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G.R. No. 93699 September 10, 1993

RAMON PRIETO, PACIFICO CANILLO, and WILFREDO AZUELA, petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AR and SONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., SAUDI SERVICES

and OPERATING COMPANY, LTD., and SAUDI ARABIAN MORRISON, respondents.Facts:

Ramon Prieto, Pacifico Canillo and Wilfredo Azuela were recruited by AR and Sons International Development Corporation(AR and Sons) for employment for a period of 24 months with Saudi Services and Operating Co., Ltd. (SSOC) in Saudi Arabia.

Their employment contract provided for the following compensation: Prieto-Mechanic - $370.00; Azuela - Mechanic - $370.00;Canillo - Clerk - $420.00. Later however, the respondent agency coerced them into signing another contract with Saudi ArabiaMorrison (SAM) without the knowledge and approval of POEA. The salaries under the second contract were much smaller.When they reached Jeddah, they were again asked to sign a contract which would further lower their salary. They refused tosign the same. They were confined in a small room and given spoiled food for about a month, after which, they wererepatriated. They filed a complaint for non payment of wages, illegal dismissal, illegal exaction of placement fees, illegalimposition of performance bond and substitution of contract against AR and Sons. In its Answer, AR and Sons claimed that thepetitioners misrepresented themselves to be qualified for the position they applied for. That it was only found out when theyarrived in Jeddah that they are not qualified. The respondent also claimed that in order to accommodate the petitioners, theywere transferred to SAM to work as assistant cooks, but were also not qualified. The LA ruled in favor of the petitioners, butNLRC reversed the same, contending that there was never an EER.

Issue:

Is there an employer employee relationship?

Held:Yes. The petitioners became an employee of SSOC and later SAM which are both represented by AR and Sons. It was admittedin the comment that the petitioners were hired and deployed abroad. The relationship is even more firmly supported by the

Agency Agreement between petitioners and AR and Sons.Since EER was established, the burden of proof of termination in termination cases lies with the employer. This burden wasnot discharged by private respondents. The petitioners were hired as mechanics and clerks, after presumably passing acorresponding trade test conducted by the recruitment agency. If AR and Sons felt that the petitioners were not qualified, theyshould have rejected the applications.

BPI Credit Corp vs NLRCG.R. 106027

July 25, 1994

Facts:

1. Benjamin Jovellanos is the Marketing Assistant of petitioner BPI Family Bank, Dagupan City branch. Ricardo Torioworked as Credit Investigator Appraiser in the same bank.

2. On July 8, 1987, a certain Alex Racimo executed an Affidavit linking Jovellanos and Torio to certain anomalies.

3. It was claimed that Racimo obtained a loan from the bank through his friend Torio.

4. Torio claimed that no charges will be collected except for the application fee of P500.

5. When the loan was released, Torio approached Racimo and asked for what he termed for the boys and mentioned

the name of Jovellanos.

6. That Racimo was only able to give P1,000 which appears to have been not taken well by Torio, who only walked away.

7. Later, Racimo was surprised to find out that he was being charged of a certain percentage of his loan.

8.

The AVP of BPI, Gaspar Antonio de los Santos brought the subjects as he and Jovellanos was on their way home from ameeting. He told Jovellanos about the affidavit but did not reveal the identity of the person who executed it.

9. Jovellanos was served a notice of preventive suspension thereafter.

10.Jovellanos asked that his suspension be lifted. He denied the charges against him. He also submitted an affidavit byRacimo stating that he was never personally approached by Jovellanos.

11.The suspension was however not ifted, intead, BPI formed a committee to investigate on previous clients about saidanomalous transactions.

12.Of the ten interviewed, only two confirmed that they were approached by some employees for some consideration.

13.Respondent Jovellanos was then served a Notice of Termination effective November 25, 1987 on the ground of wilfullbreach of trust. Jovellanos countered by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages. On September 5, 1990,the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Respondent Jovellanos.


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Issue:Was Jovellanos illegally dismissed?Held:Yes. Petitioner's submissions ignore the prosecution accorded by our Constitution to the worker's precious right tosecurity of tenure. Section 3 of its Article XIII mandates that the State shall afford full protection to labor and declaresthat all workers shall be entitled to security of tenure. Among the enunciated State policies are the promotion of socialjustice 11and a just and dynamic social order.12In contrast, the prerogative of management to dismiss a worker, as anaspect of property right, has never been endowed with a constitutional status.

we affirm the ruling of the NLRC that private respondent was dismissed; in violation of his right to procedural dueprocess. Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides the procedure for terminating a worker. Petitioner did not give fairnotice to private respondent of the charges against him. According to the petitioner, on August 12, 1987, its AssistantVice President de los Santos ". . . brought up the subject as he and Jovellanos were on their way home from a staffpresentation at about 9:45 p.m." He also ". . . confronted Jovellanos about the contents of the affidavit without naming gRacimo as its author." Such casualness and incompleteness of information cannot satisfy the requirements of dueprocess. Neither could the notice of preventive suspension served on private respondent on August 17, 1987 have anycurative effect. A reading of said notice will show that it required private respondent to explain his participation incertain ". . . reported irregular transactions pertaining to Real Estate Mortgage Loans of which you are CI-Appraiser . .." The lack of specificity or the generality of the charge speaks for itself. Worse still, petitioner thereafter conducted itsown ex parteinvestigation without the participation of the private respondent.

Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC

FACTS:Private respondent, Imelda Salazar, was employed by globed-mackay cable and radio corporation as general system analyst.Also employed by the petitioner was delfin saldivar and manager for technical support operations support with whom privaterespondent was allegedly very close.Sometime 1984, conducted an investigation on saldivars activities the report indicated that saldivar entered into a

partnership with a supplier of petitioner often recommended by saldivar. The report also disclosed that saldivar was inpossession of several air conditioned units owned by the company.

The report likewise showed that Salazar violated company regulations by involving into activities in conflict with thecompanys interest. Moreover, it showed that Salazar signed as a witness in the partnership entered by saldivar and also had

knowledge of the loss of the air conditioner units and failed to report to the employer.Consequently, Salazar was placed under preventive suspension and was asked for an explanation but instead of submitting an

explanation. Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal after petitioner notified her into writing that she wasdismissed for failure to refute and disprove these findings.Labor arbiter ordered petitioner to reinstate Salazar to her former and equivalent position and to ay full backwages

and other benefits plus P50.000 for moral damages. NLRC affirmed the decision with respect to reinstatement but limited thebackwages to two yerars.

ISSUEI. preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending

salazars investigation it does not signify that the company has adjudge the employee guilty of

the charges. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the companysproperty pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by theemployee.

II. Whether private respondent was illegally dismissed petitioner has predicated its

dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. While loss of confidence or breach of trust is a validground for termination, it must rest on some basis which must be convincingly established anemployee may not be dismissed on mere presumptions or suppositions.

III. Employees illegally dismissed entitled to reinstatement and full backwages- the intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is to

restore the employee of her status before she lost her job and to give her back the income lost during the period ofunemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her whole.

