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SevenPerennial Challenges

To Air Forces



Seven

Perennial Challenges To Air Forces

Sanu Kainikara



© Commonwealh o Ausralia 2009

Tis work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the CopyrightAct 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written

permission. Inquiries should be made to the publisher.

Disclaimer

Te views expressed in his work are hose o he auhor and do no necessarily reeche ocial policy or posiion o he Deparmen o Deence, he oyal Ausralian AirForce or he Governmen o Ausralia, or o any oher auhoriy reerred o in he ex.Te Commonwealh o Ausralia will no be legally responsible in conrac, or oroherwise, or any saemens made in his documen.

ReleaseTis documen is approved or public release. Porions o his documen may be quoedor reproduced wihou permission, provided a sandard source credi is included.

Auhor: Kainikara, Sanu.ile: Seven perennial challenges o air orces / Sanu KainikaraISBN: 9781920800437Subjecs: Air power.

Air orces.

Naional securiy.

Oher Auhors/Conribuors:Ausralia. oyal Ausralian Air Force. Air Power Developmen Cenre.

Dewey Number: 358.4

Cover design and layout by Graeme Smith

Published and disribued by: Air Power Developmen CenreCC-3Deparmen o DeenceCANBER AC 2600 AUSRLIA

elephone: + 61 2 6266 1355Facsimile: + 61 2 6266 1041E-mail: [email protected]

Websie: www.raa.gov.au/airpower



vii

About the Author

Sanu Kainikara is a ormer gher pilo o he Indian Air Force

who reired as a Wing Commander aer 21 years o commissionedservice. During his service career, he has own nearly 4,000 hourson a number o modern gher aircra and held various commandand saf appoinmens. He is a Qualied Flying Insrucor and agraduae o he Figher Weapons School, he Deence Services Saf College, as well as he College o Air Warare. He is a recipien o he

Air Force Cross.

Aer reiremen rom acive service, he worked or our years as hesenior analys, specialising in air power sraegy or a US rainingeam in he Middle Eas. Subsequenly, he was a member o he

Aerospace Engineering aculy a he MI Universiy, Melbourneand a consulan o he Air Operaions Division o DSO, also aMelbourne. He is currenly he Air Power Sraegis a he AirPower Developmen Cenre, Canberra and is also a Visiing Fellow

a he Universiy o New Souh Wales. He has published widely onnaional securiy, sraegy and air power and is he auhor o ve

books— Papers on Air Power , Pahways o Vicory , ed Air: Poliicsin ussian Air Power , Ausralian Securiy in he Asian Cenury and AFresh Look a Air Power Docrine. He is also he conribuing edioro he book Friends in High Places: Air Power in Irregular Warare.

Dr Kainikara has wo Bachelors degrees, a Masers degree in

Deence and Sraegic Sudies rom he Universiy o Madras and aPhD in Inernaional Poliics awarded by he Universiy o Adelaide.



viii

Acknowledgement

Te auhor would like o acknowledge Group Capain ick Keir

or several discussions ha disilled a number o argumens puorward as well as or he suggesions ha have served o improvehe cohesiveness o his book. Furher, his Foreword o he book isgraeully appreciaed.

Te auhor is also indebed o WGCD Keih Bren or ediing hedra version wih grea care and o Graeme Smih or creaing anaesheically pleasing cover design and exremely readable lay ou.



ix

Foreword

Tis paper is abou he seven perennial challenges o air orces. Dr

Kainikara denes he seven perennial challenges as hose ha willalways presen conundrums o air orce commanders—regardlesso how ar air orces develop in erms o sraegic and iner-Serviceaccepance, echnology, sraegy, operaional ar and acics.

In broad erms, he paper covers a range o opics—rom he naureo independen air orces, he percepions o poliicians, he publicand he media, and he issues o atriion and collaeral damage.

In specic erms, he paper idenies seven discree arenas hachallenge he ecacy o air power:

Environmen•

echnology •

Demography •

esources•

Poliics•

Atriion•

Collaeral damage•

Dr Kainikara has observed hese challenges as a proessional airmanand air power sraegis since 1971, when he joined he Indian AirForce as a gher pilo. I am cerain ha here would be agreemenha hese challenges are always presen and never seem o quie goaway—hus, hey are ruly perennial.

Te paper nishes wih an essay on he quesion o independence.Independen air orces have been around since 1918 and he oyal

Ausralian Air Force, creaed in 1921, is he second oldes in he

world. I is ineresing, however, ha Te Tird Broher , as he AirForce in known, has never been ully acceped by is elder brohers.



x

Tis is no a problem unique o Ausralia—bu an inernaionalone. Whils he benes o air power are well acceped andacknowledged o he poin where a signican amoun o comba

power o he surace orces is made up o air power elemens, eachair orce invariably sufers atacks on is independence—wheherhe argumens be made on he dubious grounds o eciency,ehos or cos-efeciveness. Wihou doub, he real argumens ora separae and independen air orce are based on he pervadingnaure o airspace ha afecs all oher operaing environmens andhe requiremen or proessional masery o air power—a masery

ha can only be acquired by years o experience, sudy and reecion– a masery impossible o acquire when air power is no your core business line. One also wonders wheher any resource-limiedmedium-sized naion, such as Ausralia, can indeed aford o penny-packe is air power resources across hree separae Services—buha is anoher debae or anoher day.

I rus ha his paper will add o he ongoing inellecual debae

and add somehing o subsance o he developmen o air powersraegy and employmen principles.

Group Capain .J. Keir, AM, CSCDirecor

Air Power Developmen CenreCanberra



xi

Author’s Preface

Te world is in urmoil, even i here is palpable peace and sabiliy

in many corners wih maured naion-saes making conceredatemps o ensure ha he disquie does no reach heir shores. A dispassionae analysis o he curren inernaional securiy revealsha some o he blame or he curren imbroglio res wih he

Wesern naions who in he pas ew decades were so absorbed inheir pursui o naional prosperiy ha clear indicaions o heemerging disrupion wen unnoiced. While ignoring he warning

signs may no have been a conscious decision, he resuls o heupheaval are bound o say wih he inernaional communiy or aconsiderably long period o ime. As ye—nearly a decade aer heevens o 11 Sepember 2001, which could be considered o have

been he ulimae caalys or he disinc and rapid shi in globalsecuriy percepions—here does no seem o be any viable soluionemerging o conain he vexed issues ha have made a mockery o he concep o peace and sabiliy in large pars o he world.

In oday’s inormaion age, he evens aking place even in remoepars o he world have cascading efecs ha impac naions ha arecomparaively sable. Tis has been acknowledged by he Wesernnaions who view hese evens—some unrelaed, bu a numbero hem inerconneced—as direc hreas o heir own securiy,compelling he Wes o inervene using a variey o means. Te use

o miliary orces o conain emerging hreas is perhaps he moscommon and may be he resul o he absence o a cohesive whole-o-governmen plan wihin a naion and he inabiliy o he oherelemens o naional power o naions o uncion efecively as acoaliion.

For he oreseeable uure, he miliary orces o he Wes will be involved in peace suppor operaions—which includes he

enire specrum rom humaniarian aid o sabilisaion operaions,oher han acual comba agains convenional or irregular orces.



xii

However, in he pas ew decades here has been a noiceablechange in he way in which miliary orces are employed as wellas on he expecaions regarding wha hey would achieve in such

inervenions. Te miliary orces o he Wes are being increasingly used o resolve issues and siuaions ha are predominanly recepiveo non-miliary soluions. A he same ime, he expecaion ha hemiliary would succeed in resolving hese issues o he saisaciono all paries concerned has increased maniold. In combinaion

wih he resricions imposed on he applicaion o orce ha he Wes has placed on heir miliary orces—or a number o reasons

ranging rom a base level concern or human lie o he philosophicalmoraliy o using orce—he orces would end o become srechedin heir overall capabiliy o achieve he desired objecives. Underhese circumsances he consrains placed on miliary orces assumecriical imporance.

Along wih he oher Services, air orces are also afeced by hechanges aking place in almos all aspecs o he employmen o

miliary orce. Miliary planners, including air campaign planners,have he onerous responsibiliy o atemping o miigae heinheren resricions ha come wih alered employmen ehosand expecaions so ha he orce can operae as close o opimumas possible. From an air power perspecive here is a lacuna in hissiuaion. On he one hand, here is a endency amongs air powerenhusiass o emphasise is srenghs and hrough hem explain

he opimum employmen o air power o obain vicory. Tereis an underlying ruh in he ac ha air power is essenial, and iscriical a imes, o vicory in a convenional conic. On he oher,he resricions placed on he unimpeded employmen o air powercanno be wished away and have o be careully considered andamelioraed o he greaes exen possible a he planning sageisel. Te wo are incompaible.

In considering he consrains under which air orces have ouncion, here is a endency o invesigae only hose ha can be



xiii

direcly addressed wihin he air orce isel. Tis makes miigainghe issues a simple mater o an air orce decision, unafeced by any ouside inuence. I is suggesed ha his approach will no provide

a susainable way orward or modern air orces mainly because iis already clear ha miliary orces, including air orces, will no beable o operae in a vacuum in he conemporary securiy scenario.Facors ha even 20 years back would no have eaured in heplanning process o an air campaign now exer crucial inuence onhe planning process o an air campaign.

Tere is a disinc aleraion, owards one o benign ambivalence,

in he general percepion o naional securiy. Tis has a saluary impac on he way in which miliary orces are perceived and hesaus accorded o hem wihin he naional psyche. Te Wesernnaions are now relucan o be seen as ‘miliarising’ and, hereore,end o keep heir miliary orces as low-key as possible. One o hereasons or he curren endency o ‘civilianise’ he miliary as aras possible is an atemp a nominally reducing he ‘srengh’ o he

sanding miliary orces. In his environmen o poliical correcness,he miliary orces will nd hemselves a he receiving end o unpalaable resricions ha diminish heir overall capabiliies, whilesill having o achieve laid down objecives.

Te correcness or oherwise o decisions ha impinge o heecacy o miliary orces can be debaed. However, a pragmaic airpower enhusias will be bes served by undersanding and acceping

he challenges ha ace modern air orces. Only hen can a clear vision or he employmen o air power in he pursui o naionalsecuriy be evolved.

Sanu KainikaraCanberraNovember 2009



xiv



xv

Contents

Abou he Auhor ..............................................................................................................vii

Acknowledgemen ...........................................................................................................viii

Foreword ..................................................................................................................................ix

Auhor’s Preace....................................................................................................................xi

Inroducion ........................................................................... 1

I. Vulnerabiliies and Consrains ..................................... 7

II. Te Challenges .............................................................. 15

Challenge One − Impac o he Environmen ..................................17

Challenge wo − Impac o echnology .............................................28

Challenge Tree − Infuence o Naional Demography ................33

Challenge Four − Resource Consrains a he

Naional Sraegic Level .........................................41

Challenge Five − Poliical Dimension o he Employmeno Air Forces..................................................................45

Challenge Six − Atriion olerance ...................................................51

Challenge Seven – Dealing wih Collaeral Damage .......................57

III. Te Quesion o Independence .................................... 63

Conclusion............................................................................ 69



xvi



…I wish o noe several poins describing he main limiaions whichwill be aced by he Air Forces in he coming millennium. Higher

expecaions, especially o air power, are developing. Tere is also high

sensiiviy o collaeral damage and civilian casualies. I is dicul o

esimae jus how many casualies public opinion is willing o olerae,

since depends on varying condiions in dieren locaions and dieren circumsances. Tere is a large quaniy o inormaion and daa on an

unlimied number o arges; each arge requires separae governmen auhorisaion…

Major General Eitan Ben-EliahuCommander Israel Air Force

Presentation at the Millennium Air Power Conference,Singapore, 2000

Moreover, air power will always carry wih i he skeleons o Guernicaand Dresden. No mater how precise he weaponry and proessional he

aircrew, every so ofen a weapon sysem will ail and non-combaans

will die…Te ‘CNN acor’ will be exploied o he ull by all hose who

believe ha air power is inhumane, somehow unair and ‘ye again’ indiscriminae and hence, in sum poliically counerproducive.

Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason (etd) RF Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal, 1994



1

Introduction

Te end o he Cold War saw he beginning o a period wherein he

need or innovaive sraegic securiy hough was gradually loweredin prioriy o aciliae greaer socioeconomic research and analysis.Tis led no only o sagnaion o sraegic securiy hough bu alsoo he ragmenaion and difusion o he undamenals o naionalsecuriy wihin he Wes.1 Perhaps his was an ineviable allouo he sudden collapse o he Sovie Union ha le he Wesernnaions wih he eeling o a winner’s euphoria ha maniesed isel

as a sense o securiy rom all evil. Subsequenly, he mos imporanhrus or mos liberal democracies became he ques or increasedprosperiy and a place or hemselves in he globalised world.

Te collapse o he Sovie Union, however, did no bring abou heprediced universal peace bu, on he conrary, only managed oremove one o he undamenal assurances o a balanced and seady

world order. In ac, he incidens o ehnic violence, civil war and

errorism increased markedly in he aermah o he end o he Cold War. A he same ime he world winessed a visible relucance onhe par o he Wes o inervene in any meaningul manner in hemore volaile regions o he world. Tis was he resul o a consciousatemp o pursue a risk-avoidance securiy sraegy, ha was seen

by he non-Wesern world as he Achilles heel o Wesern miliary orces—a relucance o accep casualies.

While he Wes has been busy in he pursui o even greaerprosperiy, here has been an evoluionary change aking place in heconduc o armed conic. Te rs and mos imporan is he acha armed conic is no longer he exclusive preserve o he legally

1 Dr Michael Evans, ‘Appoinmen in Samarra: Wesern Sraegic Tough andhe Culure o isk’, in Michael Evans, ussell Parkin and Alan yan (eds.) Fuure

Armies, Fuure Challenges: Land Warare in he Inormaion Age, Allen & Unwin,Crows Nes, NSW, 2004, p. 4.



Seven Perennial Challenges to Air Forces

2

consiued miliary orces o a sae. Second, because o he non-sae saus o he combaans, he clear disincion beween saeso war and peace has become obscured, boh lierally and in a virual

sense. Efecively, he relaionship and balance beween he miliary orces o a sae and he ghing orces or miliia o a non-sae eniy have changed and now dey a clear deniion or demarcaion. Teissue is ha hese changes were no noiced by a sanguine securiy esablishmen, alhough hey were clearly visible o anyone who was

waching.

I is also no surprising ha superior ideas ha very clearly indicaed

he Wes’s sel-obsessed undersanding o he larger world order andinernaional securiy o be wrong and a grave misake in he broaderconex were cauiously no acceped ino mainsream hinking.Te Wes also ailed o analyse he poliical, economic and securiy urmoil ha enguled mos o he non-Wesern world during he1990s, which poined owards he declining auhoriy o he saeagains indigenous insurgencies and he rise o religious ascism ha

suppors errorism as an accepable orm o waging war. When he nal explosion came, i was heard hroughou he world, and he democraic naions were le asking uncomorablequesions. Even worse was he reacion o hese saes in erms o declaring a ‘global war on error’, wih no idenied adversary anda makeshi sraegy o be implemened o achieve an unclear end-sae. For wan o a beter opion, he world’s miliary orces were

pushed ino ghing his war, one ha had all he ingrediens o previous ailed campaigns. Convenional miliary orces, rainedand developed o win batles, campaigns and wars hrough heapplicaion o overwhelming repower, relian almos compleely on echnological superioriy, are no ideally suied o combaeeing adversaries who canno be readily idenied, do no operaeaccording o he acceped norms o conic and who adop acics

designed o neuralise he advanage o convenional miliary orces.



