self: the history of a concept

SELF: THE HISTORY OF A CONCEPT LINDA VINEY’

Australian National University

Behavioral scientists, whatever their particular field of interest, find it necessary to formulate some description of the individuality of the behaving organism. The term most often used for this description is that of self. It is of interest, therefore, to trace the lineage of the current concepts of self. The frame of reference employed here is that of psychology; but, because psychology is, as yet, so youthful, contributions from other fields form a large part of the history. The concepts are examined chronologically, by date of publication, up to those of 1935. The time limit is arbitrary but convenient, based as it is on the cessation of publication of the Psychological Index in that year, and the consideration that the thirty years dating to the present may be appropriately described as the time span of modern psychology. The history, then, is concerned with the concepts of self developed in response to pre-twentieth century traditions, and offers no more than signposts to contemporary trends.

The growing importance of the self in psychology is shown by a survey of publications listed in the Psychological Index and the Psychological Abstracts to date. In no year, in its publication from 1894 to 1935, does the Index list more than five works under the heading of “Self.” The placement of this heading is interesting: “Self-consciousness” appeared in the early volumes in the category of “Conscious- ness” which changed in 1900 to “Cognition”; in 1910 “Self” was included under “Attitudes and Intellectual Activities”; while from 1915 “Self” was found in the section labelled “Social Functions of the Individual.” As these changes mirror the opening of fields in psychology, so they mirror the dominant interests of psychologists’ evolving concepts of self. Topics pertaining to the self listed in the Psycho- logical Abstracts (1927- ), on the other hand, show little change over the years. A random sample includes “Self-Acceptance”, “Self-Concept”, “Self-Attitude”, “Self-Consciousness”, “Self-Esteem”, “Self-Image”, “Self-Perception” and “Self- Rating.” Examination of the Abstracts indicates a striking increase in the number of research publications under the above headings. Commencing at the half century (1950), the incidence of publications listed has doubled three times in ten years.

EARLY CONCEPTS OF SELF The literature of classical Greece provides one of the first records of a concept

similar to that of self in the soul of Plato. The soul, as described in the Phaedo (50), as the initiator of activity, conscious, lifegiving and immaterial, later appeared as the center of the self psychology devised by Mary Calkins. Aristotle, following his master in the third century B.C., is described as “the first to make a systematic enquiry into the nature of the ego” (4, p.24). It is St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.), however, who provides the first glimpse of introspection into a personal self:

‘Now at the School of Behavioral Sciences, Macquarie University, North Ryde, New South Wales, Australia.

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. . . in the vaste court of memory. For there are present with me, heaven, earth, sea, and whatever I could t,hinlc on therein, besides what I have for- gotten. There also I meet with myself, and recall myself, and when, where, and what I have done, and under what feelings (6, p. 211).

The question of self-knowledge remained a rhetorical one for the few thinkers who raised their heads above the bog of religious dogma which stifled creative thought during the Middle Ages. It was the rapidly changing Europe of the seventeenth century which provided the stimulating background for the search for certainty reflected in the thought of Descartes, Hobbes and Locke.

Writers studying the contributions made by Rene Descartes to the construct of self have made much of the equation which he postulated between soul and self. Kehr (32) stressed the constructs which Descartes inherited from St. Augustine; for example, the explanation of will for both men necessitates the self. This will construct is common to many later authors, as is the centrality of the self in systems of cognition and consciousness, implicit in his examinations of the aphorism “I think, therefore I am. To let Descartes speak for himself:

I recognized that I was a substance whose essence or nature is to be conscious. . . . Thus this self, that is to say the soul, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even more easily known (20, p.50).

