. The said rule applies only to persons who participated in the said proceedingsand does not prejudice those who did not have the chance to participate.

According Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. in Section 1, it is required that if there are twoor more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. Therecannot be any doubt that those who took part or bad knowledge of the extrajudicialsettlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been inany manner ,deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicialsettlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, andboth "the distributees and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest.Evidently, they are the persons who, in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedythe prejudice to their rights within, the two-year Period. But as to those who did not take partin the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the setlement, there isno direct or express provision, and it is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required toassert their claims within the period extend the effects of the settlement to the two years.To to them, to those who did no t take part or had no knowledge thereof, without anyexpress legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to dueProcess law.


Title: Cua vs Vargas GR No. 156536 (2006)

Facts

Petitioner Jose Cua bought shares of some of the heirs of Paulina Vargas in the parcelof residential land with an area of 99 square meters in Virac, Cataduanes. The heirs, whoseshares totaling at 55 square meters, executed an extra-judicial settlement which wassubsequently published in a newspaper of general circulation. Later, they also executed anextra-judicial settlement with sale over the same property and among the same heirs. Oneof the heirs of Paulina who did not participate in the settlement, Gloria Vargas sought toredeem the sold shares and when it was refused by Cua, sought the annulment of the extra-judicial settlement. Her petition was dismissed by the MTC and RTC, but the CA reversed theruling of the inferior courts. Hence, Cua comes to the succor of the Supreme Court with apetition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue Whether or not the publication of extra judicial settlement after it was executed is

binding upon the heirs who did not participated therein.

Ruling

No, it is not binding. In the first place, the requirement of Sec. 1 of Rule 74 was thepublication be done before the extra judicial settlement and not after it was alreadyexecuted. Secondly, such publication was not meant to deprive heirs of their lawfulparticipation therein and instead, is designed for the protection of creditors. The partitionmade is not valid in so far as the heirs who did not participate therein is concerned.


Title: Cruz vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 140422 (2006)

FactsThis Petition assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals,affirming in toto the Decision

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 156. Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal,Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat)claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his firstmarriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto, Florencio,Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobalresulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. Buenaventura Cristobal diedintestate.More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents hadexecuted an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title to theirnames.

Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case betweenthem and private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus,a Complaint forAnnulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against privaterespondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In theirprayer, they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by respondents,cancellation of TCT's issued in the individual names of private respondents,re-partitioning ofthe subject property in accordance with the law of succession.

Issue1. Whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject

property executed by the private respondents2. Whether or not petitioners’ right to recover their share of the subject property is

barred by laches.

RulingAs regards the first issue, the Court ruled that the petitioners are not bound, the

applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states.Under the saidprovision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, theextrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons.In the case at bar, since the estate ofthe deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the subject property, thepartition thereof by the private respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlementof Buenaventura Cristobal’s estate. The partition of the subject property by the privaterespondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded therefrom.Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by private respondents amongthemselves in 1948. The Deed of Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of BuenaventuraCristobal who were also entitled to their respective shares in the subject property. Sincepetitioners were not able to participate in the execution of the Deed of Partition, whichconstitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late Buenaventura Cristobal byprivate respondents, such settlement is not binding on them.

As to the second issue, the doctrine of laches does NOT apply in the instant case.Upon petitioner Elisa’s knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject property had beentransferred to the private respondents to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from thefirst marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a petition with theirbarangay to settle the case among themselves and private respondents, but since nosettlement was had, they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to annulprivate respondents’ title over the land. There is no evidence showing failure or neglect ontheir part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, byexercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The doctrine of staledemands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitableto allow a party to enforce his legal rights. absence any strong or compelling reason, thisCourt is not disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an


owner.Laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitableconsiderations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice.Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of aproperty from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name ofanother .


Probate of Wills (Rules 75-77, Rules of Court)Title: In re: Estate of Johnson, G.R. No. 12767 (1918)

FactsEmil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States,

died in Manila, leaving a holographic will by which he disposed of his estate. The saiddocument was not executed in conformity with the provisions the Code of Civil Proceduregenerally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants the Philippines. Thereafter a petitionwas presented in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the probate of the will, on theground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, UnitedStates of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State;and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of CivilProcedure. After which, the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate.After the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered anappearance in her behalf and asserted that Ebba is a legitimate heir of the testator. Thus,she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governingtestamentary successions in these Islands. Therefore, she moved to annul the decree ofprobate and put the estate into intestate administration in order for her to claim the estateas the sole legitimate heir of her father.

IssueWhether or not the order of the probate can be set aside on the ground that the

testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made inconformity with the laws of that State.

RulingThe Supreme Court held that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic

validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the dueexecution of the will. The intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determinedby the law of Illinois and not of the Philippines.

In paragraph 2 of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal andtestamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amountof the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulatedby the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may bethe nature of the property and the country where it may be situate."

In this case the petition submitted to the lower court was insufficient to warrant the

setting aside of the order, probating the will in question, whether said petition be consideredas an attack on the validity of the decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered asan application for a rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavitswhich accompany the petition. Further, in the latter aspect the petition is subject to thefurther fatal defect that it was not presented within the time allowed by law.

Thus, the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The orderappealed from is accordingly affirmed.


Title: Manahan vs. Manahan, G.R. No. 38050 (1933)

Facts

This is an appeal taken Engracia Manahan, from the order of the CFI of Bulacan in thematter of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, denying her motion for reconsiderationand new trial.

The deceased left a will. Engracia, her niece and the named executor, filed a petitionfor the probate of the will. Proper notice and publication were done. Petition was granted.One year and seven months later, Tiburcia, sister of Donata, filed a motion forreconsideration and new trial contending that she is an heir of the deceased but was notnotified of the probate proceedings. Therefore, the proceeding was void. It was denied.Hence, this appeal.Issue

1. Is Tiburcia an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such,should have been notified of the probate of the will?

2. Is authentication synonymous to probate?

3. Can the validity of the probated will be questioned on appeal?Ruling

As to the first issue, no, she was not entitled to notification of the probate of the willand neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, nothaving filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she hadthe status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to benotified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has notbeen instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire anysuccessional right.

On the second issue, in the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essentialdifference between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The wordsauthentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that thecompetent court declared that in the execution of the will the essential external formalitieshave been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid andeffective in the eyes of the law.

With regard to the third issue, no, Once a will has been authenticated and admittedto probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal. Thedecree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannotimpugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate orindependent action or proceedings.

It is not timely to discuss the validity and sufficiency of the execution of the will in question.As we have already said, this question can no more be raised in this case on appeal. Afterdue hearing, the court found that the will in question was valid and effective and the orderadmitting it to probate, thus promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all. Theprobate of the will in question now constitutes res judicata.


Title: Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez, G.R. No. L-39274 (1975)

FactsThe case is about the probate of the will of Leodegaria Julian, who made provisions in

her will that after her husband's death all her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal landsshould be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devisedand partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in thewill her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets.

The private respondent Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds oflack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and allegedimproper partition of the conjugal estate.

Meanwhile, another lawyer who claims to be the counsel for the petitoner seek towithdraw the probate of the will and convert the proceeding into intestate proceeding. Heassailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or allegedly effected acompromise of future legitimes.

The RTC agreed with the view of the lawyer that the will was void so it dismissed thepetition for probate and converted the testate proceeding into intestate.

IssueWhether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, beforeruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.RulingNo. The court agreed with the trial court and declared that the trial court acted correctly inpassing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established.The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to beintrinsically void. However, the court also ruled that the probate court erred in declaring thatthe will is void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding. TheCourt cited the rules, "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will doesnot result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that thetestator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had notbeen made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid andothers invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalidwithout defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentaryscheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved infavor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator todispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy shouldbe avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the languageof the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect.


Title: Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, G.R. No. L-23638 (1967)

FactsIsmaela Dimagiba filed a petition for probate of the will of Benedicta de los Reyes.

Such petition was opposed by Dionisio Fernandez, et al. The court ruled in favor of probate.Fernandez et. al. appealed, but it was beyond the reglamentary period. They argued thatthey were entitled to await the other grounds for opposition before appealing.

IssueWhether or not the probate of the will became final for lack of appeal.

Ruling

Yes. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacityof the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of the will. As such, probate order isfinal and appealable. They do not have to await the resolution of its other oppositions sincethe Rules of Court enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in specialproceedings.


Title: Guevara vs. Guevara and Quinto, G.R. No. L-5405 (1956)

FactsVictorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests to his

wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a naturaldaughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter. Victorino diedbut his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement proceedinginitiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated tohimself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke theacknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, aportion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will andbased on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was notprobated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.Issue

Can a probate of a will be dispensed?Ruling

No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt tocircumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to thecourt for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to itsefficacy. Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, theright of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.


Title: In re: Estate of Deceased Jose B. Suntay, G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 (1954)

Facts

This is an appeal from the decree of the CFI of Bulacan disallowing the alleged willand testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will andtestament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China on 4 January 1931 by Jose B. Suntay.

Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, FookienProvince, China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoyand 9 children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz and a child namedSilvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.Intestate proceedings were instituted in the CFI of Bulacan and after hearing letters ofadministration were issued to Apolonio Suntay. The surviving widow filed a petition in the CFIof Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed andsigned in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. The petition wasdenied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearingthereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. Afterliberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his latefather a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court,Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedingspraying for the probate of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China.Issue

Whether or not the will allegedly probated in Amoy, China may be probated in thePhilippines.Ruling

No. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court mustbe proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also beproved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should alsobe established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.

In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate courtand on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that theproceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are adeposition or a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so, it does not measure sameas those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validityof such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties mustbe made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. Theevidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in thePhilippines.

In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have beendone in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principlesfollowed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript ofproceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed andaccepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the willreferred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of thiscountry.


Title: Abut vs. Abut, G.R. No. L-26743 (1972)

FactsThe case is about the probate of the will of Cipriano Abut. The petitioner is the son of

the deceased and the appointed executor of the said will. During the pendency of the casebut before the court a quo could even start the formal hearing of the petition, GenerosoAbut, the original petitioner, died. This eventuality prompted Gavina Abut, a sister of thedeceased executor and an heir and devisee under the will of the testator Cipriano Abut, toask the court a quo to substitute her in lieu of original petitioner and to admit an amendedpetition wherein she prayed that the probate of the will be allowed and that letters ofadministration with the will annexed be issued in her favor. The court a quo dismissed thepetition originally brought by the deceased Generoso Abut, "without prejudice to the filing ofanother petition pursuant to the requirements of the Rules of Court."

IssueWhether or not the probate court correctly dismissed the petition on the ground that

the original petitioner — who was the executor named in the will sought to be probated —died before the petition could be heard and/or terminated.Ruling

No. The court finds the dismissal untenable. The court ruled that Jurisdiction of thecourt once acquired continues until the termination of the case, and remains unaffected bysubsequent events. The court below erred in holding that it was divested of jurisdiction justbecause the original petitioner died before the petition could be formally heard. Parties whocould have come in and opposed the original petition, as herein appellees did, could stillcome in and oppose the amended petition, having already been notified of the pendency ofthe proceeding by the publication of the notice thereof.


Title: Basa vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 42226 (1935)

FactsThe judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga allowed and probated the last

will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased. In 1932, the same judge approved the account ofthe administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the willand closed the administration proceedings. In 1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed amotion in which they prayed that said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the courtlacked jurisdiction to act in the matter because there was a failure to comply withrequirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in the followingsection of the Code of Civil Procedure. Appellants claim that the provisions of section 630 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in view of the fact that althoughthe trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the required notice for "threeweeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the firstpublication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the hearing took place onthe 27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first publication instead ofthree full weeks before the day set for the hearing. The appellants also contend that the trialcourt erred in ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the notice ofhearing was published, was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.Issue

1. Whether or not the 21 days requirement of publication be followed pursuant to thesection 630 of the civil procedure.

2. Whether or not Ing Katipunan newspaper is considered a newspaper of generalcirculation.

Ruling

As regards the first issue, was held that the language used in section 630 of the Codeof Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published forthree full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the firstpublication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed forthe hearing.

As to the second issue, the record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper ofgeneral circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local newsand general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that itis published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be madein Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the Provinceof Pampanga." The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in theCode of Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers isnecessary to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.


Title: Fernandez vs. Tantoco, G.R. No. 25489 (1926)

FactsBasilia Tantoco, aged 62, executed an instrument purporting to be her will on

September 9, 1925. She was at that time a patient in the San Juan de Dios Hospital. Shedied a few days after the will was executed. Hence, an application for the probate of the willwas filed by father Vicente Fernandez, parish priest of Malolos. However, her three brothersand a nephew opposed the probate. The proponent introduced the three attesting witnessesto the instrument. The instrument shows every external requisite of proper execution, butthe trial judge refused to allow the probate, for the reason that the three witnesses are notin harmony whether all three of said witnesses were present together at the time and placewhen they affixed their signatures.Issue

Did the court err for not allowing the probate of the will?Ruling

Yes, in case of opposition to the probate of the will the proponent is legally bound tointroduce all of the subscribing witnesses, if available. They are therefore forced witnessesso far as the proponent is concerned, and he is not bound by their testimony to the sameextent that a litigant is bound by the testimony of witnesses introduced in ordinary course. Itfollows that the proponent of a will may avail himself of other proof to establish theinstrument, even contrary to the testimony of some of the subscribing witnesses, or allof them. With respect to the will now in question a prima facie case for the establishment ofthe document was made out when it appeared that the instrument itself was properly drawnand attested and that all of the signatures thereto are authentic. These facts raise apresumption of regularity; and upon those facts alone the will should, be admitted toprobate in the absence of proof showing that some fatal irregularity occurred. And suchirregularity must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence before probate can bedenied.


Title: Azaola vs. Singson, G.R. No. L-14003 (1960)

FactsFortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to be her last

residence. Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of the holographic will, submittedthe said holographic will whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as againstthe nephew of deceased Cesario Singson; He testified that he saw the holographic will onemonth, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as the same was handed to him andhis wife. He also said that he recognized all the signatures appearing in the holographic willas the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said statement, witness presented themortgage. The special power of the attorney and the general power of attorney and thatthere were further exhibited in court two residence certificates to show the signatures of thetestatrix, for comparison purposes. In the aforesaid documentary evidence is in thehandwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures appearing is in the handwriting of thetestatrix as well as the signatures appearing therein are the signatures of the testatrix.

The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the willwas procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitionerand his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her lastwill. The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, theproponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signatureare in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witnesspresented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was writtenin the handwriting of the testatrix.Issue

Whether or not the probate of the will should be granted.Ruling

We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested,he was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of theholographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present CivilCode cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses toidentify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Sinceno witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none beingrequired by law.

It becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisitequalifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a questionof finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know thehandwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even ifthe law does not so express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of thetestator". There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if sofamiliarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.

It cannot be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in thecase of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses atthe execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where thewill is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production ofthree witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if theCourt deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Courtshould be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses isproduced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it mayconsider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competentwitness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact


it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust allavailable lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the trueintention of the testator be carried into effect.

The decision appealed from is set aside, and the records ordered remanded to theCourt of origin, with instructions to hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion. Butevidence already on record shall not be retaken.


Title: Gan vs. Yap, G.R. No. L-12190 (1958)

Facts

Petitioner Gan initiated the probate of the alleged lost holographic will of Felicidad Yap.To prove the holographic will, he presented the testimony of witnesses who claimed to haveseen the said holographic will.

Issue

May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedlyseen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

Ruling

The Court ruled in the negative. According to the Supreme Court, “the Civil Coderequires [the holographic will] to be protocoled and presented to the judge, (Art. 689) whoshall subscribe it and require its identity to be established by the three witnesses whodepose that they have no reasonable doubt that the will was written by the testator (Art.691). And if the judge considers that the identity of the will has been proven he shall orderthat it be filed (Art. 693). All these, imply presentation of the will itself. Art. 692 bears thesame implication, to a greater degree. It requires that the surviving spouse and thelegitimate ascendants and descendants be summoned so that they may make "anystatement they may desire to submit with respect to the authenticity of the will." As it isuniversally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himselfalone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the above article692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they knowof the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote it.”The holographic will needs to be presented in court and to the relatives.

Unlike ordinary wills, holographic wills cannot be proven by testimonial wills whenlost or destroyed. In the first, the authenticity is guaranteed by the testimony of thesubscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). While in the latter, the onlyguarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself. “The loss of the holographic will entailsthe loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses areavailable to authenticate.”


Title: Nittscher vs. Nittscher, G.R. No. 160530 (2007)

FactsDr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the

probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to hereinrespondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petitionfor letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher’ssurviving spouse, petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the saidpetition. However, the court Order denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and grantedrespondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.Issue

Whether or not petitioner was denied due process of law because she did not receiveby personal service the notices of the proceedings.Ruling

No. Under Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.– …

If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to hiscompulsory heirs.

In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, andDr. Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail,of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondent’spetition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss thesaid petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letterstestamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner wasaccorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that shewas denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis.


Title: Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, supra

FactsSpouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American

citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter,Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entireestate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate improvements atForbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Twoyears after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter,Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, exceptfor his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter. Petitioner, as ancillaryadministrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a motion todeclare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. Themotion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator withregards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undividedinterest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereofwas allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the lawof the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee theentire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.IssueWhether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.Ruling

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the landof the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal.Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, inexceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack ofjurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested ina probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason ofcircumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable tonegligence. Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estateaccording to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted toextrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.


Title: Dais vs. Garduño and Altavas, G.R. No. 25523 (1926)

Facts

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit anappeal interposed in a probate case by the petitioners.