Introduction

3

Noneheless, in a number o cases convenional orces havecomprehensively deeaed irregular orces in batle—he deeao he aliban in 2002 and he second Batle o Fallujah in Iraq are

ne examples. Te ac ha he Wes was unable o conver hesesuccesses o holisic long-erm vicories is he culminaion o he

join efec o a number o acors over which he miliary has very litle or no inuence or conrol. Long-erm or permanen vicory over irregular or insurgen orces can only be achieved hrough a

whole-o-governmen approach, wherein all elemens o naionalpower are brough o bear appropriaely in order o obain a

poliical soluion o he issue. Since his is a complex process harequires sraegic coordinaion here is only limied undersandingo is opimum applicaion. No surprisingly, here have been nocomprehensive long-erm vicories or convenional orces inconemporary conics.

War is always complex and each evoluion brings is own unique‘og and ricion’ ha mus be surmouned by miliary orces i hey

are o be successul. Tis is no always easily achieved. Furher, war is never an isolaed ac, even when one o he conenders isill-dened in orm and acions and he lead-up o i may no beclearly discernible. As Clausewiz wroe: ‘War does no spring upquie suddenly, i does no spread o he ull in a momen; each o he wo opponens can, hereore, orm an opinion o he oher,in a greaer measure, rom wha he is and wha he does, insead o

judging him according o wha he, sricly speaking, should be orshould do.’2 Tereore, i is incumben on he miliary orces o he Wes o undersand he naure o he adversary and adap no only he operaional conceps bu also he acical aspecs o conic inorder o deea his new hrea.

2 Carl von Clausewitz, in Anatol Rapoport (ed.), Clausewitz on War , PenguinBooks, Harmondsworth, England, 1968, p. 106.




4

Te deniion and undersanding o naional securiy has undergonea dramaic change in he pas ew decades. I is no more a quesion o proecing he borders and ensuring physical saey o he homeland,

bu one o proecing he ‘naional ineres’ wherever i may be andin diferen areas and levels o ineracion. Te sraegic conexin which he deence o he naion has o be ensured has becomemuch more dynamic han ever beore. Accordingly, he miliary orces o a naion operae in a complex and unpredicable securiy environmen, across he enire specrum o conic. Tey have ocaer or he changing characer o conic as well as or he changed

noions o moraliy and ‘correcness’ o applying lehal power hahave become manies in he recen pas. Furher, lessons learnedrom recen operaions indicae ha he adversary will resor oirregular warare when conroned by he convenional migh o heSae’s miliary orces. Under hese circumsances, miliary orcesare evolving o become more adapable organisaions.

By he very naure o is business—o gh and win wars—miliary

orces are learning organisaions, especially since i is a ac ha nowo wars are he same. Te exibiliy and adapabiliy inheren inhe miliary orces are heir greaes srenghs and make hem he

bes placed wihin he elemens o naional power o be he hreadha connecs he disparae securiy iniiaives.

Air power has been a miliary insrumen or only a cenury and canhereore be considered an inan in comparison o he much older

and esablished naval and land orces. From he beginning, air powerhas been conenious—in is applicaion, is sraegic useulness andmainly in he conrol o is asses, especially in imes o conic. Evenhough mos o he naions ha mainain sanding miliary orcesnow have independen air orces, he capabiliies inheren in airpower have inuenced he oher Services in such a manner or hemo aspire o have heir own inegral ‘air arms’. Ownership o air asses

has been a vexed issue ever since he adven o air power as a viable



Introduction

5

miliary capabiliy. Tis can only be considered a subconsciousmaniesaion o he accepance o he ubiquiy o air power.

Te advanages o possessing adequae air power capabiliies and he virues o air power isel can be and has been perpeually exolled.In ac, a number o air power enhusiass even claim air power ashe panacea or all securiy relaed issues where miliary orces haveo ake he lead in securing naional ineress. Tis is he resul o aperceived need o coninually jusiy he capabiliies o air power,alhough hey do no generally ry o explain he vulnerabiliiesinheren in air power and he consrains in is applicaion ha

can afec he desired oucome. Tese well-inenioned individualsdo no undersand ha such claims are derimenal o a holisicundersanding o he employmen o air power and also do long-erm damage o is credibiliy.

Tis paper examines he vulnerabiliies o air power and how hey impac he employmen o air orces in conic siuaions. I rsexplains consrains and vulnerabiliies in a generic manner and hen

idenies seven perennial challenges o air orces ha coninuously impinge on heir efeciveness o he overall derimen o heapplicaion o air power. Te challenges ha have been ideniedhave universal applicabiliy and are no resriced o any one airorce, alhough he efec o each challenge, as well as cumulaiveefecs o a combinaion o wo or more, will vary in diferen airorces dependen on a number o acors. However, he variaions

in he way in which hese challenges manies in diferen air orceshave no been examined here.

Irrespecive o he saus o air power wihin individual miliary orces, is employmen has o be done wihin a number o consrains. Furher, air power also has a number o vulnerabiliiesha impinge on is efecive applicaion. While he vulnerabiliiescan be amelioraed by ideniying hem in ime and iniiaing

remedial acions, consrains are no easily miigaed. From a purely




6

‘academic’ poin o view, his siuaion is no conducive o opimumemploymen o air power. However, he realiy is ha he measureo ‘opimum’ would have o be ailored o caer or he consrains,

especially in he conemporary inernaional amosphere o britleand ragile diplomaic sand-ofs and belligerence.

Te use o miliary orce by Wesern naions in he ques oran elusive ‘world peace’ is by isel becoming a debaed issue.

Air power, which is seen as a monopoly o he Wes, is doubly argeed and viewed as he mos abrasive elemen o power by hedeveloping world where mos o he conemporary conics are

being ough. Tis is urher reinorced by he air power dependenmodus operandi being pracised by Wesern orces engaged in suchconics. I is hereore no surprising ha air power is consanly

being maligned as he mos error-prone o miliary capabiliiesand is placed under exremely resricive employmen rules by hepoliical leadership. Air power in ac is he asymmery o he Wes,

which heir adversaries are consciously rying o neuralise hrough

a number o concered mehods.Tis paper is mean as a baseline explanaion o he vulnerabiliieso air power ha manies as challenges o air orces, especially inimes o exremely sensiive inernaional poliical siuaions. Inhe conemporary world here is only a ne disincion beweenhe percepion o he necessiy or oherwise o using orce. Evenhe slighes misake in applying lehal orce hrough he miliary is

becoming unaccepable o he inernaional communiy. Furher,such misakes also play ino he hands o he insurgens groups whoare only oo happy o bring disrepue o convenional orces. Underhese circumsances, i is necessary or all proessional airmen oundersand clearly he challenges acing heir air orces o ensureha air power can be employed appropriaely o conribue onaional securiy.



7

I Vulnerabilities and Constraints

Te Wesern way o waging war has been consanly evolving, hepace becoming airly rapid since he end o he Vienam War. By he lae 20h cenury, he concep o atacking he enemy wihechnology-enabled, serile, long-range weapons ha minimisedhe risk o riendly casualies had become he primary way in which

Wesern naions waged war. Very clearly demonsraive o hisconcep are he cruise missile atacks mouned by he Unied Saes(US) on suspeced erroris camps in response o he bombing o he US Embassies in Kenya and anzania in 1998. However, hereis increasing evidence o sugges ha his concep was always anonsarer, based on unproven hypohesis regarding he conduc o

war. Te atacks o 11 Sepember 2001 on he win owers o he

World rade Cenre in New York, aced as a caalys o he Wes oreconsider no only he conceps o waging war bu also o recasheir hrea percepions.

Tere is no doub ha he atack on he win owers was a deningmomen in modern hisory and alered he undersanding o hreaso naional securiy wihin he relaively peaceul Wesern naionsand, perhaps, across he res o he world. Trea percepions

underwen a nuanced change. Furher, he wo major wars ha wereiniiaed aer he atacks and are sill ongoing, in Aghanisan andIraq, have proved he allibiliy o a concep o operaions ha wasrooed in echnology and sough end-saes ha were no compaible

wih he culural ehos o he naions in quesion. Tere is now agrowing, i relucan, undersanding ha conics are won or losin he undamenal space o human ideas. How his will ransorm

he naure o war is no ye clear, bu he curren global conic is




8

ully enmeshed in he cogniive domain as a clash o conradicory norms, ehics and moral atiudes.

Alhough he need o operae in he cogniive domain has beenrecognised, when he need arose o couner he hrea posed by non-sae, irregular orces, he so called ‘Free World’ had very litle choice bu o rely on heir convenional miliary orces. Ihas o be acceped ha hese miliary orces were no rained orequipped o comba wha was, even hen very clearly visible as,a war o ideals and ideas. Aer nearly eigh years o coninuousoperaions, he miliary orces o he Wes are sill a he vanguard

o hese conics and no winning he war, even aer convenionalmiliary vicories airly early in he campaign. Tere is no doubha commiting convenional miliary orces o conain and deeadispersed, ideologically and religiously moivaed irregular orces o indeerminae size, capabiliy and inen is no he ideal siuaion.

A deeper examinaion o he global socioeconomic circumsancesa he urn o he cenury clearly indicaes ha he preoccupaion

o he Wes wih ensuring economic sabiliy had dilued heiratenion owards he impending drasic changes ha were abou oenvelop heir securiy percepions. For a number o years he Wes

was ensconced wihin a deep sense o securiy and concenraingpurely on single-minded pursui o naional prosperiy. Tis madehem eiher unaware o he indicaions emanaing rom oher parso he world, unable o sring ogeher disparae evens ha once

again indicaed an impending atack, or hey chose o ignore asimprobable he warnings rom securiy agencies regarding increasinghreas o he wes’s ineress across he world.

A more posiive alernaive noe is ha miliary orces, whenhrown ino a siuaion or which hey were unprepared, were ableo leverage heir inheren exibiliy and adap admirably o hechanged circumsances in which hey have been orced o operae.

Te abiliy o adap airly rapidly is a ribue o he proessional



Vulnerabilities and Constraints

9

masery o he miliary personnel ha aided hem o ideniy he changes ha needed o be made and insiue promp aciono reain he advanage ha was iniially gained. From a purely

miliary perspecive, his is a vindicaion o he selecion andraining regime ha mos modern miliary orces have insiued.

Alhough miliary orces have been able o win batles and evencampaigns a he acical and operaional levels o he conic, hesehave no ye resuled in vicory or he Wesern naions in he warha is now being labelled Te Long War . In he conex o naionalsecuriy, here sill seems o be a lack o undersanding regarding

wha miliary orces can achieve and wha hey canno. I has o beimplicily undersood ha in he changed global sociopoliical andeconomic environmen, oal vicory, even agains an adversary wihminimal warghing capabiliies, is almos compleely ouside hecapabiliy specrum o convenional miliary orces o a naion.

Te Wes, however, coninues o sruggle o preven or counerhe urmoil ha is prevalen in he conemporary global securiy

environmen predominanly hrough he use o miliary orce.Currenly a leas, here does no seem o be any improvemen inhe siuaion and a lasing soluion seems exremely ar-eched.

Almos as an adhoc measure, miliary orces are being employed oconain a very wide swah o coningencies ranging rom he purely

benign provision o humaniarian aid o comba operaions againsmiliary orces, mosly irregular, eiher genuinely non-sae or sae-

sponsored. In addiion, because o he alered view o naionalsecuriy, Wesern miliary orces are increasingly being employedin areas ar away rom heir own naions agains adversaries who areno clearly dened and do no adhere o he convenional rules o comba.

Te core values embedded wihin he convenional miliary orces o naion-saes—adherence o he rules o engagemen, inernaional

‘norms’ in he conduc o war, he clear disincion beweencivilians and combaans, and he concep o discriminaion and




10

proporionaliy in he applicaion o orce—are an anahema o moso he irregular orces ha hey encouner in comba. In addiion,hese adversaries dene vicory and deea in very absrac erms

ha makes ‘winning’ he campaign very dicul. Even i a clear-cu miliary vicory is achieved, he ideological and religious biaso hese irregular adversaries makes i impossible or miliary orcesalone o conver ha vicory ino angible poliical conainmeno he problem. Te answer lies in being able o employ all heelemens o naional power in a coheren and concered manner oachieve lasing soluions o vexing problems.

While he need o have such a whole-o-governmen approach onaional securiy is acceped wihin he Wes, here is an unexplainedover-reliance on miliary orces o carry ou he bulk o heoperaions. Tis is rooed in he ac ha, in mos naions, he oherelemens o governmen ha should be carrying ou non-warlikeoperaions ha are criical o winning he conic do no have hecapaciy o do so efecively. For miliary orces, his demands he

esablishmen o a much broader specrum o capabiliies han would be required o successully underake convenional warlikeaciviies. Tere is a major allou rom his siuaion, which isderimenal o heir ecacy. Te sheer spread o capabiliies ha amiliary orce will be orced o induc o be efecive in his broaderrole will auomaically dilue he core capabiliies ha should beresiden wihin he orce o ensure vicory in comba operaions.

I he enhanced spread o capabiliies is induced wihou careully ensuring ha he primary warghing capabiliies o he orce arereained a he required level—in erms o equipmen, personnel,resources and raining—i could gradually become a visible

vulnerabiliy o an oherwise capable orce.

Even he mos compeen o miliary orces have vulnerabiliies andoperae under consrains ha are imposed on hem. A orce is mos

efecive when allowed o operae wihou consrain and has he wherewihal o no be vulnerable. Te efeciveness o he orce is




11

also dependen on is capaciy o keep any vulnerabiliy ha exisshidden rom he adversary.

Vulnerabiliy—he qualiy or sae o being vulnerable—iscommonly undersood o mean ragile or subjec o harm (and/orhur), usually rom exernal sources bu someimes rom inernalsources as well. When he erm is used in relaion o a place or or,i means open o atack or assaul; weak in respec o deence.1 Inmiliary erms, hereore, vulnerabiliies are he Achilles heel o heorce and concered efor mus be oriened owards ameliorainghem. Tere mus be clear undersanding hroughou he orce ha

vulnerabiliies become he cenres o graviy ha mus be proecedrom enemy atack a all imes in conic siuaions. Consrains onhe oher hand are exernal limiaions or resricions ha are placedon he employmen o a paricular capabiliy residen in he orceha make i operae a less han opimum oupu. Furher, moso he consrains placed on a orce will be known o he adversary

who can hen exploi hem o advanage. Tis is paricularly he

case when convenional orces o a sovereign naion are employedo couner and conain irregular, non-sae orces ha do noadhere o any acceped rules o engagemen and would rely on heconvenional orces operaing under consrains o laid down ruleso engagemen.