- The principle of strained relations cannot be applied indiscriminately. Here it has not been proven that the

position of the private respondent as system analyst may be characterized as a position of trust and confidencesuch that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer and employee

G.R. No. 201701 June 3, 2013


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UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC.,Petitioner,vs.MARIA RUBY M. RIVERA,Respondent.

Rivera was employed as its Area Activation Executive for Area 9 South in the cities of Cotabato and Davao. She was primarilytasked with managing the sales, distribution and promotional activities in her area and supervising Ventureslink International,Inc. (Ventureslink), a third party service provider for the companys activation projects. Sometime in 2007, Unilevers inter nal

auditor conducted a random audit and found out that there were fictitious billings and fabricated receipts supposedly fromVentureslink amounting to P11,200,000.00. . Upon further verification, Ventureslink reported that the fund deviations wereupon the instruction of Rivera.Unilever issued a show-cause notice to Rivera asking her to explain the following charges, to wit: a) Conversion andMisappropriation of Resources; b) Breach of Fiduciary Trust; c) Policy Breaches; and d) Integrity Issues.Responding through an email, dated July 16, 2007, Rivera admitted the fund diversions, but explained that such actions weremere resourceful utilization of budget because of the difficulty of procuring funds from the head office.5She insisted that thediverted funds were all utilized in the companys promotional ventures in her area of coverage. ,Unilever found Rivera guilty of serious breach of the companys Code of Business Principles causing her dismissal. Rivera

asked for reconsideration and requested Unilever to allow her to receive retirement benefits having served the company forfourteen (14) years already. Unilever denied her requestRivera filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal and other monetary claims against Unilever. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissedher complaint for lack of merit. NLRC partially granted Riveras prayer. In its Resolution, dated November 28, 2008, the NLRC

held that although she was legally dismissed from the service for a just cause, Unilever was guilty of violating the twin noticerequirement in labor cases.

Issues:A) Whether or not a validly dismissed?

B) Is Rivera entitled to an award of separation pay?Held:A) ) Rivera was not validly dismissed. the following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:

(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds fortermination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their writtenexplanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind ofassistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense.This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees

an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, anddecide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees tointelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts andcircumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge willnot suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or whichamong the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein theemployees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2)present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management.During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with theassistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by theparties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written

notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have beenconsidered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.29In this case, Unilever was not direct and specific in its first notice to Rivera. The words it used were couched in generalterms and were in no way informative of the charges against her that may result in her dismissal from employment.Evidently, there was a violation of her right to statutory due process warranting the payment of indemnity in the formof nominal damages.

B) As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article28215of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay.16In exceptional cases, however, the Court has grantedseparation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of "social justice" or on "equitable grounds." In bothinstances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moralcharacter of the employee.17In this case, Rivera was dismissed from work because she intentionally circumvented astrict company policy, manipulated another entity to carry out her instructions without the companys knowledgeand approval, and directed the diversion of funds, which she even admitted doing under the guise of shortening the
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laborious process of securing funds for promotional activities from the head office. These transgressions wereserious offenses that warranted her dismissal from employment and proved that her termination from work wasfor a just cause. Hence, she is not entitled to a separation pay. The policy of social justice is not intended tocountenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best, it may mitigate the penaltybut it certainly will not condone the offense.

PNB vs. CabansagDate: June 21, 2005Ponente: J. Panganiban

Facts:

Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist. While she was there, she looked for a job and eventually applied with theSingapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. PNB is a private banking corporation organized and existing underPhilippine laws. She was eventually employed and was issued an employment pass. In her job offer, it was stated, amongothers, that she was to be put on probation for 3 months and termination of her employment may be made by either partyafter 1 day notice while on probation, and 1 month notice or 1 month pay in lieu of notice upon confirmation. She accepted theterms and was issued an OEC by the POEA. She was commended for her good work. However, she was informed by Ruben

Tobias, the bank president, that she would have to resign in line with some cost cutting and realignment measures of thecompany. She refused but was informed by Tobias that if she does not resign, he will terminate her instead.

Issues:1. W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC has jurisdiction2. W/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR is the proper venue3. W/N Cabansag was illegally dismissed

Ruling:

1. Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relationsincluding termination disputes involving all workers, including OFWs. Here, Cabansag applied for and secured an OECfrom the POEA through the Philippine Embassy. The OEC authorized her working status in a foreign country and

entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Although she may been a direct hire at thecommencement of her employment, she became an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies uponcertification by the POEA. When she was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment certificate.

2. A migrant workerrefers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activityin a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker. Here,

Cabansag was a Filipino, not a legal resident of Singapore, and employed by petitioner in its branch office inSingapore. She is clearly an OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she has the option where to file her Complaint for illegaldismissal. She can either file at the Regional Arbitration Branch where she resides or the RAB where the employer issituated. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of propervenue.

3. The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular employee at the time of her

dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of employment had already ended. This ruling is inaccordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shallbe considered a regular employee. Indeed, petitioner recognized respondent as such at the time it dismissed her, bygiving her one months salary in lieu of a one-month notice, consistent with provision No. 6 of her employmentContract.

ANTONIO M. SERRANOVS.GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.FACTS:Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under aPOEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus$700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.


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On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon the assurance andrepresentation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months and 7days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th

paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3,Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.HELD:On the first issue.The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contracton the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the lawwas enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly therecruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWswherever they may be employed.

On the second issue.The answer is in the affirmative.To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security andparity.Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examinationreveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; andThird, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and otherOFWs to equal protection.The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of Section

10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Batong Buhay Goldmines Inc vs De la Serna 312 SCRA 22 (1999)

FACTS:

5 February 1987 - Elsie Rosalinda B. Ty, Antonia L. Mendelebar, Ma. Concepcion O. Reyes and 1,247 others filed acomplaint against Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. for:

1. Non-payment of their basic pay and allowances for the period of 6 July 1983 to 5 July 1984, inclusive, underWage Order No. 2

2. Non-payment of their basic pay and allowances for the period 16 June 1984 to 5 October 1986, inclusiveunder Wage Order No. 5

3. Non-payment of their salaries for the period 16 March 1986 to the present4. Non-payment of their 13th month pay for 1985, 1986 and 19875. Non-payment of their vacation and sick leave, and the compensatory leaves of mine site employees

6.