In a probate proceeding, certain lands belonging to the estate of the deceased wereordered sold, over the opposition of some of the heirs, for the purpose of obtaining funds forthe payment of attorney’s fees alleged to be due. The heirs excepted to this order as well asto another order denying a motion for reconsideration and the CFI refused to admit theappeal. The land was sold and the proceeds of the sale paid over to the attorney. The heirsthereupon petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the lower courtto admit the appeal. The respondent moved that the petition be dismissed on the groundthat the matters at issue had become moot questions by reason of the execution of theorder of sale and the payment of the proceeds to the attorney for the estate.Issue

1. Whether or not the order appealed from is a moot question.

2. Whether or not the order was premature for being interlocutory.Ruling

1. No. If the payment was improvidently made, the money might be ordered refundedand that, therefore, the order appealed from had not become a moot question.

2. An order issued without the consent of the heirs and directing the administrator ofthe estate of the deceased person to proceed immediately with the sale of the landpertaining to the estate is not an interlocutory order and is appealable. The court belowmay possibly have been misled by the provision in section 123 of the Code of CivilProcedure, that no ruling, order or judgment shall "be the subject of appeal to the SupremeCourt until final judgment is rendered for one party or the other." This provision applies toordinary civil action, but that it cannot be accepted literally in regard to probateproceedings, is best shown by the extensive provisions for special appeals contained insections 773 to 783 of the same Code."


Letters Testamentary and of Administration (Rules 78-79, Rules of Court)Title: Lim vs. Diaz-Millarez, et. al., G.R. No. L-17633 (1966)

FactsPetitioner, claiming to be a nephew of the late Jose Millarez who died intestate, filed

with the CFI of Negros Occidental, a petition for his appointment as judicial administrator ofthe estate of the deceased. The petition alleged that the deceased left no relatives such asdescendants, ascendants or surviving spouse, except collaterals. To the said petition,oppositor herein, claiming to be the widow of the deceased, filed an opposition on twogrounds: the petitioner has an adverse interest in the estate; and that the properties of theestate are subject matter of a litigation between her as a plaintiff and Lim as defendant in acivil case.Issue

Whether or not a person who has an adverse interest in the estate proceeding beappointed as administrator of such estate.Ruling

The Supreme Court held that Lim, as a relative of the deceased, has some interestadverse to that of Diaz-Millarez. Shown to have some liabilities to latter and to the estate asa whole, Lim cannot compatibly perform the duties of an administrator. In this jurisdiction,one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverseinterest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.


Title: Medina vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34760 (1973)

FactsThis is a review by certiorari of the resolution dismissing the petition challenging the

lower court’s orders appointing Gonzales (private respondent) as special administrator of theintestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina. Gonzales had been interfering in thepossession and enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as “Bitukang Manok” bypetitioner Del Carmen to whom the property had been sold, and full payment thereforreceived by the estate through Gonzales’ predecessor with the approval of the lower court,which overruled Gonzales’ opposition thereto as an assignee of some heirs of the estate, andas one personally interested in the purchase of the property for himself.Issue

Whether or not Gonzales, the special administrator, should be disqualified.Ruling

Yes, the special administrator is disqualified and must be excluded. It is anestablished doctrine that as administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removedwhere his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by virtue of the equallyestablished principle that an administrator is a quasi-trustee, disqualified from acquiringproperties of the estate, and who should be indifferent between the estate and claimants ofthe property except to preserve it for due administration and who should be removed whenhis interest conflict with such right and duty.

Respondent, whose appeal of the lower court’s order of approval of the sale to the CAis pending, cannot be at the same time an appellant in his personal capacity opposing thesale of the property and an appellee representing the estate and upholding the same sale asmade by the estate through Gonzales’ predecessor as special administrator. Since the estateproceedings have been pending for over 13 years now without the lower court once havingappointed a regular administrator, the said court is directed to name a suitable person.

While the provisions of the Rules of Court may be deemed directory in nature, "thespeedy settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and thoseentitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses ofadministration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law" and "courts of firstinstance should exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the timethey are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors andadministrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harshermeasures."


Title: Maloles II vs. Phillips, G.R. No. 129505 (2000)

FactsDr. Arturo de Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He alleged that he had no

compulsory heirs and named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de SantosFoundation, Inc. He named as his executor the respondent. The Petition was granted andshortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died.

The Petitioner filed a motion for intervention claiming that he was the sole full-bloodednephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of thetestator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and theissuance of letters of administration in his name. On the other hand, the respondent filed amotion for the issuance of letters testamentary. Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner'smotion for intervention.

IssueWhether or not the petitioner, being the nearest next of kin and a creditor of the

deceased has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letterstestamentary filed by the respondent.

Ruling

The Court ruled in the negative. The Petitioner has no right to intervene and opposethe petition for issuance of letters of testamentary. The Petitioner is not an heir or legateeunder the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter.As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter onlyin case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated anddisposes of all his properties the petitioner can inherit only if the said will is annulled. Hisinterest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.

His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for thefirst time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as therecords show, not supported by evidence.

Rule 79, §1 provides:

"Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition foradministration. — Any person interested in a will may state in writing the groundswhy letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein asexecutors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass uponthe sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for lettersof administration with the will annexed."

Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who wouldbe benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, suchas a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.


Title: Sison, et. al. vs. Teodoro, G.R. No. L-6704 (1956)

Facts

In1951, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in G. R. No. L-3846 ordering theTestate Estate of Margarita David to pay the claim of the Testate Estate of Crispulo Sideco. Tofacilitate the payment of the said claim, Priscilla F. Sison, an heiress of the estate, deliveredto its administrator the amount of P12,128.44 to cover the payment of her one half share inthe Sideco claim. The other heiress, herein Appellant Narcisa F. Teodoro, was unwilling to dothe same, contending that the Estate has real properties which could be sold and with itsproceeds pay the Sideco claim, hence, the administrator filed a petition with the lower courtto compel Narcisa F. Teodoro to deliver to him her share in the payment of theaforementioned Claim. The lower court entered an order.

IssueIs it right to apply the residuary funds in the payment of the Sideco Claim?

Ruling

The Court answered in the affirmative. The Court stated that the residuary funds inthe hands of the heiresses of this estate should be applied to the payment of the Sidecoclaim for it is more advantageous to use that fund to pay the claim in question than sellingthe real properties of the estate for that purpose. Besides, section 3 of Rule 89 of the Rulesof Court provides:

“The personal estate of the deceased shall be first chargeable with the payment ofdebts and expenses and if the personal estate is not sufficient for that purpose, or its salewould redound to the detriment of the participants in the estate, the whole of the realestate, or so much thereof as is necessary, may be sold, mortgaged, or otherwiseencumbered for that purpose by the executor or administrator, after obtaining the authorityof the court therefor.”

And according to section 6 of Rule 89, the Court has authority to fix the contributiveshares of the devisees, legatees or heirs for the payment of a claim if they have entered intopossession of portions of the estate before the debts and expenses thereof have beensettled and paid. Appellant argues, however, that section 3 of Rule 89, Rules of Court, is notapplicable to the instant case on the ground that it refers to the personal and real propertiesof the deceased which are in the hands of the administrator, and not to the properties of theestate which are already in the hands of the heiresses. This contention is likewise untenable.The residuary funds in the hands of the Appellant are funds of the estate and the Court hasjurisdiction over them and, therefore, it could compel the Appellant to deliver to theadministrator of this estate the necessary portion of such fund for the payment of the SidecoClaim.


Title: Matute vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-26751, L-26085, and L-16106(1969)

FactsOn August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood

brother of both the petitioner and the herein respondent Matias S. Matute, filed in SpecialProceeding (settlement of the Matute estate) a petition praying for the removal of Matias asco-administrator and his appointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged that for a period ofmore than two years from the date of his appointment, said Matias S. Matute has neglectedto render a true, just and complete account of his administration and that he is not onlyincompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate under his charge consistingof five haciendas.The respondent Matias opposed the allegation that it is completely withoutbasis and false. Records show that he made an accounting and the same was submitted tothe court. That his competence to act as administrator has been established to thesatisfaction of the court. It appears that during the reception of evidence conducted onDecember 29, 1965 by the probate court, Carlos S. Matute and the other heirs submittedtheir respective lists of exhibits in support of their motion to oust Matias. On January 8, 1966Matias filed a written objection to the admission of the movants’ exhibits on the ground thatthe same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposedoriginals which never properly identified nor shown in court. The counsel for Matias filed withleave of court a “Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence” which avers that there isno sufficient evidence on record to justify and support the motions for the removal ofthe herein co-administrator Matias S. Matute. The probate court issued an order removingMatias S. Matute as co-administrator. Hence, the certiorari.IssueWhether or not Rule 33 regarding judgment on demurrer to evidence is applicable to specialproceedings such that its disregard by the probate court amounts to grave abuse ofdiscretion.Ruling

The Court answered in the affirmative. Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Courtprovides that in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civilactions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. The applicationof the above cited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by theRules. Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the controvertedorder removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity toadduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance tointroduce evidence in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/ordemurrer to evidence. The Court view that the above actuation of the probate judgeconstituted grave abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as nullity.


Title: Baluyut vs. Pañu, G.R. No. L-42088 (1976)

FactsAlfredo Baluyut, nephew of Sotero Baluyut filed a verified petition for letters of

administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion Lopez,who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent's estate. He prayedthat he be appointed regular administrator and in the meantime as special administrator.

Mrs. Baluyut in her verified opposition alleged that she was unaware that herdeceased husband executed a will.She prayed that she be named administratrix and thatthe appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator be set aside.

The lower court cancelled Alfredo's appointment as special administrator andappointed Mrs. Baluyut as regular administratrix with a bond of P20,000. The order wasbased on the fact that as surviving spouse she has a preferential right to be appointed asadministratrix of her deceased husband's estate and that she is entitled to three-fourths ofthe conjugal estate: one-half in her own right and one-fourth as heir of the deceased. Lettersof administration were issued to Mrs. Baluyut after she posted her bond and took her oath.Issue

Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs.Baluyut as administratrix.Ruling

The probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoyspreference in the granting of letters of administration, it does not follow that she should benamed administratrix without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency todischarge that trust. Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certainperson should act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does notautomatically entitle him to the issuance of letters testamentary.We further held that ahearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointedadministrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affordingoppositors a chance to contest the petition.Moreover, it is necessary to convert theproceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannotbe dispensed with and is a matter of public policy.

After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked andproceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the willshould be conducted .Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative inthe interest of the orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs.Baluyut's fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacityshould be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.


Title: Capistrano v. Nadurata, G.R. No. 18754 (1922)

Facts

This is a proceeding commenced by the appellees for the appointment of Justo Buera asadministrator of the estate of Petra de los Santos, deceased. The application was opposedby appellants Pedro and Juan de los Santos, claiming that they were brothers of thedeceased and praying that the first of them be appointed administrator. Leon Nadurataintervened, asserting himself to be the surviving spouse of the intestate Petra de los Santos,and praying that the letters of administration be issued to him. The trial court foundNadurata not to be the surviving spouse of the deceased and the de los Santos brothers notto be the nearest relatives of the latter. The lower court, then, confirmed the appointment ofJusto Buera as administrator of the estate.

Issue

Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion when the trial court declared JustoBuera as the administrator of the estate.

Ruling

The Court answered in the negative. According to the Court “The selection of anadministrator of the estate of a deceased lies within the discretion of the court (sec. 642,subsec. 1, Code of Civil Procedure). And the record does not contain anything tending toshow an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court.”

The act of the lower court in overruling the objection of the opponents and confirmingthe appointment as administrator of the person proposed by the applicants is not onlyindicative of sound discretion, but is right and just; for the evidence shows that LeonNadurata is not surviving spouse of Petra de los Santos, who died widow and not twicewidow, and that the opponents Pedro de los Santos and Juan de los Santos are not, as theypretend to be, brother of the aforesaid deceased.


Title: Arevalo vs. Bustamante, et. al., G.R. No. 47098 (1940)

FactsTwo years and some months after Bustamante Bernabe died, his widow Rufina

Arevalo promoted the record of his intestacy; and in consideration that she was the widow ofthe deceased, was appointed by court administrator of his goods relicts. Jose Bustamante,Maria Bustamante, Corazon Reyers and Remedios Reyes who claimed to be heirs of Bernabefiled objection for the appointment of the administration.Issue

Was the appointment of Rufina Arevalo as administrator valid?Ruling

Yes. Spouse may have enjoyed preference as to the appointment of administrator ofthe estate provided that she is not competent or are unwilling to serve.


Title: Edgar San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 and 134029 (2007)

FactsThis involves consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of the CA, which

reversed and set aside resolutions of the RTC resolution denying petitioners’ motion forreconsideration. The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo who, during hislifetime, contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit in 1942 out ofwhich were born six children. In 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, in1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee, an American citizen, with whom he had a son. In 1971,Merry Lee filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State ofHawaii, U.S.A., which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custodyin 1973. In 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of theirmarriage up to his death in 1992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugalpartnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, shefiled a petition for letters of administration before the RTC.

IssueWhether or not respondent has legal capacity to file the petition for letters of

administration.Ruling

The Court ruled in the affirmative. The respondent’s legal capacity to file the subjectpetition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife ofFelicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the FamilyCode.

The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowedFelicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file thepresent petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there isinsufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as themarriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may begranted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof alsoprovides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition forletters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, asfar as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An “interested person” has been defined as one who would be benefited by the

estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Theinterest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

In the instant case, Felicidad would qualify as an interested person who has a directinterest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which wasnot denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacityto remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under thelaws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the CivilCode.


Title: Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378 (1951)

FactsThis is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan denying the

appellants' petition for relief from the judgment of the said court allowing the will executedby the deceased Damasa Crisostomo.

The appellants alleged that the judgement was obtained through fraud because theproponents of the will did not cause personal notice of the hearing to be made upon thelegal heir s of the decedent, contrary to the requirement of Rule 77, sec. 4 of the Rules ofCourt. They allege that they are "nephews and nieces and therefore legal heirs of thedeceased Damasa Crisostomo and that as an interested parties, they may appeal in thepresent case, because in the event the will is allowed, and the legacies in the will aredeclared invalid or the legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will go to appellants.

IssueWhether or not the appellants are interested parties, and that in case the legacies in

the will are declared invalid or legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will go to them.

RulingThe Court ruled in the negative. They are not interested parties. The appellants

merely alleged in their petition for relief that they are "nephews and nieces and thereforelegal heirs of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo," without specifying the degree ofrelationship they had with the latter. The interest claimed by the appellants is contingentonly.

In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, theinterest in order that a person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so thathe will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order, decree orjudgment: and not indirect or contingent. The interest claimed by the appellants is purelycontingent or dependent upon several uncertain and future events to invalidation of certainlegacies left in the will.


Title: Duran vs. Duran, G.R. No. L-23372 (1967)

Facts

Pio Duran died intestate. Among his alleged heirs are Josefina Duran, as survivingspouse; several brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces. Subsequent to his death, CiprianoDuran, one of the surviving brothers, executed a public instrument assigning and renouncinghis hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of Josefina Duran, for the considerationof P2, 500.00. A year later, Cipriano filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition forintestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate. Against said petition, Josefina Duran filedan opposition, praying for its dismissal upon the ground that the petitioner is not an"interested person" in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation the estate,in view of the afore-stated, attaching a copy of the same; in the alternative, she asked to beappointed administratrix.

Issue

Whether or not Cipriano loses his right as interested person in the estate after saidassignment is approved by the court.Ruling

The Court tuled in the negative. The situation in the Santos case involves anassignment between co-heirs pendente lite, during the course of settlement proceedings,properly and validly commenced. At the time of said assignment, therefore, the settlementcourt had already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate. As a result, anyassignment regarding the same had to be approved by said court. Since the approval of thecourt is not deemed final until the estate is closed, the assigning heir remains an interestedperson in proceedings even after said approval, which can be vacated is given. In thepresent case, however, the assignment took place when no settlement proceedings waspending. The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction ofa settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as betweenthe assignor and assignee, the same does not need court approval to be effective asbetween the parties.

An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even if the requisites ofSec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are forpurposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only. Should it be contended thatsaid partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy isto rescind or to annul the same in an action for that purpose.


Title: Avelino vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115181 (2000)

FactsPetitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio

Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino. Respondents are likewisecompulsory heirs. . The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.

Petitioner filed before the RTC of Quezon City Branch 78, a petition for the issuanceof letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate. In return, therespondents filed their opposition. The trial court converted petitioner's action for letters ofadministration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. CAaffirmed the lower court’s ruling. Petitioner submits that no partition of the estate is possiblein the instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character and extent ofthe decedent's estate. She insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion ofa motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. Theconversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be struck downfor lack of legal basis.

IssueWhether or not the court of appeals erred in upholding the lower court's finding.

RulingWhen a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or

the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bondrequired by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administeredand the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established inSection 6 of Rule 78. The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74.

Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that thelower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into anaction for judicial partition. Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of thetrial court converting an action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition hasno basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's orderis Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagreeas to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinaryaction for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. The trial court appropriatelyconverted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition,upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Courtof Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.


