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    EN BANC

    [G.R. No. 158540. August 3, 2005]

    SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner , vs. CEMENTMANUACTURERS ASSOCIATION O THE PHI!IPPINES, THESECRETAR" O THE #EPARTMENT O TRA#E AN# IN#USTR",THE SECRETAR" O THE #EPARTMENT O INANCE $%& THECOMMISSIONER O THE 'UREAU O CUSTOMS, respondents.

    R E S O ! U T I O N

    TINGA, J .(

    Cement is hardly an exciting subject for litigation. Still, the parties in this case havedone their best to put up a spirited advocacy of their respective positions, throing ineverything including the proverbial !itchen sin!. At present, the burden of passion, if notproof, has shifted to public respondents "epartment of #rade and $ndustry %"#$& andprivate respondent 'hilippine Cement (anufacturers Corporation %'hilcemcor&, )*+ hono see! reconsideration of our Decision dated -uly //0 %Decision&, hich grantedthe petition of petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation %Southern Cross&.

    #his case, of course, is ultimately not just about cement. 1or respondents, it isabout love of country and the future of the domestic industry in the face of foreigncompetition. 1or this Court, it is about elementary statutory construction, constitutionallimitations on the executive poer to impose tariffs and similar measures, andobedience to the la. -ust as much as asserted in theDecision, and the same holdstrue ith this present Resolution.

     An extensive narration of facts can be found in the Decision.)+ As can ell berecalled, the case centers on the interpretation of provisions of 2epublic Act No. //,the Safeguard (easures Act %S(A&, hich as one of the las enacted by Congresssoon after the 'hilippines ratified the 3eneral Agreement on #ariff and #rade %3A##&and the 4orld #rade 5rgani6ation %4#5& Agreement. )7+ #he S(A provides the structureand mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect

    domestic industries and producers from increased imports hich inflict or could inflictserious injury on them.)0+

     A brief summary as to ho the present petition came to be filed by Southern Cross.'hilcemcor, an association of at least eighteen %*& domestic cement manufacturersfiled ith the "#$ a petition see!ing the imposition of safeguard measures on gray'ortland cement,)8+  in accordance ith the S(A. After the "#$ issued a provisionalsafeguard measure,)9+ the application as referred to the #ariff Commission for a formalinvestigation pursuant to Section : of the S(A and its $mplementing 2ules and

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    2egulations, in order to determine hether or not to impose a definitive safeguardmeasure on imports of gray 'ortland cement. #he #ariff Commission held publichearings and conducted its on investigation, then on *7 (arch //, issued its 1ormal$nvestigation 2eport %2eport&. #he 2eport determined as follos;

    The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury not having beenestablished, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general safeguard measure be

    imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement. )

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    the import surges.)*+ Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on theimportation of gray 'ortland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in theamount of '/.9/@0/ !g. bag for three years on imported gray 'ortland Cement. )*:+

    5n < -uly //7, Southern Cross filed ith the Court a Very Urgent Application for aTemporary Restraining Order andor A !rit of Preliminary "n#unction  %#25 Application&,

    see!ing to enjoin the "#$ Secretary from enforcing his Decision of 8 -une //7 in vieof the pending petition before this Court. 'hilcemcor filed an opposition, claiming,among others, that it is not this Court but the C#A that has jurisdiction over theapplication under the la.

    5n * August //7, Southern Cross filed ith the C#A a Petition for Re$ie% ,assailing the "#$ Secretarys 8 -une //7 Decision hich imposed the definitesafeguard measure. et Southern Cross did not promptly inform this Court about thisfiling. #he first time the Court ould learn about this Petition ith the C#A as henSouthern Cross mentioned such fact in a pleading dated ** August //7 and filed thenext day ith this Court.)/+

    'hilcemcor argued before this Court that Southern Cross had deliberately andillfully resorted to forum>shopping= that the C#A, being a special court of limited

     jurisdiction, could only revie the ruling of the "#$ Secretary hen a safeguard measureis imposed= and that the factual findings of the #ariff Commission are not binding on the"#$ Secretary.)*+

     After giving due course to Southern Crosss Petition, the Court called the case for oral argument on * 1ebruary //0.)+ At the oral argument, attended by the counsel for 'hilcemcor and Southern Cross and the 5ffice of the Solicitor 3eneral, the Courtsimplified the issues in this ise; %i& hether the Decision of the "#$ Secretary isappealable to the C#A or the Court of Appeals= %ii& assuming that the Court of Appeals

    has jurisdiction, hether its Decision is in accordance ith la= and, hether a Temporary Restraining Order  is arranted.)7+

     After the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the Courts Second "ivision,to hich the case had been assigned, promulgated its Decision granting SouthernCrosss Petition.)0+#he Decision as unanimous, ithout any separate or concurringopinion.

    #he Court ruled that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over 'hilcemcors Petition, the proper remedy under Section : of the S(A being a petitionfor revie ith the C#A= and that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the "#$Secretary as not bound by the negative determination of the #ariff Commission and

    could therefore impose the general safeguard measures, since Section 8 of the S(Aprecisely reuired that the #ariff Commission ma!e a positive final determination beforethe "#$ Secretary could impose these measures. Anent the argument that SouthernCross had committed forum>shopping, the Court concluded that there as no evidentmalicious intent to subvert procedural rules so as to match the standard under Section8, 2ule < of the 2ules of Court of illful and deliberate forum shopping. Accordingly,the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 -une //7 as declared null and void.

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    #he Court li!eise found it necessary to nullify the Decision of the "#$ Secretarydated 8 -une //7, rendered after the filing of this present Petition. #his Decision bythe "#$ Secretary had cited the obligatory force of the null and void Court of 

     Appeals Decision, notithstanding the fact that the decision of the appellate court asnot yet final and executory. Considering that the decision of the Court of Appeals as a

    nullity to begin ith, the inescapable conclusion as that the ne decision of the "#$Secretary, prescinding as it did from the imprimatur of the decision of the Court of  Appeals, as a nullity as ell.

     After the Decision as reported in the media, there as a flurry of nespaper articles citing alleged negative reactions to the ruling by the counsel for 'hilcemcor, the"#$ Secretary, and others.)8+ Both respondents promptly filed their respective motionsfor reconsideration.

    5n * September //0, the Court &n 'anc  resolved, upon motion of respondents,to accept the petition and resolve the Motions for Reconsideration.)9+ #he case asthen reheard)shopping, )+ although this uestion shallbe tac!led herein shortly. Another point of concern emerged during oral arguments onthe exercise of uasi>judicial poers by the #ariff Commission, and the parties erereuired by the Court to discuss in their respective memoranda hether the #ariff Commission could validly exercise uasi>judicial poers in the exercise of its mandateunder the S(A.

    #he Court has li!eise been notified that subseuent to the rendition of the

    Courts Decision, 'hilcemcor filed a Petition for &(tension of the )afeguard Measure ith the "#$, hich has been referred to the #ariff Commission. ):+ $n an Urgent Motion dated * "ecember //0, Southern Cross prayed that 'hilcemcor, the "#$, theBureau of Customs, and the #ariff Commission be directed to cease and desist fromta!ing any and all actions pursuant to or under the null and void CA "ecision and "#$"ecision, including proceedings to extend the safeguard measure. )7/+ $n aManifestationand Motion dated 7 -une //0, the #ariff Commission informed the Court that since noprohibitory injunction or order of such nature had been issued by any court against the#ariff Commission, the Commission proceeded to complete its investigation on thepetition for extension, pursuant to Section : of the S(A, but opted to defer transmittal of its report to the "#$ Secretary pending guidance from this Court on the propriety of such

    a step considering this pending Motion for Reconsideration. $n a Resolution dated 8 -uly//8, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status uo effective of even date,and until further orders from this Court. #he denial of the pending motions for reconsideration ill obviously render the pending petition for extension academic.

