skyler schmanski - thesis

S c h m a n s k i |1

Beyond Bullets: How War Shapes International Mass Migration Skyler Schmanski

Belmont University, 2016


The Refugee: A Reflection of War

While world leaders struggle to cope with an escalating migrant crisis, scholars continue

to seek its root causes. A definitive answer has proven elusive for decades, even as the number of

refugees swells to an estimated 19.5 million worldwide.1

In modern society, no life goes untouched by another, rendering this dilemma not only a

matter of academic concern but of humanitarian imperative. To blunder into policy without

sufficient knowledge will perpetuate the current circumstances. The pursuit of such knowledge

has proven rigorous, however, since the subject’s vastness renders an all-encompassing solution

impossible. In spite of their obstacles, researchers have made significant inroads into explaining

migratory phenomena.

Some stress the effect of environmental stimuli and climate change, while others

promulgate a more classical approach to migration through economic incentives. Still others

believe coercion and violence offer the best explanations for populations fleeing en masse. Each

model of thought has merit, and together they contribute to a deeper understanding of the

subject.

This thesis posed the initial research question: What causes mass migration between

countries? In examining the final model of thought, it targeted a more specific question whose

answer continues to elude scholars: Does the type of war affect international mass migration? To

evaluate this possibility, it conducted a comparative case study between three separate wars in

the Republic of Iraq, holding all major external factors constant. Each conflict served as a sample

of the three main variants: interstate, intrastate, and intertwined warfare.

1 "Worldwide Displacement Hits All-time High as War and Persecution Increase." UNHCR News. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 18 June 2015. Web. 28 Jan. 2016.


The analysis of internationally recognized refugee statistics from each conflict revealed

that variation existed between the three wars. There were, however, unanticipated nuances to

these findings, and their limited applicability to past and future global conflicts places them in

perspective. Likewise, the results produced questions that are beyond the scope of the data

utilized in this case study.

Iraq represents a compelling starting point for explaining these grander issues, but they will

require more extensive research to determine the universal effect of war variants on this enduring

crisis.

Tracing Tragedy: Three Complementary Explanations of International Mass Migration and One Fundamental Mystery

The models of environmental evolution, economic impetus, and coercive action have

emerged as complementary theoretical frameworks for explaining the external factors

compelling migrants to abandon their homelands.

Relative to its counterparts, the model of environmental evolution represents a novel

perspective, claiming that climate change plays a definable role in the degradation of

environments to which local populations cannot adapt. Therefore, populations choose to abandon

their ecologically infertile lands in search of better prospects for settlement.2 The theory’s

relevancy amid ongoing climate discussions in the international community cannot be

overlooked, nor can the fact that scientific discoveries will add evolving dimensions to this

interpretation.

Its originality, however, bears the burden of a lack of substantial, incontrovertible evidence

2 White, Gregory. "Introduction." Introduction. Climate Change and Migration: Security and Borders in a Warming World. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011. 9. Print.


when viewed alongside other explanations. As it stands, applying the theory to a grand scale

relies heavily on forecasting rising sea levels and warming climates rather than immediately

observable case studies. Moreover, current climate-induced migrations have demonstrated sub-

regional movement at most, with researchers remaining undecided whether “it will induce long-

range migrations.” 3

Proponents and detractors acknowledge the theory’s uncertainties. A 2014 convergence of

the international scientific community in Lubeck, Germany, examined the intersection of climate

change and migration amid the broader discussion of conflict in Northern Africa. Citing the

conference, Link noted that a causal relationship between the two variables remains

inconclusive.4 Given the present state of research and the evidentiary strength of its counterparts,

climate change alone cannot account for the demographic or geographic extent of mass

migrations in the modern era.

The second body of thought explaining migratory incentive, known as the model of

economic impetus, is rooted in neo-classical economic theory, “[t]he oldest theory of migration.”