Special Adminstrator (Rule 80, Rules of Court)

Title: Matias vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-10907 (1957)

FactsAurea Matias, being the universal heiress and named executrix in the purported will

of her Aunt Gabina Raquel who died single, instituted probate proceeding. However, Basilia,cousin of the deceased and was over 80 y/o, totally blind opposed its probate and pray forthe appointment of her niece Victorina, a pharmacist, as special administrator. Oppositionwas sustained by the lower court. So Matias appealed, and while pending appeal, it wasHoracio Rodriguez, a practicing lawyer, former prosecutor and Mayor of Cavite who wasappointed special administrator. Basilia opposed again and insist his removal and pray thatspecial administration be issued to Ramon Plata. The Lower court under the respondentjudge granted the opposition and appoint Basilia, Victorina, and Ramon Plata as specialadministrator and remove Horacio. Matias questioned the order and insist that PNB or BPI beappointed should the court refused her qualification, but was denied. Later on, due toinability to perform duties, Basilia withdrew. Hence this petition by Matias against the judge,Victorina and Plata.Issue

Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion for not appointing the namedexecutrix and the propriety of appointing more than one special administratrix?Ruling

The Supreme Court found the actions of respondent judge cannot be supportedwith1. While the probate of the will was denied, the order to this effect is not yet final andexecutory. Matias beinguniversal heiress and executrix still has special interest to protect.2.While generally, there should only be 1 special administrator maybe appointed, probatecourt in its discretion,when it deems best, and whenever there are at least two factionsamong heirs, may appoint more than 1 specialadministrator or a special co-adminstrator butto administer the whole single estate exercising jointly powers of administration temporailyand not independently.3. On technical side, there was late notice of hearing for the removalof Rodriguez as special administrator, andlack of notice that Basilia and Victorina beappointed as special administrator while in their motion, it only seekremoval of Rodriguezand appointment of Plata.


Title: Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-20735 (1965)

FactsPetitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D.

Liwanag. Respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such specialadministratrix of the same court, for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted inhis favor by said Pio D. Petitioner moved to dismiss Agregado's complaint, upon the groundthat as special administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased.Issue

Whether the petitioner herein can be sued as special administratrix.Ruling

Yes, she can be sued. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the specialadministratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find theadverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases where theappointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are not to deny the presentaction on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator will bedelayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated.


Title: Anderson vs. Perkins, G.R. No. L-15388 (1961)

FactsDora Perkins Andersons filed a petition for the probate of the supposed last will and

testament of the late Eugene Anthony Perkins. On the same date of filing, petitioner alsofiled an urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administratorof the estate, and on the same, the court granted such appointment upon posting of a bondof Enrile. Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition tothe probate of the will presented by the petitioner. The special administrator submitted aninventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging the deceased atthe time of his death.

About 2 years later, special administrator submitted to the court a petition seekingauthority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institutions, certain personaleffects of the deceased which were allegedly deteriorating physically and in value. Thespecial administrator submitted before the court, as required, copy of the inventory of thepersonal effects.

Idonah Perkins opposed the proposed sale reasoning that (1) most of the propertiessought to be sold were conjugal properties; and (2) that unauthorized removal of the piecesof furniture belonging to the estate have been made. Lower court approved the sale.Issue

Whether or not the administrator has legal authority to sell personal properties thatare not perishable.Ruling

The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Supreme Court held that Section 2, Rule 81, ofthe Rules of Court, provides that the special administrator “may sell such perishable andother property as the court orders sold”, which shows that the special administrator’s powerto sell is not limited to perishable property only. It is true that the function of a specialadministrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regularadministrator is appointed. But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is tobe preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a specialadministrator of the perishable property. It is in line with the general power of the specialadministrator to preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that Section2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell “other property as the court orderedsold.”


Title: Silverio, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109979 (1999)

FactsBeatriz Silverio died intestate and was survived by her husband, three sons and two

daughters. More than three years from her death, Edgardo, son, filed a petition for letters ofadministration and an urgent petition for appointment of special administrator. He allegedthat his stepfather, (Silverio, Sr.) failed to show that he is a fit and proper person todischarge the duties of an administrator. He alleged conflict of interest because according tohim, Silverio, Sr. was a cheating husband; he removed properties from the conjugal property;he used conjugal property to buy real estate properties and concealed them by giving themto his illegitimate children; and he is charged with violations of Securities Act.

RTC appointed Edgardo as special administrator. Silverio, Sr. opposed but failed toattend hearings because he resides in Australia. Thereafter, Edgardo was appointed asregular administrator. Alleging that the rule provides that the surviving spouse takesprecedence exclusive of and over all other heirs in the appointment of administrator,Silverio, Sr. sought to annul the appointment of special administrator and later regularadministrator.Issue

Can the probate court disregard the order of preference in the appointment of theadministrator?Ruling

Yes. The court may do so. The order of preference in the appointment of anadministrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In this case, theappointment of Edgardo as administrator is proper.

In the case of Intestate Estate of the deceased Geronima Uy Coque, the Court heldthat:

“A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse tothe administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if the person enjoying suchpreferential rights is unsuitable the court may appoint another person.”

In the same case, the court disregarded the order of preference ratiocinating, thus:

xxx “The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of administrator rests,to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointmentand such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively thatthe court below was an error.”

xxx “Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest ofsome kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.” Xxx


Title: Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo vs. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934(2005)

FactsCrisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie, died leaving behind a sizable

inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock. One Belinda Castillo,claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion forintervention. Resolution on this motion was, however, held in abeyance pending someincidents in the CA. Roberto Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta, filed a petition forprobate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Healleged that he discovered his mother’s will in which he was instituted as the sole heir of thetestatrix, and designated as alternate executor for the named executor therein, a brother ofCrisanta, who had predeceased the latter.

Belinda Castillo died. The intestate proceedings was dismissed and the probate courtappointed Roberto Gabriel as special administrator of his mother’s estate. The heirs ofBelinda filed a Motion praying that they be substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their latemother.

Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, the respondent filed a "Manifestation and Motion"where she informed the probate court of her husband’s death and prayed that she beadmitted as substitute in place of her late husband, and be appointed as administratrix ofthe estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well.

IssueWhether or not the appointment of the respondent as special administratix is proper.

RulingThe Court ruled in the affirmative. The appointment of the respondent as special

administratix is proper. The Court racionated that appointment of a special administrator liesentirely in the discretion of the court. The order of preference in the appointment of aregular administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply to theselection of a special administrator. In the issuance of such appointment, which is buttemporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the court determineswho is entitled to the administration of the estate of the decedent. On this point, The Courtheld that the preference of private respondent Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient reason.

While it is true, as petitioners submit, that private respondent is neither a compulsorynor a legal heir of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and is considered a third person to the estate ofCrisanta, nonetheless, private respondent is undeniably entitled to the administration of thesaid estate because she is an heir of her husband Roberto, whose estate is the former estateof his adopting mother Crisanta.

The petitioners’ strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court ismisplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of regular administrators of estates; Section 1,Rule 80, on the other hand, applies to the appointment of a special administrator. It has longbeen settled that the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rulesregarding the appointment of regular administrators.


Executors and Administrators (Rules 81-85, Rules of Court)

Title: Mendoza vs. Pacheco and Cordero, G.R. No. 43351 (1937)

FactsFormer administrator Soriano filed a P5K bond, with respondent-appellants as

sureties. Upon accounting, Soriano was indebted to the estate for P23K and was unable toreturn it to the estate. New administrator Cosme demanded the execution of Soriano’s bond.The Court of First Instance of Laguna ordered such, after notice to the sureties. The saidcourt approved a settlement between the former and current administrators, whereby theformer ceded some real properties, reducing the debt from P 23, 000.00 to P5, 000.00. Ayear after, the new administrator requested the sheriff to levy the properties of the suretiesand advertise public sale thereof to collect the remaining unpaid debt of P5, 000.00. Suretiesfiled moved to be discharged from the bond but the court denied. They filed a Motion forReconsideration to CFI and appeal to the Supreme Court, but were all denied. The Courtruled that since they did not file an MR and appeal on the Execution order, their MR for thelevy was too late. The case was remanded to the CFI. They challenged, for the first time,that the CFI had no jurisdiction to issue execution of bond.Issue

Whether or not probate court can order execution of bond.Ruling

Yes. Probate court has the power to require the filing of the bond, fix the amountthereof, and hold it accountable for any breach of administrator’s duty. The surety is liablewithin the bond during accounting in the probate proceedings, not in another separateproceeding.


Title: Sison, et. al. vs. Teodoro, G.R. No. L-6704 (1956)

FactsThe CFI of Manila which had jurisdiction over the estate of Margarita David, issued an

order appointing appellant Carlos Moran Sison as judicial administrator withoutcompensation after filing a bond. After entering into his duties as administrator, he filed anaccounting of his administration which included items as an expense of administration thepremiums he paid on his bond.

One of the heirs, herein appellee Narcisa Teodoro, objected to the approval of theitems. The court approved the report but disallowed the items objected to on the groundthat these cannot be considered as expenses of administration. Moran Sison filed a motionfor reconsideration but was denied hence this appeal.Issue

Whether or not an executor or judicial administrator can validly charge the premiumson his bond as an expense of administration against the estate.Ruling

The Court ruled in the negative. The premiums paid by an executor or administratorserving without a compensation for his bond cannot be charged against the estate. FurtherSec. 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court does not authorize the executor or administrator tocharge to the estate the money spent for the bond. As held in the case of Sulit v. Santos (56Phil 626), the position of an executor or administrator is one of trust. The law safeguards theestates of deceased persons by making as a requirement for qualification the ability to givea suitable bond. The execution of said bond is therefore a condition precedent to acceptanceof the responsibilities of the trust. Further, the giving of the bond is not a necessary expensein the care, management, and settlement of the estate within the meaning of Sec. 680 ofthe Civil Code of Procedure, since such are the requirements after the executor oradministrator has already qualified for the office and has entered the performance of hisduties.


Title: De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-6476 (1955)

FactsPetitioner Francisco De Borja filed for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of

his deceased wife Josefa Tangco in 1940 with him later named as the executor thereof in1941. The records of the case were destroyed during the Pacific war but were reconstitutedin 1946 with Francisco De Borja qualified as executor and administrator. Due to his physicalcondition, Francisco was unable to fully administer the estate and upon petition of Matildede Borja, one of the heirs Crisanto de Borja was appointed and later qualified in 1951 as hisco-administrator.

In 1952, the Regional Trial Court without petition or notice to anyone appointed theprivate respondent Jose de Borja as co-administrator. Francisco, Crisanto, and Matilde movefor reconsideration of his appointment, which was indirectly denied by the respondent Judge.They subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the order appointing Jose as co-administrator and the order denying the motion for reconsideration, later filing acorresponding record of appeal which Tan refused to give due course holding that suchappointment is interlocutory and is hence, not appealable. Francisco et al filed for a petitionfor mandamus.

IssueWhether or not appointment of co-administrator is appealable.

Ruling

Yes, the appointment of a co-administrator is appealable. An order appointing aregular administrator is appealable as opposed to an order appointing a specialadministrator which is not appealable, being temporary and limited in time and for specificpurpose. A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all thepowers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. Hence, theappointment is also appealable and the petition for mandamus in this case, is granted.


Title: Uy Tiotico vs. Imperial and Panis, G.R. No. 29414 (1928)

FactsPetition for a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent judge from compelling the

petitioner to pay the sum of P11,250 to the respondent, Alejandro Panis, out of the funds ofthe estate of the deceased Basilisa Yangco, of which estate said petitioner is theadministrator. Respondent Panis was counsel for the administration of said estate.Issue

Whether or not Panis can enforce the payment of the attorney's fees out of the fundsof the estate.Ruling

No, The attorney can not hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees areallowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for thepayment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to theestate and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate.


Title: Rodriguez vs. Ynza, G.R. No. L-8290 - 8291 (1955)

FactsDionisio Ynza died testate in which the will was probated. There are 3 legatees, one

of which is the petitioner, and they were adulterous children of the testator. About 3 monthsafter the death of the testator and after the will was probated, one of the children andlegatees, Maria Cristina Ynza decided to sell as in fact she sold her share of one-third of allthe estates of Dionisio Ynza, to her co-legatees Julia Ynza and Jose Ynza, thereby leavingJose and Julia sole co-owners of said estates. Jose Ynza, thereafter, sold to his co-legatee andco-owner Julia his one-half share of the estate situated in the City of Iloilo as a result ofwhich, he remained half co-owner only of the properties situated in Negros Occidental. JuliaYnza died without issue in Iloilo, leaving a will which was probated in the Court of FirstInstance of Iloilo. In said will Julia left all her properties, real and personal, in the City of Iloiloto the Sisters Sofia Staub and Claudia Staub with a proviso that they have under their careher protegee Carmen Danuya. Jose Ynza filed a civil case against the executor of the will ofJulia Ynza alleging that he was the absolute owner of ½ pro indiviso with the late Julia Ynzaand other properties he shared with the latter.

IssueWhether or not petitioner is the absolute owner of such properties he shared with his

siblings.Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled, by going back to the fifth paragraph of the will of DionisioYnza, it may not be considered as accretion as apparently contemplated by the testator byhis employment of the word "accrecera". Under the old Civil Code, Article 982 thereof, thereis right of accretion in testamentary succession when two or more persons are called to thesame inheritance or to the same portion thereof without special designation of parts, andone of the persons so called die before the testator or renounces the inheritance or beincapable of receiving it. In the present case, the three persons called to the inheritance,namely, Jose, Julia, and Maria Cristina, survived the testator. However, the condition imposedin paragraph 5 of the will of Dionisio Ynza might possibly be regarded as a charge or trustlimiting the ownership and disposition of the 1/3 portion allotted to each of the legatees. Theintention of the testator might have been as contended by plaintiff-appellant to prevent theproperty from going into the hands of strangers and at the same time giving a right to thesurviving legatee or legatees the right to receive intact the one-third portion of the legateewho dies without issue. This right may naturally be renounced or waived by any of thelegatees who stand to benefit by it; and as to the condition that none of the properties orestate of Dionisio Ynza should go into the hands of strangers, since it is a condition notentirely unselfish, and it is not affected with public interest but on the contrary is ratheragainst public policy in that it limits the rights of ownership and free disposal of privateproperty, said condition may not be enforced at the instance of the State. It may be enforcedonly by the legatees who have an interest in its enforcement; but surely not by the legateewho from the very beginning not only had violated that condition but had renounced hisright to it. Under the condition imposed by paragraph 5 of the will of Dionisio Ynza, it may besupposed that in order to carry out the condition that the portion of the legatee dyingwithout issue should go to his surviving co-legatees, none of the legatees may dispose of hisone-third portion in his lifetime; and yet, both Jose Ynza and Julia Ynza not only allowedMaria Cristina to dispose of and sell her legacy of one-third portion, contrary to the provisionof the will.


Title: Tumang vs. Laguio, G.R. No. 50277 (1980)

FactsIn a special proceeding involving the estate of the late Dominador Tumang, his wife,

Magdalena, who is also the adminstratrix and executrix of the will, filed a petition to declarethe testate proceedings definitely terminated and closed with respect to her and her twochildren, Melba and Nestor. The petition was premised on the claim that the said heirs havealready received the properties adjudicated to them and that to be able to transfer the saidproperties in their names, there should be an order from the court declaring that the testateproceedings closed with regard to the said heirs. The petition was opposed by Guia Laguio,another child of Magdalena, on the ground that not all the properties adjudicated to themhave been delivered and that there could not be a partial termination of the proceedings.Magdalena, the administratrix withdrew the petition.

Issue1. Whether or not the court should have required the administratrix to render an

accounting of the cash and stock dividends received after the approval of her finalaccounting.

2. Whether or not the acceptance of the cash dividends by an heir constituted awaiver to demand such accounting.Ruling

On the first issue, yes, the Court held that the executor/administrator should accountfor his receipts and disbursements subsequent to his last accounting. Section 8 of Rule 85provides that the "executor or administrator shall render an account of his administrationwithin one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration * **,and be shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is whollysettled."

In the instant case, further accounts by the executrix appear to be in order, in view ofthe fact that the dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the final accountsrendered by the executrix. It appears that the interests of all the parties will be better servedand the conflict between petitioners and respondent will be resolved if such additionalaccounting is made. Further, "it has been held that an executor or administrator whoreceives assets of the estateafter he has filed on account should file a supplementaryaccount thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that it is only with respect to mattersoccurring after the settlement of final account that representatives will be compelled to filesupplementary account."

As to the second issue, as to the alleged waiver, SC held that the said acceptancedoes not constitute a waiver. The duty of an executor or administrator to render an accountis not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded.It is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before theadministration is finally ordered closed and terminated, to the end that no part of thedecedent's estate be left unaccounted for. The fact that the final accounts had beenapproved does not divest the court of jurisdiction to require supplemental accounting for,aside from the initial accounting, the Rules provide that "he shall render such furtheraccounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled."


Claims against the Estate (Rule 86, Rules of Court)

Title: Santos vs. Manarang, G.R. No. 8235 (1914)

FactsDon Lucas de Ocampo died, leaving certain real and personal property to his three

children through a last will and testament. The fourth clause of the will provided that hisdebt to the plaintiff be religiously paid his wife and executors in the form and at the timeagreed upon. The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly appointed to hearand determine such claims against the estate as might be presented. The committeesubmitted its report to the court .The plaintiff presented a petition to the court asking thatthe committee be required to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate whichwere recognized in the will of testator. This petition was denied by the court.

The plaintiff instituted the present proceedings against the administratrix of theestate to recover the sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied in the court.The plaintiff states that his failure to present the said claims to the committee was due to hisbelief that it was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his will,expressly recognized them and directed that they should be paid.

IssueMay the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the settlement of claims

against an estate by a committee appointed by the court be superseded by the contents of awill?

RulingThe Court ruled in the negative. The provisions of the code of civil procedure relating

to the settlement of claims against an estate by a committee appointed by the court cannotbe superseded by the contents of a will.

