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10 Eritrean-Yemeni relationsM. Venkataraman and Solomon Mebrie

INTRODUCTIONTe end o the Cold War heralded the end o superpower rivalry in the Horno A rica. Tis was accompanied by dramatic changes in regional security inthe Horn o A rica in the post-Cold War period. Te civil war in Ethiopia one o A ricas most protracted ended when the then ruling socialist military regime was overthrown and the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary DemocraticFront (EPRDF) took power in 1991, ollowed by the separation rom Ethiopiao Eritrea, which later became an independent state. At about the same time,across the Red Sea, the end o the superpowers ideological rivalry took the windout o the sails o the socialist Republic o Yemen, paving the way or its unif-cation with North Yemen. Somalia has remained without an e ective centralgovernment or about two decades since then, and has been a magnet or nu-merous agents embroiled in its con icts. Te emergence o new actors and thecontinuing involvement o various actors, along with other actors operating at

various levels, have created interesting orms o interaction in the region. Tesedynamics without doubt have created a new context or regional security in theHorn o A rica in the post-Cold War period.


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282 Institute for Security Studies

Eritrean-Yemeni relations

At a global level, the Horn o A rica, the Red Sea and the Middle East togeth-er orm a particular geopolitical and geo-strategic setting that has continued toprovide scope or geopolitical con ict as long as the Red Sea has continued to

serve as one o the busiest sea lanes. For example, the recent incidence o piracy in the Indian Ocean south o the Red Sea has attracted great attention. Globalpowers such as the US, Egypt and Israel have continued to actively engagethemselves in the region or strategic and security reasons. Currently, Eritreasalleged involvement in the war in Somalia, and the war against undamental-ism, extremism and terrorism in Yemen have attracted the attention o theglobal patrons o the regimes in the region. Some o the countries in the regionare aware o their geopolitical signifcance and one can observe their attemptsto outmanoeuvre each other. And appearing loyal to one or more regional andglobal powers may also have a negative impact on relations among states inthe region.

At the regional level, the nature o relations among actors in the post-ColdWar period has led to the emergence o regional political and security groupingswhich have considerable impact on the perceptions o threats among countriesin the region, including Eritrea and Yemen. Even though such political group-

ings may not have immediate socio-economic benefts or their members, thepolitical and diplomatic implications o such groupings are ar more serious.

At the bilateral inter-state level, the countries o the Horn o A rica haveexperiences o sponsoring one anothers political oppositions. For instance,since its independence Eritrea has been consistently supporting political groupsopposing the incumbent leaders o states in the region, which has a ected itsrelations with neighbouring countries, including Yemen.

Perceptions associated with the availability o resources in certain countriesand across their borders can be a source o con ict among states in the region.As will be discussed later, rom an economic point o view, Eritrea experienceda period o con ict with Yemen partly because o the perceived aquatic andmineral resources along its maritime border with Yemen in the Red Sea. Tenature o state actors and their relations with their respective societies also hasa signifcant impact on inter-state relations in the region, with considerable im-plications or regional security.

It is important to note that this discussion does not intend to utilise themainstream theoretical perspectives, which have long been criticised or ailingto adequately explain political phenomena in A rica, including those concerning


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M. Venkatar aman and Solomon Mebrie

inter-state relations. However, the arguments in this chapter tentatively utilisethe perspectives developed by Clapham in his work A rica and the international system: the politics o state survival (1996), and other writings along similar

perspectives. In short, this is a perspective in which inter-state relations takeplace in complex global and regional contexts, in conditions o antagonisticstate-society relationships in which military options take precedence over otheractions, and in which decision-making is highly personalised, unpredictableand, worse still, has the aim o achieving regime survival.

Te objective o this chapter is to contribute to the assessment o regionalsecurity in the Horn o A rica in the post-Cold War period by exploring therelations between Eritrea and Yemen. By reviewing the political and economicties between the two countries, the chapter reveals the evolution o bilateral rela-tions between Eritrea and Yemen in the 1990s. It identifes the maritime borderand the perceived resources in the Red Sea as key issues which have in uencedtheir relationship, and which at the later stages o the countries relationshipled to armed con ict. Te discussion then proceeds with urther identifcationand analysis o the interplay o regional and international actors, which has aconsiderable e ect on the relationship between the two countries. In attempting

to provide explanations or the prevailing state o a airs, this chapter highlightspolicy determinants o the two countries by examining the domestic contextso state-society relationships, which when combined with regional and interna-tional actors have a bearing upon regional security in the Horn o A rica.

THE EVOLUTION OF ERITREAN-YEMENI RELATIONS

An important dimension in Eritrean-Yemeni relations is the existence o amaritime rontier between the two states in the Red Sea, which has allowedcenturies o exchanges among their societies. Historical contact among thepeoples o what are today Eritrea and Yemen is re ected in the names o places,rivers and localities. For example, Bisha is a village and valley in Yemen; it isalso the name o a place in the western lowland o Eritrea. Te Mereb Riverin Eritrea separating Ethiopia and Eritrea is believed to have been named a erthe Semitic Sabeans crossed the Red Sea into Eritrea, and is linked to the name

o the Maareb Dam that was built in Yemen.1

Similarly, the Rashida ethnicgroup in eastern Eritrea is said to have migrated rom Hadramount in Yemenaround 1846. 2


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Be ore the emergence o Eritrea as an independent state, the regimes inYemen, in the south in particular, played a role in helping the Eritrean-basedmovements in their war against Ethiopia. Te port city o Aden in South Yemen

allowed the establishment o o ces o the Eritrean liberation fghters, and many o these were trained in the Yemeni town o Shaikh Uthman. 3 A er the expul-sion o the British rom Aden in 1967, the Eritrean liberation movements weresaid to have hailed the victory o South Yemen over the British colony as theirown. Te new South Yemeni government o cially declared its support or theEritrean struggle or national liberation. South Yemen served as a passage orarms to be trans erred to the Eritrean fghters. It should be noted that duringthis time the government in North Yemen also supported the Eritrean cause.It is worth quoting what Isaias A eworki, the Eritrean president, had to say on this:

It is true that ex-North Yemen had allowed Eritrean re ugees to live in itsterritory, and ex-South Yemen, until it changed its stand in 1977, o ereda ertile ground or the Eritrean revolution. It o ered us ree access in itsland and sea and Aden was our main passage through which arms were

trans erred to the feld o Eritrea. Maybe some underground or uno cialsupport had also been channelled to us. [...] we are always grate ul to thosewho supported us even morally. 4