Across the English Channel Hobbes, in his Leviathan (24), was propounding an ethical code based on self-interest. G. W. Allport hailed this doctrine as a herald of social psychology, which “. . . foreshadows modern doctrines of self-esteem . . . and self-regard as pivotal motives’’ (2, p.14). Hobbes disagreed with some of Descartes’ notions as did Locke. These later writers placed more emphasis on the material of sensory experience. John Locke conceived of man as a “thinking in- telligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider self as itself”; and he added: “. . . i t is always as to our present sensations and perceptions; and by this everyone is to himself that which he calls self” (37, p.188). An essay concerning human understanding, first published in 1690, expanded this personal identity dependent on sense data to dependency on two concomitants of these data: consciousness and memory. “The self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which i t cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness” (37, p. 196). “Continued existence makes identity” (37, p.200). This description of the self foreshadowed that of William James.

British writers continued this examination of personal identity into the eight- eenth century. The sceptic Hume followed the argument of sense based identity through to a logical conclusion:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure, I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist (27, p.252).

This elusiveness of the empirical ego, as expressed in A treatise of human nature in 1740, remains an unsolved problem of measurement.

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To recross the Channel, Abb6 de Condillac was working as a philosopher within this trend of sensory empiricism. His notion of self was not only the sum of man’s perceptions but included that which holds them together. This approach is reminiscent of the earlier inclusion of memory. The influence of Locke is noticeable. “What we understand by this word ‘I’ seems to be only possible in a being who notices that in the present moment he is no longer what he has been” (17, p.43). From this reasoning Condillac concluded that his famous statue, with no memory, would have no self-concept.

The Critique of pure reason of Kant (31), first published in 1781, made a welcome contribution to self theory in concept formation rather than content, thus ful- filling the Germanic tradition. Kant introduced the distinction between the self as subject and object. The aspect of self treated by Locke and Hume, was seen as a unity attained through synthesis: the empirical self. He also conceived of the self as agent: the pure ego. Schopenhauer (1788-1860) later pursued the Kantian division further:

Selfishness contains . . . a knower and a known . . . the knower himself, as such, cannot be known . . . As the known in self-consciousness we find ex- clusively the will . . . all striving, wishing, shunning, hoping, fearing, loving, hating (56, p.412).

This emphasis on will as the content of the self makes an interesting comparison with the descriptions by St. Augustine and Descartes of that phenomenon in which the self is simply a necessary activating constituent.

NINETEENTH CENTURY DEFINITIONS After such specualtion a sample of early nineteenth century physiological

psychology, however macabre, adds a new aspect to the concept of self. Cabanis, famous for his study of the aftereffects of decapitation by guillotine, endeavored to give a description of the physiology and anatomy of the self in his Rapports d u physique et d u moral de l’homme in 1802. The historian Brett translated his concept of “le moi central” as “an epitome of all the separate centers which the nervous system creates. The apparent signs of life which might be exhibited by the decapi- tated body are then explained as activities of neural ganglia which are relatively independent of the brain or central ego” (48, p.549). The essence of self, then appears to the physical substrate of consciousness.

The physical representation of the self was also a subject of study for those arch-materialists, the phrenologists. Krech, in an article on the cortical localization of function, presented a delightful description of the organ of self-esteem by Spur- zeim in an English publication of 1815.

Gall first found this organ in a beggar: in examining the head of this person, he observed in the midst of the upper posterior part of the head an elevrttion which he had not before observed in so high a degree: he asked him the cause of his mendicity; and the beggar accused his pride as the cause of his mental state. . . . We have a great number of proofs as to this organ, and can establish its existence. Proud persons, and those who, alienated by pride, imagine themselves to be emperors, kings, ministers, generals, etc. possess it in a high degree (33, p.39).

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For all the laughter with which the reader may greet the phrenologists, their work does represent several important developments in the concept of self during the nineteenth century. Firstly, that self-esteem was considered to be a sufficiently important personality trait for analysis by phrenologists, who were essentially practical people, reflects contemporary thought in a wider scope than the more esoteric philosophical meditations. Secondly, some of the phrenological methods of investiagtion, such as the examination of the beggar, show the hallmarks of later speculations, for example McDougall (38). Thirdly, the examination of the “alienated,” observation of the malfunction of normal processes, is a technique used in many recent attempts to isolate the self-concept, for example Zucker (62).