    "* +urisdiction of the Court of Ta( AppealsUnder )ection - of the )MA

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    #he first core issue resolved in the assailed Decision as hether the Court of  Appeals had jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari filed by 'hilcemcor assailing the 8 April //Decision of the "#$ Secretary. #he general jurisdiction of theCourt of Appeals over special civil actions for certiorari is beyond doubt. #heConstitution itself assures that judicial revie avails to determine hether or not there

    has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac! or excess of jurisdiction on thepart of any branch or instrumentality of the 3overnment. At the same time, the specialcivil action of certiorari is available only hen there is no plain, speedy and adeuateremedy in the ordinary course of la.)7*+ 'hilcemcors recourse of special civil actionbefore the Court of Appeals to challenge the Decision of the "#$ Secretary not toimpose the general safeguard measures is not based on the S(A, but on the generalrule on certiorari. #hus, the Court proceeded to inuire hether indeed there as noother plain, speedy and adeuate remedy in the ordinary course of la that ouldarrant the alloance of 'hilcemcors special civil action.

    #he anser hinged on the proper interpretation of Section : of the S(A, hichreads;

    Section 29. Judicial Review. Any interested party who is adversely affected by

    the ruling of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard

    measure may file with the TA, a petition for review of such ruling within thirty !"#$

    days from receipt thereof. Provided, however, that the filing of such petition for

    review shall not in any way stop, suspend or otherwise toll the imposition or

    collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the adoption of other appropriate

    safeguard measures, as the case may be.

    The petition for review shall comply with the same re%uirements and shall follow the

    same rules of procedure and shall be subject to the same disposition as in appeals inconnection with adverse rulings on ta& matters to the ourt of Appeals.)7+ !'mphasis

    supplied$

    #he matter is crucial for if the C#A properly had jurisdiction over the petitionchallenging the "#$ Secretarys ruling not to impose a safeguard measure, then thespecial civil action of certiorari resorted to instead by 'hilcemcor ould not avail, oingto the existence of a plain, speedy and adeuate remedy in the ordinary course of la.)77+ #he Court of Appeals, in asserting that it had jurisdiction, merely cited the generalrule on certiorari jurisdiction ithout bothering to refer to, or possibly even study, theimport of Section :. $n contrast, this Court duly considered the meaning andramifications of Section :, concluding that it provided for a plain, speedy and adeuateremedy that 'hilcemcor could have resorted to instead of filing the special civil actionbefore the Court of Appeals.

    'hilcemcor still holds on to its hypothesis that the petition for revie alloed under Section : lies only if the "#$ Secretarys ruling imposes a safeguard measure. $f, on theother hand, the "#$ Secretarys ruling is not to impose a safeguard measure, judicialrevie under Section : could not be resorted to since the provision refers to rulings in

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    connection ith t)* +-os+t+o%  of the safeguard measure, as opposed to the non>imposition. Since the Decision dated 8 April // resolved against imposing asafeguard measure, 'hilcemcor claims that the proper remedial recourse is a petitionfor certiorari ith the Court of Appeals.

    $nterestingly, 2epublic Act No. :, promulgated on 7/ (arch //0, expressly

    vests unto the C#A jurisdiction over )d+ecisions of the Secretary of #rade and $ndustry, incase of nonagricultural product, commodity or article . . . involving . . . s$*gu$/&*$su/*s u%&*/ R*-u+ At No. 8800, )*/* *+t)*/ -$/t $ $--*$ t)*&*+s+o% to +-os* o/ %ot to +-os* s$+& &ut+*s.)70+ $t is clear that any future attemptsto advance the literalist position of the respondents ould conseuently fail. ?oever,since 2epublic Act No. : has no retroactive effect, this Court had to decide hether Section : vests jurisdiction on the C#A over rulings of the "#$ Secretary not to imposea safeguard measure. And the Court, in its assailed Decision, ruled that the C#A isendoed ith such jurisdiction.

    Both respondents reiterate their fundamentalist reading that Section : authori6es

    the petition for revie before the C#A only hen the "#$ Secretary decides to impose asafeguard measure, but not hen he decides not to. $n doing so, they fail to addresshat the Court earlier pointed out ould be the absurd conseuences if their interpretation is folloed to its logical end. But in affirming, as the Court no does, itsprevious holding that the C#A has jurisdiction over petitions for revie uestioning thenon>imposition of safeguard measures by the "#$ Secretary, the Court relies on theplain reading that Section : explicitly vests jurisdiction over such petitions on the C#A.

    nder Section :, there are three reuisites to enable the C#A to acuire jurisdiction over the petition for revie contemplated therein; %i& there must be a rulingby the "#$ Secretary= %ii& the petition must be filed by an interested party adverselyaffected by the ruling= and %iii& such ruling must be in connection ith the imposition of a

    safeguard measure. 5bviously, there are differences beteen a ruling for the impositionof a safeguard measure, and one issued in connection ith the imposition of asafeguard measure. #he first adverts to a singular type of ruling, namely one thatimposes a safeguard measure. #he second does not contemplate only one !ind of ruling, but a myriad of rulings issued in connection ith the imposition of a safeguardmeasure.

    2espondents argue that the Court has given an expansive interpretation to Section:, contrary to the established rule reuiring strict construction against the existence of 

     jurisdiction in speciali6ed courts.)78+ 'ut +t +s t)* *-/*ss -/o6+s+o% o S*t+o% 27, $%&%ot t)+s Cou/t, t)$t $%&$t*s CTA u/+s&+t+o% to * /o$& *%oug) to *%o-$ss

    o/* t)$% ust $ /u+%g +-os+%g t)* s$*gu$/& *$su/* .#he !ey phrase remains in connection ith. $t has connotations that are obvious

    even to the layman. A ruling issued in connection ith the imposition of a safeguardmeasure ould be one that bears some relation to the imposition of a safeguardmeasure. 5bviously, a ruling imposing a safeguard measure is covered by the phrase inconnection ith, but such ruling is by no means exclusive. 2ulings hich modify,suspend or terminate a safeguard measure are necessarily in connection ith theimposition of a safeguard measure. So does a ruling alloing for a provisional

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    safeguard measure. So too, a ruling by the "#$ Secretary refusing to refer theapplication for a safeguard measure to the #ariff Commission. $t is clear that there is anentire subset of rulings that the "#$ Secretary may issue in connection ith theimposition of a safeguard measure, including those that are provisional, interlocutory, or dispositive in character .)79+ By the same to!en, a ruling not to impose a safeguard

    measure is also issued in connection ith the imposition of a safeguard measure.$n arriving at the proper interpretation of in connection ith, the Court referred to the

    .S. Supreme Court cases of )ha% $* Delta Air .ines, "nc* )7

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    objectives of the S(A. #he ultimate conclusion of the Court as that the phraseincludes all rulings of the "#$ Secretary hich arise from the time an applicationor motu proprio initiation for the imposition of a safeguard measure is ta!en. )00+ #hisconclusion as derived from the observation that the imposition of a general safeguardmeasure is a process, initiated motu proprio or through application, hich undergoes

    several stages upon hich the "#$ Secretary is obliged or may be called upon to issuea ruling.

    $t should be emphasi6ed again that by utili6ing the phrase in connection ith, it isthe S(A that expressly vests jurisdiction on the C#A over petitions uestioning the non>imposition by the "#$ Secretary of safeguard measures. #he Court is simply asserting,as it should, the clear intent of the legislature in enacting the S(A. 4ithout inconnection ith or a synonymous phrase, the Court ould be compelled to favor therespondents position that only rulings imposing safeguard measures may be elevatedon appeal to the C#A. But considering that the statute does ma!e use of the phrase,there is little sense in delving into alternate scenarios.

    2espondents fail to convincingly address the absurd conseuences pointed out bythe Decision had their proposed interpretation been adopted. $ndeed, suffocatedbeneath the respondents legalistic tinsel is the elemental uestionhat sense is there investing jurisdiction on the C#A over a decision to impose a safeguard measure, but noton one choosing not to impose. 5f course, it is not for the Court to inuire into theisdom of legislative acts, hence the rule that jurisdiction must be expressly vested andnot presumed. et ultimately, respondents muddle the issue by ma!ing it appear thatthe Decision has uniuely expanded the jurisdictional rules. 1or the respondents, theproper statutory interpretation of the crucial phrase in connection ith is to pretend thatthe phrase did not exist at all in the statute. #he Court, in ta!ing the effort to examinethe meaning and extent of the phrase, is merely giving breath to the legislative ill.