Vulnerabiliies can be proeced in a number o diferen ways,he bes way being he inducion o he necessary capabiliies ha

would cover he vulnerabiliy on a permanen basis. Tere is alsohe possibiliy o a emporary soluion, especially i operaing

wihin a coaliion, when a parner naion will be able o conceal he vulnerabiliy using heir own capabiliies or he duraion required.Consrains, however, can only be overcome by he removal o

1 A. Delbridge, and J. . L. Bernard, (eds.), Te Macquarie Concise Dicionary, Tird Ediion, Te Macquarie Library, McMahon’s Poin, NSW, 1998, p. 1316.




12

he exernal resrain or compulsion ha has been imposed on heemploymen o a orce. Tis is perhaps relaively more dicul

because mos o he consrains would be poliically imposed and

heir removal, even when atemped, will be a long-drawn processha may limi any advanage ha could accrue rom heir removal.

For example, he inabiliy o air power asses o say airborneindeniely—leading o a cerain amoun o impermanence—isa vulnerabiliy. Tis can be amelioraed in a number o ways,

by increasing he number o asses ha are available, by air-o-air reuelling o enhance he ‘saying power’, and by employing

uninhabied aerial vehicles o remove he human elemen haresrics he ime ha a plaorm can say alo. Whereas, heimposiion o resricive rules o engagemen ha limi ree-rangingand ull-specrum applicaion o lehal orce is a consrain in heemploymen o air power in an ofensive manner. Even hough airpower currenly has he capabiliy o be precise, discriminae andproporional in he applicaion o orce, poliical consrains do no

permi is use across he capabiliy specrum. Air campaign planningmus be done wih ull awareness o hese resricions o ensureha hey do no become vulnerabiliies ha can be exploied by headversary.

Te efeciveness o air power in suppor o naional securiy imperaives is dependen on planners undersanding heexising vulnerabiliies and consrains in is employmen in he

conemporary environmen and he awareness o how hey can be bes miigaed. Tis has a sraegic or ‘poliical’ dimension o i as well as operaional or ‘applicaion’ dimension ha will impac onhe ecacy o air power across he specrum o conic. Normally

vulnerabiliies—because hey are inheren—would be maniesa he sraegic level, wheher hey are poliical, in he cogniivedomain o he naion or he physical domain o he miliary orce,

whereas consrains—because hey are exernally imposed—willgenerally impac a he operaional and acical levels o conic.




13

In he pas wo decades or so, i is seen ha he majoriy o he hreaso he securiy o sovereign saes have mosly emanaed rom non-sae eniies conducing irregular warare. Given he globalisaion o

rade and nance, he chances o sae-on-sae conics occurringare airly low and his siuaion is unlikely o change in he nearuure. However, naion-saes do no seem o be making seriousatemps a undersanding his alered securiy scenario and have no

been able o rene heir response—which needs o be a whole-o-naion approach—o hese amorphous hreas. In he conemporary scenario, i is hereore a cerainy ha miliary orces will coninue

o be commited o all kinds o operaions, which may or may nohave any direc securiy implicaions or he naion, mainly becausehey are normally he only cohesive and readily responsive eniiesavailable ha can reac o emerging siuaions.

Tis rapid responsiveness o a modern miliary orce is almoscompleely dependen on air power’s core compeencies ha arederived rom is inheren primary characerisics—exibiliy,

responsiveness, speed, reach, peneraion, precision, discriminaionand lehaliy. Air power capabiliies o air conrol, srike, air mobiliy,inelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (IS), and commandand conrol (C2) permi i o shape, deer and deea adversariesin he batlespace. Tis makes air power a highly coveed miliary capabiliy. Opimised employmen o air power, however, needsairmen o be proessional masers who should no only be capable o

leveraging is advanages bu also be cognisan o is vulnerabiliiesand he consrains under which i is normally orced o operae.Te vulnerabiliies o air orces and he consrains in whichhey operae, individually and in combinaion, pose a number o challenges o heir achieving he desired objecives. Air commandersa all levels have o be aware o hese challenges in order o analyseand overcome hem. Te pinnacle o proessional masery or anairman would be rising above hese challenges in he employmen




14

o air power in such a way as o negae is vulnerabiliies compleely and hereby deny he adversary a angible cenre o graviy o arge.

Te challenges o he applicaion o air power are many, a largenumber o hem conexual and, hereore, ransiory in naure.However, here are some challenges—vulnerabiliies as wellas consrains—ha are perennial and will always afec heunimpeded applicaion o air power o is derimen. Tis book idenies and analyses he seven major challenges ha all air orcesace in he ecien applicaion o air power. While i elaboraes onhe challenges, i does no examine or advocae possible soluions

ha could overcome hem. Soluions are no being ofered becausehe challenges ha have been idenied are perennial in naure,and canno be miigaed compleely a any ime. Tese challengesonly vary in heir inensiy o impac on he smooh applicaiono air power, never becoming ully dorman. Furher, even wihhe echnology-enabled evoluion aking place in air power, i willconinue o ace hese challenges or he long erm since hey oo

evolve wih he changes aking place.



15

IIThe Challenges

Alhough here are very clear disincions beween vulnerabiliiesand consrains, which have been explained, in he employmen o air power hey end o combine o creae issues ha are complex. Teerm ‘challenge’ is being used o denoe each issue ha arises romeiher or boh, o indicae he more generic naure o hese issues.Mos o he issues ha sem rom eiher vulnerabiliies or consrainsare conexual in some manner or he oher and, hereore, adapiveand agile air orces recognise and miigae hem relaively early inheir incepion. In ac, he alacriy o recogniion and he rae o miigaion, i careully moniored, joinly are very clear indicaorso he alerness, exibiliy and robusness o a orce. Tese issues

become challenges only when hey combine and ransorm ino

complex eniies wih muliple lines o inuence—some o whichmay only manies in a gradual manner—ha creae secondary anderiary efecs on he conduc and progress o air campaigns.

Tere are seven major challenges ha can be idenied as perennialo air orces in he employmen o air power. Tey have beenclassied as ‘perennial’ because, irrespecive o he capabiliy growh o air power and he renemen in is applicaion by air

orces ha hemselves embody sophisicaion in heir conceps o operaions, hese challenges will always presen conundrums o aircommanders. Tis is mainly because hese challenges emanae romexernal roos and, hereore, i is no surprising ha hey canno beconrolled by acions iniiaed even a he sraegic miliary level.Only one o he challenges can be considered primarily inernal oair orces and air power, and even ha also has secondary exernal

inpus ha complicae is direc amelioraion. However, each one o




16

he seven challenges has direc implicaions a boh he sraegic andoperaional levels in he ecien employmen o air power.

O he six challenges ha are producs o acors exernal o airorces, wo canno be inuenced in any meaningul manner by eiher he air orce or he naion. Tey are:

he impac o he environmen on air operaions, and•

he impac o echnology on he developmen o air power.•

Te oher our challenges ow rom a combinaion o a naion’sculure, hrea percepions, indusrial base, ehnic cohesiveness o ispopulaion and is economic srengh. While hese are also exernalo air orces, some o hem can be inuenced by decisions a hehighes levels o governmen. Tey are:

he inuence o naional demography and is changes,•

resource consrains a he naional sraegic level,•

poliical aspecs o he applicaion o orce, and•

naional ehos regarding atriion olerance.•

Te sevenh challenge is dealing wih collaeral damage, whichis direcly conneced o he acual applicaion o air power a heoperaional and acical levels.



The Challenges

17

Challenge One − Impac o he Environmen

Te deence planner who ignores he probabiliy ha global

climae change and is resuling environmenal impac will havesuch [inernaional and regional] desabilising eecs should

proceed a considerable peril.

ebecca . ubin1

Te environmen impacs air operaions across he enire specrumo conic—rom benign airli operaions in aid o civilianauhoriies o comba operaions agains anoher air orce—in

muliarious ways. However, here are hree main elemens ha mus be considered when analysing he environmenal impac, and wihinhe ambi o which all he major as well as minor implicaions can begrouped. Tese are geography or errain, weaher and environmenalconsideraions, or wha can be ermed he ‘green efec’. errain and

weaher have impaced aviaion rom is very incepion. In ac,he rs powered ighs underaken by he Wrigh brohers were

hemselves delayed or a ew days because o unsuiable weaher,2 and i has remained a consan source o delay and anxiey oaviaion ever since. However, ‘green efec’ is a somewha moreconemporary concep and derives is implicaions or air powerrom he increasing concern regarding environmenal proecion.

1 ebecca . ubin is he Presiden o he environmen and deence consulancy,Marsel-Day.

2 Valerie Moolman, Te oad o Kity Hawk, ime-Lie Books, Alexandria, VA,1980, p. 151.




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Terrain

Air power is no limied by oceans, by shorelines, by shallowwaer. I is no limied by mounains or mounain passes or

rivers, shallow or deep. I is no limied even by disance.

General . Michael Moseley Chie o Saf, USAF, 2006

One o he major claims ha air power enhusiass make regardinghe exibiliy o air power is based on is abiliy o ranscend helimiaions on miliary manoeuvre imposed by inhospiable errain.Tis is rue o a cerain exen and air power can and rouinely doesovercome diculies posed by errain. In mos cases he reerenceis o he abiliy o air power o ransi across inhospiable errainunlike surace orces, whose speed o deploymen and abiliy oconduc manoeuvre is direcly afeced by errain. While air powerresponsiveness and manoeuvre is no afeced in he same mannersince i operaes in he hird dimension, errain direcly afecs airpower efeciveness, in operaions across he specrum o conic.

Te diluion o efeciveness is clearly apparen in radar shadow regions and in areas ha have physical obsrucions which diminishhe echnology-based capabiliies o air power in boh surveillanceand srike roles. Furher mounainous or heavily canopied jungleerrain makes accurae argeing dicul and decreases weaponefeciveness. However, synheic aperure radars (SA) have hecapabiliy o ‘see’ hrough oliage, hereby reducing he impac o

such errain on ofensive argeing. Air campaigns in such errain would invariably be criical conribuions o surace orce operaionsand he reducion o air power efeciveness can be o a magniudesucien o have severe implicaions or he success o he overalloperaions or campaign.

Admitedly, global posiioning sysem (GPS)-guided weapons havehe capabiliy o srike he coordinaes ha are ed ino hem, even

in heavily covered jungle. However, obaining accurae coordinaes



The Challenges

19

o a arge is an involved and expensive process. In combinaion wihhe high cos o he weapon isel, he overall capaciy o unerringly sipulae arges ha can hen be atacked in a ‘blind’ mode by air

asses is exclusive o only a ew naions. In oher circumsances,he accuracy o a srike canno be assured because o inhereninelligence gaps. No inelligence is compleely inallible and,hereore, even he mos sophisicaed GPS-guided weapon sysemhas an elemen o risk atached o i as he arge coordinaes may no be correc i inaccurae daabases are used and auly argedevelopmen procedures are insiued.

Te oher echnology-enabled concep used o couner he argeingproblems in inhospiable errain is laser designaion. However, inorder o designae he arge, i mus be visible o he designaingeam, wheher air or land-based. However, mounains and jungleoen preclude designaing a arge rom he air, eiher sel-lasing by he atack aircra isel, or ‘buddy-lasing’ by anoher aircra. Underhese circumsances he opion available is or a ground eam o do

he designaion, which is exremely dangerous or he designaingeam, since hey have o be in close proximiy o he arge. Laserdesignaion involves a human-in-he-loop, which inherenly carrieshe risk o he precision-guided muniions sriking he wrong argehrough misidenicaion because o human error. Furher, laserdesignaion has also go a drawback in ha he lock o he weapon ohe designaor can be broken i physical line o sigh is no possible.

Even i condiions are avourable, he enire process needs a greadeal o coordinaion and dedicaed raining. Te impac o errainon air weapons efeciveness canno be compleely eliminaed wihhe necessary assurance or i o be discouned.

In he pas ew decades, almos all conics have been conducedin he mould o irregular warare and he prevailing global securiy environmen indicaes ha his rend will coninue well ino he

uure. Tis creaes a siuaion wherein here is an absence o clearly dened ron lines and poins o conac beween he adversaries.




20

Accordingly, surace comba will be dominaed by swi operaions by small groups o elie soldiers underaking specialis missionsanywhere in he batlespace. Te success o hese operaions hinge

on he abiliy o air power o inser, susain, suppor wih res andknowledge, and exrac he eams as required. O equal imporanceis he need or air power o shape he batlespace, in erms o obaining and mainaining conrol o he air and carrying ou srikes,o isolae he non-convenional adversary. Complex errain assisshe difused non-convenional adversaries o evade deecion romairborne inelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (IS). errain

can limi he efeciveness o air power in insering, susaining andexracing Special Forces ino he comba zone and argeing cenreso graviy and high value arges o an exen wherein he overallcampaign isel will sar o lose momenum and iniiaive.

In convenional conic, air power is criical o shaping he batlespace hrough inerdicing supply lines and isolaing headversary orces. However, in complex and inhospiable errain,

ideniying and argeing lines o communicaions become diculand require an inordinaely large quanum o air power asseso generae he necessary capabiliies—IS and srike—o beefecive.

Furher, even while using he laes echnology, line-o-sighcommunicaions can become dicul in mounainous errain.Tis auomaically increases he reliance on space-based

communicaions, which may no always be secure or, in he case o smaller orces, available a all imes. Such a siuaion has implicaionsor he ecacy o he command and conrol o air operaions,hereby impeding he smooh progress o a campaign. While hereare soluions o all he issues ha arise because o errain, hey dono assure complee amelioraion. Tereore, air operaions will

be direcly afeced by inhospiable errain and his will produce a

secondary efec on surace operaions.



The Challenges

21

Weather

Teoreically, conemporary air power has all-weaher, day and nighoperaing capabiliies. However, hese capabiliies are a he very high end o he echnology specrum and are no only expensive oobain bu also require dedicaed raining and experience o employ efecively. Tis combinaion o high-end echnology and adequacy o raining is currenly available o very ew air orces. Even hesecapabiliies are degraded o a cerain degree by inclemen weaher.

As he air power capabiliy moves down he echnology specrum,his degradaion becomes increasingly pronounced ill i reaches a

place wherein all-weaher capabiliies cease o exis in a orce. Teloss o ecacy because o weaher condiions is applicable o all airpower capabiliies and only varies in he degree o which i afecseach o hem.

Te impac o weaher is paricularly appreciable in he case o IS and argeing aciviies. Airborne IS is a combinaion o airand space-based aciviies, boh o which are suscepible o being

afeced by weaher. Saellies are criical o IS and are vulnerableo weaher, he perormance o heir elecro-opical and inra-redsensors being adversely afeced. In conemporary conic siuaions,consan and coninuous inormaion ow is essenial o ensureadequacy o siuaional awareness o he commanders. IS, derivedrom a combinaion o space-based asses and airborne plaorms,plays a major role in providing his capabiliy and any deerioraion

o he inormaion gahering, exploiaion and disseminaionprocess will adversely afec he decision-making process o heorce. Furher, IS is criical o ensuring correcness o he argeingprocess and he precision o he subsequen srike. Te majoriy o adversaries ha modern convenional orces ace in conemporary conic siuaions rely on low-echnology asymmery o neuraliseheir superior warghing capabiliies.