Maine de Biran (39) is the first of the writers considered who might properly be described as a psychologist, albeit a mystic rather than a positivist and not regarded as a materialist by the standards of his own day. The self was the central pivot of his psychology. This self had not the substance of that of Descartes, nor was it simply the subject or object of Kant. He saw it as the self which causes and is aware that i t causes bodily movements, which creates language in order to handle ideas, which endures and recognizes itself in memory, which cultivates itself morally as well as intellectually by reflectively liberating itself from dependence on sense objects (23). Maine de Brian was also resposnible for the first attempted description of the development of self-awareness in infancy and childhood, that is the distinction between self and not-self as defined by Sullivan (58) and Piaget (49) within their twentieth century Zeitgeist.

The British associationists also had comments to make on the self. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) affords an appropriate example. His account of cognition, emotion and conation in terms of association principles is credible until his attempt to deal with the subject of these activities. In A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive he wrote:

There is something I call Myself, or, by another form of expression, my mind, which I consider as distinct from these sensations, thoughts etc. ; a something which I conceive not to be the thoughts, but the being that has the thoughts, and which I can conceive as existing for ever in a state of quiescence, without any thoughts at all. But what this being is, though it is myself, I have no knowledge, other than the series of its states of consciousness (46, p.40).

Before pursuing the vicissitudes of the concept of self through the turn of the century, it is appropriate to evaluate the meaning of the notions so far reviewed for behavioral scientists. The soul construct of Plato has been presented as a type of self, but what of its mystical aura, that indefinable something which distinguishes men from machines? Can this individuating aspect of the self be retained? Per- ception, memory and consciousness, witnessed through introspection, have all been cited as necessary concomitants of the self; but psychologists have experienced difficulties of criterion selection in attempts to validate the evidence of introspection. Can these difficulties be overcome? The distinction between knower and known does not solve this problem. The temptation to share the thought with David Hume that it is impossible to observe, much less, define the self, is great. Yet, strange as it may seem, it is the phrenologists who provide a few small rays


of hope a t this period in history: i t is they who pointed to the attitude to self as a significant aspect of man and (note the response of the beggar) a significant de- terminant of his behavior.

AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY Theories of personal identity have been described as falling into three cate-

gories : those concerned with relational phenomena, of which Hobbes’ is the earliest example soon to be followed by those of the early social psychologists; a search for the pure ego or element of consciousness, of which the treatise of Hume is a prime example; and the type of theory put forward by William James in which somatic data are shown to provide a basis for the sense of personal identity (52). James’ definition ran “. . . in its widest possible sense . . . a man’s self is the sum total of all that he can call his” (29, p.291). For him, the empirical self, or Rile, is made up of three constituents: the material self, or body, clothes and possessions; the social self or the opinions and knowledge a man’s fellows have of him; and the spiritual self, or inner being of abilities and traits. These are presided over by the personal unity of the pure ego, the I. Of the emotions these selves arouse, James wrote: ((lily own body and what ministers to its needs are thus the primitive object, in- stinctively determined, of my egotistic interests. Other objects may become interesting derivatively through association with any of these things” (29, p. 324). This is his self-regarding emotion. For the parallel actions James distinguished two main goals : self-seeking and self-estimation.

In reference to the topic of personal identity, The Principles of psychology provided a concise account of the history of the construct available a t the time of publication. The contribution of James to this notion reflected his formulations of the stream of consciousness and attention. “The sense of our own personal identity, then, is exactly like any one of our other perceptions of sameness among phenomena. It is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental respect, or on the continuity before the mind, of the phenomena compared’’ (29, p. 334). The originality of this contribution lies not in the newness of the concepts; dependence of identity on memory was a speculation of the fifth century and the- mechanics of this memory were the principles of association, similarity and con- tiguity of stimuli. It lies rather in James’ expression of this unity within the thinking, feeling, willing being of his psychology.