    #he Court li!eise stated that the respondents position calls for split jurisdiction,hich is judicially abhorred. $n rebuttal, the public respondents cite Sections 7*7 and0/ of the #ariff and Customs Code %#CC&, hich allegedly provide for a splitting of 

     jurisdiction of the C#A. According to public respondents, under Section 7*7 of the#CC, a decision of the Commissioner of Customs affirming a decision of the Collector of Customs adverse to the government is elevated for revie to the Secretary of 1inance.?oever, under Section 0/ of the #CC, a ruling of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs against a taxpayer must be appealed to the Court of #ax Appeals, and not tothe Secretary of 1inance.

    Strictly spea!ing, the revie by the Secretary of 1inance of the decision of the

    Commissioner of Customs is not judicial revie, since the Secretary of 1inance holds anexecutive and not a judicial office. #he contrast is apparent ith the situation in thiscase, herein the interpretation favored by the respondents calls for the exercise of 

     judicial revie by to different courts over essentially the same uestionhether the"#$ Secretary should impose general safeguard measures. (oreover, as petitioner points out, the executive department cannot appeal against itself. #he Collector of Customs, the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of 1inance are all part of theexecutive branch. $f the Collector of Customs rules against the government, the

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    executive cannot very ell bring suit in courts against itself. 5n the other hand, if aprivate person is aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of Customs, he can haveproper recourse before the courts, hich no ould be called upon to exercise judicialrevie over the action of the executive branch.

    (ore fundamentally, the situation involving split revie of the decision of the

    Collector of Customs under the #CC is not apropos to the case at bar. #he #CC in thatinstance is uite explicit on the divergent revieing body or official depending on hichparty prevailed at the Collector of Customs level. 5n the other hand, there is no suchexplicit expression of bifurcated appeals in Section : of the S(A.

    'ublic respondents li!eise cite 2abian $* Ombudsman)08+ as another instanceherein the Court purportedly alloed split jurisdiction. $t is argued that the Court, inruling that it as the Court of Appeals hich possessed appellate authority to reviedecisions of the 5mbudsman in administrative cases hile the Court retaining appellate

     jurisdiction of decisions of the 5mbudsman in non>administrative cases, effectivelysanctioned split jurisdiction beteen the Court and the Court of Appeals. )09+

    Nonetheless, this argument is successfully undercut by Southern Cross, hichpoints out the essential differences in the poer exercised by the 5mbudsman inadministrative cases and non>administrative cases relating to criminal complaints. $n theformer, the 5mbudsman may impose an administrative penalty, hile in acting upon acriminal complaint hat the 5mbudsman underta!es is a preliminary investigation.Clearly, the capacity in hich the 5mbudsman ta!es on in deciding an administrativecomplaint is holly different from that in conducting a preliminary investigation. $ncontrast, in ruling upon a safeguard measure, the "#$ Secretary acts in one and thesame role. #he variance beteen an order granting or denying an application for asafeguard measure is polar though emanating from the same euator, and does notarise from the distinct character of the putative actions involved.

    'hilcemcor imputes intelligent design behind the alleged intent of Congress to limitC#A revie only to impositions of the general safeguard measures. $t claims that thereis a necessary tax implication in case of an imposition of a tariff here the C#Asexpertise is necessary, but there is no such tax implication, hence no need for theassumption of jurisdiction by a speciali6ed agency, hen the ruling rejects theimposition of a safeguard measure. But of course, hether the ruling under revie callsfor the imposition or non>imposition of the safeguard measure, the common uestion for resolution still is hether or not the tariff should be imposed an issue definitely fraughtith a tax dimension. #he determination of the uestion ill call upon the same !ind of expertise that a speciali6ed body as the C#A presumably possesses.

    $n response to the Courts observation that the setup proposed by respondents asnovel, unusual, cumbersome and unise, public respondents invo!e the maxim thatcourts should not be concerned ith the isdom and efficacy of legislation. )0

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    ere adopted. According to the respondents, hile a ruling by the "#$ Secretaryimposing a safeguard measure may be elevated on revie to the C#A and assailed onthe ground of errors in fact and in la, a ruling denying the imposition of safeguardmeasures may be assailed only on the ground that the "#$ Secretary committed graveabuse of discretion. As stressed in the Decision, )c+ertiorari is a remedy narro in its

    scope and inflexible in its character. $t is not a general utility tool in the legal or!shop.)0+

    $t is incorrect to say that the Decision bars any effective remedy should the #ariff Commission act or conclude erroneously in ma!ing its determination hether the factualconditions exist hich necessitate the imposition of the general safeguard measure. $f the #ariff Commission ma!es a negative final determination, the "#$ Secretary, boundas he is by this negative determination, has to render a decision denying the applicationfor safeguard measures citing the #ariff Commissions findings as basis. Necessarilythen, such negative determination of the #ariff Commission being an integral part of the"#$ Secretarys ruling ould be open for revie before the C#A, hich again isespecially ualified by reason of its expertise to examine the findings of the #ariff 

    Commission. (oreover, considering that the #ariff Commission is an instrumentality of the government, its actions %as opposed to those underta!en by the "#$ Secretaryunder the S(A& are not beyond the pale of certiorari jurisdiction. nfortunately for 'hilcemcor, it hinged its cause on the claim that the "#$ Secretarys actions may beannulled on certiorari, notithstanding the explicit grant of judicial revie over thatcabinet members actions under the S(A to the C#A.

    1inally on this point, 'hilcemcor argues that assuming this Courts interpretation of Section : is correct, such ruling should not be given retroactive effect, otherise, agross violation of the right to due process ould be had. #his erroneously presumesthat it as this Court, and not Congress, hich vested jurisdiction on the C#A over 

    rulings of non>imposition rendered by the "#$ Secretary. 4e have repeatedly stressedthat Section : expressly confers C#A jurisdiction over rulings in connection ith theimposition of the safeguard measure, and the reassertion of this point inthe Decision as a matter of emphasis, not of contrivance. #he due process protectiondoes not shield those ho remain purposely blind to the express rules that ensure thesporting play of procedural la.

    Besides, respondents claim ould also apply every time this Court is compelled tosettle a novel uestion of la, or to reverse precedent. $n such cases, there ouldalays be litigants hose causes of action might be vitiated by the application of nelyformulated judicial doctrines. Adopting their claim ould unisely force this Court totreat its dispositions in unprecedented, sometimes landmar! decisions not as

    resolutions to the live cases or controversies, but as legal doctrine applicable only tofuture litigations.

    ""* Positi$e 2inal Determination'y the Tariff Commission an

    "ndispensable Re3uisite to the"mposition of 4eneral )afeguard Measures

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    #he second core ruling in the Decision as that contrary to the holding of the Courtof Appeals, the "#$ Secretary as barred from imposing a general safeguard measureabsent a positive final determination rendered by the #ariff Commission. #hefundamental premise rooted in this ruling is based on the ac!noledgment that thereuired positive final determination of the #ariff Commission exists as a properly

    enacted constitutional limitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative poer toimpose tariffs and imposts to the 'resident under Section %&, Article D$ of theConstitution.

    Congressional .imitations Pursuant To Constitutional Authority on theDelegated Po%er to "mpose)afeguard Measures

    #he safeguard measures imposable under the S(A generally involve duties on

    imported products, tariff rate uotas, or uantitative restrictions on the importation of aproduct into the country. Concerning as they do the foreign importation of products intothe 'hilippines, these safeguard measures fall ithin the ambit of Section %&, ArticleD$ of the Constitution, hich states;

    The Congress may, by law, authori$e the %resident to fix within specified limits,

    and subect to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,

    import and e&port %uotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts

    within the framewor+ of the national development program of the overnment.)0:+

    #he Court ac!noledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and,hence, governing in this case. #hey are;

    %*& It +s Co%g/*ss )+) $ut)o/+9*s t)* P/*s+&*%t to +-os* t$/+ /$t*s, +-o/t$%& *-o/t :uot$s, to%%$g* $%& )$/$g* &u*s, $%& ot)*/ &ut+*s o/ +-osts .#hus, the authority cannot come from the 1inance "epartment, the National Economic"evelopment Authority, or the 4orld #rade 5rgani6ation, no matter ho insistent or persistent these bodies may be.

