Socioeconomic Bias, Turnout Decline, and the Puzzle of Participation

David Darmofal Department of Political Science

University of South Carolina 350 Gambrell Hall

Columbia, SC 29208 Phone: (803) 777-5440

E-mail: darmofal@gwm.sc.edu

Abstract

Socioeconomic bias in voter participation poses fundamental challenges to the exercise of representative democracy. Among these are inequities in political communication and representation and a lack of political incorporation of citizens often on the periphery of society. Despite the critical implications of socioeconomic turnout bias, central questions regarding this bias in the United States remain unresolved. Has turnout bias increased over the past several decades, or has the class skew in the electorate remained largely unchanged? If socioeconomic turnout bias has increased, why has this occurred? I find that socioeconomic bias in voter participation has increased in the United States since 1960. This increased socioeconomic turnout bias did not result from decreased party mobilization efforts, as some studies contend. Instead, low- and middle-class citizens have disproportionately stopped voting because of less participatory attitudes, weakened social attachments, and changes in demographics. Where the party mobilization thesis suggests a quick reversal of the increased turnout bias if the parties simply alter their mobilization efforts, the broad and long-term sources of increased bias I identify suggest only a gradual and incremental reversal of this increased bias. The paper’s findings also bring us closer to a resolution of the puzzle of why turnout declined in the United States after 1960 despite relaxed registration laws and rising education levels. Relaxed registration laws did little to boost voter turnout. At the same time, increased education levels were insufficient to offset the turnout depressing effects of the attitudinal, social, and demographic changes of recent decades.

I thank R. Michael Alvarez, Jan Box-Steffensmeier, Wendy Tam Cho, M. Margaret Conway, Brian Gaines, Jennifer Jerit, James Kuklinski, Peter Nardulli, and Herb Weisberg for their helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank Dawn Owens-Nicholson for her help with data collection.

Political equality is a fundamental tenet of representative democracy. For citizens to

enjoy equal expression and representation in the public sphere, they must enjoy a basic equality

in political rights (Pateman 1970; Dahl 1998). Without this political equality, certain voices will

be privileged while others are disprivileged. Reflecting its Lockean heritage, American political

culture defines these shared political rights as negative rights. As a consequence, although

fundamental political rights such as the rights to vote, petition, and assembly are shared equally

by Americans, the ability to realize them is not. Disparities in socioeconomic status afford some

citizens a much greater opportunity to exercise these political rights, and a much greater voice in

the political process as a consequence (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). This inequality in

participation is evidenced even in the exercise of the most central and inherently equal of all

political rights, the right to vote. Although each citizen is afforded the same voice in the voting

booth, citizens high in socioeconomic status are much more likely than citizens low in

socioeconomic status to make their voices heard through voting (Verba and Nie 1972; Piven and

Cloward 1989). Much as with the pluralist chorus (Schattschneider 1960), the American voting

electorate sings with an upper-class accent.

This socioeconomic bias in voter participation carries several problematic normative

implications. If non-voting, lower-class citizens’ policy preferences differ from those of voting,

upper-class citizens’ preferences, elections will not accurately reflect the public’s will. And

evidence suggests that these preferences do in fact diverge, with non-voters more likely to

support social welfare spending than voters (Bennett and Resnick 1990; see also Verba and Nie

1972; Verba et al. 1993; but see Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Teixeira 1992). As a

consequence, different candidates are elected than would be elected by a voting electorate with

no class skew. The result is policy outcomes that disproportionately favor the upper-class, who

vote disproportionately (Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995;

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Burnham 1987; Piven and Cloward 1989; but see Shaffer 1981). In short, socioeconomic bias in

voting produces representational inequities on both the demand and supply sides of American

politics.

The implications of socioeconomic turnout bias extend beyond representational concerns.

In the classic Millsian ([1860] 1958) perspective, voter participation is also valued because of its

educative function (see also Pateman 1970). By voting (and taking part in the inter- and intra-

personal deliberation that precedes voting), citizens become better-informed, more efficacious,

and broadened in their concerns, and better equipped for future participation as a consequence.

Individuals low in socioeconomic status have the most to gain in citizenship from voting, but are

least likely to realize these gains as a consequence of their abstention. This may further produce

a lack of legitimacy and support for the political system among these citizens often already on

the periphery of social and political life. At the extreme, abstention and the accompanying lack

of political socialization may promote democratic instability by providing a receptive audience

for political demagoguery.

Socioeconomic inequalities in participation clearly pose considerable implications for

representative democracy. Yet the most central questions regarding socioeconomic turnout bias

in the United States remain unresolved. Has turnout bias increased over the past several decades

as turnout rates in the United States have declined, or has the class skew in the electorate

remained largely unchanged? An increase in socioeconomic turnout bias in recent decades would

make the normative implications of participatory inequalities all the more pressing.

Equally important, if socioeconomic turnout bias has increased, why has this been the

case? If increased turnout bias can be traced to a particular change in elite behavior such as a

decline in partisan mobilization, a ready remedy exists for the quick reversal of this bias. If,

conversely, increased turnout bias has been produced by a broader constellation of long-term

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societal changes, the reversal of this bias is much more likely to occur through a gradual and

incremental process at best.

Existing studies disagree over whether voters have become increasingly unrepresentative

of the larger American society. Some scholars (Reiter 1979; Burnham 1987; Rosenstone and

Hansen 1993) argue that they have, finding that turnout in presidential elections has declined

most among lower socioeconomic classes. Other scholars (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Teixeira

1992), however, find no increase in socioeconomic turnout bias. They find, instead, that different

socioeconomic classes have stopped voting at roughly the same rates. The divergence in findings

between these two sets of studies results, primarily, from differences in research design.

Even the most recent of these studies, however, examine socioeconomic turnout bias only

through the 1988 election. As a consequence, we do not know whether any trends in

socioeconomic bias have worsened or become less severe in the intervening years, or why this

might be the case. Equally problematic, all of these studies rely primarily on reported turnout and

none directly replicate their central analyses with validated turnout measures based on

respondents’ actual voting records.1

Rosenstone and Hansen and Burnham attribute the increased turnout bias they find to the

political parties disproportionately cutting back their mobilization of lower socioeconomic

1 Leighley and Nagler use the NES validated turnout measure to supplement their analysis

of reported turnout, but do not directly measure turnout bias trends using validated turnout. They find that high-income respondents have become more likely than low-income respondents to overreport their turnout over time, and conclude, therefore, that self-reported turnout provides a conservative test of increases in turnout bias (Leighley and Nagler 1992, 732). However, employing their income quintiles, increased turnout bias exists even when validated turnout is substituted for reported turnout. Leighley and Nagler also use the validated turnout measure as the dependent variable in a series of election-specific multivariate turnout models. Because the 1988 income coefficient is not larger than the 1964 income coefficient, they conclude that turnout bias has not increased. Increased turnout bias along income lines, however, need not be caused by income. Instead, it may be caused by factors such as political attitudes that covary with income.

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groups. Neither study, however, provides a direct empirical test of this mobilization thesis. At the

same time that they argue that mobilization rates were declining, several other political, social,

and demographic changes were also taking place. These societal changes may also have

increased turnout bias. If so, the sources of turnout bias are more complex and the reversal of this

bias poses a more formidable challenge for reform-minded groups than the mobilization thesis

would suggest.

In this paper, I identify which voters have stopped voting and why they have done so. I

provide a comprehensive, updated analysis of trends in turnout bias through the 2000 presidential

election. I examine these trends using each of the three principal measures of turnout in the

discipline: the National Election Studies (NES) reported turnout, the NES validated turnout, and

the Census Bureau’s Current Population Surveys (CPS) reported turnout. Finally, I examine

these trends using each of the three principal measures of socioeconomic status: education,

income, and occupation.

I find that turnout bias increased along both education and income lines over the past four

decades as lower and middle class voters disproportionately stopped voting. This education and

income bias increased both during the 1960-1972 period of aggregate turnout decline and the

1972-2000 period of aggregate turnout stability. Turnout bias has increased according to both the

NES and CPS reported turnout measures and the NES validated measure. Contrary to the

conclusions of Rosenstone and Hansen and Burnham, this increased turnout bias did not result

from changes in party mobilization. The political parties have increased their contacting of all

classes since 1960 and have actually increased their contacting more among less-educated

citizens than among better-educated citizens. Instead, lower and middle class groups

disproportionately stopped voting because of less participatory attitudes, weakened social

attachments, and changing demographics.

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This paper proceeds as follows. In the next sections, I examine the existing literature on

turnout decline and turnout bias and the principal explanation for increased turnout bias: the

mobilization thesis. In the following section, I examine trends in turnout bias using the three

measures of turnout. Next, I estimate a probit model to identify the sources of increased turnout

bias. I conclude by discussing the findings’ implications for turnout bias and for the puzzle of

why turnout declined despite rising education levels and relaxed registration laws.