The Court racionated that the Code of Civil Procedure has established a system forthe allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. If it is unnecessary to presentsuch claim to the committee, the source of nonclaims is not applicable. It is not barred untilfrom four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code of CivilProcedure, establishing questions upon actions. If a debt is expressly recognized in the willmust be paid without its being verified, there is nothing to prevent a partial or totalalienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under a guise of a debt, since all of thelatter must be paid before the amount of the legal portion can be determined.

To allow a debt mentioned in the will in the amount expressed therein on the groundthat such was the desire of the testator, when, in fact, the debt had been wholly or partlypaid, would be not only unjust to the residuary heirs, but a reflection upon the good sense ofthe testator himself. The direction in the will for the executor to pay all just debts does notmean that he shall pay them without probate.


Title: Tan Sen Guan vs. Go Siu San, G.R. No. 22451 (1924)

FactsRecord shows that the plaintiff is the administrator of the intestate estate of Tan Peng

Sue, just as the defendant is the administrator in the testamentary proceeding for thesettlement of the estate of Antonio Tampoco; that, according to the books kept by thedefendant administrator, Antonio Tampoco owed Tan Peng Sue a certain sum of money; thatupon the death of Antonio Tampoco, which occurred on February 5, 1920, proceeding wasinstituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of his estate. OnDecember 14 of that year commissioners were appointed to hear and decide whatever claimmight be presented against the estate; that said commissioners qualified as such in duetime, and rendered their final report on June 27, 1921, which was approved by the courtbelow on July 14 of said year. On March 27, 1924, the lower court presided over by theHonorable Geo. R. Harvey, judge, after considering the motion for new trial, rendered a newdecision, setting aside that of December 22, 1923, and ordering the administrator of theestate of Antonio Tampoco to pay the administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue the sum ofP28,802.60, with interest thereon at the rate of 9 6/10 per cent annum from March 28, 1920.From this decision the administrator of the estate of Antonio Tampoco appealed, assigning aserror the decision of the lower court holding the claim presented as valid and effective at thetime it was presented, and not holding the same as extinguished at that time under the law.Issue

Whether or not the action has prescribed?Ruling

Under section 690, a creditor who has failed to present his claim within the periodfixed by the committee on claims may apply to the court, within six months after the periodpreviously fixed, for the renewal of the commission for the purpose of examining his claim.Also a creditor may make such application even after six months from the expiration of theperiod formerly fixed and before the final settlement of the estate, if the committee shallhave failed to give the notice required by section 687. The record shows that the applicationof the plaintiff was presented fourteen months after the expiration of the period fixed for thefiling of claims. And while it was presented before the final settlement of the estate ofAntonio Tampoco, yet, it having been proved that the committee had published in thenewspaper La Nacion the notice required by law, there was no possible ground for grantingsaid application. Even considering this application under section 113 of the Code of CivilProcedure, we believe that the lapse of fourteen months is an unsurmountable barrieropposing the granting of said application. It matters not that the defendant did not appealfrom the order of the lower court appointing new commissioners, if it is taken intoconsideration that it was entered beyond the authority given by section 690. And as thedefendant objected to said appointment, we believe that he is now entitled to raise the pointin this court. For the foregoing the judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is herebydeclared that the plaintiff appellee has lost his right to enforce his claim in this proceeding.


Title: De Villanueva vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-18403 (1963)

FactsFor the administration of the estate of her deceased husband, Pascual

Villanueva, the widow Mauricia G. Villanueva, on December 19, 1949, petitioned the Court ofFirst Instance of Agusan, for letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 67). The petition was setfor hearing and Notice thereof was published on February 25, March 4, and 11, 1950, in theManila Daily Bulletin. At the hearing, other heirs while agreeing to the placing of estateunder administration, opposed the appointment the widow. The name of Atty. Teodulo R.Ricaforte, suggested and all the parties agreed. After the taking the required oath, Atty.Ricaforte entered upon the performance of his duties. the defendant-appellant PhilippineNational Bank filed in the administration proceedings, Creditor of Pascual Villanueva,deceased, respectfully presents its claim against the estate of the said deceased.

The administrator, on November 5, 1954, opposed the alleging that he hadno knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegationstherein. The appellant PNB, on November 14, 1958, more than four (4) Years after theopposition of the claim presented by the administrator, filed a pleading captioned "Petitionfor an Extension of time within which to File the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging,among others, that Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the periodstated in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable;that its failure to present the claiming with the period stated in the notice, was its lack ofknowledge of administration proceedings, for while said maintains a branch office in Agusan,the employees did not come to know of the proceedings, the notice has been published inthe Morning Times, a newspaper very limited circulation.

IssueWhether or not the question is already barred.

RulingThe claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower court,

within which to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed orabout 1 year and 8 months late. This notwithstanding, appellant contends that it did notknow of such administration proceedings, not even its employees in the Branch Office inButuan City, Agusan. It is to be noted that the petition for Letters of Administration and theNotice to Creditors were duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the MorningTimes, respectively, which was a full compliance with the requirements of the Rules.Moreover, the supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of appellant andits employees had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence, consisting of adeposit of an amount of money by the administrator of the estate in said Bank (AgusanAgency). It is quite true that the Courts can extend the period within which to present claimsagainst the estate, even after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension should begranted under special circumstances. The lower did not find any justifiable reason to givethe extension and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had elapsed.WHEREFORE, the order subject of the appeal is hereby affirmed.


Title: Vera vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-31364 (1979)

FactsThe Government of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue filed a

motion for allowance of claim and order for payment of taxes representing the estate's taxdeficiencies in 1963 to 1964 in the intestate proceedings of Luis Tongoy. The administratoropposed arguing that the claim was already barred by the statute of non-claims under Sec. 5Rule 86, which was sustained by the Regional Trial Court. The government filed an appeal oncertiorari against the two orders of the court.Issue

Can the claim for taxes of the government be barred under statute of limitations?Ruling

No, the provision on statute of non-claims makes no mention of claims for monetary

obligation of the decedent created by law, such as taxes which is entirely of different

character from the claims expressly enumerated under Sec. 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must

necessarily, and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. The reason for the

more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of

exception from the application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. Taxes are the

lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain availability are imperious need.

Upon taxation depends the Government’s ability to serve the people for whosebenefit taxes are collected. To safeguard such interest, neglect or omission of governmentofficials entrusted with the collection of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm ordetriment to the people, in the same manner as private persons may be made to sufferindividually on account of his own negligence, the presumption being that they take goodcare of their personal affairs. This should not hold true to government officials with respectto matters not of their own personal concern. This is the philosophy behind thegovernment's exception, as a general rule, from the operation of the principle of estoppel.


Title: Paredes vs. Moya, G.R. No. L-28051 (1974)

FactsPetitioner Severino Parades commenced a suit on January 4, 1964 in CFI-Manila, as

Civil Case No. 55880, for the collection of separation and overtime pays against hisemployer, August Kuntze. On March 5, 1971, a decision was rendered against the defendantAugust Kuntze, from which judgment, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the casewas pending appeal in the said Court, August Kuntze died on June 19, 1972. Accordingly,plaintiff Parades (now petitioner) was duly notified. Thereafter, Carmencita D. NavarroKuntze, administratrix of the estate of the deceased, was substituted in his place as party inthe appealed case. On June 5, 1973 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in said CivilCase No. 55880 for appellant's failure to file the printed record on appeal, and so the recordof the case was ordered remanded respondent court.

A motion for execution was filed by plaintiff-appellee (petitioner Parades). On August22, 1973 the provincial Sheriff of Rizal levied on the properties of defendant-appellant (nowsubstituted by the Administratrix of the estate of the Deceased, consisting of two (2) lotscovered by TCT No. 45089 issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. In theauction sale conducted by the Sheriff of Rizal on October 2, 1973, plaintiff-appellee(petitioner Paredes) being the highest bidder, acquired said lot, as per certificate of salewhich was duly annotated in the back of TCT No. 45089. However, in spite of a Motion toQuash the Writ of Execution filed by respondent-appellant (Administratrix) on September 6,1973 and still pending resolution, Parades (plaintiff-appellee, below) sold the property heacquired in execution sale in favor of his co-petitioner, Victorio Ignacio on October 10, 1973.Issue

Whether or not the petitioner erred in filing his claim to have the money judgment inhis favor executed against the properties of the deceased Kuntze.Ruling

The Supreme Court held that it was error on the part of the petitioner, to have themoney judgment in his favor executed against the properties of the deceased Kuntze.Theproper remedy of plaintiff Paredes should have been to file his claim in the administrationproceedings of the estate of the deceased defendant Kuntze where private respondent is theadministratrix. As provided by law, all claims for money against the decedent, arising fromcontract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims forfuneral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment formoney against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice.


Title: Ignacio vs. Pampanga Bus Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-18936 (1967)

FactsIn 1951, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. (Pambusco) lodged its complaint against two

defendants Valentin Fernando and Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando. The suit was toupon a contractual obligation. In January, 1955, Elchico died. By this time, Pambusco hadalready presented its evidence and submitted its case. In March,1955, intestate proceedingswere filed and notice to the estate's creditors was given for them to file their claims withinsix months from the first publication of the notice.

The CFI rendered judgment in the civil case in favor of Pambusco.

In January, 1961, the judgment in the civil case having reached finality, Pambuscomoved in the intestate proceedings that the heirs and/or the present joint administratrices,be ordered to pay the share of the deceased in the judgment debt. The administratricesopposed.

IssueWhether or not Pambusco’s claim is time-barred.

RulingThe Court ruled in the negative. It matters not that Pambusco's said claim was filed

with the probate court without the six-month period from March, 1955, set forth in the noticeto creditors. For, Section 2, Rule 86, permits acceptance of such belated claims.

The claim was filed in the probate court on February 25, 1959, while the defendantsin the civil case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The record does not show that theadministrator objected thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of time. The pendencyof that case is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim. And, the order of finaldistribution is still to be given. The order of the lower court of allowing payment of appellee'sclaim "impliedly granted said appellee an extension of time within which to file said claim."The probate court's discretion has not been abused. It should not be disturbed.


Title: Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Icarañgal, G.R. No. 29414 (1928)

FactsThe defendant, with one Jacinto Figueroa, for value received, executed in favor of the

plaintiff a promissory note for one thousand six hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614), and insecurity for its payment, said the defendant also executed a real estate mortgage on aparcel of land in Pañgil, Laguna. Thereafter, the promissors defaulted in the payment of theagreed monthly instalments; wherefore, plaintiff instituted an action for the collection of theamount due on the note. Judgment was there rendered for the plaintiff. A writ of executionwas subsequently issued and, in pursuance thereof, the sheriff levied on the properties ofthe defendants, including that which has been mortgaged by the defendant in favor of theplaintiff. The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-partyclaim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution the property which was the subject of themortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it atthe public auction. By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale ofthe property and, in consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffremained unsatisfied. Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage.The trial court dismissed the complaint.

IssueWhether or not plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage

after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-appelleeon the promissory note for the payment of which the mortgage was constituted as asecurity.

RulingThe court ruled in affirmative. The Plaintiff appellant is barred from foreclosing the

real estate mortgage. The Court ruled that for non-payment of a note secured by mortgage,the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of actionconsists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, thecreditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosureof his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of thedebt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and themortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and bothrefer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action fora single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannotsplit up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, andthereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of thefirst complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file twoseparate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another toforeclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a singlebreach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppressionto the debtor.

The court also held that a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgagedebtor either a personal action for debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage. In otherwords, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his causeof action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.


Title: Soriano vs. Parsons, G.R. No. L-24008 (1970)

FactsThe defendant Parsons Hardware Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the

Company) was the holder of two mortgage deeds over four parcels of registered land, alllocated in the province of Cavite, executed in 1955 by the spouses Claro Soriano and IreneQuilao. After Soriano’s death, Quirino Soriano was appointed administrator of the former’sestate in special proceeding 6107 of the same court. Four years later, the Company sent aletter to the provincial sheriff of Cavite, requesting him to foreclose the mortgagesextrajudicially, pursuant to the terms of the mortgage deeds. Acting on this letter, the sheriffscheduled the public auction sale of the encumbered properties for November 12, 1962. OnDecember 20, 1963, the plaintiff, in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate ofClaro Soriano, lodged the present complaint, claiming that the foreclosure sale was void asthe Company, having priorly elected to pursue its claim in the intestate proceedings, couldnot in law be permitted to turn around and instead pursue the remedy of extrajudicialforeclosure. He therefore asked that the foreclosure sale be annulled and the propertiesobject thereof be ordered reverted to the estate of Claro Soriano.Issue

Whether or not the filing of the "Contingent Claim" by the Company in the intestateproceeding constituted a bar to the extrajudicial foreclosure sale thereafter had.Ruling

The Court affirmed the decision, dismissing the amended complaint. Section 7 of Rule87 (now Rule 86) does no more than provide the mortgage-creditor, in the interest ofspeedy, orderly and inexpensive settlement of the estate of a decedent, a choice of one ofthree courses of action for the satisfaction of its loan portfolio. An entirely distinct andindependent act, to be performed in conformity with procedures laid down by the Legislatureor by this Court, is still necessary to effectuate and achieve the remedy elected.

Thus, in this case, the mere fact that the Company formally informed the intestatecourt that it was electing to foreclose judicially its mortgages did not automatically operateas authority for the court motu propio to put into motion the machinery necessary for thejudicial foreclosure of the said securities. It was indispensable for the Company to file anindependent complaint for that specific purpose. The Company did no more than signify itselection of an option. The Company never intended to abandon its securities because by thevery terms of its "Contingent Claim" it explicitly and unequivocally indicated that it wouldrely, basically, upon the mortgages, reserving its right to ask for a deficiency judgment, if,after a judicial foreclosure of its securities, a portion of the loan remained unsatisfied. Nodoubt, the Company elected the second remedy. But election by the creditor of any of thethree options is not jurisdictional, and as long as no positive forward step has been taken byhim in pursuance of the option selected, he is not precluded from dropping the optionalready chosen and resorting to any of the two other options available to him.


Title: Sps. Suria vs. Heirs of Brigido Tomolin, G.R. No. 157483 (2007)

Facts

Brigido M. Tomolin has the owner of Lot located at Agusan del Sur. It was registeredin his name. Tomolin sold the lot to Carlos Suria. After the sale, Carlos Suria and his wifeJuanita, also a petitioner, had the lot subdivided into several parcels.

Tomolin filed with the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Annulment of the Deed ofAbsolute Sale of a Parcel of Land and Cancellation of TCT with Prayer for a Writ ofPreliminary Injunction against petitioners. The complaint alleges, among others, thatTomolin, then seriously ill, was inveigled by petitioners into signing the contract of sale andthat they did not pay him the amount of P228,200.00.

Tomolin filed with the trial court an amended complaint, Tomolin died. He wassurvived by his nieces.Issue

Is the subtstitution of the late Tomolin by his heirs valid?Ruling

There can be no dispute that Tomolin’s complaint affects primarily and principallyproperty and property rights. Clearly, the action survives his death. Thus, the Court ofAppeals did not err in affirming the trial court’s judgment allowing the substitution of thelate Tomolin.


Title: Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation,G.R. No. 147561 (2006)

FactsOn May 24, 1989, Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation entered into a contract with Jose

D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and adrainage system in Republic-Asahi’s compound in Barrio Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. Republic-Asahi was to pay JDS. JDS posted a performance bond which executed, jointly and severallywith Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc (SICI).

Due to alleged slow pace of construction, Republic-Asahi extrajudicially rescinded thecontract without prejudice for recovery of damages from JDS and its sureties. Through thefiling of the complaint, Republic-Asahi sought to recover the amount expended to completethe project using another contractor. SICI filed its answer and interposed the defense thatthe money claims against it and JDS have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos,Jr. The lower court dismissed the complaint of Republic-Asahi, but it was reversed by theCourt of Appeals. Hence, SICI filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.Issue

Whether or not the death of the party extinguishes the liability of a solidary obligor.Ruling

No, as a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does notextinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when thetransmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of theobligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselvesare extinguished by death.

Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out theobligations under the performance bond.


Actions by and against Executors and Admnistrators

Title: Lopez vs. Olbes, G.R. No. 5480 (1910)

FactsOn October 13, 1908, Ricardo Lopez et al. brought suit against Adolfo Olbes, the

testamentary executor of the deceased Martina Lopez (the mother of Ricardo andgrandmother of the other plaintiffs), alleging in their complaint that Martina executed apublic instrument whereby she donated to plaintiffs a parcel of hemp land situated at theplace called Ali, in the pueblo of Guinobatan, Albay and that the said Olbes, as executor,claimed to have rights of ownership and possession to the said land adverse to those thenheld by the plaintiffs, inasmuch as the said estate still continued to belong to the deceasedMartina Lopez and was then in charge of a trustee by virtue of an agreement had betweenthe attorneys of the executor and the plaintiff Ricardo, and of the order issued by the courtin the aforesaid probate proceedings. The complaint concluded by asking that judgment berendered in the latter’s favor and against the defendant for the ownership and possession ofthe said land.

The defendant filed a demurrer in writing alleging that the plaintiffs, as the heirs ordonees could not maintain any suit against the testamentary executor to recover the title orpossession of the land so long as the court had not adjudicated the estate to them or untilthe time allowed for paying the debts should have expired, unless they be given possessionof the said land by the executor. The trial court sustained the demurrer of the defendant anddismissed the case.Issue

Whether or not the plaintiffs have the right of ownership and possession over theparcel of hemp land.Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative The action exercised by Ricardo et al is basedon the rights which as such donees had acquired by virtue of the donation inter vivos madeby Martina Lopez during her lifetime on favor of plaintiffs by an instrument the donor, adonation expressly accepted on the same date by the donees and of which acceptance thedonor was also informed on the same date; wherefore, these requirements of the law havingbeen complied with, it is unquestionable that the dominion over the land donated wasproperly transmitted to the donees who in fact and by operation of law acquired theownership of the property, as customarily occurs in all contracts of transfer of dominion.