Other publications of this period tended, in the main, to be speculations based on bizarre hypothetical experiences of the self (for example, 36). One philosopher, however, made an important contribution to the theory of personal identity or self-consciousness. He was Josiah Royce, who emphasized the importance of the interplay of self-consciousness and social-consciousness for the development of identity in the individual. Royce’s contribution of the relativity of the self-concept, dependent on communication, was best expressed in this exerpt : ((. . . I am conscious of myself. . . as in relation to some real or ideal fellow, and apart from my consciousness of my fellows I have only secondary and derived states and habits of self- consciousness’’ (54, p.468).

Tawney continued to clarify the concept of consciousness as related to self. These two constructs had been examined and conjured with until they resembled

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the proverbial chicken and egg. Tawney distinguished two varieties of consciousness. “Self-consciousness in the first sense includes the empirical qualities of the body itself, together with a sense of externality to everything else within the range of perception and memory. Reflective self-consciousness is based upon the recog- nition that the self belongs in classes with other selves, that it is in a sense one with them, and that its experiences, therefore, possess a significance for them, and theirs for it” (59, p.596). These comments sound very like a description of the activities of the pure ego and the empiricaI ego of Immanuel Kant, or the “I” and the “me” of William James. A further distinction along these lines was attempted by Hughes using the terms self and ego, which by 1906 were, even then, the source of some confusion. “By self I would indicate always an idea present in the self-consciousness of any individual; by ego, the individual who is or can be self-conscious, who has or may have the sense of self and not-self” (26, p.289). This formulation was amplified by Cunningham who equated consciousness of self with the “contrast between the self and its other . . . the other . . . being the entire content of consciousness” (18, p.112).

Definitions of consciousness of self with no definition of self create an unfor- tunate impression of early twentieth century psychology, for some attempts a t definition were made. This one, a product of the prevalent instinct theory of behavior, is particularly interesting.

The self . . . is the psychic corerspondent of a complex instinctive system which throbs as a unit, but which is not differentiated by the excessive or empathic partial activity of any part of the complex system; i t is the mass of ‘feeling’ so called by many; it is that part of the moment’s conscious experience which we are warranted in describing as the field of inattention (40, p.112).

This throbbing, pulsating mass of inattention was a much more dynamic self than had hitherto been expressed.

MARY CALKINS

Miss Calkins may be described as the most enthusiastic of self psychologists. She published A Jirst book in psychology in 1909. It covered the topics usual for a general survey of that time, but the treatment of each was carefully tailored to fit the framework of a self psychology. Calkins’ description of this framework was as follows: “Psychology has been defined as science of the self-being-conscious; and we rightly therefore ask for a further description, even if only a preliminary description of the self. The conscious of each one of us is not a reality which is merely inferred to exist: it is immediately experienced as possessed of at least four fundamental characters. The self as immediately experienced is (1) relatively persistent . . . (2) complex . . . (3) a unique, and irreplaceable self . . . and (4) related to objects which are either personal or impersonal.” (10, pp. 2-3). Curtis reviewed Calkins’ book in 1915, and had this comment to make on the centrality of self in any psychology. “Of the three ways in which Miss Calkins claims self psychology as superior to other forms of psychology, naturalness is an inferiority in a science rather than a superiority; self psychology is not effective in the sense that i t en-


courages further work; and finally self has not been made thoroughly conisstent”

Calkins wrote many pleas for consideration of the self as well as her reviews of “the self in recent psychology’’ (11, 12, 13, 14). She failed to attract much support Indeed, she attacked the problem like a suffragette and attracted fellow women. emancipists to her flag, like Preble (51) who tried to test the claim that the fundamental concept of psychology is the self by examining her own associations to a definition of psychology. It is noticeable, however, that the 1918 committee of the American Psychological Association which prepared a list of definitions of psychological terms included Calkins as a member. The resulting definitions of the term “Self” are worth quoting in their entirety:

(19, p. 98).

a. b.

itself. c. d.

e.

f.

A conscious individual, characterized by persistence and by change. A mind regarded as consciously distinguishing itself from what is not

A conscious individual in union with an organized body. The individual regarded as a progressively organized system of mental

The subject of consciousness (or experiencer) accompanying any complex

A special complex or integration of content in which the body as object

functions and processes.

of mental processes attentively experienced.

of consciousness is fundamental ( 5 , p.93).

PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF SELF A philosophical self trend developing at this time grew from the themes found

in the work of the classical introspectionists, such as Brentano (9). His idea of there always being a consciousness of self in experience, whatever the intentionality, greatly influenced the work of Edmund Husserl. This initiator of the phenomenological approach conceived of the transcendental ego as “inseparable from the individual’s process of life, the center of identity, and made up of every act and percept” (28, p.65). While he saw the totality of being as it appears for the “I” which contemplates it, Husserl claimed that postulation of a source of intentionality is not necessary. The ego is nothing more than the intentional acts located in experience. J Ime recently, Sartre (55) has extended this idea to reduce the status of the “I” of “I think, therefore I am” to that of merely another object of the environment. Another follower of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty (45), has stressed the body-subject aspect of the self, with emphasis on the physical basis of this unity and the role it plays in perception and interpersonal communication.

The phenomenological approach had great appeal, also, for the Gestaltists. Kohler (34), like Jlerleau-Ponty, equated the experienced self and the body percept, and went on to discard the other acting but not perceived self. The Gestalt view of the whole of the self plus the environment as the world of the individual is exemplified by this quotation. “Self may be regarded as an assimilative system that feeds and grows on its experiences, which in turn are determined by the whole of which i t is a part. This makes intelligable the effect of environment on the formation of character and personality” (30, p. 54).

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SOCIAL CONCEPTS OF SELF George Herbert Mead provided the major contribution to the relational

concept of self, with an emphasis similar to that of Royce. Mead saw the self as the result of a social process, an outcome of a long evolutionary process which must be approached empirically. For him, the self comprised both the ‘‘I”, the spon- taneous principle of action and impulse, and the “me”, the attitudes of others organized and taken over by the self. “The self, as that which can be object to itself, is essentially a social structure and arises in social experience” (43, p.140). In more detail: “. . . any self is a social self, but it is restricted to the group whose roles it assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds itself entering into the larger society and maintaining itself there” (42, p.276). This object self is part of the reflexive self, and the whole is distinguished by the characteristic of self-consciousness. The predominantly cognitive and social self construct of Mead exercized a strong influence on later work not only of social psychologists and sociologists but also personality theorists.

The approach of William McDougall was, in many ways, similar. His system was based on the principles of instincts and sentiments in man, the sentiment being non-inherent, organized collections of “emotional dispositions centered about the idea of some object” (38, p. 137). At the apex of the pyramid of these sentiments came the self-regarding sentiment, which developed as “essentially a social process, one that is dependent throughout upon the complex interactions between the individual and the organized society to which he belongs’’ (38, pp.150-151). “There are two principal varieties of the self-regarding sentiment, which we may distinguish by the names of ‘pride’ and ‘self-respect’ ” (38, p.165). Both involve positive and negative self-feeling. Here was the fulfillment of the promise of Hobbes of the prime motive in social psychology.

EMPIRICAL APPROACHES The theory of self in psychology by 1935 might be seen as suggesting that

there is evidence for an active, functioning, conscious self, distinct from the bodily organism but closely related to it (1). The main problems for psychologists appeared to fall in three categories: the nature of the self, its relation to the organism, and its relation to the environment (47). Psychology, however, is an empirical endeavor; so what of the activities of the measurers and experimenters up to 1935?

Probably the first empirical attack on the problem of self was that of E.B. Titchener (60) in an attempt to validate the self theory of Mary Calkins. Titchener defined three ways in which the self might become conscious: a class of mental processes may carry self-meaning, the self may be felt in body sensations, or it may be inherent in all conscious experience, He asked his students to introspect for any trace of consciousness of self; and from their answers, which did not fall into the above categories, he concluded that psychology may not be defined as the science of the self.