Socioeconomic Bias in Turnout Decline

Few trends in recent American politics have been as dramatic as the decline in voter

turnout. Turnout among eligible voters fell 7.6 percentage points between 1960 and 1972, with

the bulk of this decline, 5.3 points, occurring between 1968 and 1972 (McDonald and Popkin

2001, 966). Although turnout has not declined further since, the drop in turnout has persisted. As

a result, fifteen and a half million fewer voters went to the polls in November 2000 than would

have had turnout stayed at its 1960 rate. This mass abstention has led several scholars (Abramson

and Aldrich 1982; Teixeira 1992; Putnam 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) to express

concerns about the political health of the American polity. Some argue that a disillusioned

citizenry is becoming disconnected from its government (Teixeira 1992; Abramson and Aldrich

1982). For their part, political elites are seen as increasingly unresponsive to the concerns of

citizens who have stopped voting (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

A central question about the aggregate turnout decline remains unresolved: which

citizens produced it? Was the turnout decline from 1960 to 1972 produced equally by all social

classes, or was it produced disproportionately by lower class groups? Has the aggregate turnout

stability since 1972 been produced by stable turnout among different classes, or by offsetting

turnout trends, with declines among lower class groups matched by increases among upper class

groups? Equally important, why have citizens who have stopped voting done so?

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Studies that addressed trends in turnout bias into the late 1980s varied significantly in

their research designs. Reiter (1979, 304) sampled white respondents in the NES and found that

low-income and less-educated whites’ reported turnout fell more than twice as much as high-

income and better-educated whites’ between 1960 and 1976. Burnham (1987) also sampled a

subset of the electorate (males) and found that blue-collar males’ reported turnout in the CPS fell

roughly twice as much as white-collar males’ between 1964 and 1980. Rosenstone and Hansen

(1993, 243) used reported turnout for the entire NES sample and also found marked increases in

turnout bias along education and income lines between 1960 and 1988.

Teixeira (1992), conversely, found little increase in turnout bias along education, income,

or occupation lines between 1972 and 1988 using reported turnout in the CPS. He also concluded

that there was little increase in turnout bias using NES reported turnout between 1960 and 1988.

Leighley and Nagler (1992) likewise found little increase in socioeconomic turnout bias between

1964 and 1988. They found that the lowest income quintile in the CPS had a turnout decline of

11.0 percentage points over these years while the top income quintile had an only slightly

smaller decline of 8.3 percentage points. Leighley and Nagler concluded, as a result, that “the

voters remain the same.”2

The Mobilization Thesis

Studies that found an increased socioeconomic turnout bias into the late 1980s contended

that the political parties were responsible for the increased abstention by lower class groups.

Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 242-244) argued that as the civil rights movement receded so too

did party mobilization efforts, disproportionately depressing low SES turnout, which was

particularly dependent on this mobilization. Burnham (1987, 124) argued, alternatively, that the

2 The 1964 CPS survey, however, is a problematic baseline for an examination of trends in socioeconomic turnout bias. The 1964 Census Bureau survey included no citizenship question (McDonald and Popkin 2001). As a consequence, non-citizens are included as valid responses on the turnout question (i.e., as non-voters) even though they were ineligible to vote.

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Democratic party reduced its mobilization of lower SES groups as it shifted its issue appeals

toward higher-status citizens whom it hoped to attract in an information economy. Burnham

further argued that this change in party strategy also reduced low SES citizens’ partisan

attachments and external efficacy, and that this also depressed low SES turnout.

This mobilization thesis offers a simple solution for any increases in turnout bias. The

thesis posits that a reduction in turnout bias does not require the reversal of several distinct

political, social, and demographic trends. Instead, if the political parties simply increase their

mobilization of lower SES citizens, any increased class bias should disappear.

The mobilization thesis, however, remains untested. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 248)

infer that declining mobilization increased SES turnout bias from evidence that it depressed

African American turnout. African Americans, however, are not a socioeconomically

homogeneous group. Burnham bases his argument for the mobilization thesis on survey data and

aggregate electoral data that lack measures of party contacting efforts.

Other political, social, and demographic changes occurred over the past four decades and

may also have produced increased turnout bias. Citizens’ political attitudes became less

participatory, producing decreased psychological motives for voting (Teixiera 1992; Abramson

and Aldrich 1982). Social attachments between citizens weakened, further decreasing the

psychological motives for voting while increasing the information and transaction costs of voting

(Putnam 2000). At the same time, many lower-class workers’ earnings fell (Levy and Murnane

1992), increasing these citizens’ financial hurdles to voting.

Examining Changes in Socioeconomic Turnout Bias

Socioeconomic status is a multidimensional concept, reflecting an individual’s social and

economic location in society. The three principal measures of socioeconomic status – education,

income, and occupation – each tap different elements of SES (Knoke 1979, Himmelstein and

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McRae 1988). Moreover, each of these SES measures differs in its relationship to turnout, with

education exhibiting the strongest of the three relationships (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

For these reasons, the more comprehensive studies of turnout bias trends have generally

examined these trends along several measures of socioeconomic status.

Education has generally been measured using the individual’s level of education. Income

has typically been measured using family income, specifically the respondent’s family’s location

in the family income distribution, with the family’s income quintile particularly preferred (see

Leighley and Nagler 1992).3 Occupation has been measured with categories for white-collar and

blue-collar positions. In this paper, I employ these socioeconomic status measures, and examine

trends in turnout bias along each measure.

Figure 1 plots the National Election Studies (NES) self-reported turnout rates for

education, income, and occupation groups from 1960 through 2000. (Appendix 1 lists the

number of respondents in each SES group). Table 1 presents these turnout rates, the turnout

changes from 1960 for each group, and the 95 percent confidence intervals around these

changes.4

As Figure 1 and Table 1 show, turnout bias increased significantly along education lines

over the past four decades. Non-college-educated citizens’ turnout fell more than 20 points

between 1960 and 2000. In contrast, college-educated citizens’ turnout fell less than seven points

3 There are two reasons why family income is typically relativized and education is not.

As Leighley and Nagler (1992, 727) note, income quintiles are “more comparable over time than is the individual’s absolute income level.” Equally important, specific education levels, unlike specific family income levels, impart citizens with particular information and skills relevant to voting (e.g., bureaucratic skills are taught in both high school and college but abstract conceptual skills are taught primarily in the latter).

4 Professional, managerial, sales, and clerical workers were coded as white-collar; skilled and semi-skilled workers, service workers, foresters, fishers, farmers, farm managers, farm and non-farm laborers, and foremen were coded as blue-collar.

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over the same time period. Turnout bias also increased markedly along income lines, as the

middle income quintile’s turnout fell nearly 20 points between 1960 and 2000 while other

income groups’ turnout fell only by single digits. In contrast to the education and income trends,

turnout bias increased much more modestly along occupation lines.

Examining the trends in turnout bias further, we can see how turnout bias developed

during the two turnout periods between 1960 and 2000. The aggregate turnout decline between

1960 and 1972 was produced largely by middle and lower income and education groups.

Between 1960 and 1968, the middle income quintile’s turnout fell five points and the second

lowest quintile’s more than 12 points, while the highest quintile’s turnout was essentially stable.

Between 1968 and 1972, the middle quintile’s turnout fell another five points and the second

lowest quintile’s another two points while the top quintile’s turnout remained largely unchanged.

Education-based turnout bias played a large role in producing the sharp drop in turnout between

1968 and 1972. Between these two elections, high school-educated citizens’ turnout fell 8.4

points and non-high school-educated citizens’ turnout fell 4.6 points while college-educated

citizens’ turnout actually rose 2.5 points. In contrast, occupation-based bias grew much more

modestly during this period.

The aggregate turnout stability from 1972-2000 masks additional increases in education

and income bias. The same educational faultline that developed during the period of aggregate

turnout decline has cracked wider in recent elections. In each of the past four presidential

elections, turnout declines since 1972 have been noticeably larger among the non-college-

educated than among the college-educated. The turnout bias in the middle of the income

distribution has also grown in the most recent elections, with larger turnout declines among the

middle income quintile than among other income groups in the past two elections. As with the

1960-1972 period, occupation-based bias grew much more modestly than education- or income-

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based bias during the 1972-2000 period.5

In contrast to the period of aggregate turnout decline, comparable turnout data from the

Census Bureau’s Current Population Surveys (CPS) exist for the 1972-2000 period.6 Because the

CPS data include an unusually large number of respondents (more than 50,000 valid turnout

responses, including more than 10,000 in each SES group in each presidential election since

1972) (see Appendix 1), they provide very precise estimates of trends in turnout bias. We can use

the CPS data to replicate the NES analysis; if the CPS trends mirror the NES trends, we will

have additional evidence of increased socioeconomic turnout bias since 1972.

It is instructive, therefore, that the CPS trends track with the NES trends and that the

same general patterns emerge from both data sources (see Table 2). There have been noticeably

larger post-1972 turnout declines among the non-college-educated than among the college-

educated in the past four elections in both data sources. The CPS trends in income bias also track

with the NES trends, although they diverge in 2000, with the CPS placing the largest turnout

decline between 1972 and 2000 in the bottom income quintile. The CPS and NES again track

together on occupation bias, with neither data source showing a large, persistent increase in

occupation-based turnout bias between 1972 and 2000.

It is critical to replicate the analysis of reported turnout trends with a validated turnout

measure based on respondents’ actual voting records. Because voting is a valued societal norm,

survey respondents have an incentive to report having voted even if they did not. More than 20

5 The NES reported turnout declines since 1972 for each SES group during a time of

stable aggregate turnout are an example of Simpson’s paradox in which the group means do not equal the aggregate mean (see Simpson 1951). In the aggregate, the NES reported turnout trends are consistent with McDonald and Popkin’s findings. There is a 6.1 percentage point turnout decline between 1960 and 1972 and little decline since 1972 using the NES reported turnout measure. This is not surprising, given that the NES, like McDonald and Popkin, excludes ineligible non-citizens from its turnout measure.

6 The Census Bureau did not survey turnout in the 1960 election, and has since lost the original 1964 and 1968 CPS survey data.