Non-payment of the salaries of employees who were placed on forced leaves since November, 1985 to thepresent, if this is not feasible, the affected employees be awarded corresponding separation pay. On 27 February 1987, the complainants filed a Motion for the issuance of an inspection authority. On 13 July 1987, the Labor Standards and Welfare Officers submitted their report recommending that an Order of

Compliance be issued directing respondent Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. to pay complainants' Elsie Rosalina Ty, et al(P4,818,746.40) by way of unpaid salaries of workers from March 16, 1987 to present, unpaid and ECOLA differentialsunder Wage Order Nos. 2 and 5 unpaid 13th months pay for 1985 and 1986, and unpaid ( sic)vacation/sick/compensatory leave benefits. And on 31 July 1987, the Regional Director1adopted the recommendationof the LSWOs and issued an order directing the respondent to pay the complainants of the said amount

On 31 July 1987, the Regional Director1adopted the recommendation of the LSWOs and issued an order directing therespondent to pay the complainants

When the respondent failed to post a cash/surety bond, and upon motion for the issuance of a writ of execution by thecomplainants, the Regional Director, on 14 September 1987 issued a writ of execution appointing Mr. John Espiridion


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C. Ramos as Special Sheriff and directing him to collect the amount, otherwise he has to execute this writ by attachingthe goods and chattels of BBGMI and not exempt from execution or in case of insufficiency thereof against the real orimmovable property of the respondent.

The Special Sheriff proceeded to execute the appealed Order on 17 September 1987 and seized three (3) units ofPeterbuilt trucks and then sold the same by public auction. Various materials and motor vehicles were also seized ondifferent dates and sold at public auction by said sheriff.

BBGMI appealed the Order dated July 31, 1987 of Regional Director Luna C. Piezas to respondent UndersecretaryDionisio de la Serna, contending that the Regional Director had no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether Regional Director has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the employees of BBGMI.HELD:The Regional Director has jurisdiction over the BBGMI employees who are the complainants. The subject labor standards caseof the petition arose from the visitorial and enforcement powers by the Regional Director of Department of Labor andEmployment (DOLE). Labor standards refers to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules and regulationsrelating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational,safety and health standards.4Labor standards cases are governed by Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.Art. 128 (b) Visitorial and enforcement powers

(b) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to order and administerafter due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code based on thefindings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and toissue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order, except in cases wherethe employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officers and raises issues which cannot be

resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the ordinary course of inspection.Respondent Undersecretary Dionisio C. Dela Serna, on the other hand, upheld the jurisdiction of Regional Director Luna CPiezas by relying on E.O. 111, to quote:

Considering therefore that there still exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties; that the caseinvolves violations of the labor standard provisions of the labor code; that the issues therein could be resolvedwithout considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection; and, if only to givemeaning and not render nugatory and meaningless the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Laborand Employment as provided by Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 2 of Executive Order No.111 which states:

The provisions of article 217 of this code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationshipof employer-employee still exists, the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorizedrepresentative shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance withthe labor standards provision of this Code based on the findings of the findings of labor regulation officers or

industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to theappropriate authority for the enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests thefindings of the labor regulations officers and raises issues which cannot be resolved without consideringevidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the ordinary course of inspection.

We agree with the complainants that the regional office a quohas jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant labor standardcase.The Court in reinforcing its conclusion that Regional Director has jurisdiction over labor standards cases, treated E.O. 111 as acurative statute, ruling as follows:E.O. No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986 or three (3) months after the promulgation of the Secretary of Labor's decisionupholding private respondents' salary differentials and ECOLAs on September 24, 1986. The amendment of the visitorial andenforcement powers of the Regional Director (Article 128(b)) by said E.O. 111 reflects the intention enunciated in PolicyInstructions Nos. 6 and 37 to empower the Regional Directors to resolve uncontested money claims in cases where anemployer-employee relationship still exists. This intention must be given weight and entitled to great respect

Republic Act 7730, the law governing the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Labor Secretary and his representativesreads:Art. 128 (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases wherethe relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorizedrepresentatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of thisCode and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrialsafety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall issuewrits of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where theemployer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported bydocumentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.

The present law, RA 7730, can be considered a curative statute to reinforce the conclusion that the Regional Director hasjurisdiction over the present labor standards case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is


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determined by the law in force when the action was commenced, unless a subsequent statute provides for its retroactiveapplication, as when it is a curative legislation.

Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. vs. NLRC[289 SCRA 86 (1998)]Facts:

Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of automotive tires, tubes and other rubber products.Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association (ALU-TUCP), private respondent, is an association of monthly salaried employees

of petitioner at its Marikina factory. Prior to the present controversy, all company factory workers in Marikina includingmembers of private respondent union worked from 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with a 30 minute paid on call lunch break. On 14 August 1992 petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based employees advising all its monthly salariedemployees in its Marikina Tire Plant, except those in the Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department working on shifts, achange in work schedule effective 14 September 1992 thus 7:45 A.M. 4:45 P.M. (Mon to Fri) 7:45 A.M. 11:45 P.M. (Sat).Coffee break time will be ten minutes only anytime between:9:30 A.M. 10:30 A.M. and 2:30 P.M. 3:30 P.M.Lunch break will be between: 12:00 NN 1:00 P.M. (Mon to Fri).Excluded from the above schedule are the Warehouse and QA employees who are on shifting. Their work and break timeschedules will be maintained as it is now.Since private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the work schedule and discontinuance of the 30-minute paidon call lunch break, it filed on behalf of its members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice,

discrimination and evasion of liability pursuant to the resolution of this Court the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint onthe ground that the change in the work schedule and the elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch break of the factory workersconstituted a valid exercise of management prerogative and that the new work schedule, break time and one-hour lunch breakdid not have the effect of diminishing the benefits granted to factory workers as the working time did not exceed eight (8)hours.Issue:

Whether or not the act of management in revising the work schedule of its employees and discarding their paid lunch breakconstitutive of unfair labor practice?SC Ruling:

The Court ruled that the revision of work schedule is a management prerogative and does not amount to unfair labor practicein discarding the paid lunch break.The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally on their employer. In the instant case petitioner, as theemployer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its business operations and its improved production.

It rationalizes that while the old work schedule included a 30-minute paid lunch break, the employees could be called upon todo jobs during that period as they were on call. Even if denominated as lunch break, this period could very well beconsidered as working time because the factory employees were required to work if necessary and were paid accordingly forworking.With the new work schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour lunch break without any interruption from theiremployer. For a full one-hour undisturbed lunch break, the employees can freely and effectively use this hour not only foreating but also for their rest and comfort which are conducive to more efficiency and better performance in their work.Since the employees are no longer required to work during this one-hour lunch break, there is no more need for them to becompensated for this period. The Court agrees with the Labor Arbiter that the new work schedule fully complies with thedaily work period of eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code. Besides, the new schedule applies to all employees inthe factory similarly situated whether they are union members or not.

Paloma vs. PhilippineAirlines

[G.R. No.148415, G.R. No.156764, July 14, 2008]

Facts:

Paloma worked with PAL for 35 years. PAL had become privatized before Paloma retired. PAL paid separation/retirement gratuity andaccrued vacation leave pay, evidenced by the Release and Quitclaim. Paloma claims that PAL excluded his 450-day accrued sickleave credits. He based his claim on EO 1077, which allows retiring government employees to commute, without limit, all his accruedvacation and sick leave credits. According to him, only 58 days of the 450-day credit, he had commuted only 58 days, leaving him abalance of 392 days of accrued sick leave credits for commutation.

Issue:

Considering that PAL has been privatized before his retirement, is EO1077 applicable to Paloma?