    %& T)* $ut)o/+9$t+o% g/$%t*& to t)* P/*s+&*%t ust * *o&+*& +% $ $ .?ence, the justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive poers. $tcannot arise from administrative or executive orders promulgated by the executive

    branch or from the isdom or him of the 'resident.%7& T)* $ut)o/+9$t+o% to t)* P/*s+&*%t $% * **/+s*& o% +t)+% t)*

    s-*++*& ++ts s*t +% t)* $ $%& +s u/t)*/ su*t to ++t$t+o%s $%& /*st/+t+o%s)+) Co%g/*ss $ +-os*. Conseuently, if Congress specifies that the tariff ratesshould not exceed a given amount, the 'resident cannot impose a tariff rate thatexceeds such amount. $f Congress stipulates that no duties may be imposed on theimportation of corn, the 'resident cannot impose duties on corn, no matter ho actively

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    the local corn producers lobby the 'resident. Even the most picayune of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be observed by the 'resident.

    #here is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutionalpostulates. T)*s* +-os+t+o%s u%&*/ S*t+o% 28;2+t)out S*t+o% 28;2+t)out *g+s$t+6*$ut)o/+9$t+o% t)/oug) st$tut*, t)* P/*s+&*%t )$s %o -o*/, $ut)o/+t o/ /+g)t to+-os* su) s$*gu$/& *$su/*s *$us* t$$t+o% +s +%)*/*%t *g+s$t+6*, %ot**ut+6*.

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    >)*% Co%g/*ss t$s?s t)* P/*s+&*%t o/ )+s@)*/ alter egos to +-os* s$*gu$/&*$su/*s u%&*/ t)* &*+%*$t*& o%&+t+o%s, t)* P/*s+&*%t o/ t)* alter egos $ *-/o-*/ &***& $s $g*%ts o Co%g/*ss to -*/o/ $% $t t)$t +%)*/*%t *o%gs$s $ $tt*/ o /+g)t to t)* *g+s$tu/*. $t is basic agency la that the agent may notact beyond the specifically delegated poers or disregard the restrictions imposed by

    the principal. $n short, Congress may establish the procedural frameor! under hichsuch safeguard measures may be imposed, and assign the various offices in thegovernment bureaucracy respective tas!s pursuant to the imposition of such measures,the tas! assignment including the factual determination of hether the necessaryconditions exists to arrant such impositions. nder the S(A, Congress assigned the"#$ Secretary and the #ariff Commission their respective functions )8/+ in the legislaturesscheme of things.

    #here is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations andrestrictions imposed by Congress under Section %& Article D$, and that is suchlimitations and restrictions are themselves violative of the Constitution. #hus, no matter ho distasteful or noxious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the Court has no

    choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity can bedemonstrated.

    4hat are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case#he entire S(A provides for a limited frameor! under hich the 'resident, through the"#$ and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffsand similar imposts. #he limitation most relevant to this case is contained in Section 8 of the S(A, captioned Conditions for the Application of 4eneral )afeguard Measures, andstating;

    The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final

    determination of the &Tariff' Commission that a product is being imported into thecountry in increased %uantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic

     production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the

    domestic industry- however, in the case of nonagricultural products, the Secretary

    shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the

     public interest.)8*+

    Positi$e 2inal Determination'y Tariff Commission Plainly Re3uired by )ection 5 of )MA

    #here is no uestion that Section 8 of the S(A operates as a limitation validlyimposed by Congress on the presidential )8+ authority under the S(A to impose tariffsand imposts. #hat the positive final determination operates as an indispensablereuisite to the imposition of the safeguard measure, and that it is the #ariff Commissionhich ma!es such determination, are legal propositions plainly expressed in Section 8for the easy comprehension for everyone but respondents.

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    'hilcemcor attributes this Courts conclusion on the indispensability of the positivefinal determination to flaed syllogism in that e read the proposition if A then B as if itstated if A, and only A, then B.)87+ #ranslated in practical terms, our conclusion,according to 'hilcemcor, ould have only been justified had Section 8 read shall applya general safeguard measure upon, and only upon, a positive final determination of the

    #ariff Commission.Statutes are not designed for the easy comprehension of the five>year old child.

    Certainly, general propositions laid don in statutes need not be expressly ualified byclauses denoting exclusivity in order that they gain efficacy. $ndeed, applying thisargument, the 'resident ould, under the Constitution, be authori6ed to declare martialla despite the absence of the invasion, rebellion or public safety reuirement justbecause the first paragraph of Section *, Article D$$ fails to state the magic ord only.)80+

    But let us for the nonce pursue 'hilcemcors logic further. $t claims that since Section8 does not allegedly limit the circumstances upon hich the "#$ Secretary may impose

    general safeguard measures, it is a orthy pursuit to determine hether the entirecontext of the S(A, as discerned by all the other familiar indicators of legislative intentsupplied by norms of statutory interpretation, ould justify safeguard measures absent apositive final determination by the #ariff Commission.

    #he first line of attac! employed is on Section 8 itself, it allegedly not being as clear as it sounds. $t is advanced that Section 8 does not relate to the legal ability of either the#ariff Commission or the "#$ Secretary to bind or foreclose revie and reversal by oneor the other. Such relationship should instead be governed by domestic administrativela and remedial la. 'hilcemcor thus ould li!e to cast the proposition in this manner;"oes it run contrary to our legal order to assert, as the Court did in its Decision, that abody of relative junior competence as the #ariff Commission can bind an administrative

    superior and cabinet officer, the "#$ Secretary $t is easy to see hy 'hilcemcor ouldli!e to divorce this "#$ Secretary>#ariff Commission interaction from the confines of theS(A. Shorn of context, the notion ould seem radical and unjustifiable that the loly#ariff Commission can bind the hands and feet of the "#$ Secretary.

    $t can be surmised at once that respondents preferred interpretation is based not onthe express language of the S(A, but from implications derived in a roundaboutmanner. Certainly, no provision in the S(A expressly authori6es the "#$ Secretary toimpose a general safeguard measure despite the absence of a positive finalrecommendation of the #ariff Commission. 5n the other hand, Section 8 expresslystates that the "#$ Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive

    final determination of the )#ariff+ Commission. #he causal connection in Section 8beteen the imposition by the "#$ Secretary of the general safeguard measure and thepositive final determination of the #ariff Commission is patent, and even respondents donot dispute such connection.

     As stated earlier, the Court in its Decision found Section 8 to be clear, plain and freefrom ambiguity so as to render unnecessary resort to the congressional records toascertain legislative intent. et respondents, on the dubitable premise that Section 8 isnot as express as it seems, again latch on to the record of legislative deliberations in

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    asserting that there as no legislative intent to bar the "#$ Secretary from imposing thegeneral safeguard measure anyay despite the absence of a positive finaldetermination by the #ariff Commission.

    Fet us ta!e the bait for a moment, and examine respondents commonly citedportion of the legislative record. 5ne ould presume, given the intense advocacy for the

    efficacy of these citations, that they contain a smo!ing gun express declarations fromthe legislators that the "#$ Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure even if the #ariff Commission refuses to render a positive final determination. Such smo!inggun, if it exists, ould characteri6e our Decision as disingenuous for ignoring suchcontrary expression of intent from the legislators ho enacted the S(A. But as ithmany things, the anticipation is more dramatic than the truth.

    #he excerpts cited by respondents are derived from the interpellation of the lateCongressman (arcial 'un6alan -r., by then %and still is& Congressman Simeon"atumanong.)88+ Nohere in these records is the vie expressed that the "#$ Secretarymay impose the general safeguard measures if the #ariff Commission issues a negative

    final determination or otherise is unable to ma!e a positive final determination.$nstead, respondents hitch on the observations of Congressman 'un6alan -r., that theresults of the )#ariff+ Commissions findings . . . is subseuently submitted to )the "#$Secretary+ for the )"#$ Secretary+ to impose or not to impose= and that the )"#$Secretary+ here isho ould ma!e the final decision on the recommendation that ismade by a more technical body )such as the #ariff Commission+. )89+

    #here is nothing in the remar!s of Congressman 'un6alan hich contradictour Decision. ?is observations fall in accord ith the respective roles of the #ariff Commission and the "#$ Secretary under the S(A. nder the S(A, it is the #ariff Commission that conducts an investigation as to hether the conditions exist to arrantthe imposition of the safeguard measures. #hese conditions are enumerated in Section

    8, namely= that a product is being imported into the country in increased uantities,hether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry. After the investigation of the#ariff Commission, it submits a report to the "#$ Secretary hich states, among others,hether the above>stated conditions for the imposition of the general safeguardmeasures exist. pon a positive final determination that these conditions are present,the #ariff Commission then is mandated to recommend hat appropriate safeguardmeasures should be underta!en by the "#$ Secretary. Section *7 of the S(A gives five%8& specific options on the type of safeguard measures the #ariff Commissionrecommends to the "#$ Secretary.