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percent of actual non-voters in NES surveys do invalidly report having voted (Silver, Anderson,

and Abramson 1986, 613). Such overreports will pose a problem for studies of socioeconomic

turnout bias if different socioeconomic groups have changed significantly in their relative

propensities to overreport their voting over time. If they have, observed increases in

socioeconomic turnout bias may simply be a product of over-time changes in overreports, rather

than in over-time changes in turnout.

Recognizing the problem of overreported turnout, the National Election Studies validated

the reported turnout of respondents in the 1964 and 1976-1988 surveys by examining the

respondents’ registration and voting records.7 The trends in turnout bias using this validated

turnout measure are reported in Table 3. It is important to note that the increases in turnout bias

did not result from differences in turnout overreports across socioeconomic groups over time.

Turnout bias increased also according to the NES validated turnout measure, and the trends in

turnout bias between 1964 and 1988 vary only marginally between the NES reported and

validated measures. For example, in three-fourths of the cases, the differences in turnout bias

between the top and bottom SES groups are 3.5 percentage points or less across the two

measures.

The increases in turnout bias along education and income lines over the past four decades

are all the more surprising when one considers the strong socioeconomic skew in turnout that

existed in 1960. Lower and middle class citizens were already turning out at lower rates than

their upper class counterparts four decades ago. These lower turnout bases, however, did not lead

lower and middle class citizens to experience a floor effect in their turnout declines. Instead,

7 Although the NES also attempted to validate the turnout of respondents in the 1972 survey, these data are problematic. Typically, the NES validated respondents’ reported turnout within several months of the election (Traugott 1989, 11). However, the NES did not attempt to validate the reported turnout of respondents in the 1972 survey until 1977. Because respondents’ voting records could have been lost or purged during the intervening five years, the NES argues against using the vote validations for 1972 respondents (see Traugott 1989).

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even though starting from much lower turnout bases, lower and middle SES groups still

experienced larger percentage point declines in turnout than their higher SES counterparts.

Because of these lower turnout bases, the relative declines in turnout among lower and

middle class citizens have been even more dramatic. For example, non-high school-educated

citizens’ 22.6 point turnout decline since 1960 represents a 33 percent drop in this group’s

turnout from its 1960 level. By contrast, college-educated citizens’ 6.7 point turnout decline over

this same period represents only a 7.4 percent decline in turnout. Lower and middle class groups’

turnout has not only declined more in absolute terms over the past four decades. Because of their

lower turnout bases, these groups have also lost much larger shares of their earlier turnout than

have higher-status groups.

Over the past four decades, voters have become much less educationally and

economically representative of the larger society. Why has this increase in turnout bias occurred?

The mobilization thesis places the blame with the political parties. Alternatively, I posited that

changes in political attitudes, social connectedness, and demographics may have increased bias.

In the next section, I estimate a turnout model to identify the sources of turnout bias in the two

recent turnout periods.

Explaining Increased Socioeconomic Turnout Bias

I employed NES data on presidential elections from 1960 through 2000 to identify the

sources of turnout decline and turnout bias over the past four decades. The model included five

sets of variables: measures of party mobilization, political attitudes, social connectedness,

demographics, and registration laws. I discuss these measures in turn next.

To examine the mobilization thesis, I included the standard NES party contacting

measure of mobilization employed by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and other scholars (see

Appendix 2 for the question wording and coding of all variables). I included three measures of

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political attitudes in the model: external efficacy, political interest, and strength of partisanship.

Each taps a source of voter participation identified in previous turnout studies (Abramson and

Aldrich 1982; Teixeira 1992) and each is posited to have a positive relationship to turnout. The

external efficacy measure is a two-item measure of NES respondents’ perceptions of elite

responsiveness to citizens. Political interest is measured with an item on NES respondents’

interest in the year’s campaigns. Partisanship is measured with a folded scale of the strength of

partisan identification.

I included three measures of social connectedness. Each measure of connectedness

should be associated with stronger psychological motives for voting and lower information and

transaction costs of voting. Each, therefore, should be positively related to turnout. I included a

length of residence variable, measuring the number of years that respondents had lived at their

present residence.8 I included a religious attendance variable, measuring how frequently

respondents reported attending religious services. I also included a dichotomous measure of

marital status, with the expectation that married respondents’ turnout should be higher as a result

of spousal mobilization (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

I included each of the three measures of socioeconomic status employed in the earlier

analysis of turnout trends. Each should be positively related to turnout. Citizens with more

education are hypothesized to vote at higher rates because of stronger interest in politics and

more experience with the bureaucratic hurdles associated with voting (Wolfinger and Rosenstone

1980, 79). Because education may have a non-monotonic relationship to turnout (Wolfinger and

Rosenstone 1980, 124), I also included a squared education term. Income should also be

8 This question, unfortunately, was not asked in 1968 or 1972. Given the importance of these two elections for turnout bias, and the theoretical importance of social connectedness, I employed a measure of the respondent’s length of community residence for these two elections. This did not significantly change the parameter estimates for the residence variable in the pooled model, as interactions of community residence with 1968 and 1972 were both insignificant.

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positively related to turnout because it eases the financial hurdles to voting. For the same reason,

white-collar workers should be more likely to vote than blue-collar workers. To test this, I

included the dichotomous measure of occupation used in the earlier analysis.

I included two additional demographic measures that are consistently related to turnout. I

included age and age-squared variables, with age measured in years. Turnout is expected to

increase as individuals age and gain participatory attitudes and experience in overcoming the

bureaucratic hurdles of voting before declining in later years as voter participation becomes more

difficult (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 60; but see Highton and Wolfinger 2001). Since

voters in the South have had, and continue to have, lower turnout rates than voters outside the

South, I also included a South dummy variable measuring whether respondents resided in the

South.

Brody (1978) hypothesized that relaxed registration requirements should have boosted

turnout over the past four decades. To examine this, I augmented the NES data with data on

registration laws. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found that the most important registration

law for turnout was the closing date, the date on which registration for the election closed. As a

consequence, I included a closing date variable measuring the number of days before the election

that registration closed.9 Nagler (1991) found that closing dates had their strongest deterrent

effect on high school-educated citizens’ turnout. To replicate Nagler’s analysis and test for an

interaction between closing date and education levels, I interacted closing date with education

and with squared education. The dependent variable in the model was the NES self-reported

turnout measure.

9 Because these data were not readily available for 1968, I linearly interpolated the

closing date data for that election. An interaction of the closing date and a dummy variable for 1968 was insignificant, indicating that the interpolation did not significantly alter the estimate for closing date in the pooled model.

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Predicted Probabilities Model

I employed a predicted probabilities technique to determine how over-time changes in

these factors produced over-time changes in SES groups’ turnout rates. The technique involved

transforming NES respondents from typical members of their SES group on a variable of interest

in an earlier election into typical members of the group on the same variable in a later election

and calculating the difference in predicted turnout rates for the group that resulted from this

change (see also Teixeira 1992). First, I estimated a probit model on pooled NES data from the

1960 through 2000 presidential elections. The estimates from this model are reported in Table

4.10 I used these coefficient estimates to calculate the predicted probability of voting for each

NES respondent in a given election, giving members of each SES group their group’s average

value on the variable of interest in that election. Summing these probabilities for the SES group

in that election produced the group’s predicted turnout rate for that election. Next, to determine

how over-time changes in a factor affected the group’s turnout rate, I shifted each member’s

value on the variable of interest to the group’s average on the variable in a later election. Again I

summed the resulting predicted probabilities of voting for the group. The difference in the

group’s turnout rates across the elections was the difference attributable to the factor of interest.

For example, to identify how changes in external efficacy affected the lowest income

quintile’s turnout between 1960 and 1968, I gave each 1960 lowest quintile respondent the mean

1960 external efficacy value for that group (4.4), kept their values on the remaining variables at

their 1960 levels, and calculated their probabilities of voting. I summed these probabilities to

calculate the group’s predicted turnout. Next, I gave each lowest quintile respondent in 1960 the

10 I also examined more complex models incorporating year and period dummies and interaction terms. Although a few of these terms reached statistical significance, the substantive results differed little between the model presented here and these more complex specifications. Because there was little substantive difference between the models, I chose to keep the more parsimonious specification presented here.

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mean 1968 external efficacy value for the group (3.5), kept their values on the remaining

variables at their original 1960 levels, and recalculated their probabilities of voting. I summed

these predicted probabilities to calculate the group’s predicted turnout given the change to the

group’s 1968 external efficacy mean. Next, I calculated the difference between the group’s

original predicted turnout and their new predicted turnout. The difference between the two

predicted turnout levels was the turnout change attributable to changes in external efficacy.11

I calculated these predicted probabilities over three time periods that were identified as

central to turnout bias in the previous analysis: 1960 to 1968, 1968 to 1972, and 1972 to 2000.12

Doing so identified the sources of turnout change and turnout bias over these periods. These

sources of turnout change and bias are presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively. Each table

presents the estimated turnout change during the period that was attributable to each of the

variables in the probit model. Beneath each of these estimates are their 95 percent confidence

intervals.

Results

As the tables show, there is no empirical support for the mobilization thesis. The parties

have not disproportionately reduced their mobilization of lower class groups. Instead,

mobilization has increased among all socioeconomic groups, and has increased particularly

among the least educated (see Figure 2). The percentage of citizens without a high school

11 To calculate the turnout effects of variables included in interaction terms, I shifted

these variables (in both their main effect and interaction term) to their values in later elections while keeping the other variable included in the interaction term at its earlier level. For example, to identify the turnout effects of closing date changes between 1960 and 1968, I shifted the closing date variable in both its main effect and interaction terms to its 1968 level for an SES group while keeping the education and education-squared terms with which it was interacted at their 1960 levels for the SES group.