Wage discrepancies, largely a result of “geographic differences in labour demand and labour

supply,” influence individuals to relocate to more accommodating regions.5 The increasing

trajectory of international economic migration is visible, and the interplay of wealthier nations

seeking highly specialized foreign workers coupled with the unwillingness of many domestic

citizens to assume lower wage and lower skilled jobs indicates this trend will continue.6

3 White, Gregory. "Introduction." Introduction. Climate Change and Migration: Security and Borders in a Warming World. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011. 4-7. Print. 4 Link, P. Michael, Tim Brücher, Martin Claussen, Jasmin S. A. Link, and Jürgen Scheffran. "The Nexus of Climate Change, Land Use, and Conflict." Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society Sept. 2015: 1561-564. Academic Search Premier. Web. 29 Jan. 2016. 5 Jennissen, Roel Peter Wilhelmina. Chapter 3: A Theoretical Framework of International Migration. Macro-economic Determinants of International Migration in Europe. Amsterdam: Dutch UP, 2004. 33. Print. 6 Bohning, W. R., and Nana Oishi. "Is International Economic Migration Spreading?" The International Migration Review 29.3 (1995): 795-98. JSTOR. Web. 31 Jan. 2016.


While this perspective has assumed new dimensions throughout history, it remains defined

by the notion that migrants are compelled by the combination of economic adversity at home and

incentive abroad. Its theorists understand the laws of economics do not operate in isolation and

that they are interwoven with other societal pressures. As such, distinguishing an economic

impetus from an environmental, governmental, or other influence can prove a difficult task. The

model’s mathematical foundations are nonetheless empirical.

Other scholars have promulgated coercion as the preeminent factor in understanding the

casual relationship between external stimuli and international exoduses. The model of coercive

action contends that mass migrations are born primarily of violence and the resulting direct and

indirect factors.7 This represents a combination of catalysts, each connected to the principle that

individuals migrate either from the experience or anticipation of these crises.8 Therefore, this

model diverges from its counterparts in examining persons officially classified as refugees—a

distinction from the term migrant that implies specific motives for resettlement.

According to Article I of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the corresponding

amendments of the 1967 Protocol, the signatories officially recognize a refugee as a person “who

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,

membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his

nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of

that country.” 9

7 Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo. Chapter 1: Who Is a Refugee? Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. New York: Oxford UP, 1989. 4. Print. 8 Martin, Susan Forbes, Sanjula S. Weerasinghe, and Abbie Taylor. "Part I: Introduction and a Theoretical Perspective, Chapter 1: Setting the Scene." Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences and Responses. New York: Routledge, 2014. 3. Print. 9 The United Nations. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Dec. 2010. Web. 2 Feb. 2016.


Case studies spanning numerous decades allow this model to transcend correlation to

indications of causation. On the other hand, their breadth presents an overwhelming amount of

observable data to distill. From the physical ravages of civil war to the widespread oppression of

vulnerable demographics, humanity’s instinct for self-preservation is triggered in a multitude of

scenarios amid unavoidable violence.

Population weaponization adds a further dimension to this reasoning, arguing that state and

non-state actors wield institutional power to damage or manipulate rival nations through the

engineering or control of migration crises. The concept’s strength resides in its regionally and

historically diverse examples involving “over forty groups of displaced people [that] have been

used as pawns in at least fifty-six discrete attempts at coercive engineered migration” since

1951.10 From Cuba to East Germany, leaders have gained leverage by using migrant populations

to burden stronger national opponents.

While the author demonstrates a degree of at least moderate success with this technique,

“connecting Greenhill’s work to current research strongly suggests that nations are increasingly

less able to keep populations within their borders” and, therefore, this strategy may prove less

fruitful to leaders of exporting nations in the future.11 In addition to its arguably diminishing

relevance, an overreliance on Greenhill’s explanation could lead to conjecture of regimes’

guarded and often indiscernible political motivations. Used as a supplement in the overarching

narrative of violence, however, it supports the model.

Among the many categories of violence, one is unequivocally the most influential: war.

This thesis will consider it in three contrasting subsets: interstate, intrastate, and intertwined

10 Greenhill, Kelly M. Introduction, Chapter I: Understanding the Coercive Power of Mass Migrations. Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2010. 2-15. Print. 11 Kugler, Tadeusz. "Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy by Kelly Greenhill." Political Science Quarterly 126.2 (2011): 357-59. Academic Search Premier. Web. 2 Feb. 2016.


warfare. Further distinctions can be made within each, but this level of specificity will serve the

purpose of the following study.

An objection to this classification may be the exclusion of genocide as a distinct category.