Tings changed in 1978 when support or the Eritrean movement was haltedwhen the Derg military socialist regime in Ethiopia came to power. Te Dergregime in Ethiopia brought socialism under the tutelage o Soviet Russia and itsallies, who had also been supporting the regime in South Yemen. As the logicaloutcome o the Cold War ideological alliances, South Yemen started to supportthe Derg regime against the Eritrean liberation struggle and involved itsel in various areas o cooperation with the Derg in Ethiopia. In 1981 Ethiopia, SouthYemen and Libya concluded a tripartite agreement in which the three signedthe Aden pact, called the reaty o Friendship and Cooperation, which includedthe felds o politics, the military and the economy. 5 Tis allowed Addis Ababato introduce a strong o ensive against the Eritrean movement. 6

In contrast to South Yemens curtailment o support or Eritrea, the supportthat North Yemen extended to the Eritrean cause continued until Eritreasindependence. North Yemen provided a sa e ground or the Eritrean Peoples



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Liberation Front (EPLF) to use its land as a base as well as or receiving logisti-cal supplies rom Arab countries. 7

RELATIONS SINCE ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE

Soon a er Eritrea obtained de jure independence in 1993, Yemen was among thefrst to establish diplomatic relations with the provisional government o Eritrea.In the immediate a ermath o Eritrean independence the relations between thetwo states were cordial, although tensions existed between Eritrea and its otherneighbours, such as Sudan and, later, Ethiopia. During the same period, Yemenwas undergoing internal political turmoil. And to date, the internal politicalsituation in Yemen since the April 1993 general elections, in which a unitedYemen was ormed, has not yielded any stability. ensions between northernand southern Yemen continued in the a ermath o the election o Ali AbdellaSalih, a northerner, prompting an o cial visit by Eritreas President IsaiasA eworki in April 1994 to Sanaa in order to mediate the di erences betweenthe north and the south. Eritrea supported the unifcation o the country ando ered to protect both the north and souths aviation acilities. In other words,

Eritrea appeared to take a neutral stand.8

Te good o ces extended by the Eritrean president were reciprocated by

Yemen in December 1994, when its president visited Asmara and Khartoumin an attempt to mediate between Eritrea and Sudan. However, these media-tion e orts did not yield results. 9 Nevertheless, urther developments in bilat-eral relations during the same period were witnessed when Eritrea and Yemensigned cooperation agreements on trade and maritime security. Discussionswere held regarding investments, fshing and related activities. In addition,during the same period, students o the University o Asmara obtained scholar-ships to study at the University o Sanaa in the felds o medicine, pharmacy and engineering.

PERIOD OF CONFLICT

Te riendly and cordial relations between the two countries gradually dete-

riorated. In early 1995, the issue o the ownership o a group o islands in thesouthern Red Sea the Hanish-Zuqar Islands sparked di erences leading tostrained relations. Te islands are situated in one o the worlds busiest shipping



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lanes 160 kilometres north o Bab-el-Mandeb, the southern entrance to the RedSea. Inevitably, the con ict raised concerns about a possible threat to interna-tional navigation. Te Hanish Islands, uninhabited except or a ew Yemeni

fshermen and Eritrean soldiers, who were allowed to use them as a base duringtheir struggle or independence, 10 are roughly equidistant rom Eritrea andYemen, and con ict over the ownership had been on the anvil or quite sometime. Te spark that ignited the powder keg was the stationing o troops by Yemen on these islands in early 1995. In a statement made by Yemeni PresidentAli Abdella Salih issued on 20 December 1995 in setting out the backgroundto the dispute, it was said that a German company wanted to launch an invest-ment project on Greater Hanish. 11 Te company (Knozepbau) was said to haveplanned a 1 million investment to construct a tourist complex, including ahotel and scuba-diving acilities. Te companys request was granted by Yemenand work began in the middle o 1996. Yemeni troops were also deployed onthe islands. 12

Tese activities by Yemen alarmed the Eritrean government, which subse-quently attempted to resolve the matter. Eritrea claimed that on the basis o his-torical acts the Hanish Archipelago had been part o Eritrea rom the period

o the Ottoman Empire through Italian, British and Ethiopian occupations o the country. 13 Te Eritrean position was largely based on the assertion that theislands had belonged to the Ottoman Empire until World War I. Accordingto the 1923 reaty o Lausanne, the islands were given to Italy by the urks.Furthermore, Eritrea claimed that the agreement sponsored by the UN, whichederated it with Ethiopia, made the islands part o Eritrean marine territory. 14

Yemen, on the other hand, argued that Britain had occupied the HanishIslands in 1915 and rom then on it had been in charge o the maintenance o the lighthouses on the islands. Another Yemeni argument has been that duringthe Arab-Israeli war o 1973, Egypt requested Yemen to use the islands, whichwas granted by an agreement signed with Egypt on 12 May 1973. 15 Rejectingthis argument, Eritrea claimed that the islands were used by the EPLF duringthe war o independence and that Yemen never questioned such a right since itrecognised that the islands were part o Eritrean territory. Sanaa responded thatthe islands had been used with its consent. 16

O cial negotiations between the Eritrean and Yemeni presidents ollowedand the Eritrean oreign minister was sent to Sanaa in early October 1995 in anattempt to resolve the issue. 17 However, the bilateral negotiations ailed and on



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16 December military con ict ensued. Each side blamed the other or startingthe con ict. Te con rontation lasted or two days, 16 and 17 December, and itwas declared that Yemen lost more than 50 soldiers in the con ict. 18

Te position o both countries regarding the ownership o the Hanish Archipelago seemed irreconcilable. However, Asmara proposed that in theevent o an inability to reach an agreement international arbitration could berequested. Tis was reiterated in a meeting on 7 December 1995, during whichEritrea gave its intention to bring its case be ore the International Court o Justice (ICJ).19

Te news o the con ict alarmed the Arab states. Egypt became concernedbecause the area is a lane or international shipping and it has long-standingstrategic interests in the region. Tere ore, Egypt o ered mediation. Tesecretary o the Arab League was also involved to mediate. Te dispute thenthreatened to become an Arab-A rican issue. Te Arab League and many Arabcountries appeared to side with Yemen. Teir pro-Yemeni stand was believedto be partly because they perceived Eritrea to be a riend o Israel, whose rela-tionships with the Arabs has been hostile or obvious reasons. Tey viewed thedispute in the context o Arab-Israeli relationships dominated by con ict, in

which the Palestinian question fgured prominently. Accordingly, these Arabstates believed that Israel supported Eritrea since by removing Yemens claimto the Hanish Islands a conducive environment would be created or using theislands as a base to control the southern part o the Red Sea. Te Arabs justifedtheir stand in view o the relations that Israel had been trying to build withmany A rican countries, especially those that have a Red Sea coast. What ismore, they believed that Israel had a military base in Eritrea. 20

Te Arabs suspicion that there was an Israeli presence in Eritrea is mani-ested in the interviews conducted with the Eritrean president. Questions wereraised regarding the alleged Israeli presence in Eritrea, to which President IsaiasA werki retorted: When this incident erupted suddenly, reports started comingthat Eritrea is supported by Israel, Kuwait or other Israeli allies. Tis is only a pretext or covering up mistakes [...] it is shame ul to relate every problemto Israel.21

Although Eritrea (and Israel) rejected the accusations, it nevertheless elt it

was a ected by what it regarded as propaganda and attempted to build bridgesby sending missions to its Arab neighbours to explain its position. Te Eritreangovernment delegation led by Interior Minister Ali Said Abdella visited Saudi



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Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan and Iraq.Re erring to this diplomatic mission, Ali Said Abdella said that the talks andexchange o views on the Hanish Islands issue have helped to correct misrepre-

sentation by the Yemeni mass media about the a air.22

THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT

At the beginning o 1996 a French government delegation visited both countrieso ering its mediation and both parties later accepted this o er. 23 As mentionedabove, the Eritrean government, in an attempt to calm the waters, dispatched adiplomatic mission that visited eight Arab countries to explain the position o Eritrea in the con ict.