12 Because community residence rather than household residence was used in 1968 and 1972, the turnout differences due to changes in length of residence were only calculated for the 1968 to 1972 period.

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education who reported that a party contacted them more than doubled between 1960 and 2000

(from 13.6 percent in 1960 to 30.3 percent in 2000). In contrast, the percentage of college-

educated citizens reporting a party contact increased less than eight points over this same period

(from 32.8 percent to 40.4 percent). Changes in party mobilization actually reduced turnout bias

along education lines, rather than increase it. The turnout of non-high school-educated citizens

was boosted two points by increased party mobilization between 1960 and 2000 while the

turnout of college-educated citizens was raised only half a point by increased mobilization over

the same period.

The increases in turnout bias instead were produced by a combination of changes in

political attitudes, social connectedness, and demographics. The 1960 to 1972 period of

aggregate turnout decline particularly was an era of dramatic political and social change. Not

surprisingly, citizens’ political attitudes and social attachments underwent significant change

during this period. These political and social changes affected citizens’ electoral participation,

particularly depressing turnout among middle and lower class groups.

Changes in attitudes and social connectedness increased income bias between 1960 and

1968. During this period, the second lowest quintile’s turnout fell more than two and a half

points and the middle quintile’s more than two points as a result of declining external efficacy.

Turnout declines due to declining efficacy were significantly less pronounced among upper

income citizens. At the same time, middle and lower income turnout fell nearly a point in

response to changes in marital status, while upper income turnout was largely unchanged.13

The increase in income bias between 1968 and 1972 was produced by additional

attitudinal and social changes, as well as demographic changes. Between 1968 and 1972, the

13 Some of the turnout decline for the SES groups remains unexplained in each period. This is a product of the lack of NES time-series questions that have been asked consistently across the elections examined.

17

middle quintile’s turnout fell by nearly three points and the second lowest quintile’s by nearly

two points in response to attitudinal changes while the highest quintile’s turnout was essentially

unchanged. Both declining interest and partisanship were particularly consequential; each

produced significantly different turnout trends between the former two income groups and the

latter group (see Figure 3).

At the same time, the second lowest income quintile became noticeably younger -- their

average age fell from 48.8 to 44.1 years between these two elections -- and less rooted.14 Their

turnout fell more than two points between these elections as a consequence. In contrast, the top

quintile’s turnout fell less than half a point in response to changes in age and community

residence. For their part, the middle quintile became less likely to attend religious services over

this period and they had a significantly larger turnout decline as a consequence than either richer

or poorer citizens.

The disproportionate drops in turnout between 1968 and 1972 among middle and lower

education groups were produced by attitudinal changes among these groups. Changes in political

attitudes between 1968 and 1972 dropped turnout among the high school-educated by 2.7 points

and among the non-high school-educated by 1.8 points while reducing turnout among the

college-educated by only .8 points. Declining external efficacy, political interest, and

partisanship all produced significantly larger turnout declines among the high school-educated

than among the college-educated (see Figure 4). Declines in political interest and partisanship

also produced significantly larger turnout declines among the non-high school-educated than

among the college-educated between these two elections.

14 This quintile’s declining age over these two elections does not appear to be the product

of a large concentration of newly eligible 18 to 20 year-old citizens in the quintile. As demonstrated by a one-way ANOVA, the second lowest quintile was no more likely than any other quintile to have 18 to 20 year-olds in 1972.

18

Though political change was less dramatic during the 1972-2000 period than during the

1960-1972 period, social and demographic changes continued apace. Moral and social values

changed. The nation also moved from a manufacturing economy to an information economy. Not

surprisingly, changes in social connectedness and demographics were particularly consequential

for turnout bias between 1972 and 2000.

Declines in social connectedness particularly increased education bias. Between 1972 and

2000, changes in social attachments depressed turnout among the least-educated by three points

and among the high school-educated by 1.7 points while hardly touching turnout among the

college-educated (see Figure 5). Declining religious attendance and marital status both produced

significantly larger turnout declines among the non-college-educated than among the college-

educated.

Income changes also increased turnout bias along education lines between 1972 and

2000. Falling incomes reduced non-college-educated citizens’ turnout significantly more than

college-educated citizens’ over this period. This reflects the increased economic premium placed

on education in recent decades. At the same time, declining partisanship reduced turnout among

the non-college-educated while rising partisanship increased turnout among the college-

educated.

Along income lines, turnout declined more among the middle quintile than among other

quintiles over this period because of changes in social connectedness. The middle quintile’s

turnout fell 1.7 points in response to declining social connectedness, while the top quintile’s

turnout fell only half a point. Middle income citizens’ declining religious attendance and

declining likelihood of being married both depressed the group’s turnout.

It is noteworthy that while changes in political attitudes, social connectedness, and

demographics reduced middle and lower class groups’ turnout over the past four decades,

19

relaxed registration laws, in contrast to Brody’s thesis, did not increase these groups’ turnout.

Relaxed closing dates, in fact, did little to boost turnout among SES groups in any of the time

periods examined here. This is also in contrast to Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) finding of

a large, 6.1 point turnout increase that would result from removing closing dates altogether.

There are two reasons why relaxed closing dates had a much smaller positive effect on

turnout than the previous literature would suggest. First, although closing dates have been

relaxed over the past several decades, they have not been eliminated entirely. On average,

registration still closed more than 20 days before election day in 2000. Second, closing dates

near election day likely reflect certain states’ commitment to participation. Once the political

attitudes and social connectedness of the citizens in these states are included in a turnout model

(they were absent from Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s model), the independent effects of closing

dates on turnout are reduced.

Conclusion

The significant turnout decline since 1960 in the United States, a principal concern of

both empirical and normative scholars, has not been produced equally by all social classes.

Instead, turnout has declined more among middle and lower education and income groups than

among higher education and income groups. As a consequence of this disproportionate

abstention, an electorate that was already strongly class skewed four decades ago has become

markedly more unrepresentative socioeconomically over the past four decades. Elected officials

are increasingly being chosen by citizens who are educationally and economically

unrepresentative of the broader American society.

In contrast to Rosenstone and Hansen’s and Burnham’s mobilization thesis, changes in

partisan mobilization have not produced this increased socioeconomic turnout bias over the past

four decades. In fact, changes in party mobilization efforts have actually marginally reduced

20

turnout bias over this period. Had the parties produced the increased socioeconomic turnout bias,

a ready remedy would exist to increase representational equity: the parties would simply need to

increase their mobilization of lower class groups. In fact, the parties have already done this, and

turnout bias has increased nonetheless.

In a now classic essay, Brody (1978) argued that the decline in turnout despite rising

education levels and relaxed registration laws constituted the “puzzle of political participation.”

The results in this paper bring us closer to a resolution of Brody’s puzzle. They also argue that

identifying the sources of increased turnout bias is also the key to unlocking Brody’s puzzle.

In contrast to Brody’s thesis, relaxed registration laws did little to boost turnout over the

past four decades. Equally important, the educational upgrading that was central to Brody’s

thesis bypassed a significant portion of the American electorate. By the 2000 election, nearly half

of eligible voters still had not attended college. And in that election, these citizens who had not

attended college turned out at rates more than 20 points below their counterparts from four

decades ago. Turnout declined, and turnout bias increased, in large part because non-college-

educated citizens’ turnout, with little boost from educational upgrading or relaxed registration

laws, was unable to withstand the effects of the attitudinal, social, and demographic trends of the

past four decades.

The educational upgrading that Brody envisioned is a process that will develop only over

the long term. The turnout gains that can be expected to accompany this upgrading will also

therefore accrue only gradually over time. Reversals in turnout bias and turnout decline are all

the more likely to be gradual because of the nature of their attitudinal, social, and demographic

sources. These trends developed over several decades and are unlikely to reverse rapidly in

response to external interventions.

Declining external efficacy since 1960 has depressed turnout among the non-college-

21

educated by four points. For turnout bias and turnout decline to reverse, these citizens will need

to feel much more confident that political elites are responsive to their concerns, and that their

votes, as a consequence, are worth casting. It seems highly unlikely, however, that there is

anything that political elites can, or will, do in the short-term to significantly reverse the decline

in external efficacy.

Beyond this critical attitudinal change, citizens will also need to reconnect with each

other if turnout bias and turnout decline are to reverse. The decline in social connectedness

identified by Putnam and others has significantly depressed turnout. Again, however, any

reversals in social attachments are likely to be only gradual. The minimal and transitory nature of

increases in civic behaviors following the September 11th terrorist attacks (Putnam 2002) suggest

that even a shared, traumatic national experience is limited in its capacity to reconnect citizens to

each other.

Finally, the increased economic premium placed on education since the early 1970s has

reduced earnings among less-educated citizens. This economic premium is structural, a product

of the transition from an industrial economy to an information economy. As a consequence, a

rapid reversal in this earnings decline seems highly unlikely.

The multiple sources of turnout decline and turnout bias raise a troubling normative note

for citizens and groups interested in seeing these participation trends reversed. Lacking the ready

remedy of a change in party mobilization strategies, reform-minded citizens and groups are

dependent instead upon the reversal of multiple attitudinal, social, and demographic trends. By

their nature, these trends are only likely to reverse gradually, if at all. As a consequence, the

reversal of the increased socioeconomic turnout bias that has developed over the past four

decades is likely to be a gradual and incremental process at best.