According to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

Article II identifies the following sufficient conditions for genocide when paired with “intent to

destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its

physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.12

Note that no reference is made to war itself, given that actors are capable of committing

genocide outside its confines. Citing historian Mark Levene, the Center on Law and

Globalization reaffirms that this atrocity can emerge in radicalized warfare, regardless of form.13

From the slaughter of Tutsis in the Rwandan Civil War to the ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks in the

Bosnian War, history demonstrates the diverse conditions that lead to genocide. In an effort to

coincide with international legal definitions and establish equilibrium between infinite subsets

and ineffective general categories, this study reemphasizes that interstate, intrastate, and

intertwined represent the three main types of warfare. Additional studies focused specifically on

genocide or elaborating on other complexities of war are encouraged.

12 The United Nations. The General Assembly of the United Nations. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Treaties.un.org. Web. 13 Feb. 2016. 13 "Genocides Share Nine Common Features." Smart Library on Globalization. Center on Law and Globalization. Web. 13 Feb. 2016.


Despite the aforementioned consensus, there exists an enduring question within the model

of coercive action. Many scholars believe simply using conflict as a means to identify migratory

impact is insufficient. The proverbial domino effect can emerge in some civil wars, for example,

as raw damage and casualties induce economic deterioration that further incentivizes migrants to

flee.14 Thus, they argue the variables of war should be considered. What is not universally

established is whether the magnitude of international mass migration is influenced more by one

war variant than another. Between the analysis of case studies and existing data, stratifying the

three types according to migratory impact appears plausible.

Each of the three models establishes compelling arguments deserving of further inquiry.

None attempts to dismantle the others, instead providing a cumulative perspective. At times, a

combination of the models influences migrations, as in the “vicious cycle” of Niger’s

environmentally induced economic migration.15

At others times, they are disparate. For example, the mass exoduses triggered by British

India’s dissolution into India and Pakistan in 1947 were not compelled by environmental or

economic degradation, but by the British government’s imperial foreign policy. A thorough

viewing of history demonstrates that one model does not necessarily lead to another. This lack of

dependency justifies the independent exploration of a single explanation without detailed

analysis of its counterparts, particularly when that explanation poses a critical question.

Further exploration of the coercive action model will unravel the puzzling foundations of

migration by exploring this mystery. The following study will use this approach given its

propensity for empirical evaluation and the enduring inconclusiveness in political science

14 Adhikari, Prakash. "The Plight of the Forgotten Ones: Civil War and Forced Migration." International Studies Quarterly 56.3 (2012): 602. Academic Search Premier. Web. 13 Feb. 2016. 15 Afifi, Tamer. "Economic or Environmental Migration? The Push Factors in Niger." International Migration 49 (2011): 117. Academic Search Premier. Web. 19 Feb. 2016.


academia regarding the comparative impact of war variants. This question among sub-schools is

the focus of subsequent evaluation. It will, in turn, provide insight into causes of mass migration

between countries. Ultimately, at a time when the individual is increasingly lost amid proxy wars

and policy deliberations, this path ensures the migrant remains at the center of analysis.

The Impact of War Variants on the Magnitude of International Mass Migration

History demonstrates that the calamity of war can produce grand exoduses, as victims of

conflict seek refuge abroad. The resulting physical, sociological, political, and economic

destruction and their humanitarian consequences have not been relegated to one particular period

or region. From the first Persian Gulf War, to the civil bloodshed spilled by Kurdish and

Republican forces, to the U.S-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, interstate and intrastate war

and their intertwined synthesis have yielded refugee-strewn landscapes.

All, however, produced varying degrees of fallout. Researchers have concluded that the

characteristics of war can affect ensuing migration. Considering the findings, it follows that the

scope of migration is influenced more by one variant than another. This assertion can be

hypothesized as:

War is a catalyst for international mass migration, and the magnitude of the effect varies

by the type of war. Global conflict's extensive record provides the means for the empirical

analysis of a relationship that is imperative to understand. The verdict will have repercussions on

the international community wrestling with a crisis that has plagued humanity since its origins.