Other international e orts were also made to solve the issue. Notable amongthem was the Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfns visit to Sanaa on21 December 1995 to make a three-point proposal, which included the returno Yemeni prisoners o war, the mutual withdrawal o security orces and thesubmission o the issue to the ICJ. 24 Besides the e orts by Ethiopia, the UNSecretary General Boutros-Ghali also involved himsel by visiting the capitals

o both countries and suggested mediation e orts. Interestingly, Boutros-Ghalisupported the French mediation e ort, as it was elt that working throughthe ICJ would take a long time. Because o the sensitivity o the issue and theislands proximity to major shipping lanes, it was indicated that a quick solutionwas advisable.

France o ered to mediate the dispute and Ambassador Francis Gutmanwas sent on a act-fnding mission to both countries. Eritrea and Yemen even-tually reached an agreement on the principles or arbitrating their dispute,which was signed in Paris on 21 May 1996 and witnessed by the oreign min-isters o Egypt, Ethiopia and France. Tere was also a trilateral agreementon technical arrangements, presumably relating to ceasefre monitoring. Tetwo disputants committed to maintain the status quo, re rain rom the use o orce, submit the dispute to a fve-member arbitration panel and allow Franceto monitor military movement on the islands. It was also agreed that eachclaimant would choose two members o the panel, and the our members

would jointly select the chairman. A er the withdrawal o troops, which wasmonitored by France, the disputants agreed on the ormation o a court, a erwhich the arbitration process began. Te arbitration agreement provided or



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ruling in two phases: one on the issue o sovereignty and the other on thedelimitation o boundaries. 25

Almost three years a er the con ict, the court gave its ruling, discarding

the Yemeni argument that the entire group o islands belonged to it rom themedieval period as alse because at that time Yemen was basically an entity inthe mountains and not on the coast. Te court also rejected the Eritrean argu-ment that it had inherited the islands at the end o the colonial period. 26

Te court fnally gave its verdict in October 1998 (phase I), 27 granting Eritreathe islands o Mohabbakah, which lie some 20 kilometres o the coast andinside its territorial sea; the Haycocks Islands; and the rocks to the south-west,because they were part o the Ottoman territory administered rom the A ricancoast. Te rest o the Greater and Small Hanish islands (which were the causeo the con ict) were granted to Yemen, as they had been under the jurisdictiono the Arab coast during the Ottoman Empire. 28 Yemen obtained most o theislands it claimed and Eritrea got a ew, but the latter ulflled its commitmentto respect the decision o the court, despite speculations o the existence o pe-troleum on the Hanish-Zuqar Islands .29

A notable decision o the court concerns the rights o Eritrean fshermen to

pursue their activities on the islands that are part o Yemen, whereas Yemenifshermen cannot fsh in the waters and islands awarded to Eritrea. Tis couldbe considered as an invitation to con ict or cooperation depending on thenature o the relationship that prevails between the two states.

Te resolution o the Eritrean-Yemeni con ict through the decision o theICJ on 9 October 1998 paved the way or cooperation between the states. InNovember 1998, the Eritrean president made a three-day visit to Sanna, duringwhich the two countries set up a committee or implementing previous bilateralagreements in the felds o trade and industry, transportation and communica-tion, energy, fsheries, education and culture. 30

However, by 1999 disputes derived rom the decision o the court arose withregard to the fshing rights. Eritrea interpreted that these rights were grantedto their fshermen and not to Yemens in those places awarded to Eritrea. Againthe case was taken to the court, which approved Eritrean fshing rights in theislands o ebal al- ayir, the Sber group o islands and Hanish-Zuqar. It also

confrmed articles 103 and 108 o the previous decision. Article 103 not only gave Eritrean fshermen sole fshing rights, but also the right to camp inshoreand repair their boats. Should the government o Yemen plan to take actions



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that a ect these rights, it should frst noti y Eritrea to obtain its prior consent.Article 108 provides that should Yemen take any initiative that a ects the tradi-tional rights, it must do so upon the consent o Eritrea. 31

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Economic relations between the two countries have not been strong, althoughthe opportunity to strengthening them was present, given the long maritimeborder that the two countries share. Besides, in view o Eritreas con ictualrelationships with other neighbouring countries in the region, continuingeconomic ties with Yemen would have been a good opportunity. Realising theimportance o economic ties, the two countries made initial moves to expandtheir relationship beyond the political level, and in April and October 1993 bothcountries signed an air reight agreement. A brie lull existed in their economicrelations between 1993 and 1994 due to the civil war in Yemen. Te signing o the Sanaa Pact in November 1994 brought to the ore a new partnership betweenthe two states aimed at rein orcing and urther expanding felds o cooperation,which included a de ence pact, tourism and education. 32 A joint commission

was set up to execute the implementation o the protocol agreement. Economicharmonisation between the two states was the most important part o the SanaaPact. Un ortunately, however, by mid-1995 the implementation o most o thesigned agreements was hampered because o the deterioration in relations at thepolitical level, as discussed above. Indeed, economic issues were the primary cause o the dispute over the Hanish Islands since their location in a strategi-cally important area accompanied the perceived economic benefts o control-ling the transit lines and thereby rein orced the di erences that existed overfshing rights.

Although trade between the two countries declined as a result o the con ict,it was not severely a ected. Soon a er the peace ul resolution o the dispute,a joint communiqu was issued on 6 November 1998 that aimed to rein orceeconomic relations. Both countries undertook to work together and coordinatetheir development strategies through harmonisation o economic policies.Nevertheless, the issue o traditional fshing rights dominated the next couple

o years, re ecting the tensions in their economic relations.able 1 provides a statistical account o the extent o economic relationsbetween Eritrea and Yemen.