22

Data

The National Election Studies data used in this paper come from the American National

Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1948-2000 (ICPSR #8475), the American National

Election Studies, 1948-1997 (CD-ROM) (ICPSR #2536), and the American National Election

Study, 2000: Pre- and Post-Election Survey (ICPSR #3131). The Current Population Surveys

data used in this paper come from The Current Population Survey: Voter Supplement Files,

1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000 (ICPSR #60, 7699, 7875, 8457, 9318, 6365,

2205, 3182). The closing date data used in this paper are from: Council of State Governments.

Various Years. The Book of the States. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments; Smith,

Constance E. 1960. Voting and Election Laws: Laws for Voters. New York, NY: Oceana; and

Yadlosky, Elizabeth. 1964. “Voting Laws of the 50 States and the District of Columbia.”

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, Legislative Research Service. The closing date data

will be deposited with ICPSR.

23

Table 1: Trends in Socioeconomic Turnout Bias, 1960-2000 (NES Self-Reported Turnout)

Education Income Quintile Occupation Less than More than (Lowest) (Highest) Blue- White-

Year 12 Years 12 Years 12 Years 1 2 3 4 5 Collar Collar

1960 68.9 87.3 90.3 64.2 78.3 83.0 81.7 89.1 79.0 88.8

1964 69.4 81.9 88.2 63.8 72.9 79.0 85.0 87.0 74.0 85.2+0.5 -5.4 -2.1 -0.4 -5.4 -4.0 +3.3 -2.1 -5.0 -3.6

(-5.4,6.4) (-11.3,0.5) (-8.3,4.0) (-9.6,8.8) (-13.8,3.0) (-12.2,4.3) (-5.7,12.4) (-8.5,4.3) (-11.1,1.0) (-9.3,2.1)

1968 64.0 83.8 84.1 60.5 66.1 77.9 82.9 89.1 69.0 86.4-4.9 -3.5 -6.2 -3.7 -12.2 -5.1 +1.2 0.0 -10.0 -2.4

(-11.0,1.3) (-9.3,2.4) (-12.5,0.0) (-13.5,6.0) (-20.7,-3.9) (-13.8,3.8) (-7.5,9.9) (-6.3,6.3) (-16.3,-3.8) (-8.0,3.3)

1972 59.4 75.4 86.6 60.2 63.8 72.6 81.1 88.5 68.9 82.1-9.5 -11.9 -3.7 -4.0 -14.5 -10.4 -0.6 -0.6 -10.1 -6.7

(-15.2,-3.7) (-17.5,-6.2) (-9.4,2.0) (-12.6,4.5) (-22.1,-6.9) (-18.5,-2.2) (-9.3,8.2) (-6.4,5.3) (-15.8,-4.4) (-12.0,-1.3)

1976 58.6 69.7 85.0 56.6 67.2 71.5 74.0 86.7 65.3 82.2-10.3 -17.6 -5.3 -7.6 -11.1 -11.5 -7.7 -2.4 -13.7 -6.6

(-16.6,-4.1) (-23.5,-11.6) (-11.1,0.5) (-16.7,1.3) (-19.1,-3.2) (-19.9,-3.1) (-17.4,2.0) (-8.5,3.8) (-19.6,-7.8) (-12.0,-1.1)

1980 56.5 69.7 82.6 58.6 67.6 71.2 79.5 82.0 63.8 81.4-12.4 -17.6 -7.7 -5.6 -10.7 -11.8 -2.2 -7.1 -15.2 -7.4

(-19.3,-5.4) (-23.9,-11.4) (-13.7,-1.7) (-15.0,3.8) (-19.7,-1.7) (-20.3,-3.1) (-11.8,7.4) (-14.0,-0.2) (-21.4,-9.0) (-13.0,-1.8)

24

Table 1 Continued: Trends in Socioeconomic Turnout Bias, 1960-2000 (NES Self-Reported Turnout)

Education Income Quintile OccupationLess than More than (Lowest) (Highest) Blue- White-12 Years 12 Years 12 Years 1 2 3 4 5 Collar Collar

1984 57.0 69.8 85.3 57.0 71.1 72.1 81.2 88.8 64.3 83.4-11.9 -17.5 -5.0 -7.2 -7.2 -10.9 -0.5 -0.3 -14.7 -5.4

(-18.6,-5.2) (-23.4,-11.7) (-10.7,0.6) (-16.0,1.6) (-15.1,0.6) (-19.6,-2.1) (-9.1,8.0) (-6.5,5.9) (-20.6,-9.0) (-10.6,-0.2)

1988 50.6 62.4 85.1 47.4 59.5 70.4 79.2 85.6 56.2 81.4-18.3 -24.9 -5.2 -16.8 -18.8 -12.6 -2.5 -3.5 -22.8 -7.4

(-25.3,-11.3) (-31.0,-18.8) (-10.9,0.5) (-26.3,-7.4) (-27.2,-10.6) (-21.0,-4.1) (-11.4,6.3) (-9.8,2.9) (-28.9,-16.8) (-12.7,-2.0)

1992 50.6 71.4 88.0 54.5 70.0 76.5 86.9 89.4 66.7 85.0-18.3 -15.9 -2.3 -9.7 -8.3 -6.5 +5.2 +0.3 -12.3 -3.8

(-25.0,-11.5) (-21.7,-10.1) (-7.8,3.1) (-18.3,-1.1) (-16.3,-0.4) (-14.6,1.7) (-3.0,13.5) (-5.7,6.4) (-18.0,-6.6) (-8.9,1.3)

1996 49.5 66.6 83.4 54.5 67.5 65.6 78.4 87.4 62.0 81.2-19.4 -20.7 -6.9 -9.7 -10.8 -17.4 -3.3 -1.7 -17.0 -7.6

(-28.6,-10.1) (-27.5,-13.8) (-12.8,-1.0) (-19.6,0.0) (-19.9,-1.9) (-28.0,-6.8) (-13.2,6.7) (-8.5,5.0) (-23.7,-10.3) (-13.3,-1.9)

2000 46.3 65.7 83.6 55.7 72.3 64.4 81.5 83.9 64.8 78.9-22.6 -21.6 -6.7 -8.5 -6.0 -18.6 -0.2 -5.2 -14.2 -9.9

(-32.6,-12.6) (-28.4,-14.8) (-12.4,-0.9) (-17.9,0.9) (-16.6,4.5) (-29.0,-8.1) (-9.2,8.8) (-12.8,2.5) (-21.1,-7.3) (-15.4,-4.3)

The first cell entries are the NES reported turnout rates by education, income quintile, and occupation. The second entries are the percentage point turnout changes from 1960 foreach SES group. The third entries are the 95% confidence intervals around these turnout changes.

25

Table 2: Trends in Socioeconomic Turnout Bias, 1972-2000 (CPS Reported Turnout)

Education Income Quintile OccupationLess than More than (Lowest) (Highest) Blue- White-

Year 12 Years 12 Years 12 Years 1 2 3 4 5 Collar Collar

1972 53.1 68.3 81.8 53.5 58.0 65.4 73.2 78.5 59.2 79.2

1976 50.7 64.2 78.1 50.8 57.5 64.5 71.7 80.0 55.4 76.3-2.4 -4.1 -3.7 -2.7 -0.5 -0.9 -1.5 +1.5 -3.8 -2.9

(-3.2,-1.6) (-4.9,-3.3) (-4.4,-3.0) (-3.8,-1.7) (-1.7,0.8) (-2.0,0.2) (-2.5,-0.4) (0.6,2.3) (-4.6,-2.9) (-3.7,-2.2)

1980 49.9 63.7 78.0 50.7 57.1 63.2 71.0 78.3 55.3 75.9-3.2 -4.6 -3.8 -2.8 -0.9 -2.2 -2.2 -0.2 -3.9 -3.3

(-4.0,-2.3) (-5.4,-3.9) (-4.5,-3.1) (-3.9,-1.2) (-2.1,0.3) (-3.3,-1.1) (-3.2,-1.1) (-1.0,0.6) (-4.7,-3.0) (-4.1,-2.7)

1984 50.1 63.7 78.3 51.5 60.7 66.3 72.3 80.1 55.7 75.4-3.0 -4.6 -3.5 -2.0 +2.7 +0.9 -0.9 +1.6 -3.5 -3.8

(-3.9,-2.1) (-5.4,-3.8) (-4.2,-2.9) (-3.0,-0.9) (1.5,3.9) (-0.4,2.1) (-1.7,0.1) (0.7,2.5) (-4.3,-2.6) (-4.5,-3.1)

1988 46.2 59.7 76.0 52.6 55.2 62.5 70.1 79.7 51.4 73.1-6.9 -8.6 -5.8 -0.9 -2.8 -2.9 -3.1 +1.2 -7.8 -6.1

(-7.9,-5.9) (-9.4,-7.8) (-6.6,-5.2) (-2.0,0.3) (-4.0,-1.7) (-4.1,-1.7) (-4.0,-2.2) (0.2,2.1) (-8.7,-6.9) (-6.9,-5.4)

1992 48.1 64.1 81.9 51.3 63.0 70.3 77.1 85.3 58.4 79.0-4.9 -4.2 +0.1 -2.2 +5.0 +4.9 +4.1 +6.8 -0.8 -0.2

(-6.0,-3.9) (-5.0,-3.4) (-0.6,0.7) (-3.3,-1.0) (3.8,6.1) (3.7,6.2) (3.1,4.8) (5.9,7.6) (-1.7,0.1) (-1.0,0.4)

1996 42.0 56.3 74.5 47.3 56.3 62.2 67.4 77.9 50.0 71.1-11.1 -12.0 -7.3 -6.2 -1.7 -3.2 -5.8 -0.6 -9.2 -8.1

(-12.2,-10.0) (-12.8,-11.1) (-8.0,-6.6) (-7.3,-5.0) (-3.0,-0.5) (-5.0,-1.8) (-6.8,-4.7) (-1.6,0.2) (-10.2,-8.3) (-8.9,-7.4)

2000 43.1 59.2 77.3 49.6 59.9 66.1 72.6 80.2 53.0 75.0-10.0 -9.1 -4.5 -3.9 +1.9 +0.7 -0.6 +1.7 -6.2 -4.2

(-11.2,-8.8) (-10.0,-8.2) (-5.2,-3.9) (-5.1,-2.6) (0.6,3.2) (-0.6,2.0) (-1.7,0.5) (0.7,2.5) (-7.2,-5.2) (-5.4,-3.9)

The first cell entries are the Current Population Surveys reported turnout rates by education, income quintile, and occupation. The second entries are the percentage point turnout changesfrom 1972 for each SES group. The third entries are the 95% confidence intervals around these turnout changes.