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Held:

PAL never ceased to be operated as a private corporation, and was not subjected to the Civil ServiceLaw.

The Court can allow that PAL, during the period material, was a government-controlled corporation in the sense that the GSIS owned acontrolling interest over its stocks. One stubborn fact, however, remains: Through the years, PAL functioned as a private corporation and

managed as such for profit. Their personnel were never considered government employees. It may perhaps not be amiss for the Court totake judicial notice of the fact that the civil service law and rules and regulations have not actually been made to apply to PAL and itsemployees. Of governing application to them was the Labor Code.

However, what governs Palomas entitlement to sick leave benefits and the computation and commutation of creditable benefits is notEO 1077, but PALs company policy on the matter which, took effect in1990.

RAUL C. COSARE VS. BROADCOM ASIA, INC., ET AL.

G.R. No. 201298. February 5, 2014

FACTS:

The case stems from a complaint4for constructive dismissal, illegal suspension and monetary claims filed with the National

Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC) by Cosare against the respondents.

Cosare claimed that sometime in April 1993, he was employed as a salesman by Arevalo, who was then in the business ofselling broadcast equipment needed by television networks and production houses. In December 2000, Arevalo set up thecompany Broadcom, still to continue the business of trading communication and broadcast equipment. Cosare was named anincorporator of Broadcom, having been assigned 100 shares of stock with par value of P1.00 per share. 5 In October 2001Cosare was promoted to the position of Assistant Vice President for Sales (AVP for Sales) and Head of the TechnicalCoordination, having a monthly basic net salary and average commissions of P18, 000.00 and P37, 000.00, respectively.

Sometime in 2003, Alex F. Abiog (Abiog) was appointed as Broadcoms Vice President for Sales and thus, became Cosares

immediate superior. On March 23, 2009, Cosare sent a confidential memo 7to Arevalo to inform him of the following anomalieswhich were allegedly being committed by Abiog against the company: (a) he failed to report to work on time, and would

immediately leave the office on the pretext of client visits; (b) he advised the clients of Broadcom to purchase camera unitsfrom its competitors, and received commissions therefor; (c) he shared in the under thetable dealings or confidentiacommissions which Broadcom extended to its clients personnel and engineers; and (d) he expressed his complaints anddisgust over Broadcoms uncompetitive salaries and wages and delay in the payment of other benefits, even in the presence of

office staff. Cosare ended his memo by clarifying that he was not interested in Abiogs position, but only wanted Arevalo toknow of the irregularities for the corporations sake.

Apparently, Arevalo failed to act on Cosares accusations. Cosare claimed that he was instead called for a meeting by Arevaloon March 25, 2009, wherein he was asked to tender his resignation in exchange for financial assistance in the amount of

P300, 000.00. Cosare refused to comply with the directive, as signified in a letter 9 dated March 26, 2009 which he sent toArevalo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cosare was constructively and illegally dismissed from employment by the respondentsHELD:YES.Given the circumstances, the Court agrees with Cosares claim of constructive and illegal dismissal.

Constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossibleunreasonable, or unlikely as when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear discrimination,insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee leaving the latter with no other option but toquit.In Dimagan v. Dacworks United, Incorporated,it was explained that:

The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employees position would have felt compelled to giveup his position under the circumstances. It is an act amounting to dismissal but is made to appear as if it were not.Constructive dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise. The law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of employeesin order to protect their rights and interests from the coercive acts of the employer.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/february2014/201298.pdfhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/february2014/201298.pdfhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/february2014/201298.pdf


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It is clear from the cited circumstances that the respondents already rejected Cosares continued involvement with the

company. Even their refusal to accept the explanation which Cosare tried to tender on April 2, 2009 further evidenced theresolve to deny Cosare of the opportunity to be heard prior to any decision on the termination of his employment. Therespondents allegedly refused acceptance of the explanation as it was filed beyond the mere 48hour period which theygranted to Cosare under the memo dated March 30, 2009. However, even this limitation was a flaw in the memo or notice toexplain which only further signified the respondents discrimination, disdain and insensibility towards Cosare, apparentlyresorted to by the respondents in order to deny their employee of the opportunity to fully explain his defenses and ultimately

retain his employment.G.R. No. 154213 August 23, 2012EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY, INC., Petitioners,vs.ESTANISLAO SURIO, FREDDIE PALGUIRAN, GRACIANO MORALES, HENRY CASTILLO, ARISTOTLE ARREOLA, ALEXANDERYGOT, ANRIQUE BA TTUNG, GREGORIO ALDOVINO, NARCISO FRIAS, VICTOR FLORES, SAMUEL MARCIAL, CARLITOPALGUIRAN, DUQUE VINLUAN, .JESUS MENDEGORIN, NEIL FLORES, ROMEO MANGALIAG, JOE GARFIN and SALESTINOSUSA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by petitioner Eastern MediterraneanMaritime Ltd., and manned and operated by petitioner Agemar Manning Agency, Inc.

While on board the vessel, the respondents had experienced delays in payment of their wages and in the remittance of

their allotments and they were not paid for extra work or extra overtime; they also complained of inadequateequipment and poor working conditions

When the vessel came to dock in Switzerland, authorities from the International Transport Federation (ITF) boardedand found out that indeed the respondents were receiving less than the prevailing wage rates negotiationsfollowed between ITF and the vessel owner which resulted in payment of differentials to the respondents and theirsubsequent repatriation to the Philippines

A few days after, however, Eastern Mediterranean filed at the POEA a complaint for disciplinary action against thenewly-repatriated respondents based on breach of discipline and for the reimbursement of wage increases

During pendency of the action, R.A. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15,1995, vesting with the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims arising out of employer-employee relationships involving overseas Filipino workers (jurisdiction was formerly exercised by POEA)

POEA dismissed the complaint appeal made with NLRC, which also dismissed, saying they had no jurisdiction petitioners filed pet. For certiorari and mandamus with SC which referred the same to CA CA dismissed ruling that

jurisdiction lay with POEA, to the exclusion of NLRC

ISSUE: WON the NLRC has jurisdiction to review on appeal cases decided by the POEA on matters pertaining to disciplinaryactions

HELD/RATIO:

Perusal of the POEA rules and the IRR of R.A. 8042 show that NLRC has no jurisdiction to review disciplinary casesdecided by the POEA; the matter of inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers in the POEABlacklist/Watchlist is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of NLRC

Although the passage of the new law transferred jurisdiction over money claims from POEA to the Labor Arbiter,POEA retained jurisdiction over disciplinary/administrative cases involving overseas workers

Petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of the POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC.Consequently, the CA, being correct on its conclusions, committed no error in upholding the NLRC [When Republic Act

No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect of cases decided by the POEA, the appellatejurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of Labor in accordance with his power of supervision and control underSection 38(1), Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987]

G.R. No. 109583 September 5, 1997

TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, ROSELLE CASTIGADOR, JOSEFINA MAMON, JENELYN CASA, PEACHY LANIOG,

VERDELINA BELGIRA, ELMA FLORES, RAMONA LITURCO, GRACE SABANDO, GLORIA PALMA, AVELYN ALVAREZ,

CANDELARIA NONO, NITA BUSTAMANTE, CYNTHIA ARANDILLO, SANDIE AGUILAR, DIGNA PANAGUITON, VERONICA

BAYOGOS, JULIANITA ARANADOR, LEONORA CABALLERO, NANCY BOLIVAR, NIMFA BUCOL, ZITA GALINDO, ESTELITA

BIOCOS, MARJORIE MACATE, RUBY SEPULVIDA, ROSALIE SONDIA, NORA MAQUILING, PAULINA CORDERO, LENIROSE


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ABANGAN, SELFA PALMA, ANTONIA NAVARRO, ELSIE PENARUBIA, IRMA SOBREQUIL, SONY JAMUAT, CLETA

MAYO,respondents.