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Table 1 Average imports and exports between Eritrea and Yemen (19942002)

Commodity type Imports (Eritreannakfa)Exports (Eritrean

nakfa)

Food and live animals for food 343 845 664 45 804 200

Beverages and tobacco 11 263 212

Crude materials (inedible) excluding fuel 520 122 4 844 888

Animal, vegetable oil and waxes 12 558 800

Chemicals and related products 15 920 104 8 969

Manufactured products 24 767 800

Machinery 20 305 816

Miscellaneous 23 538 584 74 664

Total 452 720 232 50 732 720

Note: Imports and exports represent Eritrean commodities imported from and exportedto Yemen.

Source Ministry of Finance and Customs Department, Eritrea

able 1 shows that economic relations appear to have been much more benefcialto Yemen because Yemens exports to Eritrea were greater than its imports. Tereason could be that most o Eritreas exports, until the beginning o Eritreaswar with Ethiopia in 1998, were to Ethiopia. About two-thirds o Eritreasexports were to Ethiopia and the rest to other states, including Yemen. In otherwords, the disadvantage in bilateral economic ties was overcome through itsties with Ethiopia until the beginning o its war with the latter. On the otherhand, as a result o the con ict with Ethiopia in 1998, its economic ties withYemen became much more important or Eritrea.

Generally, the bilateral relationship improved with the Yemeni nationalairline travelling three times a week to Asmara, and Yemeni products such ashoney, biscuits, milk, sweets, chlorine and others were imported in large quanti-ties to Eritrea. It is signifcant that, despite their need to solidi y their economicrelationship, both countries share the characteristics o small economies in the

sense that each is unlikely to consider the other vital in issues relating to theireconomic relations. As discussed in the next section, the internal condition o both states and regional and international political considerations outweigh



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popular perception not only in Eritrea, but also in the neighbouring countries was that the groups aim was to create a security alliance against Eritrea.

In this regard, it is worth noting that perceptions are o en as signifcant

as reality in in uencing policy decisions and their implementation. Te estab-lishment o the Sanaa Forum has created a siege mentality within the Eritreanleadership. Te argument or this siege mentality is valid given the Eritreanleaderships experiences o con ict with the current political leaderships o theSanaa Forum countries. Worse still, the Eritrean political leadership, which isweakened by internal rivalry, a growing internal opposition and the di culty o leading its country and people, to whom it has given un ulflled promises, 37 will continue to be wary o the orum, irrespective o the actual per ormanceo the orum in realising its goals o cooperation, including those relatingto security.

Most importantly, in an atmosphere in which personal relationships prevailamong peer leaders in the Horn o A rica, most o whom were comrades inarms in armed movements in the region, membership o regional groupingssuch as the Sanaa Forum are very signifcant. In this context, the eeling o ex-clusion by the Eritrean leadership will continue to be immense. Te sense o

exclusion will continue to be signifcant given the non-resolution o the majorproblems in Eritreas relations with its neighbours, especially Ethiopia, and tosome extent Sudan and Djibouti. More particularly, the presence o Eritreanopposition political parties in Ethiopia would have a pro ound e ect on howthe ormer perceives such moves. In e ect, this will continue to give the SanaaForum some relevance and a political leverage or the constituent countries intheir relations with Eritrea.

However, it is also important to note that the Eritrean leadership has on oc-casion sought a working relationship with some o the political leaders o theneighbouring countries, especially with its Sudanese counterparts, in a bid tomake up or the sense o exclusion rom the regional league o leaders, who havea close alliance. o what extent such occasional bilateral engagements have im-proved or will improve Eritreas perception o threat rom the orum countriesremains to be seen. At the same time, any qualitative improvement in Eritreasrelations with Yemen, Ethiopia or Sudan will help overcome the sense o exclu-

sion rom the exclusive club that the Sanaa Forum attempted to institutionalise.It has also been reported that the Eritrean leadership was approached to jointhe orum, but re used. 38



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So ar, although the orum does appear not to yield any immediate economicbenefts or Yemen, it continues to give Yemen diplomatic backing, especially since the beginning o the intense internal war are within Yemen during the

2009/10 con ict. It is also interesting to note that Eritrea was implicated in thecon ict in Yemen as it was accused o serving as a conduit or support to rebelsin north Yemen although this is unsubstantiated. Nevertheless, it is not clearhow much the orum was a tangible actor with regard to Yemens relationshipwith Eritrea. Tis is partly because the orum was ormed a er the con ict withEritrea over the Hanish Islands had been resolved, and, there ore, the security provision to Yemen rom the orum countries was not put to the test in thatparticular case.

DECISION-MAKING AND POLICYDETERMINANTS IN ERITREA AND YEMEN

In the world o international relations policy ormulation and implementationare in uenced by a number o actors, and more so in Yemeni-Eritrean rela-tions. As it would be di cult to consider all o these actors exhaustively, a re-

alistic approach would be to identi y the major actors and issues, the orms o interaction among actors at domestic, regional and international levels and thepossible outcomes o those interactions 39 in Eritrean-Yemeni relations.

Tere ore, it is pertinent, frst and oremost, to identi y contexts in which theexternal policies o the countries are to be ormulated and implemented. Alongthis line, three broad contexts can be identifed, namely national/internal, re-gional and international, which may all have an impact on policy ormulationand implementation, and ultimately on the regimes international relations. It ison the basis o these contexts that we hope to identi y issues o relevance to theexecution o oreign policy in both countries.

The nature of state-society relationsin Eritrea and Yemen

Eritrea as a state has a very short history. Following the end o the war o in-

dependence with Ethiopia and the symbolic re erendum, Eritrea was perceivedas an emerging A rican nation expected to thrive economically. Te image o a new, thriving nation in the model o Singapore was portrayed on various



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occasions. Its political leadership was considered progressive, at least by A ricanstandards. Tis image and popular perception was also backed by the highmorale within its leadership in the a ermath o political independence. Te

political independence combined with syndromes o being di erent in view o its victory over Ethiopia appeared to have boosted the image o the leadershipand, there ore, served as a point o ocus in the relations between the leader-ship and the people. o date, Eritreans are reminded o their countrys military struggle and the political independence gained rom Ethiopia so as to maintainrelations between the incumbent leaders and a population that is increasingly insecure due to the absence o human rights, reedom and democracy, and thelack o progress in the provision o basic services.

A er the optimism o its early years o independence Eritrea later acedconsiderable challenges. Te main reason is that with time the Eritrean nationalcake could not grow. Te in ated economic image o Eritrea was gradually ound to be untenable, as can be seen rom the poor economic situation re-ported by sources such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 40 Right at the outset o Eritrean independ-ence there was doubt as to Eritreas economic/fscal viability 41 and questions as

to the democratic credentials o its leadership.42

Some orm o collective leadership and a modicum o press reedom ap-peared on the Eritrean political scene during the early days o independence.However, ollowing its war with Ethiopia (19982000), the political credentialso its leadership, its claimed espousal o democracy and the economic prom-ises have largely been discredited. Tis has created the challenge o state vi-ability in Eritrea. Te ailure to be economically viable and politically account-able and democratic led frst to a serious division within the leadership andlater appears to have widened the gap in the relations between the state andsociety at large. Te division within the political leadership led to increasedrepressive measures and heavy reliance on the military and security orces tosuppress domestic political dissent. Te result is a narrowing o the politicalleadership circle, which has led to an increasingly personalised decision-making approach.