     At the same time, nothing in the S(A obliges the "#$ Secretary to adopt therecommendations made by the #ariff Commission. $n fact, the S(A reuires that the"#$ Secretary establish that the application of such safeguard measures is in the publicinterest, notithstanding the #ariff Commissions recommendation on the appropriatesafeguard measure upon its positive final determination. #hus, even if the #ariff Commission ma!es a positive final determination, the "#$ Secretary may opt not toimpose a general safeguard measure, or choose a different type of safeguard measureother than that recommended by the #ariff Commission.

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    Congressman 'un6alan as cited as saying that the "#$ Secretary ma!es thedecision to impose or not to impose, hich is correct since the "#$ Secretary maychoose not to impose a safeguard measure in spite of a positive final determination bythe #ariff Commission. Congressman 'un6alan also correctly stated that it is the "#$Secretary ho ma!es the final decision on the recommendation that is made )by the

    #ariff Commission+, since the "#$ Secretary may choose to impose a general safeguardmeasure different from that recommended by the #ariff Commission or not to impose asafeguard measure at all. Nohere in these cited deliberations as Congressman'un6alan, or any other member of Congress for that matter, uoted as saying that the"#$ Secretary may ignore a negative determination by the #ariff Commission as to theexistence of the conditions arranting the imposition of general safeguard measures,and thereafter proceed to impose these measures nonetheless. $t is too late in the dayto ascertain from the late Congressman 'un6alan himself hether he had made theseremar!s in order to assure the other legislators that the "#$ Secretary may impose thegeneral safeguard measures notithstanding a negative determination by the #ariff Commission. But certainly, the language of Section 8 is more resolutory to that uestion

    than the recorded remar!s of Congressman 'un6alan.2espondents employed considerable effort to becloud Section 8 ith undeserved

    ambiguity in order that a proper resort to the legislative deliberations may be had. etassuming that Section 8 deserves to be clarified through an inuiry into the legislativerecord, the excerpts cited by the respondents are far more ambiguous than thelanguage of the assailed provision regarding the !ey uestion of hether the "#$Secretary may impose safeguard measures in the face of a negative determination bythe #ariff Commission. (oreover, even Southern Cross counters ith its on excerpts of the legislative record in support of their on vie. )8debated legislation, for to sides ith

    contrapuntal interpretations of a statute to highlight their respective citations from thelegislative debate in support of their particular vies. )8+ A futile exercise of second>guessing is happily avoided if the meaning of the statute is clear on its face. It +s*6+&*%t /o t)* t*t o S*t+o% 5 t)$t t)*/* ust * $ -os+t+6* +%$ &*t*/+%$t+o% t)* T$/+ Co+ss+o% t)$t $ -/o&ut +s *+%g +-o/t*& +%to t)* ou%t/ +%+%/*$s*& :u$%t+t+*s ;)*t)*/ $sout* o/ /*$t+6* to &o*st+ -/o&ut+o%

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    2ules and 2egulations to 3overn the Conduct of $nvestigation by the #ariff Commission'ursuant to 2epublic Act No. // no cited by the respondent does not contain anyprovision that the "#$ Secretary may impose the general safeguard measures in theabsence of a positive final determination by the #ariff Commission.

    Section *7 of the S(A further bolsters the interpretation as argued by Southern

    Cross and upheld by the Decision. #he first paragraph thereof states that )u+pon itspositive determination, the )#ariff+ Commission shall recommend to the Secretary anappropriate definitive measure, clearly referring to the #ariff Commission as the entitythat ma!es the positive determination. 5n the other hand, the penultimate paragraph of the same provision states that )i+n the event of a negative final determination, the "#$Secretary is to immediately issue through the Secretary of 1inance, a ritten instructionto the Commissioner of Customs authori6ing the return of the cash bonds previouslycollected as a provisional safeguard measure. Since the first paragraph of the sameprovision states that it is the #ariff Commission hich ma!es the positive determination,it necessarily follos that it, and not the "#$ Secretary, ma!es the negative finaldetermination as referred to in the penultimate paragraph of Section *7. )9/+

    #he )eparate Opinion considers as highly persuasive of former #ariff CommissionChairman Abon, ho stated that the Commissions findings are merely recommendatory.)9*+ Again, the considered opinion of Chairman Abon is of no operative effect if thestatute plainly states otherise, and Section 8 bluntly does reuire a positive finaldetermination by the #ariff Commission before the "#$ Secretary may impose a generalsafeguard measure.)9+Certainly, the Court cannot give controlling effect to thestatements of any public officer in serious denial of his duties if the la otheriseimposes the duty on the public office or officer.

    Nonetheless, if e are to render persuasive effect on the considered opinion of themembers of the Executive Branch, it bears noting that the Secretary of the "epartment

    of -ustice rendered an 5pinion herein he concluded that the "#$ Secretary could notimpose a general safeguard measure if the #ariff Commission made a negative finaldetermination. )97+ nli!e Chairman Abons impromptu remar!s made during a hearing,the "5- 5pinion as rendered only after a thorough study of the uestion after referralto it by the "#$. #he "5- Secretary is the alter ego of the 'resident ith a statedmandate as the head of the principal la agency of the government. )90+ As the "5-Secretary has no denominated role in the S(A, he as able to render his 5pinion fromthe vantage of judicious distance. Should not his 5pinion, studied and direct to the pointas it is, carry greater eight than the spontaneous remar!s of the #ariff CommissionsChairman hich do not even expressly disavo the binding poer of the Commissionspositive final determination

    """* DT" )ecretary has /o Po%er of Re$ie% O$er 2inal Determination of the Tariff Commission

    4e should reemphasi6e that it is only because of the S(A, a legislative enactment,that the executive branch has the poer to impose safeguard measures. At the same

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    time, by constitutional fiat, the exercise of such poer is subjected to the limitations andrestrictions similarly enforced by the S(A. $n examining the relationship of the "#$ andthe #ariff Commission as established in the S(A, it is essential to ac!noledge andconsider these predicates.

    $t is necessary to clarify the paradigm established by the S(A and affirmed by the

    Constitution under hich the #ariff Commission and the "#$ operate, especially in lightof the suggestions that the Courts rulings on the functions of uasi>judicial poer findapplication in this case. 'erhaps the reflexive application of the uasi>judicial doctrine inthis case, rooted as it is in jurisprudence, might allo for some convenience in ruling,yet doing so ultimately betrays ignorance of the fundamental poer of Congress toreorgani6e the administrative structure of governance in ays it sees fit.

    #he )eparate Opinion operates from holly different premises hich areincomplete. $ts main stance, similar to that of respondents, is that the "#$ Secretary,acting as alter ego of the 'resident, may modify and alter the findings of the #ariff Commission, including the latters negative final determination by substituting it ith his

    on negative final determination to pave the ay for his imposition of a safeguardmeasure.)98+ 1atally, this conclusion is arrived at ithout considering the fundamentalconstitutional precept under Section %&, Article D$, on the ability of Congress toimpose restrictions and limitations in its delegation to the 'resident to impose tariffs andimposts, as ell as the express condition of Section 8 of the S(A reuiring a positivefinal determination of the #ariff Commission.

    As*%t S*t+o% 5 o t)* SMA, t)* P/*s+&*%t )$s %o +%)*/*%t, o%st+tut+o%$, o/ st$tuto/ -o*/ to +-os* $ g*%*/$ s$*gu$/& *$su/* . #ellingly, the )eparateOpinion does not directly confront the inevitable uestion as to ho the "#$ Secretarymay get aay ith imposing a general safeguard measure absent a positive finaldetermination from the #ariff Commission ithout violating Section 8 of the S(A, hich

    along ith Section *7 of the same la, stands as the only direct legal authority for the"#$ Secretary to impose such measures. #his is a constitutionally guaranteed limitationof the highest order, considering that the presidential authority exercised under the S(Ais inherently legislative.