This type of experiment was very different in method from modern test of hypotheses concerning the self. One of the most favored techniques today is that of self-rating, probably first applied by J. McKeen Cattell in his studies of American men of science (15). An early experiment along these lines is worth reporting in

SELF: THE HISTORY O F A CONCEPT 357

detail: that of Cogan, Conklin and Hollingworth (16) published in 1915. They took a group of twenty five female subjects known to each other and asked them to rank themselves and other members of the group on each of nine traits a t intervals of from two weeks to a month. The trait names are an interesting reflection of the times: neatness, intelligence, humor, conceit, beauty, vulgarity, snobbishness, refinement and sociability. A battery of tests was given and other data collected and compared. Conclusions drawn from the experiment included that errors of self-estimation were greater than those of friends’ judgements, that with possession of desirable traits judgement of those traits was good but with non-desirable traits it was poor, and that scores on intelligence tests and self-estimates of intelligence tended to agree. Here was the beginning of the collection of evidence rather than mere speculation about the self.

It is interesting to note that a t least one anthropological study of the self- concept was carried out. Todd (61), in 1916 examined the idea of self in primitive races such as the Kafirs, the Rlaoris and the Eskimoes, and discovered that for these people it included the name of the individual, his shadow and his property. He claimed that the concept of self may be subject to consciousness of the group self; and, observing that in the primitive individual the self-concept is not modifiable, Todd also claimed that it was not modifiable in Englishmen until after the Industrial Revolution.

Many self studies followed. In Germany, for example, the self-concept of the delinquent child was examined (57), and the accuracy of self-judgments was eval- uated (44). In Japan, Kubo (35) gauged self-concepts through adjective check- lists. In the United States, experiments in self-estimation showed signs of becoming as popular as they are today (for example, 25). The work of Bernreuter (8) on self-sufficiency, and that of Baumgartner, measuring self-respect (7), testify to the variety of attempts a t empirical analysis of the self by the year 1935.

EVOLUTION: THE SELF TODAY The 1918 list of definitions of self, with its emphasis on the element of con-

sciousness, invites comparison with a more recent publication. In their dictionary, which appeared forty years later, English and English (21) have distinguished seven definitions of the term :

a. b. The living being. c.

d. e.

f .

g.

All that a person is tempted to call me or mine.

That aspect or part of the person or organism which carries out psychic,

The complex organization of characteristics making up the individual. The individual subject revealed to his own observation as the identical

and persistent center of psychological processes. The ideas, feelings and strivings, that are recognized, interpreted, and

valued by the individual as his own. A sentiment composed not only of a special object of experience, the

psychological me . . ., but of the feelings and strivings organized about that object (21, p.485).

mental or psychological acts.

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By way of summary the concepts detailed in this history are related to these present day notions of self. The first of the definitions involves the connotations of me and mine, and is currently represented by G. W. Allport’s (3) concept of the proprium. William James’ influence is apparent here, as elsewhere. The next concept is that of the self as the total organism. It is the self of Maslow’s (41) self-actualizing tendency. Of the writers reviewed, only J. S. Mill seems to have employed a similarly broad definition. The third definition is of the self as agent. Kant and Schopenhauer emphasized this aspect of the self, as well as its object character. Mary Calkins, too, leaned heavily on this concept. It is not, however, popular in psychology today.

The remaining four definitions tend to focus more on the self as object. Few writers have chosen to view self as the organization of characteristics making up the individual, or as the personality, although recently it is possible to name Heinz Hartmann (22) as doing so. A combination of agent and object in the self as the center of psychological processes is apparent in the works of writers as early as Descartes. This concept is the essence of Husserl’s transcendental ego and the body-subject self of Merleau-Ponty, as well as the self dynamism of Harry Stack Sullivan. The last two definitions listed by English and English are currently the most popular in psychology, and are relatively recent developments. The first of these is the self as ideas, feelings and strivings recognized as one’s own, like the self-concept of Carl Rogers (53) which may owe much to St. Augustine as well as later writers. It is, however, the notion of self-regard, deriving from approaches as varied as those of Spurzheim, James and McDougall, that dominates the large number of self publications currently listed in the Psychological Abstracts.

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self: the history of a concept

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