Te militarisation o the state 43 is being observed to be too demanding

or the population living on the edges o poverty and more so or the youngpopulation, who have little to attain given that higher education in particularis increasingly unavailable or them. Resorting to orce ul conscription under



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the guise o national military service, locally called sawa training in igrinya,inevitably alienates the young population and their communities in Eritrea.Te leaderships intolerance towards religious groups and political minorities

has added to the antagonisms between state and society in Eritrea.44

Tere are undamental divergences between the interest o the state, personi-fed by the increasingly insecure political leadership in Eritrea, on the one handand the insecure population at large on the other. Tis creates a policy contextin which political antagonism, secrecy and exclusion orm the basis or deci-sion-making, including the ormulation and implementation o oreign policesprimarily geared towards state or regime survival. 45 Tere ore, in antagonisticstate-society relationships policies remain the exclusive domain o a ew coter-ies or, indeed, o the ruler himsel . Te autocracy, boosted by the lack o thepeoples control over decision-making and implementation o policies, will con-tinue to have a negative impact on the oreign policies o Eritrea, including itsrelations with Yemen. Te personalisation o political leadership and its ability to control military and security resources in Eritrea will continue to be by arthe most important determinant o Eritreas oreign policy. Tis is because mosto Eritreas policies will aim at combating political instability arising rom an-

tagonistic internal state-society relationships. Tere ore, a change in the quality o Eritreas relations with its neighbours, including Yemen, would not be ex-pected in the short term, unless Eritreas antagonistic state-society relationshiptrans orms itsel internally.

Similarly, decision-making in Yemen since independence has taken place ina context in which there appears to be no undamental change in the statesrelationships with society at large. In other words, state-building e orts inYemen did not trans orm Yemens economy and politics. In act, Yemens recenthistory has witnessed turbulence and political instability. One o the ault linesin Yemens internal politics is its division into two North and South Yemen be ore and in the post-independence period. Te southern part became social-ist, whereas the northern part was considered the ally o the West. Althoughthe two reunited in 1993, the reunifcation did not help the trans ormationo Yemens state in terms o its relations with society. Te political instability within the country has continued to threaten the 1993 union. Religious radical-

ism is challenging the state in Yemen, and it is currently waging a bitter waragainst a rebellion in the north. Economically, Yemen has remained stagnant.Te continuing political instability and economic stagnation provided the



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Monograph 178 297

imperative o regime survival in Yemen. Tere ore, policies are primarily aimedat suppressing dissent. As more and more fnancial resources and human energy are diverted towards this objective, the gaps in the relations between state and

society will be likely to widen.Tis creates an atmosphere o continued instability and has a considerable

impact on the way the political leadership o Yemen ormulates and implementsits policies towards its neighbours, including Eritrea. 46 In act, the recent con-ict north o Yemen, which has been on-going since 2004, has only dimmed any prospective relationship between Eritrea and Yemen. Eritrea has been perceivedto support, along with Iran, the rebel groups in the north (called the Haouthis named a er the clan leader, and largely ollowing Shiite Islam) against Yemenand Saudi Arabia. As will be discussed later, inevitably, the entry into the po-litical picture o such regional and extra-regional actors only heightens rivalry and misperception, and exacerbates relations, particularly between Eritreaand Yemen. Te involvement o the US in supporting the Yemeni governmentagainst the northern rebels only adds uel to the fre.

Regional factors

Regional issues will continue to shape decision-making processes in both coun-tries and in uence their relations. As ar as Eritrea is concerned, its leadershipwas regarded by its counterparts, especially the leaders o Ethiopia and Sudan,as an ally in regional power play. However, as noted above, the good relationsbetween Eritrea and its neighbour did not continue. A er a ew years o cordialand supportive relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea ollowing the latters in-dependence, the relationship ran into challenges. Worsening relations resultedin the 19982000 war between the two countries. 47 Te crisis in its relations withEthiopia brought to an end Eritreas economic li eline, and this has signifcantly diminished its regional standing. Eritreas miniscule economy was no longerable to beneft rom the substantial Ethiopian market and lost revenue derivedrom Ethiopias use o Eritreas ports major blows that provided a tough test toits economic viability as a state in both the Horn o A rica and the Middle East.In other words, Eritreas attempt to thrive and develop under Ethiopias shadow

did not succeed, at least economically. Tere ore, Eritreas hostile relationshipswith Ethiopia will continue to signifcantly a ect its relations at the regionallevel, including those with Yemen.



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Similarly, Eritreas relationship with Sudan has been in turmoil. 48 Te rootcause o the worsening relations relates to mutual accusations o sponsor-ing internal opposition in each country. On occasions the Eritrean leadership

has tried to persuade its Sudanese counterpart that they are more allies thanenemies. At the same time, their relationship came under severe pressure dueto issues such as Dar ur, in which it has been claimed that Dar ur rebels weregranted sanctuary in the Eritrean capital. 49 Tere ore, no signifcant develop-ment towards viable relations has been achieved. Te porous border will alsocontinue to be a central problem between the two states. It has been notedthat the importance o Sudanese relations with Eritrea lies in the act that theormer has a relatively strong economy, whereas Eritrea, at least or now, cano er Sudan very little economically. Eritrea may also need Sudan even morebecause o the latters emerging oil economy, which may attract the Eritreanlabour orce. Eritrea, which is perceived in military terms as a relatively strongregional actor, will continue to portray the image o the regional kingmaker.And this will not augur well with the Sudanese or with the political leadershipso the other states in the region. Overall, Eritrea has constantly uctuating rela-tions with Sudan, and its relations with such an important regional power are

unlikely to avour Eritrea in its relations with its other neighbours, includingYemen, in the near uture. 50

Worse still, Eritrea has been at loggerheads with Djibouti over a borderdispute. Djibouti, as the smallest state in the region, attempted frst to appeaseEritrea, but this could no longer continue once hostility broke out in the ormo a border con ict. Te brie war with Djibouti added to Eritreas worseningimage at regional and global levels. Tis has led to the assertion that Eritrea isnow an isolated state surrounded by hostile neighbours. Even though Djibouti,which has provided military bases or global powers such as the US and France,may not pose a military threat to Eritrea, the diplomatic cost o this con ict willbe very signifcant or Eritrea.

Eritreas worsening relations with its neighbours are also evidenced in itsisolation rom the regional multilateral orums, IGAD in particular. Te diplo-matic cost o the ailure to be part o such multilateral orums, which it couldhave used or dialogue and or creating a better image, will no doubt urther

harm Eritreas long-term interests. Overall, the extent to which Eritrea will beable to improve its relations with Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti will defnitely impact on its relations with Yemen.