    Nonetheless, the )eparate Opinion brings to fore the issue of hether the "#$Secretary, acting either as alter ego of the 'resident or in his capacity as head of anexecutive department, may revie, modify or otherise alter the final determination of the #ariff Commission under the S(A. #he succeeding discussion shall focus on thatuestion.

    'reliminarily, e should note that none of the parties uestion the designation of the

    "#$ or Agriculture secretaries under the S(A as the imposing authorities of thesafeguard measures, even though Section %& Article D$ states that it is the 'residentto hom the poer to impose tariffs and imposts may be delegated by Congress. #hevalidity of such designation under the S(A should not be in doubt. 4e recogni6e thatthe authori6ation made by Congress in the S(A to the "#$ and Agriculture Secretariesas made in contemplation of their capacities as alter egos of the 'resident.

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    $ndeed, in Marc Donnelly 6 Associates $* Agregado )99+ the Court upheld the validityof a Cabinet resolution fixing the schedule of royalty rates on metal exports andproviding for their collection even though Congress, under Commonealth Act No.

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    "#$ Secretary may impose the corresponding duty or safeguard measure. And in allthree las, there is no express provision authori6ing the "#$ Secretary to reverse thefactual determination of the #ariff Commission. )standing tradition of administrative interplay beteen these to entities.

    4ithin the administrative apparatus, the #ariff Commission appears to be a loer ran! relative to the "#$. But does this necessarily mean that the "#$ has the intrinsicright, absent statutory authority, to reverse the findings of the #ariff Commission #oinsist that it does, one ould have to concede for instance that, applying the samedoctrinal guide, the Secretary of the "epartment of Science and #echnology %"5S#&

    has the right to reverse the rulings of the Civil Aeronautics Board %CAB& or theissuances of the 'hilippine Coconut Authority %'CA&. As ith the #ariff Commission>"#$,there is no statutory authority granting the "5S# Secretary the right to overrule the CABor the 'CA, such right presumably arising only from the position of subordinacy of thesebodies to the "5S#. #o insist on such a right ould be to invite department secretariesto interfere in the exercise of functions by administrative agencies, even in areasherein such secretaries are bereft of speciali6ed competencies.

    #he )eparate Opinion notes that notithstanding above, the Secretary of "epartment of #ransportation and Communication may revie the findings of the CAB,the Agriculture Secretary may revie those of the 'CA, and that the Secretary of the

    "epartment of Environment and Natural 2esources may pass upon decisions of the(ines and 3eosciences Board.)

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    the Sectoral Staff Bureaus)

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    #he )eparate Opinion cites the respected constitutional la authority 1r. -oauinBernas, in support of the proposition that such plenary poer of executive control of the'resident cannot be restricted by a mere statute passed by Congress. ?oever, thecited passage from 1r. Bernas actually states, Since the Constitution has given the'resident the poer of control, ith all its aesome implications, it is the Constitution

    alone hich can curtail such poer.)*+

     "oes the 'resident have such tariff poers under the Constitution in the first place hich may be curtailed by the executive poer of control At the ris! of redundancy, e uote Section %&, Article D$; #he Congressmay, by la, authori6e the 'resident to fix ithin specified limits, and subject to suchlimitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export uotas,tonnage and harfage dues, and other duties or imposts ithin the frameor! of thenational development program of the 3overnment. Clearly the poer to impose tariffsbelongs to Congress and not to the 'resident.

    $t is ithin reason to assume the framers of the Constitution deemed it too onerousto spell out all the possible limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority toimpose tariffs. ?ence, the Constitution especially alloed Congress itself to prescribe

    such limitations and restrictions itself, a prudent move considering that such authorityinherently belongs to Congress and not the 'resident. Since Congress has no poer toamend the Constitution, it should be ta!en to mean that such limitations and restrictionsshould be provided by mere statute. #hen again, even the presidential authority toimpose tariffs arises only by mere statute. I%&**&, t)+s -/*s+&*%t+$ -/+6+*g* +s ot)o%t+%g*%t +% %$tu/* $%& *g+s$t+6* +% o/+g+%. T)*s* )$/$t*/+st+s, )*%*+g)*& $g$+%st t)* $s-*t o **ut+6* o%t/o $%& su-*/6+s+o%, $%%ot ++t$t*$g$+%st Co%g/*sss **/+s* o +ts +%)*/*%t -o*/ to t$.

    #he bare fact is that the administrative superstructure, for all its unieldiness, ismere putty in the hands of Congress. #he functions and mandates of the particular 

    executive departments and bureaus are not created by the 'resident, but by thelegislative branch through the Administrative Code. )+ #he 'resident is theadministrative head of the executive department, as such obliged to see that everygovernment office is managed and maintained properly by the persons in charge of it inaccordance ith pertinent las and regulations, and empoered to promulgate rulesand issuances that ould ensure a more efficient management of the executive branch,for so long as such issuances are not contrary to la. )7+ et the legislature has theconcurrent poer to reclassify or redefine the executive bureaucracy, including therelationship beteen various administrative agencies, bureaus and departments, andultimately, even the poer to abolish executive departments and their components,hamstrung only by constitutional limitations. #he "#$ itself can be abolished ith easeby Congress through deleting #itle G, Boo! $D of the Administrative Code. #he #ariff Commission can similarly be abolished through legislative enactment. )0+

     At the same time, Congress can enact additional tas!s or responsibilities on either the #ariff Commission or the "#$ Secretary, such as their respective roles on theimposition of general safeguard measures under the S(A. I% &o+%g so, t)* s$*Co%g/*ss, )+) )$s t)* -ut$t+6* $ut)o/+t to $o+s) t)* T$/+ Co+ss+o% o/ t)* #TI, +s s++$/ *-o*/*& to $t*/ o/ *-$%& +ts u%t+o%s t)/oug)o&$+t+*s )+) &o %ot $+g% +t) *st$+s)*& %o/s +% t)* u/*$u/$t+

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    st/utu/*. #he Court is bound to recogni6e the legislative prerogative to prescribe suchmodalities, no matter ho atypical they may be, in affirmation of the legislative poer torestructure the executive branch of government.

    #here are further limitations on the executive control adverted to by the )eparateOpinion. #he 'resident, in the exercise of executive control, cannot order a subordinate

    to disobey a final decision of this Court or any courts. $f the subordinate chooses todisobey, invo!ing sole allegiance to the 'resident, the judicial processes can be utili6edto compel obeisance. $ndeed, hen public officers of the executive department ta!etheir oath of office, they sear allegiance and obedience not to the 'resident, but to theConstitution and the las of the land. #he invocation of executive control must yieldhen under its subsumption includes an act that violates the la.

    #he )eparate Opinion concedes that the exercise of executive control andsupervision by the 'resident is bound by the Constitution and la. )8+ Still, just threesentences after asserting that the exercise of executive control must be ithin thebounds of the Constitution and la, the )eparate Opinion asserts, the control poer of 

    the Chief Executive emanates from the Constitution= no act of Congress may validlycurtail it.)9+ Fas are acts of Congress, hence valid confusion arises hether the )eparate Opinion truly believes the first proposition that executive control is boundby la. #his is a uagmire for the )eparate Opinion to resolve for itself 

    #he )eparate Opinion unduly considers executive control as the ne plusultra constitutional standard hich must govern in this case. But hile the 'residentmay generally have the poer to control, modify or set aside the actions of asubordinate, such poers may be constricted by the Constitution, the legislature, andthe judiciary. #his is one of the essences of the chec!>and>balance system in our tri>partite constitutional democracy. Not one head of a branch of government may operateas a Caesar ithin his@her particular fiefdom.

     Assuming there is a conflict beteen the specific limitation in Section %&, ArticleD$ of the Constitution and the general executive poer of control and supervision, theformer prevails in the specific instance of safeguard measures such as tariffs andimposts, and ould thus serve to ualify the general grant to the 'resident of the poer to exercise control and supervision over his@her subalterns.

    #hus, if the Congress enacted the la so that the "#$ Secretary is bound by the#ariff Commission in the sense the former cannot impose general safeguard measuresabsent a final positive determination from the latter the Court is obliged to respect suchlegislative prerogative, no matter ho such arrangement deviates from traditional normsas may have been enshrined in jurisprudence. #he only ground under hich such

    legislative determination as expressed in statute may be successfully challenged is if such legislation contravenes the Constitution. No such argument is posed by therespondents, ho do not challenge the validity or constitutionality of the S(A.