22

Adverse weaher condiions can direcly afec air power capabiliieso orces ha are no operaing a he apex o echnology and whodo no have ready access o innovaive and sophisicaed equipmen,

such as SAs ha can ‘see’ hrough poor weaher condiions like rainand sandsorms. Such equipmens are cos-inensive and unlikely o become commonly available o all air orces in he near uure.

Weaher, hereore, can become an ally o hese difused irregularorces ranged agains modern air orces.

Unlike airborne, manned plaorms, saellies have a xed ighpah and can provide IS over a seleced area only a pre-calculaed,

alhough regular, inervals. Tis is an inheren consrain ha negaeshe concep o exibiliy o air power. I he weaher is unsuiableo gaher inormaion a he predesignaed ime ha he saellie isover he area o ineres, i will no be able o collec any daa. Onhe oher hand, a manned plaorm can avoid weaher paterns and,i necessary, revisi he heare o operaions repeaedly o obainhe necessary inormaion. A combinaion o high-end air and space

power can provide boh IS and accurae argeing irrespeciveo weaher condiions. However, he resource-inensiveness o acquiring, mainaining and operaing a holisic IS capabiliy, in asusainable manner even over he medium erm, precludes i beingavailable o mos air orces. Even he ew air orces ha could afordo nurure such a capabiliy would nd ha only a very limiedquanum is residen wihin he orce. I can be saely assumed ha

weaher condiions will be a consraining acor in he applicaion o air power or he oreseeable uure.

Te mos commonly used air power capabiliy in erms o IS is residen in is imaging sensors. However, modern air powerrelies heavily on inra-red sensors and SA as well as signal,communicaions and elecronic inelligence (SIGIN, COMINand ELIN) o monior he adversary and or argeing purposes.

Collecively, he srengh o one capabiliy compensaes or he weakness in anoher. However, he sophisicaion required o



The Challenges

23

concepualise, rain and efecively operae hese capabiliies in anopimised combined manner is very high and wihin he operaingenvelope o very ew air orces. Even he slighes misalignmen in

any one would have a debiliaing efec on he overall capabiliy. While hese echnology-enabled capabiliies miigae he efeco weaher o some exen, i canno be compleely amelioraed.

Weaher will coninue o be a resricing acor in he ecienapplicaion o air power.

Green Efect

Tere are very clear indicaors ha climae change and oherenvironmenal developmens will be a dened acor, i i is already no one, afecing inernaional and regional sabiliy, increasinghe complexiy o he securiy debae. A he sraegic level deenceplanners have o be aware o his relaively new elemen ha is

becoming increasingly imporan in global ineracions and makei inegral o overall deence analysis and planning.3 Te direc

efecs o climae change—such as reduced ood producion, risingsea levels, lack o clean waer, desericaion and climae induceddisplacemen o populaion—in urn increase he poenial o creaing more ailed saes, which are well known havens orerroris aciviies.4 Climae change can creae environmen-drivenregional insabiliy and conic possibiliies and, hereore, needs o

be moniored o improve conic avoidance sraegies. Tis is oneissue ha emanaes rom he environmen and has an overarchingsraegic impac on global securiy ha creaes a cascading efec onmiliary orces and air power.

While climae change will remain a sraegic acor in deenceplanning well ino he uure, he impac o environmenal

3 ebecca . ubin, ‘Climae Change can Treaen Deence Plans’, in Jane’s

Deence Weekly , 29 July 2009, Jane’s Publishing Company, Horley, Surrey, p. 23.4 ibid.




24

proecion aciviies on he efeciveness o miliary orces are more visible and immediae. Te 21s cenury has seen he vocierous riseo environmenal proecion aciviss and heir concered lobbying,

mainly in he Wes. A a purely academic level, environmenalproecion as a sacrosanc and non-violable primary acor o beadhered o in he planning and conduc o any developmenalor securiy aciviies is a noble concep. However, i is an exremesance and is no oen a pracical concep o implemen. While hecase or environmenal proecion is srong, he aciviies o ensureha proecion requiremens are adequaely me have o be balanced

wih he raining realiy o he miliary orces. Te aciviss end oake a one-sided view in heir approach o proecionism.

Democraic governmens ace a dilemma in hese cases. On heone hand, he environmenal aciviss orm airly inuenial groupsand here are bound o be poliical ramicaions in ignoringheir proess. On he oher, he miliary orces need o rain asrealisically as possible in order o mainain heir compeencies

a he required level, a ac ha is also known o he governmen.Democracies always have o mainain a delicae balance in heiracions beween wha is seen o be proacive o he demands o hepeople and wha is in he broader naional ineres, somehing hais no always apparen o he general public. Tereore, in dealing

wih he diverging requiremens o environmenal proecion andmiliary raining needs, governmens end o lay down resricions

on he miliary orces, especially when here is no visible direchrea o he naion.

Air power in paricular is argeed by he environmenaliss in hreediferen areas. Firs, is he issue o ‘noise polluion’ associaed

wih aircra ighs. Miliary cargo aircra, unlike heir civiliancounerpars, operae wih reduced margins o saey in erms o uelcarried and he load ha is lied, or obvious reasons. Tereore,

hey canno always adop noise abaemen procedures. In he caseo gher aircra he siuaion is even more dire, since heir engines



The Challenges

25

produce greaer noise, hey operae a diferen aliudes and aimes y over populaed areas or operaional reasons. Te only lasing soluion will be o base miliary aircra away rom heavily

populaed owns and ciies. However, he enduring principles inselecing sies or miliary air bases o mee air power generaionneeds are proximiy o populaion cenres, access o commercial andindusrial aciliies and he provision o increasingly sophisicaedsuppor arrangemens o mee he highly advanced echnologicalcomplexiy o air power sysems.5 Tese requiremens are a odds

wih relocaing miliary bases o remoe, ‘non-populaed’ areas.

Second, live armamen delivery pracices have a devasaing efecon he ora and auna o he area designaed or his purpose. Tis isundoubedly rue. However, he miigaing poin is ha mos o heair-o-ground live ring ranges are locaed in exremely remoe areaso avoid he risk o uninended damage o lie and propery becauseo errors during ransi or delivery. In recen imes, environmenalproecion groups have proesed even he use o remoely locaed

ranges, insising ha ‘rare’ species o plans and animals are beingexerminaed. Tis issue does no have a soluion and he debae

beween he miliary aviaion communiy and he environmenalproecioniss will coninue ino he uure. However, i is also o ineres, and perhaps ironic o noe here ha mos air orces’ livering ranges have been able o proec he biodiversiy o he arearom environmenal vandalism much beter han ‘open’ areas in

he same region. I is believed ha governmens need o legislaehe need o use he range or pracice purposes and se aside henecessary area. Air orces are oen no adep a public relaions and,hereore, risk losing he gh o more savvy ‘green’ organisaions o

5 Dr Sanu Kainikara and Wing Commander Bob ichardson, Air Bases: Te

Foundaion o Versaile Air Power, Chie o Air Force Occasional Paper No 3, AirPower Developmen Cenre, Canberra, 2008, pp. 43−44.




26

he derimen o heir operaional readiness, unless such acions areinsiued.

Tird, aircra are claimed o be he cause o he highesenvironmenal polluion because o he large quaniy o uel hahey burn on a daily basis. Once again his may also be rue. Teonly way o reduce he polluion would be o resric he quanumo ying being underaken by he air orce. Delivery o air poweris a complex ar and needs consan and concered pracice, romhe echnical eams o he pilos who y he aircra. Mainaininghe skill levels o he personnel a he appropriae level requires a

minimum amoun o ying o be underaken. Mos o he air orcesoday operae only he bare minimum ying hours necessary anddo no have he capaciy o reduce he raining wihou i adversely afecing he operaional readiness. While polluion associaed

wih uel burn will always remain, i could perhaps be reduced by using uel ha is more rened. However, he cos acor involved inusing more expensive uel would also have o be considered beore

moving orward wih his idea.Environmenal polluion is a major consideraion or all air orcesand seps have been iniiaed o minimise he efec o uel burn.Tere are acive research and developmen efors going on odevelop alernaive uels ha will have reduced carbon emission,alhough a recognisable breakhrough has no ye been achieved.Even aer such uels are creaed, heir open availabiliy and

afordabiliy will be resriced o ew air orces a leas or he mid-erm uure. Air orces are also urning increasingly o simulaion—much more environmenally riendly han acually operaingairborne plaorms—o mee some o he raining needs o heorce. Tis efecively reduces he carbon ooprin o air vehicles inraining by reducing he number o hours o operaions. However,o reain he necessary qualiaive edge in warghing here is sill

a requiremen or raining wih he equipmen o be operaed, wheher i is ying an aircra or ring a weapon. I is hereore



The Challenges

27

necessary o mainain an opimum balance beween he wo, whichmeans ha environmenal polluion can never be compleely neuralised hrough hese iniiaives.

Te hree primary charges ha are laid agains air orces vis-à-visenvironmenal issues have no immediae or complee soluions.Tere are suggesions o reduce he perormance o miliary aircrain order o reduce noise polluion, which is no viable soluionsince i will compromise he perormance o he plaorm isel.ealisic and requen raining is he bedrock on which operaionalpreparedness o an air orce depends and any resricion ha

reduces he minimum raining ime required will creae a loss o preparedness ha would become apparen, even in he shor erm.Tis is no in any way an atemp o belitle or dismiss he aciviieso he environmenal proecion groups or he requiremens oensure he diversiy o he environmen in a susainable manner.

While caering o he dichoomous requiremens o environmenalproecion and he basic needs o naional securiy, i is srongly

el ha environmenal requiremens should be careully balanced wih he raining required o keep he ghing orces o a naion aan appropriae sae o readiness. Any diluion o raining, eiherquaniaive or qualiaive, will have a downward spiralling efecon he ecacy o he orce as whole, leading o less han opimumperormance when he necessiy o employ air power in suppor o naional securiy arises. Mainaining he air orce a he necessary

level o operaional readiness should no be allowed o be diluedor compromised or shor-erm, poliically expedien reasons suchas paciying environmenal groups. Tis is paricularly so sinceair orces conribue only in a very limied manner o he overallgreenhouse efec. Te decision regarding how environmenaldegradaion and raining requiremens o he air orce is balanced

will have o be aken a he highes levels o governmen. Te

necessiy is or a conexually balanced approach o he issue.




28

Challenge wo − Impac o echnology

I may be said ha warare has acquired a new phase—

echnological war. In he pas, research and developmen wereonly preparaion or he nal and decisive esing o new sysemsin batle. oday he kind and qualiy o sysems which a naiondevelops can decide he batle in advance and make he nalconic a mere ormaliy—or can bypass conic alogeher.

General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (e)6

Air power was born o echnology and has coninued o remain

a echnology-relian capabiliy. In ac, he efeciveness o airpower, in all is applicaions, is compleely dependen on heair orce’s abiliy o accep and opimally employ sophisicaedechnology. Air orce is perhaps more dependen on echnology or is efeciveness han eiher land or naval orces. I is generally agreed ha echnology has been responsible or he ‘progress’ha mankind has made over he cenuries. However, air power’s

dependence on echnology is also a double-edged sword. I isechnological soluions o issues ha impede he efecivenesso air power ha has been he mos imporan acor in bringinghis relaively new warghing capabiliy o he vanguard. oday air power is one o he mos coveed capabiliies ha a naion canaspire o possess. However, while echnology is air power’s greaessrengh, echnology-dependence is also is weakness and can very

rapidly become a cenre o graviy ha is dicul o deend, whichan adversary could arge. echnology-dependence is suscepible o being argeed by asymmeric means and he neuralisaion o headvanages ha echnology brings o convenional air power. Tereis a need o ensure ha echnology ha acs as a orce muliplier is

6 General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (e) was he rs Commander o he AirForce Sysems Command, responsible or he acquisiion o missiles.



The Challenges

29

very careully proeced o avoid he orce losing is edge o lessercapable adversaries.

High-end echnology is a cos-inensive phenomenon, boh in ermso is acquisiion as well as in he raining requiremens or personnelo operae i ecienly. However, i is also criical o modern highcalibre air power or is ecacy. Tese are dichoomous acors.Te need o induc expensive echnology o have adequae airpower capabiliies resrics is spread o air orces ha havehe inrasrucure o accep i and he resources o aford i. Asechnology coninues o improve he efeciveness o air power, he

desired level o capabiliies will be available o a lesser number o airorces. Tis will lead o a echnology gap beween allies and regionalparners ha will inhibi ineroperabiliy, hereby reducing he oalair power capaciy residen in a coaliion. Furher, i could lead oa siuaion wherein mos members o a coaliion will be dependenon he major parner or he necessary air power conribuion. Inlarge-scale coaliion operaions, lack o oal air power will become

a limiing acor. A sudy conduced by he RND Corporaion has idenied ha by he mid-21s cenury he enire Unied Saes Deense budge will be able o procure only one single air plaorm i he cosgrowh and inaion in procuremen coninues a he same pace asi is currenly.7 While his may no come o pass, he rend owardsunafordable growh in he cos o air asses is imporan o noe.

Tis rend would poin owards ewer, bu more complex andexremely expensive air plaorms ha would impac on he overallcapabiliy o even large air orces o operae efecively in diferenheares simulaneously.

7 Obaid Younossi, Mark V. Arena and ohers, Is Weapon Sysem Cos Growh

Increasing? , RND Corporaion, USA, 2007, www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG588, accessed on 9 Ocober 2009.




30

Tere is anoher aspec o high-end echnologies ha will perhapsonly increase in is inensiy ino he uure. While he scieniccommuniy is developing a number o cuting edge echnologies,

mos o hem are dual-use and, hereore, commercially drivenraher han conduced solely as miliary research, as was he praciceearlier. Tis increases he chance o hese echnologies beingavailable o adversaries who could hen eiher choose o use hemor develop counermeasures agains hem. Tis could develop inoan asymmeric hrea ha may neuralise he advanages o high-endcapabiliies. Te diculies in regulaing he spread o such dual-use

echnologies will become an issue ha canno be oally conrolled.Te challenge hereore is o induc hese echnologies and henhave he capabiliy o modiy hem rom a purely miliary or airpower perspecive o ensure heir securiy in employmen.

Te srong dependence on echnology makes he developmen o airpower compeencies a complex process. Te broader echnologicaleducaional base o a naion becomes exremely imporan in his

siuaion. Te efeciveness o a conemporary air orce is dependenon wo complemenary acors—he availabiliy o well-educaedpersonnel and a developed indigenous indusrial complex. Teabiliy o he naion o creae a pool o qualied people rom

which o draw in order o susain he orce a he required level o echnological compeency is criical. A naion also needs a minimumlevel o indusrialisaion o be able o mainain he sophisicaed

equipmens ha are essenial or he generaion o modern air powercapabiliies. Tis is also indirecly dependen on having a sucienly educaed workorce.

Aviaion indusry is an enormously expensive, complex oulay and very ew naions have he capabiliy o be sand-alone air powercapabiliy generaors. Te impac o his siuaion is hreeold:

Firs, mos air orces are dependen on riendly naions and•

allies or acquiring mos o he asses.