Designing a Comparative Case Study on the Relationship of War Variants with International Mass Migratory Magnitude

As war changes, so do its consequences. To test the relationship between the type of war

and the resulting migratory patterns, this thesis will conduct a tridimensional comparative study

with the following sample set, according to the cases’ respective categorizations:

As a universal evaluation of global conflicts presents nearly insurmountable data to

interpret, this more nuanced approach must demonstrate an effective sampling, which

preliminary analysis suggests it achieves. The raw data and historical contexts of the sample

conflicts indicate their effectiveness. By comparing the three forms of warfare through examples

with commensurate attributes, external factors, including those referenced by the scholars of the

three primary models of thought, are controlled to the highest degree possible.

All conflicts occur in the Republic of Iraq within a twenty-one-year span under the one-

party rule of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath regime’s President Saddam Hussein and involve similar

external actors, in particular the United States of America—a country that demonstrably

influenced all three conflicts. Few nations display all three forms of warfare, occurring

independently of one another yet in such proximity. Not only does Iraq meet these qualifications,

but the international community has recorded reliable, consistent data since the nation came to

global prominence in the late twentieth century.

The ongoing geopolitical crisis in the Middle East suggests this body of knowledge will

continue to expand. Unlike other states that have since stabilized, Iraq remains in a precarious

position as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threatens its sustainability in the


immediate future. This study’s findings are highly relevant to the present, as a fourth case study

develops on the world stage.

Some may suggest the Syrian “Civil War” would serve as a viable intrastate or intertwined

sample. Neither classification, however, meets the necessary criteria. Given the high level of

third-party militant involvement in the conflict—notably the Russian Federation, the United

States of America, and the Islamic Republic of Iran—it is better classified as intertwined warfare

than civil warfare.

Yet it is inadvisable to use the conflict as the intertwined representation due to continuing

hostilities. Ongoing conflicts are predisposed to being politicized, rendering reliable data scarce

amid the fog of war. The Jordanian government’s inflation of the number of Iraq War refugees to

access more foreign aid is one recent example16 indicative of a larger trend. Additionally, the

geographic and socio-political factors that provide control for the case study do not exist in the

Syrian war, which involves different regime leadership and has spread beyond national

boundaries. Due to these deficiencies, the Syrian conflict will not be examined in this case study.

The current selection of cases establishes both control and variation. The control of

geographic, economic, state, regime, era, and participatory party factors allows for the

independent analysis of the effects of a given form of war. Interstate, intrastate, and intertwined

warfare represent the independent variable (x). Its dependent counterpart (y) is the corresponding

international migratory impact.

The former categorizations are determined by the types of belligerent actors: if the conflict

is waged exclusively by international states, it qualifies as interstate; if waged nearly exclusively

between rival factions within a country—often manifesting as governmental versus rebel

16 Haddad, Saleem. "Jordan's Endless Search for the Iraqi Refugee." Muftah. 22 Nov. 2010. Web. 1 Mar. 2016.


forces—it qualifies as intrastate (note the inclusion of nearly, due to external actors rarely

abstaining from supporting at least one side of a civil war in some capacity); if both types of

warfare occur within a continuous conflict, it qualifies as intertwined.

To assess the dependent variable, this study will employ quantitative analysis by

determining the total number of refugees from each. Individuals fleeing these prescribed

conflicts transcend regular migration. No single source provides comprehensive data across all

conflicts, so the study will rely on the UN Refugee Agency and the Migration Policy Institute to

ensure these statistics guarantee validity and reliability.

There are several justifications for this study’s terminology. Again, refugee represents a

superior indicator of the impact of war than migrant, given that, by definition, refugees are

products of coercion. Likewise, their migration must cross state boundaries, rendering the

international connotation inherent in their legal classification. Finally, the qualifier of mass

migration, as defined exclusively by and for this study, is the significant and simultaneous

movement of individuals from native to new regions across national borders.

If the evaluation of these cases demonstrates substantial discrepancies in migratory impact

among the three war variants, the hypothesis of a causal relationship is supported. If zero or

minimal variation is detected, the hypothesis is falsified. While separate from the hypothesis’s

contention, which only predicts variation in general, this study also expects intertwined warfare

to yield the highest refugee totals, followed by intrastate and interstate, respectively.