Facts:From July 24 to Sep 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action scoured Ilo Ilo City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in HongKong. However, it failed to deploy the applicants, prompting the aggrieved complainants to institute a case against petitionerfor violation of Art. 32 and 34 of the Labor Code. On April 5, 1991, Labor Undersecretary Nievess Confesor found the complaintmeritorious as granted the prayer of private respondents for the return of the fees they paid. The license of Trans Action was

also cancelled. Petitioner filed a motion to temporarily lift the order of cancellation. Undersecretary Confesor provisionallylifted the cancellation pending the resolution of the MR filed by petitioner. However, when the MR was denied for lac of merit,the order revoking the license of petitioner was reinstated.Petitioner questioned the revocation, cotending that the Sec of Labor does not have the authority to revoe licenses. The poweris said to be lodged with the POEA.Issue: Can the Secretary of Labor revoke the license of petitioner?Held: Yes. The power to suspend or cancel and license or authority to recruit for overseas employment is vested upon theSecretary of Labor as provided under Art 35 of the Labor Law. This was already settled in several cases. It has been previouslyemphasized that "The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of theabove quoted provisions, among others.And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply thesesanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and placementactivities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement theprovisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the

POEA,6

"on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person,. . (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agencyor entity" for certain enumerated offenses

CECILIA T. MANESE, JULIETES E. CRUZ, AND EUFEMIO PEANO II VS. JOLLIBEE FOODS CORPORATION,TONY TAN CAKTIONG, ELIZABETH DELA CRUZ, DIVINA EVANGELISTA AND SYLVIA M. MARIANO (G.R. NO.170454, 11 OCT 2012)Petitioners were employees of respondent Jollibee Foods Corporation (Jollibee). At the time of their termination, petitionerManese, Cruz and Peano were managerial employees.Petitioners were part of the team tasked to open a new Jollibee branch at Festival Mall, Level 4, in Alabang,Muntinlupa City on December 12, 2000. However, the opening of the store was postponed thrice. In preparation for theopening of the new branch, petitioner Cruz requested the commissary for the delivery of the product called Chickenjoy.

When the opening was rescheduled to December 24, 2000, petitioner Cruz made another requisition for the deliveryof the food on December 23, 2000, but the opening date was again postponed to December 28, 2000. Petitioner Cruz did notcancel the request for delivery of the products.On December 23, 2000, 450 packs of Chickenjoy were delivered and petitioners placed them in the freezer. OnDecember 26, 2000, petitioner Cruz thawed the 450 packs of Chickenjoy (ten pieces in each pack), or 4,500 pieces ofChickenjoy, in time for the branch opening on December 28, 2000. The shelf life of the Chickenjoy is 25 days from the time it ismarinated; and, once thawed, it should be served on the third day. Its shelf life cannot go beyond three days from thawing.After that, the remaining Chickenjoy products are no longer served. Within the period provided for in the company policy,valid Chickenjoy rejects are usually returned to the commissary, while rejects which are unreturnable are wasted anddisposed of properly.The sales targets of for the first and second day were not reached.Sometime in January 2001, petitioner Cruz attempted to return 150 pieces of Chickenjoy rejects to the commissary,but the driver of the commissary refused to accept them due to its discoloration and deteriorated condition, and for fear that

the rejects may be charged against him. Thus, the Chickenjoy rejects were returned to the freezer.During the first week of March 2001, the team of petitioners had a meeting on what to do with the stored Chickenjoyrejects. They decided to soak and clean the Chickenjoy rejects in soda water and segregate the valid rejects from the wastes.On April 2, 2001, petitioner Cruz was transferred to Jollibee Shell South Luzon Tollway branch in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Shefailed to make the proper indorsement as the area manager directed her to report immediately to her new assignment.On May 3, 2001, the area manager, Evangelista visited the subject Jollibee branch at Festival Mall. Evangelista toldpetitioner Manese to dispose of the Chickenjoy rejects, but Manese replied that they be allowed to find a way to return them tothe Commissary.5On May 8, 2001, Evangelista required petitioners Cruz and Manese to submit an incident report on the Chickenjoyrejects. On May 10, 2001, a corporate audit was conducted to spot check the waste products. According to the audit, 2,130pieces of Chickenjoy rejects were declared wastage.On May 15, 2001, Evangelista issued a memorandum with a charge sheet,6 requiring petitioners to explain in writingwithin 48 hours from receipt why they should not be meted the appropriate penalty under the respondent company's Code of


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Discipline for extremely serious misconduct, gross negligence, product tampering, fraud or falsification of company recordsand insubordination in connection with their findings that 2,130 pieces of Chickenjoy rejects were kept inside the walk-infreezer, which could cause product contamination and threat to food safety.The petitioners and other store managers submitted their respective letters of explanation. Thereafter, respondents Investigating Committee conducted an administrative hearing on the incident.Subsequently, the Investigating Committee sent petitioners Cruz, Manese and Peano each received a Memorandum10on its administrative findings and decision, notifying each of their termination from employment due to loss of trust andconfidence.

Thereafter, petitioners Manese, Cruz and Peano filed a Complaint12 against respondents for illegal dismissal.On July 31, 2003, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision15 dismissing the complaints for illegal dismissal ofcomplainants Manese and Peano for want of merit. However, the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Cruz is resolved inher favor, against Jollibee. Jollibee was held liable for separation pay instead of reinstatement. The LA stated that at the timethe incident was discovered on May 3, 2001, Cruz was no longer working at Jollibee Festival Mall, Level 4, as she was alreadytransferred to a different Jollibee branch on April 2, 2001. Thus, the LA held that Cruz could not be held liable therefor; hence,her dismissal was illegal.Further, the LA held that petitioner Manese was not entitled to her money claims, particularly unpaid salary, sickleave for the period from May 16-31, 2001, cooperative savings, maternity benefit, mid-year bonus and retirement pay. The LAtook note of respondents' argument alleging that such benefits due her were not given because of a car loan given by thecompany which still has an outstanding balance. Even after computing the amount due her vis-a-vis the car loan balance, shewould still owe a balance of P14,262.76.Petitioners appealed the Decision of the LA to the NLRC. Respondents filed an Opposition to Appeal18 on October 10,