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Monograph 178 299

In assessing the role o regional actors a ecting Yemeni-Eritrean relations,Yemens relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours have not been smooth,which could in one way or another impact on its relations with Eritrea. Like

Eritrea, Yemen is neither a military nor an economic giant in the region. Yemen,which is geographically adjacent to oil-rich emirates, is considered the mostimpoverished state in the Middle East. Its lack o economic resources impactsnegatively on Yemens image, and have made it economically less attractive toits neighbours, such as Saudi Arabia. Te border between Yemen and SaudiArabia, although now demarcated, nonetheless remains a cause or tension.Saudi Arabia considers its border with Yemen a liability that can be traversedby undamentalists and extremists. Tis is out o ear that Yemeni and A ricanimmigrants may cross into Saudi Arabia via its border with Yemen and createinsecurity and discord in Saudi Arabia itsel . As a result Yemen lacks the cred-ible support o Saudi Arabia, which is potentially an important ally in Yemensinternational relations, including those with Eritrea. 51

International dimensions

International dynamics also bring interesting dimensions to Eritrean-Yemenirelations, beyond the regional level. In this regard, Yemen and Eritrea are moreor less equally attractive to extra-regional power players. Te single most im-portant actor at an international level is the geopolitical situation o both coun-tries. Te interaction o political issues and the location o the two countriesbordering the international gateways to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean will bearon the two states individually and on the uture o their relationships.

Te history o the Cold War attests to the geopolitical signifcance o the twocountries divided by the Red Sea. Te attention given to the region in the pastpitted the then superpowers against each other. Te geopolitical importance o the region has continued even today. As a result, despite the act that Eritreaand Yemen are economically less attractive, they have continued to attempt toappease global powers with a strong interest in the region. Te US, or instance,is currently using Djibouti as a base and regards Yemen as strategically impor-tant in its war against terrorism. 52

Tere ore, their strategic location will continue to be an important currency or Yemen and Eritrea, which may attempt to use their respective extra-regionalpatrons at times o hostility and or economic, military and diplomatic support.



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In this regard, the political leaderships o the two countries appear to be wellaware that their strategic locations could bring them advantage by engagingextra-regional powers, and tempt both Yemen and Eritrea to work to outma-

noeuvre each other. o illustrate, there was a rumour, though unsubstantiated,that Eritrea was making its ports accessible to Iran, while Iran is being accusedby Yemen o sponsoring groups fghting the Yemeni government. Such actionsmay deepen the mutual suspicion between the two.

In dealing with global determinants in Eritrean-Yemeni relations the roleo the US will be as important as ever. Te US will continue to be a actor inthe international relations between the two countries, as well as at the regionallevel or that matter. In the context o hostile relations and in an atmosphereo mutual suspicion, the mere perception that the US avours either o theleaderships o the states in question may have an impact on the way one party perceives the other. 53

In this regard, the US has major issues with Eritrea because o its involvementin Somalia. Indeed, recently, US policy-makers, a er urging Eritrea to re rainrom destabilising Somalia, went ahead in backing a UN Security Council reso-lution in December 2009 imposing sanctions on arms and a travel ban against

Eritrean leaders. Notably, the sanction condemned Eritreas continued positionon Somalia. Tere ore, Eritreas inability to re rain rom its controversial ac-tivities in the region and in Somalia, and the inability o US policy-makers topersuade Eritrea to subscribe to their demands, do not enhance Eritreas image vis--vis the leaderships o neighbouring countries.

Te US is also pondering the allout o political problems in Yemen, as itdoes not want the state o Yemen to all into the hands o so-called terroristsand the groups sympathising with them. As a result, the US will continue toengage actively with Yemen by using both carrots and sticks. 54

Te interests o other actors, such as Israel, will be an important actor inEritrean-Yemeni relations. Te popular perception has always been that Israelavours Eritrea, with the aim o using it as a night watchman over the Red Sea.However, how much Israel will have to o er Eritrea fnancially in this unc-tion is debatable. Similarly, other regional players, like Ethiopia, Saudi Arabiaand Egypt, which have relative capabilities over Yemen and Eritrea, will be

important. Te nature and timeliness o their support or any o the impover-ished states under discussion in this chapter will be mirrored in the relationsbetween them.



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Monograph 178 301

CONCLUSION

Te Yemeni-Eritrean con ict that mani ested itsel in the war or the Hanish

Islands was resolved a er they agreed to the settlement o the dispute by inter-national arbitration. Once the Yemeni-Eritrean border commission announcedits ruling, both o them accepted it in a relatively short period o time. Tis wastaken as a positive development in the relationships between the two states andwas expected to contribute to enhance the images o the political leaderships inYemen and Eritrea in upholding the principles o international law.

However, although the con ict over the Hanish Islands has ended, bilateralrelations have not shown signifcant improvement. Te impoverished economicstatus o Yemen and Eritrea has ailed to become an incentive or coopera-tion between the two countries across the Red Sea. Tis is essentially becauseconditions o mutual distrust appear to continue in the post-con ict period. Anumber o actors responsible or the lack o observable change in the relationsbetween the two states have been explored.

Primarily, the instability in both countries is a critical actor or the externalpolicies o both states. Political instability in Yemen and Eritrea relates largely

to the nature o state-society relations in both states. State-society relationshipsin both countries are largely antagonistic in that the policies that the respec-tive political leaderships pursue are geared towards regime survival. Yemen andEritreas external policies will continue, there ore, to re ect the broader internalpolitical objectives or strategies the regimes in power pursue. Tere ore, theuture directions in the relations between Yemen and Eritrea will largely dependon the resolution o state-society antagonisms within Yemen and Eritrea.

Both the available and perceived resources along the borders o the twocountries within the Red Sea remain the locus o attention and the sources o con ict in the relations between the two. Eritrea, known or supporting politi-cal groups opposing the incumbents in states in the region, may also be temptedto take the same stance towards Yemens administration or at least there is noguarantee that these states will in the uture not be the sponsors o each othersopposition. Tis phenomenon is likely to continue to eature in the relationsbetween the two countries.

Regional power relations also have a considerable impact on the uture o Yemeni-Eritrean relations. Te nature o the relations o both states with MiddleEastern countries such as Saudi-Arabia and Iran and with A rican countries,



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mainly Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, will be signifcant or Yemeni-Eritreanrelations. Te ormation o regional groupings such as the Sanaa Forum hashad a considerable impact on the way the two states perceive each other. It was

discussed earlier that no sooner was the orum ormed than Eritrea declared itan axis o belligerence. Yet, the act remains that even though such politicalgroupings may not have immediate socio-economic benefts or their members,the political and diplomatic implications o such groupings are ar more sig-nifcant, in as ar as such regional/international organisations have continuedto provide orums or negotiation to advance their interests and help acilitatethe settlement o disputes by peace ul means. Te eeling o isolation that comesrom being excluded rom the orum o peers is politically costly or the lead-ership o the Eritrean state. Tis is especially the case with politics in A ricaand the Middle East, where the in ormal interaction among elites, includingthose in state power, is no less important than ormal state-to-state relations.Such regional groupings are use ul in terms o in ormally providing a sense o security and mutual confdence in the relations between political leaders.