The Challenges

31

Second, even hough high-end capabiliies can be procured, in•

mos cases he mainenance experise is residen in he counry o manuacure, a siuaion ha can be leveraged o preclude

complee auonomy o decision-making even a he grandsraegic level. Te counry o manuacure o he plaorm haprovides he capabiliy can exercise a sranglehold on he airorce in quesion.

Tird, hese asses are expensive and, hereore, atriion•

replacemen is a key issue a all imes.

Mos air orces operae under hese hree consrains, which willonly become more pronounced wih he increasing echnologicalsophisicaion o equipmen and associaed increase in he cos o procuremen.

A he acical and operaional levels, high-end echnology couldrapidly become a liabiliy when air orces have o uncion as par

o expediionary orces in remoe and inaccessible regions. Underhese circumsances air orces may have o operae in areas hamay, a bes, only have rudimenary echnical aciliies which could

be incapable o supporing he echnological requiremens o modern air power. Tis would need siuaional planning in order oincorporae redundancies ino air power capabiliies ha will haveo ake ino consideraion he lower echnology levels ha would

be encounered in he area o operaions. In exreme cases, henon-availabiliy o echnical suppor inrasrucure could becomedebiliaing o he ecien generaion o air power, urning high-end echnology ino a criical vulnerabiliy. In irregular warare, aninelligen adversary will always ry o ideniy such opporuniiesand could urn his hrough asymmery ino a cenre o graviy

wih devasaing efec. Conemporary conics are predominanly waged as irregular wars ough in inhospiable areas agains illusive

adversaries. Convenional orces engaged in such conics are




32

susained mainly hrough air resupply o provisions and warghingmaerial. Te vulnerabiliy o air power, relian on high echnology,mus be careully acored in a he planning sage o is applicaion

o minimise he impac o he low-echnology environmenprevalen in hese heares o operaion.

echnology-dependence o enhance air power capabiliies andailor hem o sui he increasingly demanding requiremens o he modern batlespace will coninue o be a challenge o hepraciioners o air power. Careul analysis o he circumsances andsubsequen balancing o he capabiliies ha are required o achieve

he desired efec will reduce he impac o he challenge bu will no be able o ameliorae i compleely.

Smaller air orces ace a peculiar challenge vis-à-vis he inducion o emerging echnology. In order o reain echnologically sophisicaedcapabiliies a an adequae level o compeence i is necessary o say a he leading edge o research and innovaion. Tis aciliaes heinducion o he laes echnological developmens a he earlies

opporuniy, hereby providing he orce wih a echnology edge.However, his process has he drawback in ha emerging echnology does no always lead o is successul inducion as operaionalcapabiliy. Failure o echnology is a ac o lie and can never bediscouned. Under hese circumsances, smaller air orces do nohave he criical mass o absorb he ailure wihou is capabiliies

being adversely afeced. In cerain cases his could lead o

caasrophic collapse o he orce isel. Smaller air orces, hereore,need o say slighly behind he cuting edge o echnology osaeguard hemselves rom such a collapse. Te balance required o

be mainained is delicae, suscepible o he inuence o a number o acors and, mos imporanly, conexual. Ensuring he appropriae

balance in all conexs so ha he overall capabiliy o he orce isnever compromised and ye he orce reains he necessary high-end

capabiliies is an exacing ask and an enduring challenge even o hemos proessional masers o air power.



The Challenges

33

Challenge Tree − Infuence o Naional Demography

In a ew decades, around nineeen poliies will be moving owards

he demographic range above 100 million … Very ew naion-saes o he pas have successully managed populaions his big as democracies…

Coral Bell8

Te science o demography is he quaniaive sudy o humanpopulaions hrough subjecs such as he geographical disribuiono people, socioeconomic saus, birh and deah raes, and

age and sex disribuions in order o ideniy he inuences onpopulaion growh, srucure and developmen. In a democracy,he demography o he naion impacs direcly on he composiion,culure and ehos o is miliary orces. All hree Services are equally afeced, bu in slighly varied manners, wih some elemens andcharacerisics o naional demography afecing one Service morehan ohers.

Evoluionary changes ha ake place in he demography o a naionalso aler he naion a large and can even impac he grand naionalsraegy and securiy percepions o he naion. Such changesafec air power capabiliies in a number o areas. However, moso hem can be grouped under wo undamenal bu broad areas—he personnel issues associaed wih sanding miliary orces in ademocraic naion and he secondary efec o budgeary consrains

on ghing orces.

In conemporary democraic naions, universal conscripion is noa normally acceped pracice. Te excepions o he rule are naions

wih a very small populaion pool rom which o draw personnelor heir armed orces or who ace consan exisenial hreas.

8 Coral Bell, Living wih Gians: Finding Ausralia’s Place in a more Complex World , Ausralian Sraegic Policy Insiue, Canberra, April 2005, pp. 13−14.




34

Tereore, an ‘all voluneer’ armed orce o a naion will be in direccompeiion wih oher prospecive employers o recrui he ‘besand he brighes’ o he populaion. Furher, armed orces require a

comparaively younger group o personnel ha reduce he numbersrom which hey can be recruied. O necessiy, armed orces end omove personnel o diferen locaions periodically and also atemp oregulae he moneary benes in order o align hem o he averagenaional earning. Te resul is ha, in mos democraic naions, helure o beter remuneraion and he less disrupive liesyle prospecsofered by civilian employers will limi he availabiliy o he beter

perorming young aduls o he miliary. Considering he ageingpopulaion in mos developed naions, he broader pool o peopleo draw rom will reduce ino he uure, urher aggravaing hisproblem. Only in imes o long-drawn conics, which are perceived

by he general public as sucienly imporan o naional securiy, will his siuaion change subsanially, probably by he inroduciono conscripion. A sanding, all voluneer miliary orce ha is ully subscribed and has no deciencies in is manning sae is a uopiandream or deence planners.

Tere are hree acors conneced o demography, in an indirecmanner, which afec he recruimen prospecs o naional miliary orces:

Firs, he prevailing economic sae and medium-erm uure•

prospecs o he naion—a sable and prosperous economicsiuaion will make i dicul or miliary orces o atracsucienly qualied people.

Second, he hrea percepion o a naion as undersood by he•

general populaion—in he absence o any visible and direcphysical hrea o he naion, he public a large will nd i diculo undersand he nuances o naional securiy vis-à-vis he needor expediionary operaions in some araway place. Tis will lead

o, on he one hand, indiference o he deployed orce’s success



The Challenges

35

or ailure and, on he oher, vocierous opposiion o he naion’sparicipaion in he conic. Democraically eleced governmens,caering o he domesic elecoral cycle, may no be able o

wihsand he demands or he wihdrawal o orces.Tird, he naional ehos owards miliary service, is perhaps•

more dicul o quaniy. Te willingness o commi o volunary miliary service is based primarily on culural, ehnicand socioeconomic inpus. Some ehnic groups are moreinclined o join he armed orces han ohers and, hereore,in communiies where such ehniciies are predominan, he

miliary will nd i relaively easy o nd voluneers o he righcalibre han in ohers.

Te demographic balance in he developed world is visibly changing. In mos o hese naions, he birhrae coninues oremain below wha is required o avoid an evenual decrease in heoverall populaion. Tis also leads o an ageing populaion, which is

compounded by he endency o he younger generaion o say inhe educaional sysem or much longer han wha was previously he norm. Tere is also a rend amongs he miliary service eligiblepopulaion o no commi o ull careers, waning o reain a cerainamoun o exibiliy in employmen opions. All hese acors arederimenal o recruiing he ‘righ people’ in sucien quaniies oensure ha he miliary orces are adequaely manned.

Amongs he hree Services, he enry poin sipulaed or recruimenis highes in erms o educaional requiremens or air orces, mainly

because o heir echnology bias. Tereore, everyhing else being equal,air orces will nd i harder o recrui people wih he required level o educaion and apiude as compared o he oher Services. Under hesecircumsances, he impac o demography ha indirecly inuences heeducaional process o a naion is el unequivocally in an air orce.



The Challenges

37

o remuneraions and condiions o service and, second, i increaseshe urgency o ousource or ‘civilianise’ as many miliary uncionsas possible, barring he acual comba uncions, as a cos-saving

measure. Te rs impac o such shor-sighed policies is he losso exibiliy o he orce. For air orces, ha are he mainsay o expediionary operaions, relian on heir responsiveness, reach andpeneraion or heir efeciveness, his is paricularly debiliaing.Such budgeary conrol aciviies creae consrains on he orceleading o a decline in heir efeciveness, which will be dicul andake double he ime o build back. Tere is a need or democraic

governmens o mainain a well-sudied balance beween budgeary cus and resource allocaion o ensure ha air orces have heoperaional capabiliy ha is desired o hem.

From an air power perspecive, ‘savings drives’ and budgeary cushave an immediae and more han cursory impac. Tere are vemajor derimenal acors ha can be idenied:

Firs, he ghing orce in erms o personnel—ha is, he people•

who acually go ino harm’s way rouinely in he perormance o heir duies—is a much smaller percenage o he whole orce inan air orce as compared o he oher Services. Tis lends isel o a siuaion where he efors o civilianise miliary uncionsare likely o be more concered in air orces, o he exen haa number o air orces have already ousourced even he daily servicing and mainenance o ghing equipmen o civilianconracors. While his migh aford considerable savings inpeaceime, here is also a downside o his siuaion. Tesecivilian organisaions normally would no have he capaciy orhe will o deploy o hosile operaional environmens whenneeded, which in isel will have wo immediae repercussions.Inabiliy or relucance o he supporing echnical personnel odeploy ino he operaing heare during hosiliies will direcly

reduce air power’s rapid responsiveness—one o is mos




38

prized characerisics. In a more circumspec manner, his willalso adversely impac on he inheren exibiliy o air powero deploy and operae in an expediionary mode in disan

heares, hereby efecively curailing is reach and peneraioncapabiliies.

Second, personnel in uniorm have a diferen work ehic and•

a ‘ge i done’ atiude ha ranscends he normal number o hours o work per day ehos, especially when preparing ordeploymens—on exercise or or operaions. Naions havecivilian healh and saey rules and regulaions ha are legally

binding and perhaps more resricive han hose appliedo uniormed personnel in operaional condiions. Teseresricions on he civilian workorce will no permi a unimanned by a mix o civilian and uniormed personnel o prepareisel or deploymen on a ‘war ooing’ when necessary. In anair orce, echnicians are also required o deal wih explosiveordnance loaded on aircra on a rouine basis. Te increased

danger o personnel in hese aciviies has so ar precluded heemploymen o civilians in his role. However, he shorage o uniormed echnical personnel migh necessiae he induciono civilians ino roles ha would require operaional raining,

wih he added onus o increased compensaion, insuranceec., somewha negaing he basic objecive o savings ha aresupposed o accrue.

Tird, civilianisaion will reduce he overall number o personnel•

who would have had miliary service experience. Tis afecshe naion in he long erm and he orce almos immediaely.Firs, he naional ehos owards miliary orces and service willundergo a gradual and impercepible change, leading o urhercomplexiies in recruiing and reaining personnel. I will alsochange he way in which he younger generaion views miliary service, reducing is saus and urher eroding an already

vulnerable posiion. Second, he number o people who could



The Challenges

39

orm par o he reserves or he orce will reduce dramaically. Inair orces he reserves are a highly qualied group wih specialisraining, experise and experience, who are drawn on when

here is a requiremen o increase numbers o caer or a surge inoperaions or or oher aciviies. Tey are also he reposiory o corporae memory in erms o bes pracices and ac as efecivemenors o reshly induced personnel. Civilian organisaionsha provide echnical capabiliies are normally unlikely havea long-erm ineres in improving he level o experise o heirpersonnel—preerring o mainain he saus quo, viewing

raining as a cos burden and no as an opporuniy o improveefeciveness—leading o he diminishing and evenual loss o core compeencies wihin cohesive and homogenous groups.Te reducion in he reservis numbers, which will be animmediae allou o civilianisaion, will have a cascading efecon he preparedness o he air orce, paricularly in he ghingunis.

Fourh, and one ha can never be adequaely quanied or•

ully expressed, is he quesion o uni loyaly, ghing spiri,espri de corps and he cohesiveness o an operaional uni.Only personnel in uniorm will have he sense o pride (haerm being used or wan o a beter word) in a uni sucienly developed o acually pu hemselves in dangerous and lie-hreaening siuaions knowingly o ensure ha he honouro he uni, and, hereore he orce, is no arnished. Tis is acombinaion o inangible elemens like courage, camaraderie,a sense o sel-worh, condence in onesel and ohers in heuni ec., which is dicul, i no impossible, o inculcae in a‘civilian’ group wih ragile and limied loyaly o he group ororganisaion. Te absolue need o gh and win—he basics on

which air orces are buil—ges skewed wih he inroducion o a civilianisaion process.




40

Fih, wih he increased use o civilians, who canno be deployed•

ino operaional heares, o carry ou radiionally miliary asks, he sraegic deph o he organisaion ha caers or he

provision o reinorcemens and uure roaions is considerably reduced. Air orces o mos democraic naions oday ace hisissue, a leas o some exen. Wih only ron-line unis availableor deploymens, he requency o roaion and duraion o deploymen are increasing o an almos unsusainable level.

Air orces o he democracies will always have o conend wih he

challenges posed by demography—hey are no going o go away.In ac, hey may only increase in inensiy as he curren rend o naional populaions becoming more ehnically and culurally diverse hrough global immigraion becomes more pronounced,orcing acceped socieal norms o evolve and change. Tis acoremphasises ha he move visible in mos o he developed worldo civilianise core uncions o air orces is, a bes, o shor-erm

bene based on a myopic vision o he capabiliies ha need o be embedded in an air orce. Tey hollow ou an air orce and will evenually become long-erm vulnerabiliies, which will beexremely dicul o miigae—more so in he shor erm—whenemergen hreas o naional securiy become more han apparen.

Air power, residen in air orces o calibre, will need o be proecedrom he vagaries o demographic change and is no a low cos

opion o ensuring adequacy o naional securiy.



The Challenges

41

Challenge Four − Resource Consrains a he Naional

Sraegic Level

Logisics is he bridge beween he economy o he naion andhe acical operaions o is comba orces. Obviously, hen,he logisic sysem mus be in harmony, boh wih he economicsysem o he naion and wih he acical conceps andenvironmen o he comba orces.

ear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, USN (e)9

Almos all miliary orces ace resource consrains, even a he

bes o imes, because governmens are relucan o allocae alarger share o naional resources o deence han wha could beperceived as adequae in he public eye. Tis is even more apparenin democraic socieies wherein he elecoral cycles impac on hedivision o naional resources beween deence and oher areaslike welare, medical care and inrasrucure. In recen imes, herehas been a change in he relaiviy beween naional securiy and

deence. Miliary orces are seen as he radiional guaranors o naional securiy, whereas in conemporary erms here are also non-radiional elemens ha conribue o assuring naional securiy.Tis has necessiaed a rebalancing o resource allocaion wihin he

broad ‘naional securiy’ agenda, perorce reducing he quanum hacan be made available o he miliary. I is now necessary o allocaeincreased unding and resources o non-radiional securiy agencies

like law enorcemen, cusoms and border conrol, inelligence,ranspor securiy and even healh.