Property of the testate estate of the deceased Martina Lopez is not here concerned.During her lifetime she gave away the land mentioned, in the exercise pertained to her asowner. By virtue of the said donation the sole and true owners of the land donated are theplaintiffs, so long as said donation is not proven null, inefficacious, or irregular. All thequestions which by reason of the same are raised by the interested parties must be heard ina regular trial and decided by a final judgment absolutely independent of the probateproceedings concerning the estate of the deceased, who was the previous owner of the landconcerned; and therefore the complaint of the donees should not have been dismissed, butthe trial should have been proceeded with to final judgment.


Payment of the Debts of the EstateSales, Mortgages and other Encumbrances of the Property of Decedent

Distribution and Partition of the Estate(Rules 88-90 Rules of Court)

Title: Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz and Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 41354 (1934)

FactsIn the intestate proceeding, the administrator filed a petition to authorize the sale of

two parcels of land and which the lower court granted. Consequently, the administratorexecuted a deed of sale in favor of De Guzman and De La Roma. Later, Igmidio and Pedro,legitimate sons of Gregorio de la Cruz filed a petition questioning the jurisdiction of the lowercourt to order the sale without complying with the provisions of the section of the Code ofCivil Procedure. The lower court denied the petition.Issue

Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to order the sale.Ruling

No. The orders of the lower court are set aside and the sale of the two parcels of landmade by virtue of such orders is declared null and void.

Section 722 provides, among other things, that when an executor or administratorconsiders it necessary or beneficial to sell real or personal estate… he may make applicationto the court having jurisdiction of the estate, and such court may grant license …under thefollowing regulations:

1. The executor or administrator shall present to the court his petition in writing,setting forth the amount of debts due from the deceased, with charges ofadministration, the value of the personal estate, situation of the estate to be sold, orsuch other facts as show that the sale is necessary or beneficial;

The petition of the administrator in this case does not set forth the value of thepersonal estate nor does it allege that there is no personal estate nor that if there be suchits sale would redound to the detriment of the interests of the participants therein.

It is held that the averment as to the value of the personal estate of a deceasedperson, in a probate proceeding, is an essential and necessary requisite to a petition for thesale of real estate and that a Court of First Instance acquires no jurisdiction to order suchsale if that averment does not appear in the petition; that such an order is void and that asale of real estate by virtue of such an order is null and void.


Title: Godoy vs. Orellano, G.R. No. 16584 (1921)

FactsIn consideration of the amount of P1, 000 received by the appellant, Felisa Pañgilinan,

a document was executed by her giving the plaintiff- appellee an option to buy a dredge forthe sum of P10,000. It appears from that document that the dredge is the common propertyof the vendor and of the defendants. The condition was that the plaintiff was to pay thewhole price of the dredge within twenty days and that said option was granted inaccordance with the power of attorney executed by her co-owners who reserved the right toratify whatever sale might be made, or option granted by Pañgilinan, their attorney-in-fact.The latter's co-owners did not ratify the option contract. Before the expiration of twentydays, the plaintiff appelle was ready to make complete payment of the price, but theappellant failed to deliver the dredge. Then the plaintiff- appellee brought suit against FelizaPañgilinan, and the defendants praying that they be ordered to deliver the dredge, uponpayment by him of the sum of P9,000.

The defendants Orellano alleged that the dredge in question was the property of theintestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in the Court of First Instance ofManila.Furthermore, They alleged that the plaintiff perfectly knows that said dredge is underjudicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority, and that the court hasnever authorized the sale.

IssueWhether or not the sale of the dredge is valid.

RulingThe Court ruled in the negative. The sale of the aforesaid dredge by the

administratrix, or her promise to sell it is null and void. The Rules of Court provides that inthe sale of the property of an intestate estate for the benefit of the heirs, a proceedings tobe had before an administrator of an intestate or testate estate may sell personal or realproperty.

A sale and conveyance by executors without an order of the probate court, under awill devising property to them in trust, but not authorizing any sale of the realty, otherwisethan by a direction to pay the debts of the testator, is void, and passes no title to thepurchase. Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale ofproperties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirsof Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect, andthis is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratifythe option contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney. It is in the opinion of theCourt that the judicial administratrix of the intestate estateappellant was not legallyauthorized to sell, or contract to sell, any property belonging to said estate without theauthority of the court, and the contract entered into by her with the plaintiff, without thisauthority, is null and void.


Title: Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39044 (1985)

FactsOn November 21, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a probate

court in the special proceedings of the testate estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda,authorized Vicente Legarda, as special co-administrator, to sell the Legarda TambuntingSubdivision. On December 10, 1952, Vicente Legarda as co-administrator allegedly sold anarea of about 280 square meters of the subdivision denominated as Lot 6, Block 4 situatedat Dinalupihan, Tondo, Manila at P30.00 per square meter to Abelardo Lucero. The sale wason an instalment basis and Lucero paid an initial amount of P200.00 by virtue of which areceipt was issued by Legarda. On the same day, Lucero took possession of the lot. On July31, 1956, the court issued another order authorizing the Philippine Trust Company asadministrator, to sell the subdivision at the earliest possible time at the best obtainableprice.

Issue1. Whether or not the sale of the lot to Lucero is valid.2. Whether or not the approval of the probate court is necessary for the validity of the

sale.

RulingThe Supreme Court ruled that the alleged sale made by Legarda to Lucero did not

bind the Legarda-Tambunting estate, much less, the petitioner who acquired the property indispute with the approval of the probate court and in a sole reliance on the clean title of thesaid property. As correctly ruled by the trial court: "The plaintiff (petitioner), as theregistered owner of the property, is entitled to the possession thereof, unless the defendant(private respondent) could show that he is entitled to its possession or to purchase thesame. The property was advertised for sale, but neither Abelardo Lucero nor the defendantherein appeared in the testate proceedings of Clara Tambunting de Legarda to claim theirright to the particular lot in question. The records of the testate proceedings of ClaraTambunting de Legarda did not show that any claim was made by Dr. Abelardo Lucero or bythe defendant herein. The alleged sale made by Vicente Legarda in favor of Dr. Lucero didnot bind the estate, for aside from the fact that no formal deed of sale was executed byVicente Legarda specifying the terms thereof, it was never approved by the Court. Sales ofimmovable properties by the administrators did not bind the estate and have no validityunless they are approved by the Court. Moreover, the alleged receipt issued by VicenteLegarda does not constitute even a memorandum of sale, because it did not specify theprice of the land and the manner of payment

The Court also found that the appellate court committed an error of law when it heldthat the sale of the lot in question did not need the approval of the probate court. Althoughthe Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belongingto an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of thecourt, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity of such court.


Title: Dael vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68873 (1989)

FactsVictorina Durana died intestate on August 1, 1977 in Manila; she was the wife of the

deceased Cesario Cabutihan who died earlier on June 9, 1972. Cabutihan was first married toBienvenida Durana. Less than a year thereafter he married Victorina Durana, sister of hisfirst wife. The first marriage of Cesario Cabutihan had five children and who are theintervenors. The second marriage with Victorina Durana did not produce any issue. Duringthe second marriage, they were engaged in a copra business and a public transportationbusiness. One of the private respondents herein, who filed a petition for the settlement ofthe intestate estate of Victorina Durana, wherein she also prayed for her appointment asadministratrix. Petitioners herein filed an opposition, asking that the letters of administrationbe issued instead to herein petitioner Lucilda Dael. The court below appointed Amado Zoletaas special administrator of the estate of the late Victorina Durana. Said specialadministrator, upon order of the probate court, submitted an inventory of the properties ofthe estate. a "Supplementary Inventory" was filed by the special administrator coveringother real properties of the estate of Victorina, Private respondents moved for thedisapproval of said inventories claiming that the properties listed therein were eitheracquired during the first marriage of Cesario Cabutihan or were merely the products or fruitsof the properties of said first union or otherwise acquired through the funds thereof. The trialcourt rendered a decision holding that Victorina Durana had no paraphernal propertiesbrought or contributed to her marriage with Cesario Cabutihan. The probate court therebydisapproved both inventories and annulled the extrajudicial settlement and deed of salementioned earlier. The latter two were annulled for being simulated or fictitious and forinvolving conjugal properties of the first marriage, including properties of Bienvenida, towhich Victorina is not an heir.

IssueWhether or not the appellate court committed an error in affirming the order of the

lower court.Ruling

So much of the judgments of both lower courts as declare that all the propertieslisted in the two inventories are conjugal partnership assets of the deceased spousesCesario Cabutihan and Bienvenida Durana are hereby SET ASIDE. The properties thereinenumerated shall be divided in the following manner: (a) Seven-twelfths (7/12) of fifteentwenty-ninths (15/29), and one-half (1/2) of fourteen twenty-ninths (14/29), of the propertieslisted in the inventory dated August 30, 1978, as well as all the properties listed in thesupplementary inventory dated January 16, 1979, shall constitute the estate of CesarioCabutihan. This estate shall be divided equally among his six (6) heirs, and (b) Theremaining five-twelfths (5/12) of fifteen twenty-ninths (15/29) of the properties in saidinventory shall belong to the said five (5) children, share and share alike, as their respectiveparticipations in their mother's inheritance.


Title: Reyes vs. Baretto-Datu, G.R. No. L-17818 (19267)

FactsBibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime, they

acquired vast estate (real property in Manila, Pampanga and Bulacan). When Bibiano died,he l e f t h i s sha re i n a w i l l t o Sa l ud Barre t to ( and Luc ia M i l ag ros Barretto;and a small portion as legacies to his sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and hisnephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for Maria (the widow).

As appointed administratrix, Maria prepared a project of partition, signedby her in her ownb e h a l f a n d a s g u a r d i a n o f t h e m i n o r M i l a g r o s . I tw a s a p p r o v e d , a n d t h e e s t a t e w a s distributed and the shares delivered.Salud took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of OCTsand issuance of new titles in her name.Upon Maria’s death, it was discovered that sheexecuted two wills in the first,she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; in thesecond, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. Thelater will was allowed.

IssueWhether or not Maria Geraldo has the authority to sign the partition as a guardian.

RulingThe Court ruled in the negative. During the project of partition of the property of the

deceased the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros Baretto are pending inthe court, does not mean that the guardian had not been appointed; it meant that theguardianship proceedings had not yet been terminated, and as a guardianship proceedingsbegin with the appointment of a guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been appointed whenshe signed the project of partition. There is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or error in theproject of partition, apparent on the record of the testate proceedings, which shows thatMaria Gerardo had no power of authority to sign of partition as guardian of the minor LuciaMilagros Baretto, and, consequently, no ground for the contention that the order approvingthe project of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked collaterally in theproceedings.


Title: Garcia vs. Orozco, G.R. No. L-35213 (1978)

FactsThe original plaintiffs, Serafin Orozco, Carmen Orozco, Merced Orozco and Arsenio

Orozco, are brothers and sisters and the natural children of the deceased EpifanioOrozco,with another woman. Epifanio Orozco had married Albina Garcia, sister of the originaldefendants, namely, Juan Garcia and Baldomera Garcia. The marriage was not blessed witha child.

During the marriage with Albina Garcia, the land in Mataguisi Guinobatan wasacquired by Epifanio Orozco. It also appears that the land in Malobago, Guinobatan. WhenEpifanio Orozo died on August 20,1917, he was survived by Albina Garcia, his widow, andSerafin Orozco, Carmen Orozco, Merced Orozco and Arsenio Orozco, his acknowledgednatural children.

After the death of Epifanio Orozco, his widow, Albina Garcia, executed the deed ofsale, conveying the land in Mataguisi to Baldomera Garcia for a consideration of P4,400.00.

In the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of EpifanioOrozco, one of his acknowledged natural children, original plaintiff Serafin Orozco, wasappointed as administrator. As judicial administrator, Serafin Orozco brought an action onJuly 22, 1929, for the recovery of lots located in Mataguisi, Guinobatan, and lots located inMalobago, same town.

Pursuant to the Convenio submitted by the parties , the lower court renderedjudgment on August 10, 1932, adjudicating, among other properties lots composing thelands in Mataguisi, Guinobatan, and lots composing the lands in Malobago, same town, tothe intestate estate of Epifanio Orozco, while the other properties involved therein weregiven to Albina Garcia as her share in the conjugal partnership. Subsequently, ownership ofthe parcels of land involved in the instant case were adjudicated to the estate of EpifanioOrozco. Such being the case, and inasmuch as the plaintiffs-appellees are the naturalchildren of the late Epifanio Orozco, the lower court correctly held that they are entitled tothe parcels of land in question, the ownership of which had been adjudicated in his Epifaniosfavor as early as in 1932.

The decision expressly stated that Albina Garcia no longer had the usufructuary rightas a widow of the deceased Epifanio Orozco in view of her waiver. By virtue of the writ ofexecution issued to enforce the judgment in Civil Case No. 5127, Serafin Orozco, asadministrator of Epifanio Orozco, was placed in possession of the lands adjudicated to theestate by the sheriff in November 1932.

Not long thereafter, Juan Garcia re-entered the lands in question and extra judicially ejectedtherefrom Serafin Orozco. Since that date until the present, the plaintiffs have not been ableto possess said lands.

In a separate action, Orozco et. al. sought to recover from Garcia the two parcels ofland, one situated at Mataguisi Guinobatan, Albay, alleging that they are the absoluteowners of the parcels of land in question and that the defendants in bad faith dispossessedthe former of their possession thereof. Defendants interposed the defense absoluteownership of the parcels of land involved by virtue of the deeds of sale executed in theirfavor.

After the case had been heard on the merits, the court a quo on April 28, 1944,rendered a decision, declaring the plaintiffs joint owners of the lands in question, andordering the, defendants to deliver the possession of said lands to the former. Consequently,


the orig defendants-appellants interposed an appeal within the reglementary period.However, before the records of the case could be elevated to the Court of Appeals, the samewas destroyed when the provincial capitol building where the court house was located wasdestroyed by bombs and fire during the liberation of Albay. Since it can not be reconstitutedexcept the record on appeal, the lower court ordered that the case will be tried de novo.Nevertheless, the trial court ruled in favor of Oroszo et. al with the defendant coming to thesuccor of the Court of Appeals.Issue

Whether or not the Court the deed of sale between Albina Garcia and BaldomeraGarcia is valid.Ruling

No, the deed of sale is not valid as to prejudice the inheritance of the heirs. Thejudgment made pursuant to the convenio awarded the other properties involved thereinwere given to Albina Garcia as her share in the conjugal partnership, the decision expresslystating that Albina Garcia no longer had the usufructuary right as widow of the deceasedEpifanio Orozco in view of her waiver. This judgment had long become final and executory.Considering that the petitioners Baldomera Garcia and Juan Garcia are the sister and brotherof the widow Albina Garcia, that Juan Garcia lived with his sister Albina Garcia and that JuanGarcia merely administered the properties for her, the Court held that Baldomera Garcia andJuan Garcia were not strangers to nor third parties in the proceedings against their sister,Albina Garcia.

For whatever right or interest Baldomera Garcia had in the Mataguisi properties whichshe claims were prejudiced by the act of her sister, the widow Albina Garcia, in renouncingher rights to the Mataguisi and Malobago properties and further agreeing accordingly to theconvenio which became the basis of the judgment in Civil Case No. 5127, BaldomeraGarcia's right of action was against her own sister, the widow Albina Garcia, as the vendorthereof.

When the widow agreed to the partition of the properties left by her husband andaccepted other lots instead of those in Mataguisi which she had previously sold to her sister,Baldomera Garcia, the latter had a right of action against the former. To uphold the validityof the sale made by the widow in favor of her sister would give more share to the widowthan she was entitled to and had agreed upon with the heirs of her husband, therespondents herein.


Title: Divinagracia vs. Rovira, G.R. No. L-42615 (1976)

FactsFeliciano Divinagracia died and survived by his wife and 4 daughters. The notice of

his death was published in 2 local periodicals and in Manila Times. Two days after his death,a petition was filed in the CFI of Iloilo for the settlement of his estate. The order waspublished. Emilia, one of the daughters, qualified as administratix. She administered theestate for 7 years and paid the estate and inheritance taxes. In April 1971, she submitted tothe court a final accounting and project of partition with a prayer of closure of theproceeding. The court approved and proceeding was declared closed and terminated. Thepartition was duly registered.

On June 1971 or after the order of closing the intestate proceeding had become final,Camilo Divinagracia filed a motion to reopen it and set aside the order of closure. He allegedthat he was an illegitimate child of the decedent and that he came to know the intestateproceeding only when he was transferred as a government employee from Masbate to Iloilo.

The administratix opposed. The probate court set aside its prior order of closure.Issue

Whether or not an intestate proceeding, which had already been closed, can still bereopened so as to allow a spurious child to present evidence on his filiation and to claim hisshare in the decedent’s estate.Ruling

The Supreme Court held in negative. A closure order of an intestateproceeding is already final and executor. The motion to reopen it was not filed within the 30-day reglementary period counted from the date the order of closure was served on theadministratix. The closure order could not be disturbed anymore. Moreover, the order ofreopening of the intestate proceeding was predicated on the false assumption that there hadbeen no liquidation of the conjugal partnership and no declaration of heirs. The truth is thatthe project of partition and distribution, with final accounting, which was submitted by theadministratix and approved by the probate court, contained a liquidation of the conjugalpartnership and a statement as to who were the decedent’s heirs and what were theirrespective hereditary shares.