Te geographical situation o Yemen and Eritrea, with the Red Sea lyingbetween them, is in the spotlight o global geopolitical contest, and means that

they continue to be attractive to the major global players, which attach impor-tance to the region. Global powers such as the US, and others such as Iran andIsrael, would wish to utilise either Eritrea or Yemen, or both, as strategic andsecurity watchtowers over the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Currently, thestate o Yemen has appeared to be even more vital to the US in the context o thelatters strategic interest in waging war against extremism or terrorism.

Overall, Yemeni-Eritrean relations take place in complex national, regionaland global contexts. Tis makes it di cult to oresee the trend that relationsbetween the two countries will take. Relations between the two in the uture willdepend on the strategies the incumbents in both countries deploy at domestic,regional and international levels to prolong their stay in power. In this regard,although antagonistic state-society relations in each country are not likely tobe resolved in the short term, the winning o the domestic war predicated onthe politics o survival will determine who survives and remains at the helmo state power. Consequently, the current nature o Eritrean-Yemeni relations

does not augur well or either o the countries, and it is di cult to visualise howthis will positively and tangibly contribute to regional security in the post-ColdWar period.



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Monograph 178 303

NOTES

1 MS Nawd, Eritrea: the rate o immigrants, religion, and Islam to A rica , Kuwait: Dar Al KuwaitLil Sha a, 2001, 29 (Arabic version).

2 Ibid.

3 E Haggi, Te struggle over Eritrea 19621978 , San Francisco: Hoover Institution Press, 1983,61.

4 Con erence Presidents Press, Eritrea Profle , Asmara Ministry o In ormation, 16 January 1996, 1.

5 Interestingly, Libya, which had so ar supported Eritrea, abandoned it and moved towards thenew, radical Ethiopia. Te summit was aimed against the US Middle East policy.

6 P Woodward, Horn o A rica: politics and international relations , London: I.B. auris, 1996,142.

7 A Kahsai and J Paul, Development o the Eritrean revolution, Washington DC: MERIP Reports(62) (1977), 1923, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010955 (accessed 26 September 2009).

8 M Plaut, Eritrea and Yemen: control o the shipping lanes, Review o A rican Political Economy

67 (1996), 108.

9 Eritrea and Yemen: control o the shipping lanes, 109.

10 B Whitaker, Favorable ruling, Middle East International , 16 October 1998, http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei39.htm (accessed 27 March 2010).

11 Eritrea and Yemen: control o the shipping lanes, 109

12 Ibid.

13 DJ Dzurek, Te Hanish Islands dispute, Eritrean Studies Review(2) (1996), 134.

14 Eritrea Profle , 3 February 1996, 2.

15 Eritrea and Yemen: control o the shipping lanes.

16 Ibid. For more details on the dispute, see DJ Dzurek, Eritrea-Yemen dispute over the HanishIslands, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, spring 1996, 18.

17 Te Horn o A rica Bulletin 7(4) September-October, 1995.

18 Eritrea Profle , 23 December 1995, 1.

19 Ibid. See also JA Le ebvre, Red Sea security and the geopolitical economy o the Hanish Islandsdispute, Middle East Journal 52(3) (1998), 367385.

20 M Hael, Problems acing Eritrea and Yemen, Sanaa: Sanaa Press Inc., 1997, 12.

21 Isaias A eworki, press con erence, Eritrea Profle , 21 December 1995, 1.



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22 Leader describes mission ruit ul, Eritrea Profle , 27 January 1996, 1.

23 French interest should be seen in the context o Frances close political and military ties withDjibouti where it possesses a large military base, and its strong economic ties with Yemen.

24 Dzurek, Te Hanish Islands dispute, 140.

25 For a detailed discussion on the issue, see B Kwiatkowska, Te Eritrea/Yemen arbitration:landmark progress in the acquisition o territorial sovereignty and equitable maritime bound-ary delimitation, Ocean Development & International Law, 2001, 125, http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/content/eritrea210604.pd (accessed 31 March 2010).

26 M Plaut, Yemen and Eritrea: riends once more? Review o A rican Political Economy78 (1998),660.

27 See United Nations Reports o International Arbitral Awards (UNRIAA) XXII, 211, 335or detailed in ormation on both phases o the award, http://www.pca-cpa.org (accessed 30November 2010).

28 Ibid.

29 For a ull text o the ICJ verdict, see Te EritreanYemen Arbitration Phase I: territorial sov-ereignty and scope o dispute, www.dehainews.com, 25 October 1998 (accessed 20 September2009).

30 Eritrea Profle , 7 November 1998, 1.

31 Eritrea Profle , 1 January 2000.

32 Eritro-Yemeni joint communiqu, Eritrea Profle , 3 November 1994, 1.

33 Sudan ribune , 28 December 2008.

34 Dzurek, Te Hanish Islands dispute, 2.

35 See http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=recherche&recherche=sanaa+ orum&x=12&y=11, (accessed 20 September 2009).

36 See http://www.dehai.org/demarcationwatch/articles/ECSS_Sanaa_axis_o _belligerence_partii.html (accessed 21 September 2009).

37 See the commentary by M Plaut, Te Eritrean opposition moves towards unity, Review o A rican Political Economy 32(106) (2005), 638643.

38 Ethiopia, Sudan back calls to include Eritrea in regional orum, Sudan ribune , 27 December2004, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article7228 (accessed 21 September 2009).

39 KJ Holsti, International politics: a ramework o analysis , 7th ed, Prentice Hall, 1998.

40 Tese sources estimate that Eritrea has gone down in its human development ranking rom157 in 2007/08 to 164 in 2008/09. Tere has also been increasing ood insecurity, with much o its GDP spent on imports and about one-third o the GDP obtained through remittances rom



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Monograph 178 305

the Eritrean diaspora. For more in ormation, see A rica south o the Sahara in Europa World online, http://www.europaworld.com/entry/er.dir.171 (accessed 27 April 2010); see also www.im .org or more statistical data (accessed 15 July 2010).

41 Medhane, Eritrea: the dynamics o a national question , Amsterdam: BR Grunner, 1986.42 See K ronvol and Negash, Brothers at war , Ox ord, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000.

43 Te International Institute or Strategic Studies Military balance (2009) reports Eritrea as theworlds second most militarised state.