    3iven these premises, it is utterly rec!less to examine the interrelationship beteenthe #ariff Commission and the "#$ Secretary beyond the context of the S(A, applyinginstead traditional precepts on administrative control, revie and supervision. 1or thatreason, the Decision  deemed inapplicable respondents previous citations of Cario $*

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    #he matter of imposing a safeguard measure almost alays involves not just oneindustry, but the national interest as it encompasses other industries as ell. et in allcandor, any decision to impose a safeguard measure is susceptible to all sorts of external pressures, especially if the domestic industry concerned is ell>organi6ed.narranted impositions of safeguard measures may similarly be detrimental to the

    national interest. Congress could not be blamed if it desired to insulate the investigatoryprocess by assigning it to a body ith a putative degree of independence and traditionalexpertise in ascertaining factual conditions. Affected industries ould have cause tolobby for or against the safeguard measures. #he decision>ma!er is in the unenviableposition of having to bend an ear to listen to all concerned voices, including those hichmay spea! softly but carry a big stic!. ?ad the la mandated that the decision be madeon the sole discretion of an executive officer, such as the "#$ Secretary, it ould bemar!edly easier for safeguard measures to be imposed or ithheld based solely onpolitical considerations and not on the factual conditions that are supposed to predicatethe decision.

    2eference of the binding positive final determination to the #ariff Commission is of 

    course, not a fail>safe means to ensure a bias>free determination. But at least thelegislated involvement of the Commission in the process assures some measure of measure of )*? $%& $$%* involving to different governmental agencies ithdisparate speciali6ations. #here is no legal or constitutional demand for such a setup,but its isdom as policy should be ac!noledged. As prescribed by Congress, both the#ariff Commission and the "#$ Secretary operate ithin limited frameor!s, under hich nobody acuires an undue advantage over the other.

    4e recogni6e that Congress deemed it necessary to insulate the process inreuiring that the factual determination to be made by an ostensibly independent bodyof speciali6ed competence, the #ariff Commission. #his prescribed frameor!,

    constitutionally sanctioned, is intended to prevent the baseless, himsical, or consideration>induced imposition of safeguard measures. $t removes from the "#$Secretary jurisdiction over a matter beyond his putative speciali6ed aptitude, thecompilation and analysis of picayune facts and determination of their limited causalrelations, and instead vests in the Secretary the broad choice on a matter ithin hisunuestionable competence, the selection of hat particular safeguard measure ouldassist the duly beleaguered local industry yet at the same time conform to national tradepolicy. $ndeed, the S(A recogni6es, and places primary importance on the "#$Secretarys mandate to formulate trade policy, in his capacity as the 'residents alter ego on trade, industry and investment>related matters.

     At the same time, the statutory limitations on this authori6ed poer of the "#$

    Secretary must prevail since the Constitution itself demands the enforceability of thoselimitations and restrictions as imposed by Congress. 'olicy isdom ill not save a lafrom infirmity if the statutory provisions violate the Constitution. But since theConstitution itself provides that the 'resident shall be constrained by the limits andrestrictions imposed by Congress and since these limits and restrictions are so clear and categorical, then the Court has no choice but to uphold the reins.

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    Even assuming that this prescribed setup made little sense, or seemeduncommonly silly,):7+ the Court is bound by propriety not to dispute the isdom of thelegislature as long as its acts do not violate the Constitution. Since there is noconvincing demonstration that the S(A contravenes the Constitution, the Court is ontto respect the administrative regimen propounded by the la, even if it allots the #ariff 

    Commission a higher degree of puissance than normally expected. $t is for this reasonthat the traditional conceptions of administrative revie or uasi>judicial poer cannotcontrol in this case.

    $ndeed, to apply the latter concept ould cause the Court to fall into a linguistic trapoing to the multi>faceted denotations the term uasi>judicial has come to acuire.

    nder the S(A, the #ariff Commission underta!es formal hearings,):0+ receives andevaluates testimony and evidence by interested parties,):8+ and renders a decision isrendered on the basis of the evidence presented, in the form of the final determination.#he final determination reuires a conclusion hether the importation of the productunder consideration is causing serious injury or threat to a domestic industry producing

    li!e products or directly competitive products, hile evaluating all relevant factors havinga bearing on the situation of the domestic industry. ):9+#his process aligns conformablyith definition provided by Blac!s Fa "ictionary of uasi>judicial as the action,discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, ho are reuired toinvestigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, eigh evidence, anddra conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercisediscretion of a judicial nature.):judicial poers attributable to the #ariff Commission,

    considering the pronouncement that uasi>judicial adjudication ould mean adetermination of rights privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order hichapplies to a specific situation.):+

    $ndeed, a declaration that the #ariff Commission possesses uasi>judicial poers,even if ascertained for the limited purpose of exercising its functions under the S(A,may have the unfortunate effect of expanding the Commissions poers beyond thatcontemplated by la. After all, the #ariff Commission is by convention, a fact>findingbody, and its role under the S(A, burdened as it is ith factual determination, is but amere continuance of this tradition. ?oever, Congress through the S(A offers asignificant deviation from this traditional role by tying the decision by the "#$ Secretary

    to impose a safeguard measure to the reuired positive factual determination by the#ariff Commission. Congress is not bound by past traditions, or even by the jurisprudence of this Court, in enacting legislation it may deem as suited for the times.#he sole benchmar! for judicial substitution of congressional isdom is constitutionaltransgression, a standard hich the respondents do not even attempt to match.

    Respondents )uggested "nterpretation

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    Of the )MA Transgresses 2air Play 

    2espondents have belabored the argument that the Decisions interpretation of theS(A, particularly of the role of the #ariff Commission $is88$is the "#$ Secretary, isnoxious to traditional notions of administrative control and supervision. But in doing so,

    they have failed to ac!noledge the congressional prerogative to redefineadministrative relationships, a license hich falls ithin the plenary province of Congress under our representative system of democracy. (oreover, respondents onsuggested interpretation falls ayard of expectations of practical fair play.

     Adopting respondents suggestion that the "#$ Secretary may disregard the factualfindings of the #ariff Commission and investigatory process that preceded it, it ouldseem that the elaborate procedure underta!en by the Commission under the S(A, ithall the attendant guarantees of due process, is but an inutile spectacle. As -ustice3arcia noted during the oral arguments, hy ould the "#$ Secretary bother ith the#ariff Commission and instead conduct the investigation himself. )::+

    Certainly, nothing in the S(A authori6es the "#$ Secretary, after ma!ing thepreliminary determination, to personally oversee the investigation, hear out theinterested parties, or receive evidence. )*//+ $n fact, the S(A does not even reuire the#ariff Commission, hich is tas!ed ith the custody of the submitted evidence, )*/*+ toturn over to the "#$ Secretary such evidence it had evaluated in order to ma!e itsfactual determination.)*/+ Clearly, as Congress tas!ed it to be, it is the #ariff Commissionand not the "#$ Secretary hich acuires the necessary intimate acuaintance ith thefactual conditions and evidence necessary for the imposition of the general safeguardmeasure. 4hy then favor an interpretation of the S(A that leaves the findings of the#ariff Commission bereft of operative effect and ma!es them subservient to the ishesof the "#$ Secretary, a personage ith lesser or!ing familiarity ith the relevant

    factual milieu $n fact, the bare theory of the respondents ould effectively allo the "#$Secretary to adopt, under the subterfuge of his discretion, the factual determination of aprivate investigative group hired by the industry concerned, and reject the investigativefindings of the #ariff Commission as mandated by the S(A. $t ould be highly irregular to substitute hat the la clearly provides for a dubious setup of no statutory basis thatould be readily susceptible to ran! chicanery.