Title: Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947 (1997)

FactsPrivate respondent Rosalia Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan Sanchez and Maria

Villafranca while private respondents Arturo Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugodare the legitimate children of Rosalia. Petitioners Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrnaare the illegitimate children of Juan Sanchez. Following the death of her mother in 1967,Rosalia filed on January 22, 1968, thru counsel, a petition for letters of administration overthe estate of her mother and the estate of her father, Juan Sanchez, who was at the time instate of senility. Before the administration proceedings could formally be terminated andclosed, Juan Sanchez died. Petitioners, as heirs of Juan Sanchez, filed a petition for letters ofadministration over the intestate estate of Juan Sanchez, which petition was opposed byRosalia. On October 30, 1969, however, Rosalia and the petitioners assisted by theirrespective counsels executed a compromise agreement wherein they agreed to divide theproperties of the late Juan Sanchez. The compromise agreement was not approved by theprobate court.Issue

Whether or not the compromise agreement partitioning the estate without theapproval of the probate court is valid.Ruling

The Court ruled in the affirmative. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines acompromise agreement as “a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocalconcessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” Being aconsensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicialapproval is not required for its perfection. Petitioners’ argument that the compromise wasnot valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Courtof Appeals[ where the Court ruled:

“It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. Acompromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting ofthe minds of the parties to the contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon; see also De losReyes v. de Ugarte.) And from that moment not only does it become binding uponthe parties (De los Reyes v. De Ugarte, supra ), it also has upon them the effect andauthority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judiciallyapproved (Meneses v. De la Rosa; Vda. De Guilas v. David; Cochingyan v. Cloribel”

However, although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case isessentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that“[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees ordevisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, acompromise, or any other transaction.” For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of theRules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left nowill; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirsand liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by theirjudicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of apublic instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. We find that all theforegoing requisites are present in this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties’compromise agreement/partition in this case.


Title: Vda. De Gurrea vs. Suplico, G.R. No. 144320 (2006)

FactsThe lot in question was originally owned by one of herein plaintiffs’ Attorney-in-Fact,

Rosalina Gurrea. In 1958, Rosalina Gurrea transferred the ownership of said lot to AdelinaGurrea and continued to be the owner of the lot until her death. A Special Proceedings wasinstituted to have the will she executed during her lifetime probated and to settle her estate.Under the said will, the San Juan lot was bequeathed to Pilar and Luis Gurrea, while ¼ of thelot in Baguio City and a one-hectare piece of land in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental weregiven to Ricardo Gurrea. Ricardo Gurrea, represented by the defendant, filed an Opposition.In consideration of said representation, Ricardo Gurrea agreed to pay the defendant "acontingent fee of twenty (20%) of whatever is due him either real or personal property.During the pendency of the proceedings and upon the oral instructions of Ricardo Gurrea,The defendant negotiated with the other heirs of Adelina Gurrea. The heirs arrived at anamicable settlement regarding the estate of Adelina Gurrea.

As payment of his attorney’s fees, Ricardo Gurrea offered the San Juan lot to the defendantwho was initially hesitant to accept the same as the property is occupied by squatters.However, in order not to antagonize his client, defendant agreed to Ricardo Gurrea’sproposal with the further understanding that he will receive an additional commission of 5%if he sells the Baguio property. The Defendant obtained a title/TCT to the San Juan propertyunder his name.

Ricardo Gurrea died and after his death, his heirs instituted petition for the settlement ofRicardo Gurrea’s estate. The estate’s administrator, Carlos Gurrea, filed an Inventory ofProperties left by the decedent, which did not initially include the property subject of thiscase. The said lot was included only subsequently in the Amended Inventory.

Petitioners conclude that at the time the Transfer of Rights and Interest was notarized, thereis no dispute that the subject property still formed part of the estate of Adelina Gurrea andwas, therefore, still the subject of litigation. Hence, the transfer of rights and interest overthe subject property in favor of respondent is null and void.

IssueWhether the subject Transfer of Rights and Interest executed even before the estate

proceedings were closed and terminated.

RulingThe Court ruled in the affirmative that the subject Transfer of Rights and Interest was

executed even before the estate proceedings were closed and terminated.

The Court agree with the petitioners’ undisputed contention that when the deed ofTransfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the title over the subject lot was still in thename of Adelina Gurrea and that it was only on October 7, 1980 that the title wastransferred in the name of Ricardo. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution ofthe estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closedand terminated.The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration onlyafter the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled toreceive the same.In the present case, while the subject lot was assigned as Ricardo’s sharein the project of partition executed by the heirs of Adelina Gurrea, the title over the subject


lot was still in the name of the latter and was not yet conveyed to Ricardo when the Transferof Rights and Interest was executed.

It follows that, since at the time of execution of the deed of Transfer of Rights andInterest, the subject property still formed part of the estate of Adelina, and there being noevidence to show that material possession of the property was given to Ricardo, the probateproceedings concerning Adelina’s estate cannot be deemed to have been closed andterminated and the subject property still the object of litigation.

Having been established that the subject property was still the object of litigation atthe time the subject deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the assignment ofrights and interest over the subject property in favor of respondent is null and void for beingviolative of the provisions of Article 1491 of the Civil Code which expressly prohibits lawyersfrom acquiring property or rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they maytake part by virtue of their profession.


Guardianship (Rules 92-97, Rules of Court; AM No. 03-02-05-SC 2003-05-01)

Title: Guy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163707 (2006)

FactsThe case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy

Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledgedillegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented by theirmother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administrationbefore the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with hissurviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debtshence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The otherheirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shoppingshould have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel. Petitioners further alleged thatthe claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that inexchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and herminor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.

The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplementalmotion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, shecould not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to thecertificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lowercourt. Hence, this petition.Issue

Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards.Ruling

No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardiansmust necessarily obtain judicial approval. Repudiation of inheritance must pass the court'sscrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by thecourt, the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could nothave waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimatechildren of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a rightwhich, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.

The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of theclaimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Itsjurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, withthe determination of heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of actionmay be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other toclaim inheritance.


Title: Paciente vs. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. L-58319 (1982)

FactsLeonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres, and two minor

children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land.This lot which he had inherited from hisdeceased father, Felizardo Homeres. The said lot was sold to Conchita Dumdum which wasalso sold to petitioner Patria Paciente.Consequently,she was issued TCT by the Register ofDeeds of Tacloban City. Homeres filed a petition for guardianship over the persons andestate of the minors. The petition was granted and took her oath as guardian. The actingCity Register filed a manifestation informing respondent court that Lot No. 3085-G which isthe subject of the guardianship proceedings had been registered in the name of thepetitioner and it was mortgaged to the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation. Therespondent court issued an order directing the petitioner and the manager of the bank toappear before the court and show cause why TCT covering a parcel of land co-owned by theminors should not be cancelled for having been alienated without authority from the court.Petitioner contends that respondent court in hearing a petition for guardianship is not theproper situs for the cancellation of a Torrens Title.

IssueWhether or not the respondent court acting as a guardianship court has jurisdiction

to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the transfer certificate of title of petitioner.Ruling

The Court held that the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to issue his order. In theguardianship proceedings requiring the petitioners to deliver the rentals collected by themto the guardian and authorizing the latter to collect rentals in the future, for the reason thatthe jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite personssuspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward forthe purpose of obtaining information which may be used in action later to be instituted bythe guardian to protect the right of the ward; and that only in extreme cases, where propertyclearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been judicially decided,may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.

Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the delivery or returnof the property conveyed are concerned, the Court found the orders of the respondent courtvalid. The petitioner's contentions in this regard are untenable. Even the aforecited casesrelied upon do not support her argument.

It was ruled that where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed orconveyed is in question, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the wardor in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property mustbe determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings.

In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear andindisputable. They inherited a part of the land in question from their father. The sale of thisland, where they are co-owners, by their mother without the authority of the guardianshipcourt is illegal.


Title: Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, G.R. No. 10058 (1915)

FactsThe petitioner herein was a young man, 21 years of age, the owner of property

valued at nearly P1,000,000, and temporarily traveling abroad at the time the proceedingswere had which terminated in the declaration that he was a spendthrift and the appointmentof a guardian of his property.Issue

Whether or not petitioner is spendthrift and appointing a guardian for his propertywas valid.Ruling

No. There is no evidence of any kind was taken in the case so far as appears ofrecord, and the court, in making the order of prodigality and decreeing the appointment of aguardian, had no more knowledge of the alleged spendthrift's incompetency to manage hisaffairs that he had before the petition was presented.It would be a strange condition ofaffairs indeed if a citizen and resident of the Philippine Islands could be declared to be anincompetent and his property taken from his management and control by the nakedallegation of one stranger admitted by the naked concession of another stranger.


Title: Zafra-Sarte vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-23976 (1970)

FactsOn November 3, 1961, herein petitioner Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte petitioned the Juvenile

and Domestic Relations Court for the appointment of a legal guardian over the person andproperty of Remigia Zafra, whom said respondent herein alleged to be an incompetentperson, afflicted with mental disorder and other ailments which rendered her incapable totake care of herself and to manage her property. In her verified petition, Exaltacion prayedfor her appointment as the legal guardian of the person and property of Remigia, claimingthat she is a niece of the latter, being a daughter of her (Remigia's) sister. Said petition was,however, opposed by Julian Lua, who claimed that he and Remigia Zafra have lived togetheras common-law husband and wife for more than 30 years, and by Francisco Unabia, whoclaimed that he is a half-brother of the alleged incompetent. The oppositors prayed thateither of them be appointed legal guardian of Remigia, should she be found incompetent.

The court that hears the petition granted the pettion of Zafra-Sarte.Issue

Whether or not the respondent court has power to suspend the effectivity of an orderappointing a guardian in the event of the appeal therefrom.Ruling

The Supreme Court held that the order declaring the incompetency and appointing aguardian was good, until reversed or set aside, and authorized the guardian, in spite of theappeal, to do whatever was necessary under the direction of the Court, to protect theproperty of the incompetent. The above consideration does not detract from the generalprinciple announced that such appointment of a guardian should be considered good untilreversed or set aside on appeal.

Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is reversed.


Title: Pardo de Tavera vs. El Hogar Fil. Inc., et. al., G.R. No. L-5893 (1956)

FactsCarmen Pardo De Tavera, eleven years old, is one of the co-owners of a parcel of land. Theco-owners agreed to organize a corporation under the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. and toaccept shares of stock of the corporation to be organized in exchange for their respectiveshares. The duly appointed guardian of Carmen filed a petition in the probate proceeding forthe approval of such agreement.

Later, Carmen, already of legal age, brought an action to annul the transfer of herright, share and interest in the property made by her guardian to Tavera-Luna, Inc. Plaintiffcontends that the probate court's order is a nullity because the provisions of section569, Act No. 190, the law then in force, were not complied with and for thatreason the probate court was without jurisdiction to order the transfer of her share in theproperty to the corporation to be organized and formed.

IssueWhether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed order.

RulingThe Court ruled in the affirmative. That the probate court in guardianship

proceedings had jurisdiction over the petition filed by the guardian admits of no doubt. Onlyupon the ground of lack of jurisdiction may an order entered by a court be assailedcollaterally. If the court had jurisdiction, irregularities in the proceedings which would orcould invalidate the court’s order may be assailed directly by means of an appeal but notcollaterally.

In her petition, the guardian alleged that the transfer of her ward’s share in the propertyto the corporation then to be organized would be to or for her benefit and sheexpected that the construction of a new building would enhance the value of herward’s share in the property and increase her income. No other consideration or motivecould have prompted the guardian, mother of the minor, to fi le the petition. It isnot necessary for a grant of authority to the guardian to sell the estate of the ward tostate that the income “is insufficient to maintain the ward and his family or to maintain oreducate the ward when a minor.” It is enough, as the other alternative of the law provides,that “it appears to the satisfaction of the court that it is for the benefit of the ward that hisreal estate or some part thereof should be sold, and the proceeds thereof put out at interest,or invested in some productive security.”


Title: Crisostomo vs. Endencia, G.R. No. 45623 (1938)

FactsThe Petitioner is the appointed guardian of Incompetent Petrona Crisostomo. While

the incompetent was already released from the National Psychopathic Hospital, thepetitioner filed a verified petition asking that the court which took cognizance of theguardianship case declare that the incompetent had recovered her mental faculties, that shewas able to take care of her person and to administer her property, cancel the bond filed bythe guardian, and order the termination and filing away of the record. The court declared thesaid Petrona Crisostomo able to take care of her person and to administer her own property,wherefore, it orders the termination of the guardianship. After the lapse of about ninemonths from the issuance of the order, the respondent Ramon Crisostomo, brother of theincompetent, filed a motion in the guardianship proceedings and in the same court whichhad taken cognizance of said special proceedings. He alleged that the order is null and voidbecause it was entered without notice to the nearest relatives of the incompetent andwithout hearing and that the latter had not yet recovered her mentality. The petitionerobjected on the ground that the order sought to be annulled had already become final andthat the court had already lost jurisdiction to reverse or annul the same. The respondentjudge issued an order annulling the order of termination of guardianship.

IssueWhether or not the order of restoration to capacity is valid despite of lack of notice.

RulingThe Court ruled in favor of its validity. Section 562 does not require notice of the

hearing to any other person except the guardian and the incompetent. In order that a courttaking cognizance of the guardianship of an incompetent may issue a valid order restoringhim to capacity it is necessary, under this section, (1) that a verified petition be presentedby the incompetent, his guardian, or any relative of such person within the third degree, orany friend of his; (2) that said petition should allege that the incompetent has recovered hismental faculties or his legal capacity, as the case may be; and (3) that upon receiving thepetition the court should set the same for hearing and notify the guardian and theincompetent thereof. At the hearing, the guardian, the relatives of the incompetent, and, inthe discretion of the court, any other person may oppose the remedy sought.

The section in the case under study it happened that the verified petition was signedby the guardian himself and was supported and accompanied by the sworn statement of theincompetent. In the petition it was stated that the incompetent had recovered her mentalfaculties and this allegation was corroborated by her in her sworn statement when shestated that she had already recovered her mental faculties. In these circumstances the onlylogical conclusion is that the requisites of section 562 have at least been substantiallycomplied with and that the notice and the hearing were unnecessary and superfluous.


Title: Vda. De Bengson vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-17066 (2007)

FactsAs the mother of a veteran who died in World War II, Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson

became entitled to certain accrued insurance benefits and to a monthly death compensationfor the rest of her life, all extended by the United States Veterans Administration. Uponinquiry which showed that the beneficiary was incompetent, the Veterans Administrationfiled Special Proceeding No. 586 in the Court of First Instance of La Union, where in duecourse, an order was entered on August 8, 1957, adjudging Carmen to be an incompetentand appointing the PNB as guardian of her estate comprising the monies due from the saidVeterans Administration. Letters of guardianship were issued in favor of PNB. Alleging thatshe had regained her competence, her ward, by counsel, filed a petition asking for an orderterminating the guardianship, and for delivery to her of the residuary estate. The son of theward, Francisco Bengson, filed a "Manifestation" to the effect that he was the personalguardian of the incompetent and prayed to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate inplace of the PNB. The lower Court appointed Francisco as guardian in place of PNB.Issue

Whether or not there is a valid removal of guardianship on the part of PNB and theVeterans Administration.Ruling

No. The grounds for which a guardian may be removed are found in Section 2, Rule98 of the Rules.

When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust orunsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty daysafter it is due to render an account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonablenotice to the guardian, remove him, and compel him to surrender the estate of theward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto.... (emphasis supplied).

No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would indicate, that therewas any legal ground upon which the removal of the Philippine National Bank as guardianwas founded. Neither in Francisco Bengzon's manifestation nor in the orders of the lowercourt is it made to appear that the Philippine National Bank had become incapable ofdischarging its trust or was unsuitable therefor, or that it had committed anything which theRules includes as grounds for removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that allthroughout, the Philippine National Bank has discharged its trust satisfactorily. That it hasreceived commissions allowed by law for its services is no ground to remove it, especiallysince the Bank's commission averages no more than P100.00 a year and is offset by intereston the ward's deposit and the sum that the son would probably have to disburse in bondpremiums. Neither is it sufficient to base removal on the unsubstantiated opinion that itwould be more beneficial to the interests of the ward and more convenient for theadministration of the estate. A guardian should not be removed except for the most cogentreasons; otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal.


Trustees (Rule 98, Rules of Court)

Title: Saltiga de Romero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17809 (1962)

FactsEugenio Romero bought from spouses Celedonio Jaug and Sofia Macan the latter's

"rights, interest, participation, ownership and possession" of 12 hectares of land. The land inquestion was then public land. When Eugenio Romero applied for a homestead patent forsaid land, the same was disapproved by the Bureau of Lands because said Romero alreadyhad applied for a homestead patent for 24 hectares and was disqualified from owning theadditional 12 hectares. Petitioners contend that LUTERO merely holds Lot 23 Pls-35 in trustfor the benefit of the heirs of his father EUGENIO since it was actually EUGENIO who firstapplied for the homestead but considering that EUGENIO was already granted a homestead,the application had to be placed in the name of his eldest son EUTIQUIO. The application wassubsequently transferred to the name of LUTERO who later transferred the application in thename of Ricardo Romero (RICARDO), his younger brother.

On the other hand, respondents maintain that LUTERO did not commit fraud in thetitling of Lot 23 Pls-35. They allege that the petitioners failed to prove this during the trial ofthe case. On the contrary, LUTERO complied with all the requirements of the law when hesuccessfully obtained title to the lot. Respondents also deny that LUTERO held the land intrust for the benefit of the heirs of his father EUGENIO. According to them, this violates theprovisions of The Public Land Act. Even assuming that a trust in fact was created, such is nulland void for being contrary to law. Finally, respondents maintain that the three affidavits ofsale executed in favor of the petitioners are void since they were simulated and notsupported by any consideration; and they were executed within the five-year prohibitoryperiod from the issuance of the patent. The appellants further claimed that after thepartition, they had been in occupancy of their respective shares through their tenants. TheCA ruled in favor of Lutero.