2003. NLRC issued a Resolution19 dismissing the appeal and affirming the LAs Decision in toto.20 However, the NLRC heldthatthe Labor Arbiter erred in ruling that petitioner Cruz was illegally dismissed as it found that she committed the offensesenumerated in paragraphs 1.1 to 1.5 and paragraph 2 of the Memorandum21 sent to her. Nevertheless, since respondentsfailed to interpose a timely appeal, the NLRC stated that it was constrained to affirm the findings and award of separation paygranted to petitioner Cruz by the Labor Arbiter.Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC.Petitioners appealed the Resolutions of the NLRC to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule65 of the Rules of Court.The CA rendered a Decision affirming the Resolutions of the NLRC with modification. The CA found that (1) petitionerCruz was legally dismissed in accordance with Article 282, par. (c) of the Labor Code; and (2) Jollibee is liable for the paymentof petitioner Manese's unpaid salary for the period of June 1-15, 2001, sick leave for the period of May 16-31, 2001, andcooperative savings.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, petitioners filed the present petition.ISSUE:(1) Whether the CA exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner Cruz.(2) Whether the CA erred in its appreciation of facts when it affirmed their dismissal on the ground of loss of trust andconfidence when the records show that they were dismissed based on the allegation of causing product contamination andgross negligence.RULING:

Failure to file a timely appeal by respondents caused the LAs ruling to become final and executory. In this case,respondents did not appeal from the decision of the LA who ruled that the dismissal of petitioner Cruz was illegal.Respondents only filed an Opposition to Appeal, which prayed for the reversal of the Labor Arbiters orders declaring as ille galthe dismissal of Cruz and directing payment of her separation pay. The NLRC stated that respondents' opposition could havebeen treated as an appeal, but it was filed only in October, way beyond the ten-day reglementary period within which anappeal may be filed. Although the NLRC found that Cruz was legally dismissed, it stated that it was constrained to affirm the

findings and award of separation pay granted to Cruz by the Labor Arbiter, since respondents failed to interpose a timelyappeal. Hence, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto. In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that theCourt of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it adjudged that petitioner Cruz was legally dismissed.Mere existence of a basis for the loss of trust and confidence justifies the dismissal of a managerial employee. The mereexistence of a basis for the loss of trust and confidence justifies the dismissal of the managerial employee because when anemployee accepts a promotion to a managerial position or to an office requiring full trust and confidence, such employee givesup some of the rigid guaranties available to ordinary workers.29 Infractions, which if committed by others would beoverlooked or condoned or penalties mitigated, may be visited with more severe disciplinary action. 30 Proof beyondreasonable doubt is not required provided there is a valid reason for the loss of trust and confidence, such as when theemployer has a reasonable ground to believe that the managerial employee concerned is responsible for the purportedmisconduct and the nature of his participation renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.31However, the right of the management to dismiss must be balanced against the managerial employees right to security of tenure which is not one of the guaranties he gives up.32 This Court has consistently ruled that managerial


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employees enjoy security of tenure and, although the standards for their dismissal are less stringent, the loss of trust andconfidence must be substantial and founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the managerial employeesseparation from the company.33As regards the monetary claims of petitioner Manese, the CA found that petitioner Manese had already earned thesame, except for the maternity leave. Manese's unpaid balance on her car loan cannot be set off against the monetary benefitsdue her. The Court has held in Nestl Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC38 that the employer's demand for payment of the employees'amortization on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of the cars to the employer, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It

involves debtor-creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations.39

MATLING INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. RICARDO COROSG.R. No. 157802 October 13, 2010

FACTS:After respondent Ricardo Coros dismissal by Matling as its Vice President for Finance and Administration, he filed onAugust 10, 2000 a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against Matling and some of its corporate officers inthe NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint, raising the groundamong others, that the complaint pertained to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission due to thecontroversy being intra-corporate inasmuch as the respondent was a member of Matlings Board of Directors aside from beingits Vice-President for Finance and Administration prior to his termination. The respondent opposed the petitioners motion todismiss, insisting that his status as a member of Matlings Board of Directors was doubtful, considering that he had not beenformally elected as such; that he did not own a single share of stock in Matling, considering that he had been made to sign inblank an undated indorsement of the certificate of stock he had been given in 1992; that Matling had taken back and retainedthe certificate of stock in its custody; and that even assuming that he had been a Director of Matling, he had been removed as

the Vice President for Finance and Administration, not as a Director, a fact that the notice of his termination dated April 10,2000 showed. On October 16, 2000, the Labor Arbiter granted the petitioners motion to dismiss, ruling that the respondentwas a corporate officer. On March 13, 2001, the NLRC set aside the dismissal, concluding that the respondents complaint forillegal dismissal was properly cognizable by the LA, not by the SEC, because he was not a corporate officer by virtue of hisposition in Matling, albeit high ranking and managerial, not being among the positions listed in Matlings Constitution and ByLaws. On motion for reconsideration, petitioners submitted a certified machine copies of Matlings Amended Articles of

Incorporation and By Laws to prove that the President of Matling was thereby granted "full power to create new offices andappoint the officers theretoand the minutes of special meeting held on June 7, 1999 by Matlings Board of Directors to provethat the respondent was, indeed, a Member of the Board of Directors. Nonetheless , the NLRC denied the petitioners motion forreconsideration. The petitioners elevated the issue to the CA by petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition forcertiorari and ruled that for a position to be considered as a corporate office, or, for that matter, for one to be considered

as a corporate officer, the position must, if not listed in the by-laws, have been created by the corporation's board of

directors, and the occupant thereof appointed or elected by the same board of directors or stockholders. Motion for

reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.ISSUE:Whether or not respondent was a corporate officer of Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation.RULING:Conformably with Section 25, a position must be expressly mentioned in the By-Laws in order to be considered as acorporate office. Thus, the creation of an office pursuant to or under a By-Law enabling provision is not enough to make aposition a corporate office. Guerrea v. Lezama, the first ruling on the matter, held that the only officers of a corporation werethose given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the By-Laws; the rest of the corporate officers could beconsidered only as employees or subordinate officials.It is relevant to state in this connection that the SEC, the primary agency administering the Corporation Code, adopted asimilar interpretation of Section 25 of the Corporation Code in its Opinion dated November 25, 1993, to wit:Thus, pursuant to Section 25 of the Corporation Code, whoever are the corporate officers enumerated in the by-laws are theexclusive Officers of the corporation and the Board has no power to create other Offices without amending first the corporateBy-laws. However, the Board may create appointive positions other than the positions of corporate Officers, but the personsoccupying such positions are not considered as corporate officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Corporation

Codeand are not empowered to exercise the functions of the corporate Officers, except those functions lawfully delegated tothem. Their functions and duties are to be determined by the Board of Directors/Trustees.Moreover, the Board of Directors of Matling could not validly delegate the power to create a corporate office to the Presidentin light of Section 25 of the Corporation Code requiring the Board of Directors itself to elect the corporate officers. Verily, thepower to elect the corporate officers was a discretionary power that the law exclusively vested in the Board of Directors, andcould not be delegated to subordinate officers or agents. The office of Vice President for Finance and Administration createdby Matlings President pursuant to By Law No. V was an ordinary, not a corporate, offi ce.To emphasize, the power to create new offices and the power to appoint the officers to occupy them vested by By-Law No. Vmerely allowed Matlings President to create non-corporate offices to be occupied by ordinary employees of Matling. Suchpowers were incidental to the Presidents duties as the executive head of Matling to assist him in the daily operations of thebusiness.

PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO., INC.,petitioner, vs.ARMANDO A. VINUYA, et al, respondents.


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G.R. No. 197528. September 5, 2012. BRION, J

FACTS: On March 5, 2008, respondent Vinuya et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitionerPert/CPM and its President with labor arbiter alleging among others that the agency deployed them to work as aluminiumfabricator/installer for the agencys principal,Modern Metal in Dubai, United Arab Emirates for a two-year employment whose contracts were approved by the POEAproviding for nine-hours working day, salary of 1,350 AED with overtime pay, food allowance, free and suitable housing

(four to a room), free transportation, free laundry and free medical and dental services. However, on April 2, 2007,Modern Metal gave respondents, except Era, appointment letters different from that of originally signed, increasing theiremployment terms and reducing their salaries and allowances and removing certain benefits. Further, the workingconditions were not as promised and they repeatedly complained with their agency about their predicament but to noavail. Respondents resigned from their job ci ting personal/family problems for their resignation except for Era whomentioned the real reason which is due to the company pol icy.

After several weeks, petitioner repatriated the respondent to the Philippines who shouldered their own airfare except forOrdovez and Enjambre. The agency countered that the respondents were not illegally dismissed alleging that therespondents voluntarily resigned from their employmentto seek a better paying job. The agency furthered alleged that the respondents even voluntarily signed affidavits ofquitclaim and release.

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint finding that the respondent voluntarily resigned from their job. Respondentappealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and found that the respondents were il legallydismissed. NLRC also pointed out that the signing of a different employment contract in Dubai is i llegal . ConsequentlyNLRC ordered the agency and the principal to pay, jointly and severally the respondents salary, placement fee, andexemplary damages. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC but modified theirjudgment adjusting the awards particularly the payment of their salaries in the light of the Courts ruling in Serranostriking down the clause in Section 10, paragraph 5 of the RA8042 which limits the entitlement of illegally dismissed OFW. The agency again moved for reconsideration reiteratingits earlier argument and questioned the applicability of the Serrano ruling because it is not yet final and effective butwas denied by the NLRC. Petitioner appealed with CA which upheld the decision of the NLRC finding the resignationletter as dubious.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Serrano ruling which declared the subject Section 10 of RA

8042 unconstitutional can be given retroactive application in the present case

Whether or not RA 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010 restoring the subject clause inSection 10 of RA 8042 being amendatory in nature can be applied retroactively

RULING: The SC held that the Serrano ruling can be given retroactive application as resolved in Yap vs.Thenamaris Ships Management in the interest of equity and that the Serrano ruling is an exemption to the doctrine ofoperative fact.

Moreover, the SC held that the amendment introduced by R.A. 10022 cannot be given retroactive effect not only becausethere is no express declaration of retroactivity of the law, but because the retroactive application will result in animpairment of right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of the Serrano Ruling. The SC reiterated that all statutesare to be construed as having

only a prospective application, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them retrospective effect areexpressly declared or are necessarily implied from the language used.

HELD: The petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution were AFFIRMED.Marsaman Manning Agency vs. NLRC

Marsaman Manning Agency vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 127195, August 25, 1999

R.A. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act)

Facts:

Private respondent Wilfredo T. Cajeras was hired by petitioner MARSAMAN, the local manning agent of petitioner


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DIAMANTIDES, as Chief Cook Steward on the MV Prigipos, owned and operated by DIAMANTIDES, for a contract period of ten(10) months. Cajeras started work on 8 August 1995, but less than two (2) months later, he was repatriated to the Philippinesallegedly by "mutual consent."

Private respondent Cajeras filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners with the NLRC alleging that he wasdismissed illegally, denying that his repatriation was by mutual consent, and asking for his unpaid wages, overtime pay,damages, and attorney's fees.

On 29 January 1996 Labor Arbiter resolved the dispute in favor of private respondent Cajeras ruling that the latter's dischargefrom the MV Prigipos allegedly by "mutual consent" was not proved by convincing evidence.

Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. On 16 September 1996 the NLRC affirmed the appealed findings and conclusions of theLabor Arbiter. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 12 November 1996.

Hence, the petition contending that, among other things, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering amonetary award beyond the maximum of three (3) months' salary for every year of service set by RA 8042.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling:

On the amount of salaries due private respondent, the rule has always been that an illegally dismissed worker whoseemployment is for a fixed period is entitled to payment of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of hisemployment. On 15 July 1995, RA 8042 otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" tookeffect, Sec. 10 of which provides:

Sec. 10. In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract,the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum,plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpiredterm whichever is less.

A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract

worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months' salary for everyyear of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of atleast one (1) year or more.

To follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is thelesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This iscontrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every partor word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in thestatue and to have used them advisedly.

The questioned Decision and Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are AFFIRMED.

People vs Capt. Gasacao (2005) G.R. 168449

Facts:Appellant was the Crewing Manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc., a licensed local manning agency, while his nephewand co-accused, Jose Gasacao, was the President. As the crewing manager, appellant's duties included receiving jobapplications, interviewing the applicants and informing them of the agency's requirement of payment of performance or cashbond prior to deployment.On August 4, 2000, appellant and Jose Gasacao were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment defined under Section 6paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, andpenalized under Section 7 (b) of the same law, before the RTC of Quezon City.Only the appellant was arrested while Jose Gasacao remained at large. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to theoffense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On March 5, 2001, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, rendered itsJoint Decision convicting appellant of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment in Crim. Case No. Q-00-94240 and acquitting him of thecharge in Crim. Case No. Q-00-94241.


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countenanced.

We find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scaleillegal recruitment. It was established that he promised overseas employment to five applicants, herein private complainants.He interviewed and required them to complete and submit documents purportedly needed for their employment. Although heinformed them that it is optional, he collected cash bonds and promised their deployment notwithstanding the proscriptionagainst its collection under Section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 8042 13 which state that:SEC. 60. Prohibition on Bonds and Deposits. In no case shall an employment agency require any bond or cash deposit from

the worker to guarantee performance under the contract or his/her repatriation.

Darvin v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125044

July 13, 1998

Facts:

Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed from a complaint ofone Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to recruit workers for abroad and canfacilitate the necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of this promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intendedfor US Visa and air fare.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.

Held:

Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:

...b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referrals,

contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any reason

person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in

recruitment and placement.

Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:

a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of the Labor Code, to be undertaken

by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be shown: (1) the personcharged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the said person does not have a license orauthority to do so.