This prediction is based on the notion that a greater number of militant actors would

logically create more opportunities for damage and that, coupled with internal warfare causing

significant infrastructural and economic chaos,14 this combination would induce the greatest

14 Adhikari, Prakash. "The Plight of the Forgotten Ones: Civil War and Forced Migration." International Studies Quarterly 56.3 (2012): 602. Academic Search Premier. Web. 13 Feb. 2016.


number of refugees. That said, discovering the existence or lack of variation is the primary

purpose of the study. Having defined the parameters and objective measurements of the study,

this thesis will examine the three wars in chronological order, then compare and contrast them in

conjunction.

Analyzing the Conflicts

The First Persian Gulf War began with Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait on August 2, 1990.

This aggression triggered economic and military retaliation as nations imposed sanctions and

deployed military forces to the region. Though refugees of various nationalities continued to flee

during subsequent months, the majority of migration occurred prior to the U.S.-led Coalition

invasion. Iraq’s initial act of war proved the main catalyst.17

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) identifies that the

largest refugee flows continued until April 1991, with fellow Gulf nations serving as primary

destinations.18 Despite hostilities ending only six months after their commencement, the conflict

created approximately 3 million refugees by mid-1991 according to calculations by the

Migration Policy Institute.17 Given the relatively abbreviated length of hostilities, this number is

higher than expected.

The outbreak of violence three years later between the rival factions of the Kurdistan

Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) gave rise to the Iraqi

Kurdish Civil War. The United States provided support but remained largely disconnected from

17 Galbraith, Peter W. Refugees from War in Iraq: What Happened in 1991 and What May Happen in 2003. Issue brief no. 2. Migration Policy Institute, Feb. 2003. Web. 2 Mar. 2016. 18 "Chronology: 1991 Gulf War Crisis." UNHCR News. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 20 Mar. 2003. Web. 14 Mar. 2016.


military operations, particularly compared to its role in preceding and ensuing conflicts in the

region. External actors were likewise involved, but far from the scope or scale witnessed in other

conflicts.

Hostilities continued from 1994 until the signing of the official peace treaty in 1998.

Utilizing timelines and data accumulated for the Minority at Risk Project by the University of

Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) and

disseminated by the UNHCR, this study estimates the civil war resulted in approximately 75,000

refugees. The majority of these individuals attempted to resettle in Iran at the conclusion of the

KDP campaign.19 This study recognizes this figure is less certain than those of the other two

wars, but it remains the best available estimation.

The third Iraqi conflict occurred five years later and soon became the most internationally

controversial. The Second Persian Gulf War, also known as the Iraq War, began with the U.S.

invasion of the Republic of Iraq on March 20, 2003. Assisted by a coalition of allied forces,

including the United Kingdom, the U.S. toppled Saddam Hussein’s government, marking an end

of an era for the country’s leadership. The invasion phase of 2003 gave way to the post-invasion

phase that extended until the United States’ withdrawal in 2011.

Between 2006 and 2007, sectarian violence in the country reached such levels of

bloodshed that the senior United Nations envoy to Iraq declared it a “civil war-like situation” in

November 2006.20 A January 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate confirmed “the term

‘civil war’ accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict,” though it “does not

19 "Chronology for Kurds in Iraq." UNHCR Refworld. Minorities at Risk Project, 2004. Web. 19 Mar. 2016. 20 "Decrying Violence in Iraq, UN Envoy Urges National Dialogue, International Support." UN News Centre. UN News Service, 25 Nov. 2006. Web. 27 Mar. 2016.


adequately capture the complexity.” 21 By the final phase of intertwined warfare, the conflict had

produced approximately 1.8 million refugees, most of whom settled in surrounding countries22

and gravitated toward these nations’ urban centers.23

Observe the case study’s cumulative calculations below:

This perspective demonstrates several key findings. The most notable inference is that

variation does exist between the three wars. This aligns with the assertion posed by the initial

hypothesis. The second takeaway is the conflict ranking by refugee totals. This thesis predicted

that intertwined would yield the highest number of refugees, followed by intrastate, then

interstate. The results are nearly inverse, revealing this prediction was incorrect. In reality, the

ordering stands as interstate, intertwined, intrastate. The two wars whose principle actors were

traditional state armed forces led to more migration than civil war. Moreover, these conflicts

were waged by interventionist foreign governments.