9 ear Admiral Henry E. Eccles (e) is he auhor o he pahbreaking book, Logisics in he Naional Deense , ha laid ou he concepual ramework or heheory o logisics. He was a major gure a he Naval War College, Newpor,

hode Island, rom he lae 1940s hrough he 1970s, as a hinker and wrier onnaval logisics and miliary heory.




42

Te increased complexiy o naional securiy and he larger numbero agencies involved in i, combined wih he nie amoun o resources available o mos naions, have orced democraic naions

o coninually atemp o minimise he resource requiremens o heir respecive miliary orces. Tis efor is normally win-arrowed,one aimed a nancial sringency and he oher a reducion in henumber o personnel and asses wihin he miliary. Boh heseaciviies have a signican efec on he overall miliary orceand paricularly afec air orces. Enorced nancial sringency isincompaible wih he cos-inensive naure o air power asses in

erms o heir acquisiion, operaions and mainenance. In ermso direc savings, reducing he number o air power asses beingprocured will provide a subsanial one-ime saving, which will haveo be careully balanced wih he reducion in air power capabiliiesha he reducion will creae. Greaer saving ensured by per iem o equipmen ha is no purchased can never be wihou any apparenreducion in he overall capabiliy and susaining power o heorce. o he casual observer, air orces, because o heir procliviy o be plaorm-cenric in providing air power capabiliies, providean immediae and very visible opporuniy or he governmen odemonsrae he nancial curailmen ha i is imposing on hedeence orce.

esource consrains in he miliary, however, also have ohercausal acors han merely he governmen’s relucance o be seen

as indiferen o popular demand. Firs, all democraic naions ry omove owards a siuaion o sel-suciency in developing miliary capabiliies. Te naional indusrial base plays a crucial role in hisques by ensuring ha he necessary miliary hardware is o herequired calibre and manuacured in adequae quaniy. Air powerasses are normally a he high end o he echnology specrumand require exremely sophisicaed manuacuring capabiliies orindigenous producion. Furher, he cos o creaing and mainaining

a balanced air orce wih he necessary air power capabiliies is so



The Challenges

43

high ha i precludes he opion o ‘going solo’ in almos all naions.Mos naions do no have he complee inrasrucure necessary o manuacure and suppor air power asses and capabiliies and

are, hereore, dependen on allies and oher riendly naions oeld air orces wih adequae all-round capabiliies. Te ac haeven he closes o allies will no provide ull and ree access o heenire echnology involved means ha air orces will be orced omainain an umbilical chord o he counry o supply o ensure haair power compeencies are susained a he required level. Tis is aclear vulnerabiliy and will challenge he sraegic poliico-miliary

leadership a all imes, especially when he naion has o moveino conic phase on is own. Combined wih he very high priceag ha mos air power asses carry and he poliical dimension o acquiring hese asses, air orces will always have o be conen wihhe limied availabiliy o asses ha someimes ranslaes o aninadequae quanum o capabiliies ha can be brough o bear inoperaions.

Second, even i here is adequae nancial capabiliy o acquireand operae cos-inensive air power asses, he procuremen o sucienly sophisicaed equipmen ha will provide he requiredcapabiliy o he air orce is almos compleely dependen on hepoliical and diplomaic saus o he naion wihin he inernaionalcommuniy. Tis acor is exraneous o air orces and purely in herealm o grand naional imperaives o securiy, oreign policy and

alliances and reaies. However, i plays an exraordinarily criicalpar in he wellbeing and efeciveness o an air orce dependen onoher naions or echnology ransers and oher suppor aciviiesor is operaional eciency. Te complexiies o inernaionalrelaionships make i imperaive or air orces o become as sel-relian as possible and also o be aware o he ragiliy o assuranceso echnology suppor, even rom close allies.

Te hird acor is a combinaion o he general public percepiono hreas o he naion, he naional ehos regarding he need or




44

an air orce, he undersanding o he naion’s sanding and saus wihin he inernaional communiy, and he medium o long ermrequiremen o paricipae in inernaional coaliion operaions as

par o humaniarian inervenion or peace suppor operaions. I he naional percepion o hrea is low and he public opinion is oneo minimal commimen o inernaional requess or assisance, iis more han likely ha he miliary orces will be under-resourced.Under hese circumsances, air orces may nd i exremely diculo obain he minimum amoun o resources required o susain anindependen saus. Tis acor is no purely a resource allocaion

issue and has larger ramicaions ha go o he core o he debaeregarding he need, ecacy and purpose o a naion mainaining anindependen air orce.

In all cases, resource consrains and heir many ieraions andimplicaions will be perennial challenges o air orces, even when heorce is ully immersed in operaions. Miigaing circumsances will

be ew and ar beween, and he sraegic leadership o air orces will

have o consanly neune heir resource requiremens o caer orhe broader naional consrains while ensuring ha he orce meeshe securiy needs o he Sae.



The Challenges

45

Challenge Five − Poliical Dimension o he

Employmen o Air Forces

Te measure o air power is he abiliy o a naion o exploi airspace or is own purposes—and in warime deny i o anenemy.

Admiral Arhur adord, USNChairman o he Join Chies o Saf, 1953

Socieies have always resored o laying down he acceped normsand enorcing hem hrough he enacmen o laws developed

hrough an inricae legal sysem. Conic siuaions beween wogroups or naions are no excepion. oday, he conduc o wars isgoverned by he Law o Armed Conic (LOAC) ha originaed inmedieval cusomary pracices. Te modern LOAC had is beginninga he rs conerence on Inernaional Humaniarian Law, held inGeneva in 1864. Tis rs Geneva Convenion was signed by 16saes and was ollowed by conerences in 1906, 1929 and 1949,

all o which urher developed and rened he law.10 Te laesdevelopmen has been he 1977 Addiional Proocols.

In addiion, he Hague Law is a se o inernaional laws haprescribe he means and mehods o warare. I comprises a serieso reaies ha sae wha is, or is no, legiimae in he conduc o

war. Te rs example o Hague Law is he 1868 Declaraion o S Peersburg, ollowed by he 1899 Hague Convenions, 1907

Hague Convenions, Gas Proocol o 1925, 1954 Hague CuluralPropery Convenion, 1972 Biological Weapons Convenion, 1980Convenional Weapons Convenion, 1992 Chemical WeaponsConvenion and he 1999 Otawa Land Mine Convenion.11 Much

10 oyal Ausralian Air Force, Ausralian Air Publicaion 1003—Operaions Law or RAF Commanders , Second Ediion, Air Power Developmen Cenre,

Canberra, 2004, p. 3.11 ibid, p. 4.




46

o he Hague Law is acceped as cusomary inernaional law anddirecly afecs he employmen o air power.

By deniion, an air orce o a sovereign naion is an elemen o ismiliary power legally permited o employ air power across hespecrum o conic, rom humaniarian assisance o he lehalapplicaion o orce in comba when necessary, in he pursui o legiimae orders rom he governmen o he day. A majoriy o he world’s naions are signaories o he Geneva Convenionsand is Proocols, and he Hague Law, which are he wo primary inernaional agreemens ha are sill considered he governing

bodies o work regarding he conduc o war and oher associaedissues. However, a number o naions are no signaories o he laerand more recen Proocols and Convenions, limiing heir inuenceand making hem les efecive inernaionally. Air power and isemploymen in conic are grouped under he generic umbrella hagoverns he conduc o war and he laws regarding applicaion o lehal orce have been inerpreed in a very broad manner o make

hem applicable o all air operaions.Te LOAC codes, which are common law inerpreaions o herighs and wrongs and he moral and ehical correcness or oherwiseo he applicaion o lehal miliary orce, are he neares ha hereis o a guide or he employmen o air orces. However, some grey areas sill exis and hey are open o various inerpreaions, whichafec he applicaion o orce. LOAC provides he legal sancion or

atacking a arge ha has been idenied as legiimae wihin helaw, alhough oher exraneous acors can negae such an atack onhe same arge, making i more o a consrain han a aciliaor orhe air orce o operae ecaciously. Tese are generally poliically moivaed consrains ha curail he reedom o acion o air orceso neuralise even legiimae arges because o consideraions o eiher domesic or inernaional repercussions.



The Challenges

47

Te inducion o new weapons sysems, such as uninhabiedaerial sysems and direced energy weapons, developed hroughcuting edge scienic research, has increased he demand or

legal sancicaion o heir use. Te requiremen or legal suppor will deniely increase and become more complex in he absenceo any binding reaies or inernaional agreemens regardinghe employmen o emerging echnology. Tere is already anehical debae in progress regarding hese developmens and hismigh resul in he imposiion o regulaed consrains on heiremploymen, which may negae he asymmeric advanages hese

sysems would have provided o convenional orces.In oday’s inormaion age, conemporary conic is beamed almosin real-ime across he globe. Air atacks are visually specacular and,hereore, atrac more han heir air share o media reporing in any conic. Perhaps because o he impersonal impac ha air atackscreae, here is a growing endency wihin he world media o beprosecuor, judge and jury in analysing he legaliy or oherwise o

such srikes. Even hough in a number o cases his is done wihouadequae and clear undersanding o he legal ramework or heoperaional requiremens ha necessiaed he srike, he adversepubliciy ha is generaed urher inhibis he poliical leadershiprom waning o or being seen o assume a clear decision-makingrole in he employmen o air orces.

Even when he legaliy o a srike on a arge is no in doub,

quie oen he moraliy o he atack is debaed in he media wihsucien urore o make even he mos ocused poliical leader wary o he use o air power in lehal atacks. In acualiy, he inernaionalpoliical repercussions o he applicaion o lehal orce are perhapshe leas when air power is used because i does no involve hephysical posiioning o orces in anoher counry ha could amouno an invasion. Essenially, here is a segmen o he media—albei

a small percenage—ha auomaically considers he employmeno air orces or anyhing oher han he provision o humaniarian




48

assisance as a gross ravesy o jusice. Tis is an unorunaedevelopmen and has a negaive impac on he higher levels o naional securiy decision-making.

Te irregular naure o conemporary warare, he very vague legal,moral and ehical saus o he adversary combaans, he opensuggesion o he beginning o a clash o culures, he undamenalis-uelled emphasis on he religious aspecs o he ongoing conicsand he very real concern o he poliical leadership o he Wes o

be seen o hold he moral high ground and be doing he ‘righ’ hing,all combine o produce a compleely opaque lis o convenions

and rules o engagemen ha are enorced in he employmen o air orces. Te challenge or air orce commanders and proessionalmasers o air power is o unravel hese knos and o be able o apply air power in a legal and, more imporanly, an accepable manner inpursuing naional securiy ineress and imperaives—a all order,under any circumsance.

In he recen pas, mos o he conics in which developed naions

have been engaged have been conduced ar way rom home, as arehe wo ongoing conics in Aghanisan and Iraq. Tis rend is likely o coninue or some more ime. Such expediionary operaionsnecessiae he use o air bases in he viciniy o he area o conic

by heir air orces. Tis requiremen poses a number o consrainson he acual comba employmen o air orces.

Firs, in order o reach he designaed orward base he air orce•

will have o obain overigh permission rom counries alonghe way, which may or may no be orhcoming.

Second, i will be ar easier o obain permission o base airli•

and orce muliplier asses in a orward base, bu mos hosnaions will be cauious o acceping comba elemens o heair orce ino heir airelds. Tis may require he negoiaion o

separae permission rom he hos naion.



The Challenges

49

Tird, resricions imposed by he hos naion on he usage o •

he base could resul in he efecive curailmen o he reedomo acion o hese asses. Any expediionary operaion will

normally have a poliical dimension o i, in erms o dealing wihhe hos naion’s domesic poliical and culural sensiiviies.

Deploying air asses o a naion wih a parially hosile populaion brings wih i he addiional requiremen or air base and asseproecion. Commanders will also have o be cognisan o possiblepersonnel issues ha could arise rom culural misundersandings or

insensiiviies beween air orce personnel and he local populaionha could even lead o clashes. Tese disparae acors, in hemselvesno insurmounable, coalesce ino a very broad challenge inmouning expediionary operaions and is miigaion will no beeasy nor will any efor o do so be oolproo. Air orces will have olearn o live wih i.

Air orces engaged in peace suppor operaions—an amorphous ermused by NAO o include conic prevenion, peace enorcemen,peacekeeping, peace building and provision o humaniarian aid—ace wo major consrains in opimising heir conribuion o he

join campaign. Firs is ha he objecives o he miliary ask orceand, by associaion, ha o he air orce, are never clearly dened inmos o hese circumsances, which invariably leads o mission creepin he classic sense. Air power has he capaciy o ensure ha he

enire ask orce avoids being enveloped in mission creep. However, warding agains i seting in will always require applying air powerin a less han opimum manner. Second, he rules o engagemen,especially or air orces in heir applicaion o lehal orce, are alwaysmore resricive han in oher siuaions. Tis has he poenial oallow he adversary, who may also be he aggressor, o easily seizehe iniiaive in he conic hereby increasing heir probabiliy o

vicory.




50

Te employmen o air orces, paricularly in an ofensive mode,in peace suppor operaions is oen perceived by he generalpublic, amply inuenced by he media, as a disproporionae and

inappropriae response o wha is considered minor inracionso he peace process. Tere is also a percepion ha he use o airorces in peace suppor missions is a ar oo expensive proposiion.Tis is a misconcepion. Air power no only provides he capabiliy o moun an immediae response o illegal aciviies, i is also lessexpensive in he long erm han he deploymen o surace orceso conain such minor incidens. Te use o air orces in peace

suppor missions is never a misake bu he consrains on heiruse, imposed or consideraions oher han purely miliary, makeshese operaions more complex, hereby reducing he assuranceo success. Te balancing o poliical requiremens and he need oopimise he applicaion o air power will a imes be dichoomous.In almos all cases wherein such a compeing se o prioriies riseo he surace, he poliical imperaives are bound o be consideredmore imporan, even a he cos o operaional sebacks. Air powerproessionals will need o be clearly aware o he possibiliy o sucha siuaion developing, a imes rapidly, in he mids o operaions.Tere may no be a soluion o his conundrum.



The Challenges

51

Challenge Six − Atriion olerance

So ar as air power is concerned, a dilemma will be how many

aircra and heir crews represen an accepable loss or any givenoperaion. Looked a in he cold ligh o day, his is clearly a vialquesion and one which should no be avoided.

A. C. Williams12

In a democraic naion, he decision o commi he sae’s miliary orces o armed conic will obviously be aken a he highespoliical level and wih ull awareness ha here is he possibiliy o

casualies in underaking miliary operaions. Tere is no escapinghe ac ha all orces engaged in armed conic will sufer atriion,ha is he loss o riendly orces and equipmen, a some poinor he oher and he air orce is no an excepion. Atriion is aprocess by which he srengh o a orce—physical, psychologicaland virual—is gradually worn down as a resul o atacks on isoperaional capabiliy and is capaciy o regenerae depleed orces.