IssueWhether Lutero acquired Lot 23 Pls-35 in trust for the benefit of the heirs of Eugenio.

RulingA trust is the legal relationship between a person having an equitable ownership in

property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownershipof the former entitling him to performance of certain duties and the exercise of certainpowers by the latter. The petitioners did not present any evidence to prove the existence ofthe trust. Petitioners merely alleged that LUTERO, through fraudulent means, had the title ofLot 23 Pls-35 issued in his name contrary to the alleged agreement between the family thatLUTERO would merely hold the lot in trust for the benefit of EUGENIO's heirs. The allegedagreement was not proven and even assuming that the petitioners duly proved theexistence of the trust, said trust would be of doubtful validity considering that it wouldpromote a direct violation of the provisions of the Public Land Act as regards the acquisitionof a homestead patent.


Title: Cañezo vs. Rojas, G.R. No. 148788 (2007)

FactsThe subject property is an unregistered land situated at Naval, Biliran. In a

complaint, petitioner Soledad Cañezo alleged that she bought such parcel ofland from Crisogono Limpiado, although the sale was not reduced into wr i t i ng .The rea fte r , she immed ia te l y took possess ion o f the p rope r t y. She andher husband left for Mindanao and entrusted the said land to her father,Crispulo Rojas, who took p o s s e s s i o n o f , a n d c u l t i v a t e d t h e p r o p e r t y. I n1 9 8 0 , s h e f o u n d o u t t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t , Concepcion Rojas, herstepmother, was in possession of the property and was cultivating the same. Shealso discovered that the tax declaration over the property was already in thename of his father. Respondent asserted that it was her husband who bought theproperty from Limpiado,which accounts for the tax declaration being in Crispulo’s name.Issue

I s the re an ex i s tence o f t rus t ove r t he p rope r ty – exp ress o rimp l i edbetween the petitioner and her father?Ruling

N o n e . A t r u s t i s t h e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n o n e p e r s o nh a v i n g a n e q u i t a b l e ownership of property and another person owning thelegal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling himto the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by thelatter. Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created bythe direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, orbywords evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which,without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters ofintent or, independently, of the particular intention of the parties, as being super induced onthe transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity.In light of the disquisitions, we hold that there was no express trust or resultingtrust established between the petitioner and her father. Thus, in the absence of a trustrelation, the Court concluded that Crispulo’s uninterrupted possession of thesubject property for 49 years, coupled with the performance of acts of ownership, suchas payment of real estate taxes, ripened into ownership.


Adoption and Custody of Minors (Republic Act Nos. 8581 and 8043; AM No.02-6-02)

Title: Reyes vs. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405 (2006)

FactsOn September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the

issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising beforethe RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising whodied intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were RosarioL. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising,AlfredoLising and respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.Petitioner filed anopposition to the petition claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’shusband to which Chichioco filed a petition to annul the adoption of the petitioner. Theappellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon thepetitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted.Issue

Whether or not petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption.Ruling

It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document required by

law to be entered into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other

judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office

as well as the court which rendered the judgment.

Petitioner whose adoption is presumed to be valid would necessarily excluderespondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of thelatter. To allow the proceedings below to continue would serve no salutary purpose but todelay the resolution of the instant case. Hence, the petition should be dismissed.


Title: Republic vs. Miller, G.R. No. 125932 (1999)

FactsOn July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both American citizens, filed

with the Regional Trial Court – Angeles City a verified petition to adopt a Filipino child namedMichael Magno Madaya, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code whichallows alien to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocableconsent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basisof its evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition foradoption.

On August 3, 1988, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of aFilipino child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed originally to the CA from the decision of RTC. The CAcertified the case to the Supreme Court because it involved question of law.Issue

Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt when the petition for adoption wasfiled prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.Ruling

The Supreme Court held that an alien who filed a petition for adoption before theeffectivity of the Family Code, is qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition. Such alien acquired a vested rightwhich could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.


Title: Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118870 (1996)

FactsOn the issue of custody over the minor Ray Perez II, CA ruled in favor of the boy’s

father, reversing the trial court’s decision to grant custody to the child’s mother. Therespondent, the father, is a doctor of medicine and the petitioner, the mother, is a registerednurse working in the U.S. They are married couple who are separated in fact with only onechild. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender thecustody of their son. The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child tohis mother, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. Upon appeal bythe father, CA reversed the trial court’s order and awarded custody of the boy to him rulingthat there were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over the child even under sevenyears old. It held that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s bestinterest and welfare.

IssueWhether or not the custody of the child is to be given to the father.

RulingThe Court ruled in the negative. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a

child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court findscompelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of theFamily Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatorycharacter. Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation.

The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child belowseven years old shall not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealedthe earlier Article 17, par 3 of the Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the child’sage to 5 years.The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from hismother finds its raison d’etre in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Onlythe most compelling of reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a childto someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority.In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive amother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment andimmorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity andbeing sick with a communicable disease.


Title: Santos, et. al. vs. Aranzanso, G.R. No. L-23828 (1966)

FactsSimplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes filed a petition for adoption of the petitioners.

Paulina Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old. The petition, whichwas under oath, alleged inter alia, that the whereabouts of the minors' nearest of kin,particularly their parents, were unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minorshave been abandoned by their respective parents; and that for years, since their infancy,said children have continuously been in petitioners' care and custody. The Court granted thepetition. Subsequently — eight years later — Juliana Reyes died without testament. SimplicioSantos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. In saidpetition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, assurviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age. Therespondents alleging that they are the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to thepetition for appointment of administrator. Their grounds are that Simplicio Santos" marriageto the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void: and that the adoption of PaulinaSantos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of theirparents, who were then living and had not abandoned them.

IssueWhether respondents-oppositors could assail in the settlement proceedings the

adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos.

RulingThe Respondents could not assail the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in

favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos.

The respondents-oppositors and those who, like them (Pasion sisters), claim aninterest in the estate of Juliana Reyes as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, inthe settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate successionadopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The sameholds true as long as the adoption must be — as in the instant case — considered valid.


Title: Republic vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209 (1996)

Facts

The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran andsimultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adopteeto Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquiredconsequent to his adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of namein the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and thepetitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition shouldbe conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

IssueWhether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given

or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.Ruling

No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: “Forcivil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters andboth shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parentand child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopter.”

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname ofthe adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of theadoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessaryconsequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of thecourt, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of theadoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of anadoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’sregistered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon theadoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mereincident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtivelyinserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the nameappearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing andstrictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceedingfor change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of thereasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition forchange of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirementstherefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It isan independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set ofrules.


Habeas Corpus

(Rule 102, Rules of Court; AM No. 03-04-04 – Re: Rule on Custody of Minors andWrit of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors; AM No. 08-1-16-SC Rule

on the Writ of Habeas Data; AM No. 07-9-12-SC Rule on the Writ of Amparo)

Title: Madriñan vs. Madriñan, G.R. No. 159374 (2007)

FactsPetitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on

July 7, 1993. Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter. After a bitter quarrelon May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons withhim to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought the helpof her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to no avail.She then brought the matter to theLupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this tooproved futile.

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and FrancisAngelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwellingand going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children anddeprived them of their mother’s care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear andproduce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not be returned to hercustody.

Respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but wasdriven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gamblerand drug addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties,causing him to commit acts of violence against her and their children. The situation wasaggravated by the fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequentlymeddled in their personal problems.

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance ofthe petition. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petitionfor habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courtsunder RA 8369.Issue

Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct.Ruling

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was furtheraffirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004).If a minor is being transferred from oneplace to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus casewill be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention ofthe lawmakers when they passed.

The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer,all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may beemployed by such court or officer. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matterof a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents andancillary matters.


Title: Camara vs. Pagayatan, G.R. No. 176563 (2007)

FactsPetitioner Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land Compensation Division of

the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) was detained under a warrant of arrest respondentjudge issued from a contempt citation against the former for LBP’s failure to deposit thepreliminary compensation in Civil Case No. R-1390 as provided under the trial courts order.LBP was directed to deposit the preliminary compensation, in cash and bonds, in the totalamount of P71,634,027.30 with the LBP, Manila, within 7 days from receipt of this order, andto notify the Court of compliance within such period.

LBP then complied with this order by depositing the said amount in its head office incash under its account in trust for, and in bond payable to, the trial court’s clerk of court.However the respondent judge found LBP’s compliance insufficient and ordered LBP toplace the deposit in the name of Josefina Lubrica as payee, in the form that is readilywithdrawable.

Respondent judge ordered Camara to remain in detention until LBP complies withsuch order. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.Issue

Whether or not a respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or in excess of his jurisdiction when he refused to release Camara from detentiondespite LBP’s compliance.Ruling

Yes. Under section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus does notlie if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of anofficer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdictionto issue the process. Petitioner does not question the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue theOrder citing petitioner in contempt. What petitioner assails is respondent judge’s refusal torelease Camara from detention despite LBP’s compliance of the full amount of thepreliminary compensation.

This is grave abuse of respondent judge’s contempt powers, amounting to lack orexcess of his jurisdiction.


Title: Moncupa vs. Enrile, G.R. No. L-63345 (1986)

FactsPetitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they were members of

a subversive organization. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily releasedfrom detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot andacademic since the petitioner is free and no longer under the respondent’s custody.

Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition mootand academic because of the restrictions imposed by the respondents which constitute aninvoluntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.Issue

Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic inview of the detained person’s release with restrictions.Ruling

The Supreme Court held in negative. Restraints attached to temporary release of adetained person warrant the Supreme Court’s inquiry into the nature of the involuntaryrestraint and relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.

Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainee’stemporary release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physicalrestraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.

Temporary release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints does notrender the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. It is available where aperson continue to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, wherethere is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but arenecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.


Title: Harden vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-2349 (1948)

FactsThe petitioner, Fred Harden, is being confined in prison for the contempt of court. The

proceedings for contempt arose in a civil case involving the administration of conjugalpartnership, payment of alimony, and accounting. In that case, a receiver was appointedand a preliminary injunction was issued restraining the petitioner from transferring oralienating, except for a valuable consideration and with the consent of the court first hadand obtained, moneys, shares of stock, and other properties and assets, real or personal,belonging to the aforesaid partnership, and which might be found in the names of saiddefendants or either of them. The petitioner, however, transferred cash to various banks inHongkong and California, as well as to an unknown person. He was ordered by the court toredeposit the money and the Balatoc Mining Co. shares belonging to the conjugalpartnership, which he had in Hongkong to the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China(Manila Branch). On various occasions, the petitioner failed to comply with the orders of thecourt until he was committed in prison.Issue

Whether or not the petitioner, Fred Harden, can warrant a writ of habeas corpus.Ruling

The petition is denied with costs. The grounds for relief by habeas corpus are only (1)deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights (2) lack of jurisdiction of the court toimpose the sentence or (3) excessive penalty. It was held that the court has jurisdiction toimpose the sentence simply because the person charged is in the state and he is still withinthe jurisdiction of its courts. Moreover, the penalty imposed on the petitioner is notexcessive because under Section 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, “when the contemptconsists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, hemay be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.” This justifies thepenalty imposed on Fred Harden, thereby not making it excessive. Moreover, the court’sfindings are supported by sufficient evidence and it is a matter of fact which cannot bereviewed by habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error.


Title: Olaguer vs. Military Commission, G.R. No. L-54558 (1987)

FactsThe herein petitioners were arrested by the military authorities. They were all initially

detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. All of the petitioners are civilians and they werecharged for subversion. The respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippinescreated the respondent Military Commission to try tile criminal case filed against thepetitioners. In the course of the proceedings, the petitioners went to this Court and filed theinstant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. They sought to enjoin the respondentfrom proceeding with the trial of their case. They likewise sought their release fromdetention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their arguments is that militarycommissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have beencommitted during the period of martial law. Pending the resolution of the Petition, therespondent passed sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the penaltyof death by electrocution. In sum the second Petition seeks to enjoin the said respondentsfrom taking any further action on the case against the petitioners, and from implementingthe judgment of conviction rendered by the respondent for the reason that the same is nulland void.

IssueWhether or not military commissions or tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians

for offenses allegedly committed during martial law when civil courts are open andfunctioning.

RulingThe court held that military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try

civilians for alleged offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning.

As long as the civil courts in the land are open and functioning, military tribunalscannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them. Whetheror not martial law has been proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof is of nomoment. A state of martial law, does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, norsupplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize theconferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courtsare able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.


Title: Villavicencio vs. Lukban, G.R. No. 14639 (1919)

FactsThe Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to

exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had beenpermitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. the women were kept confinedto their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the cityauthorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the womento Davao, Mindanao, as labourers. The attorney for the relatives and friends of aconsiderable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to amember of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of theparties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davaoand, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered asincluding them.Issue

Whether or not the petition is meritorious.Ruling

The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedyto relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense ofpersonal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on thewrit, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty. The law, in its zealous regardfor personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeascorpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisonedor restrained of his liberty.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint ofliberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into allmanner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a persontherefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action issufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, whohanded them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived thesewomen of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed inDavao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercisingthe liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began inManila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or untilthey freely and truly waived his right.


Title: Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125901 (2001)

FactsPetitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from

respondent and presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent claimed onthe other hand that she is the natural mother of the child.The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas corpus. Onappeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellatecourt expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.

IssueIs habeas corpus the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor?

RulingYes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention

by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any personis withheld from the person entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legalremedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in thecustody of a third person of his own free will.


Title: Andal vs. People, G.R. No. 138268-69 (1999)

FactsPetitioner Jury Andal, Ricardo Andal and Edwin Mendoza were all convicted of rape

with homicide in the Regional Trial Court. They seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of aclaim of mistrial and/or that the decision of the Regional Trial Court was void. They pray fora temporary restraining order to stay their execution and/or a preliminary injunctionenjoining their execution. They argued that the trial court was “ousted” of jurisdiction to trytheir case since the pre-trial identification of the accused was made without the assistanceof counsel and without a valid waiver from the accused.Issue

Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.Ruling

No, the Supreme Court found that there was no violation of the constitutional rightsof the accused and a resultant deprivation of liberty or due process of law. The accusedwere sentenced to the supreme penalty of death as a result of a valid accusation, trial, andjudgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.

The factual milieu does not show a mistrial or a violation of the constitutional rightsof the accused.


Change of Name (Rule 103, Rules of Court; Republic Act Nos. 9048 and 9255)

Title: Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906 (1992)

FactsPrivate respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and

Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and then known as MaximoAlcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with theconsent of their natural parents and by order of the court issued on September 9, 1967,adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. HoongWong, now deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high schoolteacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen years ofmarriage. The couples showered their adopted children with parental love and reared themas their own children

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married anda junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition tochange his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wongembarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests aChinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslimcommunity, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he isbeing ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life;and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.The RTC granted and was affirmed by the Court of AppealsIssue

Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change ofname are valid, sufficient and proper.Ruling

Yes, the Supreme Court held it did not believe that by reverting to his old name,private respondent would then be using a name which he is prohibited by law from using.True, the law prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but the law does not go sofar as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and only subjects suchrecourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not prohibit, itpermits.


Title: Dantes Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689 (2007)

FactsRommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual who filed a petition for the

change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birthcertificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these changes,among others, so that he can marry his American fiancé. The RTC granted Silverio’s petition.The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity; that Silverio’s misfortune to betrapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken againsthim. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on thepart of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the realization of their dreams. Later, a petition forcertiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

IssueWhether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate

may be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existinglegislation. Republic Act 9048 provides that it should be the local civil registrar that hasjurisdiction in petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, thepetition of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Evenassuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground uponwhich it is based (gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Underthe law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:

1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor orextremely difficult to write or pronounce;

2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by thepetitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community;or

3. The change will avoid confusion.

Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-assignment as the basis.

On the issue of change of sex, the entry cannot be changed either via a petition before theregular courts or a petition for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is nolaw to support it. And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical error involved.Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the entry written in his birthcertificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done bythe birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of aperson’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.


Title: Republic vs. Bolante, G.R. No. 160597 (2006)

Facts

This is a petition for review under Rule 45. The Republic assails and seeks to set asidethe decision of CA affirming that of the RTC) in special proceeding case of change of namecommenced by respondent Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also known as Maria EloisaBringas Bolante.

To prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed toconform to the name she has always carried and used. Finding the petition sufficient in formand substance, the trial court ordered Bolante to comply with the jurisdictional requirementsof notice and publication. She presented and marked in evidence several documents withoutany objection on the part of the Republic, represented by the OSG. Then, she took thewitness stand. Her petition was granted but OSG appealed to CA which affirmed in toto thedecision of the trial court.

Issue

1. Whether or not there is substantial compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 103 of ROC for thecourt take cognizance of the petition.

2. Whether or not the respondent’s bare testimony, unsupported by any otherevidence, is sufficient to prove that the change of her name is not resorted forillegal purposes.

RulingOn the first issue, the Court ruled in the affirmative. It cannot be over-emphasized

that in a petition for change of name, any interested person may appear at the hearing andoppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy shall appear on behalf ofthe Government. The government, as an agency of the people, represents the public and,therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the government, effectivelyrepresents the public. As it were, the Republic was fully apprised of the new dates of theinitial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a republication of the initial noticeof the hearing.