21 The United States of America. National Intelligence Council. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead. Jan. 2007. Web. 27 Mar. 2016. 22 2009 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons. Publication. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Division of Programme Support and Management, 15 June 2010. Web. 27 Mar. 2016. 23 Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. "Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced Migration Crisis." International Security 33.2 (2008): 104. JSTOR. Web. 4 Apr. 2016.

First Persian Gulf War

62%Iraqi Kurdish Civil War

1%

Second Persian Gulf War

37%

TotalRefugees:4,875,000

FirstPersianGulfWar IraqiKurdishCivilWar SecondPersianGulfWar


The third observation is the significant discrepancy in refugee totals. The First Persian

Gulf War, representative of interstate warfare, produced 167 percent of the refugees produced by

the Second Persian Gulf War, representative of intertwined warfare; and 4000 percent of those

produced by the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War, representative of intrastate warfare. The fourth

observation is that Iraq’s surrounding nations remained the refugees’ common destination across

the three wars. This fact corroborates the UNHCR’s estimate that 83 percent of the world’s

refugees live within their region of origin.22

Thus, given the available data, the case study’s results provide evidence for the

hypothesis that war is a catalyst for international mass migration, and the magnitude of the

effect varies by the type of war. The display of variation, however, was decidedly different. Both

the ranking and degree of refugee totals by conflict were not as predicted.

The findings therefore pose two major questions. First, how universally applicable are the

results to global warfare? Second, the discrepancy in percentages demands further analysis.

Chiefly, why did the representative conflict for intrastate warfare produce so comparatively few

refugees? In order to avoid overestimating the weight of these results and to place them in proper

context, further elaboration is essential.

The Impact of War Variants on International Mass Migration: A Question More Ambitious than its Answer

The world is riddled by perpetual war, and Iraq knows the cost of this tragic reality more

than most. Death on the battlefield is only half the story. The harsh fate of survivors fleeing

abroad cannot be ignored. For decades, scholars have struggled to unearth the root causes of

22 2009 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons. Publication. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Division of Programme Support and Management, 15 June 2010. Web. 27 Mar. 2016.


migration, having submitted environmental, economic, and coercive impetuses as plausible

models of thought.

This thesis seeks to contribute to this substantial body of literature by pursuing the notion

that the type of warfare affects resulting refugee crises. The results, however, pose as many

questions as they answer. To test this hypothesis, it conducted a tripartite comparative case study

by drawing from three major wars in the Republic of Iraq, each representative of one warfare

variant. In a testament to the nation’s propensity for armed conflict, all three forms of warfare—

interstate, intrastate, and intertwined—spawned in a span of two decades. This enabled the study

to hold a wide array of external factors constant across the sampling.

Controlling for factors that would potentially skew the effect of warfare types on

international mass migration rendered greater geographical or historical variety extremely

difficult. It would, therefore, be presumptuous to claim the results are universally applicable. The

idea that one would expect to see this same pattern of variation, or even variation in general, in

the conflicts of Southeast Asia or Latin America, two hundred years prior or in the future, is

intellectually dishonest. The methodology appears solid, but limiting. Thus, this study states only

that the evidence supports its hypothesis within the established timeframe of the wars in the

given region. More tests and data are required to make broader, universal declarations.

Among the results themselves, there is a profound discrepancy in refugee counts between

intrastate warfare and its counterparts. The fact that the intrastate variant composed a mere 1

percent of the total number produced by the three conflicts begs the question of whether this

figure is indicative of civil wars at large. It is simple to point to examples of civil war that

produced greater numbers of refugees than the Iraqi Kurdish conflict, but are such examples able

to control for the same factors when compared directly with the other two variants of warfare?


Likewise, the argument could be made that intrastate wars inflict more damage on the home

front, and be rebutted by the assertion that interventionist and occupying foreign powers inflict

the same or worse. The inability to answer this question represents a shortcoming of this case

study and solidifies the geographical and timeframe parameters it imposes on its results.

While this undertaking may add to the global refugee debate in some small measure, the

answers that have long eluded researchers remain. Ultimately, it demonstrates the rigor of

studying the subject of international mass migration. The end result is a question more ambitious

than its answer.


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