Tis process encompasses he decline in he orce’s overall capabiliy hrough human casualies, he loss o warghing equipmen andhe desrucion o boh civilian and miliary inrasrucure. Sucha decline will indirecly afec he securiy saus o he naion, noonly a he acical and operaional levels, bu also a he sraegiclevel. olerance o atriion is a psychological acor, in individualsas well as in a broader naional sense. I mus also be remembered

ha he hree acors ha ogeher orm he atriion process may have individually diferen olerance levels, especially a he naionalsraegic level. However, here are ew elemens unique o he airorce, as opposed o many ohers ha are common o all Services,

which afec atriion and is olerance rom an air orce perspecive.

12 A. C. Williams, ‘Challenges Facing Miliary Power’, in Suar Peach (ed.),

Perspecives on Air Power: Air Power in is Wider Conex , Te Saionary Oce,London, 1998, p. 344.




52

Te mos criical o he hree acors is he sensiiviy, paricularly

in he developed world, owards casualies. While he loss o human

lie is a universally unaccepable acor, he sensiiviy is especially

emphasised when he casualies are he naion’s own soldiers, sailorsor airmen. Te ac ha Wesern naions are exremely sensiive o

casualies has been so highly publicised ha i has gradually become

an acceped vulnerabiliy and, hereore, adversaries have argeed

i as he cenre o graviy o convenional Wesern miliary orces.

Non-sae irregular combaans who do no have he same respec

or human lie and who are in pursui o a religious ideology ha

elevaes maryrdom o a high pedesal see his as a weakness andry o exploi i, even a he cos o heir own lives. However, hese

adversaries end o be unaware o he suble nuances ha underscore

atriion olerance wihin he naional ehos o a Wesern naion. I

has been demonsraed over and over again ha hese naions are

willing and have acceped very high casualy raes when he majoriy

o he populaion has perceived vicory in a conic as a necessiy

or he very survival o he naion or even is coninued prosperiy

and sabiliy. Te diference lies in he general undersanding and

accepance o wheher a war is one o necessiy or one o choice.

Tere is a disinc diference beween such conics and, accordingly,

he naion’s willingness o accep human casualies and atriion.

Atriion olerance in wha are perceived as wars o choice will always

be he lowes.

Anoher major acor ha impinges on he percepion o atriionin a naion is he accepabiliy or oherwise o civilian casualieson boh sides o he conic. From a Wesern perspecive, his isno as applicable in conemporary conics ha are being oughar away rom he home counry and, hereore, do no normally involve civilian casualies a home. However, he civilian casualiesin he hos naion where comba operaions are being conduceddo have a direc efec on he general percepion regarding he

conduc o he war. Tis is an aspec wherein he media plays a very



The Challenges

53

imporan role in shaping he percepion and opinion o he homecrowd and can be criical in shoring up or breaking he popularsuppor or he governmen’s acions. In he pas decade or so, he

Wesern media has played a less han unbiased role in reporingengagemens, skirmishes, batles and campaigns. Tere seems o bea pervasive belie ha only miliary acions ha have gone wrongare newsworhy and his has made hem repeaedly repor one orwo incidens o genuine ailure while no menioning hundredso accuraely conduced srikes. Air orces in paricular have beenarges o his biased reporing.

Te non-sae adversaries have been very quick o leverage of he Wesern media’s unseemly hase o repor even unconrmed acionsand o analyse hem vis-à-vis moraliy and he conduc o conicand o quesion he acions o he convenional miliary engagedin conic. Te irregular adversary considers hree major acorsas inimical o Wesern naions in conic—civilian casualies,riendly miliary losses and a proraced conic. Tey are adep a

manipulaing he media o repor he casualies being caused by he miliary orces, while consciously downplaying he devasaion

being creaed wihin he general public by heir own acions. Since iis always hrough he prism o he media ha he home populaionges inormaion regarding he conic, here is ample opporuniy or he adversaries o exploi he ‘so and humane’ naure o he

Wes. By argeing he so cenre o graviy o public suppor o he

war, he adversary manipulaes he resuls o even individual acicalacions o creae sraegic efecs. Te Wesern media unwitingly is becoming a orce muliplier or irregular adversaries waging anideological war agains he values ha hey represen.

While no in any way advocaing he curailmen o he reedom o

he press—which is one o he pillars on which democracy is buil—

i is el ha he media should undergo a comprehensive awareness

program in order o beter undersand he onerous job miliary orces carry ou wihin an exremely consrained environmen.




54

Furher, hey mus also be able o grasp he sraegic efecs ha

even a single skewed repor can creae in he volaile environmen

in which conemporary conics are being waged. Te oher side o

he coin is ha miliary ocers a all levels need o undersand heoverall uncioning o he media, he ime-sensiive manner o heir

operaions and he umos imporance o being able o provide

proacive inormaion o he media as required. Tis would require

he miliary o unravel obrusive condenialiy o inormaion and odo away wih a cerain amoun o secrecy involved in disseminaing

i, while coninuing o ensure he securiy o operaions. o achieve

an accepable level o openness i may be necessary o auhorise eldcommanders o inerac direcly wih he media. Tis will ensure ha

minor issues are addressed and claried quickly and no allowed o be blown ou o proporion. On he whole, he media needs o be

clear ha being unbiased in heir reporing o a batle or campaign

does no mean being proacive o he adversary alone and he

miliary needs o become more media riendly.

Exreme casualy sensiiviy, leading o an unaccepably low levelo atriion olerance, is almos always he creaion o an over

acive media. Tis siuaion is hen very cleverly manipulaed by an

adversary well versed in percepion managemen. Tere is an irony in

he ac ha he very orces, ha proec he media’s righ o reedom

o expression are he ones ha are more oen han no argeed by he

media and heir good sanding arnished, while he same reporing

ends o make ‘heroes’ o an adversary who, le alone no adheringo he acceped norms in he conduc o comba, does no adhere o

even he base level o humaniy expeced in armed conic. Perhaps

i is ime or he Wesern media o ake an inrospecive look a heir

conduc and align hemselves appropriaely, wihou sacricing heir

‘independence’. Emoive reporing wih scan regard or he sraegic

repercussions o such analysis, which may no always be correc, will

only play ino he hands o he aggressive and radical adversary, and

provide hem wih more maerial o manipulae he hinking andpercepions o he people.



The Challenges

55

I is a combinaion o a low level o atriion olerance and air power’s visible abiliy o provide a responsive, low-risk opion o conainemerging hreas ha make i a rs choice opion in he applicaion

o orce. However, unlike in he case o surace comba, he loss o anair asse is a much more specacular even and likely o be repored

by he media as a caasrophic ailure in he conduc o he campaign. Wesern orces have no been exposed o aerial atacks and heirair orces have no had o operae in conesed airspace or so longha here is a growing percepion o even a single ‘air casualy’ asunaccepable. While he conemporary irregular adversary may no

have air power capabiliies in he convenional sense, he improvedman porable air deence sysems ha are prolieraing give hemhe capabiliy o cones conrol o he air in an asymmeric manner.Under hese operaing circumsances, loss o air asses canno beruled ou. Te leadership a he poliical and miliary sraegic levelhas o be aware o his and mus be exremely cauious when dealing

wih such losses o ensure ha i does no spin ou o conrol,afecing morale and even he basic campaign isel. Te Wesernorces have los air asses in conemporary conics and hey haveno been viewed as unaccepable. Tereore, he impac o atriiono air power is direcly linked o he percepion o he conic as oneo necessiy or choice in he home counry.

Tere is no doubing ha operaional securiy precludes providinginormaion regarding he conduc o a campaign o he general

public. However, he reason or going o war, sraegic end-saesdesired, probable inernaional repercussions o he acions beingconemplaed and he possibiliy o casualies mus be debaedand saed openly i public suppor or he acion is really beingsough. Along wih his, here is also a need o dene he level o accepable atriion in a conexual manner prior o he conicand explain i o he general public vis-à-vis he necessiy o enerconic in he rs place. I is also necessary o ensure ha he

enire naion undersands ha, more han atriion, i is he desired




56

end-sae ha will end comba operaions. Unless suppor or hecampaign is orhcoming rom he populaion, i will be oolhardy or he governmen o ener conic. Te essenial requiremen is o

ensure ha ha media manipulaion o percepions is reduced o anaccepable and conainable level.

Te las acor regarding atriion olerance, rom an air orceperspecive, is he cos acor—nancial and poliical—o loss o equipmen. Losses o air orce asses can very rapidly make he orceoperaionally unviable and incapable o providing he necessary quanum o air power. I can also become nancially unsusainable

in erms o he resources required o ensure adequae atriionreplacemen. Furher, a long lead ime is required o replace airpower asses because o he echnological sophisicaion o heirmanuacure, operaions and mainenance. Tereore, even i nancial resources were o be made available, immediae atriionreplacemen o susain he air efor may no be a possibiliy. Tehigh visibiliy o air orce losses and he public oucry ha can be

expeced could have a derimenal efec on he poliical will o henaion o coninue he conic. Naional morale is a ragile eniy and can be very easily racured. Tis will be urher exacerbaed insiuaions wherein he poliical leadership is already on he deensiveregarding he reason and conduc o he conic.

Te naional percepions viewed hrough he prism o mediareporing, exreme casualy sensiiviy, low level o atriion

olerance and he high visibiliy ha employmen o air orces has, will coninue o consrain he ecacy o employing he highly sophisicaed capabiliies o air power. Mos o hese consrainscan be reduced o a grea exen hrough well-planned and houghhrough sraegies o ensure ha media reporing is accurae andunbiased, and by inelligenly keeping public opinion aligned wihhe governmen policies. Atriion is an auomaic by-produc o he

employmen o orce, bu he naional ehos o is olerance is ckleand suscepible o manipulaion by inelligen adversaries.



The Challenges

57

Challenge Seven – Dealing wih Collaeral Damage

Given he naure o precision weapon warare, educaion o

decision-makers as o heir capabiliies and limiaions iscriically imporan.

ichard Hallion, 1999USAF Hisorian

Collaeral damage is a erm generally used o denoe uninendeddamage, injuries or deahs, especially o non-combaans andcivilian or dual-use inrasrucure, caused during comba operaions

in a conic siuaion. A majoriy o sovereign saes are signaorieso proocols, broadly based on he principles o discriminaionand proporionaliy, ha lay down he norms in he applicaion o lehal orce by heir miliary orces. Unil he mid-20h cenury, heacceped moraliy o applying orce was one o casual negligence o he unnecessary desrucion caused in rying o neuralise a arge.However, in he aermah o World War II, a leas wihin he

Wes, his percepion rapidly evolved o one o exreme cauion inargeing procedures in a span o less han 50 years.

Te reasons or his vole ace are many:

Te inernaional communiy was horried by he unparalleled•

desrucion and associaed human sufering caused by heunresriced use o miliary power during World War II and

waned o nd a beter way o conduc war.Te realisaion ha he winning coaliion would also be•

responsible or he reconsrucion o he desrucion andrehabiliaion o he displaced populaion had a saluary impacon he sraegic hinking regarding he applicaion o miliary orce.

Te necessiy o resric damage was aciliaed by echnological•

developmens ha grealy improved he accuracy o weapon




58

sysems and provided planners wih he wherewihal o beprecise in he applicaion o lehal orce. Tis capabiliy wasenhanced when combined wih he abiliy o assure he accuracy

o inelligence regarding he locaion o he arge o produce wha has come o be ermed ‘precision srike’.

Discriminaion, proporionaliy and accuracy have become•

he wachwords in poliical circles when applicaion o orce isdiscussed, paricularly wih respec o air power.

In he pas ew decades, he uninended deahs or injuries o innocen civilians in war caused by convenional miliary orces have

become a highly emoive issue. In ac all such insances are normally porrayed in he media as callous acs by superior miliary orcesacing a will agains ‘deenceless’ civilians. Any civilian casualy caused by Wesern orces has become a sor o ‘Holy Grail’ inreporing or he media. Tere are wo aspecs o his ha all miliary commanders and poliical leaders mus undersand a is mos basic

level. Firs is ha he deah and injury o innocen bysanders anddesrucion o purely civilian inrasrucure caused by he acionso irregular orces is generally repored in a mued manner and noponicaed upon by he Wesern media. On he oher hand, similaror even lesser damage caused by he acions o he regular miliary orces batling he very same irregular non-sae eniies is reporedin graphic deail and he orces involved condemned. I is in he

reporing o collaeral damage ha he media plays an inordinaely imporan role and has he capaciy o afec sraegic decision-making ha will reverberae across he enire campaign or war.

Te second aspec perhaps has more impac on he conduco conemporary miliary operaions agains irregular orces.Experience demonsraes ha almos all non-sae or quasi-saeeniies batling naional miliary orces and employing in irregular

warare—ha encompasses, counerinsurgency, sabilisaion or



The Challenges

59

peace suppor operaions—have recognised collaeral damagecaused by he miliary as an issue ha can be manipulaed o winhem sympahy and suppor, which is he undamenal requiremen

o susain insurgencies. Tereore, he media reporing o collaeraldamage has been idenied as a cenre o graviy o be argeed.Irregular orces are unusually adep a manipulaing a sympaheicmedia in search o ‘human ineres’ sories and very oen manageo urn insances o uninended collaeral damage ino asymmery in heir avour. Tis is urher reinorced by he ac ha he mediadoes no consider eiher successul ‘correc’ acions by he sae

miliary orces or similar collaeral damage caused by he acions o he non-sae eniies o be sucienly newsworhy.

Te very oen quoed damage o Europe ha was creaed by heCombined Bomber Ofensive during World War II, he damagescaused o dual-use aciliies and heir repercussions on civiliansduring recen air campaigns in he Middle Eas and he Balkans,and he heavily publicised atack on he Chinese Embassy during

he Kosovo campaign have reinorced he percepion o air poweras he bigges culpri in creaing collaeral damage. Tis percepionis no subsaniaed by he saisics o recen conics, which clearly indicae ha applicaion o lehal orce rom he air is responsible orabou 15 per cen o he oal collaeral damage. However, incorrecargeing by air power—or a number o disparae reasons—isa highly visible ac and ges more han is air share o media

coverage, analysis and condemnaion. Irrespecive o he underlyingreasons, his is a realiy wih which air campaign planners have oconend and ry o miigae as much as possible. In circumsances

wherein collaeral damage canno be avoided, or a leas resricedo accepable limis, i becomes a vulnerabiliy ha could leado poliical consrains being placed on he employmen o airpower ha in urn will diminish is efeciveness. Such a siuaion

would have ar-reaching consequences on he conduc o any join

campaign.




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Tere mus also be clear awareness across he enire orce hacollaeral damage caused by even a single acion a he acical levelcan very rapidly deeriorae ino sraegic level convulsions leading

o unwaned, and perhaps unwarraned, poliical inererence in heconduc o a campaign. Te aerial srike on a hijacked uel ankerin Aghanisan on 4 Sepember 2009 a Kunduz ha is repored ohave killed a number o civilians including children, which in lessha hree days became a parliamenary quesion or he GermanChancellor o answer and also led o he demand or he resignaiono he German Miniser or Deence, is a very illusraive example

o his direc connecion beween acical acion and sraegicconsequence. Poliical inererence, however benign, in he acualconduc o an air campaign is he rs sep owards ailure andevenual deea. Te shor hisory o air power provides ampleevidence o he disasrous efecs ha such poliical inererenceproduces on he nal oucome o he broader miliary campaign.Te campaigns o he Luwae in he Batle o Briain and he US

Air Force in he Vienam War spring o mind immediaely.