26

Table 3: Trends in Socioeconomic Turnout Bias, 1964-1988 (NES Validated Turnout)

Education Income Quintile OccupationLess than More than (Lowest) (Highest) Blue- White-

Year 12 Years 12 Years 12 Years 1 2 3 4 5 Collar Collar

1964 57.4 68.1 76.9 53.7 56.4 62.0 76.4 78.5 60.2 72.1

1976 50.9 61.4 71.9 45.5 58.9 61.8 64.2 78.5 54.5 70.6-6.5 -6.7 -5.0 -8.2 +2.5 -0.2 -12.2 +0.0 -5.7 -1.5

(-12.4,-0.6) (-12.6,-0.7) (-10.9,0.9) (-16.9,0.5) (-5.8,10.8) (-7.4,7.0) (-20.8,-3.5) (-6.4,6.4) (-11.6,0.2) (-7.1,4.0)

1980 45.2 55.0 70.1 45.8 53.9 57.8 68.4 67.6 51.7 66.8-12.2 -13.1 -6.8 -7.9 -2.5 -4.2 -8.0 -10.9 -8.5 -5.3

(-18.6,-5.8) (-19.2,-6.9) (-12.9,-0.7) (-17.0,1.1) (-12.0,6.8) (-11.7,3.1) (-16.6,0.6) (-18.3,-3.5) (-14.6,-2.4) (-11.0,0.5)

1984 47.7 57.7 72.5 44.4 60.3 62.4 67.7 79.3 51.3 71.6-9.7 -10.4 -4.4 -9.3 +3.9 +0.4 -8.7 +0.8 -8.9 -0.5

(-15.7,-3.6) (-16.1,-4.7) (-9.9,1.1) (-17.5,-1.0) (-4.1,11.9) (-7.1,7.8) (-15.9,-1.4) (-5.8,7.4) (-14.6,-3.3) (-5.7,4.7)

1988 41.3 51.7 71.8 38.7 47.6 57.6 66.9 72.7 46.3 68.7-16.1 -16.4 -5.1 -15.0 -8.8 -4.4 -9.5 -5.8 -13.9 -3.4

(-22.4,-9.8) (-22.3,-10.5) (-10.8,0.5) (-23.7,-6.4) (-17.2,-0.6) (-11.6,2.8) (-17.0,-1.8) (-12.6,1.0) (-19.6,-8.2) (-8.7,1.9)

The first cell entries are the NES validated turnout rates by education, income quintile, and occupation. The second entries are the percentage point turnout changes from 1964 for eachSES group. The third entries are the 95% confidence intervals around these turnout changes.

27

Table 4: Turnout Model Estimates

Coefficient Standard ErrorMobilization .420** .038

External Efficacy .099** .009

Political Interest .391** .021

Strength of Partisanship .187** .015

Length of Residence .161** .012

Religious Attendance .155** .012

Marital Status .185** .032

Education .704** .198

Education Squared -.089 .049

Income .085** .013

Occupation .170** .033

Age .043** .005

Age Squared .000** .000

South -.252** .032

Closing Date .012** .005

Closing Date*Education -.014** .005

Closing Date*Education Squared .003* .001

Constant -4.302** .218n = 12092, Log likelihood = -5097.232, χ2 (17 d.f.) = 3345.28*, * p < .05, ** p < .01

28

Table 5: Sources of Socioeconomic Turnout Bias, 1960-1968 (NES Self-Reported Turnout)

Education Income Quintile Occupation Less than More than (Lowest) (Highest) Blue- White-

Year 12 Years 12 Years 12 Years 1 2 3 4 5 Collar CollarMobilization +0.9 -0.1 -0.3 +0.4 0.0 +0.6 +0.2 +0.3 +0.5 +0.3

(0.8,1.1) (-0.2,0.1) (-0.4,-0.2) (0.3,0.4) (0.0,0.0) (0.5,0.6) (0.2,0.2) (0.2,0.3) (0.5,0.5) (0.3,0.3)

External -2.9 -1.5 -0.6 -2.5 -2.6 -2.0 -0.8 -0.8 -2.3 -1.1Efficacy (-3.0,-2.7) (-1.6,-1.4) (-0.7,-0.5) (-2.7,-2.4) (-2.8,-2.4) (-2.2,-1.8) (-0.9,-0.7) (-0.9,-0.7) (-2.4,-2.2) (-1.2,-1.0)

Political +0.4 -0.3 +0.1 +0.6 +0.7 -0.4 +1.0 -0.1 +0.2 -0.1Interest (0.4,0.4) (-0.3,-0.2) (0.1,0.1) (0.6,0.7) (0.6,0.7) (-0.4,-0.3) (0.9,1.1) (-0.1,-0.1) (0.2,0.2) (-0.2,-0.1)

Strength of +0.1 -0.5 -0.7 +0.1 -0.9 -0.5 +0.2 -0.7 -0.4 -0.6Partisanship (-0.1,0.1) (-0.6,-0.5) (-0.8,-0.6) (0.1,0.1) (-1.0,-0.9) (-0.5,-0.4) (0.1,0.2) (-0.8,-0.6) (-0.4,-0.4) (-0.7,-0.6)

Religious -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.8 -0.4 -0.2 -0.9 -1.4 -0.3Attendance (-0.5,-0.5) (-0.8,-0.6) (-0.8,-0.6) (-0.6,-0.5) (-0.9,-0.7) (-0.4,-0.4) (-0.2,-0.2) (-1.0,-0.8) (-1.5,-1.3) (-0.4,-0.3)

Marital -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 -0.9 -0.8 -0.9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.4Status (-0.7,-0.7) (-0.4,-0.3) (-0.2,-0.2) (-1.0,-0.8) (-0.9,-0.8) (-0.9,-0.8) (-0.3,-0.2) (-0.2,-0.1) (-0.6,-0.5) (-0.4,-0.3)

Education +0.1 +0.8 +1.0 +0.8 +0.9 +1.4 +0.6(0.0,0.1) (0.7,0.9) (0.9,1.1) (0.7,0.9) (0.7,1.0) (1.3,1.5) (0.6,0.7)

Income +0.1 +0.1 0.0 +0.4 0.0(0.1,0.1) (0.1,0.1) (0.0,0.0) (0.4,0.4) (0.0,0.0)

Occupation +0.2 -0.2 -0.1 +0.2 -0.1 +0.2 +0.1 +0.2(0.1,0.2) (-0.2,-0.1) (-0.2,-0.1) (0.1,0.2) (-0.1,-0.1) (0.2,0.3) (0.1,0.1) (0.1,0.2)

Age +0.5 +0.5 -0.6 +0.1 +1.0 -0.1 +0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0(0.4,0.5) (0.5,0.6) (-0.7,-0.5) (0.1,0.1) (0.9,1.1) (-0.1,0.0) (0.1,0.2) (-0.2,-0.1) (-0.2,-0.2) (0.0,0.0)

South -0.1 +0.1 +0.1 +0.3 -0.2 -0.6 +0.1 +0.4 -0.3 +0.3(0.1,0.1) (0.1,0.1) (0.0,0.0) (0.3,0.3) (-0.2,-0.2) (-0.7,-0.6) (0.1,0.1) (0.3,0.4) (-0.3,-0.3) (0.2,0.3)

Closing Date -0.3 +1.2 +0.4 -0.2 +0.1 +0.2 +0.4 +0.4 0.0 +0.5(-0.4,-0.3) (1.1,1.3) (0.3,0.4) (-0.3,0.0) (-0.1,0.3) (0.1,0.3) (0.2,0.6) (0.3,0.6) (0.0,0.1) (0.3,0.6)

The first cell entries are the percentage point changes in turnout between 1960 and 1968 attributable to each variable for each SES group. The second cell entries are the 95%confidence intervals around these turnout changes.