In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to private respondent. It is notclear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private respondent work abroad. What is

established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.

By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more, can hardly qualify asrecruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to show that appellant engaged inrecruitment activities.

At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that appellant probably perpetratedthe crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt.When the Peoples evidence fail to indubitably prove the accuseds authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is

the Courts duty, and the accuseds right, to proclaim his innocence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is herebyACQUITTED on ground of reasonably doubt. The accused is ordered immediately released from her confinement.


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General Milling Corporation vs. Torres

Posted byshe lamsen

196 SCRA 215 [G.R No. 9366, April 22, 1991]

FACTS:Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General Milling as a sports consultant and assistant coach. He possessedan alien employment permit which was changed to pre-arranged employee by the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission

on Immigration and Deportation. GMC requested that Cones employment permit be changed to a full -fledged coach, whichwas contested by The Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines. Alleging that GMC failed to show that there is nocompetent person in the Philippines to do the coaching job. Secretary of Labor cancelled Cones employment permit.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cones Alien Employment Permit?

HELD:The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cones Alien Employment Permit. GMCs claim

that hiring of a foreign coach is an employers prerogative has no legal basis. Under Section 40 of the Labor Code, an employerseeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of labor.GMCs right to choose whom to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an employment permit. The Labor Code

empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the services of a person in the Philippines who is

competent, able and willing at the time of the application to perform the services for which an alien is desired. DOLE is th eagency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of availability of local workers.Bernardo et al v. NLRC & FEBTCGR No. 122917, 12 July 1999

Facts:The dismissed complainants, numbering 43, are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 byrespondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called"Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers". Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent FarEast Bank and Trust Company maintained that complainants were hired temporarily under a special employmentarrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank; thatcomplainant[s] were hired due to "pakiusap"; that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as aregular feature and integral part of their duties; that through the "pakiusap" of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this

task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without creating new positions as there is no position either in therespondent or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations.The LA &, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against petitioners, holding that they could not be deemed regular employees since theywere hired as an accommodation to the recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employments were covered byEmployment Contracts w/ special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, the terms of thecontract shall be the law between the parties.

Issue:Whether petitioners have become regular employees

Held:Only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence,their dismissal from employment was illegal. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled

Persons, indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees.

The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month, afterwhich the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract.Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writingby the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.

The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with Art. 80 LC w/c provides for the requisites in theemployment agreement between an employer who employs handicapped workers. Succeeding events and the enactment ofRA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons), 13however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37of them. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that
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Galvez (Galvez) as Captain; Joel Sales (Sales) as Chief Mate; Cristito Gruta (Gruta) as Chief Engineer; Danilo Arguelles(Arguelles) as Radio Operator; Renato Batayola (Batayola), Patricio Fresmillo (Fresmillo) and Jovy Noble (Noble) as AbleSeamen; Emilio Dominico (Dominico) and Benny Nilmao (Nilmao) as Oilers; and Jose Austral (Austral) as 2nd Engineer.

Sometime in January 2000, one of the vessels Oilers, Richard Abis (Abis), reported to GASLIs Office and Crewing Manager,

Elsa Montegrico (Montegrico), an alleged illegal activity being committed by respondents aboard the vessel. Abis revealed thatafter about four to five voyages a week, a substantial volume of fuel oil is unconsumed and stored in the vessels fuel tanks .However, Gruta would misdeclare it as consumed fuel in the Engineers Voyage Reports. Then, the saved fuel oil is siphoned

and sold to other vessels out at sea usually at nighttime. Respondents would then divide among themselves the proceeds of thesale.An investigation on the alleged pilferage was conducted. After audit and examination the auditor issued a Certification ofOverstatement of Fuel Oil Consumption9for M/T Dorothy Uno stating that for the period June 30, 1999 to February 15, 2000fuel oil consumption was overstated by 6,954.3 liters amounting to P74,737.86.On February 11, 2000, a formal complaint11for qualified theft was filed with the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group(CIDG) at Camp Crame against respondents.GASLI placed respondents under preventive suspension. After conducting administrative hearings, petitioners decided toterminate respondents from employment. Respondents (except Sales) were thus served with notices22informing them of theirtermination for serious misconduct, willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime or offense against their employer. Itappears that several other employees and crewmembers of GASLIs two other vessels were likewise suspended and

terminated from employment.A case for illegal dismissal was filed against GASLI. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision26finding the dismissal of all 21

complainants illegal. The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to reinstate complainants with full backwages and to pay theirmoney claims for unpaid salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, holiday and service incentive leavepay.NLRC found the appeal meritorious and ruled that petitioners presented sufficient evidence to show just causes forterminating complainants employment and compliance with due process. Accordingly, complainants dismissal was valid,

with the exception of Sales. CA however reinstated the ruling of the LA.

Issue: Were the respondents validly dismissed?Are repondents entitled to 13thmonth pay, unpaid salaries and salary differentials?

Held:1) Galvez and Gruta were validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence; there were no valid grounds for thedismissal of Arguelles, Batayola, Fresnillo, Noble, Dominico, Nilmao and

Austral.

The respondents were dismissed on the grounds of (i) serious misconduct, particularly in engaging in pilferage whilenavigating at sea, (ii) willful breach of the trust reposed by the company, and (iii) commission of a crime or offense againsttheir employer. After examination of the evidence presented, however, we find that petitioners failed to substantiateadequately the charges of pilferage against respondents. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions ofemployers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees.As for the second ground for respondents termination, which is loss of trust and confidence, distinction should be made

between managerial and rank and file employees. "[W]ith respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence, asground for valid dismissal, requires proof of involvement in the alleged events x x x [while for] managerial employees, themere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for hisdismissal."55In the case before us, Galvez, as the ship captain, is considered a managerial employee since his duties involve the governance,care and management of the vessel.56Gruta, as chief engineer, is also a managerial employee for he is tasked to take completecharge of the technical operations of the vessel.57As captain and as chief engineer, Galvez and Gruta perform functions vested

with authority to execute management policies and thereby hold positions of responsibility over the activities in the vessel.Indeed, their position requires the full trust and confidence of their employer for they are entrusted with the custody, handlingand care of company property and exercise authority over it.As for Arguelles, Batayola, Fresnillo, Noble, Dominico, Nilmao and Austral, proof of involvement in the loss of the vessels fuelas well as their participation in the alleged theft is required for they are ordinary rank and file employees. And as discussedabove, no substantial evidence exists in the records that would establish their participation in the offense charged. Thisrenders their dismissal illegal, thus, entitling them to reinstatement plus full backwages, inclusive of allowances and otherbenefits, computed from the time of their dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement.

2) Galvez and Gruta, as managerial employees, are not entitled to their claims for holiday pay, service incentive leave pay andpremium pay for holiday and restday. Article 82 of the Labor Code specifically excludes managerial employees from thecoverage of the law regarding conditions of employment which include hours of work, weekly rest periods, holidays, serviceincentive leaves and service charges.62
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