44 Amnesty International, Human rights in state o Eritrea, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/eritrea/report-2009 (accessed 25 September 2009).

45 C Clapham, A rica and the international system: the politics o state survival , Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996.

46 Y Ismael, Middle East politics today: government and civil society (book review), Te Journal o Politics65(3) (2003), 928993.

47 For a detailed discussion on the history o the Ethio-Eritrean con ict, see R Iyob, Diasporic versus hegemonic states in the Horn o A rica 19912000, Te Journal o Modern A ricanStudies 38(4) (2000), 659682.

48 For more analysis on Eritrean-Sudanese relations, see M Venkataraman, Continuity andchanges in Eritrea-Sudan relations: recent trends and uture prospects, in M Sommer and E

Bruchhaus (eds), Horn o A rica: hot spot II revisited , Ver Litt, 2008.49 Cameron, Greg, Rake, Dorman and es amichael, Recent history (Eritrea), in Europa World

online. London: Routledge, http://www.europaworld.com/entry/er.hi (accessed 2 April 2010).

50 Eritrea and Sudan in war o words, 19 October 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/a rica/3755488.stm (accessed 18 September 2009).

51 Militants in Yemen proves headache to Saudis, 3 September 2009, http://www.newsabahtimes.com.my/nstweb/ ullstory/31680 (accessed 22 September 2009).

52 Obama tells Yemen its security is vital or US, Agence France Presse report, 7 September2009.

53 Obama tells Yemen its security is vital or US.

54 Obama tells Yemen its security is vital or US.

REFERENCES

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A rica south o the Sahara. In Europa World online. Available at http://www.europaworld.com/entry/er.dir.171 (accessed 27 April 2010).



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Agence France Presse. Obama tells Yemen its security is vital or US. AFP report, 7 September2009.

Amnesty International. Human rights in state o Eritrea. Available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/

region/eritrea/report-2009 (accessed 25 September 2009).Ayob, R. Diasporic versus hegemonic states in the Horn o A rica 19912000. Te Journal o

Modern A rican Studies 38(4) (2000).

Cameron, Greg, Rake, Dorman and es amichael. Recent history (Eritrea). In Europa Worldonline. London: Routledge. Available at http://www.europaworld.com/entry/er.hi (accessed 2April 2010).

Clapham, C. A rica and the international system: the politics o state survival . Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Con erence Presidents Press. Eritrea Profle . Asmara Ministry o In ormation, 16 January 1996.

Dzurek, DJ. Eritrea-Yemen dispute over the Hanish Islands. IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin,spring 1996.

Dzurek, DJ. Te Hanish Islands dispute. Eritrean Studies Review2 (1996).

Eritrea and Sudan in war o words, 19 October 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/a rica/3755488.stm (accessed 18 September 2009).

Eritro-Yemeni joint communiqu, Eritrea Profle , 3 November 1994.

Ethiopia, Sudan back calls to include Eritrea in regional orum. Sudan ribune , 27 December2004. Available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article7228 (accessed 21 September2009).

Hael, M. Problems acing Eritrea and Yemen. Sanaa: Sanaa Press Inc., 1997.

Haggi, E. Te struggle over Eritrea 19621978. San Francisco: Hoover Institution Press, 1983.

Holsti, KJ. International politics: a ramework o analysis , 7th ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998.

http://www.dehai.org/demarcationwatch/articles/ECSS_Sanaa_axis_o _belligerence_partii. html

(accessed 21 September 2009).http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=recherche&recherche=sanaa+ orum&x=12&y=11

(accessed 20 September 2009).

http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/content/eritrea210604.pd (accessed 31 March 2010).

Ismael, Y. Middle East politics today: government and civil society (book review). Te Journal o Politics 65(3) (2003).

Iyob, R. Diasporic versus hegemonic states in the Horn o A rica 19912000. Te Journal o Modern A rican Studies 38(4) (2000).

Kahsai A and Paul, J.Development o the Eritrean revolution. Washington, DC: MERIP Reports 62(1977), 1923. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010955 (accessed 26 September 2009).



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Kwiatkowska, B. Te Eritrea/Yemen arbitration: landmark progress in the acquisition o ter-ritorial sovereignty and equitable maritime boundary delimitation. Ocean Development &International Law , 2001.

Leader describes mission ruit ul. Eritrea Profle , 27 January 1996.Le ebvre, JA. Red Sea security and the geopolitical economy o the Hanish Islands dispute. Middle

East Journal 52(3) (1998).

Medhane, . Eritrea: the dynamics o a national question . Amsterdam: BR Grunner, 1986.

Militants in Yemen proves headache to Saudis, 3 September 2009. Available at http://www.newsa-bahtimes.com.my/nstweb/ ullstory/31680 (accessed 22 September 2009).

Nawd, MS. Eritrea: the rate o immigrants, religion, and Islam to A rica . Kuwait: Dar Al Kuwait LilSha a, 2001.

Plaut, M. Eritrea and Yemen: control o the shipping lanes. Review o A rican Political Economy 67 (1996).

Plaut, M. Yemen and Eritrea: riends once more? Review o A rican Political Economy78 (1998).

Plaut, M. Te Eritrean opposition moves towards unity. Review o A rican Political Economy 32(106) (2005), 638 643.

Sommer, M and Bruchhaus, E. (eds). Horn o A rica: hot spot II revisited. Ver Litt, 2008.

Te EritreanYemen Arbitration Phase I: territorial sovereignty and scope o dispute. Available atwww.dehainews.com, 25 October 1998 (accessed 20 September 2009).

ronvol, K and Negash, . Brothers at war . Ox ord, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000.

UN. United Nations Reports o International Arbitral Awards (UNRIAA) XXII, 211, 335. Availableat http://www.pca-cpa.org (accessed 30 November 2010).

Venkataraman, M. Continuity and changes in Eritrea-Sudan relations: recent trends and utureprospects. In M Sommer and E Bruchhaus (eds), Horn o A rica: hot spot II revisited . VerLitt, 2008.

Whitaker, B. Favorable ruling. Middle East International , 16 October 1998. Available at http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei39.htm (accessed 27 March 2010).

Woodward, P. Horn o A rica: politics and international relations . London: I.B. auris, 1996.



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APPENDIX

Figure 1 Map of the region

Source Dzurek, DJ. Eritrea-Yemen dispute over the Hanish Islands, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, spring 1996, 70

Asmara

DAHLAK

ARCHIPELAGO

Zula Block

SUDAN

ERITREA

ETHIOPIA

DJIBOUTI

Jabal al Tair

Block 2 4Alkathib

Block 2 3

Antufash

Zubair

Jabal ZuqarAbu

Kub

Bloc

Block Jan

Han

RED SEA

Danakil

Greater and

Lesser Hanish

Eritrea Oil Concessions

Yemen Oil Concessions

N

0 km 10

38 E 40 42


smgofie eritrean yemeni rels

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