29

Table 6: Sources of Socioeconomic Turnout Bias, 1968-1972 (NES Self-Reported Turnout)

Education Income Quintile OccupationLess than More than (Lowest) (Highest) Blue- White-

Year 12 Years 12 Years 12 Years 1 2 3 4 5 Collar Collar

Mobilization +0.6 +0.5 +0.2 +0.3 +1.1 0.0 +0.8 0.0 +0.4 +0.1(0.5,0.7) (0.4,0.6) (0.2,0.3) (0.2,0.3) (1.0,1.1) (0.0,0.0) (0.7,0.8) (0.0,0.0) (0.4,0.5) (0.1,0.1)

External 0.0 -0.6 -0.1 +0.4 +0.1 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1Efficacy (0.0,0.0) (-0.6,-0.5) (-0.1,-0.1) (0.4,0.5) (0.1,0.1) (-0.4,-0.3) (-0.3,-0.3) (0.0,0.1) (-0.2,-0.2) (-0.1,0.0)

Political -1.0 -1.6 -0.6 -0.5 -1.3 -1.7 -1.2 -0.2 -1.1 -0.9Interest (-1.1,-1.0) (-1.7,-1.5) (-0.7,-0.6) (-0.5,-0.5) (-1.3,-1.2) (-1.8,-1.6) (-1.3,-1.1) (-0.2,-0.2) (-1.1,-1.0) (-1.0,-0.8)

Strength of -0.8 -0.6 -0.1 -1.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 -0.8 -0.2Partisanship (-0.8,-0.8) (-0.6,-0.5) (-0.1,-0.1) (-1.1,-1.0) (-0.8,-0.7) (-0.9,-0.7) (-0.2,-0.2) (0.0,0.0) (-0.8,-0.7) (-0.2,-0.2)

Residence +0.7 -0.3 0.0 +0.2 -0.9 +0.3 +0.5 -0.2 +0.6 -0.2(0.7,0.8) (-0.3,-0.3) (0.0,0.0) (0.1,0.2) (-1.0,-0.9) (0.3,0.4) (0.4,0.5) (-0.3,-0.2) (0.5,0.6) (-0.2,-0.2)

Religious -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 +0.2 -0.3Attendance (-0.4,-0.4) (-0.4,-0.4) (-0.2,-0.2) (-0.4,-0.4) (-0.1,-0.1) (-0.7,-0.6) (-0.5,-0.4) (0.0,0.0) (0.2,0.2) (-0.3,-0.3)

Marital -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 +0.1 +0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0Status (-0.1,-0.1) (-0.2,-0.1) (-0.1,-0.1) (0.1,0.1) (0.0,0.1) (0.0,0.1) (0.0,0.0) (-0.1,-0.1) (-0.1,-0.1) (0.0,0.0)

Education +1.6 +1.0 +0.6 -0.1 +0.1 +0.5 +0.1(1.5,1.7) (0.9,1.1) (0.5,0.6) (-0.1,-0.1) (0.1,0.2) (0.4,0.5) (0.1,0.2)

Income -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4(-0.3,-0.3) (-0.4,-0.4) (-0.3,-0.3) (-0.3,-0.2) (-0.4,-0.3)

Occupation -0.1 +0.1 -0.1 +0.5 +0.1 +0.3 +0.1 -0.1(-0.1,-0.1) (0.1,0.1) (-0.1,0.0) (0.5,0.6) (0.1,0.1) (0.3,0.3) (0.1,0.1) (-0.2,-0.1)

Age -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -1.3 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5(-0.1,-0.1) (-0.7,-0.6) (-0.6,-0.5) (-0.5,-0.4) (-1.4,-1.2) (-0.7,-0.6) (-0.4,-0.3) (-0.3,-0.2) (-0.5,-0.5) (-0.6,-0.5)

South -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 +0.1(-0.3,-0.3) (-0.2,-0.2) (0.0,0.0) (-0.5,-0.4) (-0.1,-0.1) (0.0,0.0) (-0.1,-0.1) (0.0,0.0) (-0.3,-0.2) (-0.4,-0.3)

Closing Date -0.3 +0.5 +0.2 -0.2 +0.1 +0.2 +0.2 +0.2 +0.1 +0.2(-0.3,-0.3) (0.4,0.5) (0.1,0.2) (-0.3,-0.1) (0.0,0.2) (0.1,0.2) (0.2,0.2) (0.1,0.2) (0.1,0.1) (0.1,0.2)

The first cell entries are the percentage point changes in turnout between 1968 and 1972 attributable to each variable for each SES group. The second cell entries are the 95%confidence intervals around these turnout changes.

30

Table 7: Sources of Socioeconomic Turnout Bias, 1972-2000 (NES Self-Reported Turnout)

Education Income Quintile OccupationLess than More than (Lowest) (Highest) Blue- White-

Year 12 Years 12 Years 12 Years 1 2 3 4 5 Collar Collar

Mobilization +0.5 -0.1 +0.6 +1.0 +0.5 +0.1 -0.1 +0.7 +0.3 +0.4(0.4,0.6) (-0.2,0.0) (0.5,0.7) (1.0,1.1) (0.4,0.5) (0.1,0.1) (-0.1,-0.1) (0.6,0.8) (0.3,0.4) (0.3,0.4)

External -1.2 -1.8 -1.1 -0.7 -0.6 -1.1 -1.0 -0.8 -1.4 -1.1Efficacy (-1.3,-1.1) (-2.0,-1.7) (-1.2,-1.0) (-0.7,-0.6) (-0.7,-0.6) (-1.2,-1.0) (-1.1,-0.9) (-0.9,-0.7) (-1.4,-1.3) (-1.2,-1.0)

Political -0.9 -1.3 -1.0 0.0 +0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -0.9 -0.6Interest (-1.0,-0.9) (-1.4,-1.2) (-1.1,-1.0) (0.0,0.0) (0.4,0.5) (-0.6,-0.5) (-0.8,-0.6) (-0.4,-0.3) (-0.9,-0.9) (-0.7,-0.6)

Strength of -0.4 -0.2 +0.4 -0.9 -0.2 +0.2 +0.1 +0.1 -0.1 +0.1Partisanship (-0.4,-0.4) (-0.2,-0.2) (0.3,0.4) (-0.9,-0.8) (-0.2,-0.2) (0.2,0.2) (0.1,0.1) (0.1,0.1) (-0.1,-0.1) (0.1,0.1)

Religious -2.1 -1.0 -0.2 -1.2 -0.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.2 -1.1 -0.4Attendance (-2.1,-2.0) (-1.1,-0.9) (-0.2,-0.2) (-1.3,-1.2) (-0.5,-0.4) (-1.1,-0.9) (-0.6,-0.5) (-0.3,-0.2) (-1.1,-1.0) (-0.5,-0.4)

Marital -0.9 -0.7 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.8 -0.2Status (-1.0,-0.9) (-0.8,-0.7) (-0.2,-0.2) (-0.2,-0.2) (-0.7,-0.6) (-0.8,-0.6) (-0.4,-0.3) (-0.3,-0.3) (-0.8,-0.7) (-0.2,-0.2)

Education +3.8 +4.3 +3.4 +2.9 +1.6 +3.5 +1.3(3.6,4.1) (4.1,4.6) (3.1,3.8) (2.6,3.3) (1.4,1.8) (3.3,3.6) (1.2,1.4)

Income -1.5 -1.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.1(-1.5,-1.4) (-1.1,-1.0) (-0.1,-0.1) (-0.6,-0.5) (-0.1,-0.1)

Occupation +0.2 0.0 0.0 +0.4 +0.8 +0.5 +0.4 +0.4(0.2,0.3) (0.0,0.0) (0.0,0.0) (0.3,0.4) (0.8,0.9) (0.4,0.5) (0.4,0.5) (0.3,0.4)

Age -0.4 +1.7 +1.1 -1.4 +0.2 +0.9 +0.7 +0.3 +0.3 +0.9(-0.4,-0.4) (1.6,1.8) (1.0,1.2) (-1.5,-1.3) (0.2,0.3) (0.9,1.0) (0.6,0.8) (0.3,0.4) (0.3,0.3) (0.8,1.0)

South -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.6(-0.8,-0.8) (-0.7,-0.6) (-0.6,-0.5) (-0.4,-0.4) (-0.2,-0.2) (-0.4,-0.4) (-0.4,-0.4) (-0.8,-0.6) (-0.5,-0.5) (-0.6,-0.5)

Closing Date -0.1 +0.3 +0.1 0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.1 +0.1 +0.1 +0.1(-0.1,-0.1) (0.2,0.3) (0.1,0.1) (0.0,0.0) (0.1,0.2) (0.1,0.1) (0.1,0.1) (0.0,0.1) (0.0,0.1) (0.1,0.1)

The first cell entries are the percentage point changes in turnout between 1972 and 2000 attributable to each variable for each SES group. The second cell entries are the 95%confidence intervals around these turnout changes.