On the second issue, the Court also ruled in the affirmative. Jurisprudence hasrecognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. Among these are: (a)when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)when the change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and beenknown since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when thesurname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of namewas for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest.

The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollaryissue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of thecourt. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the bestevidence available.


Title: Republic vs. Belmonte, G.R. No. L-32600 (1988)

FactsThe herein private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao, a resident of Baguio City,

filed a Petition for the change other name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. For this purpose,she also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father'sname appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her mother's name recorded asPAKIAT CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN. At the time the litigation was commenced, thepetitioner was a 16-year old minor. Thus, she was assisted in the case by her mother. Thepetitioner alleged that the maiden name of her mother is Helen Chan and that the givenname Pakiat written on her birth certificate is actually the given name of her maternalgrandmother. The petitioner also asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not PoYu as erroneously written in her birth certificate and as such her real surname is Pao.

IssueCan a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in the civil

registry be joined in the same proceeding?

RulingThe Court ruled in the negative. The court held that the procedure recited in Rule 103

regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction ofentries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one forthe other for the sole purpose of expediency.

The propriety of corrections should first be determined in a different proceeding moreadversary in character than the summary case instituted by the petitioner with the trialcourt. Aside from the change of her name, the petitioner seeks a correction of entries in thecivil registry for the benefit of her parents. This she may not do through a summaryproceeding. The summary procedure for correction of the civil register under Rule 108 isconfined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to a material change in the spelling of asurname as prayed for by the petitioner. A clerical error must be apparent on the face of therecord and should be capable of being corrected by reference to the record alone. Thepetitioner seeks more than just the correction of a clerical error.

Moreover, under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry inthe civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interestwhich would be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding. An inspection ofall the pleadings filed by the petitioner with the trial court shows that the local civil registrarconcerned was never made a party to the proceeding. Said civil registrar being anindispensable party, a final determination of the case cannot be made.


Title: Hawliong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194 (1966)

Facts

Petitioner seeks to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin in a petitionfiled before the Court of First Instance of Leyte.

He testified that he is 47 years old, married, and an employee of the Leyte AsiaTrading Company; that he has been a resident of Tacloban City for more than 20 years; thathe wants to change his name to Alfonso Lantin because he is called by his Filipino friends asAlfonso and the name of his father is Placido Lantin; that he wants to have a Filipino namebecause he will soon be a Filipino citizen; that he came to the Philippines in 1925 and sincethen his Filipino friends have been calling him Alfonso; that there is no pending case againsthim as Haw Liong; and that in the event a case will arise against him as Haw Liong he iswilling to appear and answer the same.

After hearing, the court a quo allowed petitioner to change his name from Haw Liongto Alfonso Lantin. The government has appealed.Issue

Whether or not the court a quo erred in allowing the change of name of thepetitioner.Ruling

The Court ruled in the affirmative. The following may be considered, among others,as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change ofname: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult towrite or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status,such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change isnecessary to avoid confusion.

Therefore, petitioner cannot file for a change of name on the ground set forth above.As was disclosed in his cross examination, that in his business dealings with other people healways signed as Haw Liong and never used the name Alfonso Lantin; that he came to becalled Alfonso by his friends only when during the Japanese occupation his Filipino friendsasked him how he was called and he told them that his name was Alfonso, and since thenthey started calling him by that name; and that he is known in Tacloban City as Haw Liongand has not contracted with any person under the name of Alfonso Lantin. We find,therefore, no proper or compelling reason that may justify the change of name desired bypetitioner for his petition does not come under any of the cases above adverted to.


Title: Ang Chay vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-22712 (1970)

FactsJosefina Ang Chay and Mercedita Ang Chay prayed for the change of their respective

names to Josefina Hernandez and Mercedita Hernandez. Both of legal age, single andresidents of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, at 3 least years prior to the filing of thepetition; that having elected Philippine citizenship on 7 February 1966, they would like touse Filipino names by having their surnames "Ang Chay changed to "Hernandez".

The petition was opposed by the government, on the ground that the reason adducedtherefor was not proper and reasonable. After hearing, judgment was entered for thepetitioners, and their surnames were decreed changed from for all legal intent and purposes.It is from this decision that the oppositor Republic of the Philippines is appealing on thesame issue of the propriety and reasonableness of the ground for petitioners' action forchange of their name.Issue

Whether or not the change of name is valid.Ruling

The Court ruled in the affirmative. It is a ruling of long standing in this jurisdictionthat change of name is not a matter of right; that being a privilege, before it can beauthorized, the person petitioning for such change must first show proper cause ofcompelling reason therefore.

There is valid reason to justify the continued use by petitioners of the names bywhich they have been known, and with which they have always conducted, in good faith,their various social and business activities.

A mere change of name would not cause a change in one's existing family relations,nor create new family rights and duties where none exists before. Neither would it affect aperson's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship.

Thus, this Court, in some meritorious cases, granted the applications of naturalizedFilipinos for change of their foreign names to Filipino-sounding ones, in order that thehandicap in their social and business dealings, posed by their alien names, may be removedand thus enable their full integration into the Philippine society where they now belong.There is more compelling reason, therefore, for the granting of this petition and allowing theuse of Filipino names by herein petitioners, whose mother is a Filipino, and who have beenreared and schooled, and have actually lived, as Filipinos.


Title: Laperal vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-18008 (1962)

FactsThe petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R.

Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to thespouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, shenaturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in usingher maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on theground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use hermarried name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of theconjugal assets.Issue

Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over thespecific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legallyseparated from his husband.Ruling

In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being noseverance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husbandsurname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must beconsidered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that theconjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved andliquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of theconjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of thename of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of themandatory provision of Art. 372. Petition was dismissed.


Title: Secan Kok vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-27621 (1976)

FactsOn May 18, 1964, appellee Secan Kok filed a petition to change his name and that of

his daughter Marilyn Se respectively to Antonio Cuakok and Gloria Cuakok, although hispetition mentions his other minor children, namely Perfecto, Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Danieland Antonio, Jr. as having been born out of his marriage in the Catholic church on August 2,1947 at Cotabato City, without, significantly, mentioning the name of his wife.

The Court granted the petition, after the petitioner amended and file forsupplemental pleading to include his wife and children to use his name as approved in hispetition.The government appeal for the reason that the judgment had long become final andwas already executory when the present motion for supplemental pleading was filed.Issue

Whether or not the approved name of the petitioner be extended to his wife andchildren.

RulingThe Court held that the rules are very explicit. Under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the

Revised Rules of Court, it provides that a petition for a change of name shall be signed andverified by the person desiring his name to be changed, or some other person in his behalf.There is need therefore for a separate petition to be filed by the wife Lucia O. Tee, who isalready of age, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children.

To confer jurisdiction on the court, since petitions for change of name are proceedingsin rem, strict compliance with the requirements is essential, namely, that such verifiedpetition should be published for three (3) successive weeks in some newspapers of generalcirculation in the province; and that both the title or caption of the petition and its body shallrecite (1) the name or names or aliases of the applicant; (2) the cause for which the changeof name is sought; and (3) the name or names or aliases of the applicant; (2) the cause forwhich the change of name is sought; and (3) the new name asked for.

To allow the change of name of the wife and other minor children of petitioner-appellee, upon a mere motion as an incident in the proceedings for the change of name ofpetitioner-appellee, will not only deprive the government of the required filing fees thereforbut will also dispense with the aforesaid essential requirements respecting the recitals in thetitle of the petition and the publication to apprise persons, who may be in possession ofadverse information or evidence against the grant of the petition, so that they will comeforward with such information or evidence in order to protect public interest as well as theinterest of private individuals who may be prejudiced by the change of name of thepetitioner.


Title: Pabellar vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-27298 (1976)

FactsThe Republic of the Philippines appealed from the decision of the CFI granting the

petition of Mario Pabellar for change of his surname to Carandang and ordering the civilregistrar of Lucena City to make the corresponding change "in his record of birth or in hiscivil registry by way of marginal notes.”

Petitioner Pabellar wants to change his surname to “Carandang.” Presumably, norecord of his birth in the civil register is available for none was presented in evidence. Hisrecord shows that when he was baptized as an illegitimate child of Teofila Pabellar with anunknown father and paternal grandparents, he was given the name Mario Pabellar. However,he used that name only when he filed the petition in this case. He testified that his father isEsteban Carandang who is married to Rufina Marasigan. They were separated. She lived inBatangas. Esteban Carandang took Teofila Pabellar as his common-law wife and lived withher in Lucena. The petitioner has lived with his parents in Lucena since birth. He has alwaysused the name Mario Carandang.

His father urged him to see a lawyer so that he could change his surname fromPabellar to Carandang. On February 28, 1966 the petitioner filed the instant petition forchange of name. He used in the petition the name, Mario Pabellar.Issue

Is the petition for the change of name is proper?Ruling

No. The fact that the petitioner was christened Mario Pabellar does not justify hispetition for the change of his surname to Carandang. "The real name of a person is thatgiven to him in the civil register, not the name by which he was baptized in his church." In apetition for change of name "the only name that may be changed is the true or official namerecorded in the civil register."

In reality what the petitioner seeks is not a change of name. What he wants is judicialauthority for his continued use of the surname, Carandang, which he has been using sincechildhood. That use is allowed by Commonwealth Act No. 142. According to his testimony,his use of the surname Carandang has the sanction of his natural father. Judicial authority isrequired for a change of name or surname (Art. 376, Civil Code) but not for the use of asurname which the petitioner has already been using since childhood. Hence, the petition inthis case was uncalled for. In colloquial parlance, it has no leg to stand on.


Title: Republic vs. Hernandez, supra.

Facts

The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran andsimultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adopteeto Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquiredconsequent to his adoption.

Issue

Is the granting of the petition for change of name proper?

RulingNo. The Court ruled that the given or proper name, also known as

the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in thecivil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter alicense to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic changethereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decreeof adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, suchthat a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannotproperly be granted.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the nameappearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing andstrictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceedingfor change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of thereasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with allthe requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for itsadjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governedby its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. Toconsider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be todenigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remediallaw system.


Constitution of Family Home (Rule 106, Rules of Court)

Title: Taneo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108532 (1999)

Facts

Petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 (docketed as Civil Case No. 10407) todeclare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writof preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the childrenand heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 andSeptember 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the subjectproperty. Considering that said property has been acquired through free patent, suchproperty is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment ofdebt.

IssueWhether or not the family home is exempt from execution.

Ruling

The family home is not exempt from execution. A debt was incurred before the housewas deemed a family home. Before the effectivity of the Family Code, a family home mustbe constituted judicially (filing of petition) and extra-judicially (registration). It turns out thatthe instrument constituting the family home was registered only in January 24, 1966. Themoney judgment was rendered on the same date.


Absentees (Rule 107, Rules of Court)

Title: Jones vs. Hortiguela, G.R. No. 43701 (1937)

FactsMarciana Escaño had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed

judicial administrator of her entire estate, and in an order issued on May 9, 1932, AngelitaJones, her daughter by her first marriage, and Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her secondmarriage, were declared her only heirs.

The heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion allegingthat she was the only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escaño; that there neverwas a valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriagebeen celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix Hortiguelawas not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the inheritance; that the petitioner wasa minor and that during the hearing of the intestate proceedings she had not been assistedby counsel but was represent by the same attorney of Felix Hortiguela

Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to havebeen made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that fromthe latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and14 days elapsed; and in accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68,the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño is null and void.Issue

Whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage to Marciana Escaño wascelebrated.Ruling

The Court ruled in the negative. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is notnecessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration ofabsence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose toenable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of theabsentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that theformer spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the secondmarriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, thatsuch former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at thetime of the celebration of the marriage.

In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana Escaño'sformer husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last newsconcerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nineyears elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful. Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguelawas lawfully married to Marciana Escaño and was divorced from her at the time of her deaththere is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also inintestate succession, as in the present case.


Title: Armas vs. Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467 (2000)

FactsTeodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in

April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the secondhusband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. Thelatter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearanceof Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing acourt declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.

Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to bethe sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brotherbeing allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano beappointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance beadjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.Issue

Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of thedeclaration of presumptive death.Ruling

The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May1958 where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code whichonly took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactivegovernance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquiredrights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides thatdeclaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrieta’s marriagewith Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.


Title: Republic vs. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053 (1993)

FactsPetitioner Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch

10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. He testified that he was a seaman and that he hadfirst met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship'sport calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondentNolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of SanJose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic ritesofficiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.

Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained anotheremployment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique.Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from hismother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informedhim that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately askedpermission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983. Helooked for his spouse and sent letters to her known address, but it proved futile. The RTCgranted his petition and was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General opposed such on theground that first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spousewas already dead," and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the sameproceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.Issue

Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.Ruling

No, the Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for hismissing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attemptto ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of areasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead.

The spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one ofthem leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of thelaws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulledbefore the trial court in the same proceeding.


Cancellation and Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108, Rules ofCourt)

Title: Rivero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273 (2005)

FactsOn August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-

De Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofNaga City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito DyChiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate onJuly 27, 1995. He was represented by his mother. It was also alleged that the Dy Chiaosiblings recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father.

In an answer to the complaint, Mary Jane, through counsel, for herself, andpurportedly in behalf of her brothers, denied the allegations that Shirley and her father hadan amorous relationship and that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father for wantof knowledge or information; the allegation that they had recognized Benedick as theillegitimate son of their father was, likewise, specifically denied. Finally, she alleged that theplaintiff's action was for a claim against the estate of their father, which should be filed in anaction for the settlement of the estate of their deceased parents.

However, on December 13, 1996, Benedick and Maryjane, in behalf of her brothers,duly assisted by their respective cousnels hereby entered a compromise agreement. But theDy Chiao brothers, through their Uncle Henry, alleged that the Dy Chiao brothers had nolegal capacity to be sued because they were unsound mind, and did not authorize Maryjaneto execute any compromise agreement.

Issue1 1. Whether or not Henry Dy Chiao had the authority to file the amended petition for

Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.2 2. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for

recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., as well as theaction for partition and distribution of the latter's estate.

RulingThe Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court rejected the

petitioners' contention that Henry was the petitioner who filed the amended petition beforethe CA. As gleaned from said petition, the petitioners were "Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and BensonDy Chiao, represented by their uncle Henry S. Dy Chiao." Moreover, Henry had the authorityto file the amended petition and sign the requisite certification on non-forum shopping whenthe CA admitted the amended petition and appointed him as guardian ad litem of hisnephews. In resolving whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent, theappellate court needed only to determine whether the individual for whom a guardian wasproposed was so incapable of handling personal and financial affairs as to warrant the needfor the appointment of a temporary guardian. It only needed to make a finding that, basedon clear and convincing evidence, the respondent is incompetent and that it is more likelythan not that his welfare requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian. Afinding that the person for whom a guardian ad litem is proposed is incapable of managinghis own personal and financial affairs by reason of his mental illness is enough.

Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense, and the office


of such guardian is to represent the interest of the incompetent or the minor. Whether or notto appoint a guardian ad litem for the petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of thecourt where the petition was filed, taking into account the best interest of the incompetentor the minor. The court has discretion in appointing a guardian ad litem that will bestpromote the interest of justice. The appointment of a guardian ad litem is designed to assistthe court in its determination of the incompetent's best interest.

On the issue of jurisdiction, case law has it that the jurisdiction of the tribunal over thenature and subject matter of an action is to be determined by the allegations of thecomplaint, the law in effect when the complaint was filed and the character of the reliefprayed for by the plaintiff. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature ofthe action. If a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case onlyand undertakes to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case to which the statute has noapplication, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make aparticular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.


Title: Vda. De Biascan vs. Biascan, G.R. No. 138731 (2000)

FactsMaria Vda De Biascan (legal wife of Florencio) is opposing the appointment of

Rosalina, Florencio’s acknowledged child as administratix of his estate. Regional Trial Courtdoes not set aside the appointment and refuses to let her appeal ruling to Court of Appealsbecause Notice and Record on Appeal were filed late.Issue

Whether or not the order issued in April 1981 is subject to appeal.Ruling

Yes, the ruling of the trial court falls squarely under Section1 (b) and 1(e) of rule 109.Oders, decrees or judgement issued by a court in special proceeding constitutes a finaldetermination of the rights of the parties are the proper subject of an appeal. In contrast,interlocutory orders are not appealable by these are merely incidental to judicialproceedings.


Title: Lopez vs. Teodoro, G.R. No. L-3071 (1950)

FactsEulalio Lopez, Sr., an incapacitated under the judicial guardianship of Eulalio Lopez,

Jr., was the exclusive and absolute owner of an hacienda in Silay, Negros Occidental. Thecourt acting upon a motion of Senen L. Gamboa and Adelaida Gamboa filed in theproceedings for guardianship, ordered the guardian to pay the movants. The order providedthat if the guardian did not have funds to pay those debts, he should take the necessarysteps for the sale of some of the property of the guardianship

In pursuance of this authority, the guardian sold the above tract of land, the onlyproperty of which the incapacitated was possessed to Jesus bound himself to pay themortgage debt and other obligations aggregating and to satisfy the balance in twoinstallments.

Salvacion Lopez filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order authorizingsaid sale, and upon the motion being denied, she brought this petition for certiorari andmandamus, contending that the sale was null and void by reason of the court's failure toadhere to Rule 96, and praying that the orders of the respondent court be corrected and thesaid court directed to revoke the sale.Issue

Whether or not the said sale should be revoke.Ruling

The court of first instance in which the guardianship proceedings were pending hadjurisdiction to order the questioned sale. It appears that the outstanding indebtedness of theguardianship properly and legally incurred and part of which was due the petitioner for thesupport and maintenance of the incapacitated.

The petition was denied.