    (oreover, the S(A guarantees the right of all concerned parties to be heard, anelemental reuirement of due process, by the #ariff Commission in the context of itsinvestigation. #he "#$ Secretary is not similarly empoered or tas!ed to hear out theconcerns of other interested parties, and if he@she does so, it arises purely out of volition

    and not compulsion under la.$ndeed, in this case, it is essential that the position of other than that of the local

    cement industry should be given due consideration, cement being an indispensableneed for the operation of other industries such as housing and construction. 4hile thegeneral safeguard measures may operate to the better interests of the domestic cementindustries, its deprivation of cheaper cement imports may similarly or! to the detrimentof these other domestic industries and correspondingly, the national interest. Notably,the #ariff Commission in this case heard the vies on the application of representatives

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    of other allied industries such as the housing, construction, and cement>bag industries,and other interested parties such as consumer groups and foreign governments. )*/7+ $t isonly before the #ariff Commission that their vies had been heard, and this is because itis only the #ariff Commission hich is empoered to hear their positions. Since dueprocess reuires a judicious consideration of all relevant factors, the #ariff Commission,

    hich is in a better position to hear these parties than the "#$ Secretary, is similarlymore capable to render a determination conformably ith the due process reuirementsthan the "#$ Secretary.

    $n a similar vein, Southern Cross aptly notes that in instances hen it is the "#$Secretary ho initiates motu proprio the application for the safeguard measure pursuantto Section 9 of the S(A, respondents suggested interpretation ould result in thea!ard situation herein the "#$ Secretary ould rule upon his on application after ithad been evaluated by the #ariff Commission. 'ertinently cited is our ruling in Corona $*Court of Appeals)*/0+ that no man can be at once a litigant and judge. )*/8+ Certainly, thisanomalous situation is avoided if it is the #ariff Commission hich is tas!ed ith arrivingat the final determination hether the conditions exist to arrant the general safeguard

    measures. #his is the setup provided for by the express provisions of the S(A, and theproblem ould arise only if e adopt the interpretation urged upon by respondents.

    The Possibility for Administrati$e Re$ie% Of the Tariff Commissions Determination

    #he Court has been emphatic that a positive final determination from the #ariff Commission is reuired in order that the "#$ Secretary may impose a generalsafeguard measure, and that the "#$ Secretary has no poer to exercise control and

    supervision over the #ariff Commission and its final determination. #hese conclusionsare the necessary conseuences of the applicable provisions of the Constitution, theS(A, and las such as the Administrative Code. ?oever, the la is silent though onhether this positive final determination may otherise be subjected to administrativerevie.

    #here is no evident legislative intent by the authors of the S(A to provide for aprocedure of administrative revie. $f ever there is a procedure for administrative revieover the final determination of the #ariff Commission, such procedure must be done in amanner that does not contravene or disregard legislative prerogatives as expressed inthe S(A or the Administrative Code, or fundamental constitutional limitations.

    $n order that such procedure of administrative revie ould not contravene the laand the constitutional scheme provided by Section %&, Article D$, it is essential toassert that the positive final determination by the #ariff Commission is indispensable asa reuisite for the imposition of a general safeguard measure. #he submissions of private respondents and the )eparate Opinioncannot be sustained insofar as they holdthat the "#$ Secretary can peremptorily ignore or disregard the determinations made bythe #ariff Commission. ?oever, if the mode of administrative revie ere in such amanner that the administrative superior of the #ariff Commission ere to modify or alter 

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    its determination, then such reversal may still be valid ithin the confines of Section 8 of the S(A, for technically it is still the #ariff Commissions determination, administrativelyrevised as it may be, that ould serve as the basis for the "#$ Secretarys action.

    ?oever, and fatally for the present petitions, such administrative revie cannot beconducted by the "#$ Secretary. Even if conceding that the #ariff Commissions findings

    may be administratively revieed, the "#$ Secretary has no authority to revie or modify the same. 4e have been emphatic on the reasons such as that there is notraditional or statutory basis placing the Commission under the control and supervisionof the "#$= that to allo such ould contravene due process, especially if the "#$ itself ere to apply for the safeguard measures motu proprio. #o hold otherise oulddestroy the administrative hierarchy, contravene constitutional due process, anddisregard the limitations or restrictions provided in the S(A.

    $nstead, assuming administrative revie ere available, it is the NE"A that mayconduct such revie folloing the principles of administrative la, and the NE"Asdecision in turn is revieable by the 5ffice of the 'resident. #he decision of the 5ffice of 

    the 'resident then effectively substitutes as the determination of the #ariff Commission,hich no forms the basis of the "#$ Secretarys decision, hich no ould be ripe for  judicial revie by the C#A under Section : of the S(A. #his is the only ay thatadministrative revie of the #ariff Commissions determination may be sustained ithoutviolating the S(A and its constitutional restrictions and limitations, as ell asadministrative la.

    $n bare theory, the NE"A may revie, alter or modify the #ariff Commissions finaldetermination, the Commission being an attached agency of the NE"A. Admittedly,there is nothing in the S(A or any other statute that ould prevent the NE"A toexercise such administrative revie, and successively, for the 'resident to exercise inturn revie over the NE"As decision.

    Nonetheless, in ac!noledging this possibility, the Court, ithout denigrating thebare principle that administrative officers may exercise control and supervision over theacts of the bodies under its jurisdiction, reali6es that this comes at the expense of aspeedy resolution to an application for a safeguard measure, an application dependenton fluctuating factual conditions. #he further delay ould foster uncertainty andinsecurity ithin the industry concerned, as ell as ith all other allied industries, hichin turn may lead to some measure of economic damage. "elay is certain, since judicialrevie authori6ed by la and not administrative revie ould have the final say. #hefact that the S(A did not expressly prohibit administrative revie of the finaldetermination of the #ariff Commission does not negate the supreme advantages of 

    engendering exclusive judicial revie over uestions arising from the imposition of ageneral safeguard measure.

    $n any event, even if e conceded the possibility of administrative revie of the#ariff Commissions final determination by the NE"A, such ould not deny merit to thepresent petition. $t does not change the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling thatthe "#$ Secretary as not bound by the negative final determination of the #ariff Commission, or that the "#$ Secretary acted ithout jurisdiction hen he imposed

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    general safeguard measures despite the absence of the statutory positive finaldetermination of the Commission.

    "V* Courts "nterpretation of )MA

    "n 7armony %ith Other Constitutional Pro$isions

    $n response to our citation of Section %&, Article D$, respondents elevate toarguments grounded in constitutional la. 5ne is based on another constitutionalprovision, Section *, Article G$$$, hich mandates that )t+he State shall promote thepreferential use of 1ilipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods andadopt measures that help ma!e them competitive. By no means does this provisiondictate that the Court favor the domestic industry in all competing claims that it maybring before this Court. $f it ere so, judicial proceedings in this country ould berendered a moc!ery, resolved as they ould be, on the basis of the personalities of the

    litigants and not their legal positions.

    (oreover, the duty imposed on by Section *, Article G$$$ falls primarily ithCongress, hich in that regard enacted the S(A, a la designed to protect domesticindustries from the possible ill>effects of our accession to the global trade order.$nconveniently perhaps for respondents, the S(A also happens to provide for aprocedure under hich such protective measures may be enacted. #he Court cannot

     just impose hat it deems as the spirit of the la ithout giving due regard to its letter.

    $n li!e>minded manner, the )eparate Opinion loosely states that the purpose of theS(A is to protect or safeguard local industries from increased importation of foreignproducts.)*/9+ #his inaccurately leaves the impression that the S(A ipso facto unravels a

    protective cloa! that shelters all local industries and producers, no matter theconditions. $ndeed, our country has !noingly chosen to accede to the orld traderegime, as expressed in the 3A## and 4#5 Agreements, despite the understandingthat local industries might suffer ill>effects, especially ith the easier entry of competingforeign products. At the same time, these international agreements ere designed toconstrict protectionist trade policies by its member>countries. ?ence, the median, asexpressed by the S(A, does allo for the application of protectionist measures such astariffs, but only after an elaborate process of investigation that ensures factual basis andindispensable need for such measures. (ore accurately, the purpose of the S(A is toprovide a process for the protection or safeguarding of domestic industries that haveduly established that there is substantial injury or threat thereof directly caused by the

    increased imports. $n short, domestic industries are not entitled to safeguard measuresas a matter of right or influence.

    2espondents also ma!e the astounding argument that the imposition of generalsafeguard measures should not be seen as a taxation measure, but instead as anexercise of police poer. #he vain hope of respondents in divorcing the safeguardmeasures from the concept of taxation is to exclude from consideration Section %&,

     Article D$ of the Constitution.

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    #his argument can be debun!ed at length, but it deserves little attention. #hemotivation behind many taxation measures is the implementation of police poer goals.'rogressive income taxes alleviate the margin beteen rich and poor=