31

By Income

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000

Tur

nout

Quintile 1(Lowest)

Quintile 2 Quintile 3

Quintile 4 Quintile 5(Highest)

Figure 1: NES Reported Turnout 1960-2000

By Education

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000

Tur

nout

Less than12 Years

12 Years More than12 Years

By Occupation

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000

Tur

nout

Blue-Collar White-Collar

32

Figure 2: Party Mobilization 1960-2000

By Education

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000

Prop

ortio

n R

epor

ting

Part

y C

onta

ct

Less than12 Years

12 Years More than12 Years

By Occupation

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000

Prop

ortio

n R

epor

ting

Part

y C

onta

ct

Blue-Collar

White-Collar

By Income

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000

Prop

ortio

n R

epor

ting

Part

y C

onta

ct

Quintile 1(Lowest)

Quintile 2 Quintile 3

Quintile 4 Quintile 5(Highest)

33

Figure 4: Sources of Turnout Change By Education, 1968-1972

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

Mobilization ExternalEfficacy

Political Interest Partisanship Residence ReligiousAttendance

Marital Status Income Occupation Age South Closing Date

Tur

nout

Cha

nge

Less than12 Years

12 Years More than12 Years

Figure 5: Sources of Turnout Change By Education, 1972-2000

-2.5

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

Mobilization External Efficacy Political Interest Partisanship ReligiousAttendance

Marital Status Income Occupation Age South Closing Date

Tur

nout

Cha

nge

Less than12 Years

12 Years More than12 Years

Figure 3: Sources of Turnout Change By Income, 1968-1972

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

Mobilization ExternalEfficacy

Political Interest Partisanship Residence ReligiousAttendance

Marital Status Education Occupation Age South Closing Date

Tur

nout

Cha

nge

Quintile 1(Lowest)

Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5(Highest)

34

Appendix 1Number of Respondents in Each SES Group

Education Income Quintile OccupationLess Than More than (Lowest) (Highest) Blue- White-

Year 12 Years 12 Years 12 Years 1 2 3 4 5 Collar Collar1960 NES 542 (49.0) 320 (28.9) 244 (22.1) 250 (22.7) 228 (20.7) 186 (16.9) 159 (14.5) 279 (25.3) 420 (56.5) 323 (43.5)

1964 NES 647 (44.8) 458 (31.7) 338 (23.4) 271 (19.4) 255 (18.2) 362 (25.9) 220 (15.7) 292 (20.9) 522 (53.2) 459 (46.8)1964 NES (V) 549 (43.3) 407 (32.1) 312 (24.6) 216 (17.5) 225 (18.3) 324 (26.3) 203 (16.5) 265 (21.5) 455 (52.5) 412 (47.5)

1968 NES 561 (40.4) 433 (31.2) 396 (28.5) 210 (15.5) 286 (21.1) 249 (18.4) 327 (24.1) 283 (20.9) 490 (51.8) 456 (48.2)

1972 CPS 32148 (36.5) 30109 (34.2) 25848 (29.3) 19957 (22.7) 12994 (14.8) 12330 (14.0) 20991 (23.8) 21832 (24.8) 27503 (50.9) 26579 (49.2)1972 NES 850 (37.3) 733 (32.2) 695 (30.5) 414 (18.7) 517 (23.4) 460 (20.8) 350 (15.8) 470 (21.3) 795 (50.2) 789 (49.8)

1976 CPS 25797 (31.6) 28342 (34.7) 27472 (33.7) 16703 (22.4) 13368 (18.0) 17797 (23.9) 11012 (14.8) 15561 (20.9) 25169 (49.1) 26147 (51.0)1976 NES 576 (30.3) 667 (35.1) 660 (34.7) 334 (18.7) 393 (22.0) 414 (23.2) 237 (13.3) 404 (22.7) 705 (49.8) 711 (50.2)1976 NES (V) 563 (29.9) 656 (34.8) 663 (35.2) 325 (18.5) 383 (21.8) 406 (23.1) 235 (13.4) 410 (23.3) 692 (49.1) 717 (50.9)

1980 CPS 31518 (27.9) 40563 (35.8) 41103 (36.3) 20851 (19.6) 16154 (15.2) 26390 (24.8) 15432 (14.5) 27565 (25.9) 34395 (46.9) 38911 (53.1)1980 NES 361 (25.7) 498 (35.5) 545 (38.8) 249 (19.8) 207 (16.4) 337 (26.8) 195 (15.5) 272 (21.6) 533 (47.5) 590 (52.5)1980 NES (V) 405 (27.2) 547 (36.8) 535 (36.0) 260 (19.7) 208 (15.8) 355 (26.9) 212 (16.1) 284 (21.5) 578 (48.6) 612 (51.4) 1984 CPS 24073 (24.2) 36531 (36.7) 39072 (39.2) 19953 (21.1) 19420 (20.5) 15648 (16.5) 23066 (24.4) 16509 (17.5) 30941 (45.4) 37143 (54.6)1984 NES 423 (24.1) 708 (35.9) 842 (42.7) 356 (20.0) 367 (20.6) 301 (16.9) 435 (24.4) 321 (18.0) 758 (45.2) 920 (54.8)1984 NES (V) 505 (23.0) 782 (35.6) 909 (41.4) 405 (20.6) 426 (21.7) 327 (16.7) 461 (23.5) 343 (17.5) 860 (46.3) 999 (53.7)

1988 CPS 19930 (21.2) 33933 (36.2) 39969 (42.6) 15769 (16.8) 23064 (24.6) 16563 (17.7) 22575 (24.1) 15861 (16.9) 27654 (42.7) 37124 (57.3)1988 NES 360 (20.8) 609 (35.1) 766 (44.2) 251 (15.4) 333 (20.4) 375 (23.0) 331 (20.3) 341 (20.9) 664 (44.0) 844 (56.0)1988 NES (V) 424 (22.0) 691 (35.8) 815 (42.2) 305 (16.9) 368 (20.4) 406 (22.5) 363 (20.2) 359 (19.9) 760 (45.4) 916 (54.7)

1992 CPS 16748 (17.8) 33622 (35.7) 43691 (46.5) 16670 (18.9) 19730 (22.4) 14183 (16.1) 22879 (26.0) 14588 (16.6) 26858 (41.2) 38328 (58.8)1992 NES 423 (19.3) 754 (34.3) 1019 (46.4) 418 (20.0) 364 (17.5) 442 (21.2) 506 (24.2) 356 (17.1) 864 (45.1) 1054 (55.0)

1996 CPS 12633 (16.1) 26738 (34.1) 38938 (49.7) 13529 (19.0) 15840 (22.2) 10230 (14.4) 14526 (20.4) 17098 (24.0) 21384 (39.6) 32580 (60.4)1996 NES 270 (17.7) 515 (33.7) 745 (48.7) 290 (20.7) 325 (23.2) 213 (15.2) 269 (19.1) 307 (21.9) 606 (44.1) 767 (55.9)

2000 CPS 10530 (14.2) 24607 (33.2) 39037 (52.6) 12487 (19.5) 13030 (20.3) 10706 (16.7) 12761 (19.9) 15198 (23.7) 19453 (38.1) 31578 (61.9)2000 NES 232 (15.0) 515 (33.2) 803 (51.8) 335 (25.5) 180 (13.7) 208 (15.8) 370 (28.2) 222 (16.9) 513 (37.2) 867 (62.8)

The first cell entry is the number of survey respondents in each SES group with valid turnout responses. The second entry (in parentheses) is the percentage of valid turnout respondents in thatSES group. CPS = Current Population Surveys, NES = National Election Studies Reported Turnout, NES (V) = National Election Studies Validated Turnout

35

Appendix 2: Variables

Variables:

Mobilization: Did anyone from one of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to

you about the campaign? 0=No, 1=Yes.

External Efficacy: Responses to the following two questions: Do you agree, disagree, neither agree

nor disagree with the following statements: “I don’t think public officials care much what people like

me think.” “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.” Scores on each

question ranged from 1 (agree) to 3 (disagree).

Political Interest: Would you say that you have been/were very much interested, somewhat

interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns (so far) this year? Coding: 1

=Not much interested, 2=Somewhat interested, 3=Very much interested.

Strength of Partisanship: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican,

a Democrat, an Independent, or what? Would you call yourself a strong (Republican/Democrat) or

a not very strong (Republican/Democrat)? Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or

Democratic party? 1=Pure Independent, 2=Independent Leaner, 3=Weak Partisan, 4=Strong

Partisan.

Length of Residence: 1960-1964, 1976-2000: How long have you lived in this house

(condo/apartment)? 1=4 years or less, 2=5-9 years, 3=10-19 years, 4=20-29 years, 5=30 years or

more. 1968-1972: How long have you lived here in this city (town/township/county)? 1=4 years or

less, 2=5-9 years, 3=10-19 years, 4=20-29 years, 5=30 years or more.

Religious Attendance: 1960-68: Would you say you go to church regularly, often, seldom, or

36

never? 1=Never, 2=Seldom, 3=Often, 4=Regularly. 1972-2000: Would you say you go to church

every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never? 1=Never, 2=A

few times a year, 3=Once or twice a month, 4=Every week or almost every week.

Marital Status: Are you married now and living with your husband/wife — or are you widowed,

divorced, separated, or have you never married? 0=Not married, 1=Married.

Education: 1960-1972: How many grades of school did you finish? 1976-2000: What is the highest

grade of school or year of college you have completed? 1=Less than 12, 2=12, 3= More than 12

years.

Income: Respondent’s pre-tax family income in the y ear preceding the survey (exact question

wording varied from year to year). Ranged from 1 (lowest quintile) to 5 (highest quintile).

Occupation: What is your (main) occupation? Coding: 0 = Blue-collar, 1 = White-collar.

Age: Respondent’s age. Ranged from 21 to 99 in 1960-1968, 18 to 99 in 1972-2000.

South: Respondent’s state of residence. 0=Non-South, 1=South

Closing Date: Number of days before the election registration was closed. Ranged from 0 to 281.

Turnout: 1960-1996: In talking to people about the election, we find that a lot of people weren’t able

to vote because they weren’t registered or they were sick or they just didn’t have time. How about

you, did you vote? 2000: In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people weren’t

able to vote because they weren’t registered, they were sick, or they just didn’t have time. Which of

the following statements best describes you: One, I did not vote; Two, I thought about voting this time

-- but didn’t; Three, I usually vote, but didn’t this time; or Four, I am sure I voted? Coding: 0 = Did

not vote, 1 = Voted.

37

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