Air power is coveed or is capabiliy o respond almos immediaely o any emerging evenualiy across he specrum o conic—romhumaniarian assisance in case o naural or man-made disaserso securiy issues ha migh develop ino hreas o he naion assuch. However, when he response requires he applicaion o lehalorce, i is necessary o balance his capabiliy wih accurae IS

and argeing procedures o ensure ha avoidable collaeral damagedoes no derac rom he rapidiy o response. Tis is a uniquely airpower issue and mus be encompassed in he planning process a allimes since i is a criical acor ha will afec he conduc o heoverall campaign. Air power has he residen capabiliy o neuralisea arge, in a ime-sensiive manner, when required. However, hereis nohing worse han applying lehal power and neuralising he

wrong arge o give air power a repuaion, mosly undeserved, or

ailure and he ile o ‘wrongdoers’. I is apparen ha opimising



The Challenges

61

he advanages inheren in responsive air power capabiliies andleveraging of hem is a complex process. Furher, i incorrecly done,i can creae insurmounable problems or he ecacy o ofensive

air power. Collaeral damage ha resuls rom he responsiveapplicaion o air power also carries he possibiliy o escalaing

wha oherwise may have been a limied operaion, especially i hepoliical dimension wihin he heare o operaions is riddled wihacue inernal dissenions.

Tere will always be collaeral damage, even i i is miniscule, whenmiliary orces are engaged in conic, regardless o he naure o he

adversary and he characer and conduc o he campaign. Tis is so,irrespecive o he bes inenions o he orce o minimise collaeraldamage and he echnological sophisicaion in he applicaiono orce. Tis is an irreuable ac o lie. Furher, he chances o collaeral damage are only going o increase in he uure as morecampaigns are likely o be launched agains non-sae adversaries

who operae in urban areas wihin he civilian populaion. Tey

also careully plan heir irregular warare acics in such a way as oensure ha collaeral damage becomes an inescapable par o heapplicaion o convenional orce, in he rm belie ha i is a cenreo graviy o sae miliary orces. In mos conemporary conics hismay indeed be rue. Jusly or unjusly, he immediae menal picureormed in he mind o he general public when collaeral damageis menioned is ha o an air srike gone erribly wrong. Air orces

across he world will have o be cognisan o boh hese acors and be prepared o deal wih accusaions o callousness, irresponsibiliy and ourigh ailure every ime ha hey are employed by heirgovernmens in he pursui o naional securiy.

Collaeral damage and is poliical allou will no ever become anissue o he pas, irrespecive o he legaliy and sophisicaion o heapplicaion o lehal orce. Air commanders have o become expers

a miigaing he repercussions o collaeral damage—hrough all




62

levels o he naional securiy debae—o ensure ha batleeld vicories do no become unwiting sraegic deeas.



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IIIThe Question of Independence

Te air ocean and is endless ouer space exension are one andindivisible, and should be conrolled by a single homogeneous

orce.

Alexander P. de Seversky (1894−1974)

In Secion II, seven perennial challenges o he ecien applicaiono air power, all o which have direc impac a he acical,operaional and sraegic levels, have been idenied and briey explained. However, here is a ar greaer challenge, a a much higherlevel han even he sraegic applicaion o air power ha all airorces ace, even hough i may no be readily apparen o he casual

observer—he quesion o he independen saus o he orce inrelaion o he oher Services. Te vexed issue o he independenceo air orces has been a consan acor in he debae regarding airpower and is opimum employmen as an elemen o miliary power rom is very incepion during World War I. Te issue has

waxed and waned in imporance dependen on he conex andcircumsances o he debae and lain dorman in he recen pas.

However, he issue has no been resolved in he pas 100 years andis bound o come up again a some poin in he uure. Te quesiono he need or independen air orces seems o have a lie o is own,and will be probably being debaed a cenury hence. In order oplace and undersand he seven perennial challenges in conex, i isnecessary o examine his issue in an overarching manner.

Par o he blame or he oher Services rying periodically o abolish

he air orce, and pariion he air power capabiliies and asses




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beween hemselves, mus be shared by he air power enhusiass.Commencing immediaely aer World War I and o a cerain exenconinuing even oday, air power advocaes seem o have a procliviy

o consisenly ariculae highly exaggeraed air power capabiliiesha verge on he wishul hinking. I is, hereore, no surprising haair power perormance alls shor o he claimed capabiliy and in arelaive sense is considered less han efecive. Tis siuaion lendsisel o being misinerpreed, eiher genuinely or deliberaely, by heoher Services o indicae ha air power would be beter managedand more ecaciously employed i is conrol was handed over o

more ‘experienced’ orces. Tis accusaion o ineciency is re-emphasised by deracors o air power hrough a somewha labouredargumen ha hisory does no suppor he graning o independenair orce privileges o he applicaion o air power. I is indeed rueha, in comparison o wo millennia o hisory residen in he landorces, air power has only a cenury o hisory o all back on andindependen air orces even less, since he rs independen air orce

was ormed only in 1918! However, independen saus o a basicmiliary capabiliy canno be deermined on he basis o he lengho is exisence, bu has o be done purely on is conribuion o heoverall miliary capabiliies o he join orce and, o a lesser exen,o he nuances necessary o be masered in ensuring is opimumapplicaion.

Independence o any elemen wihin he miliary is dependen on

ha capabiliy clearly demonsraing is individual capaciy o noonly conribue direcly and signicanly o overall vicory in war bu also becoming a criical acor in achieving vicory. Tis meansha vicory canno be achieved i he capabiliy in quesion is absenor less han required. I his explanaion is acceped, hen he debaeregarding he independence o air orces can be pu o res once andor all, since air power has conribued o vicory in innumerableoccasions in he pas ew decades and, more imporanly, been he

war-winning acor on a large number o occasions, specically in



The Question of Independence

65

he pas wo decades. Furher, air power has conclusively become amiliary capabiliy, perhaps he only one, which can rapidly creaeefecs ha easily ranscend he purely miliary—becoming an

ecien sraegic poliical ool.Te curren realiy is ha even wih all he residen sraegiccapabiliies ha have been amply demonsraed, air orces are silllikely o be reaed a less han par by he oher Services, presumably a subconscious denial o accepance as an equal. Tis siblingrivalry is all oo common and perhaps will only go away when anindependen space and/or cyber orce is creaed, a which ime

he hree Services, including he air orce, would ogeher ry oundermine he saus o he ‘new kid on he block’. Tis is mainly

because an independen space/cyber orce will encompass andpervade all he hree mediums, much as air orce covered andpermeaed boh he surace and mariime domains when i arrivedon he scene a cenury ago.

Te quesion o he independen saus o air orces is only being

agged here o highligh wo primary aspecs regarding air power:

Firs, only air orces can provide he necessary level o conrol o •

he air in and around he heare o operaions ha will ensurereedom o unimpeded manoeuvre or he res o he join orce.Tis primary requisie or adequae conrol o he air or hesuccess o surace operaions has been so deeply subsumed in

he psyche o Wesern miliary orces ha i does no seem oeaure as a requiremen anymore. Te ac ha Wesern orceshave always been provided he necessary level o conrol o he air or since World War II has led o a careless disregard, as

well as a loss o meaning and saus, o he need or conrol o he air ha demands an independen campaign o achieve andmainain a he required level. Since his paper is abou perennialchallenges acing air orces, he concep o conrol o he air isno being elaboraed urher.




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Second, wihin he conemporary specrum o conic, here is•

no mission, operaion or campaign ha can be conduced wihcomplee assurance o success i air power, wielded efecively

by an independen air orce, is no available o conribue. Suchconribuion can be in erms o IS beore, during and aer heconic, in aciviies ha shape he batlespace advanageously or he surace orces, in he exploiaion o he deerrencapabiliies o air power or in he provision o responsive,precise, proporionae and discriminaory atacks on ideniedarges.

Mos o he modern army and naval orces now operae inegralair arms in addiion o he air orce. A large orce like he UniedSaes miliary may nd his a viable siuaion and even necessary or operaional efeciveness. For smaller orces, operaing underconsrains o resources and personnel, he creaion o wha in efecare hree separae ‘air orces’ in order o have direc conrol over air

asses will creae a plehora o command and conrol issues which will derac rom he opimum employmen o scarce air asses.Operaing separae air arms or he army and navy will also creaeraining gaps and duplicae mainenance aciliies, wasing resourcesha could be gainully uilised elsewhere. More imporanly,he enire air power capabiliy o he small orce may no even

be docrinally aligned because o he inheren dispariies in he

operaing ehos o he hree Services. Tis could lead o a siuaion when he quanum o air power ha he small orce produces may no be sucien o mee acical and operaional requiremens. Tereis meri in smaller miliary orces sudying he prospec o creaing

join air capabiliies ha reside wihin he air orce o opimise heconribuion o air power o he overall miliary capabiliy.

Frankly, i is abou ime o end he debae regarding he need or

oherwise o have an independen air orce. Te need o he hour




67

is o ge on wih moulding he hree Services ino a seamless orceha can leverage of he srenghs o each individual Service onan as required basis. A seamless orce is he bes answer agains a

dispersed and ill-dened adversary and canno be ormed in heabsence o any one o he hree Services. I here is a shorall inany one, he seams will become eviden rom he ouside and candevelop ino ‘gaps’ ha will in urn be he cenres o graviy o beexploied by an inelligen enemy.

I has o be clearly undersood ha only an independen air orce will be able o provide he necessary robusness o he applicaion o

orce, lehal, nonlehal and conribuory, rom he hird dimensionin his riumvirae o miliary power. Wihin his sphere, air orcesace he seven perennial challenges ha, i no careully manipulaedand well conained, will derac rom he holisic efeciveness o airpower. Any efor direced owards deracing rom is independensaus can only diminish he air orce’s abiliy o conribuemeaningully o he join campaign, hereby direcly weakening he

miliary efor owards naional securiy.




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69

Conclusion

Air orces have evolved in he course o he pas cenury rom

being edgling conribuors o miliary orces ha can, and oendo, make he diference beween vicory and deea. Tis has

been achieved hrough a pragmaic combinaion o people andechnology. From he beginning, air power praciioners have beenpeople o exraordinarily propheic vision, who were able o developinnovaive and orward-looking conceps, had asue undersandingo he applicaion o each o air power’s residen capabiliies and

were dedicaed proessionals in heir employmen o air power.Troughou is hisory, air power has been aided by echnologicaladvancemens ha regularly improved is capabiliies by quanumleaps, making possible wha was only an impossible ‘pipedream’only a ew decades ago.

Te improvemen in air power capabiliies by a magniude madei imperaive or is praciioners o be proessional masers o air

power o ensure he opimisaion o is operaional applicaion andsraegic employmen. Te adequacy o such proessional masery is dependen on an incremenal growh hrough he lower rungs ahe echnical level and encompasses a ull career spanning decades.

Addiionally, in conemporary imes i requires an undersanding o he employmen o air power as par o a seamless orce o augmenor lead a join ask orce consising o a combinaion o land and

naval orces and oher governmen agencies in a mulinaionalenvironmen. Tis is no easily achieved.

While he achievemens o air orces—boh in war and in peace—are many and laudable, here are seven primary challenges o heirecacy ha have been idenied here. Tey are considered primary mainly because none o hem can be ully eliminaed now or inohe oreseeable uure and, hereore, will always have a derimenal

efec on he applicaion o air power.




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Individually, none o he challenges are o such a magniude as ocompleely overwhelm he eciency o an air orce. However,circumsanially, in combinaion wih each oher or as a collecive

whole, hey have he poenial o reduce he efeciveness o airorces o levels ha would border on heir being oally debiliaed.Tere is a real need or a clear undersanding o each one o hechallenges and or enunciaed miigaion sraegies ha ake inoaccoun he conex o he applicaion o air power. Tis has o bedone while acceping he ac ha none o he challenges can be ully miigaed or any lengh o ime. Tese challenges also impose wo

urher issues on he air campaign. Firs, each one o he challengeshas eiher direc or indirec sraegic dimensions ha manies a hehighes levels o poliico-miliary decision-making and, hereore,none o hem can be conained even emporarily a he purely operaional level. Tis siuaion carries he inheren risk o sraegicinererence a he execuion level o air campaigns, which has alwaysproven o be damaging o heir overall smooh conduc. Second,challenges, by heir very naure, end o impac operaions a hemos inopporune ime. Tereore, air campaign planners need ohave an in-deph undersanding and mus be cognisan o each oneo hem, rom he iniial planning sages hrough he execuion andhe successul culminaion o he campaign. Te air commandermus consanly be aware o he sraegic dimensions ha eachchallenge could hrow up and mus have he proessional masery omiigae heir efecs rom he sraegic o he acical level.

Te objecive o his monograph has been o highligh heconsrains and vulnerabiliies ha modern air orces have oconend wih on a daily basis while sriving o provide he naion

wih air power o he required qualiy and adequacy wheneverrequired. I is hoped ha i will also provide a beter undersandingo he complexiy o applying air power hrough he employmen o air orces. Governmens have, in he pas decade or so, increasingly

resored o he employmen o air orces as a responsive reacion o




71

emerging hreas. A imes such deploymens have been wihoua really clear vision regarding he objecives o be achieved and adeniion o he desired end-sae. Furher, even when he end-

sae is dened, even vaguely, he suiabiliy o air power o pursuea paricular course o acion o achieve i is no considered a heappropriae sraegic level. Air power’s responsiveness and low probabiliy o own casualies have become he mos imporancharacerisics rom a poliical perspecive. elegaing he plehorao oher capabiliies ha air orces can bring o bear across hespecrum o conic o secondary saus is derimenal in he long

erm o he undersanding o he value o air power. Air power is hemos exible and ecien miliary capabiliy and can aler and shapehe batlespace o one’s advanage provided he air campaign issucienly well planned in line wih he clearly laid down objecivesand aking ino accoun he perennial challenges ha ace air orces.

Air orces will coninue o mee he increasing demands beingplaced on hem o he bes o heir abiliy; his is an inheren

characer o orces o calibre. However, indiscriminae employmeno hese orces carries he danger ha relenless sreching o henie resources o he air orce will a some sage make i snap andputing i ogeher again may prove o be an impossible ask. I will

be pruden or air power proessionals o monior consanly heperennial challenges ha ace air orces and coninuously renehe miigaing sraegies ha could be pu in place so ha he plans

or heir employmen will be pragmaic and ye mee he naionalsecuriy requiremens.

A modern, auonomous, and horoughly rained Air Force inbeing a all imes will no alone be sufcien, bu wihou i herecan be no naional securiy.

General H. H. ‘Hap’ Arnold, USAAF

Commanding General, US Army Air Forces, 1941-1945

seven perennial challenges to air forces

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